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SOURCE BOOK FOR SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

BY

KIMBALL YOUNG

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*"We, who are many, are severally
members one of another"*—ST. PAUL



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PREFACE

The purpose of this book is to present pertinent materials in the field of social psychology which are not easily available either for the student or for the general reader. No apology need be offered for particular aspects of the field which perhaps have been omitted or slighted. The present compilation with its accompanying interpretation is selective rather than exhaustive. If this work assists in bringing about a better understanding of social behavior, it will have well served its purpose; if it stimulates genuine thinking upon current problems of social control, it will have doubly fulfilled its function.

It is the point of view of the writer that the objective consideration of social phenomena should be rigidly separated from the techniques involved in social reform. The selections I have made are designed to indicate the nature of social behavior rather than to suggest how any individual should conduct himself in his social relations. Only when we approach the phenomena of social living in a scientific fashion, discovering how men interact on each other; only when we see how profoundly important culture patterns are in determining the course of our social and individual life organizations; only when we observe how men react to leaders, to crowd situations, to the spread of opinion or to propaganda—only, then, after patient investigation—should we venture to suggest changes in the social order. *Savoir pour prévoir* is the motto.

The work of the past twenty years in social science and social psychology has left us with a great heritage for the analysis of practical situations. The writer has deep interest in the application of our knowledge to the end of effecting personal adjustments in society. But from the angle of method, the therapy should be laid aside entirely until the diagnosis is as complete as we can make it. So it is with the data of social psychology. Not until we understand how social behavior in its wider scope goes on, should we attempt to control it. Any other procedure is faulty and leads to the same social and

personal magic-making which marks the primitive mind, whether ancient or contemporary.

The writer wishes to acknowledge the courtesy of the large number of publishers and authors who have so kindly permitted their materials to be included in this volume. In the case of each selection due credit is given both to the writer and to the publisher. Special mention should be made of the fact that the selections from F. H. Allport, R. W. Emerson, J. A. Puffer and H. C. Warren are used by permission of, and by arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company, the authorized publishers. The writer is in greatest debt to Magdalene Anderson Young for her unselfish concentration on the task of completing this volume. He also wishes to thank his colleagues who have given generously of their time and advice. The drawings for the volume were made through the kindness of Mr. A. O. Dahlberg. A debt of gratitude is due Miss Katharine D. Lumpkin for the patient reading of the manuscript and to Miss Charlotte Fisk for assistance in the arduous task of correcting the proof.

University of Wisconsin
May 11, 1927

KIMBALL YOUNG

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION: ON THE USES OF THIS VOLUME.	xxv
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PART ONE

The General Features of Social Behavior

CHAPTER I: THE FALSE SEPARATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL	
FROM THE GROUP	3
I. Introduction	3
II. Materials	4
1. INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY: AN ORGANIC PROCESS. <i>C. H. Cooley</i>	4
III. Class Assignments	6
IV. Selected Bibliography	6
CHAPTER II: EVOLUTION AND PRE-HUMAN SOCIAL LIFE 8	
I. Introduction	8
II. Materials	10
A. <i>The Evolution of Social Behavior</i>	10
2. THE EVOLUTION OF MAN'S HIGHER FUNCTIONS.	
<i>H. H. Batden</i>	10
B. <i>Pre-Human Social Life</i>	17
3. THE VOICES OF PIGEONS AS A MEANS OF SOCIAL CONTROL. <i>W. Craig</i>	17
4. SOCIAL CONDITIONING TO SEX BEHAVIOR AMONG PIGEONS. <i>C. O. Whitman</i>	20
5. SOCIAL LIFE AMONG APES. <i>W. Köhler</i>	20
III. Class Assignments	28
IV. Selected Bibliography	28
CHAPTER III: HUMAN SOCIAL LIFE 30	
I. Introduction	30
II. Materials	32

6. THE SOCIAL GROUP AS AN EVOLUTIONARY UNIT. <i>B. W. Kunkel</i>	32
7. HUMAN ASSOCIATION AND HUMAN NATURE. <i>F. S. Chapin</i>	35
8. GREGARIOUSNESS AS A BASIS OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR. <i>W. Trotter</i>	37
9. STIMULATION RANGES AND REACTION AREAS. <i>F. H. Giddings</i>	43
10. SOCIAL ATTITUDES IN COMPETITION. <i>I. J. Whittemore</i>	45
11. PARTICIPATION AND SOCIAL ASSIMILATION. <i>R. E. Park and W. I. Thomas</i>	47
III. Class Assignments	53
IV. Selected Bibliography	54
CHAPTER IV: TYPES OF SOCIAL GROUPINGS,	56
I. Introduction	56
II. Materials	59
12. THE NATURE OF THE IN-GROUP. <i>W. G. Sumner</i> . .	59
13. TYPES OF HUMAN ASSOCIATIONS. <i>C. A. Ellwood</i> . .	61
14. THE NATURE OF THE PRIMARY IN-GROUP. <i>C. H. Cooley</i>	63
15. THE BOYS' GANG AS A PRIMARY GROUP. <i>J. A. Puffer</i> .	65
16. CONGENIAL GROUPS (Some case studies)	69
17. CHANGES IN GROUP LIFE UNDER MODERN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY. <i>C. H. Cooley</i>	72
III. Class Assignments	75
IV. Selected Bibliography	76
CHAPTER V: GROUP CONTROLS AND CULTURE STANDARDS	78
I. Introduction	78
II. Materials	81
A. <i>Group Controls and How They Arise</i>	81
18. CRISES AND THE RISE OF GROUP CONTROLS. <i>W. I. Thomas</i>	81
19. CRISES AND THE REVELATION OF CONSCIOUS MOTIVES. <i>J. M. Williams</i>	83
20. THE HALIFAX DISASTER: AN INTENSIVE CRISIS. <i>S. H. Prince</i>	84

CONTENTS

ix

B. <i>Group Standards of Conduct</i>	95
21. THE DEFINITION OF THE SITUATION BY THE GROUP. <i>W. I. Thomas</i>	95
22. THE FOLKWAYS AND THE MORES. <i>W. G. Sumner</i>	97
23. AUTHORITY AND CUSTOM. <i>J. Dewey</i> and <i>J. H. Tufts</i>	104
24. THE NATURE AND PLACE OF RITUAL IN THE GROUP. <i>W. G. Sumner</i>	106
25. THE TENDENCY TO FORMALISM IN SOCIETY. <i>C. H. Cooley</i>	108
26. CUSTOM AND LAW. <i>L. T. Hobhouse</i>	111
27. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MORES AND FORMAL LAW. <i>W. G. Sumner</i>	112
C. <i>The Rationalization of Culture (Ethos)</i>	112
28. ETHOS OR CULTURE STANDARDS. <i>W. G. Sumner</i>	112
29. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OCCIDENTAL ETHOS. <i>W. Sombart</i>	113
III. Class Assignments	116
IV. Selected Bibliography	117

PART TWO

The Psychological Foundations of Social Behavior

CHAPTER VI: ORIGINAL NATURE, INDIVIDUAL DIFFER-	
ENCES, AND INTELLIGENCE	121
I. Introduction	121
II. Materials	123
A. <i>Original Nature and Individual Differences</i>	123
30. THE ORIGINAL TENDENCIES OF MAN. <i>E. L. Thorndike</i>	123
31. THE INHERITANCE OF MENTAL ABILITY. <i>V. L. Kellogg</i>	127
32. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AMONG HUMAN BEINGS. <i>R. E. Turner</i>	129
33. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN PHYSICAL FORM AND THEIR BEARING ON PERSONALITY. <i>E. Kretschmer</i>	132

B. <i>Physical Basis of Intelligence</i>	139
34. ORGANIC BASIS OF LEARNING AND INTELLIGENCE. <i>C. J. Herrick</i>	139
35. SOME DEFINITIONS OF INTELLIGENCE. <i>E. L. Thorndike, L. M. Terman and S. S. Colvin</i>	140
36. INTELLIGENCE AS A MECHANISM. <i>J. Peterson</i>	141
III. Class Asssignments	143
IV. Selected Bibliography	144
CHAPTER VII: INSTINCTIVE NATURE	146
I. Introduction	146
II. Materials	149
37. THE NATURE OF FUNDAMENTAL DRIVES. <i>E. C. Tolman</i>	149
38. THE NATURE OF "DRIVES." <i>R. S. Woodworth</i>	150
39. THE THREE-FOLD HIERARCHY OF ACTIVITIES. <i>E. C. Tolman</i>	151
40. INSTINCT AS PURPOSE OF THE ORGANISM. <i>W. McDougall</i>	154
41. WARREN'S LIST OF HUMAN INSTINCTS AND INSTINCTIVE TENDENCIES. <i>H. C. Warren</i>	155
42. THORNDIKE'S LIST OF ORIGINAL RESPONSE PATTERNS. <i>E. L. Thorndike</i>	156
43. INSTINCTS AS PREPOTENT REFLEXES. <i>F. H. Allport</i>	157
44. WHAT INSTINCT IS AND WHAT IT IS NOT. <i>L. L. Bernard</i>	158
45. MISUSE OF THE TERM "INSTINCT" IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. <i>L. L. Bernard</i>	161
46. TYPES OF INSTINCTS LISTED BY 500 WRITERS. <i>L. L. Bernard</i>	165
47. ARE INSTINCTS DATA OR HYPOTHESES? <i>E. Faris</i>	166
48. DESIRE, NOT INSTINCT, AS A FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT. <i>K. Dunlap</i>	168
III. Class Assignments	173
IV. Selected Bibliography	174
CHAPTER VIII: EMOTIONS, FEELINGS, AND WILL	176
I. Introduction	176
II. Materials	179

CONTENTS

xi

49. THE NATURE OF EMOTION. <i>S. S. Brierley</i>	179
50. THE STIMULI WHICH EVOKE THE FUNDAMENTAL EMOTIONS. <i>J. B. Watson</i>	180
51. THE FEELINGS. <i>E. S. Bogardus</i>	182
52. A CLASSIFICATION OF TEMPERAMENTS. <i>H. C. Warren</i> .	184
53. TEMPERAMENT AND ITS RELATION TO INSTINCTIVE TRENDS AND TO COMPENSATORY MECHANISMS, ETC. <i>J. W. Bridges</i>	185
54. TYPES OF VOLITIONAL ORGANIZATION. <i>J. E. Downey</i> .	190
III. Class Assignments	191
IV. Selected Bibliography	192
CHAPTER IX: THE ACQUIRED NATURE OF MAN: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS	
I. Introduction	193
II. Materials	194
55. THE INDIVIDUAL AND ENVIRONMENT FROM A PHYSIO- LOGICAL STANDPOINT. <i>C. M. Child</i>	194
56. THE NEED OF STUDYING THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE TO- TAL SITUATION. <i>M. P. Follett</i>	206
57. THE INTEGRATION PRINCIPLE. <i>K. Young</i>	208
58. INTELLIGENCE AND LEARNING. <i>J. Peterson</i>	210
III. Class Assignments	217
IV. Selected Bibliography	217
CHAPTER X: SOME MECHANISMS OF HABIT FORMATION .	
I. Introduction	219
II. Materials	220
59. THE MECHANISM OF THE CONDITIONED RESPONSE. <i>W. H. Burnham</i>	220
60. THE RELATION OF THE CONDITIONED RESPONSE TO HABIT FORMATION. <i>J. B. Watson</i>	225
61. THE MODIFICATION OF INSTINCTIVE TENDENCIES. <i>W. S. Hunter</i>	226
62. HIERARCHY OF HABIT FORMATION IN SOCIAL EVOLU- TION. <i>L. L. Bernard</i>	239
III. Class Assignments	240
IV. Selected Bibliography	241

CHAPTER XI: IMITATION, SUGGESTION, SYMPATHY, AND	
COMPENSATION	242
I. Introduction	242
II. Materials	244
63. IMITATIVE ACTION. <i>E. L. Thorndike</i>	244
64. LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF THE TERM IMITATION. <i>J. Peterson</i>	245
65. IMITATION AND THE CONDITIONED RESPONSE. <i>G. Humphrey</i>	253
66. SUGGESTION. <i>W. McDougall</i>	256
67. THE LAW OF SUGGESTION. <i>W. D. Scott</i>	257
68. SUGGESTIBILITY AS AN ATTITUDE. <i>J. J. B. Morgan</i>	258
69. SYMPATHY AND THE CONDITIONED RESPONSE. <i>G. Humphrey</i>	261
70. COMPENSATION. <i>G. Stanley Hall</i>	264
III. Class Assignments	265
IV. Selected Bibliography	267
CHAPTER XII: THE MENTAL PROCESSES AND SOCIAL BE-	
HAVIOR	268
I. Introduction	268
II. Materials	271
A. <i>The Conscious Processes</i>	271
71. ATTENTION AND BEHAVIOR. <i>K. Young</i>	271
72. THE FUNCTIONING OF IDEAS IN SOCIAL GROUPS. <i>J. Peterson</i>	275
73. MENTAL TRAITS AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR. <i>W. I. Thomas</i>	279
74. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. <i>F. H. Lund</i>	281
B. <i>The Unconscious Processes</i>	284
75. THE PLACE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS FUNCTIONS IN BEHAVIOR. <i>E. Bleuler</i>	284
C. <i>The Dual Types of Associative Thought</i>	286
76. TWO TYPES OF ASSOCIATIVE THINKING: AUTISTIC AND REALISTIC. <i>F. L. Wells</i>	286
77. AUTISTIC (DEREISTIC) THINKING. <i>E. Bleuler</i>	288

CONTENTS

xiii

D.	<i>Rationalization and Social Behavior</i>	290
	78. RATIONALIZATION AND MOTIVATION. <i>F. L. Wells .</i>	290
	79. RATIONALIZATION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR. <i>J. H. Robinson</i>	292
III.	Class Assignments	295
IV.	Selected Bibliography	296

PART THREE

Personality and Social Behavior

CHAPTER XIII:	PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL CONDITIONING	299
I.	Introduction	299
II.	Materials	303
	A. <i>The Growth of Personality</i>	303
	80. THE CONDITIONED RESPONSE AND PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT. <i>W. H. Burnham</i>	303
	81. THE INFLUENCE OF OTHER SELVES ON THE RISE OF SELF. <i>G. Stanley Hall</i>	308
	82. THE CHILD-PARENT RELATIONSHIP: AUTHORITY AND INFERIORITY COMPLEX. <i>W. A. White</i>	311
	83. IDENTIFICATION AND DRAMATIZATION. <i>G. Stanley Hall</i>	317
	84. THE PLAY LIFE OF CHILDREN. <i>M. T. Whitley</i>	318
	85. THE COMPENSATORY NATURE OF PLAY. <i>E. S. Robinson</i>	323
	B. <i>Language and Personality Development</i>	328
	86. PERSONALITY, SOCIABILITY, AND LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT. <i>C. H. Cooley</i>	328
	87. THE LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHILD. <i>N. Niemeyer</i>	333
	88. LANGUAGE AND THE RISE OF SELF-FEELING. <i>C. H. Cooley</i>	335
	89. NAMES AND THE CHILD'S IMAGE OF HIMSELF. <i>G. Stanley Hall</i>	338
	90. THOUGHT, SYMBOLS, AND LANGUAGE. <i>G. H. Mead</i>	341
III.	Class Assignments	346
IV.	Selected Bibliography	347

CHAPTER XIV: PERSONALITY AND FAMILY AND GROUP

PRESSURES	349
I. Introduction	349
II. Materials	350
91. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONALITY IN THE BOY. <i>E. R. Groves</i>	350
92. CHILDHOOD FIXATION ON MOTHER AND SISTERS. (A Case Study)	351
93. EARLY SOCIAL CONDITIONING: BUILDING OF SOCIAL ATTITUDES. (A Case Study)	354
94. PERSONALITY AND INFERIORITY CONFLICT. (A Case Study)	359
95. THE COURSE OF PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT IN THE GIRL <i>E. R. Groves</i>	361
96. THE EFFECT OF AN UNSATISFACTORY MOTHER-DAUGHTER RELATIONSHIP UPON THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PERSONALITY. <i>J. Taft</i>	363
97. THE PROJECTION OF PARENTS' AMBITIONS UPON THEIR CHILDREN. <i>K. Young</i>	374
III. Class Assignments	379
IV. Selected Bibliography	379

CHAPTER XV: THE ADULT PERSONALITY AND THEORIES OF

PERSONALITY	382
I. Introduction	382
II. Materials	384
A. <i>Adult Personality</i>	384
98. THE RELATION OF OCCUPATIONS TO HABITS AND VALUES. <i>J. Dewey</i>	384
99. THE EFFECT OF OCCUPATIONS ON ATTITUDES AND VALUES. <i>E. S. Bogardus</i>	385
100. THE SOCIAL SELF AND SOCIAL CONTACT. <i>W. James</i>	388
101. WIT AND HUMOR IN THE PERSONALITY. <i>E. S. Bogardus</i>	389
102. DESIRE FOR SOCIAL APPROVAL: A MAINSPRING OF THE SELF. <i>W. Williams</i>	394
103. PERSONALITY AS ORGANIZED AROUND FUNDAMENTAL WISHES. <i>W. I. Thomas</i>	395

CONTENTS

xv

104. THREE TYPES OF PERSONALITY ORGANIZATION: EXTROVERT, INTROVERT, AND AMBIVERT. <i>E. S. Conklin</i>	398
B. <i>Theories of Personality</i>	402
105. A PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF PERSONALITY. <i>J. W. Bridges</i>	402
106. A PSYCHIATRIC INTERPRETATION OF PERSONALITY. <i>A. J. Rosanoff</i>	406
107. A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF PERSONALITY. <i>E. W. Burgess</i>	409
III. Class Assignments	413
IV. Selected Bibliography	414

PART FOUR

Social Attitudes and the Subjective Environment

CHAPTER XVI: PERSONALITY AND THE MENTAL PATTERNS OF THE GROUP		419
I. Introduction		419
II. Materials		421
108. THE TYPES OF ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH WE LIVE. <i>L. L. Bernard</i>		421
109. THE UNCONSCIOUS NATURE OF MENTAL PATTERNS. <i>R. L. Finney</i>		425
110. UNCONSCIOUS SOCIAL IMAGES. <i>T. Burrow</i>		428
111. SOCIAL ATTITUDES. <i>E. Faris</i>		431
112. ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS. <i>R. E. Park</i>		434
113. STEREOTYPES AS SUBJECTIVE ENVIRONMENT. <i>W. Lippmann</i>		435
114. HOW STEREOTYPES ARISE. <i>A. D. Weeks</i>		440
115. STEREOTYPES AND ERRORS IN JUDGMENT OF CHARACTER. <i>S. A. Rice</i>		443
116. THE POWER OF STEREOTYPED WORDS. <i>A. Lipsky</i>		449
117. SLOGANS AND CATCHWORDS IN SOCIAL CONTROL. <i>F. E. Lumley</i>		451

III. Class Assignments	458
IV. Selected Bibliography	459
CHAPTER XVII: MYTHS AND LEGENDS AS PART OF SUBJECTIVE ENVIRONMENT	
I. Introduction	461
II. Materials	464
118. MYTH AND SOCIAL IMAGINATION. <i>G. Sorcl</i>	464
119. HOW MYTHS AND LEGENDS ARISE AND BECOME MENTAL PATTERNS. <i>F. van Langenhove</i>	466
120. THE DEVIL BABY: AN INSTANCE OF MYTH-MAKING IN RELATION TO GOSSIP AND SOCIAL CONTROL. <i>J. Addams</i>	473
121. HISTORICAL LEGENDS AND NATIONAL HERO-WORSHIP. <i>A. B. Hart</i>	474
122. THE MILLENIAL HOPE AND CRISIS. <i>S. J. Case</i>	478
III. Class Assignments	479
IV. Selected Bibliography	480
CHAPTER XVIII: PREJUDICE: AN OUTGROWTH OF SUBJECTIVE ENVIRONMENT	
I. Introduction	482
II. Materials	483
A. <i>General Features of Prejudice</i>	483
123. ANTIPATHY AND PREJUDICE. <i>J. Royce</i>	483
124. SOCIAL DISTANCE AND PREJUDICE. <i>R. E. Park</i> . .	485
125. PREJUDICE AS SOCIAL DISTANCE. <i>E. S. Bogardus</i> .	488
126. THE MEASUREMENT OF SOCIAL DISTANCE. <i>E. S. Bogardus</i>	490
B. <i>Race Prejudice</i>	493
127. THE NATURE OF RACE PREJUDICE. <i>E. F. Young</i> .	493
128. RACE PREJUDICE AS DEFENSE MECHANISM. <i>R. E. Park</i>	494
129. RACE PREJUDICE AND CASTE FEELING. <i>W. I. Thomas</i>	497
130. RACE PREJUDICE AS A FORM OF ISOLATION. <i>W. I. Thomas</i>	499

CONTENTS

xvii

131. COLOR PREJUDICE AND RACE PREJUDICE. <i>Lord Olivier</i>	501
III. Class Assignments	502
IV. Selected Bibliography	503
CHAPTER XIX: TYPES OF PREJUDICE	505
I. Introduction	505
II. Materials	507
A. <i>The Negro Prejudice</i>	507
132. THE NEGRO PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES. <i>F. Boas</i>	507
133. UNDERSTANDING THE NEGRO. <i>W. D. Wallis</i>	510
134. NEGRO-WHITE ATTITUDES. <i>Chicago Commission on Race Relations</i>	512
135. THE STORY OF A MAN HUNT IN THE DELTA. <i>B. A. Ratliff</i>	518
136. LYNCHING AND EMOTIONAL RELEASE. <i>F. Tannenbaum</i>	524
137. NEGRO-WHITE RELATIONS IN JAMAICA	525
B. <i>Some Other Forms of Prejudice</i>	528
138. WHITE-AMERICAN INDIAN PREJUDICE	528
139. THE JEW AND AMERICAN SOCIAL ATTITUDES	533
140. RELIGIOUS PREJUDICE	535
III. Class Assignments	538
IV. Selected Bibliography	539

PART FIVE

Leadership and Prestige in Social Behavior

CHAPTER XX: CHARACTERISTICS OF LEADERSHIP AND PRESTIGE	543
I. Introduction	543
II. Materials	545
A. <i>General Features of Leadership</i>	545
141. THE INFLUENCE OF LEADERSHIP. <i>W. I. Thomas</i>	545

142. THE SOCIOLOGY OF AUTHORITY. <i>L. Stein</i> . . .	546
143. USES OF GREAT MEN. <i>R. W. Emerson</i> . . .	549
144. MENTAL TRAITS OF LEADERS. <i>C. H. Cooley</i> . . .	551
145. CRISIS AND TYPES OF LEADERSHIP. <i>E. B. Gowin</i> . . .	552
146. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES: EXECUTIVES COMPARED WITH AVERAGE MEN. <i>E. B. Gowin</i>	553
147. LEADERSHIP AND GROUP ACTIVITY. <i>F. S. Chapin</i> . . .	557
B. <i>Prestige and the Masses</i>	559
148. HISTORY OF THE WORD "PRESTIGE." <i>L. Leopold</i> . . .	559
149. KINDS OF PRESTIGE. <i>G. Le Bon</i>	560
150. LEADERSHIP AND THE MASSES. <i>C. H. Cooley</i> . . .	562
151. THE VENERATION OF LEADERS. <i>R. Michels</i> . . .	564
152. LEADERSHIP AND THE AROUSAL OF FAITH. <i>G. Le Bon</i>	566
153. LEADERS AS A SYMBOLIC PROJECTION OF AN IDEAL. <i>C. H. Cooley</i>	568
154. EMULATION AND IDENTIFICATION IN LEADERSHIP. <i>C. H. Cooley</i>	569
155. LEADERS AS CARRIERS OF AUTHORITY. <i>A. Lipsky</i> . . .	569
156. THE INFLUENCE OF PRESTIGE-BEARERS ON CON- VENTION. <i>C. Mackay</i>	570
157. LEADERSHIP AND THE POWER OF WORDS. <i>A. Majid</i> . . .	572
158. WHY THE MASSES LIKE THE MYSTICAL WRITERS. <i>O. L. Schwarz</i>	574
159. PRESTIGE AND PERSUASION. <i>W. Macpherson</i> . . .	575
160. IMPORTANT FACTORS IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PUB- LIC SPEAKING. <i>H. A. Overstreet</i>	577
III. Class Assignments	578
IV. Selected Bibliography	579
CHAPTER XXI: TYPES OF LEADERSHIP AND PRESTIGE . . .	582
I. Introduction	582
II. Materials	584
161. THE ORIGINS OF LEADERSHIP IN RUDIMENTARY SO- CIETY. <i>E. Mumford</i>	584
162. SOME INSTANCES OF LEADERSHIP IN PRIMITIVE SO- CETIES. <i>H. Webster</i>	587

CONTENTS

xix

163. SOME TYPES OF LEADERS. <i>O. L. Schwarz</i>	592
164. THE QUALITIES OF POLITICAL LEADERS. <i>C. E. Merriam</i>	595
165. THE AMERICAN POLITICAL BOSS: TYPES AND METHODS OF CONTROL. <i>F. R. Kent</i>	597
166. THE REFORMER TYPE OF POLITICAL LEADER: A STUDY IN CONTRASTS. <i>W. B. Munro</i>	601
167. TWO TYPES OF RADICAL LEADERSHIP: EMOTIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC. <i>W. T. Root</i>	606
168. RADICALISM, LEADERS, AND SOCIAL REFORM. <i>S. A. Rice</i>	611
169. THE INVENTOR AND SOCIETY. <i>J. M. Baldwin</i>	615
170. INVENTION AND CULTURE. <i>A. A. Goldenweiser</i>	616
III. Class Assignments	621
IV. Selected Bibliography	622

PART SIX

Collective Behavior

CHAPTER XXII: CHARACTERISTICS OF CROWD BEHAVIOR	627
I. Introduction	627
II. Materials	629
A. <i>The Psychology of Crowd Behavior</i>	629
171. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF SOCIAL AGGREGATIONS. <i>M. Bentley</i>	629
172. THE TYPES OF CROWDS AND COMMON PREDISPOSITIONS. <i>H. Clark</i>	641
173. THE INFLUENCE OF THE GROUP UPON MENTAL PROCESSES. <i>F. H. Allport</i>	643
174. THE POWER OF WORDS AND CROWD BEHAVIOR. <i>G. Le Bon</i>	647
175. SOME PRIMITIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF A CROWD. <i>W. D. Scott</i>	648
176. THE CROWD AND UNCONSCIOUS ATTITUDES AND STEREOTYPES. <i>E. D. Martin</i>	650
177. EGOTISM, HATRED, AND ABSOLUTISM IN CROWD THOUGHT AND BEHAVIOR. <i>E. D. Martin</i>	651

178. SENSE OF UNIVERSALITY, SOCIAL PROJECTION, AND MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE CROWD SITUATION. <i>F. H. Allport</i>	655
179. METHODS OF SWAYING A CROWD. <i>W. D. Scott</i>	657
B. <i>Crowd Behavior and Fashion</i>	658
180. FASHIONS AS A FORM OF CROWD BEHAVIOR. <i>P. Clerget</i>	658
181. FASHION IN PHRASES. <i>C. Mackay</i>	661
III. Class Assignments	664
IV. Selected Bibliography	666
CHAPTER XXIII: THE AUDIENCE	668
I. Introduction	668
II. Materials	669
182. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN THE AUDIENCE. <i>C. H. Woolbert</i>	669
183. THE CLASS-ROOM AUDIENCE. <i>C. R. Griffith</i>	679
184. THE EFFECT OF AN AUDIENCE ON A MENTAL-MOTOR PROCESS. <i>L. E. Travis</i>	684
185. HOW TO RENDER AN AUDIENCE SUGGESTIBLE. <i>W. D. Scott</i>	685
186. ADVANTAGES AND METHODS OF CHANGING AN AUDIENCE INTO A CROWD. <i>W. D. Scott</i>	688
III. Class Assignments	690
IV. Selected Bibliography	692
CHAPTER XXIV: MENTAL EPIDEMICS	693
I. Introduction	693
II. Materials	696
187. MENTAL EPIDEMICS, SUGGESTION, AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION. <i>B. Sidis</i>	696
188. A LIST OF EUROPEAN MENTAL EPIDEMICS: MEDIEVAL AND MODERN. <i>B. Sidis</i>	698
189. MEDIEVAL MENTAL EPIDEMICS: CRUSADES AND FLAGELLANTS. <i>B. Sidis</i>	698
190. THE WITCHCRAFT MANIA. <i>B. Sidis</i>	700
191. THE TULIPOMANIA IN HOLLAND: 17TH CENTURY. <i>C. Mackay</i>	702

CONTENTS

xxi

192. THE MISSISSIPPI BUBBLE <i>C. Mackay</i>	704
193. CROWD BEHAVIOR AND RELIGIOUS SUPERSTITION. <i>K. Anthony</i>	709
194. CROWD BEHAVIOR IN RELIGIOUS REVIVALS. <i>C. C. Cleveland</i>	710
195. THE CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH. <i>R. G. Cleland</i>	712
196. THE FLORIDA LAND BOOM. <i>G. M. Shelby</i>	714
197. PROPHYLACTICS AGAINST MOB MIND. <i>E. A. Ross</i>	718
III. Class Assignments	720
IV. Selected Bibliography	721
CHAPTER XXV: THE NATURE OF PUBLIC OPINION	722
I. Introduction	722
II. Materials	725
198. THE PUBLIC AND PUBLIC OPINION. <i>M. Ginsberg</i>	725
199. THE NATURE OF PUBLIC OPINION. <i>R. E. Park</i> and <i>E. W. Burgess</i>	726
200. PUBLIC OPINION AS A COLLECTION OF INDIVIDUAL OPINIONS. <i>F. H. Allport</i>	734
201. PUBLIC OPINION AS A RATIONAL JUDGMENT OF A GROUP. <i>C. A. Ellwood</i>	734
202. PUBLIC OPINION AS FORMULATED BY THE FEW. <i>W. B. Munro</i>	736
203. PUBLIC OPINION AND COMMUNITY INTERESTS. <i>J. Bryce</i>	737
204. POLITICAL ASPECTS OF PUBLIC OPINION. <i>J. Bryce</i>	738
205. DIFFERENTIA OF PUBLIC OPINION. <i>W. J. Shepard</i>	739
206. CROWD ATTITUDES AND PUBLIC OPINION. <i>F. H. All- port</i>	745
207. FACTS, DISCUSSION, AND CONSENSUS OF OPINION. <i>A. D. Sheffield</i>	746
208. ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN PUBLIC OPINION. <i>E. S. Bogardus</i>	749
209. PUBLIC OPINION AND CRIME. <i>E. H. Sutherland</i>	752
III. Class Assignments	753
IV. Selected Bibliography	754

CHAPTER XXVI: THE ORGANS OF PUBLIC OPINION . . .	756
I. Introduction	756
II. Materials	757
210. ORGANS OF PUBLIC OPINION. <i>W. J. Shepard</i> . . .	757
211. THE CONTENT OF NEWSPAPERS: 1899. <i>D. F. Wilcox</i> .	765
212. THE CONTENT OF NEWSPAPERS: 1924	772
213. THE LACK OF PROFESSIONAL CONSCIENCE IN NEWS- PAPERS. <i>A. H. Lloyd</i>	773
214. NEWSPAPERS AND PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY. <i>J. Bryce</i> .	774
215. NEWSPAPERS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES. <i>J. Bryce</i>	775
216. THE PRESTIGE OF THE NEWSPAPER. <i>J. Bryce</i> . . .	775
217. THE NEED FOR AN ENDOWED PRESS. <i>J. W. Jenks</i> . .	776
218. THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN AN ENDOWED PRESS. <i>D. F. Wilcox</i>	777
III. Class Assignments	779
IV. Selected Bibliography	780
CHAPTER XXVII: PROPAGANDA: THE MANUFACTURE OF OPINION	782
I. Introduction	782
II. Materials	784
219. THE DEFINITION OF PROPAGANDA. <i>K. Dunlap</i> . . .	784
220. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PROPAGANDA. <i>R. Dodge</i> . . .	785
221. PROPAGANDA AND MOTIVATION. <i>E. K. Strong</i> . . .	793
222. PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF PROPAGANDA. <i>K. Dunlap</i> .	798
223. PROPAGANDA AND ORGANIZATION. <i>A. Lipsky</i> . . .	799
224. PROPAGANDA AND SOCIAL CONTROL. <i>E. K. Strong</i> . .	799
225. HOW THE NEWSPAPER'S POLITICAL POLICY IS FORMED. <i>F. R. Kent</i>	805
226. PUBLICITY AND THE ALTERATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION. <i>E. L. Bernays</i>	806
227. CONTROL OF PUBLICITY IN THE INTERESTS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. <i>C. A. Ellwood</i>	808
228. PROPAGANDA THROUGH THE MOTION PICTURE. <i>H. A. Larrabee</i>	811

CONTENTS

xxiii

229. PROPAGANDA AND A STUDENT-UNION DRIVE IN A COL-	
LEGE	821
III. Class Assignments	826
IV. Selected Bibliography	827
INDEX	829



INTRODUCTION

This book is designed for the college or university student and for the general reader who would know more specifically what the principal features of social psychology are. If the layman finds certain technical papers which he chooses to omit, he may do so without destroying the balance of the whole. It is advisable, though possibly not essential, that the student shall have had preparation in introductory psychology as well as in introductory social science. In the early chapters, however, there are materials of both sociological and psychological import which will furnish a working basis for any intelligent reader.

For classroom purposes the book provides materials to accompany a formal text, or it may be employed by itself as a basis for the usual course. With the class assignments and the data cited in the bibliographies there is sufficient material here for a semester's work. While many teachers prefer to use their own methods in organizing class work, ample suggestions are made for more extensive study. These suggestions are found in class assignments covering questions, exercises, special reports, and longer themes. Sources of more complete bibliographies are indicated throughout, so that the teacher and student may go into the whole field of social behavior by following out the clues given.

The introductory discussions constitute an integral part of the book and should be read by the student in order that he may understand more easily the particular selections. These discussions precede rather than follow the selections, since it is believed that they will assist the reader to read more intelligently and to perceive the bearing of the selections on one another and on the fundamental point of view.

Something should be said about the organization of the materials. It is the writer's view that the social behavior of individuals can not be understood without some knowledge of the nature of the social life and of the culture patterns to which the individual is exposed. He believes, moreover, that a more adequate approach to social psy-


chology can be made through the group than through the individual. Whatever we may say in regard to the evolution of the human species, certainly since man has been known to us through prehistoric and subsequent times he has always been born into some social grouping, which grouping, in turn, has always carried with it some type of culture. It is perhaps futile to talk about "social origins" in the race, but we do know that children are born into a more or less definitely organized series of groups possessing language, various techniques, social codes, bodies of knowledge, views on religion and magic, and so on through the whole gamut of culture patterns. Such groups comprise persons of various ages and capacities who are constantly playing upon one another. The newcomer simply adds one more person to the stage already set for him by those who have appeared before him and who have caught hold of the modes of life from still older generations.

Accordingly, in the early chapters of this book we present pre-human and human behavior from the standpoint of the group rather than from that of the individual, and then give attention to the culture which arises from this group life. Thereafter, we pass on to study the physiological and psychological roots of social behavior in the individual proper. Finally, upon this triple foundation of social group, culture, and individual, we examine the personality as it develops in various group relationships. Moreover, we see how the personality is affected by culture standards external to the individual, such as houses and tools, but more particularly (for us) by that internal, subjective world of attitudes, images, and ideas which he gets from his fellows and which plays such a fundamental rôle in determining his crowd action, his social attitudes, and his whole participation and status in the group.

In short, the social process, I take it, deals with three variables—social groups, culture patterns, and individual organisms. Social psychology treats largely the first of these, sociology the second, and physiology and psychology the third. But for our present purposes it seems best to deal at the outset with some features of the first two as they relate to one another, before we consider the individual as an organism which is inducted into social groups and cultures carrying with him, as he does, the outfit that his heredity has accorded him.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN FOOTNOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHIES

<i>Amer. Anth.</i>	AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
<i>A. J. Psy.</i>	AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
<i>Am. J. Soc.</i>	AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
<i>Atlantic Mon.</i>	ATLANTIC MONTHLY
<i>Beh. Monog.</i>	BEHAVIOR MONOGRAPHS
<i>Biol. Bull.</i>	BIOLOGICAL BULLETIN
<i>Comp. Psy. Monog.</i>	COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY MONOGRAPHS
<i>Contemporary Rev.</i>	CONTEMPORARY REVIEW
<i>Economics Jour.</i>	ECONOMICS JOURNAL
<i>Fortn. Rev.</i>	FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW
<i>Harper's</i>	HARPER'S MAGAZINE
<i>Intern. J. Ethics</i>	INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS
<i>Intern. Quarterly</i>	INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY
<i>J. Abn. Psy.</i>	JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY (See next item)
<i>J. Abn. & Soc. Psy.</i>	JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (For the volumes XV-XIX this periodical was called Journal of Abnormal Psychology and So- cial Psychology)
<i>J. Animal Beh.</i>	JOURNAL OF ANIMAL BEHAVIOR
<i>J. App. Psy.</i>	JOURNAL OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY
<i>J. App. Soc.</i>	JOURNAL OF APPLIED SOCIOLOGY
<i>J. Educ. Psy.</i>	JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
<i>J. Exp. Psy.</i>	JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
<i>J. Ment. Sci.</i>	JOURNAL OF MENTAL SCIENCE
<i>J. Personnel Res.</i>	JOURNAL OF PERSONNEL RESEARCH
<i>J. Phil.</i>	JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. (For volumes I-XV this periodical was called Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods).
<i>J. Race Development</i>	JOURNAL OF RACE DEVELOPMENT
<i>Ment. Hyg.</i>	MENTAL HYGIENE
<i>Nerv. & Ment. Disease Monog.</i>	NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASE MONOGRAPH
<i>New Repub.</i>	NEW REPUBLIC
<i>Ped. Sem.</i>	PEDAGOGICAL SEMINARY (Since volume XXX this periodical has been called Pedagogical Seminary and Journal of Genetic Psychology)
<i>Pol. Sci. Quarterly</i>	POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
<i>Pop. Sci. Mo.</i>	POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY
<i>Psychoanalytic Rev.</i>	PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW
<i>Psy. Bull.</i>	PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN
<i>Psy. Mon.</i>	PSYCHOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS
<i>Psy. Rev.</i>	PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW
<i>Pub. Am. Sociol. Society</i>	PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY
<i>Relig. Educ.</i>	RELIGIOUS EDUCATION
<i>Scien. Mon.</i>	SCIENTIFIC MONTHLY
<i>Soc. Forces</i>	SOCIAL FORCES (For volumes I-III this periodical was called The Journal of Social Forces).
<i>Soc. Rev.</i>	SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW



CHAPTER I

THE FALSE SEPARATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL FROM THE GROUP

I. INTRODUCTION

That man was not born to live alone is an old observation of more significance than is usually attributed it in suggesting matrimony to likely bachelors or to marriageable women. In fact, the individual is a concept quite as abstract and quite as open to criticism as the older theological doctrines concerning the origin of species, or the more recent notion that the contribution of heredity may be completely dissociated from that of environment in the make-up of the human adult. The doctrine of individualism, which got such a hold on Western thinking at the close of the Middle Ages and which in our social and economic system is so closely connected with the individualistic motive and with the individualistic notion of personal salvation, has never been given up. The social contract theory that originally man was a lonely, isolated creature roaming over the face of the earth and fighting with beasts and other men for food or sexual satisfactions, has been completely destroyed by logic and anthropology, but is nevertheless constantly being reaffirmed because it is so dear to our belief in independence, in self-sufficiency, and in individual power. According to this social contract notion, society began when two or three persons mutually agreed that they could get more protection and more food, as well as more satisfactions, if they banded together. Therefore, one of them, presumably the stronger, was elected president of the society, and the other two secretary and treasurer respectively, unless the president decided to take the latter office himself. We see so much of this sort of thing going on now in our own civilization that we imagine it to have been so at the outset. Furthermore, popular literature and common parlance about "cave man stuff" and "original nature" help this notion to stick with us.

As preliminary to the first division of our work, therefore, we have introduced a selection which briefly states a standpoint fundamental to this entire book. For Cooley the essential nature of the social process is the dual relationship of the individual and the social group made up of other individuals representing, as they do, a type of social interplay at various points of contact.

Moreover, the individuals in a group are influenced on all sides by the cultural formulations which have come down to them from the past or which are actually in the making at any particular time or place.

Thus social psychology must take into account this "organic" process of social living. It is false and unsatisfactory to separate the individual from the social *milieu* in which he lives, moves, and has his being. In subsequent papers we shall see this becoming more evident in the concrete example of life. The reader should consult particularly the papers of Kunkel (no. 6), Chapin (no. 7), and Child (no. 55).

II. MATERIALS

1. Individual and Society: An Organic Process¹

A separate individual is an abstraction unknown to experience, and so likewise is society when regarded as something apart from individuals. The real thing is Human Life, which may be considered either in an individual aspect or in a social, that is to say general, aspect; but is always, as a matter of fact, both individual and general. In other words, "society" and "individuals" do not denote separable phenomena, but are simply collective and distributive aspects of the same thing, the relation between them being like that between other expressions one of which denotes a group as a whole and the other the members of the group, such as the army and the soldiers, the class and the students, and so on. This holds true of any social aggregate, great or small; of a family, a city, a nation, a race; of mankind as a whole: no matter how extensive, complex, or enduring a group may be, no good reason can be given for regarding it as essentially different in this respect from the smallest, simplest, or most transient.

So far, then, as there is any difference between the two, it is rather

¹ Reprinted by permission from C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, pp. 1-2; 3; 10-11; 12. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902.

in our point of view than in the object we are looking at: when we speak of society, or use any other collective term, we fix our minds upon some general view of the people concerned, while when we speak of individuals, we disregard the general aspect and think of them as if they were separate. Society, or any complex group, may, to ordinary observation, be a very different thing from all of its members viewed one by one—as a man who beheld General Grant's army from Missionary Ridge would have seen something other than he would by approaching every soldier in it. There may, in all such cases, be a system or organization in the whole that is not apparent in the parts. In this sense, and in no other, is there a difference between society and the individuals of which it is composed; a difference not residing in the facts themselves but existing to the observer on account of the limits of his perception. A *complete* view of society would also be a complete view of all the individuals, and *vice versa*; there would be no difference between them.

And just as there is no society or group that is not a collective view of persons, so there is no individual who may not be regarded as a particular view of social groups. He has no separate existence; through both the hereditary and the social factors in his life a man is bound into the whole of which he is a member, and to consider him apart from it is quite as artificial as to consider society apart from individuals.

Of course the view which I regard as sound, is that individuality is neither prior in time nor lower in moral rank than sociality; but that the two have always existed side by side as complementary aspects of the same thing, and that the line of progress is from a lower to a higher type of both, not from the one to the other.

Finally, there is *the social faculty view*. This expression might be used to indicate those conceptions which regard the social as including only a part, often a rather definite part, of the individual. Human nature is thus divided into individualistic or non-social tendencies or faculties, and those that are social. Thus, certain emotions, as love, are social; others, as fear or anger, are unsocial or individualistic. Some writers have even treated the intelligence as an individualistic faculty, and have found sociality only in some sorts of emotion or sentiment.

The opinion I hold is that man's psychical outfit is not divisible into the social and the non-social; but that he is all social in a large sense, is all a part of the common human life, and that his social or moral progress consists less in the aggrandizement of particular faculties or instincts and the suppression of others, than in the discipline of all

with reference to a progressive organization of life which we know in thought as conscience.

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises

1. List the groups to which you belong. Indicate how your habits and attitudes vary according to which group you are with.
2. Show how one may view the personality first from the angle of his group membership: race, nation, business or vocational organization, fraternity, city, church, neighborhood and family. Then show how one may view the personality from the angle of the isolated individual.

What difference does it make in the type of fact which one uncovers about the personality when one uses one or the other standpoint?

3. Is there any type of behavior which is not socially colored?

B. Topics for Class Reports

1. Review Gault's *Social Psychology* Ch. II, pp. 13-17 on "The Sense of Social Unity." Illustrate this fact from the behavior of people in this country during the World War.
2. Review for the class Sherrington's paper cited in the bibliography. Discuss his point of view about social integration. Compare with Child's view (Cf: bibliography).

C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers

1. Cooley's Organic Theory of Society.
2. The Relation of Society to Personality.

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CHAPTER II

EVOLUTION AND PRE-HUMAN SOCIAL LIFE

I. INTRODUCTION

The interplay of individual and social group is by no means confined to mankind. We find evidence of social life among the other forms of animal life. This "organic" process is well evidenced even in the remarkable interrelation of plants with one another. It is especially common in the insect world so well described by Fabre, Wheeler, the Peckhams, Beebe, and others. Certainly the whole process of higher evolution is not unrelated to the fact that many species have lived in groups and that an important part of an organism's environment consists of other members of its own or related species. This social environment was perhaps not less important than the physical world of atmosphere, water, land, and food in the development of the higher mental functions. In reality the group is, quite as much as the isolated individual, an evolutionary unit in many species.

It follows from this that we must take into account the social life of animals if we are to get a correct perspective for viewing the complex life of man. Limitations of space, as well as remoteness of species, prevent a complete review of the whole range of social life in plants and animals below our own species. Rather, we introduce the material on pre-human social life with Bawden's very important paper which traces the changes in the organism that took place with alterations in the forms of animal life. We note the importance of erect posture, the recession of the snout and the development of the face, the rise of delicate musculature of throat and mouth and its novel place in intersocial stimulation, the evolution of the hand and the corresponding brain changes which accompanied these alterations. These changes were indicative of a great forward step in evolution. Interstimulation was made more easy. Group life could be pro-

foundly altered by one gesture foretelling the oncoming action of another. The tool-making capacity came into play. The stage was set for the beginnings of culture.

When we observe the evolution of our species in this long-time perspective, we are more capable of understanding the biological roots of man's higher development. Bawden's paper gives this bird's-eye view of the whole range of later evolution and is fundamental to everything else that follows in this volume.

Craig's paper on the voices of pigeons is introduced, not because bird forms relate directly to human evolution, but because we have illustrated therein a specialized development of vocalization in social interplay without, of course, true language. It indicates a type of development that is significant in revealing the importance of vocal gesture in the control of members of one's group. So, too, Whitman's experiments in training pigeons to breed with other species point to the important place which social conditioning plays in determining the direction of one of the deepest of animal tendencies.

For our purposes, however, the epoch-making studies of Yerkes and Köhler on the life of apes is most important. In the life of apes we observe many of the fundamental social characteristics of man himself: love, jealousy, fear, mutual aid, attachment, repulsion, and so on. There is considerable emotional concern among the members of the group when one of their members is separated from them, but apparently it lasts only while they can still see him or hear his cries, as the independence of memory is not yet fully established. As an adjunct to their social life, the apes possess the rudiments of language, in that distinctive cries and grunts point to, or signify, certain objects or situations. Without going as far as Garner in believing that the apes possess language in the sense that man possesses it, we are able to see, in these studies, the fact that these anthropoid relatives of ours show in simpler form the beginnings of nearly all that we count as human: social life, incipient language, and the elements of higher mental processes,

II. MATERIALS

A. THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

2. The Evolution of Man's Higher Functions¹

The Shift in Evolution with the Appearance of Man

The end toward which evolution moves in the animal kingdom seems to be control over the environment, especially over the vegetable world. The animal, like the plant, is confined to the circular chemical process from dioxide to dioxide; but the animals make the plants partially prepare their food for them, and some animals, the carnivores, make other animals still further prepare their food. This process exhibits higher and higher forms of behavior as there is more and more control over the expenditure side of this circle. When in civilized man we get an adequate control over the vegetable and animal environment the evolutionary movement along this line reaches its climax and a certain degree of finality. Unless some great catastrophe transforms the face of nature it seems as if this stage of evolution, which Darwin and his followers so adequately grasped, would give place to a new type of development.

For one thing, evolution has shifted from the development of sensory and motor organs to a modification of the environment itself. Man does not evolve a better organ of vision but invents lenses to supplement his imperfect optical instruments. He supplements the ear by telephone and telegraph. He refines his tactile delicacy by instruments of precision. He supplements motor and locomotor organs by artificial means of power and transportation. Evolution shifts from the inside to the outside environment. Thus is opened up the era of extra-organic evolution—evolution in terms of implements and weapons and extensions of the sensory and motor functions by mechanical means. It is of course just as legitimate to speak of evolution as taking place in the pushing out of railroads on the frontier, the extension of commerce, the invention of the automobile and the aeroplane, as in the cephalization of sense-organs and the telescoping of the metamereres.

The whole life period is estimated to have been anywhere from twenty-five to sixty-five millions of years, almost all of this having elapsed before the appearance of the Primate. Yet this comparatively ill-equipped and puny mammal has transformed the face of the earth,

¹ Reprinted by permission from H. H. Bawden, "The Evolution of Behavior" *Psy. Rev.* 1919: XXVI: pp. 264-67; 268-72; 272-73; 273-76.

exterminating not only the more ferocious of the beasts, but many varieties of his own species. The polar bear or the cactus tree is relatively adapted to its environment. It must await secular changes to alter its form; and if these are too sudden it will perish. But certain creatures, among whom were man's ancestors, instituted what, looking back upon it from our present vantage-ground, we may call the human as contrasted with the natural economy. The creature controls and modifies the environment instead of being controlled by it. He turns meandering rivers into straight irrigation ditches; he plants seeds and cultivates them instead of depending on the uncertain sowing by wind and insect; he domesticates animals for food and labor power; he fashions animal pelts and the fibers of plants into clothes and the wood of trees and materials from the quarry and claybank into shelter; he discovers or invents fire, tools and weapons; he is discovering means of immunization against the ravages of harmful parasites; and there only remain the problems of artificial production of protoplasm and interplanetary transit when he will have controlled the fact of death itself.

It was the greater range of control and variability of response which these supplementary extra-organic sensori-motor processes made possible which gave man his great lead over the other types. The insects developed complex forms of sensory and motor organs, sometimes of marvelous delicacy, but this only rendered them still more dependent upon fixed conditions in the environment, whereas the unique thing about the human variation was the use of one part of the environment (the weapon or the tool) to control another part, in the interests of the organism. As one writer says, "It was not to the fact that man possessed hands that he owed his mastery. It was because he used those hands to make an alteration in his environment." The higher types may be said to have organized more of the environment into themselves by reason of a more variable adjusting apparatus in the brain whereby an equation might be established among increasingly remote stimulations. Or, again, looking at it from the other point of view, the higher animal may be said to have widened the scope of his individuality or selfhood just to the degree that, by extra-organic means, he has increased his control over the environment by supplementary sensory and motor organs. If by natural selection is meant merely the non-deliberative method of survival in the sub-human stages of evolution, then natural selection is comparatively wasteful, arbitrary, rigid, and blind, leading to the survival of the fittest in only a limited sense of that word; but if it is used in the widest sense as including all phases

of this extra-organic evolution, then there is every reason to believe that all the phenomena of human civilization and culture have persisted only because of their superior survival value.

It is conjectured that the comparatively sudden shift in the evolutionary process which we encounter with the appearance of man—sudden in comparison with other geological changes—took place because of the abrupt alteration of the environment when the ice-sheet began to descend from the north in the early part of the Quaternary age.

Here the beam tips in the evolutionary process. Our ancestor was not equipped to meet such an emergency so far as his gross structure was concerned; many other forms were indeed better equipped than he. What determined his survival and his preponderant power ever since was the accident, if it was an accident, that he began to live by indirect means. The center of the struggle was shifted from the organism itself to the environment. Extra-organic extensions of the organic functions so transformed the environment in the case of the Primates that they were able to survive where otherwise they would perish. The conquest of the environment by indirect means is the great mutation by which the evolutionary process leaped forward in man.

The Hegemony of the Accessory Muscles

One cannot penetrate into the beginnings of behavior, especially as found in the action-systems which evidently underlie human conduct, without the query arising whether the emergence of that mirror-image of himself that man has come to dignify as a distinct entity under the word mind or spirit or the psychical, may not have been a quite accidental and incidental product of the extraordinary development of the accessory muscles, particularly those of speech. Up to the time when our anthropoid ancestor began to babble to some effect, his motor processes did not differ essentially from those of his brute associates. They involved the gross musculatures of the trunk and limbs and, on the whole, constituted a unified and continuous action-system. But when, in the midst of such fundamental adjustments of food and sex, the freedom of the arms and hands made possible the use of the weapon and the tool, and thus released the voice, measurably, from its strict servitude to the needs of the warning cry and the signal of distress, we may imagine that the mechanism of the larynx came into the service of social ends. With the multiplication of the new types of situation which would spring rapidly from the mastery of the environment through the use of one extra-organic process to control another, the

need for some method of communication would arise, more precise than the primitive gamut of insufflations and grunts. What more natural than that this flexible mechanism of vocalization, relatively freed from the sterner demands made upon it in the past, should be modified and enriched to furnish the symbols of reference necessary to a more diversified group activity.

With the recession of the snout, the abbreviation of the tusks or tearing teeth, and the substitution of the hand for the muzzle in the manipulation of the food object, the finer musculatures situated in the head and neck become liberated for this surrogative function in relation to a widening range of sensori-motor adaptations.

And it is chiefly noteworthy that the use of such an accessory musculature, under the conditions of an extra-organic evolution such as we have been supposing, would naturally represent, in the main, arrested or incipient (*i. e.*, controlled, or what in recent studies have been called conditioned) responses. Speech partakes of the character of an attitude rather than an act. The word or name comes to stand for the act. It is a tentative movement which serves as a kind of substitute for the completed performance. As the distinctively human aspect of behavior, in the course of time, passed over almost entirely into terms of the extra-organic adjustments, these intra-organic co-ordinations which have come to stand for them, would finally carry an increasing ratio of the meanings of life. And since such meanings are always conditioned, in the sense that they are symbolic of the deeper-lying and more pervasive activities of the fundamental muscles, and ever point to them and presuppose them, it is natural that there should appear a plane of cleavage between the two levels of behavior. This is the biological basis for that duplication of realms that has played such an important, and often disastrous, part in the evolution of psychological theory.¹

The Function of the Larynx in Indirect Control

We have seen that the liberation of the larynx was a collateral effect of the eversion of the foot, the freeing of the arms and hands, the recession of the snout, and the consequent substitution—except for the mastication of food—of the manipulative functions of the hand for those of the mouth. This effect was of momentous importance in relation to the initiation of increasingly indirect methods of control. The substitution of the gesture for the completed act, of the spoken word for the gesture, of the written for the spoken word, and then, within

¹ This refers to the mind-body problem.

the confines of the now socialized behavior of the individual, of sub-vocal articulation for interlocutory discourse, introduced a technic for handling the remotest parts of the environment as the stimulus receded farther and farther from the response. No part of overt behavior escaped the effects of this introversion: every act, and every object and situation, representing possibilities of action, was destined to find its counterpart in some incipient innervation or tentative tintinnabulation of the articulo-motor apparatus, and to a less degree of the optico-motor and grapho-motor mechanisms involved in reading and writing.

It was no accident that the elaboration of symbols took place primarily in connection with the functions of the larynx and the ear rather than in connection with those of the eye and the hand. It was these which were first freed from the stress of the struggle for survival. The eye must still be at the service of the hand, but the ear was, comparatively, released from this necessity and could take up with the larynx the functions of speech. Moreover, in our ability to make sounds we have a mechanism which, unlike the signs which appeal to the eye, we have always at our service. In the midst of all other kinds of activity, in any position of the body, in darkness as well as in light, the larynx may keep up its kinaesthetic comment upon the other activities, with a check upon it, in turn, by the ear. This expansion of activities is reflected in the increasing complexity of the central conductors, chiefly in the cortex. It is an instructive fact that the center for language lies adjacent to the center for the hand and without doubt the fact that the language center is unilateral is to be correlated with the fact that man is normally right-handed.

Behavior is turned in upon itself in the form of arrested movements, this inhibitory process promoting, in turn, the multiplication of new conduction-pathways. Speech uses many of the same muscles as eating, but it has elaborated a far more complex system of synapses. The function of this new behavior-complex is what is called thought, which has been significantly described as interior speaking. The advent of a larynx, converted to the uses of language, gave our ancestor a new machine by which his power of accumulating experience was increased. It is the power of operating at a distance by the use of symbols, which demarks man from the brutes and gives one man or one race superiority over another. Man is *homo sapiens*, the thinking animal, because he is the speaking animal; brutes are the dumb animals.

We do not know precisely how language originated—probably in the cries and calls of animals in relation to food and sex, and the expression of such other fundamental trends as fear and anger and pain. We

may observe its beginnings by a study of the child. Such a study gives us an insight into what is perhaps the most complex and closely interwrought system of behavior-patterns which is anywhere to be found—the only basis of behavior upon which it is conceivable that the vast superstructure of human literature and science and philosophy and art could have been erected. The complexity of this system is apparent in an enumeration of the sensori-motor mechanisms which are involved. A word may be spoken, heard, written or seen, involving the intricate interplay of musculatures of the articulo-motor, the auditory, the grapho-motor, and the optico-motor apparatus, while, the synaptic connections in the cortex and lower centers in the brain, are to be found a most complicated system of corresponding conduction-pathways. As in the history of the race, the child begins by hearing words spoken, gradually learning to speak them himself by reason of that extraordinary over-production of movements in vocalization which is the natural accompaniment of the abundant vitality and proliferation of new cells which characterize the growing organism.

The limitations and the dangers of the symbol grow directly out of its usefulness. The very assistance which the word renders as a convenient handle to remoter objects and events and situations leads almost inevitably to a substitution of means for ends. Man gives a thing a name or finds a word to mediate between an attitude and an act, and then uses the name as if it were the thing and the word as if it were the finality of response—forgetting that the name may be but the moment's rendering of the stimulus, that the word may be but the moment's embodiment of the response. Words come to be treated as the miser treats his coins, hoarded up and gloated over for their own sake, in disregard of the fact that they are but a medium of exchange, their value depending upon the concrete things they represent. Language is that portion of behavior which functions as a buffer between other parts of behavior, intermediary between the inaccessible tensions within the individual and the overt adjustments of social intercourse. It partakes of the character of both conduct and thought; it is less overt than what we call acts, but more overt than the tentative movements in the accessory muscles which we call thought. Its chief utility lies just in this ambiguous, this amphibious character. Theoretically a word alters its meaning every time it is used, since it is being employed to mediate factors in a situation different, to some extent, from any that has ever been encountered before; practically, the word becomes a compromise and a reducer of these differences to some common denominator of action. Here are both its great serviceability and its harm-

fulness in growth. In so far as this reduction of differences is subservient to the ends of an experimental expansion of experience, it makes for economy and efficiency in action; but when it becomes habituated to the point of functioning independently as a behavior-pattern, there is danger of the substitution of a system of abstract relations for the world of concrete individual facts.

It is clear, therefore, why language has been of so much value in building up what we call our intellectual life. A word can stand, not only for the extra-organic object or event remote in space or time, but also for the obscure intra-organic innervations and nascent movements for which an unrarried psychology has had no other descriptive terms than the vague popular terms feeling and thinking. It stands for these, and relates them in that total of overt activities which we call the conduct of life. Language thus is a bridge between the inner citadel of the interoceptive and proprioceptive complex we call the self and that exteroceptive complex we call the outer world. Words are our "in-nards" trying to find hands and feet; they are also the machinery by which we succeed in bringing an increasingly wider range of the environment under control, organizing it, in a very true sense, into the very substance of our selfhood.

A gesture, then, is an arrested act. A word is a substitute for a gesture. A thought is an incipient word. The image or idea or meaning or thought is but a name for the most-reduced of acts, the tentative partial performance which serves as a substitute for the deed in its overt entirety. Meaning is this indicative, this forward or backward referring, significance of such nascent responses. A meaning originally is a signal-fire, a notch cut, a mark made, a line drawn, to direct subsequent action. A monument, a cross, a badge, a label, a tally, a voucher, an autograph, an endorsement, a bill, credentials, insignia, a flag, an escutcheon, a password, a cipher, an epitaph has meaning because it records past or controls future behavior. The gradual reduction of these to the more abstract symbols of grammar, rhetoric, logic, mathematics, methodology is merely an accessory muscular refinement on the more fundamental motor adjustments.

The Organization of a World of Values

We shall not have arrived at a comprehensive view of the evolution of behavior without calling attention again to a fact presupposed in all that has been said: namely, that all this elaboration of stimulus and ramification of response is ultimately and always for the sake of bring-

ing fulfilment to certain inherited or acquired propensities. All this development of bilateral symmetry and the metameric form, this cephalization of the sense-organs and magnification of the brain, all the complications presupposed in the building up, through these, of spatial and temporal adjustments, and particularly of a world of incipient responses or symbolizations through the action of the accessory muscles—all this may be said to be for the sake of finally reaching the distant object and its ingestion or manipulation in connection with food or sex. In other words, there is a final consummation of the means in the ends, of the instruments in the values, of life. This may be called the ultimate equation of a world of methods or means with a world of ideals or ends. In our human sphere it is the culmination of efficiency in culture, of science in art. In terms of the evolutionary process, it is a consummation of the function of the distance-receptors in that of the interoceptors and proprioceptors. The tactile-kinaesthetic imagery is the carrier of the meaning: an object, a situation, a world, seen, heard, smelled, is for the sake of a world touched, manipulated, enjoyed. It is the contact-values which are the goal of the pursuit of the distant object, and all of our economic and social institutions in human society are capable of interpretation from this point of view.

B. PRE-HUMAN SOCIAL LIFE

3. The Voices of Pigeons as a Means of Social Control ¹

The reactions of the individual dove must be adjusted to meet the activities of many other birds—first its parents, later its mate, its young, its neighbors, and the strangers that come in its way. The activities of these other birds are endlessly diverse, and are changing from day to day and from hour to hour; the responses to the activities of these other birds must, accordingly, be adapted in each case to the immediate social situation. The adaptation to the immediate social situation must in many cases be exceedingly delicate, requiring that each individual be delicately susceptible to the influence of others. Most important of all, the individuals are free to change their positions in society. Individuals that are now treated with parental affection are later treated as outsiders. Those now regarded as strangers and enemies, may, after a period of familiarization, be accepted as members of the flock. Mated birds, after remaining absolutely faithful through a long period, may,

¹ Reprinted by permission from W. Craig, "The Voices of Pigeons Regarded as a Means of Social Control" *Am. J. Soc.* 1908-09: XIV: pp. 87-88; 99-100. Copyright by the University of Chicago.

under certain circumstances, separate, and one of them or each of them may form a new and different union. Now, if pigeon A can become for a time attached to pigeon B, to the exclusion of all other possible mates; and if it can afterward become attached to pigeon C, to the exclusion of all other possible mates; then it is evident that pigeon A must have been under some profound influence from pigeon B, and again under a similarly profound influence from pigeon C; such an influence of one bird over the behavior of another is social control.

The means of social control are various, including much more than the voice, not to speak of the song. The different utterances of the voice, the varying inflections of each of these utterances, the form and color of the body, the bowing, strutting, bristling of feathers, and all the expressions of emotion, are agencies potent to rouse and direct the activities of other birds. The nest, the eggs, and the young, when they come, are so many instruments for effecting social control.

The organization of pigeon society is so flexible and adaptable that it cannot all be accounted for by reference to the instinctive machinery within each member of the society. Each dove is truly an individual, free to adapt itself to new conditions and thus to change its relations to society. For this reason, so long as an individual dove does maintain a fixed relation (such as that of mate), it does so by virtue of influences which society brings to bear upon it. That is to say, each is held in its place and held to its duties by social control. The song is one means of social control.

The uses of the song in social control are so numerous and so complexly interrelated that a complete list of them could not be made. I have drawn up the following partial list simply to give some notion of the diversity of the uses of the song.

1. Personal control, as that of the male over his mate.
2. Suggestion; as, the nest-call coo quickly brings the mate, the challenge coo causes the enemy to flee.
3. Stimulation; as, working up both male and female to the point of pairing, inducing oviposition in the female.
4. Inhibition; as, inhibiting adultery, inhibiting the use of nesting-sites other than the one chosen; inhibiting copulation out of the normal time.
5. Co-ordination in space; as, leading male and female to use the same nest.
6. Co-ordination in time; as, leading male and female to go through the brooding activities synchronously.

7. To proclaim: (a) the bird's species; (b) the bird's sex; (c) the bird's individual identity; (d) the bird's rights.

8. Tradition; as, when an experienced bird is mated with an inexperienced one, the former takes the lead.

It should be added that, while these and many other uses may be ascribed to the song, there are still other forms of social control served by utterances other than the song. For example, the voice of the young exerts a most powerful influence over the parent. The uses of the song are of the same general nature as the uses of other utterances, depending similarly upon the constitution of pigeon society and upon the susceptibility of the members of that society to control by the voices and gestures of their comrades. The song, therefore, ought never to be studied (as hitherto it has been studied) without references to the whole system of vocal and gestural activity. And this system is of such magnitude that in the present paper I have not been able to mention all its details, much less to explain them.

Some of the pigeon's performances have been called ceremonies; this name has been applied, not carelessly, but after due consideration. The non-ceremonial vocal performances of pigeons are more like ordinary converse or communication; for they are used at any time, even upon the slightest stimuli, and they are accordingly simple, short and quick, and so flexible as to be changed this way and that according to the immediate circumstances. Those performances which I have called ceremonies, on the other hand, are reserved for more important violent gestures or tense attitudes; they occupy a considerable time, often with a certain number of repetitions; and they have a fixed and definite form, which is not sacrificed to meet the petty circumstances of each occasion. These bird-ceremonies are more comparable to the elaborate ceremonies of some primitive peoples than to anything else in human sociology. Therefore, when naturalists witness the extravagance, the display of superabundant energy, in the songs of birds, let them not hastily conclude that the song is merely a vent by which surplus energy may go to waste; let them remember that similar extravagance appears in the human analogue of bird songs—the ceremonies of primitive peoples. Extravagance does not prove that savage ceremonies are useless, no more does it prove that birds' songs are useless.

4. Social Conditioning to Sex Behavior Among Pigeons¹

If the bird of one species is hatched and reared by a wholly different species, it is very apt when fully grown to prefer to mate with the species under which it has been reared. For example, a male passenger-pigeon that was reared by ring-doves and had remained with that species was ever ready, when fully grown, to mate with any ring-dove, but could never be induced to mate with one of his own species. I kept him away from ring-doves a whole season, in order to see what could be accomplished in the way of getting him mated finally with one of his own species, but he would never make any advances to the females, and whenever a ring-dove was seen or heard in the yard he was at once attentive.

It may be remarked by the editor that the discovery of this principle furnishes the key to Professor Whitman's success in hybridizing the various species of pigeons. A novel and important principle of behavior is here involved. The range of stimuli to which an instinctive tendency will respond may be modified by habits acquired long before the first expression of the instinct. The first expression of a delayed instinctive tendency may thus be in part a function of all that the organism has previously acquired.

(Consult also Section 62)

5. Social Life Among Apes²

It is hardly an exaggeration to say that a chimpanzee kept in solitude is not a real chimpanzee at all. That certain special characteristic qualities of this species of animal only appear when they are in a group, is simply because the behavior of his comrades constitutes for each separate animal the only incentive which will bring about a variety of different behavior, and observation of many peculiarities of the chimpanzee will only be clearly *intelligible* when the behavior and counter-behavior of the individuals and the group are considered as a whole. The group connection of chimpanzees is a very real force, of some-

¹ Reprinted by permission from C. O. Whitman "Behavior of Pigeons" in *The Posthumous Works of Charles O. Whitman*, vol. III (ed. by H. Carr) p. 28. Washington. Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1919.

² From *The Mentality of Apes* by Wolfgang Köhler, pp. 293-95; 296-97; 298; 299-300; 301; 302; 310-11; 317-18; 319-20; 327-28. Reprinted by permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.

times astonishing degree. This can be clearly seen in any attempt to take one animal out of a group which is used to hanging together. When such a thing has never happened before, or not for a long time the first and greatest desire of the separated creature is to get back to his group. Very small animals are naturally extremely frightened, and show their fear to such a degree, that one simply has not the heart to keep them apart any longer. Bigger animals, who do not show signs of actual fear, cry and scream and rage against the walls of their stockade, and, if they see anything like a way back, they will risk their very lives to get back to the group. Even after they are quite exhausted from these outbursts of despair, they will crouch, whimpering, in a corner, until they have recovered sufficient strength to renew their raging.

Generally the remaining animals of the group, even when they hear his moanings from a distance, do not take the same strong interest in him, nor are as sad at the separation as he is. The others are still the "group." One cannot say that they listen to his wailings without any sympathy. It often happens, that if it is only possible for them to get near the prisoner's cage, one or other of the animals will rush to it and put his arms around him through the bars. But he has to howl and cry for this affection to be shown him; as soon as he is quiet, the rest of them do not worry; they show no desire to get to him, and even his good friends soon stop embracing him, in order to return peacefully to the more important group. It must not be imagined that the *isolated* ape is sad only because he is in a cage, and the others have more freedom. For if one of them is outside, and the others in the cage, the one alone tries his utmost to get to the others in the cage.

(Exactly the same happenings are to be seen when an animal, who has been isolated from his group for some weeks for testing purposes, comes back again. His joy reaches such a pitch, that it is easily accompanied by faint glottal cramp. The others do not get *quite* so excited; but as the fact of his return makes an active impression, the whole group becomes very lively; they put their arms around him, even beat him a little for pleasure. At the same time it matters a great deal who the returned ape is. The oldest animal, who occupied a special position in the life of the community, was, on any such occasion, greeted by a universal welcome, such as was not accorded to the others.)

But just as considerable—though transitory—interest is shown, when an isolated creature's wailings can be heard or seen, so also I noticed the strong effect on the others, when they once saw with their own eyes the signs of weakness and illness in one of the little chimpanzees. During his fatal illness Konsul, when he seemed a little bet-

ter, was once more let out into the open, where the others were gaily eating green stuff. He dragged himself painfully to them, but after taking a few steps he suddenly fell to the ground with a piercing cry of fear. Tercera was sitting some distance away, chewing. She sprang up, her hair standing on end all over her body with excitement. She reached him in a few strides, on two legs, her face filled with the utmost concern, her lips protruding with sorrow, and uttering cries of distress; she caught hold of him under the arms, and did her best to raise him. One could not imagine anything more maternal than this female chimpanzee's behavior, and I give these words their literal meaning, as applied to conduct which was called forth at that moment by the immediate and strong impression made on her by the breakdown she witnessed. The fact that Konsul, after being taken back to his room, never came out again, evoked as little sign of grief from Tercera as from the other members of the group. Therefore, when we compare the former conduct with the naturally ethical behavior of humans, we must not lose sight of the fact that it is an indispensable condition that the weakness and helplessness has to be seen or heard first; it must be a concrete fact. The ape will feel no sympathy when merely imagining such a case, because he hardly ever has such images.

If an isolated chimpanzee is forcibly *attacked* before the eyes of the group, great excitement goes through the group. The moment your hand falls on him, the whole group sets up a howl, as if with one voice. The excitement thus expressed has usually nothing of fear in it, and the group does not run away. On the contrary, if they are separated by the railings, they try to get to the place of punishment. Even the lightest form of punishment, pulling the ear of the offender, or a playful pretence at punishment, often stirred single members of the group to much more decisive action.

When the apes have grown much older and their awe of us big humans has diminished, and especially after they have arrived at sex maturity, I find the drive of the group to repulse an assault on one of its members grown inordinately stronger. In the end, one has to give up punishing even bad offences, when the whole group is in the same room as the wrong-doer. The only thing necessary to the uproar is that that scream shall be uttered in that characteristic manner that whips up all the others. It has happened to me that in such circumstances Rana, the good-tempered, has suddenly lost her head, and in a mad fury sprung at my neck, when the moment before she was playing happily with me.

It is part of the extraordinary variation in character of the chimpan-

zees that many of them will not intentionally incite to mass attack, while others of them, when they are in a bad mood, will readily do so, fly into a rage over a trifle, and behave viciously in order to incite the herd. This is unhappily the case with the gifted Sultan, whose disposition to drop into the rôle of the wronged and to be pitied, has had to be mentioned before. Thus, in a passion, with which the innocent observer has had nothing to do, he will attack him with fury. He hops, choking with his glottal cramps, and screaming, up to an older animal that has often helped him, whines, springs shrieking back at the human, and so on, in a manner that is an expression of challenge, if appearance ever expresses anything. On the other hand, a very strong feeling, such as anger, tends, when checked from expanding itself on the object that aroused it, to turn and expend itself upon an entirely different object. When Sultan was quite young, and I punished him, he, not daring to avenge himself upon me, would run in a fury at Chica, whom he could not abide anyhow, and persecute her, although she had absolutely nothing to do with the cause of his rage.

The limit of the "outside," against which the group as a whole reacts so strongly on specially impressive, affective occasions, is by no means determined zoologically; the group is a vaguely-organized community of chimpanzees *used to each other*. One day a newly-bought chimpanzee arrived, and at first was put for purposes of the sanitary control in a special cage a few metres away from the others. She at once aroused the greatest interest on the part of the older animals, who tried their best with sticks and stalks put through the bars to indicate at least a not too friendly connection with her; once even a stone was thrown against the wire-netting at the newcomer, and any active proceedings taking place between us and the new arrival were accompanied by excited noises from the others. When the newcomer, after some weeks, was allowed into the large animals' ground in the presence of the older animals, they stood for a second in stony silence. But hardly had they followed her few uncertain steps with staring eyes, when Rana, a foolish but otherwise harmless animal, uttered their cry of indignant fury, which was at once taken up by all the others in frenzied excitement. The next moment the newcomer had disappeared under a raging crowd of assailants, who dug their teeth into her skin, and who were only kept off by our most determined interference while we remained. Even after several days the eldest and most dangerous of the creatures tried over and over again to steal up to the stranger while we were present, and ill-treated her cruelly when we did not notice in time. She was a poor, weak creature, who at no time showed the slightest

wish for a fight, and there was really nothing to arouse their anger, except that she was a stranger.

In the transition to gradual endurance the group became a little less closely organized. Sultan, who had played less part in the above-mentioned assault, was the first to be left alone with the newly-arrived female. He at once began to busy himself with her in his most diligent manner, but she was really very shy after her bad treatment. However, he went on trying to make friends, with sparkling eyes and a most friendly manner, until at last she gave way to his invitations to play, to his embraces, and—rather shyly—to his childish sexual advances. When the others came near and he was any distance away, she called him anxiously to her; and really he defended her most gallantly when any other member of the group advanced with inimical bearing. Whenever she was frightened, they at once put their arms around each other. Two other female apes, however, likewise soon broke away from the muttering group, and played with the newcomer and kept on putting their arms around her; until at last only Chica and Grande, who up till now had shown no special friendship for each other, united by a mutual aversion, formed a conservative alliance and led their own life in distant spots of the stockade, away from the newcomer and the renegades.

The coherence of the group is by no means homogeneous as between all the members. In Tenerife any animal that distinguished itself in any way played a special social rôle for the rest. Tschego who, as the oldest and strongest member of the group, and commanding the most respect, was the one to whom the rest ran in time of danger, and whose support each party tried to win when there was a quarrel, easily carried the whole troop with her when she changed her occupation or place. But there was Rana also who, on account of her stupidity and her dependent, un lively behavior, was for the most part *de trop*, which state of things she did not improve by perpetually trying to approach the others. Secondly, there are in the relations of any two animals all grades of friendship and even qualitative colorings down to a small dislike. Some of these special relations lasted all the time I made observations on the group, or as long as the animal concerned lived. Rana, rejected over and over again by the bigger animals, had taken possession of little Konsul, and never tired of him till his death. Tschego and Grande were all the time a little group in themselves within the larger group, and the friendship between Chica and Tercera lasted through all the changes of time, though it was Tercera who constituted the strong, helpful,

"giving" half. In the course of everyday life, these old predilections might almost escape notice; but it only required fear or danger for them to be at once expressed, in seeing who embraced whom, and which two retired into a corner together. And in the sharing of sleeping-apartments these proved friendships were adhered to; the younger chimpanzees prefer to sleep in couples the whole night through with their arms around each other. In less important situations it is easy to overlook these strongly cemented relationships, because they are often overlaid by weaker and constantly changing friendships. Rana had to give up her Konsul to all the other animals in turn, because each of them, at one time or another, took a special fancy to him. Big Tschego, quite at first, had a special penchant for the older little male, Sultan, who enviously tried to keep this preference on the part of the head of the group for himself, by attacking any other animal who dared to approach. But after his character had earned for him one or two hard reproofs from Tschego's hand, he quite lost his rôle of confidant, and it looked most comical to see him, with increased respect and slightly retiring, squatting near her, but quite unnoticed; how he would scratch his head with a more and more disquieted expression on his face, at the same time still trying to chase the others away from Tschego, until at last she herself got angry, and drove him away.

It is difficult to describe the methods of intercommunication among these animals, apart from their greetings. It may be taken as positively proved that their gamut of *phonetics* is entirely "subjective," and can only express emotions, never designate or describe objects. But they have so many phonetic elements which are also common to human languages, that their lack of articulate speech cannot be ascribed to *secondary* (glossolabial) limitations. Their gestures too, of face and body like their expression in sound, never designate or "describe" objects (Bühler). But their range of expression by gesture and action is very wide and varied, and, beyond all comparison, superior, not only to that of the lower apes, but also to the orang-utan's. Much is easily comprehensible to us human beings—for example, rage, terror, despair, grief, pleading desire, and also playfulness and pleasure. But, in photographs, the expression of a slight degree of fear is often mistaken for mirth, and great fear for rage—though when a genuine manifestation of rage occurs, it is unmistakable. The expression of other feelings becomes intelligible to the careful observer within a few weeks, with one exception: there are certain spells of "pure excitement" over whose exact character I have formed no definite opinion, even after six years'

study. But among themselves the animals understand perfectly "what is the matter," on almost every occasion—that is evident from their communal behavior towards the individual in question.

The chimpanzee's register of emotional expression is so much greater than that of average human beings, because his whole body is agitated and not merely his facial muscles. He jumps up and down both in joyful anticipation and in impatient annoyance and anger; and in extreme despair—which develops under very slight provocation—flings himself on his back and rolls wildly to and fro. He also swings and waves his arms about above his head in a fantastic manner, as a sign of disappointment and dejection.—I have never seen anthropoids *weep*, nor laugh in quite the human sense of the term. There is a certain resemblance to our laughter in their rhythmic gasping and grunting when they are tickled, and probably this manifestation is, physiologically, remotely akin to *laughter*. And, during the leisurely contemplation of any objects which give particular pleasure (for example, little human children), the whole face, and especially the outer corners of the mouth, are formed into an expression that resembles our "smile." I have already mentioned the habit of scratching the head when uncertain and in doubt, but to scratch the whole surface of the body, especially the arms, the breast, the upper portion of the thighs, and the lower abdomen, and against the direction in which the hair grows, is expressive of a wide diversity of emotions.

Chimpanzees understand "between themselves," not only the expression of *subjective moods* and emotional states, but also of definite desires and urges, whether directed towards another of the same species, or towards other creatures or objects. I have described the manner in which some of them used the "language of the eyes" when in a state of sexual excitement. A considerable proportion of all desires is naturally shown by direct imitation of the actions which are desired. Thus, one chimpanzee who wishes to be accompanied by another, gives the latter a nudge, or pulls his hand, looking at him and making the movements of "walking" in the direction desired. One who wishes to receive bananas from another, imitates the movement of snatching or grasping, accompanied by intensely pleading glances and pouts. The summoning of another animal from a considerable distance is often accompanied by a beckoning very human in character. The chimpanzee has also a way of "beckoning with the foot," by thrusting it forwards a little sideways, and scratching with it on the ground. Human beings are often the recipients of invitations by a gesture of what the animals want

done; thus, Rana, when she wished to be petted, stretched her hand out towards us, and at the same time clumsily stroked and patted herself, while gazing with eager pleading. Another obvious method of invitation is for an ape to assume or indicate in his own person whatever movements he would perform in the activity he wishes the other to undertake, in the same way that a dog invites us to play with him, by leaping and running, and then looking back towards us. Anthropoids behave in the same way in inciting others to play with them, to have sexual relations with them or to join with them in that mutual inspection of the skin and hair which is one of their most absorbing occupations; in all cases their mimetic actions are characteristic enough to be distinctly understood by their comrades.

This skin treatment is distinctively *social*, no chimpanzee shows so much interest in his own body if he is alone.

The whole *group* of chimpanzees sometimes combined in more elaborate and semi-rhythmic *motion-patterns*. For instance, two would wrestle and tumble about near some post; their movements would become more regular and tend to describe a circle round the post as a centre. One after another, the rest of the group approach, join the two, and finally they march in an orderly fashion and in single file round and round the post. Their movements become animated; they no longer walk, they trot, and as a rule with special emphasis on one foot, while the other steps lightly; thus a rough approximate rhythm develops and they tend to "keep time" with one another. They wag their heads in time to the steps of their "dance" and appear full of eager enjoyment of their primitive game. Variations are invented afresh with every occasion; on one occasion an ape went backwards, snapping drolly at the one behind him; often the circular common movement would be varied by individuals spinning round their own axis at the same time; and once, as the whole group were joyously trotting round a box, little Kònsul stepped to one side outside the circle, drew himself up to his full height, swung his arms to and fro in time to the trotting, and each time that fat Tschego passed him, caught her a sounding smack behind. A trusted human friend is allowed to share in these games with pleasure, as well as in other diversions, and sometimes I only needed to stamp solemnly and rhythmically round and round the post twice, for a couple of black figures to form my train. If I had enough of it and left them, the game generally came to an abrupt end. The animals squatted down with an air of disappointment, like children who "won't play any more," when their big brother turns away.

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What changes in the environment of an animal would occur with the assumption of erect posture?
2. What changes in habits would occur with the development of prehensile (grasping) power of the hands?
3. What changes occurred in the brain corresponding to changes in posture and in the new functions of the throat and mouth muscles after the development of hands and erect posture? (Consult Bawden and Herrick cited in bibliography.)
4. What is the function of vocalization among pigeons?
5. What effect does social experience (conditioning) have upon the expression of sex drives in pigeons?
6. In what particulars is the social life of apes like that of human beings? In what particulars is it unlike?

B. Topics for Class Reports

1. Review briefly the pertinent features of animal evolution, especially since the rise of the Primates. (Consult Baitsell, Lull, Wilder, and Wells cited in bibliography.)
2. Report for the class Wheeler's studies on the social life of insects. (Cf. bibliography.)
3. Report from Park & Burgess materials on plant communities. (Cf. bibliography.)
4. Report Allport's discussion of social stimulation by facial gesture. (Cf. bibliography.)
5. Report your own observations on the influence of vocalization in the social life of the domesticated fowl.
6. Report Conradi's study of sparrows reared by canaries. (Cf. bibliography.)
7. Report on Yerkes' books on ape behavior.
8. Criticise the view of Garner in regard to ape language. (Cf. bibliography: Garner, Köhler, Yerkes.)

C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers

1. Plant and Animal Communities. What Light Do They Throw on Human Social Life?
2. Fundamental Distinctions between the Social Life of Man and the Lower Animals.

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CHAPTER III

HUMAN SOCIAL LIFE

I. INTRODUCTION

The first two papers in this chapter consider the social group as an evolutionary unit. Kunkel shows how the moral attitudes arise from social living. This moral sense has meaning only in society, and is essentially a part of the mechanism by which the elementary group survives and advances. Chapin indicates particularly the manner in which association affects selection and survival. Those members of the group who hold together in crises tend to survive as against those who do not.

Individualism is a distinctly recent matter in human evolution and is highly dependent upon a complex social organization like that of Western Europe and America in historical times. As we saw above (Chapter I), the notion that the individual is the unit of evolution and of existence is itself the result of certain culture patterns. It is related to Christianity, with its emphasis on personal salvation, and to the capitalistic economic order, with its emphasis on self-assertiveness, its doctrine of *laissez faire*, and its notion of individual initiative in invention. Surely all this later development could come only in a society highly integrated through division of labor and scarcely could have been evident in the rudimentary states of social development.

The selections from Trotter, while they contain some loose phrases, show the important place which gregariousness occupies in behavior. This writer has sought to emphasize the mechanisms which make the individual susceptible to herd influences.

The paper by Giddings is important in that it furnishes a psychological clue to the social process. Interstimulation depends on a range of stimuli and an area of response. Moreover, culture patterns furnish the frames of behavior into which the stimuli and the re-

sponses fall. While the physical factors of food and survival are important, and while heredity sets the limitations to all development, the basis of social life, properly speaking, rests upon these matters of social conditioning and reconditioning. The student should not be confused by Giddings' rather too fine distinctions between social, crowd and societal psychology. These differentiations refer really to the extent of the stimulation ranges and the reaction areas.

Within the social group, however, there is always rivalry and competition. While there is mutual aid and co-operation in the tasks which concern the entire group, within the group there is individual interplay for position and status. The paper by Whittemore is based on an experiment to test the nature of the competitive consciousness. That is, what kinds of ideas fill the mind during competition? It is interesting to note that competition so frequently becomes associated with a distinct attitude of surpassing some particular person and that the attitude of competition with the group as a unit is not so prominent. Furthermore, individual differences in capacity apparently play a rôle in the tendency of the individual to pair off in competition with some one "about his own size," to use a common phrase. Moreover, during extended competition there are readjustments to different persons who are thought to be within the range of one's own powers to excel. It is also noteworthy that autocompetition (competition with one's self) plays a considerable part in the group situation described. Increased blood pressure and possibly other physiological changes indicate the physical substrata upon which competition takes place.

Another aspect of social living-together is described in the word "participation." The selection from Park and Thomas indicates the importance of this form of interstimulation and response in making one a member of a group. The assimilation of the foreigner into the American folkways and mores offers an excellent illustration of this point. It is clear that any merely external ritual is ineffective in touching off the deeper attitudes and habits which lie behind participation. And in order to alter these, communication is necessary; hence the place of language. Furthermore, the learning process involved—the education, if you will—means bringing about sufficient reconditioning, that is, new associations, to the new situations to make the immigrant feel the sense of social solidarity, to feel at home

in the life about him. This means changing his attitudes and habits from those of the old world culture to the new culture norms of his adopted country. Language, education, political habituation, adaptation to the freer, more individualistic definition of situations in this country, are factors in this participation process.

In short, this series of papers shows the general nature of the social interstimulation and interresponse that contributes the social personality. On the evolutionary side we have developed mechanisms which make us sensitive to the herd about us, and today in undergoing any change of environment we must recondition ourselves to a new set of herd influences. Yet it is wise to recall at all times that individual differences and individual competition within the group also have a place in social progress. But so far as the group as a unit is concerned, solidarity and safety must be purchased at some expense to individuality. In the next chapter we shall examine more closely the forms of groups to which men belong.

II. MATERIALS

6. The Social Group as an Evolutionary Unit¹

Ever since the beginning of the war in Europe, the rest of the world has seen what marvels the co-operation of practically all citizens can accomplish at least in the matter of man's control of his environment. The significance of this, I believe, is not far to seek. It lies in the strong probability that man has evolved not so much as an isolated individual as a part of a greater organized group which I feel inclined to call simply the human association. In some cases it is evident that the individual animal has not been the unit which has been best adapted to its environment, but a group of individuals which survives in competition with other groups. The association of animals may be the evolutionary unit quite as truly as the individual; in the same way that the individual body is the evolutionary unit rather than the specialized organs and cells making it up.

The habits of the apes, especially the less specialized ones, those which more nearly represent the common ancestor of the human race and the larger anthropoid apes would seem to indicate a gregarious

¹ Reprinted by permission from B. W. Kunkel "Members One of Another" *Scien. Mon.* 1917; IV: pp. 534; 540-43.

habit in man's primitive ancestors. It is only the larger anthropoid apes like the gorilla and the orang in which the habit approaches the solitary, and these forms have very restricted ranges which would seem to indicate that they are disappearing. If man did not evolve as a part of a group, if the group were not the unit which was perfected for the struggle, much of the peculiarly human psychical activity has no meaning. The moral sense and the power of speech, man's most distinctly human possession, could not easily have come into being apart from a social life in a community of interdependent parts.

Darwin has summed up the evidence regarding man's ancestors as follows, "Judging from the habits of savages and the greater number of *Quadrumania*, primeval man, and even his apelike progenitors, probably lived in society."

Darwin even went so far as to suggest that man sprang from a comparatively small and weak species rather than a powerful one like the gorilla since it would have necessitated the development of social qualities which led him to give and receive aid from his fellow men.

"An animal possessing great size and strength and ferocity, and which like the gorilla could defend itself from all enemies, would not perhaps have become social; and this would most effectually have checked the acquirement of the higher mental qualities such as sympathy and the love of his fellows."

The moral sense is a natural and inevitable development from the social instincts and would have been acquired by any animal endowed with well-marked social instincts, including the parental and the filial affections, as soon as the intellectual powers had become as well developed as in man. As Darwin has shown, the social instincts lead an animal to take pleasure in the society of its fellows, to feel a certain amount of sympathy with them and to perform various services for them. Horses and cattle are known to lick and nibble each other in smoothing their coats, and monkeys are prone to help each other to remove vermin from inaccessible parts of their bodies, and in some instances it has been observed that they remove burs and thorns from each other. Then, as soon as the mental faculties had become highly developed, images of all past actions and motives would be passing through the mind of each individual and that feeling of dissatisfaction which invariably results from any unsatisfied instinct, would arise, as often as it was perceived that the enduring social instinct had yielded to some other instinct. And still later after the power of language had been acquired, the common opinion how each one ought to act for the

public good would naturally become in a permanent degree the guide to action. In other words, the social instincts are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the evolution of a moral sense.

Alfred Russel Wallace expresses the same truth as follows:

"The moral sense in man has developed from the social instincts and depends mainly on the enduring discomfort produced by any action which excites the general disapproval of the tribe. Thus, every act of an individual which is believed to be contrary to the interests of the tribe, excites its unvarying disapprobation and is held to be immoral; while every act, on the other hand, which is, as a rule, beneficial to the tribe, is warmly and constantly approved, and is thus considered to be right and moral. . . . The social instincts are the foundation of the moral sense."

The moral sense has no significance from the point of view of the individual, but only from that of the larger association for "although a high standard of morality gives but a slight or no advantage to each individual man and his children over the other men of the same tribe, yet an increase in the number of well-endowed men and advancement in the standard of morality will certainly give an immense advantage to one tribe over another. A tribe including many members who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always ready to aid one another, and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes."

Furthermore, no tribe could hold together if murder, robbery, treachery, etc., were common within its limits.

Thus it would seem that the presence of a moral sense in man presupposes a group intimately associated, and more or less interdependent, and that the evolution of a moral sense results in the better adaptation of the group rather than of the individual. One of the few really distinguishing features of the human race, morality, could not have evolved had there not been the necessity for an association of mutually dependent individuals.

Together with a moral sense, the power of speech distinguishes man from the lower animals. And just as the social habit was necessary for the evolution of morality, it was absolutely essential for the development of language. It is scarcely necessary to indicate so obvious a relationship. It has the same function in the community that a nervous system has in an individual body, for, by means of it, different parts of the organism are brought into relationship with each other and a change in one part is transmitted to a widely different part for the accomplishment

of some purpose by the larger group. Just as the nervous system unifies or integrates the individual body, language brings the association into harmonious action. As Professor Sayce has said in his *Introduction to the Science of Language*, "Language is the creation of society."

Once the human species ceased to be *Homo alalus*, the stimulation of one part of the social organism called forth action in a different part and the whole association was knit more firmly together and *Homo sapiens* appeared on the scene of action. Language also allowed memories to be passed on so that there might be a storage, as it were, of impressions to be released by the association at a subsequent time. Man acquired the power of directing actions within the association at a distance both of time and space and these two troublesome conceptions were to a certain extent overcome. As soon as men had to live together, and found that they could by making signs direct each other's actions, there was immediately an immense step made forward in the arrangement of propositions within our brain, as Professor Clifford has expressed it.

This very brief consideration of the way humanity may have evolved shows how fundamental the association of human individuals has been in that evolution, and how fundamentally unified a group of men must have been in order to survive. What constitutes a human association I have not discussed. It might be a single family like the Swiss Family Robinson, or a tribe, or a nation, or the entire human species. The limits can be determined only on the basis of interdependence and the so-called vital circulation. In the infancy of the human race it must have been the troupe occupying a restricted region between the members of which some division of labor and mutual aid must have been practised, at least to the extent that sentries to warn of approaching danger and signal the rest of the association may have been set, or one member may have acted as leader and directed the flight from the enemy or spied out food and shelter.

7. Human Association and Human Nature¹

The origin of the mental faculties and moral nature of mankind is to be explained by the socializing influences of group life.

Throughout the ages before man was differentiated, certain animals lived in groups and were becoming accustomed to the advantages afforded by association. Life in societies is the most powerful weapon in

¹ Reprinted by permission from F. S. Chapin, *Introduction to the Study of Social Evolution*, pp. 102; 103; 104-05; 106; 107. New York. The Century Company, 1913.

the struggle for life. The animals which know best how to combine have the greatest chances for further evolution even though they may be inferior to others in each of the faculties enumerated by Darwin and Wallace, save in the intellectual faculty. This last is generally admitted to be the most powerful aid in the struggle for existence. But the intellectual faculty is eminently a social faculty. "Language, imitation, and accumulated experience are so many elements of growing intelligence of which the unsociable animal is deprived." For this reason we find at the top of each class of animals, those which combine the greatest sociability with the highest development of intelligence. "The fittest are thus the most sociable animals, and sociability appears as the chief factor of evolution, both directly, by securing the well-being of the species while diminishing the waste of energy, and indirectly, by favoring the growth of intelligence."

Thus it was that thousands of years before man appeared, association was preparing the way for human society. Association was a chief cause of the development of intelligence and of the power to co-operate. Moreover, social life developed with a progressive weeding out of unsocial creatures which thereby became a more easy prey to physical forces and living enemies.

The savage peoples of the present day live in groups, and all the remains of prehistoric men show that they too lived in groups. There is no reason to believe that the anthropoid precursor of man was an unsocial animal. Indeed, the mental differences that mark men off from other creatures are those that are created by social discourse. Speech in particular, an attainment that has given man his pre-eminence among other animals, is distinctly a social creation. Since association and sociability have been such all-important factors in the mental evolution of mankind we shall consider the advantages that accrue from social life.

Association immediately affects selection and survival. Life in groups affords protection from extremes of climate and from ferocious animal enemies. A fierce enemy is more sure to exterminate the single individual. In this way it happens that sociability has a definite survival value, for the individual accustomed to group life is selected to survive, while the individual living an isolated existence lacks the advantage of co-operation and is more often destroyed.

Life in societies insures a larger and a more certain food supply. Social animals hunt in packs, when their combined strength is often able to vanquish prey that one of them could not overcome singlehanded.

But the great effect of association and group life upon selection is found in the fact that through the advantages of protection and food

supply gained by co-operation and mutual aid, the average social animal has a better chance to reach maturity and have offspring. Under the safer conditions of group life, more progeny can reach maturity than is possible in the uncertain state of isolated families.

Association reacted powerfully upon variation, for social life furnished safety from enemies and permanence of food supply, making possible the birth and nurture of a larger number of offspring, also permitting new variations to arise and to become definite characteristics of the group. Under conditions of comparative security, individuals possessing variations in the direction of tolerance, sympathy, and compassion, were likely to be favored with longer life and more numerous progeny than individuals without these traits. More numerous offspring means an increased chance for the appearance of a new germinal variation. With many progeny surviving, it is reasonably certain that some individuals will have innate capacities superior to those generally possessed by the former generation. In this way, association tended to cumulate biological gains.

In group life the gain of one member through imitation became the gain of the group. A new way to perform some old function, greater dexterity attained by one, a surer method for securing food, were gains quickly imitated by other members of the group. In this manner all received the benefit from the discovery of one. Participation in the common cause, sharing in the general benefit, operated to modify the more plastic individuals and developed sympathy and toleration. Imitation of those who were of a naturally sympathetic and reasonable disposition tended to repress excessive cruelty and intolerance and gave that unity and coherence which made co-operation both practicable and successful. In this way the social process cumulated gains and group experience came to be more ordered and varied.

8. Gregariousness as a Basis of Social Behavior ¹

The cardinal quality of the herd is homogeneity. It is clear that the great advantage of the social habit is to enable large numbers to act as one, whereby in the case of the hunting gregarious animal strength in pursuit and attack is at once increased to beyond that of the creatures preyed upon, and in protective socialism the sensitiveness of the new

¹ From W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, pp. 29-30; 31; 32; 34; 112-113; 114-118; 119; 120. T. Fisher Unwin London, 1916. American copyright by the Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

unit to alarms is greatly in excess of that of the individual member of the flock.

To secure these advantages of homogeneity, it is evident that the members of the herd must possess sensitiveness to the behavior of their fellows. The individual isolated will be of no meaning, the individual as part of the herd will be capable of transmitting the most potent impulses. Each member of the flock tending to follow its neighbor and in turn to be followed, each is in some sense capable of leadership; but no lead will be followed that departs widely from normal behavior. A lead will be followed only from its resemblance to the normal. If the leader go so far ahead as definitely to cease to be in the herd, he will necessarily be ignored.

The original in conduct, that is to say resistiveness to the voice of the herd, will be suppressed by natural selection.

Again, not only will the individual be responsive to impulses coming from the herd, but he will treat the herd as his normal environment. The impulse to be in and always to remain with the herd will have the strongest instinctive weight. Anything which tends to separate him from his fellows, as soon as it becomes perceptible as such, will be strongly resisted.

In interpreting into mental terms the consequences of gregariousness, we may conveniently begin with the simplest. The conscious individual will feel an unanalysable primary sense of comfort in the actual presence of his fellows, and a similar sense of discomfort in their absence. It will be obvious truth to him that it is not good for the man to be alone. Loneliness will be a real terror, insurmountable by reason.

Again, certain conditions will become secondarily associated with presence with, or absence from, the herd. For example, take the sensations of heat and cold. The latter is prevented in gregarious animals by close crowding, and experienced in the reverse conditions; hence it comes to be connected in the mind with separation, and so acquires altogether unreasonable associations of harmfulness. Similarly, the sensation of warmth is associated with feelings of the secure and salutary.

Slightly more complex manifestations of the same tendency to homogeneity are seen in the desire for identification with the herd in matters of opinion. Here we find the biological explanation of the ineradicable impulse mankind has always displayed towards segregation into classes. Each one of us in his opinions and his conduct, in matters of dress, amusement, religion, and politics, is compelled to obtain the support of a class, of a herd within the herd. The most eccentric in opinion or conduct is, we may be sure, supported by the agreement of a class, the

smallness of which accounts for his apparent eccentricity, and the preciousness of which accounts for his fortitude in defying general opinion. Again, anything which tends to emphasize difference from the herd is unpleasant. In the individual mind there will be an unanalysable dislike of the novel in action or thought. It will be "wrong," "wicked," "foolish," "undesirable," or as we say "bad form," according to varying circumstances which we can already to some extent define.

It is, however, sensitiveness to the behavior of the herd which has the most important effects upon the structure of the mind of the gregarious animal. This sensitiveness is closely associated with the suggestibility of the gregarious animal, and therefore with that of man. The effect of it will clearly be to make acceptable those suggestions which come from the herd, and those only. It is of especial importance to note that this suggestibility is not general, and that it is only herd suggestions which are rendered acceptable by the action of instinct.

In the early days of the human race, the appearance of the faculty of speech must have led to an immediate increase in the extent to which the decrees of the herd could be promulgated, and the field to which they applied. Now the desire for certitude is one of profound depth in the human mind, and possibly a necessary property of any mind, and it is very plausible to suppose that it led in these early days to the whole field of life being covered by pronouncements backed by the instinctive sanction of the herd. The life of the individual would be completely surrounded by sanctions of the most tremendous kind. He would know what he might and might not do, and what would happen if he disobeyed. It would be immaterial if experience confirmed these beliefs or not, because it would have comparably less weight than the voice of the herd.

It is desirable perhaps to enumerate in a summary way the more obvious gregarious characters which man displays.

1. He is intolerant and fearful of solitude, physical or mental. This intolerance is the cause of mental fixity and intellectual incuriousness which, to a remarkable degree from an animal with so capacious a brain, he constantly displays. As is well known, the resistance to a new idea is always primarily a matter of prejudices, the development of intellectual objections, just or otherwise, being a secondary process in spite of the common delusion to the contrary. This intimate dependence on the herd is traceable not merely in matters physical and intellectual, but also betrays itself in the deepest recesses of personality as a sense of incompleteness which compels the individual to reach out towards some larger existence than his own, some encompassing being in whom his perplexities may find a solution and his longings peace. Physical loneliness and

intellectual isolation are effectually solaced by the nearness and agreement of the herd. The deeper personal necessities cannot be met—at any rate, in such society as has so far been evolved—by so superficial a union; the capacity for intercommunication is still too feebly developed to bring the individual into complete and soul-satisfying harmony with his fellows, to convey from one to another

Thoughts hardly to be packed
Into a narrow act,
Fancies that broke through language and escaped.

Religious feeling is therefore a character inherent in the very structure of the human mind, and is the expression of a need which must be recognized by the biologist as neither superficial nor transitory.

2. He is more sensitive to the voice of the herd than to any other influence. It can inhibit or stimulate his thought and conduct. It is the source of his moral codes, of the sanctions of his ethics and philosophy. It can endow him with energy, courage, and endurance, and can as easily take these away. It can make him acquiesce in his own punishment and embrace his executioner, submit to poverty, bow to tyranny, and sink without complaint under starvation. Not merely can it make him accept hardship and suffering unresistingly, but it can make him accept as truth the explanation that his perfectly preventable afflictions are sublimely just and gentle. It is in this acme of the power of herd suggestion that is perhaps the most absolutely incontestable proof of the profoundly gregarious nature of man. That a creature of strong appetites and luxurious desires should come to tolerate uncomplainingly his empty belly, his chattering teeth, his naked limbs, and his hard bed is miracle enough. What are we to say of a force which, when he is told by the full-fed and well-warmed that his state is the more blessed, can make him answer, "How beautiful! How true!" In the face of so effectual a negation, not merely of experience and common sense but also of actual hunger and privation, it is not possible to set any limits to the power of the herd over the individual.

3. He is subject to the passions of the pack in his mob violence and the passions of the herd in his panics. These activities are by no means limited to the outbursts of actual crowds, but are to be seen equally clearly in the hue and cry of newspapers and public after some notorious criminal or scapegoat, and in the success of scaremongering by the same agencies.

4. He is remarkably susceptible to leadership. This quality in man may very naturally be thought to have a basis essentially rational rather

than instinctive if its manifestations are not regarded with a special effort to attain an objective attitude. How thoroughly reasonable it appears that a body of men seeking a common object should put themselves under the guidance of some strong and expert personality who can point out the path most profitably to be pursued, who can hearten his followers and bring all their various powers into a harmonious pursuit of the common object. The rational basis of the relation is, however, seen to be at any rate open to discussion when we consider the qualities in a leader upon which his authority so often rests, for there can be little doubt that their appeal is more generally to instinct than to reason. In ordinary politics it must be admitted that the gift of public speaking is of more decisive value than anything else. If a man is fluent, dextrous, and ready on the platform, he possesses the one indispensable requisite for statesmanship, if in addition he has the gift of moving deeply the emotions of his hearers, his capacity for guiding the infinite complexities of national life becomes undeniable. Experience has shown that no exceptional degree of any other capacity is necessary to make a successful leader. There need be no specially arduous training, no great weight of knowledge either of affairs or the human heart, no receptiveness to new ideas, no outlook into reality. Indeed, the mere absence of such seems to be an advantage; for originality is apt to appear to the people as flightiness, scepticism as feebleness, caution as doubt of the greater political principles that may happen at the moment to be immutable. The successful shepherd thinks like his sheep, and can lead his flock only if he keeps no more than the shortest distance in advance. He must remain, in fact, recognizable as one of the flock, magnified no doubt, louder, coarser, above all with more urgent wants and ways of expression than the common sheep, but in essence to their feeling of the same flesh with them. In the human herd the necessity of the leader bearing unmistakable marks of identification is equally essential. Variations from the normal standard in intellectual matters are tolerated if they are not very conspicuous, for man has never yet taken reason very seriously, and can still look upon intellectuality as not more than a peccadillo if it is not paraded conspicuously; variations from the moral standard are, however, of a much greater significance as marks of identification, and when they become obvious, can at once change a great and successful leader into a stranger and outcast, however little they may seem to be relevant to the adequate execution of his public work. If a leader's marks of identity with the herd are of the right kind, the more they are paraded the better. We like to see photographs of him nursing his little granddaughter, we like to know that he plays golf badly, and rides the

bicycle like our common selves, we enjoy hearing of "pretty incidents" in which he has given the blind crossing-sweeper a penny or begged a glass of water at a wayside cottage—and there are excellent biological reasons for our gratification.

In times of war leadership is not less obviously based on instinct, though naturally, since the herd is exposed to a special series of stresses, manifestations of it are also somewhat special. A people at war feels the need of direction much more intensely than a people at peace, and as always they want some one who appeals to their instinctive feeling of being directed, comparatively regardless of whether he is able in fact to direct. This instinctive feeling inclines them to the choice of a man who presents at any rate the appearance and manners of authority and power rather than to one who possesses the substance of capacity but is denied the shadow. They have their conventional pictures of the desired type—the strong, silent, relentless, the bold, outspoken, hard, and energetic—but at all costs he must be a "man," a "leader who can lead," a shepherd, in fact, who, by his gesticulations and his shouts, leaves his flock in no doubt as to his presence and his activity. It is touching to remember how often a people in pursuit of this ideal has obtained and accepted in response to its prayers nothing but melodramatic bombast, impatience, rashness, and foolish, boasting truculence; and to remember how often a great statesman in his country's need has had to contend not merely with her foreign enemies, but with those at home whose voracious malignity has declared his magnanimous composure to be sluggishness, his cautious scepticism to be feebleness, and his unostentatious resolution to be stupidity.

5. His relations with his fellows are dependent upon the recognition of him as a member of the herd. It is important to the success of a gregarious species that individuals should be able to move freely within the large unit while strangers are excluded. Mechanisms to secure such personal recognition are therefore a characteristic feature of the social habit.

Recognition by vision could be of only limited value, and it seems probable that speech very early became the accepted medium. Speech at the present time retains strong evidence of the survival in it of the function of herd recognition. As is usual with instinctive activities in man, the actual state of affairs is concealed by a deposit of rationalized explanations which is apt to discourage merely superficial inquiry. The function of conversation is, it is to be supposed, ordinarily regarded as being the exchange of ideas and information. Doubtless it has come to have such a function, but an objective examination of ordinary conversa-

tion shows that the actual conveyance of ideas takes a very small part in it. As a rule the exchange seems to consist of ideas which are necessarily common to the two speakers, and are known to be so by each. The process, however, is none the less satisfactory for this; indeed, it seems even to derive its satisfactoriness therefrom. The interchange of the conventional lead and return is obviously very far from being tedious or meaningless to the interlocutors. They can, however, have derived nothing from it but the confirmation to one another of their sympathy and of the class or classes to which they belong.

Conversation between persons unknown to one another is also—when satisfactory—apt to be rich in the ritual of recognition. When one hears or takes part in these elaborate evolutions, gingerly proffering one after another of one's marks of identity, one's views on the weather, on fresh air and draughts, on the Government and on uric acid, watching intently for the first low hint of a growl, which will show one belongs to the wrong pack and must withdraw, it is impossible not to be reminded of the similar manœuvres of the dogs, and to be thankful that Nature has provided us with a less direct, though perhaps a more tedious, code.

9. Stimulation Ranges and Reaction Areas¹

Behavior of any description, animal or human, individual, social or societal, is a product of five generic factors, each of them divisible and subdivisible as far as you please.

The first factor is a sustentation field: an inhabitable bit of the earth's surface capable of producing food, and otherwise of providing for an upkeep of plant and animal life. The second factor is an ancestry of commingled dominant and recessive traits, which was handed down in heredity a mechanism of "original nature." The third factor is a certain range (comprising a reach and a scatter) of stimulation. Some stimuli travel far, others but a little way. The fourth factor is an extent or area of reaction. Not all neurons and not all individuals reached and hit by a given stimulus respond to it. Those that do respond make up a reaction area. The fifth factor is a history of primary conditionings and successive reconditionings of reflexes and their combinations.

Have we not now found significant differentiae which broadly mark out divisions of psychology which it has become convenient, if not indeed necessary, to recognize for purposes of intensive scrutiny? Stimuli of

¹ Reprinted by permission from F. H. Giddings "Stimulation Ranges and Reaction Areas" *Psy. Rev.* 1924: XXXI: pp. 449; 452-55.

such limited range that they reach only each individual at a time and disturb only a correspondingly limited reaction area give us the distinctive or differential phenomena (but not all the phenomena) of individual psychology. Stimuli of greater but nevertheless limited range which reach all the individuals of an intimate group or company (companion, *socii*) and the corresponding reaction area give us the differential phenomena of social psychology. Stimuli of considerable range which reach a multitude of individuals and the corresponding reaction area give us the differential phenomena of crowd psychology. And finally, stimuli of indefinite range which reach all the intimate groups and multitudes that compose and constitute a population, and a correspondingly wide reaction area, give us the differential phenomena of societal psychology.

Of the countless reconditionings whereby the reactions of populations to stimulations of indefinite reach and bewildering scatter are fashioned into human society only brief and highly generalized descriptions can be offered at this time. Enumerated in order of occurrence they are: conditioning by interstimulation and response, reconditioning by kind, reconditioning by speech, reconditioning by spoken discriminations of kind (subjectively the "consciousness of kind"), and reconditioning by integrations of habit (folkways, culture). These reconditionings enter into an integration of co-individual behavior.

In the beginning is multi-individual response (i. e. responses by many individuals) to one after another wide-ranging stimulation. There is congregation at places: feeding places, drinking places, places that offer shelter and security. There is concourse and commingling on occasion, when things happen. Multi-individual responses may be simultaneous or approximately so, or they may occur with varying degrees of promptness, differences from which emerge leadership and following. They may be prevailingly alike or prevailingly unlike, and herein lie all possibilities of conflict, competition and co-operation.

Conditioning begins with interstimulation and reactions to it. In any aggregation or assemblage of animals or of human beings the behavior of each individual is stimulus to many of his fellows, now and then to all of them; and some of them, now and then all of them, react. With this interchange communication begins, and herein lie the possibilities of suggestion and suggestibility, of example, imitation and mass intimidation. An exceedingly important phase of multi-individual behavior conditioned by interstimulation is dramatization. In the presence of another or of others the acts of any and each individual become acting. Con-

ditioned by interstimulation and response multi-individual behavior becomes co-individual behavior.

Reconditioning begins with facts and distinctions of kind. Creatures of one identical kind or variety tend to keep together and to go together. This is not because of gregarious instinct. It is because, first, offspring of the same parents and often most of the offspring of one ancestral line for two or three generations hold together by inertia unless an extraneous cause scatters them; and, because, second, holding together is the line of least resistance. Creatures of identical kind do not as a rule repel one another, partly because they are not usually as dangerous to one another as creatures of unlike kind are, and partly because the cries and other behavior of similars are in everything except individual source almost identical with the autostimulating behavior of each individual provocative of reactions within himself.

That the fact last alleged is more substantial than a mere ingenious assumption might be, will be conceded, I think, if we reflect upon the certainty that without the similarity of stimulation by kind to autostimulation, speech could not have been acquired. For, as a behavioristic fact, speech is precisely such an approximate identity of self and other stimulation, of self and other response. With the acquisition of speech a further reconditioning of co-individual behavior began, more radical and far-reaching, perhaps, than any other in the whole history of the human race. It brought every phase of the experience of each individual to bear upon the behavior of every other, and it made possible the handing on of experience, and of acquisitions too subtle for transmission through any other medium, from generation to generation. Conversationalized experience became knowledge, an essential part of which was conversationalized discrimination.

With discriminations talked about came sortings, the beginnings of classification, of distinctions of kind; and among these the most important by far was a talked about discrimination of "own kind" from "other kind," of "my kind" and "our kind" from "your kind," "his kind," and "their kind." Without entering into the question upon which behaviorists and the psychologists of subjectivism are at odds let us say that in the language of the vulgar (if we are talking as behaviorists) or of the esoteric (if we are subjectivists) the phenomenon of which we now speak is an "awareness" or "consciousness" of kind. When men attained it they began to be *social* as already they had been *gregarious*. Now they not only *consorted* by kind, but also they began to *associate*, picking and choosing companions and confirming their likes and dislikes by talk-

ing about them. It was, in short, "the consciousness of kind," or at any rate, the "talking about" distinctions of kind *that converted the animal herd into human society*, a reconditioning of all behavior second in its tremendous importance only to the effects of speech itself.

Finally, came reconditioning by an integration of habits and an accumulation of knowledge (both of which now were talked about) which had been made possible by speech and association. The integrations constituted folkways or customs, and the acquisitions became cultures and culture patterns. The reconditionings which these have brought about constitute our so-called civilization.

10. Social Attitudes in Competition ¹

The General Experimental Situation. The observers, seventeen in number, ranged in age from eighteen to fifty-five years. The average age is 26.2 and the A.D., 5.0. They met twice weekly in groups of four and worked on a task involving the copying of passages from the daily newspapers with rubber letter-stamps impressed individually. In each normal experimental period of an hour, four five-minute tests of working ability were given. During some of these tests the observers competed, during others they disregarded one another's performances. The specific instructions for competition and non-competition were as follows:

Non-competition

"Try to get as much work done as you can, remembering that both the quality and quantity of the work you do will count in your final score. Don't attempt to beat your fellow workers."

Competition

"Try to beat out your fellow workers, remembering that both quality and quantity count in your final score. You may use any method you see fit to employ in keeping track of the progress of your competitors. Compete!"

Summary of Conclusions. 1. Competition on a task commences with an adjustment period in which the subjects either report (a) a conscious effort to orient themselves to the task, to build up both speed and quality in preparation for future competition of a social sort, or (b) a conscious attempt to discover their probable position in ability relative to opponents, in preparation for more intimate rivalry.

2. Competition with the group at large is less frequent than com-

¹ Reprinted by permission from I. J. Whittemore "The Competitive Consciousness" *J. Abn. & Soc. Psy.* 1925-26: XX: 17-18; 32-33.

petition with a particular individual. That member of the group whose skill most nearly approaches the skill of a given subject is the one who tends to be singled out as his principal rival.

3. Auto-competition plays a large part in the competitive efforts of all subjects; it plays the principal part with some of them.

4. The consciousness of competitive effort is *ex post facto*; rather in the nature of a recognized attitude than an immediate awareness. It resembles the acknowledgment of a determining tendency. Occasionally it breaks through into consciousness as an immediate experience of the efforts of others or as a recognized comparison, at the moment, with the subjects' previous performances.

5. In most cases the competitive spirit rises during the period of adjustment. It dies out in the long run.

6. Elements of the competitive attitude sometimes carry over into non-competitive periods of work, but there are no objective indications of a rise in productivity corresponding to this persistence.

7. The subject-matter of consciousness during competition includes irrelevant ideas, awareness of auto-competitive effort, and socio-competitive references. The proportion of irrelevant ideas is higher in non-competition than in competition.

8. A social situation relieves the boredom of a simple task oft repeated. In competition the "game" element is responsible for some of this relief.

9. About as many subjects indicate a preference for non-competitive as for competitive work. (There is no relation between preference and success.)

10. There is some evidence that most subjects undergo physiological changes leading to a rise in blood pressure, probably attributable to an emotional element of excitement, during periods of competition.

II. Participation and Social Assimilation ¹

The Americanization Study has assumed that the fundamental condition of what we call "Americanization" is the participation of the immigrant in the life of the community in which he lives. The point here emphasized is that patriotism, loyalty and common sense are neither created nor transmitted by purely intellectual processes. Men must live and work and fight together in order to create that community of in-

¹ Reprinted with permission from mimeographed materials prepared by R. E. Park and W. I. Thomas for the "Americanization Study" which was made under the direction of A. T. Burns for the Carnegie Corporation, New York, 1917-19.

terest and sentiment which will enable them to meet the crises of their common life with a common will.

It is evident, however, that the word "participation" as here employed has a wide application, and it becomes important for working purposes to give a more definite and concrete meaning to the term.

(1) *Language*

Obviously any organized social activity whatever and any participation in this activity implies "communication." In human, as distinguished from animal society, common life is based on a common speech. To share a common speech does not guarantee participation in the community life but it is an instrument of participation, and its acquisition by the members of an immigrant group is rightly considered a sign and a rough index of Americanization.

It is, however, one of the ordinary experiences of social intercourse that words and things do not have the same meanings with different people, in different parts of the country, in different periods of time, and, in general, in different contexts. The same "thing" has a different meaning for the naïve person and the sophisticated person, for the child and philosopher; the new experience derives its significance from the character and organization of the previous experiences. To the peasant a comet, a plague, an epileptic person may mean a divine portent, a visitation of God, a possession by the devil; to the scientific man they mean something quite different. The word "slavery" had very different connotations in the ancient world and today. It has a very different significance today in the Southern states and the Northern states. "Socialism" has a very different significance to the immigrant from the Russian pale living on the "East Side" of New York City, to the citizen on Riverside Drive, and to the native American in the hills of Georgia.

Psychologists explain this difference in the connotation of the same word among people using the same language in terms of difference in the "apperception mass" in different individuals and different groups of individuals. In their phraseology the apperception mass represents the body of memories and meanings deposited in the consciousness of the individual from the totality of his experiences. It is the body of material with which every new datum of experience comes into contact, to which it is related and in connection with which it gets its meaning.

When persons interpret data on different grounds, when the apperception mass is radically different, we say popularly that they live in different worlds. The logician expresses this by saying that they occupy dif-

ferent "universes of discourse"—that is, they cannot talk in the same terms. The ecclesiastic, the artist, the mystic, the scientist; the Philistine, the Bohemian, represent more or less different universes of discourse. Even social workers occupy universes of discourse not mutually intelligible.

Similarly, different races and nationalities as wholes represent different apperception masses and consequently different universes of discourse and are not mutually intelligible. Even our remote forefathers are with difficulty intelligible to us, though always more intelligible than the eastern European immigrant, because of the continuity of our tradition. Still, it is almost as difficult for us to comprehend *Elsie Dinsmore* or the *Westminster Catechism* as the *Koran* or the *Talmud*.

(2) Education

It is apparent, therefore, that in the wide extension and vast complexity of modern life, in which peoples of different races and cultures are now coming into intimate contact, the divergences in the meanings and values which individuals and groups attach to objects and forms of behavior are deeper than anything expressed by differences in language.

Actually common participation in common activities implies a common "definition of the situation." In fact every single act, and eventually all moral life, is dependent upon the definition of the situation. A definition of the situation precedes and limits any possible action, and a redefinition of the situation changes the character of the action. An abusive person, for example, provokes anger and possibly violence, but if we realize that the man is insane this redefinition of the situation results in totally different behavior.

Every social group develops systematic and unsystematic means of defining the situation for its members. Among these means are the "don'ts" of the mother, the gossip of the community, epithets ("liar," "traitor," "scab") the sneer, the shrug, the newspaper, the theater, the school, libraries, the law and the gospel. Education in the widest sense—intellectual, moral, esthetic—is the process of defining the situation. It is the process by which the definitions of an older generation are transmitted to a younger. In the case of the immigrant it is the process by which the definitions of one cultural group are transmitted to another.

Differences in meanings and value, referred to above in terms of the apperception mass, grow out of the fact that different individuals and different peoples have defined the situation in different ways. When we speak of the different "heritages" or "traditions" which our different immigrant groups bring, it means that owing to different historical cir-

cumstances they have defined the situation differently. Certain prominent personalities, schools of thought, bodies of doctrine, historical events have contributed in defining the situation and determining the attitudes and values of our various immigrant groups in characteristic ways in their home countries. To the Sicilian, for example, marital infidelity means the stiletto; to the American, the divorce court. And even when the immigrant thinks that he understands us he nevertheless does not do this completely. At the best he interprets our cultural traditions in terms of his own. This is well exemplified in a letter dated May 2, 1907 to President Roosevelt from an Italian (the writer was at the time in Sing Sing) proposing to make him president of the Black Hand if his candidacy for the presidency at Washington failed. The native American appreciates the "manhood" and the "big stick" of Colonel Roosevelt in their whole context, but the Sicilian identified them with his own "omerta."

Actually the situation is progressively redefined by the consequences of the actions, provoked by the previous definitions, and a prison experience is designed to provide a datum toward the re-definition of the situation, though in the case of the Italian this was evidently not doing its perfect work.

It is evidently important that the people who compose a community and share in the common life should have a sufficient body of common memories to understand one another. This is particularly true in democracy, where it is intended that the public institutions should be responsive to public opinion. There can be no public opinion except in so far as the persons who compose the public are able to live in the same world and speak and think in the same universe of discourse. For that reason, it seems desirable that the immigrants should not only speak the language of the country but should know something of the history of the people among whom they have chosen to dwell. For that same reason, it is important that native Americans should know the history and social life of the countries from which the immigrants come.

It is important also that every individual should share as fully as possible a fund of knowledge, experience, sentiments and ideals common to the whole community and himself contribute to this fund. It is for this reason that we maintain and seek to maintain freedom of speech and free schools. The function of literature, including poetry, romance and the newspaper, is to enable all to share vicariously and imaginatively in the inner life of each. The function of science is to gather up, classify, digest and preserve, in a form in which they may become available to community as a whole, the ideas, inventions and

technical experience of the individuals composing it. Thus not merely the possession of a common language but the wide extension of the opportunities for education becomes a condition of Americanization.

The immigration problem is unique in the sense that the immigrant brings divergent definitions of the situation and this renders his participation in our activities difficult. At the same time this problem is of the same general type as the one exemplified by "syndicalism," "bolshivism," "socialism," etc., where the definition of the situation does not agree with the traditional one. The modern "social unrest," like the immigrant problem is a sign of the lack of participation and this is true to the degree that certain elements feel that violence is the only available means of participating.

In general, a period of unrest represents the stage in which a new definition of the situation is being prepared. Emotion and unrest are connected with situations where there is loss of control. Control is secured on the basis of habits and habits are built upon the basis of the definition of the situation. Habit represents a situation where the definition is working. When control is lost it means that the habits are no longer adequate, that the situation has changed and demands a redefinition. This is the point at which we have unrest—a heightened emotional state, random movements, unregulated behavior—and this continues until the situation is redefined. The unrest is associated with conditions in which the individual or society feels unable to act. It represents energy, and the problem is to use it constructively.

The older societies tended to treat unrest by defining the situation in terms of the suppression or postponement of the wish; they tried to make the repudiation of the wish itself a wish. "Contentment," "conformity to the will of God," ultimate "salvation" in a better world, are representative of this. The founders of America defined the situation in terms of participation, but this has actually taken too exclusively the form of "political participation." The present tendency is to define the situation in terms of "social participation," including a demand for the improvement of social conditions to a degree which will enable all to participate.

(3) *Individual Liberty*

But, while it is important that the people who are members of the same community should have a body of common memories and a common apperception mass, so that they may talk intelligibly to one another, it is neither possible nor necessary that every individual and every group should have an identical body of experiences and that every-

thing should have the same meaning for everyone. A perfectly homogeneous consciousness would mean a tendency to define all situations rigidly and sacredly and once and forever. Something like this did happen in the Slavic village communities and among all savage people, and it was the ideal of the medieval church, but it implies a low level of efficiency and a slow rate of progress.

Mankind is distinguished, in fact, from the animal world by being composed of persons of divergent types, of varied tastes and interests, of different vocations and functions. Civilization is the product of an association of widely different individuals, and with the progress of civilization the divergence in individual human types has been and must continue to be constantly multiplied. Our progress in the arts and sciences and in the creation of values in general has been dependent on specialists whose distinctive worth was precisely their divergence from other individuals. It is even evident that we have been able to use productively individuals who in a savage or peasant society would have been classed as insane—who perhaps were indeed insane.

The ability to participate productively implies thus a diversity of attitudes and values in the participants, but a diversity not so great as to lower the morals of the community, and prevent effective co-operation. It is important to have ready definitions for all immediate situations, but progress is dependent on the constant redefinition of the situation, and the ideal condition for this is the presence of individuals with divergent definitions, who contribute, in part consciously and in part unconsciously, through their individualism and labors to a common task and a common end. It is only in this way that an intelligible world, in which each can participate according to his intelligence, comes into existence. For, it is only through their consequences that words get their meanings and that situations become defined. It is through conflict and co-operation, or to use a current phrase of the economists, through "competitive co-operation", that a distinctly human type of society does anywhere exist. Privacy and publicity, "society" and solitude, public ends and private enterprises are each and all distinctive factors in human society everywhere. They are particularly characteristic of historic American democracy.

In this whole connection it appears that the group consciousness and the individual himself are formed by communication and participation, and that the communication and participation are themselves dependent for their meaning on common interests.

But it would be an error to assume that participation always implies an intimate personal, face-to-face relation. Specialists participate notably

and productively in our common life, but this is evidently not on the basis of personal association with their neighbors. Darwin was assisted by Lyell, Owen and other contemporaries in working out a new definition of the situation, but these men were not his neighbors. When Meyer worked out his theory of the transmutation of energy, his neighbors in the village of Heilbronn were so far from participating that they twice confined him in insane asylums. A postage stamp may be a more efficient instrument of participation than a village meeting.

Defining the situation with reference to the participation of the immigrant is of course not solving the problem of immigration. This involves an analysis of the whole significance of the qualitative and quantitative character of a population, with reference to any given values—standards of living, individual level of efficiency, liberty and determinism, etc. We have, for instance, in America a certain level of culture, depending, let us say as a minimum, on the perpetuation of our public school system. But, if by some conceivable *lusus naturae* the birth-rate was multiplied a hundred fold, or by some conceivable cataclysm a hundred million African blacks were landed annually on our eastern coast and an equal number of Chinese coolies on our western coast, then we should have neither teachers enough nor buildings enough nor material resources enough to impart even the three R's to a fraction of the population, and the outlook of democratic participation would become very dismal. On the other hand it is conceivable that certain immigrant populations in certain numbers, with their special temperaments, endowments and social heritages, would contribute positively and increasingly to our stock of civilization. Certainly if the immigrant is admitted on any basis whatever, one condition of his Americanization is that he shall have the widest and freest opportunity to contribute in his own way to the common fund of knowledge, ideas and ideals which makes up the culture of our common country. It is only in this way that the immigrant can *participate* in the fullest sense of the term.

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What distinctive human traits seem to have arisen in the group?
2. Criticize, pro and con, Darwin's statement that "man sprang from a comparatively small and weak species." What advantage would there be in this condition? Is there any evidence from man's nature today that this was perhaps the case?

3. Upon what grounds may we say that moral sensibility rests distinctly upon social interaction?
 4. Criticize, pro and con, Chapin's statement that "the intellectual faculty is eminently a social faculty." Did not men group themselves together because they had the intelligence to foresee the advantages of such social life rather than develop their intelligence through living with other persons?
 5. Indicate by examples how association might affect biological selection and the persistence of certain traits in the individual.
 6. Illustrate the effect which "the voice of the herd" has in influencing one's behavior at the present time.
 7. Distinguish between gregariousness and sociability.
 8. Show that in order to understand conditioning we must understand the content as well as the mechanism of the social conditioning.
 9. Show how competition may exist within a group along with mutuality and co-operation.
 10. Criticize current methods of Americanization in the light of Park and Thomas' discussion of principles.
- B. Topics for Class Reports
1. Review Fiske's theory of the importance of the extension of human infancy. (Cf. bibliography.)
 2. Review Kidd's theory of the importance of social traits in the evolution of human culture. (Cf. bibliography.)
- C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers
1. The Social Group as an Evolutionary Unit.
 2. Social Psychological Critique of the Social Contract Theory.
 3. The Interdependence of Group Life and the Higher Mental Powers.

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CHAPTER IV

TYPES OF SOCIAL GROUPINGS

I. INTRODUCTION

The most fundamental division of social groups as to type is that between the "in-group" and the "out-group" (the others-group). This separation runs throughout society, primitive as well as modern. The in-group attitudes and habits are those of loyalty, co-operation, mutual aid, concern for social welfare of other members, and sense of social solidarity and oneness. All of these attitudes and habits are integrated around the group ideals and standards, around the need for group survival. In sharp contrast with them stand the attitudes and habits built up in reference to the out-group, that is to those groups to which one does not belong. Around these, one integrates his dislikes, his disgusts, his prejudices, his fears. There is either group conflict, open or implied, or else indifference at all times.

This ambivalent situation, love, sympathy, loyalty, mutuality, and the like, directed toward the in-group, and hatred, fear, suspicion, avoidance, or even warfare directed toward the out-group, corresponds in social evolution to the deepest division of one's trends as a personality. Thus, in time of war it is possible to love ardently one's country, and at the same time to hate and fear the enemy with equal vigor.

One process accompanies and abets the other. To love one's friends and to hate one's enemies is natural; one might say, inevitable. But to love one's enemies, following the injunction of The Master, is a severe doctrine; indeed it is, like many of His wise sayings, a paradox. That is to say, Jesus, of course, intended, by this doctrine, to eliminate hatred, for He perceived that one could not "love" an enemy, a member of the out-group, a Gentile, an *Auslander*.

The paper by Sumner presents some valuable aspects of this matter

of in-group versus out-group, touching especially on ethnocentrism.

But there is another dimension in social groupings. Within any given set of in-groups there may be other groupings, themselves dividing into in-group versus out-group relations. Thus we come to Cooley's fundamental concept of the "primary" and the "secondary" groupings. The family, for example, is the most fundamental primary group; it is the group in which biological trends and social patterns are integrated. In this sense it is primary, as also in the sense used by Cooley. Both Ellwood and Cooley make pertinent comments on these two types of groups. Secondary groupings tend also to be much more voluntarily and self-consciously formed than do the primary groupings. The present period of culture is one marked by the increasing domination of the secondary groupings.

Of the primary groups other than the family, we may mention the neighborhood and the play group. Growing out of the play group is the important gang group. This is of great value in the process of forming new attachments not related to the family or group of elders. In most cases it does have a geographic unity, but it cuts across many other types of groupings which adults might regard as true barriers to social intercourse. That is to say, it overrides religious, racial, and other cultural barriers. For example, Catholic and Protestant boys are found in the same gangs. So, too, boys of Italian or Greek homes mingle with Irish-American and German-American and with the older American stock of British extraction. The paper by Puffer, while of older date, and of somewhat looser terminology, than the investigations of Furfey and Thrasher, contains the essential features of the in-group attitudes and habits of the gang. Among these are leadership, division of tasks, subordination to gang purposes, and typical antagonistic responses to outside groups. Criminalistic gangs which infest our urban centers are fed by these boy gangs. Their organizations have all the features of the close-knit primary group abetted by all the devices of modern rapid communication and transportation and of sophisticated warfare.

There is also a form of primary group hitherto little studied which has been termed the congenial group. The writer has included a section taken from a series of examples which he has collected of this type of intimate, face-to-face group. The congenial group grows

out of play groups originally, but in adolescence and adulthood it seems dependent rather on conscious common interests and less on geographical locality than is the case in the primary groups described by Cooley. In this aspect the congenial group partakes of some characteristics of the secondary group.

Another type of grouping in both primitive and modern social life and partaking of primary group characteristics, though often formed on the basis of conscious interests and thus akin to secondary groupings, is the so-called "secret society." These associations are sometimes more or less purely recreational in the sense of possessing club-house and amusement features; but at other times, they play a distinctive part in social control. Such were the men's societies among primitive peoples. Such is our own Ku Klux Klan. Such have been the religious cults organized in every society at all complex. There are also, both in primitive and present societies, groupings of military classes, occupational and professional classes, and, among pre-literate peoples, groups known as "age-classes." An enormous literature on this type of grouping among primitive people is available. There exists also some descriptive material bearing on the secret fraternities of our own time, although, of course, little of reliable sort on their secret features since they are still a vital part of current culture. Given our complex political organization in the Western World, and our notions of democracy and open classes, it is of great interest to note how large a place these cults play in present social control. While no selections are given to illustrate this type of grouping, the student will find in the bibliography materials to which he can refer for interesting and enlightening data.

Industrialism and political democracy as culture patterns have produced certain profound changes in our modes of life—changes of which many of us are hardly aware. It is amazing to note that college students of the present generation know so little, for instance, of the horse-drawn wagon and carriage stage of transportation which existed everywhere before 1900. This is merely a current instance of the speed of change and the attendant unconsciousness of what has taken and is taking place all about us. New modes of travel, better means of communication, advanced commercial and industrial techniques, ever-changing scientific appliances are everywhere mak-

ing for increased wealth, health, and comfort. Yet, while material culture has made great changes, the moral codes, the mores, belong distinctly to another age. This has produced a crisis in our social life, perhaps the most profound crisis in history. As a concluding section of the present chapter the paper of Cooley on changes in group life in present-day society indicates some of the more important alterations which democracy and industrialism have produced.

II. MATERIALS

12. The Nature of the In-Group¹

The conception of "primitive society" which we ought to form is that of small groups scattered over a territory. The size of the groups is determined by the conditions of the struggle for existence. The internal organization of each group corresponds to its size. A group of groups may have some relation to each other (kin, neighborhood, alliance, connubium and commercium) which draws them together and differentiates them from others. Thus a differentiation arises between ourselves, the we-group, or in-group, and everybody else, or the others-groups, out-groups. The insiders in a we-group are in a relation of peace, order, law, government, and industry, to each other. Their relation to all outsiders, or others-group, is one of war and plunder, except so far as agreements have modified it. If a group is exogamic, the women in it were born abroad somewhere. Other foreigners who might be found in it are adopted persons, guest friends, and slaves.

Sentiments in the in-group and towards the out-group. The relation of comradeship and peace in the we-group and that of hostility and war towards others-groups are correlative to each other. The exigencies of war with outsiders are what make peace inside, lest internal discord should weaken the we-group for war. These exigencies also make government and law in the in-group, in order to prevent quarrels and enforce discipline. Thus war and peace have reacted on each other and developed each other, one within the group, the other in the intergroup relation. The closer the neighbors, and the stronger they are, the intenser is the warfare, and then the intenser is the internal organization and discipline of each. Sentiments are produced to correspond. Loyalty to the group, sacrifice for it, hatred and contempt for outsiders, brotherhood within, warlikeness without—all grow together, common products

¹ Reprinted by permission from W. G. Sumner, *The Folkways*, pp. 12-15. Boston: Ginn and Company, 1906.

of the same situation. These relations and sentiments constitute a social philosophy. It is sanctified by connection with religion. Men of an others-group are outsiders with whose ancestors the ancestors of the we-group waged war. Virtue consists in killing, plundering, and enslaving outsiders.

Ethnocentrism is the technical name for this view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it. Folkways correspond to it to cover both the inner and the outer relation. Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders. Each group thinks its own folkways the only right ones, and if it observes that other groups have other folkways, these excite its scorn. Opprobrious epithets are derived from these differences. "Pig-eater," "cow-eater," "uncircumcised," "jabberers," are epithets of contempt and abomination. The Tupis called the Portuguese by a derisive epithet descriptive of birds which have feathers around their feet, on account of trousers. For our present purpose the most important fact is that ethnocentrism leads a people to exaggerate and intensify everything in their own folkways which is peculiar and which differentiates them from others. It therefore strengthens the folkways.

When Caribs were asked whence they came, they answered, "We alone are people." The meaning of the name Kiowa is "real or principal people." The Lapps call themselves "men," or "human beings." The Greenland Eskimo think that Europeans have been sent to Greenland to learn virtue and good manners from the Greenlanders. Their highest form of praise for a European is that he is, or soon will be, as good as a Greenlander. The Tunguses call themselves "men." As a rule it is found that nature peoples call themselves "men." Others are something else—perhaps not defined—but not real men. In myths the origin of their own tribe is that of the real human race. They do not account for the others.

The Jews divided all mankind into themselves and Gentiles. They were the "chosen people." The Greeks and Romans called all outsiders "barbarians." In Euripides' tragedy of *Iphigenia in Aulis*, Iphigenia says that it is fitting that Greeks should rule over barbarians, but not contrariwise, because Greeks are free, and barbarians are slaves. The Arabs regarded themselves as the noblest nation and all others as more or less barbarous. In 1896, the Chinese minister of education edited a manual in which this statement occurs: "How grand and glorious is the Empire of China, the middle kingdom! She is the largest and richest

in the world. The grandest men in the world have all come from the middle empire." In all the literature of all the states equivalent statements occur, although they are not so naïvely expressed. In Russian books and newspapers the civilizing mission of Russia is talked about, just as, in the books and journals of France, Germany, and the United States, the civilizing mission of those countries is assumed and referred to as well understood. Each state now regards itself as the leader of civilization, the best, the freest, and the wisest, and all others as inferior. Within a few years our own man-on-the-curbstone has learned to class all foreigners of the Latin peoples as "dagos," and "dago" has become an epithet of contempt. These are all cases of ethnocentrism.

13. Types of Human Associations¹

We have already mentioned among the forms of human association or types of human groups, natural genetic groups, which we have called "communities," and also "primary groups." We have not distinguished between these two, as some communities are primary groups. If a community is any group which carries on all phases of a common life, it must be a natural genetic group. Individuals are born into it and hence membership in it is more or less involuntary. Hence such groups are sometimes called *involuntary groups*. They include all sorts of natural groups, such as the family, the neighborhood group, kinship groups, cities, states, and nations. Because communities are natural, non-specialized groups, embracing all phases of life, they are of more interest to students of group behavior than the more or less artificial and specialized groups. They are more stable, as a rule, as well as more all-embracing.

In contrast with these natural, genetic groups we must place the *voluntary*, purposive groups which we find in human society. These are associations of persons formed for special purposes. They are sometimes called "interest groups." Such are political parties, religious sects, trade unions, industrial corporations, cultural associations, and the like. Sometimes these specialized, purposive groups include in their membership only one sex, one age class, or one economic class. Modern civilization is characterized by the great growth of these specialized forms of human association. As such groups are not found below the human level, they must be considered as products of human culture. While,

¹ Reprinted by permission from C. A. Ellwood, *The Psychology of Human Society*, pp. 117-18; 119-21. New York. D. Appleton & Company, 1925.

therefore, they are very important for understanding the later phases of social and cultural evolution, they are not so important for understanding fundamental factors in human social life.

More important still for sociological purposes is the distinction between *primary* and *secondary* groups.¹

Secondary groups are those which do not necessarily involve face-to-face association or intimate, direct, personal relations. These groups have become so important in human society that some, like the state and the nation, have actually been confused with human society itself. Yet secondary groups are all the result of human culture and could not even exist without considerable cultural equipment on the part of man. They probably did not begin to exist until the stage of barbarism was reached, or not more than twenty thousand years ago. Yet such groups as cities, provinces, states, and nations, on the one hand, and political parties, religious sects, and great industrial corporations, on the other, are not only obviously important for understanding the social life of our present human world, but their control has become one of the main problems of our civilization. We can best understand these secondary groups, however, by approaching them through the study of the primary group. The student should not fail to note that the classification of groups into primary and secondary cuts across the classification of groups as involuntary and voluntary.

Another very important distinction for sociological purposes among the forms of human association is that between the *institutional* and *non-institutional*. As we have seen, those groupings and relations of individuals which have been reflected upon, sanctioned, and established, or "instituted," by the authority of communities, we call "institutions." Such are the family, property, the state, the church, and the school. As institutions are dependent upon reflective thought, intercommunication, and the organization of authority, they are not found, in the strict sense, below the human level. Their importance in human social life is indicated by the fact that they have been reflected upon, sanctioned, and established by human communities. They embody the chief consciously recognized values in the social life.

In spite of the tendency of civilization to "institutionalize" all the more important groups and relations in human society, there are still many non-institutional groups and relations. Such, for example, are the temporary groups that are constantly forming and dissolving, as crowds, mobs, play groups, or groups of friends. Indeed, many of the everyday relations of life of individuals with one another are still non-

¹ Cf. Cooley, Section 14 on primary groups.

institutional. The neighborhood group, for example, although a permanent group, can scarcely be said to be institutionalized. These unreflective, non-institutionalized forms of association of human beings retain great interest for the social psychologist, because in them we may frequently discern the original, unreflective tendencies of human nature more clearly than in the institutional groups, which necessarily take on an artificial character, as a result not only of reflection but of social coercion.

The distinction between *temporary* and *permanent* groups is not so important, as the temporary groups are usually found within larger permanent groups. However, even here certain distinctions in the type of behavior may be noted. Evidently the permanent group is more important for understanding human collective life as a whole than the temporary group; so also, the involuntary than the voluntary, the institutional than the non-institutional, the primary than the secondary. Primary groups are especially important for the understanding of social behavior, since the original form of association was an association of personal presence.

14. The Nature of the Primary In-Group¹

By primary groups I mean those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and co-operation. They are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual. The result of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group. Perhaps the simplest way of describing this wholeness is by saying that it is a "we"; It involves the sort of sympathy and mutual identification for which "we" is the natural expression. One lives in the feeling of the whole and finds the chief aims of his will in that feeling.

It is not to be supposed that the unity of the primary group is one of mere harmony and love. It is always a differentiated and usually a competitive unity, admitting of self-assertion and various appropriative passions; but these passions are socialized by sympathy, and come, or tend to come, under the discipline of a common spirit. The individual will be ambitious, but the chief object of his ambition will be some desired

¹ Reprinted by permission from C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, pp. 23; 24; 25; 26-27; 29-30. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909.

place in the thought of the others, and he will feel allegiance to common standards of service and fair play. So the boy will dispute with his fellows a place on the team, but above such disputes will place the common glory of his class and school.

The most important spheres of this intimate association and co-operation—though by no means the only ones—are the family, the play-group of children, and the neighborhood or community group of elders. These are practically universal, belonging to all times and all stages of development; and are accordingly a chief basis of what is universal in human nature and human ideals. Such association is clearly the nursery of human nature in the world about us, and there is no apparent reason to suppose that the case has anywhere or at any time been essentially different.

As regards play, I might, were it not a matter of common observation, multiply illustrations of the universality and spontaneity of the group discussion and co-operation to which it gives rise. The general fact is that children, especially boys after about their twelfth year, live in fellowships in which their sympathy, ambition and honor are engaged even more, often, than they are in the family. Most of us can recall examples of the endurance by boys of injustice and even cruelty, rather than appeal from their fellows to parents or teachers—as, for instance, in the hazing so prevalent at schools, and so difficult, for this very reason, to repress.

Of the neighborhood group it may be said, in general, that from the time men formed permanent settlements upon the land, down, at least, to the rise of modern industrial cities, it has played a main part in the primary, heart-to-heart life of the people. Among our Teutonic forefathers the village community was apparently the chief sphere of sympathy and mutual aid for the commons all through the “dark” and middle ages, and for many purposes it remains so in rural districts at the present day.

In our own life the intimacy of the neighborhood has been broken up by the growth of an intricate mesh of wider contacts which leaves us strangers to people who live in the same house. And even in the country the same principle is at work, though less obviously, diminishing our economic and spiritual community with our neighbors.

Besides these almost universal kinds of primary association, there are many others whose form depends upon the particular state of civilization; the only essential thing, as I have said, being a certain intimacy and fusion of personalities. In our own society, being little bound by place, people easily form clubs, fraternal societies and the like, based

on congeniality, which may give rise to real intimacy. Many such relations are formed at school and college, and among men and women brought together in the first instance by their occupations—as workman in the same trade, or the like. Where there is a little common interest and activity, kindness grows like weeds by the roadside.

But the fact that the family and neighborhood groups are ascendant in the open and plastic time of childhood makes them even now incomparably more influential than all the rest.

Primary groups are primary in the sense that they give the individual his earliest and completest experience of social unity, and also in the sense that they do not change in the same degree as more elaborate relations, but form a comparatively permanent source out of which the latter are ever springing.

These groups, then, are springs of life, not only for the individual but for social institutions. They are only in part molded by special traditions, and, in larger degree, express a universal nature.

To return to primary groups: the view here maintained is that human nature is not something existing separately in the individual, but a *group-nature or primary phase of society*, a relatively simple and general condition of the social mind. It is something more, on the one hand, than the mere instinct that is born in us—though that enters into it—and something less, on the other, than the more elaborate development of ideas and sentiments that makes up institutions. It is the nature which is developed and expressed in those simple, face-to-face groups that are somewhat alike in all societies; groups of the family, the playground, and the neighborhood. In the essential similarity of these is to be found the basis, in experience, for similar ideas and sentiments in the human mind. In these, everywhere, human nature comes into existence. Man does not have it at birth; he cannot acquire it except through fellowship, and it decays in isolation.

15. The Boys' Gang as a Primary Group¹

The gang age . . . is from ten to sixteen. In a few cases, this organized group life begins as young as seven; in a few, also, it lasts up to eighteen or nineteen. Between thirteen and fourteen is the average age; and in a general way, the boy's social education in the gang takes about five years.

¹ The selections from J. A. Puffer, *The Boy and His Gang*, pp. 26; 27; 29-30; 32-33; 34-35; 36; 37-38; 143; 144; 147-48; 148-49, are used by permission of, and by arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company, the authorized publishers.

Nearly always, the gang is a strictly local affair, limited to a certain district or to one or two streets.

As for nationality, the gang is apt to be thoroughly unprejudiced and democratic. . . . Fifty-four of my gangs were of mixed nationality, while in only one was any line drawn at breed or color— "No Jews or Negroes allowed."

In respect to definiteness of organization, there are marked differences in gangs. Some are loosely knit and of short duration; others are select in their membership and rigid in their structure, so that they last through several generations of boys. Some gangs are autocratic, some democratic, —this, naturally, depending largely on the leader.

Most of them have names,—the Hicks Street Fellows, The Bleachery Gang, Morse Hollow Athletic Club, Wharf Rats, Crooks, Liners, Eggmen, Dowser Glums. Most have a regular time and place of meeting, rules and officers, though only a few have written constitutions and by-laws. Moreover, the definiteness of the organization and the *esprit de corps* seem to be quite independent of any formality or written code. Two organizations may be equally definite and forceful; and yet one may have its organization explicit in articles of federation, while that of the other is covert in the brain and muscles of its leader.

In general, about half the city gangs have their regular meeting-place on the street or street corner. For the other half, my records show four gangs meeting in clubrooms; three in houses; two in a shed; and one each in a shanty, behind a barn in the woods, in a house made of old barrels in a back street, a hencoop, a hut in the woods, a tent in the woods, a tent in the yard, a dugout, an empty attic, and the cellar of a shed.

Two boys said: "We didn't have no leader." This is not correct. Consciously or unconsciously there must be a leader in every social group. A few gangs have a long list of officers elected formally by ballot at stated periods. But forty-four gangs ($66\frac{2}{3}$ per cent) have one leader, who takes his position naturally with little form or ceremony. Of the sixty-six gangs—

1	gang	had	six	officers	or	leaders
1	"	"	four	"	"	"
4	gangs	"	three	"	"	"
8	"	"	two	"	"	"
44	"	"	one	officer	or	leader
8	"	"	no	regular	leader	

The following words express the spirit of the boys in reference to leadership:—

"J. was ringleader. Steals most; says, 'Come on.' " "I was leader. Had stumps, and the one who could do the most stumps would be leader."
 "D. was the leader. He could fight best and had most money." "G. was leader. He gave you anything if he had it. Worst one in the gang."
 "D. was leader. Pretty good fellow. Most daring fellow. Choose him by ballot." "No regular leader. One fellow proposed a thing. He knew most about it, and take the lead."

Commonly when boys enter a new gang some form of a reception is tendered them. In winter the new fellow may get a rub in the snow; in summer months he may be given a ducking or a little rough-and-tumble good time. In the Jenhine Boys, the new fellow "had to wrestle with Gibson to see if he was strong," while in the Tennis Club, they "pounce on a fellow and give it to him for two or three minutes." In a few gangs there were definitely planned initiation ceremonies. In the Jeffries Point Gang they threw a new fellow up in the air for five or ten minutes to test his grit. "If he didn't cry, let him in." The object of the initiation ceremony appears to be to test the new fellow's grit and strengthen his spirit of loyalty.

In the sixty-six gangs we find—

18	rules	as to	"squealing,"	snitching,	or	telltaling
8	"	"	"	lying to one of the gang		
8	"	"	"	standing by each other in trouble		
5	"	"	"	"divvying up" or paying equal parts of the expenses		
3	"	"	"	unjust fighting		
2	"	"	"	using tobacco		
1	rule	"	"	swearing		
1	"	"	"	stealing		

We find the demand for loyalty and justice in the foreground and for morality in the rear. Although the rules are rarely put on paper there are few gangs without an unwritten code. These rules are necessary for the existence of the gang. They must be strictly enforced or the gang is dissolved. Expulsion is the usual penalty.

Boys drop out of the gang suddenly, so that very few remain after sixteen years of age. At this time boys are entering the second adolescent period, and become intensely interested in girls.

As for involuntary withdrawals, ten boys were expelled from their

gangs for "squealing," three for unjust fighting, one each for bossing, failure to pay dues, cowardice, getting fresh, and disobedience. "Kicked one fellow out," ran the reports, "for telling on the others." "Put a fellow out for fighting with another boy. The other fellow was in the right." "Put him out because he would run off when needed to fight."

Disputes are sure to arise in any social group and especially in a gang. "If there was any dispute, have a scrap over it. Fellow who got the worst of it, gave up." "If there was a dispute the leader settled it." "The officers would most always settle disputes, talk it over, get circumstances, and then settle it."

These cases illustrate the most common methods of settling internal troubles. In ten cases the boys fought it out; in seven other cases the matter was settled by the leader, a bigger boy, or an outsider.

The typical boys' gang, then, is no mere haphazard association. Accidents of various sorts—age propinquity, likeness of interests—bring together a somewhat random group. Immediately the boys react on one another. One or more leaders come to the fore. The gang organizes itself, finds or makes its meeting-place, establishes its standards, begins to do things. It develops, in some sort, a collective mind, and acts as a unit to carry out complex schemes and activities which would hardly so much as enter the head of one boy alone. The gang is, in short, a little social organism, coherent, definite, efficient, with a life of its own which is beyond the sum of the lives of its several members. It is the earliest manifestation in man of that strange group-forming instinct, without which beehive and ant hill and human society would be alike impossible.¹

Of all the gang-nurtured social virtues, loyalty and its allies stand easily first. The gang, indeed, exists only because of the loyalty of its members to one another. Without this mutual loyalty there could be no gangs. All the great leaders and successful trainers of boys use the lever of loyalty in reaching and holding their boys.

This gang loyalty, however, is by no means a loyalty to individuals only; it is a loyalty also to ideals. The boy refuses to "squeal" under pressure, partly to shield his fellows, but still more because squealing is contrary to the boys' moral code. He joins the tribal wars, partly because, like the good barbarian he is, he loves his neighbor and hates his enemy, but quite as much because certain fightings are demanded by the gang's standard of honor. The moral education of the gang from the outside, therefore, consists, in part, of a deft substitution of the best ideals of the grown-up world in place of the crude standards

¹ Puffer uses the word instinct in a broad general way. See ch. VII.

of youth. But it must be deftly done and always, at any price, without violence to the immemorial code of Boyville.

In the gang, then, we find the natural time and place for the somewhat sudden birth and development of that spirit of loyalty which is the foundation of most of our social relations. We must, in short, look upon the gang as nature's special training-school for the social virtues. Only by associating himself with other boys can any youth learn the knack of getting on with his fellow men; acquire and practice co-operation, self-sacrifice, loyalty, fidelity, team play; and in general prepare himself to become the politician, the business man, the efficient citizen of a democracy. It may well be questioned whether any association of state or church or neighborhood or school or order has had a greater influence over the lives of most of us men than had the dozen or so of boys who were our intimate companions between the ages of twelve and fifteen.

So with the gang virtues. The impulses to loyalty, fidelity, co-operation, self-sacrifice, justice, which are at the basis of gang psychology, are powerfully reinforced, as we have already seen, by nearly all the typical gang activities.

Even collective stealing is a lesson in co-operation. Thieving expeditions are often definitely planned; one boy watches while the others steal; one engages the attention of the storekeeper while another annexes his property; one member of the gang plagues the victim to get chased, and then the rest loot his goods. Most especially, however, in the group games of the gang do we find the most convenient tool for teaching many of the most essential social qualities.

16. Congenial Groups (Some Case Studies) ¹

(1) *A Childhood Group*

One of the first group experiences which I remember is that of a small neighborhood "bunch." The group consisted of seven girls ranging from the ages of six to nine years. Our group kept together for about five years in spite of the many intrusions attempted by several boys of the neighborhood. This group carried on various activities. For some time we played at various things, the favorite ones being public school and circus. Three of us who had been attending St. James Academy gave music lessons to the rest. The other two girls were Catholic and so I was the only one whose parents would allow

¹ Selections from the writer's collection.

the "dressing up" in a black shawl to represent a nun or "sister," while giving lessons. Needless to say I was the most popular music teacher of the three. At other times we played house having a mamma, papa, aunt, nurse-maid, baby and usually a doctor. After several years of this kind of play we somehow conceived the idea of organizing a lodge. We met in our woodshed at regular times and each one of us held an office. Nothing much was accomplished except a few scrap-books were made for the Smithville Children's Home. The mothers many times helped us bake cookies and do some fancy work which we took delight in selling on Saturdays at our dry-goods-box store. The money was generally used for a party. We had no conscious purpose or ideals however.

(2) Childhood and Adolescent Groups

When I was a small child we lived on a farm and did not have any near neighbors. There were four of us children ranging in size and age near enough to play together. So my brothers and sisters formed the first play group of which I was a member.

When I was old enough to go to school I found other children who liked the same things and who wanted to play the same things as I did. We formed a group which consisted of five girls. Sometimes others joined us in our play at school, and we very often took part in the games with the larger groups at the noon hour. After school we adjourned to the home of one of the girls and played there until we had to go home. We had no other object but play in our minds. We played with dolls, dressed up like our mothers, played house, and various other things of interest to girls. Sometimes one or two of us would get permission from our folks to stay over night at one of the other's home. We would take turns staying at the different places.

As we grew older our interests changed and we gradually drifted apart, joining other groups and forming other friendships.

The next group of any importance was that formed at high school. This group consisted of two other girls, my sister and myself. We four had the best times of our lives. We went everywhere together and did everything together. We had the same ideals and purposes and what one wanted to do we agreed very well on doing. We were together everyday and nearly every evening of the week. We went to shows, parties, musical programs, church socials, and everything that came along. We took week-end excursion trips and spent our vacations together. If there was nothing special going on in town, we would gather at one home and spend the evening making candy, playing

cards and other games. Of course, there were times when we would invite in our friends to share a good time with us, so that we did not entirely isolate ourselves from others. We could have a good time with a crowd as well as alone. We also took hikes and climbed mountains. We were near the seashore and we spent many week-ends at the beach.

This group of friendship has been one of real value and although all four of us are in different parts of the country now, we still keep in touch with one another.

(3) *A Congenial Group in High School and College*

The first real congenial group to which I belonged originated in high school. It consisted of four members, although the congenial tie and association was much stronger with one member and myself than with the others. None of us had ever met before we entered high school; and because we lived in distant parts of the city from each other, we usually only met while at school. We ate lunch together, and then strolled around the halls or in the vicinity of the school building, at such times talking to each other and enjoying each other's companionship. The school athletic contests we always attended together, and occasionally we went to a show, or had a party in one of our homes. We never attempted any organization.

The year following our high-school graduation, three of us came to the state university and roomed at the same place. As a result of this, the congenial bonds between us became very close, and we could meet at every meal and in the evenings. During that first year, I roomed with the fellow with whom I had been most congenial in high school, and ever since we have been the closest of pals. The next year, the fourth member of the group came here to school, but none of us have roomed together since that first year. It is our custom, however, to have a little stag party in my room about once a month, at which times we play cards, have a big "feed," smoke, talk over old times, and end up with an all-inclusive "gab-fest." We still continue to go to games and shows together,—though less often than in high school, and usually trade dances at the University affairs. It is also interesting to note that we are all registered in different schools, including Law, Economics, Business Administration, and Medicine.

(4) *A Congenial Group in College*

My group at the university consisted of four members. One of the boys came from Detroit. He was inclined to be religious. He was a

good debater and enjoyed an argument. He had a rather naïve reaction to things about him, taking so much for granted that he furnished the target of many a broadside. The second was a fellow from Staten Island. Brilliant of mind and vigorous of body, he represented the questioning element. The third, my roommate, was of good Methodist stock. He wore a seven and a half inch hat, and got Phi Beta Kappa his Junior year. He was the leavener of the group. Then there was myself whose main function was to start the lad from Detroit and keep him going until we could line up somewhat evenly on some topic.

Temperamentally we were most homogeneous and our interests all were of the more intellectual sort. We met in each other's rooms and discussed everything from beginnings to future outcomes in history, philosophy, science and literature. Our discussions would last until midnight when we would retire to a "Dog" (an "all night lunch") or one or two would decide to take a hike until daylight.

Our discussions were interesting. They started nowhere and ended nowhere. No field of the real or the imagined was left untouched and although we realized that we never got anywhere, the atmosphere of congeniality and the desire to be together offered the impetus to try our wits and sharpen our weapons of logical offense and defense at every opportunity. A further bond was our mutual dislike of the co-eds, at least at the outset.

The degree of permanence of the group is interesting. After one year and a half, number one joined a fraternity, bought the largest pin possible, and immediately dropped the other three. At the end of the third year, number two shifted to the Law School and became interested in a Law co-ed and he, of course, gradually transferred his attention elsewhere. The last two remained together until graduation.

17. Changes in Group Life under Modern Industrial Society ¹

The changes that have taken place since the beginning of the nineteenth century are such as to constitute a new epoch in communication, and in the whole system of society. They deserve, therefore, careful consideration, not so much in their mechanical aspect, which is familiar to every one, as in their operation upon the larger mind.

If one were to analyze the mechanism of intercourse, he might, perhaps, distinguish four factors that mainly contribute to its efficiency, namely:

¹ Reprinted by permission from C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, pp. 80; 81-83; 84; 86-87. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909.

Expressiveness, or the range of ideas and feelings it is competent to carry.

Permanence of record, or the overcoming of time.

Swiftmess, or the overcoming of space.

Diffusion, or access to all classes of men.

It is not too much to say that these changes are the basis, from a mechanical standpoint, of nearly everything that is characteristic in the psychology of modern life. In a general way they mean the expansion of human nature, that is to say, of its power to express itself in social wholes. They make it possible for society to be organized more and more on the higher faculties of man, on intelligence and sympathy, rather than on authority, caste, and routine. They mean freedom, outlook, indefinite possibility. The public consciousness, instead of being confined as regards its more active phases to local groups, extends by even steps with that give-and-take of suggestions that the new intercourse makes possible, until wide nations, and finally the world itself, may be included in one lively mental whole.

The general character of this change is well expressed by the two words *enlargement* and *animation*. Social contacts are extended in space and quickened in time, and in the same degree the mental unity they imply becomes wider and more alert. The individual is broadened by coming into relation with a larger and more various life, and he is kept stirred up, sometimes to excess, by the multitude of changing suggestions which this life brings to him.

From whatever point of view we study modern society to compare it with the past or to forecast the future, we ought to keep at least a subconsciousness of this radical change in mechanism, without allowing for which nothing else can be understood.

In the United States, for instance, at the close of the eighteenth century, public consciousness of any active kind was confined to small localities. Travel was slow, uncomfortable and costly, and people undertaking a considerable journey often made their wills beforehand. The newspapers, appearing weekly in the larger towns, were entirely lacking in what we should call news; and the number of letters sent during a year in all the thirteen states was much less than that now handled by the New York office in a single day. People are far more alive today to what is going on in China, if it happens to interest them, than they were then to events a hundred miles away. The isolation of even large towns from the rest of the world, and the consequent introversion of men's minds upon local concerns, was something we can hardly conceive.

The change to the present régime of railroads, telegraphs, daily papers, telephones and the rest has involved a revolution in every phase of life; in commerce, in politics, in education even in mere sociability and gossip—this revolution always consisting in an enlargement and quickening of the kind of life in question.

Probably there is nothing in this new mechanism quite so pervasive and characteristic as the daily newspaper. What a strange practice it is, when you think of it, that a man should sit down to his breakfast table and, instead of conversing with his wife, and children, hold before his face a sort of screen on which is inscribed a world-wide gossip!

The essential function of the newspaper is, of course, to serve as a bulletin of important news and a medium for the interchange of ideas, through the printing of interviews, letters, speeches and editorial comment. In this way it is indispensable to the organization of the public mind.

The bulk of its nature, however, is best described by the phrase organized gossip. The sort of intercourse that people formerly carried on at cross-road stores or over the back fence, has now attained the dignity of print and an imposing system. That we absorb a flood of this does not necessarily mean that our minds are degenerate, but merely that we are gratifying an old appetite in a new way.

Democracy has arisen here, as it seems to be arising everywhere in the civilized world, not, chiefly, because of changes in the formal constitution, but as the outcome of conditions which make it natural for the people to have and to express a consciousness regarding questions of the day. It is said by those who know China that while that country was at war with Japan the majority of the Chinese were unaware that a war was in progress. Such ignorance makes the sway of public opinion impossible; and, conversely, it seems likely that no state, having a vigorous people, can long escape that sway except by repressing the interchange of thought. When the people have information and discussion they will have a will, and this must sooner or later get hold of the institutions of society.

One is often impressed with the thought that there ought to be some wider name for the modern movement than democracy, some name which should more distinctly suggest the enlargement and quickening of the general mind, of which the formal rule of the people is only one among many manifestations. The current of new life that is sweeping with augmenting force through the older structures of society, now carrying them away, now leaving them outwardly undisturbed, has no adequate name.

Popular education is an inseparable part of all this: the individual must have at least those arts of reading and writing without which he can hardly be a vital member of the new organism. And that further development of education, rapidly becoming a conscious aim of modern society, which strives to give to every person a special training in preparation for whatever function he may have aptitude for, is also a phase of the freer and more flexible organization of mental energy. And the widest phase of all is that rise of an international consciousness, in literature, in science and, finally, in politics, which holds out a trustworthy promise of the indefinite enlargement of justice and amity.

This unification of life by a freer course of thought is not only contemporaneous, overcoming space, but also historical, bringing the past into the present, and making every notable achievement of the race a possible factor in its current life—as when, by skilful reproduction the work of a medieval painter is brought home to people dwelling five hundred years later on the other side of the globe. Our time is one of “large discourse, looking before and after.”

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises.

1. List the in-groups to which you belong. Indicate by notation whether they are of the primary or the secondary sort.
2. List the distinguishing attitudes of the individual toward his in-groups and toward his out-groups.
3. Write out the description of some congenial group to which you have belonged.
4. Give some current examples of ethnocentrism.
5. Illustrate from events of the World War how we tended to break up the whole civilized world into two groups: in-group or out-group. What characteristics did we attribute to the enemy (out-group)? What characteristics did we give the in-group?
6. Show how the sentiments and attitudes built up for international good will and co-operation during the World War have been dissipated by subsequent peace time events. Use as examples the League of Nations, World Court, the matter of international agreements on disarmament, the question of international debts, the tariffs, etc.
7. Illustrate primary and secondary groups; involuntary and voluntary groups; institutional and non-institutional groupings. Give the distinguishing characteristics of each type.
8. Describe the organization and working of a boys' gang of which you have been a member. Or do so for a gang of which you know.
9. Why may one say that criminal gangs are primary in-groups?

10. Differentiate between a gang such as is described by Puffer and a Boy Scouts organization or an athletic club. Is one necessarily superior to the other in the function of socialization? Discuss pro and con. Contrast the personal and social influences at work in each type.
 11. List some of the important changes in group life which have come about as a result of the division (specialization) of labor, of the commercial domination of our life organization and of rapid communication and transportation which accompany these.
 12. Why is a democracy easier to maintain in a primary group than in a society marked by secondary groupings?
- B. Topics for Class Reports
1. Review Furfey's book on the gang for the class. (Cf. bibliography.)
 2. Review Thrasher's book on the gang for the class. (Cf. bibliography.)
 3. Report on the organization of the Boy Scouts in contrast to the organization of the typical gang.
- C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers
1. A Socio-psychological Study of the Know-Nothing Party as an Illustration of a Type of Group and Group Control.
 2. A Socio-psychological Study of the Ku Klux Klan.
 3. A Socio-psychological Study of the Knights of Labor.
 4. The Function of the Cult in Primitive and Modern Society.
 5. The Origin and Function of the Congenial Group.

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CHAPTER V

GROUP CONTROLS AND CULTURE STANDARDS

I. INTRODUCTION

This chapter deals with group controls : how they arise out of crises or new, untested situations, how they become organized through the "definition of the situation" into folkways and mores. It treats of the place of ritual and formalism, the place of authority in reference to custom, the relation of law to custom, and finally the nature of our culture ethos.

The first paper, by Thomas, discusses the importance of studying crises in social situations. The formation of habits, more or less common to a group, leads to custom. This is shown to rest upon some standardized method of solving a critical social situation. Such situations are those of birth, puberty, marriage, war, famine, and old age. Then, too, there is the relationship between crises and the rise of division of labor and function. This is evidenced by the special social functions of priest, warrior, medicine-man, trader, and so on. Williams' paper indicates that during crises the individual motives come to awareness. This phase of reaction is, perhaps, relatively recent. Many of the alleged motives turn out, on examination, to be rationalizations for deeper incentives lost to the individual and to the group. The paper by Prince on the Halifax disaster shows the social disorganization arising from a violent social catastrophe. Here, since the crisis is obviously one of unusual severity, it reveals in a more extreme manner social behavior under great strain. Both the profound physiological and psychological alterations are noted. The disintegration of morale and the enhancement of social attitudes is well shown, indicating the factor of individual differences in meeting unusual situations. A more careful study should be made of other disasters: floods, famines, hurricanes, earthquakes. Naturally, the basic problem of relief has overshadowed the more theoretical but scientifically valuable need for investigation of social changes under

crises. Yet, social workers are becoming ever more aware of the social-psychological effects of these crises upon personality traits and upon the morale of communities.

A crisis leads to some method of delimiting, or defining, or finding the boundaries of the situation. That is to say, in solving any problem one attempts to circumscribe it in such a way that he can react to it successfully. Thomas' paper of the "Definition of the Situation" is a very valuable statement of the place of the group: family, neighborhood, gang, trade union, etc., in defining the situation for the individual. Moreover, the definition is carried largely in verbal form. Throughout this book we shall observe the ever-present place which language plays in social intercourse. In defining the situation for the individual it is of primary significance.¹ As one of my students puts it, "speech is an essential to social control."

Sumner's volume *The Folkways* and Sumner and Keller's *The Science of Society* are classics in social science. The selections included here may well be supplemented by further reading in these works. The folkways and the mores furnish the basis for the definitions of all types of situations with which the individual comes into contact. Failure to conform to the folkways marks one as eccentric and queer; failure to conform to the mores marks one as anti-social and leads to various sorts of social pressure—ridicule, ostracism, punishment by pain, imprisonment, banishment, even death. The folkways and mores are the backbone of our cultural heritage. Taboo is a term employed to describe the forms of acts prohibited by the mores.

Associated with the folkways—a part of them in fact—one finds social rituals. Ritual, which is more or less unconscious, plays an important rôle in developing and establishing the mores. It is, in short, the most highly standardized form of definition of a situation. It is nicely seen in the ritualism of the Hebrew peoples described by the Tharauds in that interesting book *The Shadow of the Cross*.

The selection from Dewey and Tufts reveals the place of author-

¹ I think the use of such a term as *crisis* to describe the combination of novel stimuli around which interpretative meaning and particular patterns of response are built will not offend the technical reader unless he has been overindulged in a certain pedantic atmosphere sometimes too prevalent in psychology. So, too, it is legitimate to employ the term *situation* to describe the totality of stimuli leading to behavior changes.

ity behind the customs (mores and folkways) of a group. The luck interest in the formation of custom is also stressed. One may consult Sumner's writings for material on this matter. Luck has played a large part in establishing and rationalizing custom. Events fall out contrary to the best laid plans of individuals. This is attributed to luck. (We say chance.) Or the chance configuration of events leads to an association of these events in the minds of persons (magical thinking). Out of this grows a definition which controls one's attitude and action in regard to some event. Finally, Dewey and Tufts summarize the means of enforcing custom and discuss briefly taboo and ritual.

Cooley in his paper on formalism in society describes a phase of this whole ritualistic tendency. He shows the ill effects of undue formalism in the group and in its effect on the personality. There is some question, however, as to whether Cooley is quite correct in doubting the ill effects of ritualism in present Western society. In the twenty years since Cooley's book was written there has been considerable drift toward the standardization of morals, life interests, and behavior which may bode ill for democratic culture. Machine culture may produce many comforts and increase the general average of wealth, but through its standardization it may "starve" the higher life of the personality quite as much as a thoroughly formalised, ritualistic religion may do.

Two papers, one by Hobhouse and one by Sumner, indicate in brief statements the relationship between custom and law. The latter is more formal, more conciously arrived at. And yet laws not resting upon mores have little efficacy, as we see everywhere about us today.

Particular cultures in time come to take on features which set them off rather sharply from other cultures. Thus we easily separate Occidental from Oriental culture in terms of certain traditional conceptions of difference: differences in philosophy, in life organization, in modes of thinking as well as in action. Sumner has applied the Greek word "ethos" to this totality of characteristics. His paper and the one following it by Sombart, furnish a key to an understanding of the present ethos of the Western World. What Sombart calls "modern 'values'" are the very things which mark our culture and give it its distinctive ethos. Size, quantity, hurry, belief in progress, etc., all these are part and parcel of our ethos. Since we are

participants in it we find it difficult to realize any other form of cultural organization as quite "right" or "natural."

II. MATERIALS

A. GROUP CONTROLS AND HOW THEY ARISE

18. Crises and the Rise of Group Controls¹

Prominent among the problems which must engage the attention of the social psychologist is the genesis of states of consciousness in the social group and their modifying influence on the habits of the group. In group—as in individual life—the object of an elaborate structural organization is the control of the environment and this is secured through the medium of attention. Through attention certain habits are set up answering to the needs of individual and group-life. When the habit is running smoothly, or as long as it is adequate, the attention is relaxed; but when new conditions and emergencies arise, the attention and the emotions are called into play, the old habit is broken up, and a new one is formed which provides for the disturbing condition. In the reaccommodation there is a modification and an enlargement of consciousness. Since it is through crisis or shock that the attention is aroused and explores the situation with a view to reconstructing modes of activity, the crisis has an important relation to the development of the individual or of society.

A study of society on the psychological side involves, therefore, an examination of the crises or incidents in group-life which interrupt the flow of habit and give rise to changed conditions of consciousness and practice. Prominent among the crises of this nature are famine, pestilence, defeat in battle, floods and drought, or in general sudden and catastrophic occurrences which are new or not adequately provided against; and in the process of gaining control again after the disturbance are seen invention, co-operation, sympathy, association in larger numbers and on a different basis, resort to special individuals who have or claim to have special power in emergencies either as leaders or as medicine men. Another set of incidents, regularly recurrent and anticipated indeed, but of a nature calling for recurrent attention, are birth, puberty, and death. The custom, ceremonial, and myth growing up about

¹ Reprinted by permission from W. I. Thomas, "The Province of Social Psychology" *Am. J. Soc.* 1904-05: X: pp. 446-48; 449-50. Copyright by the University of Chicago.

these incidents in group-life, and the degree to which special functions have become associated with them, indicate that they have had a powerful influence on the attentive processes and the mental life of the group. Shadows, dreams, swooning, intoxication, and epilepsy represent another class of responses of functionaries who act as interpreters of the phenomena. Still another set of crises arises in connection with the conflict of interest between individuals, and between the individual and group-habits. Theft, assault, magical practice, and any and all invasion of the rights of others are the occasion of the formulation of legal and moral practice, and of the emergence of a class of persons specially skilled in administering the practice.

The mediation of crises of this nature leads, on the one hand, to the development of morality, religion, custom, myth, invention, art, and, on the other hand, to medicine man, priest, lawgiver, judge, physician, artist, philosopher, teacher, and investigator. It leads also to the formation of special classes and castes, to the concentration of knowledge, wealth, power, and technique in the hands of particular classes and persons, and to the use of special opportunity on the part of the few to manipulate and exploit the many. Viewed merely as incidents, both the crises and the practices growing up about them are a part of the history of institutions, but viewed from the standpoint of attention and habit, they are subject matter of social psychology.

It is in relation also to crisis, or the disturbance of habit, that invention, imitation, and suggestion—factors of the greatest importance in social evolution—may be studied to the best advantage. The crisis discloses the inadequacy of the habit, the invention is the mental side of the readjustment, imitation is the mode of reaction to the new condition or copy provided through invention, and suggestion is the means by which the copies are disseminated. Language is so rich a mine for the social psychologist, and so important in the study of suggestion and imitation, because it is not only a register of the consciousness of the race, but is, more than any other medium, the means by which suggestion is operative, and by which the race-copies are handed on from generation to generation. For this reason all culture and all the history of culture may be said to be implicit in language.

The psychology of social organization, taken from the standpoint of origin, is one of the most important questions with which the social psychologist has to do, and is also best approached from the standpoint of crisis. The advantage and necessity of living together in large numbers are apparent. But association in large numbers calls for inhibitions and habits not demanded in the individualistic state; and through the

stress and strain of readjustment and the formation of habits suitable to social life steps are taken in the development of consciousness as well as of institutions. The maternal system of control, and the steps by which filiation through descent as a basis of association gives way to association based on common activities and interests and the occupation of a common territory; the psychology of the blood-feud, its weakness as an agent of control, the steps in its breakdown, and the substitution of control based on law; blood-brotherhood and tribal marks as signs of community of interest, totemism as an agent of control; initiatory ceremonies as an attempt to educate the young in the traditions of the tribe; taboo and fetichism as police agencies; secret societies and their influence in bringing about solidarity; property and its influence on association and habit; popular assemblies among the natural races and their influence in promoting association; offense and punishment, particularly the consideration of why an act is offensive and the process by which a punishment is selected to fit the offense—these are materials furnishing a concrete approach to a psychological study of association. In the play of attention about these practices we are able to trace steps in the development of the consciousness of the race.

19. Crises and the Revelation of Conscious Motives¹

Crises bring conscious motives to the fore; this is true whether the crisis arises in the relations of individuals or of groups. In a crisis, the question is raised as to the motives of those who precipitated it; and those who are involved seek to understand the motives of those who are responsible in order to formulate their attitude. For instance, on the occasion of the dismissal of Professor Scott Nearing of the University of Pennsylvania, the motives of the trustees who favored the action were challenged by Professor Nearing's friends, who were deliberating what attitude to take to this violation of freedom of teaching. Again, Rev. Henry E. Jackson says of the incident which eventually resulted in his leaving the Presbyterian Church of which he was pastor: "Two years before I left the church, a preconcerted and systematic outburst of criticism broke over me totally unexpectedly and without warning. . . . Some of the criticism was true, much of it false, and most of it foolish. This made me suspicious, for I knew that when men hide their real purpose and need to invent reasons for their actions, they naturally twist and falsify facts to such an extent as to be ridic-

¹ From J. M. Williams, *The Foundations of Social Science*, pp. 435-36. Copyright 1920 by A. A. Knopf, Inc.

ulous." The author describes the process through which he analysed the motives of his critics and concludes: "Thus, by a long process of examination and elimination, I was compelled to conclude that the reason for the disturbance was just what I believed at the beginning it must be. It was this: I differed fundamentally with two small but influential groups of men in the church on two big questions, dogma and money." Whenever habitual social relations are broken people inquire as to the motives of those who are responsible for the break. There develops a keen interest in motives. On unerring insight into motives depends social survival in a crisis, as well as the social adjustments that are required in every day life.

20. The Halifax Disaster: An Intensive Crisis¹

The first of these phenomena was the "stun" of the catastrophe itself. The shock reaction at Halifax has been variously described. It has been graphically likened "to being suddenly stricken with blindness and paralysis." It was a sensation of utter helplessness and disability. "We died a thousand horrible deaths" ran one description, "the nervous shock and terror were as hard to bear as were the wounds." "The people are dazed," wrote another observer, "they have almost ceased to exercise the sensation of pain." This physiological reaction animals and men shared alike. The appearance of the terror-stricken horses was as of beasts which had suddenly gone mad.

A physiological accompaniment of shock and distraction is the abnormal action of the glands. The disturbance of the sympathetic nervous system produced by the emotional stress and strain of a great excitement or a great disappointment is reflected in the stimulation or inhibition of glandular action. Much physical as well as nervous illness was precipitated by the grief, excitement and exposure of the disaster. Among cases observed were those of diabetes, tuberculosis and hyperthyroidism, as well as the nervous instability to which reference is subsequently made. Such an epidemic of hyperthyroidism—exaggerated action of the thyroid gland—is said to have followed the Kishineff massacres, the San Francisco earthquake and the air-raids on London.

Turning now to other psychological aspects, we have to note the presence of hallucination in disaster.

¹ Reprinted by permission from S. H. Prince, "Catastrophe and Social Change—Based upon a Sociological Study of the Halifax Disaster" pp. 36-39; 40; 41-42; 42-46; 47; 48-52; 53-57. *Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law*, vol. XCIV: 1920.

Hallucination may be roughly defined as false sense impression. For example, the patient sees an object which has no real existence, or hears an imaginary voice. Hallucinations are termed visual, auditory, tactile, etc. according to the sense to which the false impression appears to belong.

Hallucination is induced by the unusual suggesting the expected. It is sense-perception colored by association. It is the power of a dominant idea that, unbidden, enters the field of consciousness and takes possession of even the senses themselves. In Halifax one idea seemed to dominate most minds and clothe itself in the semblance of reality—the expected Germans. For a long time there had been under public discussion the question as to whether or not the city would be shelled by Zeppelin raiders, or possibly by a fleet at sea. All street-lights had been darkened by military orders. The failure to draw window shades had been subject to heavy penalty. It is no wonder eyes looked upward when there came the crash, and when seeing the strange unusual cloud beheld the Zeppelin of fancy. A man residing on the outskirts of the town of Dartmouth “heard” a German shell pass shrieking above him. Dartmouth Heights looks out over Halifax harbor, and here perhaps the vista is most expansive, and the eye sees furthest. The instant after the explosion a citizen standing here “saw” clearly a German fleet manoeuvring in the distance. That shells had actually come few on the instant doubted. The head of one firm advised his employees not to run elsewhere, as “two shots never fall in the same place.”

This—a German assault—was the great mental explanation that came into the majority of minds. There was one other—that of the end of the world. Many fell to their knees in prayer. One woman was found in the open yard by her broken home repeating the general confession of the church. Few would have been surprised if out of the smoky, cloud-ridden skies there should have appeared the arch-angels announcing the consummation of mundane affairs. Indeed there were instances, not a few, of those who “saw” in the death-cloud “the clear outlines of a face.” Thus both auditory and visual hallucination were manifested to a degree.

Hallucination has been described as “seeing” something which has no basis in reality. Thus it differs from delusion, which is rather a mis-interpretation of what is seen. “Delusions are closely allied to hallucinations and generally accompany the latter. The distinction lies in the fact that delusions are not false sensations but false beliefs.” Anxiety, distraction by grief and loss, as well as nervous shock play freely with the mind and fancy and often swerve the judgment of perception. This was especially noticeable at Halifax in the hospital identification, particularly

of children. A distracted father looked into a little girl's face four different times but did not recognize her as his own which, in fact, she was. The precisely opposite occurrence was also noted. A fond parent time and time again "discovered" his lost child, "seeing" to complete satisfaction special marks and features on its little body. But often there were present those who knew better, and the better judgment prevailed. Again this phenomenon was repeated in numberless instances at the morgue. Wearied and white after frantic and fruitless search wherever refugees were gathered together, the overwrought searchers would walk through the long lines of dead, and suddenly "recognize" a missing relative or friend. Regretfully the attendant fulfilled the same thankless task from day to day. There had been no recognition at all. The observer had seen "not the object itself but the image evoked in the mind."

In catastrophe primitive instincts¹ are seen most plainly and less subject to the reconditioning influences of ordinary life. This was especially noticeable at Halifax. The instinct of flight for self-preservation was reflected in the reaction of thousands.

The instinct of pugnacity was to be seen in many a fine example of difficulty overcome in the work of rescue.

The parental instinct was everywhere in evidence, and was reflected not only in the sacrifices made and the privations endured by parents for their young, but in every act of relief, which arose in involuntary response to the cry of the distressed.

The gregarious instinct—the instinct to herd—showed itself in the spontaneous groupings which came about and which seemed somehow to be associated with feelings of security from further harm. The refugees found comfort in the group. They rarely remained alone.

These and other instinctive responses in a greater or less degree of complication were to be remarked of the actions not only of individuals but of groups as well. In the latter the typical phenomena of crowd psychology were manifested upon every hand. The crowd was seen to be what it is—"the like response of many to a socially inciting event or suggestion such as sudden danger." Out of a mere agglomeration of individuals and under the stress of emotional excitement there arose that mental unity, which Le Bon emphasizes. There was noticeable the feeling of safety associated with togetherness which Trotter suggests. There was the suggestibility, with its preceding conditions which Sidis

¹ The reader should understand that the word *instinct* is here used in a very general sense in this paper. It covers both innate tendencies and much that is the result of experience.

has clarified, namely, expectancy, inhibition, and limitation of the field of consciousness. There were the triple characteristics which Giddings notes: "Crowds are subject to swift contagion of feeling, they are sensitive to suggestion . . . and always manifest a tendency to carry suggested ideas immediately into action."

At first all was confusion. Some ran to the cellars. Some ran to the streets. Some ran to their shops. Those in the shops ran home. This was in the area of wounds and bruises. Farther north was the area of death. Thither the rescuers turned. Automobiles sped over broken glass and splintered boards toward the unknown. Then came the orders of the soldiers, whose barracks were situated in the very heart of the danger district, for the people to fly southward, Common-ward, to the open spaces—anywhere. Another explosion was imminent. Then came further outbreaks of the flight impulse. Runs a graphic account:

The crowd needed no second warning. They turned and fled. Hammers, shovels and bandages were thrown aside. Stores were left wide open with piles of currency on their counters. Homes were vacated in a twinkling. Little tots couldn't understand why they were being dragged along so fast. Some folks never looked back. Others did, either to catch a last glimpse of the home they never expected to see again or to tell if they could from the sky how far behind them the Dreaded Thing was. . . . They fled as they were. . . . Some carried children or bundles of such things as they had scrambled together. . . . Many were but scantily clad. Women fled in their night dresses. A few were stark naked, their bodies blackened with soot and grime. These had come from the destroyed section of the North End. What a storm-tossed motley throng, and as varied in its aspect and as poignant in its sufferings as any band of Belgian or Serbian refugees. . . . A few rode in autos, but the great majority were on foot. With blanched faces, bleeding bodies and broken hearts, they fled from the Spectral Death they thought was coming hard after, fled to the open spaces where possibly its shadow might not fall. Soon Citadel Hill and the Common were black with terrified thousands. Thousands more trudged along St. Margaret's Bay Road, seeking escape among its trees and winding curves. . . . Many cut down boughs and made themselves a fire—for they were bitterly cold. Here they were—poorly clad, badly wounded, and with not one loaf of bread in all their number, so hastily did they leave, when galloping horsemen announced the danger was over and it was safe to return.

The ever-shifting responsiveness to rumor which distinguishes a crowd was noted.

The entrance to the Park was black with human beings, some massed

in groups, some running anxiously back and forth like ants when their hill has been crushed. There were blanched faces and trembling hands. The wildest rumors were in circulation and every bearer of tidings was immediately surrounded.

Not only here but when the crowd trekked back, and in the subsequent scenes which were witnessed in supply stations and shelters, the association which Sidis draws between calamity and hyper-suggestibility in the body politic was abundantly endorsed.

We must now endeavor to understand the phenomena of emotion which accompany a great catastrophe.

It will be accurate enough for our purpose to think of the emotions as complicated states of feeling more or less allied to one another and to the human will. Among them are jealousy and envy—"discomfort at seeing others approved and at being out-done by them." This appeared repeatedly in the administration of relief and should be included in disaster psychology. Again greed—more strictly a social instinct than an emotion—was common.

Fear has already been referred to. Anger, shame, resentment while evident, were of less significance. Gratitude was early shown and there were many formal expressions of it. Later on, it seemed to be replaced by a feeling that as sufferers they, the victims, were only receiving their due in whatever aid was obtained.

Of special interest is the rôle of the tender emotions, kindness, sympathy and sorrow, as well as the reactions which may be expected when these occur in unusual exaltation through the repetition of stimuli or otherwise. Whatever may be the nature of the process whereby the feelings of his fellows affect a man, that which chiefly concerns us here, is how these reactions differ when the stimulation is multiplex. Of this multiplex stimulation in collective psychology Graham Wallas has written:

The nervous exaltation so produced may be the effect of the rapid repetition of stimuli acting as repetition acts, for instance, when it produces seasickness or tickling. . . . If the exaltation is extreme conscious control of feeling and action is diminished. Reaction is narrowed and men may behave, as they behave in dreams, less rationally and morally than they do if the whole of their nature is brought into play.

What Wallas has said of the additional stimulation which the presence of a crowd induces may be given wider application, and is indeed a most illuminating thought, describing exactly the psycho-emotional

reactions produced by the stimulation of terrifying scenes, such as were witnessed at Halifax.

A case in point was that of the nervous exaltation produced upon a young doctor who operated continuously for many hours in the removal of injured eyes. The emotional tension he went through is expressed in his words to a witness, "If relief doesn't come to me soon, I shall murder somebody."

Another instance where conscious control of feeling and action was diminished was that of a soldier. He was so affected by what he passed through during the explosion and his two days' participation in relief work, that he quite unwittingly took a seat in a train departing for Montreal. Later in a hospital of that city after many mental wanderings he recovered his memory. Over and over again he had been picturing the dreadful scenes which he had experienced.

The nature of sympathy may not be clearly comprehended but of its effects there is no doubt. It may lead to the relief of pain or induce the exactly opposite effect; or it may bring about so lively a distress as to quite incapacitate a man from giving help. Again it may lead to the avoidance of disaster scenes altogether. Thus some could on no account be prevailed upon to go into the hospitals or to enter the devastated area. Others by a process understood in the psychology of insanity secured the desired avoidance by suicide.

Joy and sorrow are pleasure-pain conditions of emotional states. Sorrow is painful because "the impulse is baffled and cannot attain more than the most scanty and imperfect satisfaction in little acts, such as the leaving of flowers on the grave"; although the intensity is increased by other considerations. Here again the unusual degree of stimulation which catastrophe induces brings about a behavior other than that which commonly attends the experience of grief. A phenomenon associated with wholesale bereavement is the almost entire absence of tears. At Halifax, there was little crying. There seemed to be indeed a miserable but strong consolation in the fact that all were alike involved in the same calamity.

There was also to be added the phenomena of emotional parturition. As was to be expected the shock meant the immediate provision of a maternity hospital. Babies were born in cellars and among ruins. Premature births were common. Nor were all the ills for which the shock was responsible immediately discernible. There were many post-catastrophic phenomena. Three months after the explosion many found themselves suffering an inexplicable breakdown, which the doctors attributed unquestionably to the catastrophe. It was a condition closely

allied to "war-neurasthenia." Another disaster after-effect also may be here recorded. This was the not unnatural way in which people "lived on edge," for a long period after the disaster. There was a readiness and suggestibility to respond to rumor or to the least excitant. Twice, at least, the schools were emptied precipitately, and citizens went forth into pell-mell flight from their homes upon the circulation of reports of possible danger. No better illustration is afforded of the sociological fact that "the more expectant, or overwrought the public mind, the easier it is to set up a great perturbation. After a series of public calamities . . . minds are blown about by every gust of passion or sentiment."

There are also to be included a few miscellaneous observations of behavior associated with the psychology of disaster relief. (1) The preference upon the part of the refugee for plural leadership and decision. (2) The aggravation of helplessness through the open distribution of relief. (3) The resentment which succeeds the intrusion of strangers in relief leadership. (4) The reaction of lassitude and depression after a period of strain. (5) The desire for privacy during interviews. (6) The vital importance of prompt decision in preventing an epidemic of complaint.

Analytic psychology is becoming increasingly interested in the phenomena of repression, inhibition and taboo. The real motives of action are often very different from the apparent motives which overlie them. Instinctive tendencies are buried beneath barriers of civilization, but they are buried alive. They are covered not crushed. These resistances are either within our minds or in society. The latter are summed up in conventionality, custom and law, all so relatively recent in time as to supply a very thin veneer over the primitive tendencies which have held sway for ages. Few realize the place which conventionality, custom and law possess in a community until in some extraordinary catastrophe their power is broken, or what is the same thing the ability to enforce them is paralyzed. This fact is especially true of repressive enactments, and most laws fall within this category. Catastrophe shatters the unsubstantial veneer.

With the possibility of apprehension reduced to a minimum in the confusion at Halifax, with the deterrent forces of respectability and law practically unknown, men appeared for what they were as the following statement only too well discloses:

Few folks thought that Halifax harbored any would-be ghouls or vultures. The disaster showed how many. Men clambered over the bodies of

the dead to get beer in the shattered breweries. Men taking advantage of the flight from the city because of the possibility of another explosion went into houses and shops, and took whatever their thieving fingers could lay hold of. Then there were the nightly prowlers among the ruins, who rifled the pockets of the dead and dying, and snatched rings from icy fingers. A woman lying unconscious on the street had her fur coat snatched from her back. . . . One of the workers, hearing some one groaning rescued a shop-keeper from underneath the debris. Unearthing at the same time a cash box containing one hundred and fifty dollars, he gave it to a young man standing by to hold while he took the victim to a place of refuge. When he returned the box was there, but the young man and the money had disappeared.

Then there was the profiteering phase. Landlords raised their rents upon people in no position to bear it. The Halifax Trades and Labor Council adopted a resolution urging that the Mayor be authorized to request all persons to report landlords who "have taken advantage of conditions created by the explosion." . . . Plumbers refused to hold their union rules in abeyance and to work one minute beyond the regular eight hours unless they received their extra rates for overtime; and the bricklayers assumed a dog-in-the-manger attitude and refused to allow the plasterers to help in the repair of the chimneys. And this during days of dire stress . . . when many men and women were working twelve and fourteen hours a day without a cent or thought of remuneration. Truckmen charged exorbitant prices for the transferring of goods and baggage. Merchants boosted prices. A small shopkeeper asked a little starving child thirty cents for a loaf of bread.

On Tuesday, December the twelfth, the Deputy Mayor issued a proclamation warning persons so acting that they would be dealt with under the provisions of the law.

Slowly the arm of repression grew vigorous once more. The military placed troops on patrol. Sentries were posted preventing entrance to the ruins to those who were not supplied with a special pass. Orders were issued to shoot any looter trying to escape. The Mayor's proclamation, the warning of the relief committee, the storm of popular indignation gradually became effectual.

The stimulus of the same catastrophe, it thus appears, may result in two different types of responses—that of greed on the one hand or altruistic emotion on the other. One individual is spurred to increased activity by the opportunity of business profit, another by the sense of social needs. Why this is so—indeed the whole field of profiteering—would be a subject of interesting inquiry. Whether it is due to

the varying degrees of socialization represented in the different individuals or whether it is not also partly due to the fact that philanthropy functions best in a sphere out of line with a man's own particular occupation, the truth remains that some display an altogether unusual type of reaction in an emergency to the actions of others; and perhaps exhibit behavior quite different from that which appears normal in a realm of conduct where associations based on habit are so strongly ingrained.

The energizing influence of an emotional excitant was shown at Halifax in the remarkable way in which sick soldiers abandoned their beds and turned them over to the victims rushed to the military hospitals. It was seen again in the sudden accession of strength displayed by the invalids and the infirm during the hurried evacuation of the houses. The resistance to fatigue and suffering received more abundant illustration at Halifax in the work of rescue and relief. Often men themselves were surprised at their own power for prolonged effort and prodigious strain under the excitement of catastrophe. It was only on Monday (the fifth day) that collapses from work began to appear. Among the more generally known instances of unusual endurance was that of a private, who with one of his eyes knocked out, continued working the entire day of the disaster. Another was that of a chauffeur who with a broken rib conveyed the wounded trip after trip to the hospital, only relinquishing the work when he collapsed. An unknown man was discovered at work in the midst of the ruins although his own face was half blown off. Those who escaped with lesser injuries worked day and night while the crisis lasted. Many did not go home for days, so manifold and heavy were the tasks. There was no pause for comment. Conversation was a matter of nods and silent signs, the direction of an index finger. Weeks later the workers were surprised to find themselves aged and thin. The excitement, the stimulus of an overwhelming need had banished all symptoms of fatigue. During the congestion which followed the arrival of the relief trains there were men who spent seventy-two hours with scarcely any rest or sleep. One of the telephone terminal-room staff stuck to his post for ninety-two hours, probably the record case of the disaster for endurance under pressure.

Magnificent effort, conspicuous enough for special notice was the work of the search parties who, facing bitterest cold and in the midst of blinding storms, continued their work of rescue; and the instance of the business girls who in the same weather worked for many hours

with bottles of hot water hung about their waists. An effect which could not escape observation was the strange insensibility to suffering on the part of many of the victims themselves. Men, women and little children endured the crudest operations without experiencing the common effects of pain. They seemed to have been anesthetized by the general shock. Sidewalk operations, the use of common thread for sutures, the cold-blooded extracting of eyes were carried on often without a tremor. This resistance to suffering was due not only to the increase of energy already described but also to the fact that the prostrating effect of pain is largely relative to the diversion of attention,—as “headaches disappear promptly upon the alarm of fire” and “toothaches vanish at the moment of a burglar’s scare.” Much pain is due to the supersensitivity of an area through hyperaemia, or increased blood supply, following concentrated attention. Thus it is actually possible by volition to control the spread of pain, and the therapeutic virtues of an electric shock or a slap in the face are equally demonstrable. This reasoning is also applicable to the absence of sympathetic reactions among many disaster workers. They were found often to be “curiously detached and not greatly moved by the distressing scenes in morgue, in hospital, in the ruins and at the inquiry stations.”

Catastrophe and the sudden termination of the normal which ensues become the stimuli of heroism and bring into play the great social virtues of generosity and of kindness—which, in one of its forms, is mutual aid. The new conditions, perhaps it would be more correct to say, afford the occasion for their release. It is said that battle does to the individual what the developing solution does to the photographic plate,—brings out what is in the man. This may also be said of catastrophe. Every community has its socialized individuals, the dependable, the helpful, the considerate, as well as the “non-socialized survivors of savagery,” who are distributed about the zero point of the social scale. Calamity is the occasion for the discovery of the “presence of extraordinary individuals in a group.” The relation of them to a crisis is one of the most important points in the problem of progress.

At Halifax there were encountered many such individuals as well as families who refused assistance that others might be relieved. Individual acts of finest model were written ineffaceably upon the social memory of the inhabitants. There was the case of a child who released with her teeth the clothes which held her mother beneath a pile of debris. A wounded girl saved a large family of children, getting them all out of a broken and burning home. A telegraph operator at the cost of his life

stuck to his key, sent a warning message over the line and stopped an incoming train in the nick of time.

Group heroism was no less remarkable. For the flooding of the powder magazine in the naval yard an entire battery volunteered. This was why the second explosion did not actually occur. Freight handlers too, as well as soldiers, revealed themselves possessors of the great spirit. A conspicuous case was that of the longshoremen working on board of a ship laden with explosives. Fully realizing the impending danger, because of the nearness of the burning munitioner, they used what precious minutes of life remained them to protect their own ship's explosives from ignition. A fire did afterwards start upon the ship but a brave captain loosed her from the pier, and himself extinguished the blaze which might soon have repeated in part the devastations already wrought.

No disaster psychology should omit a discussion of the psychology of helpfulness—that self-help to which the best relief workers always appeal, as well as of the mutual aid upon which emergency relief must largely depend. Mutual aid while not a primary social fact is inherent in the association of members of society. As it insured survival in the earlier stages of evolution, so it reveals itself when survival is again threatened by catastrophe.

The illustrations of mutual aid at Halifax would fill a volume. Not only was it evidenced in the instances of families and friends but also in the realm of business. Cafes served lunches without charge. Drug stores gave out freely of their supplies. Firms released their clerks to swell the army of relief. A noteworthy case of community service was that of the Grocers's Guild announcing that its members would

fill no orders for outside points during the crisis, that they would co-operate with the relief committee in delivering food-stuffs free of charge to any point in the city, and that their stocks were at the disposal of the committee at the actual cost to them.

By incidents such as these, Halifax gained the appellation of the City of Comrades.

Catastrophe becomes also the excitant for an unparalleled opening of the springs of generosity. Communication has transformed mutual aid into a term of worldwide significance. As at San Francisco, when from all directions spontaneous gifts were hurried to the stricken city, when in a period of three months seventeen hundred carloads and five steamer-loads of relief goods arrived, in addition to millions of cash contributions, so was it at Halifax.

B. GROUP STANDARDS OF CONDUCT

21. The Definition of the Situation by the Group¹

Preliminary to any self-determined act of behavior there is always a stage of examination and deliberation which we may call *the definition of the situation*. And actually not only concrete acts are dependent on the definition of the situation, but gradually a whole life-policy and the personality of the individual himself follow from a series of such definitions.

But the child is always born into a group of people among whom all the general types of situation which may arise have already been defined and corresponding rules of conduct developed, and where he has not the slightest chance of making his definitions and following his wishes without interference. Men have always lived together in groups. Certainly the wishes in general are such that they can be satisfied only in a society. But we have only to refer to the criminal code to appreciate the variety of ways in which the wishes of the individual may conflict with the wishes of society. And the criminal code takes no account of the many unsanctioned expressions of the wishes which society attempts to regulate by persuasion and gossip.

There is therefore always a rivalry between the spontaneous definitions of the situation made by the member of an organized society and the definitions which his society has provided for him. The individual tends to a hedonistic selection of activity, pleasure first; and society to a utilitarian selection, safety first. Society wishes its members to be laborious, dependable, regular, sober, orderly, self-sacrificing; while the individual wishes less of this and more of new experience. And organized society seeks also to regulate the conflict and competition inevitable between its members in the pursuit of their wishes. The desire to have wealth, for example, or any other socially sanctioned wish, may not be accomplished at the expense of another member of the society,—by murder, theft, lying, swindling, blackmail, etc.

It is in this connection that a moral code arises, which is a set of rules or behavior norms, regulating the expression of the wishes, and which is built up by successive definitions of the situation. In practice the abuse arises first and the rule is made to prevent its recurrence. Morality is thus the generally accepted definition of the situation, whether expressed

¹ Reprinted by permission from W. I. Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl*, pp. 42-44; 49; 49-50. Boston. Little, Brown & Company, 1923.

in public opinion and the unwritten law, in a formal legal code, or in religious commandments and prohibitions.

The family is the smallest social unit and the primary defining agency. As soon as the child has free motion and begins to pull, tear, pry, meddle, and prowl, the parents begin to define the situation through speech and other signs and pressures: "Be quiet," "Sit up straight," "Blow your nose," "Wash your face," "Mind your mother," "Be kind to sister," etc. This is the real significance of Wordsworth's phrase, "Shades of the prison house begin to close upon the growing child." His wishes and activities begin to be inhibited, and gradually, by definitions within the family, by playmates, in the school, in the Sunday School, in the community, through reading, by formal instruction, by informal signs of approval and disapproval, the growing member learns the code of his society.

In addition to the family we have the community as a defining agency. At present the community is so weak and vague that it gives us no idea of the former power of the local group in regulating behavior. Originally the community was practically the whole world of its members. It was composed of families related by blood and marriage and was not so large that all the members could not come together; it was a face-to-face group.

A less formal but not less powerful means of defining the situation employed by the community is gossip. The Polish peasant's statement that a community reaches as far as a man is talked about was significant, for the community regulates the behavior of its members largely by talking about them. Gossip has a bad name because it is sometimes malicious and false and designed to improve the status of the gossipier and degrade its object, but gossip is in the main true and is an organizing force. It is a mode of defining the situation in a given case and of attaching praise or blame. It is one of the means by which the status of the individual and of his family is fixed.

The community also, particularly in connection with gossip, knows how to attach opprobrium to persons and actions by using epithets which are at the same time brief and emotional definitions of the situation. "Bastard," "whore," "traitor," "coward," "skunk," "scab," "snob," "kike," etc., are such epithets. In "Faust" the community said of Margaret, "She stinks." The people are here employing a device known in psychology as the "conditioned reflex." If the word "stinks" is associated on people's tongues with Margaret, Margaret will never again smell sweet. Many evil consequences, as the psychoanalysts claim, have resulted from making the whole of sex life a "dirty" subject, but the

device has worked in a powerful, sometimes a paralyzing way on the sexual behavior of women.

Winks, shrugs, nudges, laughter, sneers, haughtiness, coldness, "giving the once over" are also language defining the situation and painfully felt as unfavorable recognition. The sneer, for example, is incipient vomiting, meaning, "you make me sick."

And eventually the violation of the code even in an act of no intrinsic importance, as in carrying food to the mouth with the knife, provokes condemnation and disgust. The fork is not a better instrument for conveying food than the knife, at least it has no moral superiority, but the situation has been defined in favor of the fork. To smack with the lips in eating is bad manners with us, but the Indian has more logically defined the situation in the opposite way; with him smacking is a compliment to the host.

In this whole connection fear is used by the group to produce the desired attitudes in its member. Praise is used also but more sparingly. And the whole body of habits and emotions is so much a community and family product that disapproval or separation is almost unbearable.

(Consult section 11)

22. The Folkways and Mores¹

Men begin with acts, not with thoughts. Need was the first experience, and it was followed at once by a blundering effort to satisfy it. It is generally taken for granted that men inherited some guiding instincts from their beast ancestry. If there were such inheritances, they controlled and aided the first efforts to satisfy needs. Experiments with newborn animals show that in the absence of any experience of the relation of means to ends, efforts to satisfy needs are clumsy and blundering. The method is that of trial and failure, which produces repeated pain, loss, and disappointments. Nevertheless, it is a method of rude experiment and selection. The earliest efforts of men were of this kind. Need was the impelling force. Pleasure and pain, on the one side and the other, were the rude constraints which defined the line on which efforts must proceed. The ability to distinguish between pleasure and pain is the only psychical power which is to be assumed. Thus ways of doing things were selected, which were expedient. They answered the purpose better than other ways, or with less toil and pain. Along the

¹ Reprinted by permission from W. G. Sumner, *The Folkways*, pp. 2-3; 24; 25; 26; 28-29; 30; 59; 60; 76; 87; 90; 94-95; 96; 107-108. Boston. Ginn & Company, 1906.

course on which efforts were compelled to go, habit, routine, and skill were developed. The struggle to maintain existence was carried on, not individually, but in groups. Each profited by the other's experience; hence there was concurrence towards that which proved to be most expedient. All at last adopted the same way for the same purpose; hence the ways turned into customs and became mass phenomena. Instincts were developed in connection with them. In this way folkways arise. The young learn them by tradition, imitation, and authority. The folkways, at a time, provide for all the needs of life then and there. They are uniform, universal in the group, imperative, and invariable. As time goes on, the folkways become more and more arbitrary, positive, and imperative. If asked why they act in a certain way in certain cases, primitive people always answer that it is because they and their ancestors always have done so.

Folkways due to false inference. Furthermore, folkways have been formed by accident, that is, by irrational and incongruous action, based on pseudo-knowledge. In Molembo a pestilence broke out soon after a Portuguese had died there. After that the natives took all possible measures not to allow any white man to die in their country. White men gave to one Bushman in a kraal a stick ornamented with buttons as a symbol of authority. The recipient died leaving the stick to his son. The son soon died. Then the Bushmen brought back the stick lest all should die. A party of Eskimos met with no game. One of them returned to their sledges and got the ham of a dog to eat. As he returned with the ham bone in his hand he met and killed a seal. Ever afterwards he carried a ham bone in his hand when hunting. A very great number of such cases could be collected. In fact they represent the current mode of reasoning of nature people. It is their custom to reason that, if one thing follows another, it is due to it. No scientific investigation could discover the origin of the folkways mentioned, if the origin had not chanced to become known to civilized men. We must believe that the known cases illustrate the irrational incongruous origin of many folkways. In civilized history also we know that customs have owed their origin to "historical accident,"—the vanity of a princess, the deformity of a king, the whim of a democracy, the love intrigue of a statesman or prelate. By the institutions of another age it may be provided that no one of these things can affect decisions, acts, or interests, but then the power to decide the ways may have passed to clubs, trades unions, trusts, commercial rivals, wire-pullers, politicians, and political fanatics. In these cases also the causes and origins may escape investigation.

The folkways are "right." Rights. Morals. The folkways are the

"right" ways to satisfy all interests, because they are traditional, and exist in fact. They extend over the whole of life. There is a right way to catch game, to win a wife, to make one's self appear, to cure disease, to honor ghosts, to treat comrades or strangers, to behave when a child is born, on the warpath, in council, and so on in all cases which can arise. The ways are defined on the negative side, that is, by taboos. The "right" way is the way which the ancestors used and which has been handed down. The tradition is its own warrant. It is not held subject to verification by experience. The notion of right is in the folkways. It is not outside of them, of independent origin, and brought to them to test them. In the folkways, whatever is, is right. This is because they are traditional. When we come to the folkways we are at the end of our analysis. The notion of right and ought is the same in regard to all the folkways, but the degree of it varies with the importance of the interest at stake. Some usages contain only a slight element of right and ought. It may well be believed that notions of right and duty, and of social welfare, were first developed in connection with ghost fear and other-worldliness, and therefore that, in that field also, folkways were first raised to mores. "Rights" are the rules of mutual give and take in the competition of life which are imposed on comrades in the in-group, in order that the peace may prevail there which is essential to the group strength. Therefore rights can never be "natural" or "God-given," or absolute in any sense. The morality of a group at a time is the sum of the taboos and prescriptions in the folkways by which right conduct is defined. Therefore morals can never be intuitive. They are historical, institutional, and empirical.

World philosophy, life policy, right, rights, and morality are all products of the folkways. They are reflections on, and generalizations from, the experience of pleasure and pain which is won in efforts to carry on the struggle for existence under actual life conditions. The generalizations are very crude and vague in their germinal forms. They are all embodied in folklore, and all our philosophy and science have been developed out of them.

Definition of Mores. When the elements of truth and right are developed into doctrines of welfare, the folkways are raised to another plane. They then become capable of producing inferences, developing into new forms, and extending their constructive influence over men and society. Then we call them the mores. The mores are the folkways, including the philosophical and ethical generalizations as to societal welfare which are suggested by them, and inherent in them, as they grow.

We may now formulate a more complete definition of the mores. They are the ways of doing things which are current in a society to satisfy human needs and desires, together with the faiths, notions, codes, and standards of well living which inhere in those ways, having a genetic connection with them. By virtue of the latter element the mores are traits in the specific character (ethos) of a society or a period. They pervade and control the ways of thinking in all the exigencies of life, returning from the world of abstractions to the world of action, to give guidance and to win revivification. "The mores (*Sitten*) are, before any beginning of reflection, the regulators of the political, social, and religious behavior of the individual. Conscious reflection is the worst enemy of the mores, because mores begin unconsciously and pursue unconscious purposes, which are recognized by reflection often only after long and circuitous processes, and because their expediency often depends on the assumption that they will have general acceptance and currency, uninterfered with by reflection."

The mores have the authority of facts. Each one is subjected to the influence of the mores, and formed by them, before he is capable of reasoning about them. It may be objected that nowadays, at least we criticise all traditions, and accept none just because they are handed down to us. If we take up cases of things which are still entirely or almost entirely in the mores, we shall see that this is not so. There are sects of free-lovers amongst us who want to discuss pair marriage. They are not simply people of evil life. They invite us to discuss rationally our inherited customs and ideas as to marriage, which, they say, are by no means so excellent and elevated as we believe. They have never won any serious attention. Others want to discuss property. In spite of some literary activity on their part, no discussion of property, bequest, and inheritance has ever been opened. Property and marriage are in the mores. Nothing can ever change them but the unconscious and imperceptible movement of the mores. Religion was originally a matter of the mores. It became a societal institution and a function of the state. It has now to a great extent been put back into the mores. Since laws with penalties to enforce religious creeds or practices have gone out of use any one may think and act as he pleases about religion. Therefore it is not now "good form" to attack religion. Infidel publications are now tabooed by the mores, and are more effectually repressed than ever before. They produce no controversy. Democracy is in our American mores. It is a product of our physical and economic conditions. It is impossible to discuss or criticize. It is glorified for popularity, and is a subject of dithyrambic rhetoric. No one dares to analyze it as he would

aristocracy or autocracy. He would get no hearing and would only incur abuse. The thing to be noticed in all these cases is that the masses oppose a deaf ear to every argument against the mores. It is only in so far as things have been transferred from the mores into laws and positive institutions that there is discussion about them or rationalizing upon them. The mores contain the norm by which, if we should discuss the mores, we should have to judge the mores. We learn the mores as unconsciously as we learn to walk and eat and breathe. The masses never learn how we walk, and eat, and breathe, and they never know any reason why the mores are what they are. The justification of them is that when we wake to consciousness of life we find them facts which already hold us in the bonds of tradition, custom, and habit. The mores contain embodied in them notions, doctrines, and maxims, but they are facts. They are in the present tense. They have nothing to do with what ought to be, will be, may be, or once was, if it is not now.

Possibility of modifying mores. The combination in the mores of persistency and variability determines the extent to which it is possible to modify them by arbitrary action. It is not possible to change them, by any essential element; it is possible to modify them by slow and long-continued effort if the ritual is changed by minute variations. The German emperor Frederick II was the most enlightened ruler of the Middle Ages. He was a modern man in temper and ideas. He was a statesman and he wanted to make the empire into a real state of the absolutist type. All the mores of his time were ecclesiastical and hierocratic. He dashed himself to pieces against them. Those whom he wanted to serve took the side of the papacy against him. He became the author of the laws by which civil institutions of the time were made to serve ecclesiastical domination. He carried the purpose of the crusades to a higher degree of fulfillment than they ever reached otherwise, but this brought him no credit or peace. In the United States the abolition of slavery was accomplished by the North, which had no slaves and enforced emancipation by war on the South, which had them. The mores of the South were those of slavery in full and satisfactory operation, including social, religious, and philosophical notions adapted to slavery. The abolition of slavery in the northern states had been brought about by changes in conditions and interests. Emancipation in the South was produced by outside force against the mores of the whites there. The consequence has been forty years of economic, social, and political discord. In this case free institutions and mores in which free individual initiative is a leading element allow efforts towards social readjustment out of which a solution of the difficulties will come. New mores will be

developed which will cover the situation with customs, habits, mutual concessions, and co-operation of interests, and these will produce a social philosophy consistent with the facts. The process is long, painful, and discouraging, but it contains its own guarantees.

What changes are possible. All these cases go to show that changes which run with the mores are easily brought about, but that changes which are opposed to the mores require long and patient effort, if they are possible at all. The ruling clique can use force to warp the mores towards some result which they have selected, especially if they bring their effort to bear on the ritual, not on the dogmas, and if they are contented to go slowly. The church has won great results in this way, and by so doing has created a belief that religion, or ideas, or institutions, make mores. The leading classes, no matter by what standard they are selected, can lead by example, which always affects ritual. An aristocracy acts in this way. It suggests standards of elegance, refinement, and nobility, and the usages of good manners, from generation to generation, are such as have spread from the aristocracy to other classes. Such influences are unspoken, unconscious, unintentional. If we admit that it is possible and right for some to undertake to mold the mores of others, of set purpose, we see that the limits within which any such effort can succeed are very narrow, and the methods by which it can operate are strictly defined. The favorite methods of our time are legislation and preaching. These methods fail because they do not affect ritual, and because they always aim at great results in a short time. Above all, we can judge of the amount of serious attention which is due to plans for "reorganizing society," to get rid of alleged errors and inconveniences in it. We might as well plan to reorganize our globe by redistributing the elements in it.

Dissent from the mores; group orthodoxy. Since it appears that the old mores are mischievous if they last beyond the duration of the conditions and needs to which they were adapted, and that constant, gradual, smooth, and easy readjustment is the course of things which is conducive to healthful life, it follows that free and rational criticism of traditional mores is essential to societal welfare. We have seen that the inherited mores exert a coercion on every one born in the group. It follows that only the greatest and best can react against the mores so as to modify them. It is by no means to be inferred that every one who sets himself at war with the traditional mores is a hero of social correction and amelioration. The trained reason and conscience never have heavier tasks laid upon them than where questions of conformity to, or dissent from, the mores are raised. It is by the dissent and free judgment of the best reason and conscience that the mores win flexibility and automatic re-

adjustment. Dissent is always unpopular in the group. Groups form standards of orthodoxy as to the "principles" which each member must profess and the ritual which each must practice. Dissent seems to imply a claim of superiority. It evokes hatred and persecution. Dissenters are rebels, traitors, and heretics. We see this in all kinds of subgroups. Noble and patrician classes, merchants, artisans, religious and philosophical sects, political parties, academies and learned societies, punish by social penalties dissent from, or disobedience to, their code of group conduct. The modern trades union, in its treatment of a "scab," only presents another example. The group also, by a majority, adopts a programme of policy and then demands of each member that he shall work and make sacrifices for what has been resolved upon for the group interest. He who refuses is a renegade or apostate with respect to the group doctrines and interests. He who adopts the mores of another group is a still more heinous criminal. The medieval definition of a heretic was one who varied in life and conversation, dress, speech, or manner (that is, the social ritual) from the ordinary members of the Christian community. Persecution of a dissenter is always popular in the group which he has abandoned. Toleration of dissent is no sentiment of the masses.

Antagonism between an individual and the mores. The case of dissent from the mores, which was considered above, is the case in which the individual voluntarily sets himself in antagonism to the mores of the society. There are cases in which the individual finds himself in involuntary antagonism to the mores of the society, or of some subgroup to which he belongs. If a man passes from one class to another, his acts show the contrast between the mores in which he was bred and those in which he finds himself. The satirists have made fun of the *parvenu* for centuries. His mistakes and misfortunes reveal the nature of the mores, their power over the individual, their pertinacity against later influences, the confusion in character produced by changing them, and the grip of habit which appears both in the persistence of old mores and the weakness of new ones. Every emigrant is forced to change his mores. He loses the sustaining help of use and wont. He has to acquire a new outfit of it. The traveler also experiences the change from life in one set of mores to life in another. The experience gives him the best power to criticise his native mores from a standpoint outside of them. We are forced to believe that, if a baby born in New England was taken to China and given to a Chinese family to rear and educate, he would become a Chinaman in all which belongs to the mores, that is to say, in his character, conduct, and code of life.

23. Authority and Custom ¹

Authority behind the Mores. The old men, or the priests, or medicine men, or chiefs, or old women may be the special guardians of these customs. They may modify details, or add new customs, or invent explanations for old ones. But the authority back of them is the group in the full sense. Not the group composed merely of visible and living members, but the larger group which includes the dead, and the kindred totemic or ancestral gods. Nor is it the group considered as a collection of individual persons. It is rather in a vague way the whole mental and social world. The fact that most of the customs have no known date or origin makes them seem a part of the nature of things.

Origin of Customs; Luck. The origin of customs is to be sought in several concurrent factors. There are in the first place the activities induced by the great primitive needs and instincts. Some ways of acting succeed; some fail. Man not only establishes habits of acting in the successful ways; he remembers his failures. He hands successful ways down with his approval; he condemns those that fail.

This attitude is re-enforced by the views about good luck and bad luck. Primitive man—and civilized man—is not ruled by a purely rational theory of success and failure. "One might use the best known means with the greatest care, yet fail of the result. On the other hand, one might get a great result with no effort at all. One might also incur a calamity without any fault of his own." "Grimm gives more than a thousand ancient German apothegms, dicta, and proverbs about 'luck.'" Both good and bad fortune are attributed to the unseen powers, hence a case of bad luck is not thought of as a mere chance. If the ship that sailed Friday meets a storm, or one of thirteen falls sick, the inference is that this is sure to happen again. And at this point the conception of the group welfare as bound up with the acts of every member, comes in to make individual conformity a matter for group concern—to make conduct a matter of mores and not merely a private affair. One most important, if not the most important, object of early legislation was the enforcement of lucky rites to prevent the individual from doing what might bring ill luck on all the tribe. For the conception always was that the ill luck does not attach itself simply to the doer, but may fall upon any member of the group. "The act of one member is conceived to make all the tribe impious, to offend its particular god, to expose all the tribe

¹ Reprinted by permission from J. Dewey and J. H. Tufts, *Ethics*, pp. 52; 53-55; 56-57. New York. Henry Holt & Company, 1908.

to penalties from heaven. When the street statues of Hermes were mutilated, all the Athenians were frightened and furious; they thought they should all be ruined because some one had mutilated a god's image and so offended him." "The children were reprov'd for cutting and burning embers, on the ground that this might be the cause for the accidental cutting of some member of the family." In the third place, besides these sources of custom, in the usefulness or lucky character of certain acts, there is also the more immediate reaction of individuals or groups to certain ways of acting according "as things jump with the feelings or displease them." An act of daring is applauded, whether useful or not. The individual judgment is caught up, repeated, and plays its part in the formation of group opinion. "Individual impulse and social tradition are thus the two poles between which we move." Or there may even be a more conscious discussion analogous to the action of legislatures or philosophic discussion. The old men among the Australians deliberate carefully as to each step of the initiation ceremonies. They make customs to be handed down.

Means of enforcing customs. The most general means for enforcing customs are public opinion, taboos, ritual or ceremony, and physical force.

Public approval uses both language and form to express its judgments. Its praise is likely to be emphasized by some form of art. The songs that greet the returning victor, the decorations, costumes, and tattoos for those who are honored, serve to voice the general sentiment. On the other hand ridicule or contempt is a sufficient penalty to enforce compliance with many customs that may be personally irksome. It is very largely the ridicule of the men's house which enforces certain customs among the men of peoples which have that institution. It is the ridicule or scorn of both men and women which forbids the Indian to marry before he has proved his manhood by some notable deed of prowess in war or chase.

Taboos. Taboos are perhaps not so much a means for enforcing custom, as they are themselves customs invested with peculiar and awful sanction. They prohibit or ban any contact with certain persons or objects under penalty of danger from unseen beings. Any events supposed to indicate the activity of spirits, such as birth and death, are likely to be sanctified by taboos. The danger is contagious; if a Polynesian chief is taboo, the ordinary man fears even to touch his footprints. But the taboos are not all based on mere dread of the unseen.

They may be used with conscious purpose. In order to have a supply of cocoanuts for a religious festival the head man may place a taboo upon

the young cocoanuts to prevent them from being consumed before they are fully ripe. The conception works in certain respects to supply the purpose which is later subserved by ideas of property. But it serves also as a powerful agency to maintain respect for the authority of the group.

Ritual. As taboo is the great negative guardian of customs, ritual is the great positive agent. It works by forming habits, and operates through associations formed by actually doing certain acts, usually under conditions which appeal to the emotions. Praise or blame encourages or inhibits; ritual secures the actual doing and at the same time gives a value to the doing. It is employed by civilized peoples more in the case of military or athletic drill, or in training children to observe forms of etiquette, so that these may become "second nature."

Physical Force. When neither group opinion, nor taboo, nor ritual secures conformity, there is always in the background physical force. The chiefs are generally men of strength whose word may not be lightly disregarded. Sometimes, as among the Sioux, the older braves constitute a sort of police. Between different clans the blood feud is the accepted method of enforcing custom, unless a substitute, the wergeld, is provided. For homicide within a clan the remaining members may drive the slayer out, and whoever meets such a Cain may slay him. If a man murdered his chief or kindred among the ancient Welsh he was banished and "it was required of every one of every sex and age within hearing of the horn to follow that exile and to keep up the barking of dogs, to the time of his putting to sea, until he shall have passed three score hours out of sight." It should be borne in mind, however, that physical pains, either actual or dreaded, would go but a little way toward maintaining authority in any such group as we have regarded as typical. Absolutism, with all its cruel methods of enforcing terror, needs a more highly organized system. In primitive groups the great majority support the authority of the group as a matter of course, and uphold it as a sacred duty when it is challenged. Physical coercion is not the rule but the exception.

24. The Nature and Place of Ritual in the Group¹

The process by which mores are developed and established is ritual. In primitive society it is the prevailing method of activity, and primitive religion is entirely a matter of ritual. Ritual is the perfect form of drill and of the regulated habit which comes from drill. Acts which are or-

¹ Reprinted by permission from W. G. Sumner, *The Folkways*, pp. 60-61; 62. Boston: Ginn & Company, 1906.

dained by authority and are repeated mechanically without intelligence run into ritual. If infants and children are subjected to ritual they never escape from its effects through life. We see the effect of ritual in breeding, courtesy, politeness, and all forms of prescribed behavior. Etiquette is social ritual. Ritual is not easy compliance with usage; it is strict compliance with detailed and punctilious rule. It admits of no exception or deviation. The stricter the discipline, the greater the power of ritual over action and character. In the training of animals and the education of children it is the perfection, inevitableness, invariableness, and relentlessness of routine which tells. They should never experience any exception or irregularity. Ritual is connected with words, gestures, symbols, and signs. Associations result, and, upon a repetition of the signal, the act is repeated, whether the will assents or not. Association and habit account for the phenomena. Ritual gains further strength when it is rhythmical, and is connected with music, verse, or other rhythmical arts. Ritual may embody an idea of utility, expediency, or welfare, but it always tends to become perfunctory, and the idea is only subconscious. All ritual is ceremonious and solemn. It tends to become sacred, or to make sacred the subject-matter with which it is connected. Therefore, in primitive society, it is by ritual that sentiments of awe, deference to authority, submission to tradition, and disciplinary co-operation are inculcated. Ritual operates a constant suggestion, and the suggestion is at once put in operation in acts. Ritual, therefore, suggests sentiments, but it never inculcates doctrines. Ritual is strongest when it is most perfunctory and excites no thought. By familiarity with ritual any doctrinal reference which it once had is lost by familiarity, but the habits persist. Ritual is something to be done, not something to be thought or felt. Men can always perform the prescribed thoughts or emotions. The acts may bring up again, by association, states of the mind and sentiments which have been connected with them, especially in childhood, when the fantasy was easily affected by rites, music, singing, dramas, etc. No creed, no moral code, and no scientific demonstration can ever win the same hold upon men and women as habits of action, with associated sentiments and states of mind, drilled in from childhood. Mohammedanism shows the power of ritual. Any occupation is interrupted for the prayers and prescribed genuflections.

The mores are social ritual in which we all participate unconsciously. The current habits as to hours of labor, meal hours, family life, the social intercourse of the sexes, propriety, amusements, travel, holidays, education, the use of periodicals and libraries, and innumerable other details of life fall under this ritual. Each does as everybody does. For

the great mass of mankind as to all things, and for all of us for a great many things, the rule to do as all do suffices. We are led by suggestion and association to believe that there must be wisdom and utility in what all do. The great mass of the folkways give us discipline and the support of routine and habit. If we had to form judgments as to all these cases before we could act in them, and were forced always to act rationally, the burden would be unendurable. Beneficent use and wont save us this trouble.

25. The Tendency to Formalism in Society¹

Too much mechanism in society gives us something for which there are many names, slightly different in meaning, as institutionalism, formalism, traditionalism, conventionalism, ritualism, bureaucracy and the like. It is by no means easy, however, to determine whether mechanism is in excess or not. It becomes an evil, no doubt, when it interferes with growth and adaptation, when it suppresses individuality and stupefies or misdirects the energies of human nature. But just when this is the case is likely not to be clear until the occasion is long past and we can see the matter in the perspective of history.

Thus, in religion, it is well that men should adhere to the creeds and ritual worked out in the past for spiritual edification, so long as these do, on the whole, fulfil their function; and it is hard to fix the time—not the same for different churches, classes or individuals—when they cease to do this. But it is certain that they die, in time, like all tissue, and if not cleared away presently rot.

It has been well said that formalism is "an excess of the organ of language." The aim of all organization is to express human nature, and it does this through a system of symbols, which are the embodiment and vehicle of the idea. So long as spirit and symbol are vitally united and the idea is really conveyed, all is well, but so fast as they are separated the symbol becomes an empty shell, to which, however, custom, pride or interest may still cling. It then supplants rather than conveys the reality.

Underlying all formalism, indeed, is the fact that it is psychically cheap; it substitutes the outer for the inner as more tangible, more capable of being held before the mind without fresh expense of thought and feeling, more easily extended, therefore, and impressed upon the multitude. Thus in our own architecture or literature we have innumerable

¹ Reprinted by permission from C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, pp. 342-44; 344-47. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909.

cheap, unfelt repetitions of forms that were significant and beautiful in their time and place.

The effect of formalism upon personality is to starve its higher life and leave it the prey of apathy, self-complacency, sensuality and the lower nature in general. A formalized religion and formalized freedom are, notoriously the congenial dwelling-place of depravity and oppression.

When a system of this sort is thoroughly established, as in the case of the later Roman Empire, it confines the individual mind as in a narrow cage by supplying it with only one sort of suggestions. The variation of ideas and the supplanting of old types by new can begin only by individuals getting hold of suggestions that conflict with those of the ruling system; and in the absence of this an old type may go on reproducing itself indefinitely, individuals seeming no more to it than the leaves of a tree, which drop in the autumn and in the spring are replaced by others indistinguishable from them.

Among the Hindoos, for instance, a child is brought up from infancy in subjection to ceremonies and rites which stamp upon him the impression of a fixed and immemorial system. They control the most minute details of his life, and leave little room for choice either on his part or that of his parents. There is no attempt to justify tradition by reason: custom as such is obligatory.

Intolerance goes very naturally with formalism, since to a mind in the unresisted grasp of a fixed system of thought anything that departs from that system must appear irrational and absurd. The lowest Chinaman unaffectedly despises the foreigner, of whatever rank, as a vulgar barbarian, just as Christians used to despise the Jews, and the Jews, in their time, the Samaritans. Tolerance comes in along with peaceful discussion, when there is a competition of various ways of thinking, no one of which is strong enough to suppress the others.

In America and western Europe at the present day there is a great deal of formalism, but it is, on the whole, of a partial and secondary character, existing rather from the inadequacy of vital force than as a ruling principle. The general state of thought favors adaptation, because we are used to it and have found it on the whole beneficial. We expect, for example, that a more vital and flexible form of organization will supplant the rigid systems of Russia and the Orient, and whatever in our own world is analogous to these.

But dead mechanism is too natural a product of human conditions not to exist at all times, and we may easily find it today in the church, in politics, in education, industry and philanthropy; wherever there is a

lack of vital thought and sentiment to keep the machinery pliant to its work.

Thus our schools, high and low, exhibit a great deal of it. Routine methods, here as everywhere, are a device for turning out cheap work in large quantities, and the temptation to use them, in the case of a teacher who has too much to do, or is required to do that which he does not understand or believe in, is almost irresistible. Indeed, they are too frequently inculcated by principals and training schools, in contempt of the fact that the one essential thing in real teaching is a personal expression between teacher and pupil. Drill is easy for one who has got the knack of it, just because it requires nothing vital or personal, but is a convenient appliance for getting the business done with an appearance of success and little trouble to any one.

Even universities have much of this sort of cant. In literature, for instance, whether ancient or modern, English or foreign, little that is vital is commonly imported. Compelled by his position to teach *something* to large and diverse classes, the teacher is led to fix upon certain matters—such as grammar, metres, or the biographies of the authors—whose definiteness suits them for the didactic purpose, and drill them into the student; while the real thing, the sentiments that are the soul of literature, are not communicated. If the teacher himself feels them, which is often the case, the fact that they cannot be reduced to formulas and tested by examinations discourages him from dwelling upon them.

In like manner our whole system of commerce and industry is formal in the sense that it is a vast machine grinding on and on in a blind way which is often destructive of the human nature for whose service it exists. Mammon—as in the painting by Watts—is not a fiend, wilfully crushing the woman's form that lies under his hand, but only a somewhat hardened man of the world, looking in another direction and preoccupied with the conduct of business upon business principles.

A curious instance of the same sort of thing is the stereotyping of language by the cheap press and the habit of hasty reading. The newspapers are called upon to give a maximum of commonplace information for a minimum of attention, and in doing this are led to adopt a small standard vocabulary and a uniform arrangement of words and sentences. All that requires fresh thought, either from reader or writer, is avoided to the greater comfort of both. The telegraph plays a considerable part in this, and an observer familiar with its technique points out how it puts a premium on long but unmistakable words, on conventional phrases (for which the operators have brief signs) and on a sentence structure

so obvious that it cannot be upset by mistakes in punctuation. In this way our newspapers, and the magazines and books that partake of their character, are the seat of a conventionalism perhaps as destructive of the spirit of literature as ecclesiasticism is of the spirit of Christianity.

26. Custom and Law¹

Custom as custom is a rule accepted uncritically and supported in any case that arises by general sentiment, and the mass of custom forms the groundwork of social life, in which its function has been compared, aptly enough, to the function of instinct in the life of the individual. Law undoubtedly arises out of custom, but is essentially a rule declared and enforced by a constituted authority. There is, indeed, a transitional stage at which a court declares the law without enforcing it, but it is a matter of words whether we decide to call such a rule custom because it will be enforced by sentiment or the action of the successful party, or law because it is authoritatively announced. The rule is, in fact, at the transitional point between custom and law. Developed law is the rule which a court will enforce. In law every rule is strictly defined and limited, whereas in custom the edges are generally left ragged, and in this precision there is both gain and loss. Law is more certain, and for the same reason more rigid, and the necessary adaptation to the circumstances is left to lawyers, and is too often biased by the sentiments of the legal class. However, the ultimate authority of law is the same as that of custom. It is the rule of the authority acting for the community, and to disobey it is by implication to revolt against the communal life as at present constituted—a revolt which can be justified only if that constitution is radically bad. The power of amending law without touching the constitution of the community is therefore a necessity in the interests of social conservation.

We have remarked that a civilized community always has a regular organ or organs to maintain its common rules. This organ or system of organs in its entirety is what we know as the State. That is to say, by the community we understand the people owning a common rule in all their varied lives and relationships, by the State, the fabric of law, government and defense by which the rule is maintained. The State, therefore, is not the community, but a system of institutions, and therefore regarded as a union of human beings, an association.

¹ Reprinted by permission from L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Développement*, pp. 47-48; 50. New York. Henry Holt & Company, 1924.

27. Differences Between Mores and Formal Law¹

When folkways have become institutions or laws they have changed their character and are to be distinguished from the mores. The element of sentiment and faith inheres in the mores. Laws and institutions have a rational and practical character, and are more mechanical and utilitarian. The great difference is that institutions and laws have a positive character, while mores are unformulated and undefined. There is a philosophy implicit in the folkways; when it is made explicit it becomes technical philosophy. Objectively regarded, the mores are the customs which actually conduce to welfare under existing life conditions. Acts under the laws of institutions are conscious and voluntary; under the folkways they are always unconscious and involuntary, so that they have the character of natural necessity. Educated reflection and scepticism can disturb this spontaneous relation. The laws, being positive prescriptions, supersede the mores so far as they are adopted. It follows that the mores come into operation where laws and tribunals fail. The mores cover the great field of common life where there are no laws or police regulations. They cover an immense and undefined domain, and they break the way in new domains, not yet controlled at all. The mores, therefore, build up new laws and police regulations in time.

C. THE RATIONALIZATION OF CULTURE (ETHOS)

28. Ethos or Culture Standards²

All that has been said in this chapter about the folkways and the mores leads up to the idea of the group character which the Greeks called the *ethos*, that is, the totality of characteristic traits by which a group is individualized and differentiated from others. The great nations of south-eastern Asia were long removed from familiar contact with the rest of mankind and isolated from each other, while they were each subjected to the discipline and invariable rule of traditional folkways which covered all social interests except the interferences of a central political authority, which perpetrated tyranny in its own interest. The consequence has been that Japan, China, and India have each been molded into a firm, stable, and well-defined unit group, having a character strongly marked both actively and passively.

¹ Reprinted by permission from W. G. Sumner, *The Folkways*, pp. 56-57. Boston. Ginn & Company, 1906.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71; 73-74.

The ethos of one group always furnishes the standpoint from which it criticises the ways of any other group.

We are familiar with the notion of "national character" as applied to the nations of Europe, but these nations do not have each an ethos. There is a European ethos, for the nations have so influenced each other for the last two thousand years that there is a mixed ethos which includes local variations. The European *kharma* is currently called Christian. In the ancient world Egypt and Sparta were the two cases of groups with the firmest and best-defined ethos. In modern European history the most marked case is that of Venice. In no one of these cases did the elements of moral strength and societal health preponderate, but the history of each showed the great stability produced by a strong ethos. Russia has a more complete and defined ethos than any other state in Europe, although the efforts which have been made since Peter the Great to break down the traditions and limitations of the national ethos, and to adopt the ethos of western Europe, have produced weakness and confusion. It is clear what is the great power of a strong ethos. It is an overruling power for good or ill. Modern scholars have made the mistake of attributing to *race* much which belongs to the ethos, with a resulting controversy as to the relative importance of nature and nurture. Others have sought a "soul of the people" and have tried to construct a "collective psychology," repeating for groups processes which are now abandoned for individuals. Historians, groping for the ethos, have tried to write the history of "the people" of such and such a state. The ethos individualizes groups and keeps them apart. Its opposite is cosmopolitanism. It degenerates into patriotic vanity and chauvinism. Industrialism weakens it, by extending relations of commerce with outside groups. It coincides better with militancy. It has held the Japanese people like a single mailed fist for war. What religion they have has lost all character except that of a cohesive agent to hold the whole close organization tight together.

29. Characteristics of the Occidental Ethos¹

The child possesses four elementary "values"; four ideals dominate its existence. They are:

- (a) Physical bigness, as seen in grown-ups and imagined in giants;
- (b) Quick movement—in running, bowling a hoop, riding on a roundabout;

¹ By permission from *The Quintessence of Capitalism* by Werner Sombart, (Selections from Chap. XII). Published by E. P. Dutton & Company.

- (c) Novelty—it changes its toys very quickly ; it begins something and never completes it because another occupation attracts it ; and
- (d) Sense of power—that it why it pulls out the legs of a fly, makes Towzer stand on his hind legs and beg nicely, and flies its kite as high as it can.

Curious as it may sound, these ideals, and these only, will be found in all modern “values.” Let us take them in turn.

(a) We attach importance to quantities, to mere size. It is what interests us, what we admire most. That I fancy, will be generally admitted. There is a universal tendency (to use the words of Lord Bryce) “to mistake bigness for greatness.” It matters not wherein the bigness consists : it may be the population of a town or a country, the height of a monument, the breadth of a river, the frequency of suicide, the passengers carried by a railway, the size of a ship, the number of players in an orchestra, or what not. Of course our greatest admiration is reserved for a huge sum of money. Besides, money makes it possible to measure the size of otherwise unmeasurable things and to compare them. It is a natural and easy step from this to the belief that that is valuable which costs much. We say this picture or this jewelry is twice as valuable as that. In America, where this modern tendency may be studied better than anywhere else because there it has reached its greatest perfection, people come to the point at once, and prefix to every commodity its monetary value. “Have you seen the 50,000-dollar Rembrandt at Mr. A’s house?” is a not unusual question. “Today Mr. Carnegie’s 500,000-dollar yacht entered the harbor of” (say) Boston—so you may read in the daily paper.

Get into the habit of looking at the mere quantity of things and you will naturally tend to compare any two phenomena that may come under your notice ; you will weigh the one against the other and pronounce the larger to be the more valuable. Again, if of two things the one becomes larger than the other in a given space of time, it is said to have been successful. So that the inclination towards what is measurably big brings with it necessarily another tendency—worship of success. The modern business man is appraised only in accordance with his success. Now success means to overtake others ; to do more, to achieve more, to possess more than others ; in a word, to be great. The pursuit of success holds out the unlimited possibilities as the chase of profits ; the one complements the other.

To illustrate the influence on the inner workings of the mind of this quantitative valuation of things, so characteristic of our day, let us refer to the attitude of people to sport. What is invariably the main

question of interest? Is it not, who will win? Who will score most? A match is but a quantitative balance between two results. Imagine such a standpoint in an ancient Greek wrestling school! Imagine it at a Spanish bullfight! the thing is impossible. In both these cases qualitative values were looked for, e. g., the highest personal artistic skill.

(b) Speed is almost the same consequence to the modern man as massivity. To rush on in a 100-h. p. motor-car is one of the supremest ideals of our age; and he who cannot speed madly along contents himself with reading of record-breaking velocity.

Moreover, a curious concept has sprung into existence, that of "beating the record." In terms of record-breaking you impress on your memory the speediest achievements as the most valuable ones. In its fullest meaning the new concept refers to great size and great speed combined. All the megalomania, all the mad hurry of our time, is expressed in record-beating.

(c) Whatever is new nowadays attracts merely because it is a novelty. It attracts most when the assurance is possible, "There never has been anything like it." Sensational we call its effect on the mind. That the love of sensation is a marked feature of the age requires no expatiation. Modern journalism is perhaps the best proof. But recall also how fashions in dances, no less than in clothes, change from season to season. Is it not because nothing is so attractive as what is new?

(d) The sense of power is the fourth characteristic of the modern spirit: it is felt in the consciousness of superiority over others. But in reality it is only an expression of weakness;¹ hence its importance in the child's world. For after all, any one gifted with true greatness, which is usually inward, will be hardly likely to estimate the outward semblance of power at all highly. Power has no temptation for Siegfried; only a Mime thirsts for it. Bismarck in all probability did not bother much about the power he exercised; but in Lassalle the desire for power must have been tremendous. A king possesses power; it is therefore of small moment in his sight. But the financier of humble origin, who keeps a kingly borrower waiting in his antechamber for some little time, suns himself in this power in consequence, is like a little boy who makes his doggie bring back the stick he keeps on throwing from him. Moreover, when neither by money nor any other outward force power over mankind is given us, we talk of the conquest of nature. That is why our age is so childishly delighted with epoch-making

¹ Sombart here touches on a point made very explicit in the theory of compensation of Dr. A. Adler of Vienna. Cf.: Adler's *The Neurotic Constitution*, New York, 1915.

discoveries—say, the mastery of the air, and such-like achievements. The truly great man, however, will be comparatively unmoved at the sight of a biplane in the air. A truly great generation concerned with the deepest problems of life will not be enraptured because it made some discoveries in technical science. Power of this sort it will assuredly regard as “superficial.” Our own age lacks true greatness; accordingly, like a child it admires the power which new inventions bestow, and it overrates those who possess it. Hence the high esteem in which the populace holds inventors and millionaires.

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What place has crisis in the rise of social control? Illustrate.
2. Are the conscious motives brought out in crisis always the true motives? Discuss.
3. What cultural factors offered to some of the citizens of Halifax an explanation of the disaster?
4. What current events of the time offered explanations to others?
5. How does a great crisis such as an explosion, a famine, an earthquake, a fire, or a flood bring out individual differences (a) in emotions; (b) in sympathetic actions; (c) in aggressiveness; (d) in co-operation; (e) in leadership. (Name other qualities which are also revealed.)
6. List the historical crises through which the United States has passed since the opening of the nineteenth century. How have these brought about alterations in the forms of group controls? Illustrate.
7. Describe briefly some crisis through which you have gone. Indicate how the social definitions of the situation helped or hindered your solution of your problem.
8. Illustrate out of your own experience or out of observed experiences of others how the folkways and mores of European immigrants run counter to those of America.
9. Just wherein does coming to America constitute for the immigrant a “crisis”?
10. Distinguish, by giving examples, between the mores and the folkways.
11. What is the correlation between complexity of social and economic organization and the rise of all sorts of formalisms? Illustrate.
12. Why is the Volstead Act so difficult to enforce in certain areas and among certain groups?
13. What is the relation of authority to custom?
14. What is the relation of the mores to law?
15. Distinguish between the ethos of the Orient and the Occident.

16. It has been said that present Occidental culture is essentially extroverted in character while that of the Orient is essentially introverted. Is this psychological description sound? Discuss.
- B. Topics for Class Reports
1. Review for class discussion Park and Miller's *Old World Traits Transplanted*.
 2. Do the same for Steiner's *On the Trail of the Immigrant*.
 3. Report on Thomas' article on Taboo from *Encyclopedia Britannica* (Cf. bibliography).
 4. Review Patrick's discussion of "Our Centrifugal Society." (Cf. bibliography.) Does this describe one phase of our ethos?
 5. Review Sumner and Keller's chapter XXI on the aleatory (luck) element in social behavior. (Cf. bibliography.)
- C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers
1. Group Morale and Crises as Illustrated from Disaster Areas.
 2. Personal Disintegration in Disaster Areas.
 3. Study of Personal Documents of Immigrants with a View to Revealing the Mechanisms of Meeting Crises.
 4. The Relations of Mores and Law.
 5. The Effect of Capitalism on the Occidental Ethos.

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PART TWO
PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

CHAPTER VI

ORIGINAL NATURE, INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES, AND INTELLIGENCE

I. INTRODUCTION

To understand social behavior it is essential to describe the organic basis of the mechanisms on which it rests. Too frequently the social scientist has ignored the biological background of individual action. As we noted in the general introduction, one can not understand the social process without recognizing the place which the biological foundations of behavior play in this same process. An important contribution to this field came through the work of Charles Darwin and for psychology especially through that of his cousin, Francis Galton, with his study of the importance of individual differences. Another contribution to social psychology came from McDougall with his insistence on the important place which the emotions and the instincts take in social conduct. Finally, we shall have to look to the contribution from general psychology on the nature of the learning process and the forms of mental organization which arise in the individual. In the present chapter we shall deal with the factors of individual differences and with the contrast between original and learned or acquired nature. We shall also consider the organic basis of intelligence.

The biological roots of human behavior are far deeper than the product of this behavior which we term "culture." Thorndike in his paper on original versus acquired nature indicates some of the fundamental contrasts that may be recognized at the outset in studying the individual. He indicates the units of original nature and the method by which they are combined into larger patterns. Kellogg's paper deals with the inheritance of mental abilities first clearly pointed out by Galton. The law of ancestral inheritance has been somewhat modified, since it is now recognized that the percentage of

influence of various ancestors is not quite what Galton estimated it to be. Nevertheless, his fundamental point of a diminishing effect of any particular ancestor upon the present individual, in terms of the remoteness of this ancestor, is sound. Likewise, his law of filial regression shows that any combination of traits rests upon a variety of ancestral characters coming from a wide selection of persons. The work started by Galton in the field of inheritance of mental abilities is still going on. While many of the earlier assumptions are being modified by more careful study of early physical and social conditionings, thus upsetting the assurance of some of the earlier work, it still remains true that there is everywhere overwhelming evidence of the importance of heredity in human behavior.

Turner's paper reviews further the nature of individual differences, giving some statistical evidence from the field of intelligence. Man's life rests not only on his original nature, but also on the fact that this original nature varies, one man with another. Furthermore, social experience makes for further differentiation among men. But the fact remains that men differ in physical condition, in resistance to disease, innate mental abilities, in volitional qualities and even, perhaps, in instinctive and emotional tendencies. There is perhaps less variability in the racially older instinctive tendencies than in the newer abilities such as intelligence or learning capacity, which rest more particularly upon the higher nervous centers—those which were last to evolve. In short, while social surroundings play an enormous rôle in determining the direction which life organization takes, certainly heredity has a distinct part in limiting the direction and extent of this social influence.

White's review of Kretschmer's work on the relation of physical make-up to character traits is important. While the character or personality organization is taken up later, this paper is introduced here to show the possible correlation of physique and the whole personality development. Certainly the correlations reported by Kretschmer are significant if further study shows that his own results are at all universal.

In the second section of this chapter are three papers dealing with intelligence. Herrick indicates the neurological foundation of both original and learned nature. One should consult Herrick's *Intro-*

duction to Neurology for a fuller and more complete understanding of the interrelation of original to acquired nature on the neurological side. This is followed by a series of short definitions of intelligence from Thorndike, Terman, and Colvin. Finally there is a selection from Peterson indicating a probable mechanistic explanation of intelligence. By such conception intellectual capacity is more adequately brought into line with the functioning of the nervous system.

II. MATERIALS

A. ORIGINAL NATURE AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

30. The Original Tendencies of Man¹

Any man possesses at the very start of his life—that is, at the moment when the ovum and spermatozoon which are to produce him have united—numerous well-defined tendencies to future behavior. Between the situations which he will meet and the responses which he will make to them, pre-formed bonds exist. It is already determined by the constitution of these two germs, that under certain circumstances he will see and hear and feel and act in certain ways. His intellect and morals, as well as his bodily organs and movements, are in part the consequence of the nature of the embryo in the first moment of its life. What a man is and does throughout life is a result of whatever constitution he has at the start and of all the forces that act upon it before and after birth. I shall use the term “original nature” for the former and “environment” for the latter.

The Problems of Original Nature

Elementary psychology acquaints us with the fact that men are, apart from education, equipped with tendencies to feel and act in certain ways in certain circumstances—that the response to be made to a situation may be determined by man’s inborn organization. It is, in fact, a general law that, other things being equal, the response to any situation will be that which is by original nature connected with that situation, or with some situation like it. Any neurone will, when stimulated, transmit the stimulus, other things being equal, to the neurone with which

¹ Reprinted by permission from E. L. Thorndike, *Educational Psychology*, (Briefer Course), pp. 2-7; 9-10. New York. Columbia University, Bureau of Publications of Teachers College, 1914. (Author’s copyright).

it is by inborn organization most closely connected. The basis of intellect and character is this fund of unlearned tendencies, this original arrangement of the neurones in the brain.

The original connections may develop at various dates and may exist for only limited times; their waxing and waning may be sudden or gradual. They are the starting point for all education or other human control. The aim of education is to perpetuate some of them, to eliminate some, and to modify or redirect others. They are perpetuated by providing the stimuli adequate to arouse them and give them exercise, and by associating satisfaction with their action. They are eliminated by withholding these stimuli so that they abort through disuse, or by associating discomfort with their action. They are redirected by substituting, in the *situation-connection-response* series, another response instead of the undesirable original one; or by attaching the response to another situation in connection with which it works less or no harm, or even positive good.

The behavior of man in the family, in business, in the state, in religion and in every other affair of life is rooted in his unlearned, original equipment of instincts and capacities. All schemes of improving human life must take account of man's original nature, most of all when their aim is to reverse or counteract it.

Names for Original Tendencies

Three terms, reflexes, instincts, and inborn capacities, divide the work of naming these unlearned tendencies. When the tendency concerns a very definite and uniform response to a very simple sensory situation, and when the connection between the situation and the response is very hard to modify and is also very strong so that it is almost inevitable, the connection or response to which it leads is called a reflex. Thus the knee-jerk is a very definite and uniform response to the simple sense-stimulus of sudden hard pressure against a certain spot. It is hard to lessen, to increase, or otherwise control the movement, and, given the situation, the response almost always comes. When the response is more indefinite, the situation more complex, and the connection more modifiable, instinct becomes the customary term. Thus one's misery at being scorned is too indefinite a response to too complex a situation and is too easily modifiable to be called a reflex. When the tendency is to an extremely indefinite response or set of responses to a very complex situation, and when the connection's final degree of strength is commonly due to very large contributions from training, it has seemed more appropriate to replace reflex and instinct by some term like capacity, or tendency, or potentiality. Thus an original tendency to

respond to the circumstances of school education by achievement in learning the arts and sciences is called the capacity for scholarship.

There is, of course, no gap between reflexes and instincts, or between instincts and the still less easily describable original tendencies. The fact is that original tendencies range with respect to the nature of the responses from such as are single, simple, definite, uniform within the individual and only slightly variable amongst individuals, to responses that are highly compound, complex, vague, and variable within one individual's life and amongst individuals. They range with respect to the nature of the situation from simple facts like temperature, oxygen or humidity, to very complex facts like "meeting suddenly and unexpectedly a large animal when in the dark without human companions," and include extra-bodily, bodily, and what would be commonly called purely mental, situations. They range with respect to the bond or connection from slight modifiability to great modifiability, and from very close likeness amongst individuals to fairly wide variability.

Much labor has been spent in trying to make hard and fast distinctions between reflexes and instincts and between instincts and these vaguer predispositions which are here called capacities. It is more useful and more scientific to avoid such distinctions in thought, since in fact there is a continuous gradation.

The Components of an Original Tendency

A typical reflex, or instinct, or capacity, as a whole, includes the ability to be sensitive to a certain situation, the ability to make a certain response, and the existence of a bond or connection whereby that response is made to that situation. For instance, the young chick is sensitive to the absence of other members of his species, is able to peep, and is so organized that the absence of other members of the species makes him peep. But the tendency to be sensitive to a certain situation may exist without the existence of a connection therewith of any further exclusive response, and the tendency to make a certain response may exist without the existence of a connection limiting that response exclusively to any single situation. The three-year-old child is by inborn nature markedly sensitive to the presence and acts of other human beings, but the exact nature of his response varies. The original tendency to cry is very strong, but there is no one situation to which it is exclusively bound.

Original nature seems to decide that the individual will respond somehow to certain situations more often than it decides just what he will do, and to decide that he will make certain responses more often than

it decides just when he will make them. So, for convenience in thinking about man's unlearned equipment, this appearance of *multiple response* to one same situation and multiple *causation* of one same response may be taken roughly as the fact.

It must not, however, be taken to mean that the result of an action set up in the sensory neurones by a situation is essentially unpredictable—that, for instance, exactly the same neurone-action (paralleling, let us say, the sight of a dog by a certain two-year-old child) may lead, in the two-year-old, now to the act of crying, at another time to shy retreat, at another to effusive joy, and at still another to curious examination of the newcomer, all regardless of any modification by experience. On the contrary, *in the same organism the same neurone-action will always produce the same result—in the same individual the really same situation will always produce the same response*. The apparent existence of an original sensitivity unconnected with any one particular response, so that apparently the same cause produces different results, is to be explained in one of two ways. First, the apparently same situations may really be different. Thus the sight of a dog to an infant in its mother's arms is not the same situation as the sight of a dog to an infant alone on the doorstep. Being held in its mother's arms is a part of the situation that may account for the response of mild curiosity in the former case and fear in the latter. Second, if the situations are really identical, the apparently same organism really differs. Thus a dog seen by a child, healthy, rested and calm, may lead to only curiosity, whereas, if seen by the same child, ill, fatigued, and nervously irritable, it may lead to fear.

Similarly, the really same response is never made to different situations by the same organism. When the same response seems to be made to different situations, closer inspection will show that the responses do differ; or that the situations were, in respect to the element that determined the response, identical; or that the organism is itself different. Thus, though "a ball seen," "a tin soldier seen," and "a rattle seen" alike provoke "reaching for," the *total* responses do differ, the central nervous system being provoked to three different responses manifested as three different sense-impressions—of a ball, of a tin soldier, and of a rattle. Thus, if "ball grasped," "tin soldier grasped," and "rattle grasped" alike provoke "throwing," it is because only one particular component, common to the three situations, is effective in determining the act. Thus, if a child now weeps whenever spoken to, whereas before he wept only when hurt or scolded, it is because he is now exhausted, excited, or otherwise changed.

The original connections between situation and response are never due to chance in its true sense, but there are many minor co-operating forces by which a current of conduction in the same sensory neurones or receptors may, on different occasions, diverge to produce different results in behavior, and by which very different sensory stimulations may converge to a substantially common consequence.

The original tendencies of man, however, rarely act one at a time in isolation one from another. Life apart from learning would not be a simple serial arrangement, over and over, of a hundred or so situations, each a dynamic unit; and of a hundred or so responses, fitted to these situations by a one-to-one correspondence. On the contrary, they co-operate in multitudinous combinations. Their combination may be apparent in behavior, as when the tendencies to look at a bright moving object, to reach for a small object passing a foot away, and to smile at a smiling familiar face combine to make a baby smilingly fixate and reach for the watch which his father swings. Or the combination may take place unobserved in the nervous system, as when a large animal suddenly approaching a solitary child makes him run and hide, though the child in question would neither run nor hide at solitude, at the presence of the animal, or at the sudden approach of objects in general.

It is also the case that any given situation does not act absolutely as a unit, producing either one total response or none at all. Its effect is the total effect of its elements, of which now one, now another may predominate in determining response, according to co-operating forces without and within the man. The action of the situations which move man's original nature is not that of some thousands of keys each of which unlocks one door and does nothing else whatever. Any situation is a complex, producing a complex effect; and so, if attendant circumstances vary, a variable effect. In any case it does, so to speak, what it can.

31. The Inheritance of Mental Ability¹

Francis Galton, cousin of Charles Darwin, anthropologist, traveler, founder of biometry and modern eugenics and profound student of evolution and heredity, was the first outstanding scholar to call serious attention to the biological inheritance of human mental traits and capacity. Most studies in human heredity antecedent to his—and his own studies were made less than sixty years ago—were confined almost

¹ Reprinted by permission from V. L. Kellogg, *Mind and Heredity*, pp. 42-7. Princeton. Princeton University Press, 1923.

exclusively to the inheritance of physical characteristics. Galton, himself an excellent example of the personal advantage which comes through being derived from a family stock in which unusual mental capacity has been a conspicuous hereditary feature, studied the mental ability of Oxford students and distinguished English families. He found that the correlation between Oxford brothers and Oxford fathers and sons as regards mental ability was much greater than among unrelated Oxonians. He found mental ability running for generations in English families, despite sufficient dissimilarity in environment and opportunity among successive generations to make this continuing ability not explicable by environmental advantage. He determined that the chance of a son of an eminent man to show eminent ability himself was about 500 times as great as that of a son of a man taken at random. His observations and conclusions are readily accessible in his various well-known books and papers, as *Hereditary Genius*, *English Men of Science their Nature and Nurture*, *Human Faculty and Its Development*, *Natural Inheritance*, and others. The prestige of his name, his lucid style of writing, and the ingenious and thorough character of his studies combined to give the results of his work a wide and convincing hearing. There has been no question, since his work, that human mental qualities are inherited just as are human physical qualities. There had been much question of it before him.

Galton, however, studied heredity statistically and his determinations of inheritance behavior are expressed as averages. With regard to mental inheritance he paid less attention to the inheritance of particular mental traits than to mental capacity as a whole. He formulated two principal generalizations, based on his studies of both mental and physical inheritance, which are now commonly known as "Galton's Laws." The first, known as the general law of ancestral inheritance, is to the effect that an individual derives one-half of his inheritance from his two parents, one-fourth coming from each; one-fourth of his inheritance from his four grandparents; one-eighth from his eight great grandparents; and so on by diminishing fractions until the sum of this infinite series equals 1 or the total inheritance of the individual. Galton's second generalization, called the law of filial regression, can be summed up by saying that the children of parents who vary from the mean of the population vary similarly, but to less extent than the parents. "This law of regression," says Galton, "tells heavily against the full hereditary transmission of any gift. Only a few of many children would be likely to differ from mediocrity so widely as their mid-

parent (average condition of the two parents) and still fewer would differ as widely as the more exceptional of the two parents. The more bountifully the parent is gifted by Nature, the more rare will be his good fortune if he begets a son who is as richly endowed as himself, and still more so if he has a son who is endowed yet more largely."

An excellent example of the results of this latter law may be seen in the case of Galton's collateral family, that of the Darwins. Of Charles Darwin's five sons four have shown unusual mental ability—but none has been a second Charles. But we are all familiar with examples of "filial regression." Indeed, so conspicuous in our eyes is the frequent failure of the children to equal an unusually able parent in mental capacity that we tend to overlook the equally frequent possession by these children of mental endowment above the average of the population. But the law of filial regression calls for both these phenomena.

Galton's generalizations based on the examination and statistical treatment of many data mark a distinct step forward in the study of heredity. Especially must we be grateful to him for having brought mental inheritance into line with physical inheritance and for having determined and expressed the general or average inheritance behavior of both physical and mental heritable endowment by common generalizations. But interesting and suggestive as these generalizations may be they do not tell us what we especially wish to know, and that is something about the specific inheritance behavior of specific traits; something about what we may probably or certainly expect with regard to the presence or absence in the child or children of a given trait, physical or mental, which is included in the history of this child's ancestry. If, for example, both of the parents are feeble-minded, or one is feeble-minded and the other normal, or if both parents are normal but one or two or three or all of the grandparents are feeble-minded, or if all are normal, will the child or children be feeble-minded or not? That is the kind of question we burn to have answered by the students of heredity. Can they answer such questions?

32. Individual Differences Among Human Beings¹

When one turns from a consideration of the elements which compose original nature to inquire into its influence in human life, the first fact

¹ From R. E. Turner, *America in Civilization*, pp. 90-92. Copyright by A. A. Knopf, Inc. 1925.

that strikes one is the infinite variations which exist among men. "All men are created equal" is a traditional element in American thought, but if the statement means that men are equally endowed at birth with the constituents of original nature, there is no truth in it. Variation among individuals is one of nature's fundamental facts, and it is as true of the inherited equipments of individual men as it is of the leaves of the trees in the forest. Of course, the variety which marks adult men is not caused entirely by differences in their heredity, but the bases of the variety exist in their native traits. All men, as organisms, have similar needs, but not in the same degrees; nor do they have the same strength to seek the desirable satisfactions: there are the "weak" and the "strong." All, too, are capable of similar emotions, but there are the "stolid" and the "flighty." Neither are the instinctive impulses of a common grade in all men: there is the "miser," who has made acquisition his supreme interest, and his opposite, the "spendthrift," who acquires only to spend again. In a like manner, one may see the "rake" and his foil, the "ascetic." Men differ, also, in the qualities of their intelligence: there are geniuses—such as Shakespeare, Goethe, and Tolstoi; there are the unremembered dullards and average men. Aristotle was probably the first man to make a list of such differences, but only in recent years has a scientific study of them been attempted. From these studies it has become clear that men vary not only in their general levels of intelligence, but also in their more specific capacities, such as sensitiveness of color and sound and rhythm, their rates of learning and forgetting, attentiveness to stimuli, and speeds of reaction. In fact, there are variations among men in every need, capacity, tendency, and strength which are inherited as original nature.

This basic unlikeness among men is established by their heredity. In the union of the germ cells into the single cell from which the organism develops are brought together the determinants of the original nature of the offspring. Variation in these determinants is just as much a fact as is any other form of variation. Furthermore, not only are differences inherited from the parents, but traits from earlier ancestry may contribute to the original nature of the offspring. Thus each newborn babe receives a complex and composite body of the traits which are carried in the germ plasms of its parents. Since traits from ancestry earlier than the immediate parents may appear in the child, families from generation to generation may have decidedly inferior or superior members. Thus there are strains of good and bad heredity. There appear, also, to be specific variations, as between the sexes: for example

it is thought that the range of variation is greater in the males than in the females. Likewise it is probable that some inherited differences are due to race qualities. However, it is most certainly false that all of one sex, or all of one race, or any excessive portion of a sex or a race, are superior to the other sex or races. The facts as to the distribution of the inherited differences between the sexes, and especially among the races, remain as yet uncertain. On the other hand, "alike as two peas in a pod," even when applied to blood relatives, is superficial knowledge.

With these facts as to the variations in the inherited equipments of men, it becomes pertinent to inquire into the range of the differences, which can be discovered only by comparing the behaviors of men. Reference already has been made to the g  nius, the person of exceptional endowment, whose intelligence is superior and whose achievements are therefore greater; but often these superior minds show diseases and elements of insanity. The fact is, men grade from the geniuses through the high average, the average, the dullards, the stupid, to the feeble-minded, who are classified as morons, imbeciles, and idiots. Statistical studies indicate that the percentage of individuals in each group is about as follows:

"Near" genius or genius	.25
Very superior	6.75
Superior	13.00
Normal, or average	60.00
Dull, rarely feeble-minded	13.00
Border line, sometimes dull, often feeble-minded	6.00
Feeble-minded	1.00

Of the feeble-minded group about three-quarters are "morons," or those with a mental development of a twelve-year-old child. Under ordinary circumstances these cannot be distinguished from persons of higher intelligence, but since they lack the capacity to make suitable reactions to new situations they are a dangerous element in the population. Not all of this range of variation is due to heredity, but certainly heredity is the chief factor in its maintenance: from generation to generation the Lowell and Adams families showed superior members, and at the lower sweep of the range ran the members of the Jukes and Kallikak families. If the "raw materials of behavior" are of a low grade, little can be expected; but if they are good in quality, although they may be wasted, they offer the prospect of achievement.

(Consult sections 146, 147)

33. Individual Differences in Physical Form and their Bearing on Personality¹

The attempt to classify men into types has always lured the thinker from the earliest times and has been frequently attempted from various points of view. Hippocrates made the attempt to account for health and disease on the basis of his humoral doctrine and now Kretschmer attempts to correlate certain temperaments with certain bodily configurations.

To understand the contribution of Kretschmer one must bear in mind the major accomplishment of Kraepelin in the field of psychiatry. The service which he rendered by the separation of the two great groups of psychoses, the manic-depressive and the schizophrenic, based upon their course and outcome, is too well known to require comment. It is upon the basis of these two great groups that Kretschmer's work, in the first instance, takes its origin. The first problem he set himself was to see if there was any correlation between these two fundamental psychoses and the physical make-up as it could be observed and measured from the surface. In other words, whether the manic-depressives (circulars or cycloids) and the dementia precoxes (schizophrenes or schizoids) exhibited each or both a characteristic bodily make-up. For this purpose he investigated in his first series 85 circulars and 175 schizophrenes to which were later added over 100 further cases, bringing the total number investigated to 400 cases.

The details included in the main the face and skull; the general physique including musculature, fat distribution, proportions of limbs and extremities, chest, stomach, shoulders, pelvis; the surface of the body including pigment, hair; the glands; the measurements of the height, chest, shoulders, limbs, and skull; and certain temporal considerations such as age, onset of psychosis and physical illness.

From a consideration of these details three types emerged as follows:

1. *Asthenic type*. Characterized by a deficiency in thickness but with undiminished length of all parts of the body—face, neck, trunk, extremities, and in all the tissues—skin, fat, muscle, bone, and vascular system. The picture here is of "a lean narrowly-built man, who looks taller than he is, with a skin poor in secretion and blood, with narrow

¹ Reprinted by permission from W. A. White's review of E. Kretschmer *Physique and Character. An Investigation of the Nature of Constitution and of the Theory of Temperament* (New York. Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1925) in *Psychoanalytic Rev.* 1926: XIII pp. 98-105.

shoulders, from which hang lean arms with thin muscles, and delicately boned hands; a long, narrow, flat chest, on which we can count the ribs, with a sharp rib-angle. A thin stomach, devoid of fat, and lower limbs which are just like the upper ones in character. . . .

"A variant of this type has wide shoulders, but with a plank-like, flat chest, and very sharp outstanding shoulder bones. Instead of the thin stomach, in some cases we find a loose, small, enteroptotic pendulant stomach, or a disposition of fat in eunochoid or feminine form. . . . Often we find a variety of the asthenic type distinguished by stronger or weaker manifestation of symptoms of the dysgenital group—of infantilism (akromicria), of femininism (waist, enlarged buttock-circumference, enlarged hip measurements, feminine arrangement of puberty hair), and particularly a streak of eunochoidism with abnormal height and abnormal length of extremities. . . .

"A favorite form of variation is a mixture between asthenic and athletic types. . . . (*e. g.*, long, narrow chests, with coarse extremities, an incongruity between face and physique, etc.), or else a middle-type of slim muscular figure, which, again, may tend more towards the gracile thin side, or more towards the strong muscular side."

The asthenic face presents an angular profile, long nose, and is of a shortened egg form. "The skin and soft parts are thin, pale, poor in fat; on the bridge of the nose particularly, the skin is stretched thin and smooth over the sharply outstanding bone. The bone formation is throughout delicate; where, as is the case with the malar bone and the supra-orbital arch the conformation is well marked, this is not due to strong bony growth but to the transparency and thinness of the soft covering flesh. The circumference of the skull is small, measuring 55.3 cms.—by far the lowest measurement of the three types of head. The asthenic skull is, compared with the other types, on an average short, low, and of a middling breadth. In the figures representing the measurements one is surprised by the smallness of the sagittal diameter (18.0), while in width (15.6) it is larger than the skull of the athletic type. We find that the shape of the back of the head is usually steep, with but little roundness. On this account and because of the shortened sagittal diameter, we often find among asthenics also the visual appearance of the 'high-head,' without its being necessary on this account from the absolute measurement of the height to the width. In the face the general principle of growth of the asthenic men is repeated, so that the upward growth is undisturbed while the sideways growth lags behind. . . .

"When you examine the asthenic face it looks long and narrow, sal-

low, and thin, and, in addition, sharply molded. On account of its narrowness it often appears longer than it is."

A marked disproportion of the asthenic face is that between the length of the nose and the hypoplastic under-jaw which produces the angular profile especially when the forehead is rather sloping, the upper half of the facial contour runs straight forward along the ridge of the nose to its tip and from the tip of the nose straight back to the small chin.

Looking at the asthenic face from the front; "in the purest cases, it manifests a shortened egg-shape in the lines of its circumference, while the contour of the lower jaw runs downward from the ears to the tip of the chin unexpectedly quickly and sharply. . . . Only a few of the asthenics show the classical angle-profile, for it is not by all of them that the hypoplasia of the jaw in the sagittal axis shows itself so strongly, and leads on to the distinctive backward-springing of the chin in the profile. The nose, too, does not always spring so strongly forward, often it is only long, thin, and with the tip drawn downwards. In all these cases we have a simple long-nosed profile."

2. *Athletic type*. "The male athletic type is recognized by the strong development of the skeleton, the musculature and also the skin.

"A rough impression of the best example of this species is as follows:

"A middle-sized to tall man, with particularly wide projecting shoulders, a superb chest, a firm stomach, and a trunk which tapers in its lower region, so that the pelvis, and the magnificent legs, sometimes seem almost graceful compared with the size of the upper limbs and particularly the hypertrophied shoulders.

"The solid long head is carried upright on a free neck, so that the sloping linear contour of the firm trapezius looked at from in front, gives that part of the shoulder which is nearest the neck, its peculiar shape.

"The outlines and shading of the body are determined by the swelling of the muscles of the good or hypertrophied musculature which stands out plastically as muscle-relief. The bone-relief is specially prominent in the shape of the face. The coarse boning throughout is to be seen particularly in the collar-bones, the hand and foot joints, and the hands. Next to the shoulders the trophic accent often lies on the extremities, which in some cases are reminiscent of acromegaly."

The athletic type of face is steep egg-shaped. . . . "It also, just as the physique, is primarily characterized throughout by the pronounced trophism of the bones and skin (the muscles play but a small part

here); the skin is thick, firm, generally fresh and of a good turgor, sometimes unclean, with a tendency to pimples, and often pasty and somewhat puffy. The color is generally pale. The bony relief has in many cases a plastic appearance, which can be easily observed on account of the pad-like shading of the bony supra-orbital arch, and the compact formation of the malar bone and the prominent under jaw.

"The circumference of the skull is of a medium size. The shape of the skull is on the average high, narrow, and of a fair medium length. The shape of the back of the head varies, sometimes it is strikingly steep, sometimes projecting. A tendency to tower-skull is every now and then observed.

"The shape of the athletic profile offers but little which is characteristic. The prevailing type is heavily boned, snubbed-nosed, with projecting, well-molded chin, and a gently curving profile line.

"The athletic faces are often very long, the mid-facial length can attain an astonishing measurement (up to 9 cm.). The chin also is on the average long, in some cases it is molded into a cone shape."

3. *Pyknic type*. "The pyknic type, in the height of its perfection in middle-age, is characterized by the pronounced peripheral development of the body cavities (head, breast, and stomach), and a tendency to a distribution of fat about the trunk, with a more graceful construction of the motor apparatus (shoulders and extremities).

"The rough impression in well-developed cases is very distinctive: middle height, rounded figure, a soft broad face on a short massive neck, sitting between the shoulders; the magnificent fat paunch protrudes from the deep *vaulted* chest which broadens out towards the lower part of the body.

"If we look at the limbs, we find them soft, rounded, and displaying little muscle-relief, or bone-relief, often quite delicate, the hands soft, rather short and wide. The joints of the hands in particular and the clavicle are often slim and almost elegantly formed. The shoulders are not broad and projecting as with the athletes, but (especially among older people) are rounded, rather high, and pushed forward together, and they are often set down against the breast with a characteristically sharp depression on the inner deltoid curve. It seems then as if the whole mass of the shoulders were slipping downwards and inwards over the swelling chest; and the head also plays a part in this static displacement; it sinks forward between the shoulders, so that the short thick neck seems almost to disappear, and the upper portion of the

spinal column takes on a slight kyphotic bend. In profile the neck no longer seems, as is the case with the other types, a slim round column, which carries the chin like a sharply cut-off, widely projecting capital, but in well-developed cases of middle-age and over, the point of the chin is directly joined with the upper forehead without any definite bends by a sloping line.

"The breast-shoulder-neck proportion is, apart from the shape of the head and face, and the manner of the disposition of the fat, the most characteristic mark of the pyknic character.

"The pyknics tend emphatically to a covering of fat. And besides this the manner in which the fat is disposed is characteristic.

The obesity of the pyknic is restricted for the most part within *moderate* limits, and is primarily an obesity of the trunk, the fat deposit in the case of the male results usually in a compact fat belly. . . . The pyknic face is of smooth five-cornered type.

"A typical pyknic face is the true mirror of the pyknic physique. It has a tendency to breadth, softness, and rotundity. The large skull, therefore, is round, broad, and deep, but not very high. The skin of the face is stretched softly on the unprojecting bony structure, letting the blood-vessels of the skin show through, the cheeks and nose having a tendency to redness. On account of the fullness of the individual parts the skeleton tends to breadth and flatness, and is not very prominent. The overlay of fat is rich; it is mainly concentrated, especially among old people, on the lower lateral parts of the cheeks, in front of the angle of the jaw, and in the region below the chin. . . .

"The profile of the pyknic is, as a rule, but gently curved, not particularly high, clear, and complete in the particulars of the nasal and lip contours, and yet not sharp and projecting. The mutual relations in length of the forehead and mid-face, nose and chin, are, in general, very harmonious, and their proportions can often be used as an index for the average.

"The front-view circumference of the pyknic face varies in the typical cases about the characteristic flat five-cornered shape. . . . We see far more usually simple, soft, broad, round faces, which are, as far as anatomical structure and proportion go, fundamentally analogous to the pentagonal type, without attaining its morphological obviousness."

In addition to these three types he describes certain irregular, dysplas-

tic forms, many approaching in make-up the types of glandular imbalances, particularly the dysgenital group.

The distribution of these types among the 260 cases first examined was as follows:

	Circular	Schizophrene
Asthenic	4	81
Athletic	3	31
Asthenic-Athletic mixed	2	11
Pyknic	58	2
Pyknic mixture	14	3
Dysplastic	34
Deformed and uncataloguable forms ...	4	13
	<hr/> 85	<hr/> 175

The table speaks for itself. The correlation is striking.

The author then proceeds to a detailed description of the cycloid and the schizoid temperaments. This is decidedly the best description the reviewer is familiar with. Numerous illustrative type cases are briefly described to show how these temperaments work out in actual individuals. Following this is a chapter on average men: cyclothymes and schizothymes, as he now calls them, also with illustrative case material. Finally he attempts the analysis and classification of a group of geniuses and closes with a chapter on the theory of temperaments.

The classification into cyclothymes and schizothymes presents a close similarity to many other attempts at classification which have been made and corresponds with the direction of the flow of libido in the psycho-analytic sense. The classifications I have in mind are Ostwald's romanticists and classicists; Nietzsche's dionysians and apollonians; William James' tough-minded and tender-minded; William Blake's prolific and devouring; Otto Gross' inferiority with shallow consciousness and inferiority with contracted consciousness; Jung's extraverted and introverted; and Bleuler's syntonics and schizoids.

Kretschmer not only attempts to show specifically that the psychotic presents in exaggerated form, as does the genius only what the normal man also possesses but his particular contribution is the correlation of these personality types with the body form and make-up. The relation of all these elements in the two main temperament types is well set forth in the following table. It might be well to preface this table by a statement that he includes in the *diathetic proportions* the following characteristics of temperament:

1. Sociable, good-natured, friendly, genial;
 2. Cheerful, humorous, jolly, hasty;
 3. Quiet, calm, easily depressed, soft-hearted;
- and in the *psychesthetic proportions* the following peculiarities of character:
1. Unsociable, quiet, reserved, serious (humorless), eccentric;
 2. Timid, shy, with fine feelings, sensitive, nervous, excitable, fond of nature and books;
 3. Pliable, kindly, honest, indifferent, dull-witted, silent.

	<i>Cyclothymes</i>	<i>Schizothymes</i>
Psychesthesia and mood	Diathetic proportion: between raised (gay) and depressed (sad)	Psychesthetic proportion: between hyperesthetic (sensitive) and anesthetic (cold)
Psychic tempo	Wavy temperamental curve: between mobile and comfortable	Jerky temperamental curve: between unstable and tenacious alternation mode of thought and feeling
Psychomotility	Adequate to stimulus, rounded, natural, smooth	Often inadequate to stimulus: restrained, lamed, inhibited, stiff, etc.
Physical affinities	Pyknic	Asthenic, athletic, dysplastic, and their mixtures

The following table gives a classification of the special dispositions found as distributed between the two great types:

	<i>Cyclothymes</i>	<i>Schizothymes</i>
Poets	Realists Humorists	Pathetics Romantics Formalists
Experimenters	Observers Describers Empiricists	Exact logicians Systematists Metaphysicians
Leader	Tough whole-hoggers Jolly organizers Understanding conciliators	Pure idealists Despots and fanatics Cold calculators

The book is a serious and a brilliant attempt to hitch up the physical and the psychic from the point of view of the basic necessity that they be interrelated intimately. It is essentially descriptive. If its conclusions are borne out it will remain to follow description with interpretation. This will be a fascinating problem for the future.

B. PHYSICAL BASIS OF INTELLIGENCE

34. Organic Basis of Learning and Intelligence ¹

In addition to his hereditary organization the newborn child possesses the large association centers of the brain with their vast and undetermined potencies, the exact form of whose internal organization is not wholly laid down at birth, but is in part shaped by each individual separately during the course of the growth period by the processes of education to which he is subjected, that is, by his experience. This capacity for individuality in development, this ability to profit by experience, this docility, is man's most distinctive and valuable characteristic. And since the form which this modifiable tissue will take is determined by the environing influences which are largely under social control, it follows that human culture can advance by leaps and bounds wherever a high level of community life and educational ideals is maintained.

It is true that the child is born with no mental endowments; but how rich is his inheritance in other respects! He has an immense capital of pre-formed and innate ability which takes the form of physiological vigor and instinctive and impulsive actions, performed for the most part automatically and unconsciously. This so-called lower or animal nature is ever present with us. In infancy it is dominant; childhood is a period of storm and stress, seeking an equilibrium between the stereotyped but powerful impulsive forces and the controls of the nascent intellectual and moral nature; and in mature years one's value in his social community life is measured by the resultant outcome of this great struggle in childhood and adolescence. This struggle is education.

The answer to the riddle of life, however, lies not in a successful attack upon the native innate endowments of the child. No, that would be unbiological and wasteful, for our world of ideas and morals is no artificial world within the cosmos, but it is a natural growth, which is as truly a part of the cosmic process as are "ape and tiger methods"

¹ Reprinted by permission from C. J. Herrick, *Introduction to Neurology*, pp. 350-51. Philadelphia. W. B. Saunders Company, 3d ed., 1922.

of evolution. No higher association center of the human brain can function except upon materials of experience furnished to it through the despised lower centers of the reflex type. So also, no high intellectual, esthetic, or moral culture can be reached save as it is built upon the foundation of innate capacities and impulses.

35. Some Definitions of Intelligence¹

(a) Realizing that definitions and distinctions are pragmatic, we may then define intellect in general as *the power of good responses from the point of view of truth or fact*, and may separate it according as the situation is taken in gross or abstractly and also according as it is experienced directly or thought of. The power of good responses to abstract qualities and relations rather than gross total facts and to ideas rather than direct experiences may be called the more intellectual variety of intellect.

(b) It is evident that the important intellectual differences among men will not be found on the sensory, perceptual, or purely reproductive level. It is well known that a moron may be able to see, hear, taste or smell, react to a signal, balance a bicycle, steer an automobile, or cancel A's about as well as an intellectual genius. The latter would be somewhat his superior in memory for non-sense syllables, would excel him still more in logical memory, and would outclass him hopelessly in the ability to distil meanings from the raw products of sensation and memory. The essential difference, therefore, is in the capacity to form concepts, to relate them in diverse ways, and to grasp their significance. *An individual is intelligent in proportion as he is able to carry on abstract thinking.*

(c) I consider the most helpful viewpoint from which to consider intelligence is that it is equivalent to the capacity to learn. *An individual possesses intelligence in so far as he has learned, or can learn to adjust himself to his environment.* This does not unduly emphasize the problem aspect of intelligence and rightfully attributes intelligence to those animals whose sole ability to learn is confined to the hit-and-miss try-out of experience ("trial and error").

¹ Reprinted by permission from (a) E. L. Thorndike "Intelligence and its Measurement" (A Symposium) *J. Educ. Psy.*: 1921: XII: p. 124. (b) L. M. Terman: *ibid.*: pp. 127-8. (c) S. S. Colvin: *ibid.*: p. 136.

36. Intelligence as a Mechanism¹

Now intelligence, is not a force at all; it is not a power that effects adjustment, but is only a mechanism through which or by means of which the adjustment is brought about. For our purpose we shall define intelligence as a biological mechanism by which diverse impulses are brought together and given a somewhat unified and consistent effect in behavior. These impulses are, of course, the results of stimuli of various kinds—interoceptive, proprioceptive, and exteroceptive—both simultaneous and successive, direct and indirect. It is then the *stimulating situation*, external objects and interorganic changes resulting partly from general metabolism, that forces the adjustment in intelligent as well as in reflex and automatic acts. Consciousness is but an aspect, peculiarly intimate to the individual himself, of the adjustment; it is a peculiarly direct aspect of the relation between the individual and the situation to which he is responding, not something apart from these things that regulates behavior.

Taking this position we rid ourselves of certain difficulties, especially of those relating to dualism and mysticism, and we are forced to conceive of some sort of mechanism that will be free from the limitations of associationism already indicated, one that will account for our feelings of activity and for the organizing and reconstructive functions usually attributed to intelligence, as well as for the more simple calling up of one experience or habit by the stimulus that has been associated with it. Since a mechanistic conception need not rest upon any one simple principle, there is no reason why we should give up the conception of association in so far as it is useful and is supported by empirical tests. Mechanism as here used means simply an arrangement of the different parts of the organism, both inter- and intracellular, whereby all the life processes may by interstimulation and by arousal from external objects be kept in properly balanced operation and adjustment to environment. Interstimulation among the different part-processes of the organism may be either facilitating or inhibiting, in all conceivable degrees, so that responses to external situations may be properly co-ordinated.

The position here taken definitely assumes that behavior, defined broadly enough to comprehend all our conscious experiences as well as

¹ Reprinted by permission from J. Peterson "Intelligence Conceived as a Mechanism" *Psy. Rev.* 1924: XXXI: pp. 283-86.

unconscious acts, is completely determined by organic structure as affected by internal and external stimulation. It is only an abstract, absolute determinism, an artifact of the philosophers, that people shudder at. Every sane person accepts in his dealings with associates the kind of practical determinism we are assuming. The question, often asked, whether a complete knowledge could predict every event in the universe a thousand years in advance of its happening, is misleading and useless and hides within itself a dualism that we are trying to avoid; such knowledge is obviously impossible, and the prediction itself would have to be part of the events. Knowledge is better regarded as an acquired readiness for responses of certain kinds to given conditions, than as an apprehending of things in the universe by an outside agent; it is not something added to the universe, but rather a modification of an organized part of the universe by other parts. Even though the aim of psychology is to understand and control behavior, in a world so inconceivably complex as is ours, all that can ever be accomplished is control within certain narrow fields and for short periods of time. Nor need we fear that the constantly growing hope of science for greater control of events by ourselves is going to curtail our own freedom and discourage our ambitions. This hope has been strengthened in late years by discoveries and achievements that no one could have predicted a century ago.

We cannot elaborate on the detailed workings of our intelligence mechanism, but can only suggest very briefly the underlying principles. It is unquestionably wrong to conclude from the rate of the nerve impulse and the shortness of reaction time as measured in our laboratory experiments, that the effect of a stimulus is but momentary. On the contrary there is ample evidence, both subjective and objective, to suggest that the effects of the several stimuli are held over in the organism in some way so as to join with one another and operate collectively. By this means the responses become functions of certain more or less complex situations and probably never of any one single stimulus. Sensory impulses do not simply go out through higher centers to muscles and glands, bring about responses, and thus end their effects. The responses which they arouse set up further sensory or proprioceptive impulses, which in turn pass through higher co-ordination centers and thence to effectors, bringing about other responses and adjustment tensions; and so on. In this manner, and probably also by more direct interstimulation of autonomic processes, the effects of stimuli persist for a time—often for long periods—and enable the organism to suspend action and respond with more organic complete-

ness to the general consistency of the situation, both inner and outer. Behavior, moreover, instead of being a passive receptivity to stimuli, is motivated by the urge of inner organic processes and general metabolism, and external conditions are but contributory stimulative and directive agencies.

The individual is therefore intelligent in proportion to the extent of his ability to take in the effects of the related factors in relatively large practical situations. But different individuals are doubtless disposed to respond differently by innate constitution to the various aspects of these situations—the social, the immediately objective, the symbolical and remotely objective, the unitary, the abstract and analytical, etc.—and by different degrees of directness, and so we obtain a corresponding variety of intelligences. The freedom of any individual is measured by his relative independence of the order of stimuli and of the conditions immediately about him, and is evidently dependent on his heredity and past training. Such freedom is not incompatible with predictability nor contradictory to the laws of science.

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises

1. How important are individual differences for social life?
2. How may one determine the original tendencies in a child? In an adult? List the traits of a person which are largely due to his original nature. List those largely due to acquired nature.
3. Do we as adults ever act on the basis of original nature only? Discuss pro and con.
4. How would a great crisis call out original nature? Would habit and attitude still play a part in the behavior under such conditions? Discuss.
5. What common observations have you made which bear out the fact of individual differences:
 - a) as to physical size and strength;
 - b) as to intelligence;
 - c) in the matter of emotional expression;
 - d) on the side of instinctive tendencies: sex, hunger, self-assertion, etc.?
6. Which of Kretschmer's physical and personality types do you come under? Does his description of character fit you?
7. Can you relate the three definitions of intelligence to Peterson's discussion of "intelligence as mechanism"?
8. Is the capacity to do "abstract thinking" a valid criterion to higher intelligence? Discuss pro and con.

B. Topics for Class Reports

1. Review, with critical comments, Galton's study of heredity and genius. (Cf. bibliography.)
2. Review Ward's criticism of Galton's position. (Cf. bibliography.)
3. Review Ellis' and Woods' studies of genius.
4. Review Cox's book on genius as a revelation of a new method of investigating genius. (Cf. bibliography.)
5. Review the literature on the inheritance of mental ability. (Cf. Pintner and his references cited in bibliography.)

C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers

1. The Current Treatment of Inheritance of Mental Ability.
2. The Man of Genius as a Biological and as a Sociological Product.
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CHAPTER VII

INSTINCTIVE NATURE

I. INTRODUCTION

In the eighteenth century, when the ideas which lie behind our Constitution and fundamental law were formulated, there was very little knowledge of the relationship between the deeper instinctive and emotional life of man and his intellectual development. It was assumed, for instance, that in politics a citizen made up his mind very deliberately and self-consciously and then went about to cast his ballot for this man or that measure on the basis of the best intellectual judgment he could give; and that he chose his mate or his business partner or his profession or vocation in much the same self-conscious, deliberate, rational way. Moreover, such men as Godwin and Condorcet in the time of the French Revolution imagined that man could go on perfecting himself indefinitely through the unlimited power of his rational capacities to better his condition.

These ideas, which were held by many of our early statesmen have come down to us in our own political and social history, so that the man in the street, the ordinary citizen, the usual student, imagines that what he does is done from a simple rational motive, that he "makes up his mind" and then goes ahead to do the pre-determined action. Through the work of Hall, McDougall, Wallas, Freud, Jung, Adler, and others we know that this simple rationalist method is thoroughly fallacious. Deeper than the intellectual powers lie the emotions and instinctive tendencies which rest on the racially older and more ancient foundations of our being. What we so frequently imagine to be self-consciously determined are in reality actions motivated from instinctive-emotional patterns that are simply covered over with intellectual rationalizations or excuses acceptable to our social group. Throughout this entire volume we shall see again and again how much of social behavior is really rooted in emotions and instinctive trends, and how little of it rests upon the purely

rational functions. In truth, the emotions and the instinctive trends furnish the motives, the drives, for behavior of all sorts. The intelligence serves its purpose, largely to modify and secure these ends in the directions laid down by culture patterns. When we come to discuss leadership we shall see that individual differences in drive and intelligence play important parts in setting off leaders from followers. In the discussion of crowd behavior and of public opinion we shall see how much appeal is made to emotions. The instinctive-emotional tendencies are far deeper in the race than intellectual capacities. Our culture, in fact, is basically organized in reference to these deeper trends, even though very wide divergencies in content of culture are everywhere evident. That is, the crises which gave rise to culture patterns were definitely related on the organic side to man's emotions and instincts.

It is with a view to giving a foundation for understanding the important place of instinctive tendencies and emotions that this chapter and the one following it are presented.

There are really two divergent views of instinct. One may be called the hormic, purposive or drive theory. Instinct so thought of is related to fundamental appetites, desires, or inner urges of the organism. Actually much that is described as instinct under this standpoint includes learned as well as innate features. These impulses result in a totality of actions, an integration of responses in satisfaction of these deep organic needs. McDougall's view is such. And although Dunlap has restated his concepts as *desire*, not *instinct*, he still has much the same view. So too, the psychoanalysts, with their emphasis upon sex and ego manifestations, or of sex, ego and herd instincts as with MacCurdy, belong in this school. This may be called a teleological view, but without employing the word "teleological" to mean any spiritual, non-material force, but merely in reference to biological mechanisms which function together in the survival of the living organism. In short, this standpoint concerns itself with treating the total response of the organism, not the single units, the single reflexes, which are native to it. Only by describing the totality of the organism in reference to its environment can we reach an adequate view.¹

¹ The present writer is fully aware of the danger of this hormic view degenerating into one associated with all sorts of pseudo-scientific and mystical dog-

The contrasted view of instinct is that held today by the bulk of American animal psychologists and by many social psychologists. This may be called, for want of a better term, the "reflex" or "mechanist" theory. They see very little in the *general drive* concept and they scout the purposive aspect of instinctive life. They put their attention to uncovering the simpler units of action in original behavior, namely, the reflexes. Allport's list of "prepotent reflexes," of course, is really a series of complex patterns of various reflexes, and his view is somewhat intermediate between the two. His term seems largely a new one for the old familiar "instinct" but in more rudimentary form. The view of Bernard is more distinctly that of the "reflex" theory. He holds that instinct must be thought of in terms of structural units laid down at birth or developing with normal growth, and that in the case of the human being there are literally hundreds of these structural units which combine under environmental pressures to form the deeper combinations or integrations which have by other writers been glibly called "instincts."

When all is said and done, however, these two views are not so widely separated. The paper by Woodworth on the nature of a drive is important in indicating that "drive" and "mechanism" are much the same thing. Moreover, one mechanism may serve as a drive for a more elaborate one. Thus hunger or sex, as innate patterns, may in time become drives for an elaborate number of other mechanisms that are picked up in experience. Thus, for example, the peculiar conditioning of the pigeons cited in the earlier paper by Whitman simply means that the fundamental urges or mechanisms which we term "sex" may be associated with a variety of objects outside the organism. Thus the bird may mate with a distinctly different species or attempt mating with one of its own sex and so on, depending on its early training or conditioning.

The papers by Tolman are in point because they indicate clearly that the contrast between the "reflex" or "mechanistic" school (to adopt McDougall's term for the moment) and the hormic or "drive" school may be resolved by recognizing hierarchies of behavior units

mas. But certainly there is good ground for this concept of instinct when carefully circumscribed. Those who would supernaturalize such a concept would do the same thing with any descriptive term. In fact, some psychologists write about reflexes (original and conditioned) as loosely and as metaphysically as those whom they accuse of faulty thought in reference to instincts.

from simple reflexes to those in combination or pattern. The latter may be called instincts as easily and as logically as the former. It is a matter of definition.

The lists of instincts by McDougall, Warren, and Thorndike are typical of the older classifications. These items represent patterns of behavior, at least in some instances, which contain learned as well as native features.

There is no doubt, however, that the term "instinct" has been fearfully abused and misused by unnumbered writers. This not only applies to literary persons and the pseudo-scientific popularizers of objective knowledge, but has been particularly true of the social scientists. Bernard's two papers are especially appropriate criticisms of this loose, ill-advised usage.

In the paper by Faris we have an attempt to give up the concept of instinct entirely and to substitute such a fairly objective term as "attitude." Is it not, however, at present a questionable thing to give up dealing with original reactions and to use only "attitudes" in describing behavior instead? Does this answer fully the need to consider the original, innate, and inherited roots of behavior? Are there not original patterns or reflexes, or instinctive tendencies, if you will, basic to these attitudes?

We must conclude, then, that most students of social, as of individual, behavior are concerned with original nature, and recognizing its place in man they do attempt some consistent formulation of the principles. Hence, we must give some consideration to this fundamental aspect of man's nature until more conclusive light has been shed on the question of dismissing the innate tendencies as of no concern in social psychology.

II. MATERIALS

37. The Nature of Fundamental Drives¹

The criteria on the basis of which one may assume the existence of a specific fundamental drive appear to be three: (1) the individuals of the species must *all* be observed on various occasions to exhibit a recurring tendency towards a certain generalized type of *end* (for example, food);

¹ Reprinted by permission from E. C. Tolman, "The Nature of Fundamental Drives" *J. Abn. & Soc. Psy.* 1925-26: XX: pp. 349-59; 357-58.

(2) the tendency towards this "end" must appear as a common and explanatory aspect of behaviors otherwise concretely different; and (3) the assumption of specific differences in the temporary strength of this tendency must explain why on one of two similar occasions the individual will do so and so, while on the other he (or another individual) will do quite otherwise.

In the first place, we must draw a distinction between "drives of the first order" and "drives of the second order." Hunger and sex belong to the former, gregariousness and self-assertion to the latter. The former have direct and immediate physiological implications; the latter do not.

The fundamental drives, then, appear to divide into two groups, which may be called first-order drives and second-order drives, respectively. The former (further subdivided into appetites and aversions) we conceive as corresponding to simple physiological needs. The latter are secondary and merely contributory to the first-order drives.

A tentative list for the first-order drives would be: hunger, sex, fatigue-demands, excretion-demands, sensitive zone-demands, on the one hand, and fear and pugnacity, on the other. Each of these would ultimately go back to and be definable as the demand for (appetite) or the demand against (aversion) a distinctive physiological condition. A tentative, very tentative, list for the second-order drives would be: curiosity, gregariousness, demand for dominance, demand for submission, and imitateness. Each would be identified not by any specific and simple physiological need but by a gross behavior character, *c. g.*, a tendency "to get more of a distant or unfamiliar stimulus" (curiosity); a tendency "to seek and stay in the presence of others" (gregariousness); a tendency "to dominate and control others" (self-assertion); a tendency "to submit to others" (self-abasement); and, finally, a tendency "to copy the ends pursued by others" (imitateness).

Described in a definite and experimentally controllable fashion, each of these second-order drives would be capable of quantitative measurement and treatable as a variable whose functional dependence upon the first-order drives and upon differences of early training and environment could be determined experimentally (or statistically).

38. The Nature of "Drives"¹

Once the point of view of a dynamic psychology is gained, two general problems come into sight, which may be named the problem of

¹ Reprinted by permission from R. S. Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, pp. 36; 37; 42; 204-05. New York. Columbia University Press, 1918.

“mechanism” and the problem of “drive.” One is the problem, how we do a thing, and the other is the problem of what induces us to do it.

This distinction between drive and mechanism may become clearer if we consider it in the case of a machine. The drive here is the power applied to make the mechanism go; the mechanism is made to go, and is relatively passive. Its passivity is, to be sure, only relative, since the material and structure of the mechanism determine the direction that shall be taken by the power applied. We might speak of the mechanism as reacting to the power applied and so producing the results. But the mechanism without the power is inactive, dead, lacking in disposable energy.

“Drive” is not essentially distinct from “mechanism.” The drive is a mechanism already aroused and thus in a position to furnish stimulation to other mechanisms. Any mechanism might be a drive. But it is the mechanisms directed towards consummatory reactions—whether of the simpler sort seen in animals or of the more complex sort exemplified by human desires and motives—that are most likely to act as drives. Some mechanisms act at once and relapse into quiet, while others can only bring their action to completion by first arousing other mechanisms. But there is no absolute distinction, and it will be well to bear in mind the possibility that any mechanism may be under certain circumstances the source of stimulation that arouses other mechanisms to activity.

Many drives combine to produce social activity. The fear motive drives men together in times of insecurity; the pugnacity motive bands them together for group combat; the economic motive brings industrial co-operation and organization; the self-assertive and submissive tendencies bring emulation as well as obedience; the expansion of the self to cover one’s family, one’s clique, one’s class, one’s country contributes to loyalty; while the parental instinct, expanding its scope to cover others besides children who are helpless, leads to self-sacrifice and altruism. But besides all these there is the social motive proper, the tendency toward group activity, which is not only found by experience to be beneficial but, what is more important psychologically, is interesting in itself to creatures that have a native capacity for that sort of action.

39. The Three-fold Hierarchy of Activities¹

The human being is a mechanism which makes responses to external stimuli. The nature of these responses and whether there is any overt

¹ Reprinted by permission from E. C. Tolman “Instinct and Purpose” *Psy. Rev.* 1920: XXVII: pp. 219-22.

response at all, however, is a variable matter. This changeability depends, first, upon the possibility of different internal adjustments (either called out by specific external stimuli or as the result of internal physiological rhythms) and second, upon the changes in the internal structure of the organism due to learning.

Our task must now be a more specific classification and description of such responses and internal adjustments. Different classification would no doubt be possible, but for our interest, which is concerned primarily with a definition of instinct, the necessary classification is simple. It contains but three groups: (1) independent reflexes, (2) subordinate acts, and (3) determining adjustments.

By an independent reflex we shall mean any response to a stimulus which takes place always in the same manner and relatively independently of what the rest of the organism is doing. The kick of the foot in response to a tap on the knee, winking in response to a movement before the eyes, sneezing in response to tickling the nose, yawning in response to certain internal sensations, are examples. These always occur in much the same way and each is relatively complete in itself and independent of what the rest of the organism may be doing.

Activities on the other hand, such as biting, chewing, swallowing, which form part of larger wholes—in this example, eating—would be classed in the second group: i. e., termed subordinate acts. The members of this group are almost infinitely numerous. The leg movements of walking, the handlings of curiosity, the cries and shouts and strugglings of anger, the sighing and tears of sorrow, the facial expressions, words and gesticulations of love, would all be examples. In fact all the things we do, not as separate and independent reflexes, but as parts of bigger groups of activity, belong to this second class.

Finally we have as our third group what we called determining adjustments. These, are, in fact, to be considered as identical with the internal adjustments described in our picture of the slot-machine, (omitted). They determine and set in readiness the subordinate acts. Whether one responds to one and the same stimulus with the subordinate acts of handling and manipulation, those of destruction, or those of rejection, depends upon which particular determining adjustment has first been aroused—whether one of curiosity, one of anger, or one of fear.

It is to be noted that determining adjustments often occur in hierarchies. What may be called the lowest one of the hierarchy is then the immediate determining adjustment for the actual subordinate acts. The

next higher one of the hierarchy releases this lowest one. A still higher one releases that, and so on. For example, we may suppose that on a given occasion an individual's leg and foot movements are directly subordinate to what may be called the walking adjustment. This walking adjustment, however, we may assume is subordinate to an anger adjustment. (The man may be on his way to confront a business opponent.) This anger adjustment will then be subordinate to a business adjustment and, finally, this business adjustment itself may be assumed to be subordinate to what may be called the man's general socio-domestic adjustment. In the case of such a hierarchy of adjustments it is obvious that the function of all, save the lowest one in the sequence, consists in a release of a lower determining adjustment rather than in a release of actual subordinate acts.

One further point. In the case of activities such as eating, running, walking, is it legitimate to talk of a determining adjustment as something existing in addition to the individual walking or eating movements themselves? The reason I assume that there is a distinct walking adjustment rather than that the individual walking movements are released directly by the next higher adjustment (for example, the anger of the above illustration) may be indicated first by the case of the child. In the case of a baby, the individual walking movements are obviously very irregular and variable. Yet (when the child is in the "walking vein") they are all *walking* movements: they all fall within that one general class. Now, wherever these two phenomena occur, of variability within a class of movements and persistence of the class as a whole, my thesis will be that we must assume a specific determining adjustment.

In an adult the situation (in the case of walking) would seem to be somewhat different because of the added influence of habit. With the advent of habit there come fixed and invariable sequences (in the case of walking, fixed and invariable sequences of foot and leg movements). This being the case, the assumption of an immediate walking adjustment to release and maintain walking movements, as such, would not seem so necessary. The total complex of movements is nearly equivalent to a single act and as such would seem a candidate for the *immediate* control of a higher adjustment, such, for example, as the anger of the preceding illustration. It may be noted, however, that in unusual situations such as unevenness or obstacles in the path, this unitary and automatized character of walking may break down, in which case the original walking adjustment would seem again to have to come to the fore to release further walking movements not part of the automatized act.

This discussion has brought out three important points concerning determining adjustments which it will be well to summarize. (1) The determining adjustment sets in readiness a particular group of subordinate acts. One and the same external or internal stimulus may call out quite different groups of subordinate acts according to the particular determining adjustment which happens at the time to be aroused. (2) Determining adjustments often occur in hierarchies, the higher ones calling out the lower ones and the lowest one of all calling out the actual facts. (3) The essence of the determining adjustment and the reason for it consists in the variability of the subordinate acts. If such variability has disappeared, as is the case where habits have developed, the determining adjustment tends to atrophy and may, perhaps, even disappear altogether.

40. Instinct as Purpose of the Organism¹

We may therefore define "an instinct" as an innate disposition which determines the organism to perceive (to pay attention to) any object of a certain class, and to experience in its presence a certain emotional excitement and an impulse to action which find expression in a specific mode of behavior in relation to that object.

"An instinct" is to be defined and recognized, not by the kind of movements in which it finds expression, but by the kind of change of the animal's situation which its movements, whatever they be, tend to bring about and which, when it is achieved, brings the train of behavior to a close. Thus the nature of the instinct at work in an animal cannot be recognized by simple observation of its movements. You may see one pigeon pursuing another assiduously from place to place; but these varied movements of locomotion and pursuit may express either the combative instinct, or the pairing instinct, or the food-seeking impulse of the young pigeon. Yet there can be no doubt that these are distinct instincts, whose operation is attended by appetites requiring very different situations for their satisfaction. Unlike reflex action, instinctive action strives toward a goal, a change of situation of a particular kind, which alone can satisfy the impulse and allay the appetite and unrest of the organism. We must, therefore, define any instinct by the nature of the goal, the type of situation, that it seeks or tends to bring about, as well as by the type of situation or object that brings it into activity.

¹ Reprinted by permission from W. McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, pp. 110; 118-19. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923.

(McDougall's list of instincts follows).

(a) The Major Instincts of Mammals and of Man

- | | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. The Parental or Protective | 8. Self-Assertion |
| 2. The Combative | 9. Submission |
| 3. Curiosity | 10. Mating |
| 4. Food-seeking | 11. Acquisitiveness |
| 5. Repulsion | 12. Constructiveness |
| 6. Escape | 13. Instinct of Appeal |
| 7. Gregariousness | |

(b) Some Minor Instincts

- | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------|
| 1. To sneeze | 4. To defecate |
| 2. To cough | 5. To urinate |
| 3. To scratch an itching spot | 6. Laughter |

41. Warren's List of Human Instincts and Instinctive Tendencies ¹

Instincts

- | | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1. <i>Nutritive</i> | 2. <i>Reproductive</i> |
| Metabolic expressions | Mating (sexual attraction, courtship) |
| Walking | Maternal |
| Feeding | Filial (of infancy) |
| Wandering (Hunting) | |
| Acquiring (Hoarding) | |
| Cleanliness | |
| 3. <i>Defensive</i> | 4. <i>Aggressive</i> |
| Flight | Fighting |
| Subjecting | Resenting |
| Hiding | Domineering |
| Avoiding | Rivalry |
| Modesty (Shyness) | |
| Clothing (Covering) | |
| Construction (Home-making) | |

¹ This selection from H. C. Warren, *Human Psychology*, p. 106 is used by permission of, and by arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company, the authorized publishers.

5. *Social Organization*

- Family (parental and filial)
- Tribal (Gregarious)
- "Apathetic"
- Sympathetic
- Antipathetic
- Co-operative

Instinctive Tendencies

- Imitateness
- Playfulness
- Curiosity
- Dextrality (right-handedness)
- Esthetic expression
- Communicativeness

42. Thorndike's List of Original Response Patterns¹

- I. Food getting and protective responses.
 - 1. Eating
 - 2. Reaching, grasping and putting objects into the mouth
 - 3. Acquisition and possession
 - 4. Hunting
 - 5. Collecting and hoarding
 - 6. Avoidance and repulsion
 - 7. Rivalry and co-operation
 - 8. Habitation
 - 9. Responses to confinement
 - 10. Migration and domesticity
 - 11. Fear
 - 12. Fighting
 - 13. Anger
- II. Responses to the behavior of other human beings.
 - 14. Motherly behavior
 - 15. Gregariousness
 - 16. Responses of attention to other human beings
 - 17. Attention-getting
 - 18. Responses to approval and to scornful behavior
 - 19. Responses by approving and scornful behavior
 - 20. Mastering and submissive behavior

¹ Reprinted by permission from E. L. Thorndike, *Educational Psychology*, Vol. I. Selections from Chapters VI and VII. New York. Columbia University, Bureau of Publications of Teachers College, 1913. (Author's copyright).

21. Display
22. Shyness
23. Self-conscious behavior
24. Sex behavior
25. Secretiveness
26. Rivalry
27. Co-operation
28. Suggestibility and opposition
29. Envious and jealous behavior
30. Greed
31. Ownership
32. Kindliness
33. Teasing, tormenting and bullying
34. Imitation

III. Minor bodily movements and cerebral connection.

35. Vocalization
36. Visual exploration
37. Manipulation
38. Cleanliness
39. Curiosity
40. Multi-form mental activity
41. Multi-form physical activity
42. Play

43. Instincts as Prepotent Reflexes ¹

The human being has inherited a number of prepotent reflexes which are fundamental not only in their original potency, but in the control which they exert over habit formation throughout life. Ultimately, as well as genetically, they are prepotent. Most of these reflexes are functional at birth; one, the sensitive zone reflex, appears in early infancy; while the sex activities alone require a considerable period for the development of the structures concerned. We may recognize six important classes of human prepotent reflexes:

Starting and withdrawing
Rejecting
Struggling
Hunger reactions
Sensitive zone reactions
Sex reactions

¹ This selection from F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology*, p. 50 is used by permission of, and by arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company, the authorized publishers.

It should be emphasized that each of these activities comprises, not a single reflex, but a large group of effector movements occurring upon the application of the appropriate stimulus. The reflexes of any pre-potent group include responses in the visceral as well as the somatic, or skeletal, effectors.

44. What Instinct is and What It is Not ¹

An instinct is not only an inherited action pattern, but it is also definite. It is a specific response to a specific stimulus or set of stimuli. One can not inherit an abstraction. Inheritance is either of concrete organs or tissues or of combinations of such, that is, of structures which determine the patterns of actions which inevitably proceed from them under unmodified conditions. These patterns of action, thus determined by the inherited organization of structures, we call instincts. Strictly speaking, one cannot inherit activities, but one may inherit the structure, the functioning of which determines the action pattern. This is our justification for speaking of the inheritance of instinct.

But action patterns can also be determined by acquired organization and functioning of structures. Practically all of the skills are such acquired or synthetic organizations of structure, functioning in different or more complex ways than those to which inheritance directed them. Where such acquired or superinduced organizations of structures and functions occur and become automatic, we speak of habit instead of instinct. Such modification of the organization of inherited structures, creating acquired action patterns or habits, occurs but slightly or seldom among the highly standardized basic structures of the human organism.

Consequently, we rightly regard these fundamental structural and functional organizations, which remain much or wholly the same throughout the life period and which are so basic to the life of the individual and the species, as mainly instinctive. They retain their inherited form with a minimum of change until the death of the individual.²

But when we consider some of the more flexible and phylogenetically less basic structures and tissues of the body we find that they undergo a considerable modification of general structural and functional organization with the passage of time, and particularly in the first years

¹ Reprinted by permission from L. L. Bernard "The Misuse of Instinct in the Social Sciences" *Psy. Rev.* 1921: XXVIII: pp. 97-100.

² Cf. Bernard, *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (1926) Chs. VII-IX for elaboration.

of life, including the prenatal period of development. Even the minor and peripheral neuromuscular controls—not those most basic to the evolution and survival of the type, such as those of the heart and those used in breathing—undergo a considerable modification in their collective or functional structural organization. We are born with a few skills in the neural structures which control these peripheral muscles, probably largely because of our long history of parental care through a prolonged period of infancy; but we acquire a vast multitude of such skills or functional organizations of structures under the pressures of modern civilization or the complex social environment which we call civilization. These acquired skills—although they may have instinctive foundations of a rudimentary and often imperceptible sort—are properly called habits. The historical process of evolution, out of which the instincts developed by means of natural selection, had no need of such skills, and they were consequently not built into the organism by heredity. But our multiplied problems of organic adjustment to the physical environment, which is constantly differentiated into ever-increasing complexity through the medium of our expanding social environment, calls for a vast mass of neuromuscular technique which may continue in operation for only a few generations or even decades but which must be spread abroad throughout the population almost simultaneously. Consequently these skills cannot by any manipulation of Mendelian inheritance be made to appear and become generalized throughout society through heredity. They must be acquired; they are habits.

An even more flexible part of the organism which lends itself to the formation of an infinite number of acquired functional organizations of structure is the brain. It would seem that the chief function of the flexible brain is to provide an organism, which has become fairly definitely set in its fundamental or basic vital and visceral structural organizations and can no longer modify them easily to fit new and ephemeral environmental conditions, with a mechanism for making multitudinous and rapid and, especially, most intimate and detailed adjustments to a highly complex and kaleidoscopic environment such as is created in and by the development of a social or rational world. For this reason the brain is the least set or permanently organized portion of the organism. Our neural stimulus-response processes or action patterns are connected up after the point of fertilization, that is, after our heredity is organized or predetermined; and billions of these connections remain to be made even after birth. Even though we recognize the fact that vast numbers of

these neural connections are made in carrying into effect the hereditary organization of the newly organized life cell at the point of fertilization, we must also recognize that, as soon as the environment begins to operate upon the growing organization of cells which constitute this new individual, the inherited adaptations begin to be modified and new connections are increasingly made to carry the environmental pressures or determiners into effect in action as the power and complexity of the environment increase for the individual. At the point where the environment has multiplied most largely its direct effects upon the individual, where he has established with it direct contacts through the media of language, custom, tradition, public opinion and the acquired muscular adaptations to his physical world, the influence of the hereditary determiners has become more and more indirect because their operation has been increasingly and repeatedly modified by interrupting environmental factors which build up substitute or modified neural response connections in the cortex. Thus the brain, with its billions of neurones and the almost unlimited opportunity for acquired action-pattern or thought-pattern connections or combinations to be made within the cortex, becomes the chief region for habit formations. Here least of all—if at all—do we find developed the instinctive form of action.

The theory of innate or inherited ideas or images has been abandoned and relegated to the poetry of the mystics. Ideas and images are the product of acquired functional organizations of neural structures or habits. Likewise are our social and ethical ideals or values the result of such acquired organization. These last differ from ideas only in the complexity of the functional neural organization, permitting of a comparison and contrast of idea and imaginal units within the valuational complexes which we call social and ethical. To speak of instinctive ideas is manifestly absurd. To call ideals or social and ethical values, negative or positive, such as goodness, criminality, democracy, or conservatism, instinctive or inherited is therefore manifestly unjustifiable. Such an employment of instinct can persist only among those who have not yet analyzed the processes by which action patterns are built up. The fundamental problem of the social sciences, which have grown out of the attempt to adjust man to his social environments, is therefore to work out the mechanism by which new and non-instinctive action and thought patterns are built up to mediate these adjustments of man to the social environments which the social sciences undertake. The problem of the following article (Section 45) is confined to showing how and why the rôle of instinct has been overemphasized in the social sciences in recent years. Such a task is urgent in itself in order that those who are work-

ing in these subjects may not go farther afield in search of false but seductive leads.

45. Misuse of the Term "Instinct" in the Social Sciences¹

There are various forms of the misuse of instinct in the social sciences. One type, which is literary rather than pseudo-scientific and is found in particular among the poets and belles lettres generally, but also among the technical writers, consists of such terms as "instinct with perfume," "instinct with life," "instinct with heredity," "instinct with the breath of heaven," and "instinct with the spirit of hate." This use of the term has no hereditary significance whatever, but is merely a metaphorical way of saying that an object is filled with some prized quality. The most serious confusion, however, is the one mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, where the functioning automatism is not distinguished as to origin, any relatively fixed or definite action pattern being pronounced an instinct whether it is acquired or inherited. If all that the writer or reader meant to convey by such an employment of the term instinct (as seems to be the case with some Continental and a few American writers in social science) is that the act is performed without reflection or consciousness of purpose or previous plan, little harm would in most cases be done. For example, if by saying that people are "instinctively protectionists" or by speaking of "instinctive truth-telling" the writers mean that certain people are protectionists or truth-tellers by habit, and if the reader understands such to be the sense of the expressions, it cannot be said that harm is done, although little may be gained in the way of closer definition of subject matter or technique from such indefinite employment of the term. However, the writer often confuses both himself and the reader by such vagueness of speaking, for he may at one time mean only to emphasize the automatic character of the act and at another he may fall back upon the recognized or approved meaning of the term, implying that the automatism is an inherited action pattern. Especially is there such danger of confusion to both reader and writer in the latter of the two expressions above and in such expressions as "instinctive regard for law," or the "instinctive conservatism of the propertied," or this striking instance: "Jefferson's instinct to keep the government close to the people." These are functional qualities, based upon highly complex organizations of acquired neural connections or structures and cannot be inherited, but must be acquired from expe-

¹ Reprinted by permission from L. L. Bernard "The Misuse of Instinct in the Social Sciences" *Psy. Rev.* 1921: XXVIII: pp. 100-103; 116-19.

rience. Yet it would be easy to cite several hundred similar instances of confusion in the employment of this term from a collection made by the author of this article, many of them drawn from some of the leading writers of the day in the social sciences.

This vague employment of the term instinct finds its logical *reductio ad absurdum* in the application of the term to well-developed habit complexes, such as the "instincts" listed in the classification in McDougall's *Introduction to Social Psychology* and the various books on educational psychology of recent years. The most cursory analysis of the origin of the action patterns involved in such so-called instincts as the parental instinct, reproductive instinct, fighting instinct, instinct of self-preservation, the gregarious instinct, and the like will show that by far the majority of the action content is acquired. Most of what a parent does for a child is the product of racial or individual experience and therefore belongs to the category of acquired habit rather than to that of inheritance or instinct. The same is true of the content of the other so-called instincts mentioned in this paragraph. To characterize such habit complexes as instincts implies either the abandonment of the accepted and desirable definition of instinct as stated above or a failure to analyze the structure of the acts involved. An instinct, since it is as much a unit character as any other product of Mendelian inheritance, is inconceivable apart from the fact of its structure.

The assumption of an original and unchanging characteristic central emotion, which is the essential attribute of the instinct, is itself without foundation in the data. The fact is that every action pattern which fails to function with perfect automaticity develops some sort of emotion or other mental expression which is characteristic of the act performed or attempted. But a purely instinctive action pattern, functioning without interruption or hindrance, should develop no consciousness and therefore should be without a characteristic emotion such as McDougall insists upon.

The claim of some authors that instinct involves a conscious element is clearly untenable. Such writers have lost sight of instinct as it appears in its purest form in the lower animals. Among men the instincts have become largely distorted by the lengthening period of infancy and by man's increasing susceptibility through his highly flexible cortical processes to environmental influences—most of which he has himself accumulated as social habits through a long period of social evolution—with the result that many of the instincts which function intact in the lower animals are merely vestigial in man or have become broken up and detached from their former places in the developmental

process as a whole and reattached to some particular section or aspect of it. The result is that man has come to be primarily dependent upon his social environment for guidance in the building of his action patterns, and, since that environment changes constantly and rapidly, it is inevitable that there is a large element of consciousness in most human acts which are at all complex in character. The failure to recognize these facts, of the vestigial or delayed character of many human instincts and of the large element of consciousness necessarily involved in human conduct, is alone responsible for the inclusion of consciousness of stimulus and of end in the definition of instinct.

No more is it proper to speak of purposiveness as essentially characteristic of instinct. We customarily regard any activity which serves to adjust the organism to its environment as purposive. If consciousness of the end enters into the act the purposive character is even more evident. But the attribution of purpose is in no sense dependent upon the origin of the act. As with the emotional content, the sense of purpose is dependent alone upon the functional nature of the act. Consciousness of the end being characteristic of the most highly developed purposiveness in action, we may say, on the basis of our previous argument, that habit adjustment or acquired action patterns have a higher degree of purposiveness than have instinctive acts. Similarly erroneous is the claim that instinct is to be defined in terms of the function of the act. The function of the act has no necessary relation to its origin. All acts have some functional significance in the scheme of things. Nor does the fact that an act is pleasurable signify that it is instinctive in origin. Investigations into the neural correlates of feeling show conclusively that feeling is the function of the organization of the act and not of its origin, except in the negative sense that instinctive acts would not normally be unpleasant under natural conditions. But under the artificial conditions of civilization they may easily give rise to unpleasantness, while acquired action processes are often the sources of the highest if not of the intensest pleasures.

The demand of the accumulated complex social environment, which we call modern civilization, is for an organism with a maximum of variation of activity at a maximum of speed. Only with such capacity for change can man make the most of his powers and reap the largest reward from nature's resources and society's riches. Only with such powers can man be so ubiquitous, adapting himself to all climes in quick succession, living under all the conceivable conditions which his interests dictate. The insect has a narrow locus and dies in the same season in which it is born, or it makes the transition by means of metamorphosis. Its

instincts are practically fixed. If man was solely a creature of instinct, he, too, could not enjoy his vast range of adaptability. It is because his completer or progressive development demands ever greater flexibility of adaptation that he is shedding his instincts as he evolves and substituting for them control through the growing and self-perfecting institutions of his social environment. Man is able to dispense with instinct because he has a highly complex and well organized social environment, and in so far as this environment is improved and becomes more adequately organized to meet his present and future needs it dispenses with his instincts in the evolutionary process of selection or it represses and transforms them in the progressive character development of the individual. For man to be accumulating new instincts instead of losing or repressing and transforming old ones would work exactly contrary to his needs of adaptation to his increasingly complex and changing environment. The rate and mass and degree of change in this environment are already so great that his adaptations could not possibly be made on the basis of instinct alone or even primarily.

Are we not, then, in the light of these facts, forced to the conclusion that the complex social "instincts" are in reality aggregates of habits, organized and reorganized from more elementary habits and simple constituent instincts, with reference to some specific function, the content constantly changing as the function and organization of the adjustment to be made vary? Although the content of the habit complex, miscalled instinct, varies constantly with the character of the adjustment, the aggregate of acts itself retains the same class name as long as it serves the same general function in society or for the individual. Thus, the habit complex tends to be named with reference to its function or according to its value—as maternal, gregarious, ethical, fighting—while the content varies infinitely, never consecutively possessing that unity of character which is essential to the concreteness of biological instinct. The class term for the group of fluid or changing acts is an abstraction representing ordinarily a social valuation, although it may also be named generically after the root type of structure to which it conforms. The explanation for calling the habit complex an instinct is sometimes the confusion of automaticity with inheritance and sometimes an inability to separate the total aggregate of activities from some prominent instinctive act which is included in it. Sometimes it is both. Both criteria are deceptive guides. Sometimes the resemblance between the total habit complex and the constituent or foundation instinct is more symbolical than real. Sometimes it represents the continuation of a name long after the habit complex, through growth in content and changed adaptation,

has undergone a complete transformation of character and has lost its former resemblance to the instinct. This is markedly true of the so-called maternal instinct which, in content of activity in the human being, has only a few remnants of the original maternal instincts of lower animal types.

But there would be no conclusive objection to this misuse of instinct if it brought good results. Its results are not good, but disastrous. The method has so far been barren of aid either to the investigator, to the teacher, or to the social reformer. The educational psychologies, like the social psychologies, start out with an elaborate analysis of the so-called instincts and then solemnly inform the reader that the task of the educator is to guide these instincts into fruitful development as a method of adjusting the child to life; that it is the function of the school to develop the instincts instead of repressing them. The process of applying the instincts to the living educative process turns out in the most of these books to be a very general and vague one. And so it is in the social psychologies. The applications have little of the exactness which characterizes the definitions of instincts.

This inability in practice to make the development of the instincts fulfil the promise of the classification is not, however, a matter to occasion surprise. The social and educational psychologists have started to build their superstructures of individual character and social institutions upon too sophisticated and too unstable units. These units (supposed instincts) will not retain their form and character under the pressures of environment in the socializing process. Their contents are too fluid and indefinite. It will be necessary to divest the "instincts" of their acquired content and to reduce them to the most ultimate possible terms. Then the psychologist, the educator and the sociologist can begin to use them as building stones of character out of which to construct the foundations and part of the superstructures of social life. The exposure of the present incorrect usage of instinct should clear the field for a vastly more important labor of analysis in character and society building.

46. Types of Instincts Listed by 500 Writers¹

A statistical analysis of the usage of instincts in 5684 cases taken from various types of literature, seems to show that the so-called in-

¹ Reprinted by permission from L. L. Bernard, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 132. New York. Henry Holt & Company, 1926.

studies distribute themselves under the distinct headings and a group called miscellaneous follows.

Topic	No. Cases	Topic	No. Cases
Aptitude	177	Vegetation and climate	74
Art-sociology	177	Violence	176
Dislike or repulsion	74	Wages and prices	31
Economics	177	Religions	87
Esthetic	177	Regulation	31
Etiquette	74	Self-discipline	134
Family	177	Self-discipline	177
Fear and flight	177	Self-discipline	177
Food	177	Sex	177
Intelligence or social	177	Wormmanship	177
Intelligence	177	Miscellaneous	177
Imitation	0		

The list merely represents the rough material as a whole or in part by approximate the numerical writers' names from the mental and social sciences. The numbers after the title represent the frequency with which the topic was found to occur.

4. The Instance Data or Hypotheses?

It is clear that the treatment of the term instance is in doubt. It will be seen that the number and classification of the instance is in a state of direct confusion. James talks of over some thirty-two, including the instance of looking sugar. But Angel is content with half that number, rejecting the alleged instance of creaminess. Perhaps he had a small box of the over and refusing to make anything and modesty. He did, however, make certain additions and so James' list. Walter has twenty-six, including "looking," "seeing," and "remembering," while Thorndike in his *Elementary Psychology* enumerates over forty or more besides certain "multiple tendencies" both of thought and action. Not to the all, Thorndike, Walter, James and the rest, among the psychologists as well as Graham Wallas, Langdon Clarke, Ellsworth and others and many others all follow with their own lists. No two men agreeing and each with his own account of a what should be included and what rejected. McLaughlin, in his *Classical Psychology*,

¹ Borrowed by permission from E. S. Sigmund "The Instance Data or Hypotheses," *Am. J. Soc. Sci.*, 1910, 10, 1-10, 11-12, 13-14, 15-16, 17-18, 19-20, 21-22, 23-24, 25-26, 27-28, 29-30, 31-32, 33-34, 35-36, 37-38, 39-40, 41-42, 43-44, 45-46, 47-48, 49-50, 51-52, 53-54, 55-56, 57-58, 59-60, 61-62, 63-64, 65-66, 67-68, 69-70, 71-72, 73-74, 75-76, 77-78, 79-80, 81-82, 83-84, 85-86, 87-88, 89-90, 91-92, 93-94, 95-96, 97-98, 99-100, 101-102, 103-104, 105-106, 107-108, 109-110, 111-112, 113-114, 115-116, 117-118, 119-120, 121-122, 123-124, 125-126, 127-128, 129-130, 131-132, 133-134, 135-136, 137-138, 139-140, 141-142, 143-144, 145-146, 147-148, 149-150, 151-152, 153-154, 155-156, 157-158, 159-160, 161-162, 163-164, 165-166, 167-168, 169-170, 171-172, 173-174, 175-176, 177-178, 179-180, 181-182, 183-184, 185-186, 187-188, 189-190, 191-192, 193-194, 195-196, 197-198, 199-200, 201-202, 203-204, 205-206, 207-208, 209-210, 211-212, 213-214, 215-216, 217-218, 219-220, 221-222, 223-224, 225-226, 227-228, 229-230, 231-232, 233-234, 235-236, 237-238, 239-240, 241-242, 243-244, 245-246, 247-248, 249-250, 251-252, 253-254, 255-256, 257-258, 259-260, 261-262, 263-264, 265-266, 267-268, 269-270, 271-272, 273-274, 275-276, 277-278, 279-280, 281-282, 283-284, 285-286, 287-288, 289-290, 291-292, 293-294, 295-296, 297-298, 299-300, 301-302, 303-304, 305-306, 307-308, 309-310, 311-312, 313-314, 315-316, 317-318, 319-320, 321-322, 323-324, 325-326, 327-328, 329-330, 331-332, 333-334, 335-336, 337-338, 339-340, 341-342, 343-344, 345-346, 347-348, 349-350, 351-352, 353-354, 355-356, 357-358, 359-360, 361-362, 363-364, 365-366, 367-368, 369-370, 371-372, 373-374, 375-376, 377-378, 379-380, 381-382, 383-384, 385-386, 387-388, 389-390, 391-392, 393-394, 395-396, 397-398, 399-400, 401-402, 403-404, 405-406, 407-408, 409-410, 411-412, 413-414, 415-416, 417-418, 419-420, 421-422, 423-424, 425-426, 427-428, 429-430, 431-432, 433-434, 435-436, 437-438, 439-440, 441-442, 443-444, 445-446, 447-448, 449-450, 451-452, 453-454, 455-456, 457-458, 459-460, 461-462, 463-464, 465-466, 467-468, 469-470, 471-472, 473-474, 475-476, 477-478, 479-480, 481-482, 483-484, 485-486, 487-488, 489-490, 491-492, 493-494, 495-496, 497-498, 499-500, 501-502, 503-504, 505-506, 507-508, 509-510, 511-512, 513-514, 515-516, 517-518, 519-520, 521-522, 523-524, 525-526, 527-528, 529-530, 531-532, 533-534, 535-536, 537-538, 539-540, 541-542, 543-544, 545-546, 547-548, 549-550, 551-552, 553-554, 555-556, 557-558, 559-560, 561-562, 563-564, 565-566, 567-568, 569-570, 571-572, 573-574, 575-576, 577-578, 579-580, 581-582, 583-584, 585-586, 587-588, 589-590, 591-592, 593-594, 595-596, 597-598, 599-600, 601-602, 603-604, 605-606, 607-608, 609-610, 611-612, 613-614, 615-616, 617-618, 619-620, 621-622, 623-624, 625-626, 627-628, 629-630, 631-632, 633-634, 635-636, 637-638, 639-640, 641-642, 643-644, 645-646, 647-648, 649-650, 651-652, 653-654, 655-656, 657-658, 659-660, 661-662, 663-664, 665-666, 667-668, 669-670, 671-672, 673-674, 675-676, 677-678, 679-680, 681-682, 683-684, 685-686, 687-688, 689-690, 691-692, 693-694, 695-696, 697-698, 699-700, 701-702, 703-704, 705-706, 707-708, 709-710, 711-712, 713-714, 715-716, 717-718, 719-720, 721-722, 723-724, 725-726, 727-728, 729-730, 731-732, 733-734, 735-736, 737-738, 739-740, 741-742, 743-744, 745-746, 747-748, 749-750, 751-752, 753-754, 755-756, 757-758, 759-760, 761-762, 763-764, 765-766, 767-768, 769-770, 771-772, 773-774, 775-776, 777-778, 779-780, 781-782, 783-784, 785-786, 787-788, 789-790, 791-792, 793-794, 795-796, 797-798, 799-800, 801-802, 803-804, 805-806, 807-808, 809-810, 811-812, 813-814, 815-816, 817-818, 819-820, 821-822, 823-824, 825-826, 827-828, 829-830, 831-832, 833-834, 835-836, 837-838, 839-840, 841-842, 843-844, 845-846, 847-848, 849-850, 851-852, 853-854, 855-856, 857-858, 859-860, 861-862, 863-864, 865-866, 867-868, 869-870, 871-872, 873-874, 875-876, 877-878, 879-880, 881-882, 883-884, 885-886, 887-888, 889-890, 891-892, 893-894, 895-896, 897-898, 899-900, 901-902, 903-904, 905-906, 907-908, 909-910, 911-912, 913-914, 915-916, 917-918, 919-920, 921-922, 923-924, 925-926, 927-928, 929-930, 931-932, 933-934, 935-936, 937-938, 939-940, 941-942, 943-944, 945-946, 947-948, 949-950, 951-952, 953-954, 955-956, 957-958, 959-960, 961-962, 963-964, 965-966, 967-968, 969-970, 971-972, 973-974, 975-976, 977-978, 979-980, 981-982, 983-984, 985-986, 987-988, 989-990, 991-992, 993-994, 995-996, 997-998, 999-1000.

has proposed a criterion which requires the instinct to be found among the animals, not in all the animals but in some of them, and also to be found in an exaggerated form among abnormal people. This leads him to posit some fifteen or more, the number varying in different editions of his work. The zoological garden on the one side and the insane asylum on the other would thus have a veto on the candidates for the list, but the criteria have found favor with but few.

Trotter in a war-time book insists on four instincts and no more: Ames in his *Psychology of Religion* reduces them to two instincts which he finds quite sufficient to explain the complexities of human life; while Freud, Jung, Le Bon and Kropotkin each reduces human nature to one single instinctive principle, though they do not agree on what it is.

How does it happen that gifted men are so unable to agree on what they consider the basic facts of human nature? Some slight differences might be understood, but surely the range is distressingly wide. One, or two, or four, or eleven, or sixteen, or thirty, or forty—this looks suspicious. Facts are the given, accepted, apparent data of a problem. Perhaps instincts are the hypotheses.

The difficulty in formulating a doctrine of instincts is that habit and social interaction enter in so early that it is difficult to disentangle the original from the acquired. For example, Watson investigated the causes of fear in children. A statement by James has been repeated and reaffirmed by many subsequent writers.

Strange animals, either large or small, excite fear, but especially men or animals advancing toward us in a threatening way. This is entirely instinctive and antecedent to experience. Some children will cry with terror at their very first sight of a cat or dog, and it will often be impossible for weeks to make them touch it.

Watson tested this, by introducing into the presence of children who had no previous experience with animals, all sorts of strange stimuli, a pigeon, a rabbit, a white rat, or a dog, but he was unable to find any visual experience that caused fear. He did find, however, that if a sudden noise frightened a child at the same time that a hairy animal or a fur coat was shown him, the presence of the coat or animal alone would subsequently arouse fear. And the moral of that is that the conditioned reflex, or as the older writers called it, simultaneous association, begins to modify inherited reactions from the very first, and continues so to modify them. Instincts are therefore impossible to make out in their purity, for they are constantly being modified by habit and social experience.

This much at least is plain: An instinct in developed human beings can never be the result of direct observation. At best, it can be a hypothetical inference, an assumed elementary component, in a complex human situation. It was formerly assumed that human mothers were in possession of a maternal instinct which enabled them to perform their duties adequately. But if untaught human mothers be carefully observed, very little evidence appears in support of this notion. One of the most awkward sights to be seen, says Watson, is an uninstructed young mother trying to bathe her baby. It is safe to say that the doctrine of a maternal instinct so eloquently preached by psychologists is not only untrue, but has been the occasion of much suffering and even of the death of many children. A mother robin knows without teaching how to prepare a place for her young, what sort of food they need, and where to find it. There is much evidence that human mothers are far less competent in this respect.

What I am insisting on is that the human instincts, except in the case of very young children performing various simple acts, are never the result of direct observation. These infantile acts are moreover of the reflex type. If human instincts were assumed as hypothetical concepts to be arrived at at the end of the discussion, the psychologist would not commit the sin against the Holy Ghost. What this type of "genetic" psychologist does is to make his hypotheses into a fact and put it at the first of his discussion; but to make into fact that which is not fact is to deserve censure. If we are ever to get ahead, we must know a fact when we see it.

The social psychologist should fasten his attention on the facts of human nature which lie all around us in the form of attitudes, desires, and wishes, which can be recorded, studied, collected, classified, and explained, and which are open to no such objection as the instincts, which in the nature of the case are always hypothetical components of a complex form of behavior.

48. Desire, not Instinct, as a Fundamental Concept¹

But it does not seem to me, at present, that either in instinct, or in emotion, in the general sense of the term emotion, we have the most vital factor in social interactions. Admitting the great importance of instinct and emotion, yet these aspects of mental life seem no more important than other aspects, among which are habit, perception, and

¹ Reprinted by permission from K. Dunlap "The Foundations of Social Psychology" *Psy. Rev.* 1923: XXX: pp. 91; 92-97.

ideation. In fact, it may be possible that there is no one aspect of individual mental life which is of predominant importance in social relations, and that, therefore social psychology is really only what I have called a particular psychology. This conclusion is really an attractive one, and I am by no means willing to deny its potential importance. But before adopting it, I should like to see one more attempt made to found social psychology on specific processes, because there is one aspect of mental life, an aspect woefully neglected during the last sixty years, which seems to me of enormous importance in social life, and which may possibly be of primary importance. This aspect is *desire*.

It will probably be understood by this audience in what I have to say here about "desire" I am not discussing the psychoanalysts' *wish* or *libido*, but that I am dealing with a topic which has been discussed by psychologists for centuries, and which is treated by such texts as those of Stout and Maher, who derived their conceptions of desire from the older psychologists before the advent of Freud. I may add that I outlined my own conception of desire in a book which I published before I had ever heard of Freud or his doctrines. This explanation, unnecessary here, would be necessary if my remarks should come before a wider audience, because there are many persons, and even some popular writers on psychoanalysis, who assume that the Freudians discovered all the psychological principles they have woven into their scheme. It is, however, very probable that an important basis for the popular appeal of psychoanalysis has been its recognition, in however distorted a fashion, of desire, together with the ignoring of this topic by the orthodox schools of psychology which have been in the ascendency.

It must not be supposed that in desire I am offering a mere formal substitute for the instincts. The instincts are not concrete facts, but are points of view from which we classify the mass of activities; and these same activities we also classify from the converse point of view of habit. Desires, on the other hand, are not principles of classification, but are actual facts in the organism of the same order as the muscular and glandular activities which are classified now as instincts, now as habits. And they are as directly observable, by the animal which has them, as are his movements of arms and legs.

We may classify desires among the *feelings* or *affections*, and we may consider feelings as being states, conditions, or changes in the *self*. This point of view has been very widely held from the scholastic period down to the present day, however much various theorizers may have differed in their descriptions of the self. Now, under the influence

of the modern theory of the feelings as somatic and visceral states and processes, this point of view is still held, because the fundamental self is, for modern psychology, the body as it is experienced.

I must repeat, that the desires and other feelings are objective facts of immediate experience, just as real and just as objective as are the colors, sounds, and other facts in the environment. They are just as capable of interpretation in the mathematical symbols of physics and chemistry as are the "external" sense data. Sense data are perceived by reactions initiated through the receptors of the so-called "special senses"; feelings are experienced by reactions initiated principally in receptors of the afferent visceral branch of the nervous system; but this difference is no greater than the difference between the mechanisms for vision and olfaction.

While we are considering the feelings as experienceable objects, we must not ignore their dynamic effects. A feeling is always a real stimulus pattern which is the beginning of a reaction pattern, and the reactions thus initiated are among the most important determining influences in the total reaction system. The afferent current derived from feelings must go efferently somewhere, to some muscles and glands; and because of the strength of the supply, must have important results. If perceptual reactions and thought reactions concurrent with the feeling reactions "drain" off his efferent current into their channels without seriously altering the course of these channels, the reactions may be extended and intensified, sometimes usefully. In this case, the feelings are said to be "under control." The affective discharge may, however, modify the normal discharge pattern of the perceptual and ideational reactions and seriously interfere with their efficacy in making proper adjustments to the environment, or even blocking the channels altogether, turning the efferent discharge into the channels for the evoking of new emotional responses. In this case, the feelings are said to be "uncontrolled."

In any case, the feelings are not only the background, against which external objects are experienced; they contribute also a driving force, which makes the reactions initiated from "external" stimulus patterns more efficacious, or less so, as the case may be; but in either case, energizing and activating the whole reaction system. This activation is not the function of desire alone, but is also the work of many other feelings and emotions. Hunger, fear, rage, pain, joy, and localized sex feeling are illustrations of feelings which have "driving force." But none of these have social value except in so far as they involve, also, or are derived from, desire; and even in so far as individual life is concerned, it is

doubtful if man would be able to adjust himself effectively to the environment without desire.

To construct a list of desires in the present stage of investigation is a rash act. Yet, it is important that we should have a tentative list, and I have not hesitated at rashness. The tentative list includes nine desires: alimentary desire, excretory desire, desire of rest, desire of activity, desire of shelter, amatory desire, parental desire, desire of pre-eminence, and desire of conformity). At least four of these desires (amatory, parental, pre-eminence, conformity) seem to be of supreme social importance, because of the actions, emotions, ideas, and discriminations they determine and regulate. While we might guess at the tissues in which certain of these desires occur, I do not consider their physiological assignment the matter of primary importance at present.

I am using the term, desire, perhaps, somewhat rashly. I do not mean, for example, by the "desire of conformity," either the varied acts of conformity to the group or to the leader, nor do I mean the ideas and perceptions of difference and agreement in thought and action. I mean the feeling which lies at the root of the development of these ideas and activities, and which I believe runs through our complex emotions of embarrassment over being peculiar, of fear of seeming odd, or conspicuous in certain ways, or pleasure in being in fashion. I believe there is such a feeling, which I name from the situations in which its effects are characteristically obvious, but which I believe can exist in isolation from the acts and ideas to which it usually leads. Perhaps I should not call it the desire, but rather the radical of the desire; but the shorter designation seems at present permissible. The existence of such a simple feeling may seem less plausible in the cases of pre-eminence and conformity than in the cases of the other desires; but I am at least assuming it in these cases.

If we consider social interrelations, we notice three outstanding forms, represented by the family, the State, and the Church; as well as various minor forms of interrelation which are sometimes included in these, but which sometimes are in conflict with them. The problem of the family involves not only the producing and rearing of children, but also a much more complicated set of problems involving the psychological differences of sex, and the organization of two or more individuals with these differences into a group. In accordance with the exact forms the family takes, various of the first seven desires are involved in the organization. But always, and essentially, the amatory and parental. The adjustments and activities requisite to afford satisfaction on these desires, and the consequence of incomplete or inadequate or unbalanced

expression of these desires, constitute the fundamental network of family problems.

The problems of courtship and marriage and divorce, and the problems of prostitution and promiscuity, can not be settled without thorough analysis of the play of these desires. It is only on the basis of an understanding of the essential difference in the conditions and forms of amatory desire between men and women that many unsuccessful families are harmonized and made successful.

In so far as the family organization suffices for the satisfaction of all the types of desire, no further organization is necessary. And this is the situation in small primitive groups. But with increasing population, satisfaction of the first seven desires increasingly demands another type of organization, the State, which, as it arises, is necessarily in conflict with the family.

In the State, whether it be the tribe, the clan, the nation, or the less determinate group, the desires for pre-eminence and for conformity are given their maximal satisfaction. The satisfaction of desires of alimentation, rest, activity are regulated by the State, and for the maintenance of its own organization, it interferes in the family group, sometimes for better, sometimes for worse.

With the increasing complexity of the state organization it becomes inadequate. It becomes impossible for a single organization to provide for all desires, and the failure to satisfy adequately the desire for conformity and for activity leads to new organizations within, and also independent of the State. The Church and secret societies are at first mere aspects of the State. But eventually these emerge as independent or quasi-independent organizations for the satisfaction of the desires of conformity, of pre-eminence, and of activity. These organizations not only provide opportunities for leadership and for conformity, in addition to those provided by the State, but they also provide activity, which may be indulged in for its own sake; in other words, *play*. For the desire for activity does not grow less with increasing age of civilization, or increasing individual age; and play, in the form of religious ceremonies, or ritual "work" of secret societies, or sports, or of many other sorts, must be provided.

These venerable institutions furnish but a fraction of the problems of social psychology in our complex civilization. The recognition of desires as psychological facts and forces opens up fields of investigation which I believe can not otherwise be cultivated adequately. Problems of criminality, criminal tendency, and criminal types; problems of cultural and vocational education; of the development and maintenance of

conventions and laws; of the raising of ethical standards; of the determination of the nature and conditions of feeble-mindedness, are typical features of the fields which lie before us.

In my opinion, it is idle to discuss instinct, or emotion, or any other factors in social relations, without taking account of desire. Without desires, there are no social relations. One organism might act upon others and be acted upon by them, just as pebbles on the beach grind on each other. But this action, even if conscious, is not what we mean by social relations. If the pebbles on the beach were conscious, we might call their action-tendencies *instincts* in the same sense in which our action-tendencies are called instincts. But such a collection of conscious pebbles would still not be a society. Even cattle in the herd are associated through desire.

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What function does instinct play in animal behavior?
2. What is the nature of a drive? How may one drive set off another?
3. Illustrate from food-getting, from sex behavior, and from flight, the three-fold hierarchy of activity described by Tolman.
4. How do human instincts differ from animal instincts?
5. What evidence can you muster to show that McDougall, Thorndike, and Warren include many learned tendencies in their lists of instincts?
6. What does Allport mean by calling instincts "prepotent reflexes"?
7. List ten phrases and sentences from current magazines, newspapers, and books to show the type of activity which is popularly called instinctive but which by scientific standards can not be so described.
8. List ten such phrases and sentences from writings in social science.
9. Discuss critically Faris' standpoint in reference to instincts. Is there any sound methodological reason why instinct, emotion, intelligence, and temperament may not serve as hypotheses in the science of social psychology? Is an attitude not also an hypothesis? What is the difference between data and hypotheses?
10. What is Dunlap's point in preferring the term "desire" to that of "instinct"? Is anything gained by this change in term? Discuss pro and con.

B. Topics for Class Reports

1. Report on Allport's discussion of maturation of reflexes. (Cf. bibliography).
2. Review Craig's theory of appetites as fundamental to instinctive action. (Cf. bibliography).

3. Report on Kuo's papers on the fallaciousness of the concept of instinct in psychology. (Cf. bibliography.)
 4. Report on McDougall's criticism of the mechanistic standpoint in regard to instincts. (Cf. bibliography.)
 5. Report on Lashley's criticism of the libido concept. (Cf. bibliography.)
 6. Report on Watson's paper (1925) on instincts. (Cf. bibliography.)
 7. Review Bernard's book on instincts. (Cf. bibliography.)
 8. Report on Herrick's paper on purpose in psychology. (Cf. bibliography.)
- C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers
1. Giving Up the Instincts in Social Psychology: Pro and Con.
 2. The Hormic Theory of Instincts: Advantages and Disadvantages.
 3. The Mechanistic Theory of Instincts: Advantages and Disadvantages.

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CHAPTER VIII

EMOTIONS, FEELINGS, AND WILL

I. INTRODUCTION

Undoubtedly the importance of the emotions and the feelings in behavior has not been fully appreciated. The emotional and feeling aspects of social attitudes, which will become increasingly evident as we proceed in this volume, are still usually ignored or given a minor place in contrast with the emphasis placed upon the intellectual functions. As we mentioned in the previous chapter, the older intellectualistic interpretation of behavior still persists in spite of the incisive analysis of the whole field by Wallas, McDougall, Dewey, and Freud. It is so current to imagine that a man votes because "he makes up his mind" deliberately and rationally, or that he chooses his vocation, or his clothes, on similar rationalistic grounds, that the more adequate view is with difficulty understood. The present group of papers gives the biological and psychological basis of emotions, feelings, and temperament.

Miss Brierley's paper shows the physiological accompaniments of emotions. She also indicates the relation of instinctive to emotional behavior along the lines of McDougall. Watson would modify this to say that emotion is internal, covert behavior, whereas instinctive action is overt. The former involves the smooth muscles and glandular organs, the latter the striped muscles and the organs of gross bodily movement. Watson's paper gives the results of his study of the stimuli which evoke the fundamental emotions. This is important in giving the mechanisms which are innate. It also disabuses our minds of popular notions that children are innately afraid in the dark, of furry animals, etc.

It is important to note, however, that emotional responses may become associated with a wide range of objects and situations. Thus, while fear, rage, and love are the fundamental emotions, through association or conditioning a large number of situations may come

to be tied to these. Moreover, through combination and extension the higher types of emotions—grief, sorrow, joy, reverence, awe, and the like—may be built up. The mechanism of conditioning is described in a subsequent chapter.

The feelings or the affective processes refer to the "tonal quality" of the organism. They are usually classified under two types: pleasure or well-being, and pain or displeasure. The paper by Bogardus reviews the essential aspects of the feelings. It may be said further that the feeling of pleasure seems to accompany the fullness or completeness of response in the organism. When man secures the object of his attention and gratifies his drives or impulses, there ensues a state of well-being or release which we call pleasure. The bodily tensions arising from partial and incomplete responses are removed in the successful outcome. When the action or response is blocked or thwarted, the corresponding state is painful or disagreeable. Here the tensions remain because the final response is inhibited. There is no doubt that in many disturbances of personality, the thwarting of desires and ambitions plays a considerable rôle in mental breakdowns and that the painful or displeasurable feeling states are the result of this blocking. However, it is apparent that the feelings do not initiate behavior. The feelings rather accompany action and set the seal of approval or disapproval upon it. The basis of behavior, as we have noted, is in the instinctive impulses and the emotions.

Temperament is related both to the emotions and to the feelings. It is based upon the general organization of the physiological mechanisms. Since antiquity men have observed that some persons are by general cast more joyful and sanguine than others. Some men are marked by irritability, tendencies to quick temper, and the like. Warren's paper gives the older classification of temperament correlated with the feelings of pleasure, pain, or indifference. He has also classified the general types of person into active or passive. This larger division may be considered a dual division of the volitional nature.

Mood should be considered the more or less temporary diurnal fluctuation within the general temperamental frame. Thus persons ordinarily cheerful may have an occasional "Blue Monday." Or grief over a death or severe shock may make for a change of mood from sanguine to melancholic.

In Bridges' paper we have an attempt to relate temperament to certain instinctive tendencies, to endocrine gland activity, and to compensatory mechanisms which are evident in many personalities.

Related to temperament and to the whole complex of emotions and feelings is the will, or volitional pattern. The concept *will* has been much discussed in psychology. For our purposes we may consider it in terms of action and inhibition. There are certain types of persons whose actions are rapid and impulsive as against those who are slower and more deliberate. Likewise there are individual differences in powers of inhibition. Some persons are flexible, others are full of resistances. Some people can control their responses with much greater ease than others. These capacities are related both to intelligence and to temperament. One of the functions of intelligence is to inhibit the will until a more adequate adjustment can be made. Will is also related to expenditure of energy. Some persons are rapid, hyperactive; others are slow and hypoactive.

The whole field of will and temperament in relation to personality has not been extensively investigated except in Miss Downey's work. Some experimental work on choice reactions has been done by Wheeler and others, but not in the light of personality adjustment. The short quotation from Miss Downey's book on will-temperament closes this chapter. She gives in a brief summary the outstanding features of her test, and also her three-fold classification of fundamental will patterns.

Much could be written regarding the will. There is no doubt that inhibition is related to the most complex social adjustments. Will and choice reactions go hand in hand. The individual who can hold back, who can consider consequences, who can inhibit the cruder emotions and replace them with more socialized ones, who can accept the ethical standards of his society, who can cover up his more animal nature with reactions dependent on the higher mental functions, makes his social adjustments more successfully than others. To be weak-willed is to be ineffective in the social group. It is to be suggestible, to be led by every wind of doctrine. It is to be left at the mercy of the emotions and instinctive drives at their unsocialized level.

The process of making the personality is the process of modifying and extending the instinctive, emotional, and volitional quali-

ties which come to us from our heredity and making them over through learning into socially acceptable features of behavior. Here the intellectual capacities come extensively into play, not to replace but to direct and to control these deeper racial tendencies which furnish the motive power to all action.

II. MATERIALS

49. The Nature of Emotion ¹

We are, however, no longer content to define an instinct as a mere tendency to act, for that turns out to be too simple a statement in many cases. If we examine some of the more important and typical instances we find that there is not only a tendency to overt action appropriate to the situation, but that a strong emotion normally accompanies this impulse. In some cases, indeed, the emotion is so much the more dramatic and characteristic a part of the total experience, that popularly we name the instinct from the emotion rather than from the action. This is so in the case of fear, and sometimes anger. The terms fear and anger are, however, best kept for the characteristic emotions which are felt along with the characteristic impulses.

Some psychologists have come thus to reserve the term instinct for those tendencies to action which normally carry with them a characteristic emotion. The emotion and the instinct are found to show a very intimate relation, so intimate that it is often extremely difficult to say where the one ends and the other begins.

Nor are emotions themselves simple things, and there has been much controversy as to their exact nature. If we observe ourselves and others when under the sway of fear, for example, we find that all levels of bodily and mental functioning are involved. There is a feeling of tension which when well marked under strong emotion is decidedly unpleasantly toned; there is a certain narrowing and intensifying of consciousness,—one can only attend to those objects or events which are relevant to the emotional state, and these have an unusual value; and there are more or less violent changes in physiological conditions and overt behavior,—a wild heart-beat, blanched face and lips, dry throat, stilled breathing, a “rising” of the hair, dilation of the pupils, wide-opening of the eyes, muscular twitchings and tremblings and the incipient movements of flight or concealment. So much we can observe in the ordinary way. Re-

¹ From S. S. Brierley, *An Introduction to Psychology*. pp. 83; 84-85; 86. Used by permission of Dodd, Mead & Company, Inc.

cent physiological research (based largely on the method of the conditioned reflex) has revealed the profound extent and the special significance of the organic changes. Under the stress of fear, or rage, the arterial pressure is increased, the pulse is quickened, the blood-supply to the viscera is lessened and that to the skeletal muscles is increased; sugar, as a source of energy, is thrown into the blood from its storehouse in the liver, digestive processes temporarily cease; and the secretion of "adrenin" by the suprarenal glands is greatly stimulated, the effect of which substance *adrenin* is further to heighten all the above mentioned processes, to increase the ready coagulability of the blood and to restore fatigued muscles quickly. These physiological facts help us to understand why it is that, under the stress of great emotion, people are able to perform unusual feats of strength, agility or endurance; why, for example, the soldier, in a state of fighting lust and battle exaltation, can ignore a severe abdominal wound or degrees of fatigue that would normally incapacitate him. (Cf. pp. 84, 92-93 above).

It is also made clear to us why milder, but longer continued, emotional states, which are not able to discharge in appropriate reactions, as e. g. anxiety, worry and fear, have so evil an effect upon digestion and bodily health generally. Digestive troubles are very commonly emotional in origin. Clearly the biological significance of emotion is that it normally reinforces and makes preparation for the effective functioning of those instinctive reactions with which it is so intimately connected. This connection is not a mere accompaniment, but involves a very complex interrelation of parts and functions.

50. The Stimuli Which Evoke the Fundamental Emotions¹

Early Types of Emotional Reactions. After observing a number of infants, especially during the first months of life, we suggest the following group of emotional reactions as belonging to the original and fundamental nature of man: *fear, rage and love.*

Fear. What stimulus apart from all training will call out fear responses; what are these responses, and how early may they be called out? The principal situations which call out fear responses seem to be as follows: (1) To suddenly remove from the infant all means of support, as when one drops it from the hands to be caught by an assistant (in the experiment the child is held over a bed upon which has been

¹ Reprinted by permission from J. B. Watson, *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, pp. 199; 199-202. Philadelphia. J. B. Lippincott, 1919.

placed a soft feather pillow); (2) by loud sounds: (3) occasionally when an infant is just falling asleep or is just ready to waken, a sudden push or a slight shake is an adequate stimulus; (4) when an infant is just falling asleep, occasionally the sudden pulling of the blanket upon which it is lying will produce the fear responses. The responses are a sudden catching of the breath, clutching randomly with the hands (the grasping reflex invariably appearing when the child is dropped), sudden closing of the eye-lids, puckering of the lips, then crying; in older children possibly flight and hiding (not yet observed by us as "original" reactions). In regard to the age at which fear responses first appear, we can state with some sureness that the above mentioned group of reactions appears at birth. It is often stated that children are instinctively afraid in the dark. While we shall advance our opinion with the greatest caution, we have not so far been able to gather any evidence to this effect. When such reactions to darkness do appear they are due to other causes; darkness comes to be associated with absence of customary stimulation, noises, etc. (they should be looked upon as conditioned fear reactions). From time immemorial children have been "scared" in the dark, either unintentionally or as a means of controlling them (this is especially true of children reared in the South).

Rage. In a similar way the question arises as to what is the original situation which brings out the activities seen in rage. Observation seems to show that the *hampering of the infant's movements* is the factor which apart from all training brings out the movements characterized as rage. If the face or head is held, crying results, quickly followed by screaming. The body stiffens and fairly well-coordinated slashing or striking movements of the hands and arms result; the feet and legs are drawn up and down; the breath is held until the child's face is flushed. In older children the slashing movements of the arms and legs are better co-ordinated, and appear as kicking, slapping, pushing, etc. These reactions continue until the irritating situation is relieved, and sometimes do not cease then. Almost any child from birth can be thrown into a rage if its arms are held tightly to its sides; sometimes even if the elbow joint is clasped tightly between the fingers the response appears; at times just the placing of the head between cotton pads will produce it. This was noticed repeatedly when testing eye co-ordinations in infants under ten days of age. The slight constraint put upon the head by the soft pads would often result in a disturbance so great that the experiment had to be discontinued for a time.

Love. The original situation which calls out the observable love

responses seems to be the stroking or manipulation of some erogenous zone, tickling, shaking, gentle rocking, patting and turning upon the stomach across the attendant's knee. The response varies. If the infant is crying, crying ceases, a smile may appear, attempts at gurgling, cooing, and finally, in slightly older children, the extension of the arms, which we should class as the forerunner of the embrace of adults. The smile and the laugh which Freud connects with the release of repression (we are not denying in the case of adults this may be true) we should thus class as original reaction tendencies intimately connected from infancy with the stimulation of, in our opinion at least, the erogenous zones.

51. The Feelings¹

Human nature possesses a *tonal quality*, somewhat after the fashion perhaps of a musical instrument, only far more complex and significant. If all goes well the human organism experiences a pleasant tone or feeling. If the environment impinges harshly upon the organism, then a disagreeable tone is experienced. An unbroken continuance of favorable or unfavorable circumstances may cease to bring out the organic tonal quality. If the environment has few new stimuli and arouses no new responses then the human organism lapses into a chronic state of disagreeableness, or ennui. If the environmental factors repeatedly defeat the organism at every turn then an essentially unpleasant organic tone becomes chronic and is accompanied by cynicism and fatalism. If circumstances present new problems from time to time the organism is likely to be stimulated to its highest efficiency.

The tones of psychic nature are as old as psychic nature itself. They appear almost simultaneously with the causal stimuli. They are the first or advance responses of the organism to specific stimuli. A type of stimuli which as a rule has been favorable in the past to the organism or to the race or to both produces an agreeable tone in the organism. If some one were to suggest to me a visit to the dentist's chair, I should experience an unpleasant tone, providing my previous experiences have been exceedingly painful. The stimulus releases an habitual reaction that has been built up on the basis of painful dental experiences, and I experience disagreeable feelings again. On the other hand if some one were to suggest to me a beefsteak fry in the Rockies, I should experience a highly agreeable psychic tone, providing I have enjoyed several such occasions. This tonal character of one's nature seems to give a quicker-

¹ Reprinted by permission from E. S. Bogardus, *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, pp. 11-13. New York. The Century Company, 1924.

than-thought evaluation to a proposed activity under the basis of past experience.

A pleasurable feeling is the beginning of a whole response of the organism and indicates that in the history of the organism or the species, the act which the given stimulus is calling forth has been helpful. The pleasurable tone is a blind guide, implying but not necessarily proving the present value of a proposed response. The fact that a certain type of responses has been helpful or harmful in the past indicates that in all probability this type will continue to be helpful or harmful. If, however, conditions have changed, the tonal voice may prove a misleader. Before he responds to his tonal or feeling guidance, it is necessary, therefore, for a person to notice whether or not the main factors in a given social situation have changed.

People are alike in their tonal responses because they have had about the same fundamental experiences of gain or loss. In the history of the human species, certain ways of doing have proved favorable to race development; and others, unfavorable. Advantage is accompanied by agreeable tones or feelings, and disadvantage by a disagreeable tonal quality, ranging from a sense of complete loss (sorrow) to one of complete energization (angry determination). Upholders of race prejudice and race pride should observe that all races irrespective of color are characterized under similar circumstances by the same psychic tones or feelings. Social traditions have developed variations, but after all, the white, yellow and black races alike experience joy, sorrow, and anger when responding to the respective types of stimuli.

The feeling or tonal qualities developed earlier than thinking in the species. The feelings have longer roots than ideas. They are more definitely a part of the inner core of personality. They have helped to make personality, long before thinking reached its full development, either in the individual or in the race. It is difficult to argue down the feelings.

Again, feeling is not on the plane of thinking. It is not in the same class of phenomena. Thinking is superior in quality to feeling in that it can describe and analyze feeling, but it is inferior in that it can rarely overcome feeling. If one has been taught throughout the earlier years of life that thirteen is an unlucky number, it is with difficulty in later years that one can throw off the feeling response that thirteen had better be avoided. Years of thinking to the contrary do not always succeed in overcoming feeling. An idea which is thrown against the feelings by way of argument does not meet them on their plane. It would seem that the best way to cope with the feelings is to stimulate counter feelings.

52. A Classification of Temperaments¹

Temperament is the phase of character based upon an individual's hedonic attitudes; it expresses the development of his systemic life. We rate a man's hedonic standing quite apart from his intellectual or moral standing.

The older psychology recognized four kinds of temperament: the choleric, melancholic, sanguine, and phlegmatic. This classification was based upon a doctrine of internal secretions which though in the main erroneous contained a germ of truth.

Temperament is possibly correlated with the modes of heart action. The heart-beat may be strong or weak, and it may be rapid or slow. Combining these pairs we get four varieties of temperament which correspond to the classic types. The *sanguine* temperament represents strong and slow activity, the *melancholic* weak and rapid, the *choleric* strong and rapid, and the *phlegmatic* weak and slow.

The objection to the four-fold division is that it does not take account of the positive and negative phases which form the differential basis of hedonic phenomena. The optimist and the pessimist would both belong to the sanguine type.

A more exact classification of temperaments is based upon both the mode of activity and the quality of hedonic tone. The former has two phases, active and passive; the latter three phases, pleasant, unpleasant, and indifferent. Combining these two groups of characteristics we obtain the six varieties of temperament shown in the accompanying table:

<i>Mode of Activity</i>	<i>Hedonic Tone</i>	<i>Temperament</i>
Active	Pleasant	Sanguine
	Unpleasant	Choleric
	Indifferent	Mercurial
Passive	Pleasant	Jovial
	Unpleasant	Melancholic or Saturnine
	Indifferent	Phlegmatic

(Consult section 33.)

¹ This selection from H. C. Warren, *Human Psychology*, pp. 375-76, is used by permission of, and by arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company, the authorized publishers.

53. Temperament and its Relation to Instinctive Trends and to Compensatory Mechanisms, etc.¹

A distinction is sometimes made between disposition and temperament. The former is regarded as a matter of emotional or instinctive attitude, probably based upon the native prescription of instincts; while the latter is a matter of general hedonic characteristic, based upon bodily conditions, such as endocrinal factors and the nature of the nervous tissue: excitability, fatigability, and so forth. This distinction has some historical justification and it may have some value; but in this paper the term temperament signifies total affective make-up. It thus includes the factors designated by the term disposition. This is more in agreement with popular usage, and conforms as well to the more frequent usage in psychopathology. Furthermore the results of recent investigations tend to break down the distinction; for disposition as defined is referable through instinct to bodily conditions probably of the same kind as those concerned in temperament. The limitation of the term temperament to speed and strength of reaction, as in the Wundtian analysis of the traditional temperaments seems wholly arbitrary, for speed and strength are merely aspects of the total affective pattern.

The essential nature of temperament is, if possible, more uncertain than its definition or its analysis. There are in the field many apparently divergent theories. It is the object of this paper to present these theories, to raise the question of their ultimate harmony, and to indicate certain factors that must be taken into consideration in any final theory of temperament. The topics that will be discussed in succession are as follows: (a) relation of temperament to instinct, (b) relation to internal secretion, (c) relation to autonomic functions, (d) psychopathic types of temperament, (e) inheritance of temperament.

(a) The relation of temperament to instinct is perhaps the most obvious aspect of the subject. There appears to be a temperament (disposition) based upon each of the most important instincts. Fear has its temperamental parallel in timidity, pugnacity in irascibility, self-assertion and self-abasement in ascendency and submissiveness, the parental instinct in tenderness (altruism), love in amorousness or sentimentality, acquisition in miserliness, the gregarious instinct in sociality, and so on. Subjects differ in temperament because they do not inherit all the instincts to the same degree. Temperament is due to the predominance of some one instinctive tendency or to the greater susceptibility to some one

¹ Reprinted by permission from J. W. Bridges "Theories of Temperament: an Attempt at Reconciliation" *Psy. Rev.* 1923: XXX: pp. 36-43.

particular type of instinctive response. If two or more dominant instincts are about equal in strength, the resulting temperament will be in the nature of a compromise or combination. Aggressiveness, for example, is probably a matter of self-assertion and pugnacity. This dependence of temperament upon instinct does not imply any particular theory of the emotions. Whether emotion is itself a kind of instinct, or the visceral aspect of an instinct, or the subjective aspect of an instinct does not matter in this case. Such questions arise only when the fundamental nature of temperament is involved.

A special form of dependence of temperament upon instinct has been emphasized by the psychoanalysts, especially by Adler and his followers. They have pointed out that frequently a trait of temperament or character may be a compensation for or a defense reaction against a strong instinctive trend of an opposite nature. Pronounced egotism is thus a defense against a strong feeling of inferiority, prudishness is a defense against unusual eroticism, and so on. It would seem, therefore, that the dominant instinct may result in either a similar temperament or an opposing one depending perhaps on the nature of one's early training. In the former case the temperament is truly instinctive, in the latter it is rather a matter of habit. Instinct is concealed by compensating habits. Some of the possibilities are indicated in the following table:

<i>Instinct</i>	<i>Similar Temperament</i>	<i>Compensating Temperament</i>
Fear	Timidity	Courage (rashness)
Curiosity	Progressiveness	Conservatism
Pugnacity	Contentiousness (irascibility)	Pacifism
Self-assertion	Ascendency	Submissiveness
Self-abasement	Submissiveness	Ascendency (egotism)
Parental	Tenderness (altruism)	Misanthropy
Love	Amorousness (sentimentality)	Prudishness
Acquisition	Miserliness	Prodigality
Gregariousness	Sociality	Antisociality

It should be noted that in certain cases a temperament is capable of a two-fold interpretation. It may be due to a dominating instinct, or to a compensation for an opposite instinct. Egotism (ascendency), for example, may be based upon self-assertion or may be a compensation for self-abasement (inferiority), courage may be based directly upon pug-

nacity and self-assertion or may be a reaction against fear, pacifism may be based upon fear or upon repressed pugnacity, and so on. In such cases the instinctive temperament may be distinguished from the one due to compensating habit by the fact that the latter usually goes to extremes. A courage that compensates for fear is usually rashness, an egotism that compensates for inferiority is more or less megalomaniacal, and a pacifism that compensates for pugnacity is a militant pacifism. A compensating temperament is never a golden mean. Its very existence depends upon a complete denial of the opposite trend. Prudes are always extremists.

(b) The endocrinological theory of temperament is a more recent development. It may, however, be regarded as a modern form of the four-humor doctrine of the ancients, which has been handed down through twenty centuries and which still influences psychological terminology. Many modern textbooks classify temperaments after Galen into sanguine, phlegmatic, choleric, and melancholic. The modern theory ascribes temperament to the influence of autacoids (hormones and chalone) thrown into the blood stream by ductless glands. The type of temperament depends upon the dominating gland—a matter of relative hyper-secretion. We thus have a temperament for each endocrine gland instead of for each instinct as above. For example, the thyroid temperament is the restless, excitable, nervous type; the adrenal temperament is the virile, aggressive, pugnacious type; and characterizations of other gland types have also been suggested. Furthermore, anything which temporarily upsets the normal endocrinal balance will lead to moods or temporary aberrations of temperament.

This theory arose from the work of Cannon, and Crile on internal secretion in the emotions; and has been applied to personality and temperament by Lavastine, Berman, and others. It is probably not incompatible with the first theory, but merely carries the analysis one step further. The dominance of an instinct may be based upon the relative dominance of some endocrinal gland; and a compensating temperament would thus be interpreted as a strong system of habits built up to overcome and conceal the ever present influence of the dominating gland.

(c) The relation of temperament to autonomic functions has been worked out chiefly by Kempf. The autonomic nervous system consists of two antagonistically related parts: (1) the sympathetic system and (2) the cranial and sacral systems. The smooth muscles and glands constitute part of the total autonomic apparatus, and they are supplied for the most part by nerves from each of the above systems. For example, the

cranial system is inhibitory to the heart and excitatory to the stomach, whereas the sympathetic is excitatory to the heart and inhibitory to the stomach. At every segment this antagonism between the two systems occurs, and there is a tendency to approximate what may be called a normal balance. When this balance is upset by either a hypertonicity of one system or a hypotonicity of the other, a "segmental craving" arises. Furthermore, any variation in the physiological condition of a viscus due to such processes as assimilation and excretion also results in this segmental craving. An empty stomach, for example, results in rhythmic tonic contractions of the stomach walls and consequent craving in the gastric segment (hunger). Such autonomic affective disturbances compel the projicient apparatus (central nervous system), which is an instrument of the autonomic, continually to adjust its receptors until stimuli are found which allay the distress. These segmental cravings or egocentric drives vary from subject to subject and are the very foundation of personality. Temperament is thus determined by the unbalanced segment or the most easily unbalanced segment, and by the habits (conditioned behavior) acquired by the central nervous system in order to relieve the segmental distress.

Is this theory compatible with the endocrinological and the instinct theories? Since glands of internal secretion are merely a part of the total autonomic apparatus, it is clear that endocrinal functions are included in autonomic functions; and, moreover, it has been shown that the hormone action of adrenalin, upon the circulation for example, is the same as excitation of the sympathetic system which supplies the segments concerned. Where the sympathetic excites, adrenin excites; where the sympathetic inhibits, adrenin inhibits. Similarly every internal secretion may have the same effect as some segment of the autonomic system. Internal secretions and autonomic functions are thus mutually interdependent. A segmental distress may be initiated by hypersecretion, and vice versa a hypersecretion may be initiated by a segmental distress. It is clear that we have here two complementary functions neither of which can at present be regarded as more fundamental than the other: and just as instinct may be a matter of relative hypersecretion so it may be a matter of the tonus of autonomic segments. Thus the three views so far considered are on analysis found to be in reality harmonious, or at any rate not incompatible.

(d) Psychiatrists have frequently called attention to the exaggerated forms of temperament found in the psychopathic and insane and their relation to certain normal types. Here as elsewhere a study of the ab-

normal has thrown light on normal traits often overlooked, because the abnormal present the same phenomena in relief. Jelliffe has called our attention to the cyclothymic temperament which is exaggerated in manic-depressive insanity. Its main characteristic is the alternation of exalted and gloomy moods. In some cases the exalted or euphoric mood tends to predominate, while in others the gloomy mood plays this rôle, just as in manic-depressive insanity there may be regular alternation or the tendency for one mood to predominate. Hoch and Jung have studied the autistic or "shut in" temperament in dementia precox, and have compared it to the introverted, day-dreaming type among the so-called normal. The hysteric temperament with its emotional instability and superficiality has been described by Ribot as "psychological infantilism" which is shown in varying degrees by many people not usually classified as hysterical. The epileptic temperament with its egoism, ill-humor, fanaticism, obstinacy, and duplicity is referred to in every treatise on the subject. Surely many non-epileptics show the same traits in lesser degree.

Rosanoff has recently presented a theory of personality based on psychiatric experience. He classifies the abnormal types into (a) the anti-social, the hysterical, malingering, criminal type, (b) the cyclothymic, (c) the autistic, and (d) the epileptic. These types are merely quantitative variations of normal types. No hard and fast lines can be drawn between the types. Pure types are the exception, mixed types the rule in both normal and abnormal cases. All normal subjects have within them either manifest or latent antisocial, cyclothymic, autistic, and epileptic tendencies in various degrees. These tendencies may be observed especially in children; but they are normally inhibited to some extent and outgrown in the course of development to maturity. The power of inhibition is thus the most important differentium of the so-called normal.

(e) These temperamental trends are, according to Rosanoff, inherited in accordance with definite Mendelian principles and in conformity to the following scale of dominance: normal, anti-social, cyclothymic, autistic, and epileptic. The scale progresses from epistatic to hypostatic traits, that is to say, the manifestation of each succeeding trait is concealed or inhibited by the preceding one. A general power of inhibition may also be inherited. Davenport has shown that feeble inhibition is probably a Mendelian dominant in inheritance. When the inhibiting power is weak or when it is removed by drugs, by disease; or by senile involution, the underlying trends come to the surface.

(Consult sections 33, 105 and 106).

54. Types of Volitional Organization ¹

The phases of the dynamic pattern that seem most essential to the author include: (1) those of speed and fluidity of reaction; (2) those of forcefulness and decisiveness of reaction; (3) those of carefulness and persistence of reaction.

Tests of these three phases of activity give us three groups of tests that may be briefly described as speed-tests, test for aggressiveness, and tests of carefulness and persistence.

The first group includes four specific tests:

- Speed of Movement
- Freedom from Load
- Flexibility
- Speed of Decision

The second group is composed of tests for:

- Motor Impulsion
- Reaction to Contradiction
- Resistance to Opposition
- Finality of Judgment

Tests for the four following traits make up the third group:

- Motor Inhibition
- Interest in Detail
- Co-ordination of Impulses
- Volitional Perseverance

The results of the will-temperament test are presented in the form of a graph called the will-profile.

Some will-profiles show a consistent emphasis of the speed items; such a profile characterizes a mobile, rapid-fire sort of person. Other will-profiles emphasize the care and persistence scores; such a profile characterizes a deliberate person interested in detail. An isolated emphasis of the aggressive traits may also occur—"aggressive" being used here to suggest personal force and initiative without involving, necessarily, belligerency. Highly patterned profiles occur with relative infrequency but when found are worthy of careful analysis. Profiles frequently reveal only a slight emphasis of one or two aspects of temperament; sometimes they are best described in negative terms as non-aggressive or careless. There are profiles that run high or low, for all the traits that are tested; there are others that rise and fall irregularly.

¹ From J. E. Downey, *The Will-Temperament and Its Testing*, pp. 62-63: 70-71, copyright 1923 by World Book Company, Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York, used by permission of the publishers.

The pivotal traits in the will-profile are, possibly, motor impulsion and motor inhibition. Motor impulsion is placed first in the group of aggressive traits, but it might also be thought of as the fifth speed item. An emphasis of these five traits give us something corresponding to James's explosive will. Motor inhibition, similarly, is given first place in the final group, but it might be included among the aggressive traits.

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises

1. Define emotion. Distinguish it from instinct.
2. What are some of the commonly considered innate stimuli to fear and to anger which Watson has shown not to be original but learned stimuli?
3. List the types of stimuli or situations which make you displeased. List those which make you pleased. Can you relate these states to desires of your personality?
4. In how far are feelings subject to intellectual control?
5. Why is it so difficult to "dispel" your feelings by arguing with yourself that they "don't mean anything," etc.?
6. Can one "will" to love another? Discuss pro and con.
7. What relation has the endocrine system to temperament?
8. Classify yourself on Warren's scale of temperament. Classify your parents and brothers and sisters. Do you find any likeness in temperament between members of your family? Can you account for any likeness in terms of social influences?
9. Are temperamental qualities absolutely determined by physical conditions of the organism? Discuss pro and con.
10. Are racial differences in temperament due more to innate or to social conditions? Discuss pro and con.
11. How would you describe your own will-temperament on Downey's scale?
12. Underline the following terms which apply to your own will pattern:
 - a) quick and impulsive; b) slow, cautious; c) abundance of energy; d) deficiency of energy.

B. Topics for Class Reports

1. Review Cannon's work on the physiology of the emotions. What is his standpoint in regard to the place of the cerebral cortex in emotional expression. (Cf. bibliography.)
2. Review Crile's theory of the origin of the emotions. (Cf. bibliography.)
3. Report on Allport's theory of the differentiae of the emotions. (Cf. bibliography.)

4. Report on Kempf's theory of the place of the autonomic system in the development of personality. (Cf. bibliography.)
 5. Review Downey's study of will-temperament and the criticisms of it. (Cf. bibliography.)
- C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers
1. Present Status of Endocrinology in Reference to the Emotions.
 2. The Racial History of the Emotions and Feelings.
 3. Emotion and Feeling: The Bases of Social Behavior.

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CHAPTER IX

THE ACQUIRED NATURE OF MAN: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

In the past ten or fifteen years it has been somewhat customary among psychologists to separate rather sharply the factors of heredity from those of environment. Much work in educational psychology, especially that directed toward mental measurement, took this direction. At the present time the standpoint of careful scholars in the field of psychology does not so sharply divide the forces of heredity from those of environment. While we may grant the place of physical heredity, the study of the actual individual organisms shows that the forces of heredity and of environment become so intermingled, so interdependent, in fact, that the earlier distinctions do not hold at least in describing the adult. The inherited mechanisms of the individual do not grow up in a vacuum but are constantly under the limitations of the environmental pressures. So too, instinctive tendencies, as we have already mentioned in a brief manner, are modified in the direction of their development. Likewise the emotions may be greatly modified by training. The present chapter gives a series of papers on the fundamental features of man's acquired nature, built, as it must be, upon the foundations of heredity and learning.

The work of Child in the field of physiology has been of the greatest importance for social psychology. The opening paper is a summary of his contribution to the whole matter of the relation of heredity to environment and of his very novel concept of the gradient. He indicates that environment determines the direction of growth, the specialization of function, the graded differences in rate of living. All this is of importance in showing that the environment is no passive matter, but dynamically important in fashioning the organism. If this is applied to man, it gives additional proof to the important place which the conditioning of the individual to his group occupies in the making of his personality, of the tremendous place

which culture patterns play in stamping a set of attitudes, ideas and habits upon him.

The quotation from Miss Follett is offered as an additional caution on the need of studying the individual in his environmental setting. To segregate the person from his social *milieu* and to attempt to study his social behavior as if it existed in him aside from this social *Gestalt* or pattern is the notable error of academic psychology. Against this tendency we must be on our guard at all times. The short selection from a paper by the writer indicates briefly the principle of integration so important in describing the organism as a whole.

Peterson's paper on intelligence and learning indicates very well the dynamic nature of the learning process. The passivity of the older association psychology must give way to a view which recognizes the active driving force of innate trends in the organism. Until we realize the vital, living interplay of the individual and his environment, our description and interpretation of social behavior will be faulty and incomplete. The limitation of the mechanical principle applied to life phenomena is nowhere more apparent than just here. The analogy to solid bodies moving about under definite external forces has given us a false view of the more dynamic life process. The instability and sensitivity of living organisms are so pitched that the mere mechanics of falling bodies or of mere quantitative changes under heat, light, or pressure seen in physical objects is insufficient for the description of their behavior. For living forms we need additional concepts in treating the phenomena. And these concepts must take into account both the bodily changes which incite reaction and the fundamental fact of interaction between the organisms themselves.

II. MATERIALS

55. The Individual and Environment from a Physiological Standpoint ¹

The individual organism evidently represents some sort of integration of the processes of living protoplasm into an orderly and harmonious

¹ Reprinted by permission from C. M. Child "The Individual & Environment from a Physiological Viewpoint": in symposium *The Child, the Clinic, and the*

whole and this integration has a definite pattern for each species. The most conspicuous characteristics of the living individual are its orderly character and its physiological unity.

Every organism lives in an external world, an environment which acts upon it in various ways, and to this action the organism reacts with changes of one kind or another. These reactions constitute the behavior of the organism, though in daily life we commonly limit the term behavior to that group of reactions which are most conspicuous to us in other individuals, namely, the motor reactions. Strictly speaking, these constitute only a part of the behavior of an organism; many motor reactions do not involve mass movement and many which do involve such movement are not externally visible. Some features of the behavior of organisms, such, for example, as the passage of a nerve impulse along a nerve fiber, can be made evident to our senses only with the aid of special apparatus.

It is in the behavior of organisms, in their reactions to environment, that their unity and orderly character, the integration into a whole of their component parts and activities, is most conspicuous; and this is particularly the case in the higher animals and man. Since it is only through their behavior that organisms continue to live, it is obviously of fundamental importance for biology to inquire how they come to behave as they do, how the different parts and processes are integrated into a harmonious whole.

Proceeding then on the basis of what we do know, we still regard heredity and environment as the essential physico-chemical factors in making any organism what it is and we have now to inquire what present-day biology has to say concerning the parts played by these two factors. Recent investigations on the breeding of animals and plants and on the cell have brought to light certain facts and laws of inheritance and have shown us their significance in many cases. In consequence of these investigations the attention of biologists has turned within the last two decades to a considerable degree from the development of the individual to its heredity, or, as now very commonly, though I believe somewhat incorrectly, termed, its genetics. With this swing of the pendulum of biological investigation and attention there has naturally been great emphasis on the importance of heredity. In some of the recent writings environment is largely or wholly ignored. Morgan, for example, in his *Physical Basis of Heredity* seems to regard environment as without fundamental significance.

Court, pp. 126; 126-27; 127; 130-131; 131; 133-139; 139-144; 146-148; 151; 152-154. New York. The New Republic Company, 1925.

When we examine more closely the conclusions of many recent writers concerning the overwhelming importance of heredity, we find that they are thinking chiefly in terms of the species rather than of the individual. It is true that some biologists, in their enthusiastic urging of the importance of heredity for the species, have failed to make clear the distinction between the species and the individual as regards the significance of environment, and so appear to deny that environment has any essential significance. But when this distinction is clearly drawn they will undoubtedly admit, as does Conklin, that both environment and heredity are essential for the development of the individual.

Physiological relations between organism and environment. At this time we are primarily concerned with the individual as a living and reacting system, rather than with the species, which is an abstraction from the individuals of which it consists. As a matter of fact, a living organism is inconceivable except in relation to environment. It lives and moves and has its being in relation to an external world.

As regards the nature of the relations between individual and environment, it has, of course, long been known that organisms derive their energy from the external world and that interchange of substances between organism and environment is necessary for continued active life. But investigations of recent years have shown us that environment is an essential factor, not only for continued existence, but also for the development of the form and structure and the physiological relations of parts characteristic of the individual. A brief survey of some of the results of research in this field will serve to show how intimate and how fundamental this relation between organism and environment is.

Turning first to some of the very simple organisms, we find that they are essentially small masses of protoplasm bounded by a superficial layer or membrane, which is different in appearance and physical consistency from the interior. If, however, we cut through the mass and thus expose a portion of the internal protoplasm to the external world, it very soon acquires the characteristics of the external layer, in fact it becomes an external layer. Under certain other conditions a part of the external layer may pass into the interior, and when this happens it very soon becomes like the rest of the internal protoplasm. These simple experiments show that the hereditary potentialities of differentiation of external layer and interior exist in all parts of the protoplasm but that the realization of these potentialities in the actual differentiation occurs only as a reaction to environment, that is, the external layer arises only at the surface where the protoplasm is in contact with the water or other fluid in which

such organisms live. Heredity in such cases determines only the possibility of a surface layer and an interior, and reaction to environment determines the differentiation and also its persistence. In these simple forms, then, the general pattern of the organism results directly from the behavior of the protoplasm on a certain environment, though the constitution of the protoplasm, that is, its heredity, is concerned in determining the character of external and internal parts.

Most organisms are not as simple as this. In addition to differences between surface and interior they show differences in other directions in the body and these differences we commonly regard as expressions of physiological polarity and symmetry. Polarity is the arrangement of parts with reference to a longitudinal axis, that is, a line drawn through the body longitudinally. A plant with growing tip at the apex of the stem and root at the base, and an animal with head at one end and other organs in a definite order between the head and the posterior end, are said to possess polarity. The arrangements of parts in other directions about the polar axis constitute symmetry. Some organisms, such as the starfish, are radially symmetrical, others like man are more or less completely bilaterally symmetrical.

It is evident that polarity and symmetry represent in some way the basis of the general plan or pattern of the individual. Since the individuals of a species in nature are very similar in their general pattern it has commonly been assumed that polarity and symmetry are in some way determined in the constitution of the protoplasm and are therefore matters of heredity; and various more or less speculative theories concerning their nature have been advanced. Recent investigation leads us to believe, however, that environment plays an important part in originating even these fundamental features of the patterns of organisms.

Many lines of evidence have shown that in eggs and in early stages of development, before any visible differentiation of organs has taken place, polarity and symmetry are represented by graded quantitative differences which, without going into technical details, we may call differences in rate of living. One end of the polar axis, for example, is characterized by a higher rate of living and the rate decreases from this end to the other in a regular gradient. The growing apex of the plant and the head of the animal develop from the end which is living most rapidly, and other organs develop at other levels. The different conditions associated with the different rates of activity at different levels determine the different organs at these various levels. Similar relations apparently exist with respect to symmetry.

All the facts at hand indicate that these physiological gradients represent polarity and symmetry in their simplest terms. In other words, in all except the simplest organisms, in which differences exist only between surface and interior, these physiological gradients constitute the ground plan, the foundations of individual pattern. Development is a process of progressive complication of this relatively simple situation, but the whole process is orderly and a physiological consequence, on the one hand, of the presence and pattern of the gradients, and, on the other, of the hereditary constitution of the protoplasm in which the gradients occur. If this is true, the problem of the relation between the individual and environment appears in a new light. We must determine whether these gradients, and through them the pattern of the individual, can be altered by changes in environment. We must also determine what part environment plays in the origin of such gradients. Only when we have done these things shall we possess a basis for an adequate conception of the living individual and its relations to environment.

As a matter of fact, investigation has already progressed far enough along these lines to give us a great mass of interesting and highly significant data, from which we are able to draw conclusions which seem to possess a practical as well as a biological bearing. Without going into details of experiments or results, I shall attempt to show you something of what these investigations have already accomplished, and in what direction the facts point as regards our conception of the individual.

We may consider first the alteration of existing gradients and its effect on the structural and physiological pattern. We can alter the rate of living in protoplasm by means of many physical and chemical agents, for example, temperature, electricity, anæsthetics, poisons, etc. If gradients in rate of living really constitute polarity and symmetry, it ought to be possible to alter the whole pattern of the individual experimentally. Such alteration is possible to a high degree in many of the simpler organisms throughout life, and in the earlier stages of development of even the higher animals. For example, it is possible by means of many different agents which inhibit physiological activity to decrease the rate of living of the more active relatively to the less active regions and so to produce individuals with small and imperfectly developed heads and brains: one eye in the median line instead of one on each side; or, with more extreme action, forms without any eyes, and even without heads. Extensive differences in position and development of other organs along the axes are associated with these changes. On the other hand, we can increase the relative rate of living of the more active regions and so produce indi-

viduals with large heads and brains and, in some cases, with extra eyes and with changes in position and proportion of other organs opposite in direction to those which result from inhibition. We can make bilateral animals radial and vice versa, and we can even obliterate polarity and symmetry completely, so that instead of developing into a complex individual the organism remains spherical and the only differences are those between surface and interior. In short, by altering the physical or chemical environment of the developing individual in certain ways we can produce forms which would be regarded as belonging to very different species from the normal individuals if we did not know their origin. Moreover, these experimental results are not at random and occasional, but we can predict and control to a large extent the character of the result in a particular case.

At present there is no evidence that any of these modifications are inherited in the slightest degree; and if, as all the evidence indicates, they result merely from changes in rate rather than in character or specific combination of the process of living, we should not expect them to be hereditary.

But we can go even further in experimental control of individual pattern. It is possible, through the action of various experimental conditions, to determine differences in rate of living in different regions of a mass or protoplasm or of cells. In many of the simpler organisms we can determine new physiological gradients and so new physiological axes in this way. In fact, with the proper experimental conditions the new axes obliterate the old. In the eggs or spores of some plants, for example, polarity may be determined by differential action of light—that side of the cell toward the light becoming the apical growing region of the plant. Among the simpler animals in which isolated pieces of the body develop into new individuals, we find that the environmental differences between the free surface and the surface in contact as the piece lies on the bottom of a dish, are often sufficient to determine a new polarity. In such cases the active end of the gradient is the upper free surface, probably because the cells of that region can more readily obtain oxygen and get rid of waste products. Again, the presence of a cut surface with its increased physiological activity is often sufficient to determine the active end of a new gradient, and so the position of a new head. It has also been shown for certain forms, both plants and animals, that the passage of an electric current of a certain strength through a cell or cell-mass for a certain length of time will determine a physiological gradient and so a polarity.

It is, then, possible through the quantitatively differential action of environmental factors on different regions not only to modify existing gradients and so to alter the patterns of individuals, but to determine new gradients and, through these, individual patterns in new directions.

But physiological gradients may also be inherited. When we cut a flatworm into pieces, each piece represents a fraction of the original polar gradient, and when the piece undergoes reconstitution into a new individual, that end of the piece nearest the head of the original animal, and therefore representing the most active region of the piece, gives rise to the new head. In such cases the fraction of the original gradient becomes the basis of the polarity of the new individual, that is, this individual inherits its polarity. In many cases of division among the simpler organisms a similar inheritance of the gradients and so of polarity and symmetry occurs. It is entirely possible that such inheritance of polarity and symmetry may occur in the germ cells of certain species. Such inheritance is not "inheritance of acquired characters," in the Lamarckian sense, but simply the persistence, predominantly or wholly, in the cytoplasm of cells of a quantitative differential in physiological activity. But whether polarity and symmetry arise anew in each generation, as in some organisms, or are inherited, as in some forms of reproduction in certain organisms, they can be modified experimentally and in nature must be subjected to varying environmental conditions during the life of the individual. The difficulty of accounting for the high frequency of the normal in nature still remains.

The normal individual pattern represents only a small fraction of the hereditary potentialities of any protoplasm. All abnormal forms represent the realization of hereditary potentialities just as truly as does the normal. How, then, shall we account for the similarity and the high frequency in nature of what we call the normal? In the past the biologist has often regarded the normal pattern as resulting from the free and unobstructed working of heredity, the abnormal as representing a modification of heredity by environment. From the physiological view-point, however, two factors appear to be concerned in the normal and abnormal individual alike. One of these factors is the hereditary constitution of the protoplasm in which the gradient is determined. Whatever the nature of the environmental action which originates the gradient, the protoplasmic constitution will determine its final form: its height, length, steepness, etc. In other words, polarity and symmetry and individual pattern result not simply from differential action of environment on protoplasm, but from the reaction of the protoplasm to the external differential. The character of this reaction must depend on the constitution of

the protoplasm. In short, the uniformity of protoplasmic constitution in each species counterbalances in some degree the variations of environment.

The second factor is what we may call the standardization of developmental environment for each species. In each species the environment of the germ cells in the parent body is in its larger features similar for different germ cells and in different individuals. Fertilization, egg-laying and embryonic development also take place under more or less standard conditions for each species. In later life the individual may be subjected to highly variable environmental conditions but, except in the simpler forms, these have little effect in altering the more general species characteristics of its pattern, though they may have very great effect in altering the more minute details.

We find, in general, a progressive standardization of developmental environment in the course of evolution: that is, the conditions under which development occurs are progressively more exactly determined, for example, by reactions to environment of the parent in depositing the eggs; by parental care of the eggs or embryos; by egg shells; development of food within the egg; and, finally, in the mammals and man, by embryonic development within the parent body.

These two factors, the hereditary constitution of the protoplasm and the standardization of developmental environment, enable us to account for the high degree of uniformity of the individuals of a species in nature and at the same time to understand how individual pattern can be so readily and so extensively altered experimentally. The physiological gradient is a reaction to environment and at the same time the physiological basis of individual pattern. In other words, individual pattern as regards form and structure as well as function, represents in each case the behavior of a particular kind of protoplasm in reaction to certain external conditions. Heredity represents the possibilities of behavior and each individual organism represents the realization of some of these possibilities.

Physiological dominance and subordination. We are accustomed to say that all living protoplasm is irritable or excitable. This means that its rate of living can be accelerated temporarily by the action upon it of external energies. The most generalized and primitive form of such an excitation process in protoplasm is a gradient, that is, the excitation spreads or is transmitted by means of complex electro-chemical changes from the region primarily excited. With increasing distance from the point of primary excitation the degree of the transmitted change decreases; and at a certain distance, which varies according to the proto-

plasm, the strength of the primary excitation and various other factors, the excitation process dies out. In other words, the process undergoes a decrement in the course of transmission and a gradient in physiological activity is the result. Decrements appear in various forms of transmission of energy in physical media, for example, in the transmission of waves in water and air, in transmission of electric current, etc., and the decrement in protoplasmic transmission is apparently not fundamentally different from these, though the process concerned is more complex.

A gradient of transmitted excitation in protoplasm may be evanescent, but if it persists long enough to determine persistent differences in the protoplasmic conditions at its different levels, that is, long enough to be "remembered," it may become a physiological axis. The foundations of the physiological axis and of the gradient in transmission of excitation in protoplasm are then the same. Polarity and symmetry originate in such gradients of the transmission of excitation, and these gradients are determined by the differential action of external conditions on different regions of the protoplasm.

Whenever a protoplasmic region is excited, such a gradient arises for the time being and it is evident that the most active region of this gradient exercises a certain degree of dominance or control over other regions to which the excitation is transmitted, just as the sending end of a telegraph line controls for the time being the receiving end, or as the region where a wave starts controls the regions of the air or water to which the wave is transmitted. In the organism such dominance and subordination of parts is the basis, the starting point, of the physiological integration of the parts into a harmonious whole. We can follow this integration from the simple gradient through the various complications of development to its most complex manifestations in the physiological relations within the nervous systems of the higher animals and man. The simple gradient is the basis on which the nervous system originates and develops. The protoplasmic gradient is the most generalized form of reflex arc. From the dominance of the most active end of the gradient to the dominance of the brain in the higher animals and man there is physiological continuity; the one develops out of the other. The brain develops from the dominant region of the gradient; the region with the highest rate of living and nervous dominance develops out of the primitive protoplasmic dominance.

In the simpler organisms and in early stages of many if not all higher forms, dominance is more or less autocratic in character; that is, the head region controls other parts, but is largely independent of

them. As evolution progresses, however, this autocratic character of dominance becomes less marked, until in the higher animals and man the organism approaches a democracy with representative government and the cerebral cortex functions as a deliberative and judicial body, acting as the final arbiter on all messages from other parts of the body which are important enough to reach it.

Intraindividual environment and physiological integration. Environment within the organism is no less important for the cells or other parts of the individual than is the external world for the individual as a whole. The physiological gradient and the dominance of more active over less active regions represent the first step in the establishment of a standard intraindividual environment. As soon as such a gradient is established, the relations to each other of different regions along its course become more or less definite. These physiological relations represent, as I have pointed out, the beginning of physiological integration and of the conditions which determine the course of differentiation of different parts. If this is true, reaction to the environment within the individual is an essential factor in the development of each part. As a matter of fact, experiment shows that this is the case in many of the simpler organisms throughout life and in the earlier stages of development of many of the higher forms. In some cases, however, the parts, or certain of them, appear to be largely independent of each other during development, or certain stages of it. As regards these forms, the experimental evidence, though not yet complete, indicates that the parts which appear to be independent of their relations with other parts were determined by such relations in earlier stages, perhaps in some cases even in the egg before development began. But even though the course of differentiation of parts may be determined very early in some cases, later in others, and in still others may be directly dependent on intraindividual environment throughout the life of the individual, there is every reason to believe that primarily the position of a cell or a protoplasmic region is an important factor in determining what it shall become. Its position determines its intraindividual environment and its reaction to this environment plays a part in determining its differentiation.

In many of the simpler animals the body may be separated by cutting into various pieces and these pieces reconstitute new individuals in the course of a few days. Ordinarily in such cases the head arises from that end of the piece nearest the head of the original animal and the other parts develop in order. By altering the levels at which the cuts are made

we can show that any level of the body back of the head can be made to develop into any part of the new individual which arises from the isolated piece. If we cut the piece in such a way that a particular body-level is at its anterior end, the cells of that level develop into a new head; if that same body-level is at the posterior end of a piece it develops into a posterior end; if it is in the middle of the piece it develops into the middle region of the body, and so on. On further analysis of the situation we find that the head develops from that region of the piece which is most active physiologically and therefore most independent of other parts; and that what other regions and cells become is determined by their positions with respect to that most active region, that is, their position in the gradient. In other words, the most active region, because of its activity, becomes the leader, the organizer, the integrator, and is an essential factor in determining what other regions shall become. In such organisms every level of the body is capable of developing into a head, but in any particular case the most active region gives rise to a head first, and less active regions to other parts. In order that any region of the body may give rise to a head, it must become sufficiently active to be largely or wholly independent of other parts.

These illustrations suffice to give a hint of the part which intraindividual environment plays in determining the behavior of different regions or cells. A physiological gradient represents the first step in making the intraindividual environment different for the different regions or cells, and the dominance and subordination associated with such a gradient constitute the first step in physiological integration. We may say, then, that physiological integration of the organism into a harmonious whole begins with the determination of the intraindividual environment of different regions or cells by the physiological gradient or gradients, and the reaction of the regions or cells to this environment. Of course, as development proceeds and the various organs become more widely different, the environment of each becomes more and more complex and specific, various sorts of chemical correlation become possible, as I have previously described, and these in turn lead to further complication.

I have already tried to show that the individual as a whole originates in the reaction of a particular kind of protoplasm to an external world. We may now go a step further and say that this reaction determines differences in intraindividual environment and that these differences are concerned in the differentiation of the parts. In short, the physiological gradient constitutes the first step in integration of behavior and the foundation of the integrated behavior of later stages of development.

Any particular individual represents only a small fraction of the hereditary possibilities of his protoplasm. All the modifications which we can produce experimentally, whether subnormal or supernormal, represent hereditary possibilities just as truly as does the normal organism. As we have seen, the whole structural and functional pattern of the individual may be altered and controlled by environmental factors—in other words, by the education it receives during early development. Its general reactions during these early stages constitute the physiological foundation of all its later behavior.

But even though the general anatomical and physiological characteristics of the human organism are, to a large extent, fixed before birth, the development of individual character and personality is only beginning at this time. This development is closely associated with the minuter development of the central nervous system, particularly the cerebral cortex, which takes place after birth. Students of human psychology and education have learned something of the possibilities of environment in the development of character and personality. But, within recent years some biologists have maintained that heredity is the important factor even in this field, and that environment has only a secondary significance. Such conclusions result in part from failure to make clearly the distinction between the species and the individual, as was noted above, and perhaps also in part from failure to recognize the significance of physiological experiment. No one who is concerned with physiological experimentation, particularly on the simpler organisms and the earlier stages of development, can doubt the fundamental importance of environment and education for the individual. If the results of such experimentation mean anything, we have the best of reasons for believing that, within the limits of the hereditary potentialities of the individual, environment and its educational effects are potent factors in determining human character and personality. The fact that it appears at present to be difficult to alter the hereditary potentialities through the action of environment does not justify us in ignoring, or in minimizing, the importance of environment for the individual.

At present we know but little more concerning the range of hereditary potentialities in any human individual than we did concerning the hereditary potentialities of the lower organisms before the days of experimental biology; but it is certain that no individual represents more than a small part of the potentialities of his protoplasm, even as regards general anatomical and physiological characteristics, and environment is an essential factor in determining what part he does represent. We are only on the threshold of knowledge concerning human personality,

but what little we do know suggests that we shall find environment no less important in that field than it is among the lower animals; and in human environment the social factor is of course by far the most significant. We have seen that the physiological actions of other parts upon the individual cell or cell-group in the organism are factors of great importance in determining what rôle it shall play. Certainly social environment is no less important for the human being. In the organism, position may determine that of two cells, alike at the beginning of development, one shall live at a high rate, another at a low rate, and that in consequence the two shall play very different parts in the individual. The social parallel requires no illustration, for it is obvious that the education of the individual through his social environment is an essential factor in determining the part which he shall play in society.

It must be borne in mind, however, that the complexity and range of human relations to environment are far greater than in the simpler organisms. For the behavior of the simplest organisms the immediate environment at any given moment is of chief importance; for them there is little past and no future. In forms with polarity and symmetry, the physiological gradients represent a memory of past reactions. Among such organisms, then, both past and present play a part in determining behavior. Human beings, however, as well as some of the higher mammals to some degree, are able to foresee or imagine future actions of themselves or others and their consequences, or possible consequences. For them the future, as well as the past and the present, is a real factor in determining their behavior. Behavior with reference to the future we call intelligent or purposive behavior. Whether this ability of man to react with reference to a possible future is the basis of what we call human responsibility or freedom, or whether something more is involved in this freedom, is a question which need not concern us here.

56. The Need of Studying the Individual in the Total Situation ¹

Any individual psychology which has not recognized the unifying nature of experience, any social psychology which has failed to see this, has dealt not with life but with abstractions from life. As we have

¹ Reprinted by permission from M. P. Follett, *Creative Experience*, pp. 114-116 New York. Longmans Green & Company, 1924.

found that a sensation never exists in experience but is a psychological abstraction, that a "trait" of personality is also a psychological abstraction, so many times our studies reveal to us that the meaning of a social situation is to be found not in its elements viewed separately but only in the total situation, or to use the still more suggestive word of the *Gestalt* school, a *Gesammtsituation*. Our perceptual experience, our personal experience, our social experience, is a complex structure, a unity. But it must be remembered that the *Gesammtsituation* cannot be comprehended by thinking of it as a matter of mere interaction. Integration is more than "mere co-ordination," as was pointed out by Watt when he spoke of the tendency to emphasize the process of co-ordination of sensations with one another and to ignore what he calls integration. For some years we have been approaching this point of view. It has often enough been questioned whether there is such a thing as "pure sensation" in experience.

Of recent years the doctrine of functional units has had many adherents. J. S. Haldane points out that the metabolic activity within the organism is a "whole" activity. "Such processes as secretion, absorption, growth, nervous excitation, muscular contraction, were treated formerly as if each was an isolable physical or chemical process, instead of being what it is, one side of a many-sided metabolic activity of which the different sides are indissolubly associated." A number of biologists have dealt with a whole organism and another whole the constitutive elements of which are organism and environment. But perhaps the most suggestive treatment of wholes, in the fields we are looking at, has come from those who have been working at the integrative action of the nervous system. Sherrington as early as 1906 gave us his view of mental life as the progressive creation of new and higher functions through integrative processes. Holt in 1915 insisted on the difference between organic and mechanical response and made *organization* the central point of his psychology. He used the term integration clarifyingly and suggestively, and indicated its implications. Watson in 1919 said explicitly, "The behaviorist is interested in integrations and total activities of the individual." The whole behaviorist school tends more and more to see the organism not as a mere *collection* of reflexes or instincts or habits. Psychobiologists are dealing with "whole personalities." When Kempf, in a book which I have found very helpful, describes "the dynamic nature of the personality," he tells us of an integrative unity, of a functional whole. If dissection has been the method of traditional psychology, the study of integrative processes

is surely the chief characteristic of contemporary psychology. Ogden has written recently of what he expressly calls "the psychology of integration."

57. The Integration Principle¹

The older anatomy and physiology dealt with the structure and function of the separate organs of the plant or animal. It is only recently that biologists turned their attention to the study of the organism as a whole. Under the lead of such men as Jennings, Ritter, Herrick, and others, who found that many phases of animal life could not be stated in terms of bio-chemistry and physics alone, a large number of studies have been made upon the animal as a behaving organism, as a complex whole. Men were forced to recognize, in short, that the mere investigation of the action of parts of the organism left them with an inadequate picture of how the entire animal got on in reference to the specific nature of its environment. All that this meant, of course, was that in the life activities of animals the complete mechanism is bound up together in the process of survival. The separate units, muscle groups, glands, etc., seem to coalesce in the behavior toward some stimulus outside the organism. The study of comparative neurology and comparative behavior showed that the principle called *integration* ran throughout the entire organic world, but especially in the higher forms of animals.

When an animal, bisymmetrical in form, is studied, it is found that sets of antagonistic muscles operate on either side of the body to bring about movement. These may react either alone or in synchronization with those of the opposite side. It is found further that these muscles are under the control of a central nervous system which, no matter how elementary, controls the behavior of this animal in reference to stimuli, so that it may respond as a whole, harmoniously. For example, a two-eyed free-swimming organism is stimulated by a light which strikes both eyes with equal intensity. The nerves conduct an impulse to the muscles in such a fashion that they co-ordinate to cause the animal to move in a straight line. If the light be stronger on one side than the other, it may move in a circle toward or away from the light, depending upon whether it is positively or negatively heliotropic, that is, attracted toward or away from a light stimulus. In this second case one set of muscles is operating almost entirely alone and the other antagonistic muscles are for the time being shunted out of action,—may be said to

¹ Reprinted by permission from K. Young "The Integration of the Personality" *Ped. Sem.* 1923: XXX: pp. 265-67.

be inhibited. Thus integration, the working together of the parts in a whole, is seen on the level of simple co-ordination. Likewise, even here, *inhibition*, the checking or blocking of one set of muscles, is also possible when the occasion demands. To use the phraseology of an older psychology, in the first instance the two groups of muscles might be said to be *associated* in action together; in the second, one group of muscles may be thought of as *dissociated* in action from the whole functioning.

What is true at the simpler stages of biological life exists on a higher plane with more complex animals. Sherrington, working with mammals, principally dogs, has shown the tremendous importance of the integrative action of the nervous system in the control of the organism. The skill in walking, in food-getting, etc., the alternating balance of nervous impulses in the same, the chain stimuli-response relationship involved in such activities as eating, swallowing, and digesting, all illustrate the neat balance of the organism in biological survival. Nevertheless, even in the animals, *inhibition* plays a tremendous place. The development of the cerebral cortex, which we know is so important in the development of the higher mental powers, is concerned in part, if not in whole, with blocking the reflex activities of the lower brain centers, allowing the nervous impulses to co-operate together to bring about more complicated behavior. In the case of man it is illustrated in the field of skill. At first, the progress in running a maze, tossing balls, playing games is slow and deliberate. There is cramping of the muscles, there is loss of a play because attention is focused too long on one process alone, letting other simultaneous processes, e. g., muscle activities, lapse. Finally, often to our surprise, we find that we are able to make the entire movement, being, however, only aware of it afterwards. Somehow, suddenly the antagonistic muscles, say, of the arm and hands and fingers, operated together in correct alternation so that you made a clean-cut stroke down the alley of the maze, a thing one frequently sees in the psychological laboratory, or one finds that the hand-eye co-ordination one has so long sought in handball seems, of itself, to spring, like Minerva, full-fledged into existence. We know, of course, from careful studies of learning, that a long, preliminary process of weaving the separate elements of the muscular movements under the guiding control of the eye has preceded this perfection. Thus, too, we find that after a period of rest from practice we return to the game or act of skill and surprise ourselves at our decided improvement. James meant just this progress in integration, of knitting into finally balanced wholes the units of behavior, when he remarked that "we learn to skate in summer and to swim in winter."

We recognize, therefore, at the biological levels, tendencies for the

organism to be completely oriented to whatever it is doing, as the animal in feeding seems to be absorbed in the task before him. We also find, however, that separate elements in the organism, muscle groups and sense organs, may be involved while the other sets or senses are shunted out. We find, even, that the use of one set of muscles may inhibit another—one cannot at the same time run and play possum in hiding, one cannot at the same time chew and swallow. But the important thing to recall is that, although these separate trends may operate alone, or at separate times, so far as the entire organism is concerned, its principal survival possibility is its capacity to attend *in toto* to the situation and, using all its powers, get food, escape danger, catch its prey, seek its mate, fight for its own or its mate's existence, or perform whatever other act the moment demands and its powers make possible.

58. Intelligence and Learning¹

It is undoubtedly true that degree of intelligence is somewhat closely related both to the rate and to the limit of learning, especially when higher forms of learning are concerned. Learning is adaptation to external conditions, and intelligence is certainly to be judged in considerable measure by the nature of such adaptation. But a wholesale identification of learning ability with intelligence is confusing, to say the least. In the first place, ability to learn in one line of performance or on one kind of problem usually does not mean correspondingly high ability in others.

Too frequently learning has been regarded as a sort of passive adaptation to environmental conditions, or an adaptation to *immediate* circumstances. This view is at any rate often implied, if not explicitly asserted, and the learning in such cases is supposed to be determined by the frequency and the recency of the stimuli that the individual has encountered. Learning on such a view is wholly contingent upon the order (and perhaps the intensity) of the stimuli that happen to impinge on the individual. This is the passive deterministic view that seems to be forced upon many psychologists today, even though there is beginning to be more emphasis placed on the instincts. However, this more dynamic view of instincts as movers to behavior is meeting some difficulty in the attempted amalgamation of it with the passive association view. While the instincts may serve as drives, the frequency-recency doctrine will still fix their *drive-ways* along channels that are determined wholly by the mere contingencies of the immediate environment.

¹ Reprinted by permission from J. Peterson "Intelligence and Learning" *Psy. Rev.* 1922: XXIX: pp. 375-76; 378-82; 384-89.

Wherein lies the weakness of this passive association view, which certainly belies our common observations and introspections? It seems to lie chiefly in the rather common assumption that because the nerve impulse has great speed and flashes through the body in a small fraction of a second, the excitation of any one stimulus therefore dies out quickly and the individual comes under the spell of the next succeeding stimulus. Of course the usual view is not so boldly stated as this. The fact probably is that we are never under the influence of a single stimulus, but are always directly reacting to several stimuli, some simultaneously impinging upon our sensory end organs and others occurring successively. Somehow the effect of successive stimuli overlap so that we may react to several things at once; that is to say, we react to situations and not to mere successive individual stimuli. The fact here stated is undeniable, and is illustrated in a very simple form in temporal rhythm in which the separate impulses come so rapidly in succession that our muscular movements cannot easily respond to each separately, so we react with foot, head, or hand, to groups of two, three, or more impulses, as the case may be. More complex cases also occur, as is illustrated in responses to some problem wherein the meaning or the end is perceived; but such cases have not been sufficiently studied scientifically. How such behavior is possible neurally is one of the big present-day problems of our science and of functional neurology; but that it is possible is evident in almost any moment of our behavior, either introspectively or from the standpoint of external observation. The reason that the problem has come upon us so forcibly only today is that we have been using such terms as perception of meaning, perception of end, perception of relations, will, attention, judgment, and others, as explanatory. This subjective conception of different faculties which carry with them the implications of arbitrary forces, has blinded us to the real problem. The passive associationism satisfied us only because its inadequacies were covered up by these faculties. Examine most of our modern texts and reports of investigations, and see if we are free in our thinking from the use of arbitrary faculties! A departure from the use of these arbitrary faculties by some writers has left them with only the passive frequency-recency conception of learning.

The inadequacy of this passive view of learning, based on an oversimplified neurology of behavior, is so patent as to be observed even by the layman; so while the more scientific psychologist has either admitted frankly our present ignorance regarding the more complex aspects of behavior or has supplied the deficiency of neurological knowledge by the free use of such terms as perception of results, consciousness

of relations, voluntary direction of acts, etc., the less scientific person, the tender-minded, to use a term employed by Dunlap, has freely drawn on animistic principles, and on "the subconscious," usually capitalized and used in the sense of a conscious unity with arbitrary powers, outside the reach of our conscious life. Anything that cannot be explained as due to the normal processes of our waking life is referred to the subconscious.

All such "explanations" have, of course, only dodged the issue; but how can we as psychologists blame the non-scientific person for this when we ourselves have been ascribing the same kind of powers to consciousness, whenever our neural account has come short? I have in my possession a quarterly publication by one of our own Southern state universities, a commencement address by an honored citizen (but not a psychologist) which extols, apparently with the approval of this institution, the wonders of the "subjective mind." A few sentences will give the point of view: "It is in the silence that we conceive and visualize that which later takes form and is manifested in the external world. This is true of every great work which man has accomplished along any line. The processes go on in the subjective mind which never sleeps but is always busily engaged. A problem arises in the objective mind and demands a solution. It is relegated to the subjective mind which is capable of solving any problem which is properly presented to it. We are not conscious of it, but the work is constantly going on until finally the solution presents itself to the conscious mind." What an opportunity we are missing, my fellow psychologists, by not letting this hidden, sleepless genius solve our problems, too! Note how our pseudo-scientific brethren, the Freudians, by invoking the aid of this wonderful *subconscious mind* and its more sleepy and less capable antagonist, the "censor," have succeeded even beyond their original expectations, with our own psychological problems as well as with medicine, philosophy, mythology, art, morality, and other fields! The writers representing this dogma, accepting it uncritically on the all-or-none principle, have succeeded in finding in nearly all lines of human endeavor, illustrations suitable and convincing to themselves of the workings of the subconscious. Of course a collection of such substitutions of terms for causal relations and of such uncritically selected illustrations interpreted to suit the theory, is not science at all.

While psychology cannot hope to satisfy the popular mind which can give no serious attention to its foundations and which expects simple answers to its problems, in its own familiar terms, there can be little doubt that real deficiencies in the science are in part responsible for the

pseudo-science illustrated above. James felt the deficiency keenly and wrestled continuously with the edicts of a too-passive determinism which the associationism of his time forced upon him. He was driven, because of his keen introspective powers, to hold (though not consistently) to a "scientific psychology" in the text of his *Principles* and to a contradictory sort of ethics in his footnotes. Surely when we shall know more of the facts about the causal connection of stimuli of all kinds and their resulting responses in various complex forms we shall not need to hold that ethics demands any other basis in human behavior than that of facts. The right must somehow be the consistent, the greatest moral economy, to use an apt term of Perry's, or else *why* is it the right and *whence* come its sanctions?

Too frequently behavior is regarded as merely of the reflex type: a stimulus is received from external objects and a response results; another stimulus, and another response; and so on. How do the impulses become integrated into a unitary plan of action? While it may be true that all integrations may some day be understood on the basis of merely the greater frequency of the propagation of nerve impulses along certain tracts than along others, such an interpretation is far from promising today. It is discounted by many familiar facts of behavior in the form of facilitation and inhibition of one group of impulses by other groups, usually explained, if at all, on the assumption of some sort of drainage. The integration of neural impulses making for unitary action of some sort in the central nervous system, as reflected in certain phenomena of attention and voluntary choice, will furnish problems for neuro-physiologists for some time.

It appears that our conception of learning needs modification, particularly as to the alleged dependence of the process on frequency-recency factors. Elimination of random acts not favoring the dominant determining tendency seems to be brought about somehow by interference through conflict of different interacting processes. Determining tendencies and purposes are themselves but general directions in behavior effected by the larger consistency of the environment and by the inner metabolic processes. The more consistent acts survive in the form of ideals, principles, vocational activities, etc., and the less consistent ones are eliminated, not because the former are stimulated more frequently and the latter less frequently, but because of a greater degree of mutual facilitation by the several part processes in the one case and of inhibition in the other. Many stimuli, both external and internal, affect the organism simultaneously, and since, particularly in the higher organisms, there are various interrelated organs so arranged that each stimulates others,

it is obvious that any important effects may be reflected from organ to organ, each being an external stimulus in fact to the other. Often the stimulus of one organ or part process by another is not direct (mechanical), but one organ may set up an internal metabolic change the effect of which becomes a stimulus to another. Skeletal muscles, in responding to any stimulus, also excite sensory impulses (proprioceptive) which tend to arouse further responses. Thus effects of stimulation by any external object are held over in the organism for a time to blend with other later stimuli, and the result is that the organism reacts to situations involving many objects, and the part processes by mutual inhibition and facilitation gradually take directions giving them on the whole the completest expression. This account agrees very well with introspective evidence. At any one time in a complex situation we not only see many things to which to adjust ourselves, but we clearly recall various circumstances in the immediate past with which our reactions must also square.

In complex, conscious organisms like ourselves these part processes if strongly organized in certain directions may be felt as original forces compelling us to act in certain ways, or to inhibit certain desires or other tendencies. What we call will is evidently the result of such organizations, as are also certain automatisms which may seem to prevail over the will at certain times, with the feeling that other personalities are controlling our own acts. Double personalities are thus to be understood. Learning thus considered is getting control over immediate conditions for larger and more far-reaching orientation, and is not merely adaptations to the contingencies of immediate stimuli.

Such a view presents the old question of freedom in a light that is suggestive and of practical value, as well as one that is consistent with science. Freedom becomes relative independence of immediate circumstances and ability to control them in the light of larger possibilities; it is neither dependent upon any mystical arbitrary force of will nor non-predictable, but is conditioned by degree of intelligence, by nutritional changes, and by training. This view, moreover, agrees with introspections as to our power to overrule immediate circumstances. We overrule them because they are inconsistent with the larger conditions that have shaped our behavior trends, both those that are innate and those that are acquired. Bodily stored energy becomes liberated in such a fashion as to inhibit incongruous activities and to bring about the completest expression of the inner determining drives, whether these are called purposes, instincts, wishes, or what not. In the words of Holt, the importance of the immediate stimulus recedes with the higher forms of behavior. Wrong conduct, he says, "is wrong simply because it is

behavior that does not take into account consequences; it is not adjusted to *enough* of the environment; it will be made right by an enlargement of its scope and reach." It is along this line that we must solve the problems of freedom and will in so far as they belong to psychology.

Certain currents of our American psychology have been too much dominated by the passive associationism which conceived the individual in infancy as a purely receptive being actuated wholly from without, a sort of *tabula rasa*; and much of the pseudo-psychology of the "sub-conscious" is a revolt of man's unsophisticated nature against the outcome of such a view. There is no good reason in fact why scientific psychology should not emphasize the inner urge of the metabolic changes as important factors in instincts, and give association processes a lesser rôle in selection and reconstruction processes of our mental adjustments. Wundt, representing a continental European tendency, distinguished between "passive combination" of mental processes, calling these association, and the more active type of combination, which he termed apperception. But this latter term does not explain anything so far as the selection in learning is concerned; neither does Stout's "cumulative disposition" stated in terms of meaning, nor the co-conscious of Prince, whether or not it be a reality. These conceptions all seem to be built on the view that consciousness is a causal agency, a sort of original force. McDougall's animism, though it seems to have been motivated by a real short-coming of our associationism in psychology, is subject to the same criticism.

Intelligence and learning are obviously closely related. In their higher aspects both involve the capacity to take in a large situation, and by response to remote conditions to delay action and inhibit motor tendencies aroused by immediate stimuli until they have been co-ordinated with the larger circumstances. It is thus comprehensible that an individual learns by erroneous responses and that errors may be rather quickly eliminated, incontrovertible facts which are enigmas to the frequency-recency view of learning. Learning processes, of course, differ materially among themselves and there are gradations in learning, ranging from the simplest contiguous associations, illustrated by mere passive adaptation to immediate conditions, to the more explicitly rational readjustment to situations involving ideational elements. In the latter case the organism must resist impulses to immediate response as these are checked by the more remote circumstances, and it therefore becomes subject to strains and stresses characteristic of deliberation. Many of these various learning processes have little relation to one another. If we speak of these modification possibilities as a general learning capac-

ity, we can mean nothing definite at all. While in general there are close relationships among the higher forms of learning, the several capacities may occasionally vary greatly among different individuals, as when we find a college woman almost incapable of learning ball tossing, or seriously deficient in acquiring mathematical skill.

Intelligence refers more particularly to one's ability to be affected by a wide range of circumstances and to delay reaction to them while the significant elements are selected out and weighed with respect to their bearing on the attainment of any particular end. It is more closely related to the sort of adjustment found in the higher forms of ideational learning. That person is most intelligent who, with a given amount of experience and maturity, is most apt to perceive significant relations and to react discriminatively to them as distinct from the numerous irrelevant elements in the situations met. He is said to be far-sighted, sagacious, and so on, because he refrains from making immediate responses which entangle him in conflicts later on. Intelligence is not synonymous with mere quickness of learning; it implies in addition the constancy of purpose, the discriminative ability, and the persistency that keeps the desired end in view while means are varied till appropriate control of the circumstances are obtained. The readiness with which a given series of syllables may be fixed in mind is not necessarily a safe criterion of intelligence, for the latter term seems to refer more directly to one's inherited mechanism for *selective* responses of the sort mentioned above.

We need more studies comparing different persons of various learning rates in given performances as to their perseverance against obstacles under a uniform degree of encouragement, so that we may know more of the limits of learning. We may yet find that on a scale of increasing difficulty, fast learners toward more easily obtainable ends are not regularly able to go as far toward the mastery of complex and difficult problems as some slow learners. The relations of the rate of learning to limits of ability to learn are yet not well known, because our so-called physiological limits have usually been only the maximum speed obtainable, or the point where gross errors easily measurable cease to occur, limits that leave us ignorant on many points of importance. Because of obvious practical difficulties involved in the getting of subjects for suitable experiments, we are still in great ignorance regarding limits of attainment in nearly all forms of learning. The information we have is based on so few cases as to leave any general conclusions as yet insecure.

Why this selective mechanism that we have called intelligence is conscious in its operations we do not know. Science cannot look upon con-

sciousness as an original force, interesting in itself and puzzling as it may be as an aspect of the processes of behavior. The problem of freedom, scientifically conceived, seems not to be a problem regarding any sort of spontaneous force, but rather one of how, by constantly enlarging integrations, the individual gets more and more relative independence of the influence of immediate stimuli and of the order in which they chance to come, and thereby becomes better oriented to the larger circumstances and the possibilities of further behavior which they offer.

(Consult section 36)

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What is meant by the terms: "polarity"; "symmetry"; "physiological gradient." (Consult Child's *Physiological Foundations of Behavior* cited in bibliography for more detail than is given above.)
2. Why is it essential to study the individual in his social setting?
3. Why are experiments upon human beings and animals in the laboratory often said to be "unnatural"?
4. Why must we take the principle of integration into account in describing behavior?
5. Distinguish between instinct, habit and intelligence.
6. How does Peterson's dynamic view of the learning process link up with Child's standpoint of the relation of the organism to the environment?

B. Topics for Class Reports

1. Review Thurstone's criticisms of the stimulus-response psychology. (Cf. bibliography.)
2. Report Sherrington's paper on animal mechanism, especially to bring out the principle of integration. (Cf. bibliography.)
3. Review Miss Follett's book cited in the bibliography.

C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers

1. The Contribution of *Gestalt* Psychology to Social Psychology.
2. The Principle of Integration in Social Psychology.

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CHAPTER X

SOME MECHANISMS OF HABIT FORMATION

I. INTRODUCTION

This chapter treats of the formation of habits in some detail. The opening paper by Burnham presents the fundamental concepts of conditioned response and inhibition. As we shall see in subsequent materials, much that has been called imitation, sympathy, and compensation depends upon this mechanism.

Watson shows how conditioned responses become integrated into the larger units of habits. The building of the conditioned response unit takes place, as Pavlov has shown, through the mediation of the cerebral cortex, and all sound psychology of behavior must recognize this fact. One difficulty with the so-called stimulus-response psychology is its frequent failure to recognize the dynamic, active part which the cortical centers play in the formation of the hierarchies of habits.

Hunter's paper discusses the modifications in behavior which take place in the field of instinctive patterns. He shows very clearly the place of social conditioning or substitution in response. In fact, sublimation is but a type of conditioning which has ethical approval. It is not some supernatural process, but rests upon the basic facts of learning.

The final paper by Bernard attempts to relate the content of habit to social evolution. As culture advanced, the forms of habit were constantly enlarged. In the higher stages, language, itself dependent on social conditioning, becomes increasingly important. Along with it the whole psycho-social environment of mores, folkways and techniques comes into operation. In the latest stages of this evolution this cultural environment (that is, these culturally determined habits) includes science, art, and those techniques which result from man's highest mental functions and his most highly specialized social life.

II. MATERIALS

59. The Mechanism of the Conditioned Response¹

The laws of the association of ideas have long been known; but only recently was it discovered that when stimuli of disparate character—for example, sensations of taste and sound—occur simultaneously, they, too, become associated and the laws of this association are in large part similar to the laws of association of ideas.

The discovery of the association of stimuli was made by Russian investigators, the chief of whom is Pavlov. This great physiologist has studied the secretion of the salivary gland in the dog as affected by different stimuli, and developed a most elaborate technique for this purpose; but the results may be described in very simple language. We may take the classic example, a story often told, but still as wonderful as ever.

If you give your dog a piece of meat, a secretion of saliva occurs. The stimulus of the taste or odor of the meat is followed by the secretion of saliva as a response. This is an ordinary spinal-cord reflex. If, every time you give your dog a piece of meat, you ring a bell, after a while you can ring the bell without giving the meat and nevertheless there will be a flow of saliva. The sound of the bell has become associated with the stimulus of the meat and produces the same physiological reaction of the gland. Such an associated stimulus is called a conditioned, or associated, stimulus, and the reaction produces a conditioned reflex. In this case, according to Pavlov, the association is functioned by the brain cortex.

According to Pavlov, to note first his general view, the function of the higher brain centers is governed by the fundamental principle of the flow of nervous energy toward the point of greatest irritability; and as a matter of fact, this point shifts from one part of the cortex to another, and consciousness is, we may assume, the correlative of this shifting affectability.

We may, then, to put the whole matter with arbitrary simplicity, say that the brain cortex seems to be the seat of a constant ebb and flow of excitability. To use the word focus or center loosely, as Pavlov and Krasnogorski do, we may say that certain centers are continuously the seat of greater or less irritability, and whenever stimuli from the different receptor organs come into the cortex, they tend to associate themselves with those centers which are especially stimulated at the time. Or, in

¹ Reprinted by permission from W. H. Burnham "The Significance of the Conditioned Reflex in Mental Hygiene" *Mental Hygiene* 1921: V: pp. 674-75; 676; 676-77; 679-82; 683-84; and *The Normal Mind*. D. Appleton & Co. 1924.

other words, the path of least resistance is the path which is already the seat of excitation in the direction of such an excited center. Hence the great fact of association—that any stimulus, however indifferent, tends to become associated with other stimuli which at the given moment are active in the brain cortex.

Physiologically, the great significance of the conditioned reflex is that it furnishes an objective method of studying the function of the cortex; psychologically, it is of importance as a method of studying association.

Pavlov's students have produced a large amount of data, the investigations having been made with dogs, monkeys, and children. A vast number of illustrations could be cited. If you sound a definite tone every time you give the dog meat, then that tone becomes associated with the original stimulus and produces the flow of saliva without the meat. Whistling is capable of association to produce the same conditioned reflex. Scratch the dog in a definite place every time he is fed, and a conditioned reflex is formed for the scratching. Even pain on a definite spot of the skin may become associated to produce a similar conditioned reflex. If we may trust these investigators, even place a piece of ice on the skin every time the dog is fed and, after a number of repetitions, you may merely place the ice on the skin and the flow of saliva will occur.

Pavlov's experiments have thus made clear what the conditioned reflex is—namely, a reflex produced by any indifferent stimulus associated with a biologically adequate stimulus. In other words, if an indifferent stimulus is repeated a certain number of times simultaneously with the biologically adequate stimulus, an association is formed so that it comes to pass that the associated indifferent stimulus produces precisely the same physiological effect. If we could leave the whole matter here, it would be relatively simple; but the processes in nature are seldom simple; and in this particular case, we have yet to consider the other side of the whole matter—namely, the function of inhibition.

If one scratches a dog every time he is fed, then the scratching becomes a conditioned stimulus; that is, it occasions a secretion of saliva when no food is given. Now when a conditioned reflex of this kind has been formed, if, during the scratching, a new stimulus—say, for example, a tone that has been made a special stimulus—is added, immediately the scratching stimulus loses its effect. Also, the adding of another unusual tone to a usual one inhibits the salivary reflex, the stronger the tone, the greater the inhibition. Pavlov and his students have made extended investigations of the different forms of inhibition, and they find that such a simple reflex as the secretion of saliva is influenced by innumerable factors, not only by the more intense stimuli,

but by any stimulus from the environment, by any sound, however weak, the flickering of a light, a shadow on a window, or even a draft of air or the like.

Sherrington has shown that inhibition is a positive function, and he draws a significant parallel between stimulation on the one hand and inhibition on the other, in part as follows: Although the processes of excitation and of inhibition, are polar opposites, and although one is able to neutralize the other, there are correspondences between reflex inhibition and reflex excitation. Both undergo fatigue. Both outlive their stimulation periods for a short time in proportion to their intensity. The latent period of both is about the same. Many of the time relations of the one resemble those of the other.

That the stimuli of the environment have power to excite this or that form of activity has long been known. That, on the other hand, these stimuli have power to arrest or inhibit such activity has been worked out only recently. The intimate nature of the reflex inhibitory process remains obscure; but, as Sherrington has described it, started by nervous excitation, reflex inhibition seems, detail by detail, to present an exact counterpart to nervous excitation. "Often the two processes meet and neutralize each other according to dosage, in appearance as do acidity and alkalinity."

In all these uses of inhibition we see it as an associate of, and a counterpart or counterpoise to, excitation. Whether we study it in the more primitive nervous reactions which simply interconnect antagonistic muscles, or in the latest acquired reactions of the highly integrated organism, inhibition does not stand alone, but runs always alongside of excitation. In the simple correlation uniting antagonistic muscle-pairs, inhibition of antagonist accompanies excitation of protagonist. In higher integrations, where, for instance, a visual signal comes by training to be associated to salivary flow, the key of the acquiring of the reflex and of its maintenance is attention. And that part of attention which psychologists term negative, the counterpart and constant accompaniment to positive attention, seems as surely a sign of nervous inhibition as is the relaxation of an antagonist muscle, the concomitant of the contraction of the protagonist. In the latter case the co-ordination concerns but a small part of the mechanism of the individual and is spinal and unconscious. In the former case it deals with practically the whole organism, is cortical and conscious. In all cases inhibition is an integrative element in the consolidation of the animal mechanism to a unity. It and excitation together compose a chord in the harmony of the healthy working of the organism.

In the field of the conditioned reflexes several forms of inhibition appear. Associated stimuli, on account of their unstable character, are especially liable to inhibition. Any new stimulus is likely to inhibit whatever conditioned stimulus is active; and then again any new stimulus is likely to inhibit the inhibition. Thus the whole matter of association, both in our co-ordinated activity and in our thinking, is extremely complex. Just as, in the case of the muscles, constant interplay of stimuli and of inhibitions occurs, so in the mental field we must conceive an equally complex interplay of associations and inhibitions, and a continuous action and reaction of stimulation and inhibition, in the conditioned reflexes and systems of conditioned reflexes that are active in any individual who has had experience—in the child after the first year and a half or two years, perhaps, of life, and in much more complex fashion in later years.

The inhibitory effect of the environmental stimuli referred to above is gradually to wear out the conditioned stimuli and the conditioned reflexes. Hence, as all the investigations show, the conditioned stimulus needs to be continually re-enforced by association with the unconditioned or original stimulus; and when such repetition does not occur, the conditioned reflex soon disappears. This dying out of the conditioned reflex is thus to be looked upon as a form of inhibition, and concrete illustrations are plentiful.

Thus, while the first form of inhibition is the definite and sudden extinction of a conditioned reflex by inhibition of the associative stimulus by some new stimulus of sufficient intensity, the second form of inhibition is the gradual wearing out of the conditioned reflex by the inhibitory effect of the ordinary stimuli of the environment.

It should be noted that this condition of inhibition in turn is very unstable and easily removed by the occurrence of other stimuli. If, when a conditioned reflex has died out for lack of re-enforcement of the associated stimulus with the original stimulus, some new stimulus suddenly occurs—for example, the light of an electric light thrown into the dog's eyes, a stimulus that has no relation to the original stimulus—it acts at once as an inhibition of the inhibition; that is, the sudden flash of the electric light removes the inhibiting stimulus and re-establishes the conditioned reflex. One or two illustrations given by Anrep may be cited:

After repeated experiments with Dog 4, when the differentiation of the second sound had been firmly established (so that no secretion was expected), something irritated the mucous membrane of the animal's nose and

the dog sneezed. Three minutes later an inactive note was sounded, and, instead of the zero anticipated, 28 drops of saliva were registered. No secretion was caused by the sneezing, but the irritation produced inhibited the inhibition.

In another case, when experimenting with Dog 4, a large fly flew into the room: this very slight noise was quite sufficient to inhibit the inhibition and to cause the secretion of 15 drops. If a metronome or a simple bell is set in action during the sound of the inactive tone, one gets a still greater effect.

Thus the Russian investigators have shown the significance of inhibition for the nerves as Sherrington has for the muscles—i. e., that in all development and training of the central nervous system, inhibition is as important as response. According to Krasnogorski, stimulation and inhibition are in a certain sense the two halves of one and the same activity of the nervous system. And he maintains that in the conditioned reflex we have an almost ideal method of investigating the process of central inhibition in children.

We may simplify the complexity of the whole matter by a general statement such as that given by Anrep:

Each extra stimulus in turn inhibits the conditioned activity of the brain, superimposing itself on the process it encounters in every part of the same. If it meets with excitation, it inhibits the excitatory process; if it meets with inhibition, it inhibits the inhibition.

It may be added that several kinds of inhibition are distinguished. Morgulis enumerates some of these as follows:

There are several kinds of internal inhibition. Waning conditioned reflexes, due to a repeated application of the conditioned salivary stimulus without the aid of an unconditioned stimulus, is one kind. Another kind is the delayed reflex which appears if the conditioned stimuli are regularly followed by feeding a few seconds or even minutes after the conditioned stimulation has ceased. Conditioned inhibition is likewise a form of internal inhibition arising when an irrelevant factor is added to the conditioned stimulus, the combination not being reinforced by feeding. In such a combination the conditioned stimulus, is quite ineffective, but alone it exerts the usual influence. The process of differentiation and concentration, already described above, represents a still other type of internal inhibition—the inhibition of differentiation. Furthermore, it is a very common and very important occurrence that an inhibition checks another inhibition, the result being a reactivation of the inhibited reflex.

60. The Relation of the Conditioned Response to Habit Formation ¹

The relationship, theoretically, between the simplest cases of the conditioned responses we have studied and the more complicated, integrated, spaced and timed habit responses we are considering, seems to me to be quite simple. It is the relationship apparently of part to whole—that is, the conditioned reflex is the unit out of which the whole habit is formed. In other words, when a complicated habit is completely analyzed, each unit of the habit is a conditioned reflex. Let us go back a moment to the type of conditioned reflex we have already considered in previous lectures:

S ————— R	
Electrical Contact (Noxious)	Movement of the foot
<i>When conditioned</i> , the visual stimulus of circle	Calls out same movement of foot

This is a simple type of conditioned response. Now by hypothesis every complicated habit is made up of just such units. I shall try to make this a little clearer. Suppose in place of conditioning my subject to withdraw his foot when a visual stimulus of a circle is shown, I condition him to turn, say, one step to the right. When he turns to the right he faces a visual stimulus of a square. To this stimulus he is conditioned to walk forward five steps. He then faces a triangle. To this stimulus he is conditioned to move two steps to the right. This puts him face to face with a cube. In response to this he has to step up three steps instead of turning to right or left. You can see from this simple illustration that I can lead him all around the room and back to the starting point. I do this by arranging a series of visual stimuli to each of which I condition him so that he must move in a certain way—that is, turn to the right, to the left, move upward, downward, forward or backward, put his right hand up, stretch out his left hand, and the like. Now suppose each time I begin experimenting upon him, I run him through the whole series from the beginning. Isn't typewriting, piano playing and every other special act of skill resolvable or analyzable into just such a set of units? Of course in real life, in establishing separate conditioned reflexes making up the whole habit, we sometimes use food or we pet the child to condition it when the right response is made; we may cuff it or otherwise punish it for a wrong response or allow it to run itself down into blind

¹ Reprinted by permission from J. B. Watson, *Behaviorism*, pp. 157-58. New York. W. W. Norton Company, 1925.

alleys, bringing on partial fatigue (which is an equivalent of punishment), etc.

And why are these units timed and spaced as they are? Why is the series arranged as it is? There is no order or sequence as such in the world we live in—except in a few such things as the sun, moon, stars, etc., and even these are obscured for days and weeks sometimes. Even they are not orderly enough for us to steer a ship by, hence the compass and sextant. The answer is this: *Society*, or the *accident of environment places them that way*. By *society* I mean the men and women constituting it who have set up complicated patterns of response that must be literally followed. Words have a certain number of letters and they follow one another in definite sequence established by Mr. Johnson or Mr. Webster and our other early lexicographers. The holes of the golf course must be played in a certain sequence, pool balls must be shot into certain pockets. By *accident of environment* I mean, for instance, the simple fact that if you are to go from your own home to the old swimming hole you must (1) go to the right of a certain hill, (2) cross a small stream, (3) pass through a grove of pine trees, (4) follow down the left bank of a dry stream until you (5) get to the cow pasture, (6) then from behind a clump of large willow trees (7) you have come to your desired haven. Each of the numbers represents a visual stimulus that must be reacted to, at least during the learning stages.

61. The Modification of Instinctive Tendencies¹

Previous writers have attacked the question of the modification of instinct at three chief points: (a) indicating that an increase in perfection of response through practice does take place; (b) disentangling (partly) the separate rôles of maturation and use in the increasing perfection; and (c) pointing out that modifications concern either the stimulus or the response side of the instinct. It is this latter point that we wish to formulate in the present section.

Shortly after birth an individual will, through heredity, manifest the fear reaction upon the presentation of certain stimuli. By virtue of associations, these stimuli may later become ineffective and new stimuli be secured which were previously indifferent. Thus birds on desert islands show no fear of man until the frequency of his appearance, coupled with effective stimuli for fear, finally endows the perception of

¹ Reprinted by permission from W. S. Hunter "Modifications of the Sensory and Motor Aspects of Instinct" *Psy. Rev.* 1920: XXVII: pp. 248-50; 251-57; 260-61; 263-69.

man himself with the capacity to arouse fear. Studies of the conditioned reflex are laboratory observations of this same phenomenon. The protective reflex of the finger, e. g., has as its unconditioned (inherited) stimulus injury to the finger; but by a frequent simultaneous presentation of sound and injury, sound also becomes an effective stimulus producing withdrawal of the finger. The internal mechanism of this need not concern us in the present discussion. It should be stated, however, that habits as well as inherited forms of response are susceptible to this type of modification, the distinction being that we deal with conditioned reflexes directly when the changes effected are made from the original stimulus rather than from stimuli which in themselves may be one or more removed from the hereditary status of the response.

From the side of changes in effector activities proper, the same statements are true although the term conditioned reflex seems not to have attached to such modifications, undoubtedly due to the accident governing the choice of laboratory procedure. The protective reflex and the salivary reflex, i. e., the effector activities proper, have been kept constant in such studies and experimentation directed toward the analysis of stimulus changes. However the physiological changes effected are presumably no different from those which occur in the contrary case when experience changes the type of response while the stimulus remains constant. The illustrations of this are legion. One may cite the changes which occur in the "expression" of fear and anger as the human individual matures in a social environment, or one may consider the modifications which occur in animal behavior during the process of learning. In the latter case, a total situation is presented to a white rat placed in a visual discrimination box, calling forth exploratory movements; but under the influence of punishment, reward, and frequency, the exploratory movements are inhibited and give way to well-defined food responses. One may state such an outcome either as the inhibition of an instinctive response to a given stimulus by acquired responses, or as the acquisition by the food-getting response of a new stimulus. Perhaps both are involved.

The social values of the above types of change in instinct have been so widely recognized that we need not elaborate the problem further. This is not true, however, in the case of those modifications termed sublimations. The sublimation of instinct in the human individual is an example of the simultaneous modification of the afferent and efferent phases of the response. Anger becomes righteous indignation by the substitution of a new and (in this case) an ideal stimulus for the sensory (animal) one and by the conversion of the gross bodily attack into the

response of denunciation, purchasing Liberty Bonds, or longer hours of labor. Sex impulses may be sublimated in artistic activity, in dancing, in religious activity, or, when joined possibly with the parental impulse, in social service. Instances of sublimation are those where the inherited impulses are placed at the service of activities which bear little or no resemblance to the activity which normally embodies the impulse. The cases are not due to the suppression or elimination of the instinct in its entirety; only the somatic, skeletal responses are inhibited while the visceral continue probably at full intensity. The individual may entirely fail, and usually does fail, to identify the persistent behavior complex, because to the uninitiated, instincts are identified in terms of their somatic components. It is this difficulty of identification which permits the sublimation to proceed unimpeded by emotional conflict, and unthreatened by the failure which would almost surely be its lot did the subject realize the origin of his impulses in their proper (unconditioned) instinct.

Although the non-technical use of sublimation means to purify, or to idealize, the preceding analysis would indicate that the physiological mechanisms involved need not include the equivalent of ideals. The stimuli for artistic activities, for dancing, for charity and social service may be as concrete as for the arousal of any other form of modified instinctive performance. The presence of syncopated music and members of the opposite sex initiates dancing, and the awareness of suffering and poverty calls out charitable relief in those individuals possessing the sublimated behavior. And so, although one would hesitate to apply this term to animals below man, the understanding of instinctive modifications is better when one realizes the essential continuity of the phenomena. Thus a dog can by training be made angry by whistling, and the instinct can then be modified on its effector side by training the dog to vent his pugnacity in some unusual manner. Behavioristically, the instinct is as truly sublimated as in man, although the social significance of the change may be infinitesimal.

(I) *Technique of Modifications*

We must agree with Woodworth that compelling evidence of sublimation is difficult to secure. We believe, however, that the psychoanalysts have made a good case for its existence; and when we remember the introspective difficulties besetting the identification of visceral components of response and of minor somatic responses in general, we are tempted to conclude that the case will always lack that clear-cut evidence which is desirable. We shall indicate schematically in a following paragraph

how the neural processes may proceed in sublimation; but here, in the light of Woodworth's remarks, renewed emphasis should be placed upon points already stressed.

1. Sublimations do not arise suddenly in an effort to control an unruly impulse that is recognized as undesirable; they are the end-products of modifications whose formation has probably extended over several years. The behavior which may be said to undergo this modification may indeed never make its actual appearance, due to the fact—which we shall emphasize later in the paper—that certain habits or customs have been fixed upon the individual before the normal time for the instinct to appear. Therefore when the instinct manifests itself, it does so from the very beginning in modified form.

2. The visceral responses which constitute the physical basis of the impulse and emotion of the sublimated behavior can be identified by skilled introspection as closely similar to the visceral core (or "feel") of the unsublimated form of response. Indeed this is a chief reason for insisting that such behavior as righteous indignation, e. g., is a refined and derived form of animal anger. Or again, the alleged similarity of the emotional quales is a prominent reason for the insistent attempts to identify the sex and religious activities.

3. One need not assume, as Woodworth does, that in sublimated forms of behavior the "drive" does only work foreign to its natural purpose. On the contrary, an introspective description of the cases would suggest that, did we have adequate recording methods, widespread visceral and somatic responses would be found present at low intensity in contrast to the high intensity marking the untransformed behavior. What is important is that the behavior initiated by the sublimated impulse shall not impress the observer as a surviving (or anticipating) part of the original instinct. The uninitiated subject may only feel the restlessness due to viscera changes without recognizing in any degree the total response to which this restlessness normally belongs. He may therefore proceed to make use of this impulsive tendency in some socially acceptable behavior, the frequent repetition of which may constitute his idiosyncrasy or even his profession. We shall see later that many instinctive impulses may be made to work out purposes other than those for which the instinct was apparently designed. In sublimation the situation is the same, a behavior component becomes transferred from one total response to another through the so-called conditioned reflex type of association and so does duty in the service of a purpose not originally its own.

A formulation in terms of the neural diagram of Fig. I may help

give definiteness to the preceding account. Instincts belong to either of two classes: those having a conspicuous visceral component in the stimulus, and those that do not. This visceral component corresponds on the physiological side to the appetite or desire prominent in food-getting and sex, e. g., relatively absent in fear and anger, and totally absent in the simpler instincts (reflexes) of walking, standing, grasping, and even in such responses as collecting, curiosity, and others. This




FIGURE I

Schematic representation of the neural elements involved in the modification of instinct. NS, the central nervous system; S_1 , the original stimulus; S_2 , an acquired stimulus; R_1 , the original somatic response; R_2 , a new or modified somatic response; X, the visceral sensory component of the stimulus; and IR, the internal, or visceral, response. The mutual relations of these elements are discussed in the body of the paper.

visceral component is represented in the figure by X. Normally the instinctive behavior R is produced by the unconditioned stimulus S_1 acting alone or in conjunction with internal stimulus. In many cases these afferent conditions also produce visceral effects, IR. Modifications of this original inherited equipment, so far as the elements of the neuro-physiological mechanisms are concerned, may be thought of in any one of the following ways, or in combinations of these: (1) S_2 acting alone or in conjunction with X may by use become an effective stimulus for the responses R_1 (somatic) and IR (visceral). The organism now fears some new object, has adopted some new article of diet, or (as is beautifully illustrated for animals below man in Craig's work with pigeons)

has acquired some new sexual object. The internal appetite is still present, the responses of the skeletal muscles are unmodified, the visceral effects underlying the consciousness termed emotion are in full vigor, only the external stimulus has changed, although it may have changed to something which no longer suggests S_1 to the experiencing subject. (2) S_1 , in the cases where by heredity the co-operation of X is necessary to give the afferent activity control of the final common path to R_1 and IR , may by use secure the power to arouse R_1 when X is absent. Here belong the cases where an instinct is aroused in the absence of the normal appetite or desire, jaded instincts, in a word. (3) Modification 2 may occur after S_2 has become the effective stimulus. (4) By use, or through the absence of the proper S , X may become so vigorous, so intense, so voluminous, that in the absence of an effective S , or even of any discoverable S , it may secure possession of the final common path to R_1 and IR . As examples we may cite: Breed's chicks, when they gave the drinking reaction in the air with no observable outside stimulus present; the case of a starving man or one perishing with thirst who swallows totally inadequate and normally non-effective stimuli; unreasoning, groundless fears; and finally cases of gluttony, alcoholism, and abnormal sex hunger. (5) S_1 or S_2 may by practice secure the power to arouse R_1 not only in the absence of X but without involving any noticeable visceral changes, IR . This is the instinctive behavior devoid not only of normal appetite but of the normal emotional satisfaction which accompanies its exercise. Again the most striking illustrations come from the field of food and sex responses. (6) The modification of the instinct may proceed with S_1 and X unchanged but with the responses shifted from R_1 to R_2 —or from a clumsy and unskilled R_1 to an efficient performance of the same response (as, e. g., in Breed's experiments). Again it should be noted that R_2 may be so different from R_1 that an observer not knowing the genetic facts would be unable to detect a relationship between the two activities. (7) The final case of modification occurs when the effects of practice, or use, have substituted S_2 — R_2 for the original behavior with or without abnormality in X and IR . These are the typical cases of sublimation; and if X and IR are unmodified, they are the cases where the desires and emotions (satisfactions) of one original response are put at the service of, or incorporated into, derived forms of behavior. Stated in this manner and placed in relation to other forms of stimulus and response changes, sublimation loses any mystical character it may have been thought to include and stands forth as a peculiarly important type of the modification of instinct.

(2) The Temporal Position of the Modifications

So far our analysis has concerned those phases of instinctive modifications which can be formulated in terms of change in the elements of the stimulus-response situation. Two other problems now remain to be emphasized, problems which although of fundamental importance in the modification and control of behavior are unnoticed in the social psychologies, and are at the best treated only by implication by the technical students of instinct. These problems are: (1) The temporal position of the modification, whether coming prior or subsequent to the first instinctive performance; and (2) modifications of the biological purpose, or end, involved in the inherited behavior.

The modifications of instinctive performance are not all variations (of the stimulus, of the somatic response, or of the visceral response) produced after the instinct first appears. Instances which do belong here we have already illustrated. Other modifications occur because of influences at work before the instinct makes its initial appearance. These changes will clearly affect the instincts in proportion to the length of the interval between birth and instinct's appearance and in proportion to the social value inherent in a modification of the instinct in question. The dates and order of the appearance of the various instincts are sufficiently known to serve our present general purpose. Figure 2 indicates for man the early appearance of the responses of feeding, fear, anger, and vocalization, the final appearance of the sex and parental responses, and the intermediate appearance of such responses as play, acquisition, locomotion, construction, etc. We do not mean to imply by the use of this diagram any more than concerns our immediate purpose. The instincts and instinctive tendencies in man are as a rule too indefinite in their manifestations to enable a very satisfactory listing, and the question of their temporal order of appearance is one calling for much additional experimental work. Particularly is it important for the problem of the modification of instinct that the early traces be noted of instincts which appear late.

Our very simple diagram (Fig. 2) enables us to visualize clearly the possibility of the temporal aspects of the modifications above mentioned. It also serves to suggest that the instincts which will be most open to change by virtue of pre-experience will be the ones listed farthest to the right. Feeding, fear, and anger, e.g., appearing as they do practically at birth, offer no other possibility than modifications subsequent to their appearance; while the temporal interval antedating

sex, e. g., makes possible the acquisition of many responses which will serve to modify (and control) that instinct.

The responses of feeding, fear, and anger, as we have said, appear too early in the individual's life for this general type of modification; but such responses as play, constructiveness, sex, display, and the parental instinct, occurring later, offer the individual and the social group an opportunity to determine prior to the onset of the behavior the stimuli which shall ordinarily arouse it and the form which it shall




FIGURE II

Diagram indicating: the early appearance of the instincts of feeding, fear, anger, and vocalization; the intermediate appearance of such instinctive responses as play, acquisition, locomotion, etc.; and the late appearance of sex and parental behavior. The curves for each instinct suggest the appearance of component elements before the complete instinct matures and is active. No emphasis is to be placed either upon the relative order of the intermediate instincts or upon the form and length of the several curves.

take. Play activities vary in their content in dependence upon the social environment, as do constructiveness and sex also. Long prior to the maturing of the latter instinct and even longer before its usual manifestation, society has set before the individual a pattern which, like the Great Stone Face of Hawthorne's tale, shall serve more or less unconsciously to instruct and guide him in the accepted stimuli and responses of that behavior. Religious training likewise can, and does in many cases, take the young individual and so shape his religious symbols and responses that when religious activities do appear definitely in adolescence, it shall seem but natural to turn to one sect or one religion for their gratification. Society in this type of modification is giving the individual the benefit of its own experience, not by permitting the instinct to

manifest itself in the crude animal form and then modifying it, but by building up the proper controls prior to the emergency.

In all cases a definite and accurate formulation of the adaptive value of the behavior has waited upon a clear perception of cause and effect relations among objects and events, which in many cases means waiting upon scientific analysis. Until the individual and society know the biological purposes of instincts, only accident can identify the purposes which society approves and fosters with those which heredity is seeking. But once this knowledge is forthcoming, society and the individual may proceed consciously and definitely to foster the purpose, or they may change the environment in such a way that the biological purpose can give way to a new purpose, or, finally, the biological purposes may be satisfied incidentally so far as the conscious plans of the individuals are concerned.

Nor should the present type of instinctive modification be confused with the voluntary exercise of a response that may at times be automatic and inherited. Such a case would occur when one winks voluntarily at a joke, and so might apparently be said to have modified the biological purpose of protection normally subserved by this response. In order to subsume the winking response under this third type of modification, the winking would have to be produced by the individual's voluntarily placing himself in front of a stimulus which would automatically bring about the response and then for a social purpose which might or might not be the same as the biological one. Perhaps in the last analysis so-called voluntary activity is precisely of this nature, consisting of a highly elaborated conditioned reflex whose stimulus is an idea. But for the purposes of the present discussion there is an active participation and a feeling of control in voluntary activity which contrasts strikingly with the automatic, impulsive, compelling characteristic of the instinctive response (characteristics which are as definitely present when the instinct is "used" for social purposes as they are when it accomplishes purely biological ones).

The two great modifications which have been made in biological purposes appear to be these: (1) purposes which are inimical to civilized social life are supplanted by new and more acceptable ones; and (2) the biological purposes in all of the more powerful instincts are occasionally or habitually secondary to the use of the instinctive behavior as a pleasure giver. To be sure, in so far as the original synaptic connections persist—and it is my opinion that they are rarely if ever lost—the original biological end of the behavior will tend to remain and be satisfied, although perhaps only surreptitiously.

The accompanying table has been drawn up with reference to the two types of cases suggested above. Here an attempt is made to state the biological purposes subserved by certain of the instincts and to place over against these the recognized social purposes which usually or occasionally dominate them. In some cases the two will be identical, due at times to accident and at times to foresight. The principle involved in this third type of modification of instinct is not dependent for its validity upon the accuracy of the analysis of the table; it is dependent rather upon the fact of variation between the two types of purpose whose detailed nature is there suggested.

There are certain features of the table which invite definite comment. In column three I have placed only what have seemed to be social purposes that are widely recognized in social practice. No attempt has been made to indicate the vast multiplicity of purposes for which the instincts may on occasion be used. With the appearance in man of ideational processes and ideational methods of behavior control, it has

<i>Instinct</i>	<i>Biological Purpose</i>	<i>Social Purpose Definitely Fostered</i>
Anger	Defense of organism by removing offending object.	Used in hostility and competition to stimulate great endeavor. Put at service of customs.
Fear	Defense of organism by moving it from offending environment.	Used for taboos in maintenance of social organization.
Acquisitiveness	Accumulation of food and nest supplies.	Accumulation of objects possessing general value or power to satisfy human wants. Fostering prestige.
Vocalization	Stimulation of certain instincts and habits in associates.	Communication of ideas; stimulation of any instinct or habit in self or other.
Hunting	Securing of food and mates.	Recreation, health, and prestige.

<i>Instinct</i>	<i>Biological Purpose</i>	<i>Social Purpose Definitely Fostered</i>
Rivalry	Domination, particularly in sex and play activities.	Domination in all fields of activity.
Feeding	Nourishment.	Nourishment, pleasure, and social solidarity.
Sex	Reproduction.	Pleasure and reproduction. Begetting of offspring in order that parents may be cared for in sickness and old age.
Parental	Protection of young.	Protection of young.
Display	Sex excitant, arousal of fear in others.	* Sex excitant, arousal of fear in others, prestige, creation of caste.
Religious	Protection from "Great Danger."	Protection from "Great Danger," Protection of morals, social service.

The * indicates that biological purpose is not specifically combated. Present occidental society fosters all instincts in some degree for health and pleasure as well as for the social purposes above enumerated.

become possible to use the instincts not for their biological ends alone but for almost any end that the manipulator may have in mind. The demagogue and the propagandist by placing certain stimuli before the crowd may utilize the resultant fears, angers, acquisitivenesses, or religious activities to satisfy ulterior purposes of much or little merit. This is a matter of great social importance, but what we have indicated in the table differs in at least two vital ways from the uses of instinct made by the individual social manipulator. In the first place, the social purposes or utilities there listed are definitely sanctioned by present Occidental society; and in the second place, the individual in whom the instinct manifests itself may be, and usually is, well aware of the social purpose to be attained, inasmuch as much social or group effort is directed toward instructing him on this very point.

So far as our analysis can reveal, the social purposes permit the accomplishment in a more or less incidental manner of the biological purposes without any attempt to combat these purposes save in the case of the sex instinct and the religious tendency. In the hunting instinct, e. g., the purposes of recreation, good health, and prestige are not incompatible with the food- and mate-getting end; nor does society repress the latter. The occasions on which the instinct appears may be limited by law, but when it does appear the biological end to be attained is laudable. This is true also in the cases of fear, anger, and the other responses whose social purposes are indicated with an asterisk. Society definitely favors the use of display (in clothing and physical prowess) as a sex excitant as well as an enhancer of prestige and a creator of class distinction. The original form of the stimulus and response is usually modified, and sublimated instincts may have been added to the complex, but when the instinct appears its biological purpose is approved. In the case of the religious tendency, on the other hand, society is tending to negate the biological purpose of protection from great danger or the mysterious threat (or however one may formulate the unseen characteristic of objects with which primitive man seeks to get *en rapport* through definite religion and magic). In its place it is putting social service and the maintenance of moral conduct as the proper goal of the religious impulse. The change is not that of stimulus and response or of the accretion of other instinctive impulses alone, nor is it a limitation of the occasions upon which the impulse may manifest itself. This is not to say that the use of the religious tendency as a defense mechanism against the imperfections of the present does not receive great social sanction; it is to emphasize that much of the time, and in some groups most of the time, when the behavior appears, its biological purpose is combated.

Before extending our comments to include the sex instinct, we may best return and take up the thread of our argument as left where it was stated that the second fundamental manner in which biological purposes are modified is the use of the instinct as a pleasure giver. It should be noted that with all instincts (not merely with that of sex) there is a pleasure and satisfaction in the experiencing of inherited muscular and glandular activity where the experiencer is free to turn his attention to the response as opposed to the stimulus. In the arousal of the instinct under conditions that realize or tend to realize the biological (and certain social) purposes of the response, the attention of the individual is definitely focused upon the stimulus which initiates and controls his behavior. Thus in a fire where the individual is in danger, it is not

the emotional thrill which is in the focus of consciousness but the dangerous aspects of the situation. The bystanders, on the other hand, who have congregated, can enjoy the thrills of fear aroused by the fire because in the background of consciousness is the understanding that, so far as they are involved, it is all make-believe. It is beyond our intention to offer an explanation for this enjoyment of inherited forms of response under the conditions described; it is enough to indicate the fact and its implications for the modification of instinct. Within the limits of the apparently harmless, society sanctions the arousal of instincts for purposes of pleasure. Forms of art vie one with another in subtle stimulations of the instincts, while in the fringe of the beholders consciousness the feeling of make-believe permits him to enjoy the resultant behavior. The individual confronts himself upon the stage and the screen with stimuli for all of the instincts—fear, anger, hunting, acquisitiveness, religion, sex, etc.—and then enjoys the result much as a child in play will pretend the existence of hobgoblins in order to enjoy the thrill of fear, or wiggle a sore tooth or finger for the pleasure of the resultant pain.

It so happens that the sex instinct is through heredity accompanied by a greater pleasure than pertains to the exercise of any other instinct, and it is therefore not unexpected that the history of the modifications of this instinct should be peculiar. In the animals below man, where there is no awareness of the biological end, the instinct functions solely for reproduction. No social purpose exists. The use of sex for pleasure, so far as I know, has its first beginnings among the monkeys, although here the probable absence of thought processes would count against its conscious use for that purpose. Moreover, among primitive men and even among peoples as advanced as the Central Australian natives, the biological purpose of reproduction is unknown (undoubtedly because of the great temporal interval between the activity of the instinct and the birth of the offspring), and yet there is sufficient development to insure the presence of definite social purposes. The result is that the sex instinct is recognized by society as a type of behavior whose purpose is the production of pleasure. Women are property, and the violation of chastity is the violation of a property right.

With the development of man to the point where the biological purpose of sex is understood, comes the possibility that society and the individual may definitely sanction the biological purpose. Thus they have done. Certain individuals and certain groups have maintained that the only conscious purpose to be sanctioned is the biological one; and yet in

practice society at the present time sanctions the modification of this instinctive behavior by utilizing it in the ancient manner as a pleasure mechanism. This it does through emphasis upon birth control and the make-believe stimulation of the instinct on the stage and in certain phases of art in general.

In the case of the food-getting instinct society and the individual do not at present combat the biological purpose, although they do relegate it to the background and satisfy it incidentally in many cases. In instances of perversion, however, the nutritive purpose has been definitely combated. Thus it is said that the Roman voluptuaries practised artificial vomiting in order that their banquets might proceed unhindered by the limited capacity of the individual. While our own banquets lack this interesting feature, nevertheless they are conducted for pleasure and not for the purpose of nutrition. Custom has from time immemorial recognized the effect on social solidarity of "breaking bread" together, utilizing the pleasurable aspects of feeding in the creation of consciousness of kind. This and similar uses of instinct to satisfy social rather than biological purposes is fundamental in understanding social phenomena.

62. Hierarchy of Habit Formation in Social Evolution ¹

It must be apparent that there has been an increase in the flexibility of the behavior patterns from the period of the dominance of instinct to the period of the dominance of externally stored language symbols over human behavior. Along with this increasing flexibility of behavior patterns has also gone a greater degree of selectiveness in the adjustment process, so that the adaptation of the organism becomes increasingly more specialized and individualized. This development from the fixity of instinct to the flexibility of habit, making possible an intelligent adjustment of man to his environment on the basis of a rational manipulation of stored language symbols, may be represented in the diagram on the following page. Man has achieved his cultural civilization literally by means of a stairway of habit adjustment technique.

¹ Reprinted by permission from L. L. Bernard, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*. pp. 153, 154. New York. Henry Holt & Company, 1926.

heredity or from social contact which inducts them into a particular culture system?

9. How are the higher habits correlated with the advancement of culture?
10. What instinctive tendencies are modified by social conditioning before they reach their maturity?

B. Topics for Class Reports

1. Report on Humphrey's paper on the relation of the Freudian wish to conditioned responses. (Cf. bibliography.)
2. Review Mateer's study of conditioned responses in children. (Cf. bibliography.)
3. Report on Morgulis' paper on Pavlov's work. (Cf. bibliography.)

C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers

1. The Criticism of the *Gestalt* Psychology of the Conditioned Response.
2. The Contribution of Behaviorism to Social Psychology.

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CHAPTER XI

IMITATION, SUGGESTION, SYMPATHY, AND COMPENSATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Among the mechanisms mentioned in the earlier social psychology the most important are imitation and suggestion. Sympathy, also, has long been recognized as a fundamental factor making for sociability. Latterly we have come to recognize compensation as another important mechanism in the field of social behavior. The present chapter deals with these four mechanisms.

The earlier writers on social psychology used the term imitation to cover any sort of action wherein one person did some act identical with or similar to another. This ran the gamut from reflexes like yawning to complex social features, as where one class aped another in social custom or fashion. It was Thorndike, followed by Watson, who began to indicate the limitations upon the wide and loose use of the term imitation. While Thorndike, as we shall see by the first selection, still holds to some types of activity as coming under this term, he limits it to very specific acts. Peterson, on the other hand, has shown in his article quoted below the widespread misuse of the term and suggests distinct limitations. More significant, perhaps, is the paper by Humphrey showing that much that is called imitation is not due to any instinctive patterns, but fits nicely into the category of the conditioned response. While it may be legitimate to employ the term "imitation" in social psychology, it should be carefully circumscribed by definition and brought in line with the general principles of conditioning and integration which are essential to a sound psychology of learning. And social conditioning is merely a phase of the learning process.¹

¹ Bernard in his recent book, *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (1926), uses the term "imitation" extensively, but defines the mechanism largely in terms

Suggestion likewise should be defined rather more closely. Some writers include in suggestion the stimulus factor, while others deal only with the determining tendencies, or apperceptive mass or patterns of previous experience that are set off by this stimulus. The present writer believes that both factors must be recognized. The stimulus incidentally may arise from oneself as well as from another person. It is, moreover, usually a verbal stimulus. The papers by McDougall, Scott, and Morgan stress important points in the understanding of this mechanism. Suggestion plays perhaps the leading rôle in the social drama. Everywhere stimuli impinge on us in the form of direct and, more particularly indirect, suggestion, which, in turn, influences our attitudes and actions in every social situation.

Sympathy is often said to be an instinct, but possibly its roots lie not so much in instinct as in the emotion of love. Furthermore, it has both an emotional-feeling quality and an intellectual aspect. One must usually image the object of his sympathy as well as feel, or sense, vicariously his emotions and feelings. The building up and the extension of sympathy is described by Humphrey in terms of the established principle of conditioning. This again is much more satisfactory than the earlier concept of sympathy as some vague innate pattern which came into being by mere maturity of growth. The highest form of sympathy arises with the development of what is sometimes called the ejective consciousness. That is the time when the child learns that other people's bodies have experiences in them like his own. As Baldwin says, it is then that the "social self is born."

The compensatory mechanism is largely a substitutive one. Compensation refers really to the objects of the conditioning in reference to the total personality, or organism-as-a-whole, rather than to the mechanism proper. Compensation takes place at different levels, just as any substitution may. Here it is usually thought of as a replacement of one function for another in which the individual is deficient. In contrast with sublimation it consists in the fact that the latter is a replacement for a loss of, or failure of, opportunity to function

of conditioned responses. Imitation might also be used in reference to group-to-group interaction. The difficulty, however, is like the difficulty with the word "instinct," it covers too much or else too little.

normally when one might while compensation is rather substitutive for a function which one can not fulfil for organic reasons. In popular parlance the two terms are often synonymous.

The paper by Hall points out that much compensation is quite unconscious. He also shows that this procedure is perfectly normal for the individual; in fact where it does not take place a disintegration of the personality may result. The citations from literature merely serve to indicate how widespread has been the recognition of this principle among all cultures that possessed even the rudiments of mythology and cosmic philosophy, that is, wherever the beginnings of imagination and thought touched social life.

II. MATERIALS

63. Imitative Action ¹

No one common rule for the original effect of the perception of instinctive behavior in another man can be given. His behavior in attention, cautious approach, the avoiding reactions and the hunting instinct, produces something much like itself. His behavior in anger, combat for mastery, courtship and parental affection produces in the spectator something as a rule quite unlike itself. The effect of his behavior in attempted mastery and submission is dubious, varying greatly with its concomitants and being little known in any case. Seeing a man in the attitude of submission may make the spectator more submissive or more aggressive. Whether the perception of instinctive behavior originally produces like behavior is a question to be studied separately in the case of each instinct.

The question is often very difficult. Under present conditions children would usually *learn* by training to run from whatever others ran from, to look at whatever others looked at, and the like, even if there were no original tendencies to do so. Moreover the object or event, the perception of which causes A to respond by a certain instinctive behavior which then spreads to B, is likely to be perceived by B also, so that whether his behavior is a response to A's behavior or to the object itself is often in doubt. For example, A's fear at a snake may arouse B's fear indirectly by merely calling B's attention to the snake. Finally A's response may, upon his perception of B, be modified to include

¹ Reprinted by permission from E. L. Thorndike, *Educational Psychology* (Briefed Course), pp. 46; 47; 48; 49. New York. Columbia University, Bureau of Publications of Teachers College, 1914. (Author's copyright.)

certain behavior which acts as a special signal to provoke approach, fear, or whatever the response may be, in B. Thus the danger-signal might be given by A when frightened in company, though not when frightened alone; and B might respond, not to A's general fright, but to the danger signal.

The most probable cases for the production, by behavior witnessed, of similar behavior in the witness, are *smiling when smiled at, laughing when others laugh, yelling when others yell, looking at what others observe, listening when others listen, running with or after people who are running in the same direction, running from the focus whence others scatter, jabbering when others jabber and becoming silent as they become silent, crouching when others crouch, chasing, attacking and rending what others hunt, and seizing whatever object another seizes.*

In my opinion these probabilities are all, or nearly all, real, and are the chief, or even the only components of the imitative tendency which shows itself in large masses of men, and produces panics, and orgies, and frenzies of violence, and which only the rarest individuals can actively withstand.

On the whole, the imitative tendencies which pervade human life and which are among the most powerful forces with and against which education and social reform work, are, for the most part, not original tendencies to respond to behavior seen by duplicating it in the same mechanical way that one responds to light by contracting the pupil, but must be explained as the results of the arousal, by the behavior of other men, of either special instinctive responses or ideas and impulses which have formed, in the course of experience, connections with that sort of behavior. Man has a few specialized original tendencies whose responses are for him to do what the man forming the situation does. His other tendencies to imitate are habits learned nowise differently from other habits.

64. Limitations on the Use of the Term Imitation ¹

The conception of imitation as an important method of adjustment, though now, fortunately, omitted from important books on social psychology, is still in good standing with certain writers even of text books in this line of work; and it serves, no doubt, not only to retard progress by substitution of vague thinking for scientific analysis, but also to preserve the reflex idea of behavior to which we have already

¹ Reprinted by permission from J. Peterson "Imitation and Mental Adjustment" *J. Abn. & Soc. Psy.* 1922-23: XVII: pp. 4; 7-8; 9-11; 12-15.

referred. If we are to make real progress in social psychology it is necessary to get rid of some of the terms that only give satisfaction to our ignorance and divert attention from the need of more scientific study. An important object of social psychology should be to give means of control of social processes and not merely ability to indicate and name uniformities in behavior. In abnormal psychology, where closer attention must be given to individual behavior in actual attempts to modify it, the imitation doctrine is obviously breaking down before a more dynamic view, although its counterpart, suggestion, still reigns supreme in certain quarters.

To the psychologist who comes into close relations with the individual from all standpoints and attempts to render an accurate account of his behavior whether in terms of stimulus-response relations or in terms of mental processes as introspectively obtained, the imitation doctrine does not seem adequate. To him it seems to be a far-fetched and wholesale generalization that has little relation to facts. If he attempts to modify the behavior of any individual on the principles of this doctrine he wonders how any one could take it seriously except in a general sense. There are many circumstances that would bring about similar actions of two or more individuals, uniformity of action. The uniformity of action among individuals may be due to any one, or to combinations, of the following conditions: (1) The individuals may have practically identical innate structures and may be stimulated by common stimuli. (2) They may find uniformity to some degree the most economical and time saving. (3) If one individual acts very differently from his fellows he may attract the attention of others and become embarrassed, self-conscious, or may receive disapproval and suffer disadvantages therefrom. (4) There may be obvious approval or friendship shown by others as a reward of copying their behavior, thus arousing one's instincts of comradeship so characteristic of small groups. (5) Different individuals may have successively come into, or been born into, the same social environment and each has taken on the *mores* and habits of the social group by a trial and error process and by actual instruction. (6) Social life requires common language and other symbols of thought and action, and any person of a group can get self-expression and self-assertion to any considerable degree only by the use of such understood language and symbols, however inadequate they may seem to him to be. The early stages of the acquirement of one's native language (spoken) are certainly characterized by trial and error learning, despite loose statements by theorists to the effect that language is acquired by imitation. This has been shown by a number of careful studies of infants.

(7) The actions of others may call an individual's attention to certain things and conditions, stimulating and important to him, which he needs or is organically prepared to use but did not know were available, such as, the presence of food, of some toy, or of certain physical or moral dangers. The stimulus value of these things is increased by the actions of other members of the group. (8) The enthusiasm of individuals for certain kinds of behavior or specific kinds of activity is not great when they are alone or in very small groups, but may be greatly increased by the stimulation of enthusiasts or of specialists in certain lines when present. (9) Each individual may have for certain acts—such as yawning, smiling, giving vent to general activity of certain emotional kinds—an inherited special mechanism of such a nature that when one individual of a group performs certain acts, for whatever cause, these mechanisms are automatically stimulated in other individuals. (10) Different individuals may have acquired, by trial and error learning, mechanisms that work as do those for yawning, etc., which have been inherited. Finally, (11) Through the work of important and recognized individuals, certain kinds of work and recreation, certain manners and special activities may have acquired recognition and approval to the extent that a person finds it possible to elevate himself by doing these things, if he has the ability to do so.

Uniformity in dress, for example, may be accounted for by (2), (3), and (11), of the conditions enumerated above; in manners, by (3), (4), (5), (6), and (11); in language, by (5) and (6), and in some respects by (11); in ceremonies and much of general religious behavior, by (3), (4), (5), (6), (8), and (11); uniformity in mob action and in other "social currents" (Ross), together with the rapid spread of excitement, by (7) and (8); in fashions (other than in dress), fads, new cults, etc., by (3), (4), (8) and (11); in the use of improved apparatus, implements and machines, methods of lighting, heating, transportation, etc., by (2), (7), and (11) chiefly, but also in part by (3) and (4). These uniformities are mainly the stock in trade of the imitation sociologists who see things in the large and from a distance. Only responses to conditions (11) could with propriety be called imitative responses.

There remain, aside from special cases soon to be considered, the spread of certain functional diseases dealt with more particularly by physicians and alienists. These are often accounted for by (1), (2) in some respects, (7) and (1) combined, regarding certain supposed dangers as apprehended by those with neurotic constitutions, and (10); but usually, as in the case of hypnotic phenomena and certain other cases

of suggestion, they need also, and often receive, special analysis. On hypnosis, and suggestion in the narrow and more technical sense of the term, there are, of course, various views, which we cannot here attempt to evaluate. The position of the New Nancy School, represented by Émile Coué and his followers, which regards suggestion as the same as auto-suggestion, the subconscious realization of an ideal (i. e., a form of self-expression, I take it), as well as the emphasis put by the Freudians on instinctive drives, are important instances of movements that tend to put away the older passive-reflex views favoring the wholesale application of the concept of imitation. Obviously much more research is desirable in these lines, as the methods thus far used in connection with these newer movements do not in certain respects merit the designation scientific, and therefore the results obtained toward the establishment of the interpretations are not convincing to those who do not already believe. That this statement is probably not unfair to these schools can be shown from the fact that the large body of psychologists using scientific methods common to the various sciences do not accept their methods and results today. The uncritical attitude of many of the Freudians, for instance, of accepting indiscriminately any result obtained by a member of the school and of defending it as a personal matter, makes it seem to the unbiased, or let us say disinterested, scientific mind more like a religious creed than a body of scientific facts. Nevertheless, it must be confessed that the Freudian movement has done much to displace the passive suggestion-psychology in the field of the abnormal.

If now we seek to define imitation more specifically and to determine its limits, we shall have to confine our attention chiefly to acts coming under the conditions of stimulation (9), (10), and (11), as stated in a foregoing paragraph. By imitation we shall mean the direct arousal of definite acts in one individual by their performance by another individual, usually, but not necessarily, of the same species. The important thing to stress in the definition is that the *specific act* by the one individual is the stimulus for the imitating act which closely copies it, for we wish to exclude the many gregarious acts which are clearly not imitative in the technical sense of the term, and would come under our cases (1), (3), (4), (6), (7), and (8). Since the behavior of one individual often has important biological significance for others, it is obvious that in phylogenetic history instinctive interest in fellows would have survival value as an original trait. Such interest is, however, not usually of the sort that centers attention on the specific acts performed. One animal, for example, by picking up food, or by attempting to get food, either by pecking or by scratching more or less at random, or by run-

ning about in play, is likely to arouse a fellow, not to duplicate these acts specifically, but to behavior resembling that of the stimulating animal in a general way; it may, indeed arouse it to general food-hunting or play activity, and since the structures of the two animals are alike the acts are apt to take on the form of imitation very closely. Yet this is hardly a case of imitation. The one animal has only increased the excitability of the other (lowered its stimulus threshold) to certain classes of stimuli; but its specific acts, as experiments show, are usually not copied. Thus if two animals are separated from their fellows the one may be aroused to greater uneasiness and make ceaseless efforts to return if its mate in confinement escapes and leaves it alone, though it may not duplicate the specific acts of the other which enabled it to escape, such as turning a button, pushing a bar, or walking up an inclined plane. This is clearly, then, only a case of the manifestation of gregariousness, even though the increased activity of the remaining animal leads by trial and error to immediate escape. Indeed, it has been shown in carefully controlled experiments on various types of animals that more specific duplication than this of an act of one (trained) animal by another is a very rare occurrence, even though the trained animal repeats the performance before the untrained one; and the few instances of exact copying that have been obtained are accounted for by most investigators either by accidental success of random acts somewhat limited in their field of exploration by the escape of the trained animal, or by the heightened receptivity to certain stimuli (direction of attention) that has been effected in the untrained animal. Similar results are to be expected from experiments on children as less carefully controlled observation indicates, though in the case of humans we need more investigation. That some acts are rather directly copied, however, cannot be denied, and in these few cases specific innate mechanisms seem to be provided by which the occurrence of the act in one individual tends directly to set the act off in another (our case 9). Yawning (man and some animals), smiling, screaming, and laughing in the case of man, and looking curiously at and examining certain objects, running in certain directions, flying when other members of the flock fly, and a few other such acts of a specific sort may thus be reproduced without training; but even in these cases, which are of little importance both in human and in animal behavior, the tendency is not so strong, nor are the acts so invariable, as some writers have assumed of imitative acts. In general, only those acts for which there is an adequate neural mechanism between stimulated organ and responding organ that can be set off by the specific act to be copied, can thus be copied imitatively; and certainly

such special mechanisms are not numerous even in man. The uncritical person who uses imitation so freely to explain social behavior, or the transmission of certain functional diseases, does not stop to consider the sort of mechanism that would be necessary for such imitation. The case quoted from Baudouin on the copying of responses of fear of a toad are certainly the results of some training and are brought out in neuro-pathic constitutions. Inquiry into the reason of decreasing intensity with successive generations, the reverse of what would be expected in purely imitative acts, is not made.

The greatest error of the imitation school, so far as general point of view is concerned, is that of regarding the individual as passive and indiscriminative to an unreal extent, and therefore directed in group or social activities largely by the actions momentarily perceived in others. Contrary to this view, the individual is essentially an organization of biological processes, the different functional divisions of which are perpetually interacting upon and mutually stimulating one another, as well as receiving stimuli from the environment. This has naturally not been wholly overlooked by the imitation school, but they have usually neglected the importance of this urge from within the individual, these larger determining tendencies acquired both through heredity and by the general consistency of the environment in the ontogenetic history. Self-assertion is probably not a specific instinct as McDougall, for instance, has assumed, but is a general characteristic of the impulses of the life processes, which are maintained only by keeping up constant relations with the external world. All of the various situations that confront one serve in a way to modify these processes, to direct them, but the individual is not so reflexly susceptible to modification by them as has been assumed. They may check activity at one point and facilitate it at another; but impediments and blocks to activity, whether by other organisms or by inorganic conditions, if they do not actually annihilate the organism, often tend only to increase the urge from within it, to enhance the relative importance of the environment of the distant past which has, somehow in the phylogenetic history, determined the hereditary structure and the general character of the organism.

It is an error to suppose that these adjustment processes in the organism are primarily conscious and purposive. Experiments have shown that even in higher forms of learning, many significant and determining circumstances are frequently overlooked by the individual, even though they influence the learning in the manner that they would if the principles involving their use were explicitly conscious. Such unconscious and semi-conscious adjustments, by which each individual becomes more or

less satisfactorily accommodated to his environment, is certainly frequent in our unreflective behavior, such as, favoring and accepting the views and prejudices of those persons who treat us kindly and from whom we derive certain benefits and aids.

In the processes of social adjustment stresses and anxieties arise, due to the fact that the individual is not passive and wholly amenable to the influence of immediate stimuli, just as one may get "turned round" in a new place or city and may struggle to get back to one's normal egocentric orientation. Ambitions and self-projections, or the more permanent and pronounced tendencies in one's development, arise out of the give-and-take of social life; and the failure of these ambitions is sometimes almost actual self-destruction, depending on the extent to which the ideals have been seriously entertained. As life gets to higher levels the satisfaction of mere hunger and of the primal biological impulses becomes of secondary importance to the freedom with which one can work out and realize the more far-reaching impulses to social expression, and minor conflicts become more prolonged and therefore more nerve-racking. The direction of development is more completely determined from within by inheritance and by the larger and more general consistency of the environment, and there is less tendency to yield to temporary pressure. Responses become more and more delayed and the effects of the several successive stimuli are prolonged so that all may work together simultaneously toward behavior that is more and more long-ranged and consistent with the larger circumstances. Various weaknesses thus show themselves more consistently in the self-conscious processes and become compensated for by appropriate adjustments and attitudes; and if contact with the social environment is not constant and natural, and competition is not within the easy range of one's powers, abnormal behavior arises because of failure to try out at every step one's projecting and determining impulses and ideas. Fears and anxieties result and further impede normal behavior, and complications increase.

It is obvious that this is a dynamic process of carefully, though not necessarily consciously, balancing and evaluating opposing impulses and inducements, one that cannot be understood or described in terms of any general formula that either the imitation or the association doctrine supplies. The overlapping of successive stimulus-effects is of great importance, and it is generally overlooked by the advocates of these passive conceptions which make behavior too much dependent upon the contingencies of immediate circumstances. It is well to avoid assumptions of spontaneity which frequently go with such terms as attention, will, purpose, perception of meaning or of ends. It is true that in the higher

ranges of this adjustment process these mental states are important; but we have no convincing evidence that the conscious aspects of them are forces in the popular sense of that term, that they contribute anything unique to the process by virtue of their being conscious. Not that they are epiphenomena apart from the biological process; they are probably but aspects of it at high tension. Mind is consequently not to be regarded as a directing factor in behavior in the sense of something spontaneous, sometimes assumed, but rather as an evolving mechanism whereby past experience can play its part with present conditions in the direction of the detached and locomotive organism. As one biologist has put it: "Just as the various steps in the metabolic process are dependent on those which preceded them, so when an organism becomes differentiated into parts, when the main process becomes subdivided into subsidiary ones, these react on each other. What is internal to the whole becomes external to the part. An external stimulus may set up an internal metabolic change, giving rise to a response whose extent and nature depend on the structure of the mechanism and its state when stimulated, that is to say, on the effect of previous responses. Such a response may act as an internal stimulus giving rise to further response, which may modify the first, and so on. Parts thus become marvelously fitted to set going, inhibit, or regulate each other's actions; and thus arises that power of individual adaptation, or self-regulation, so characteristic of living organisms."

Thus interacting parts in the higher conscious processes come to have the force of feeling of spontaneous characters, because they may so inhibit tendencies induced by present environment. Parts of the general process may become detached, as in the case of automatic writing, for instance, that the subject refers to them as controlling agencies outside of himself. "They make me" do this and that, we are told. Why these part processes are conscious as we find them, or self-conscious normally when all are taken together, and just what this implies as to the ultimate nature of reality, no one knows.

It is in the interactions of these part processes, as stimulated and nourished by present environment, that each impulse is checked, modified, or worked over into what may be called the *completest* or the *most* consistent response, from the present standpoint of the individual. To each individual the identical social and physical environment, objectively speaking, confronted at any point by all is peculiar; in one person it stimulates a response vastly different from that aroused in another, because to each with a different heredity and a different past it represents different possibilities and dangers. Though a considerable body

of facts about the nervous system is now available, we know very little yet of the nervous mechanisms and their mode of operation by which the effects of the various stimuli are thus held over for a time—as we know introspectively they are, as well as by objective experiment—and reorganized into unitary responses toward greater self-expression. This is an attractive field for future conquests, when we get over being satisfied with terms and conceptions that imply either too much passive receptivity to present stimuli and too much indeterminateness in the individual, on the one hand, or too great detachment from the world of casual relations on the other.

65. Imitation and the Conditioned Response¹

One of the first things which strikes the observer of children and adults alike is what seems a universal tendency to do as others do, to imitate. Everywhere may be seen examples of action apparently done not because the individual has himself decided that such an action fits the particular situation but because such and such another individual is performing or has performed the same action.

(1) *Nature of Imitation*

The fundamental thing about an imitative response is that it is similar to the stimulus which produced it. Putting this the other way round, the fundamental thing about a stimulus which produces an imitative response is that it is similar to the response which it evokes. I may imitate the sound of a locomotive more or less successfully, the gait of a man walking down the street, the action of a crowd taking off their hats. In each case the response I make is in some way similar to the stimulus.

There is the case of a crying baby. Originally the stimulus was perhaps a pain, but as the child cries he hears himself crying. Then we have S producing R, and with it the auditory stimulus S_2 , the sound of the baby's own cry in the baby's ears. Hence by the law of substitution of stimuli, S_2 , the auditory stimulus, produces R, the reaction, and the more the baby cries the more he cries. Now it does not make any difference to the infant whether the auditory stimulus, once established, comes from himself or from another child. Whenever he hears the sound of crying he will cry, until the reflex has disappeared by "lack of support" from the primary stimulus, that is, until he grows up and is not accus-

¹ Reprinted by permission from G. Humphrey "Imitation and the Conditioned Reflex" *Ped. Sem.* 1921: XXVIII: pp. 1; 3; 4; 5; 6-8; 9; 20.

tomed to hear himself crying. That is why the sound of a crying baby does not bring shrieks from a company of adults; the reflex has died out from lack of use.

There is another way in which imitation may come about, but by slightly different means. Suppose that a herd of cattle is feeding together and something occurs to startle them, perhaps the sound of a gun. They all manifest signs of fear and run in the opposite direction. Any individual, A, will, as he runs, see his fellows running, and this will always have occurred whatever the stimulus. Hence the sight of a running fellow will act as the conditioned stimulus for the activity of running. If now I drive a frightened animal into the field with the originally placid herd, it is very likely that the whole body will be stirred up to activity, especially at night when there are fewer conflicting stimuli.

There are still other ways in which imitation may arise, but all depend upon the fundamental process of the conditioned reflex. For instance, the child lying in the cradle makes many combinations of muscular responses to various stimuli, such as kicking or gurgling. The whole organism may be thrown into an intense activity by a single strong stimulus. If then the mother gurgles at the same time, gurgling on some future occasion may cause kicking or a dozen other actions from the repertoire, and no one then says that the child is imitating. But if the mother happens to gurgle at the same time as the child is gurgling and making few other movements, and gurgles more frequently when the child gurgles, then after a time the gurgle from the mother will call forth the "imitative" gurgle from the child. Here the original secondary stimulus comes from without, and we have a kind of converse of type one. There may be other types, but all will be found to depend, as these do, upon the establishment of a conditioned reflex where the secondary stimulus is similar to the reaction. Imitative action may be defined as *action involving a conditioned reflex the secondary stimulus of which is similar to the reaction.*

(2) *Integration of Imitative Actions*

Take a simple example of a childish imitation. "George. Age 1 year, 8 months. The other day there was a man at our house fixing the wall paper in one of the rooms. That evening George took a small camp chair and, pushing it to the wall, got up in it and rubbed the paper up and down. He did this two or three times." Or "Emma. Age 2 years, 4 months. Emma saw a girl out of doors throwing up a ball, running to catch it and laughing. For an hour or more after, Emma ran about the room, making believe to catch it, running about and laughing."

These two examples show the general working of the mechanism described. The act once imitated serves as its own stimulus.

The general connection between imitation and repetition is very marked. In fact it is hard to say where one ends and the other begins, whether repetition is not "self-imitation" just as often as it is response to repeated stimuli. Here we have repetition of an action imitated from others; this may be either response to repeated stimuli or imitation of self, the primary and secondary stimuli being identical. In either case the examples show the way in which integration adds step by step to the system.

This method by which imitative units combine with themselves to form "higher units" of conduct is well illustrated in the following simple example. "Bertha. Age 1 year. Bertha's mother dips the comb in the wash basin when she combs Bertha's hair. If Bertha is given a comb she strikes the edge of the basin with it, but puts it in her mouth as often as to her head." Here we have originally the visual stimulus of a certain motion of the arm (mother's) when a comb is in her hand. The imitation seems to arise somewhat as follows: primary stimulus, say sight of a bright object, reaction movement of the arm, secondary stimulus sight of arm moving. S_2 , the sight of the arm moving will at first provoke the reaction of moving the arm again. This will soon become inhibited because the original primary stimulus will be absent, and thus the reaction will die out. Now comes the fresh stimulus of the comb, which at the same time substitutes "hand with a comb" for "moving hand" as the exciting stimulus, and inhibits the inhibition of the original reflex. There is now operative and uninhibited the reaction of moving the arm at the visual stimulus of a comb in the hand. When the child is given a comb she moves her arm. It is notable, however, that she "puts it to her mouth as often as to her head," i. e., the movements she makes are not new ones but those she has already performed. She had learned already by trial and error to strike something with an object in her hand, to bring the object to her head and to her mouth. When she had seen her hand moving it had been with these motions, and therefore by conditioned reflex it is these motions which she reproduces. She did not "learn" the peculiar motion of combing the hair by imitation. She did not "copy" her mother's movement but reacted with a movement already in her repertoire.

This comparatively simple imitative act is found then to consist of the following processes: (1) An imitative conditioned reflex is formed, (2) this is inhibited. (3) the inhibition is inhibited by a new stimulus and at the same time (4) a new conditioned reflex is formed, leaving

(5) the imitative reflex the stimulus for which is motion of hand holding a certain object. Such imitative reflexes are very common. Yet another step in the integration comes when the child on seeing the object puts it in his hand. E. g., Roy. Age 2 years, 9 months. Roy went across the street where carpenters were building a house. He saw a chisel used. When he came home, without stopping to have his coat taken off he got a case knife and toy mallet and used them as he had seen the chisel used." Here we see the imitative units combining to form a higher unit, which is imitation of the *carpenter*. He had acquired the reflex of walking to a thing and grasping it in much the same way as above described of the child with a comb. This is tacked on to the object—stimulus reaction to the carpenter. When the boy reaches home he goes for the chisel and imitates the carpenter. Here is integration into a small imitative system. By conditioned reflexes such smaller systems may be combined into larger and yet larger wholes, the whole retaining a predominantly imitative flavor.

The discussion of the integration of imitative activities makes yet clearer the point upon which insistence has been laid, namely that an imitative activity, except for the minor difference of similarity between the secondary stimulus and the response, is ordinary conditioned reflex activity. Imitative reflexes can be built up into systems just as any other. Just as in the rest of life, the imitative stimulus "recedes" with development, from the immediate presentation of the senses to what is called an ideal.

Imitation, it has been seen, is not an instinctive or innate, but a learned, reaction, consisting of activity based upon conditioned reflexes where the secondary stimulus and the reaction are identical. This secondary stimulus may originate either in the same or in another organism, so that imitation may technically be either of self or others. Thus no new activity is learned by imitation, but only new combinations of activities already acquired, the action imitated serving to integrate a new series, the elements of which are already part of the organism's stock in trade. Accordingly the statement that a child learns so much by imitation is only true if by learning is understood "synthesis of previously performed reactions."

66. Suggestion ¹

Suggestion is a process of communication resulting in the acceptance with conviction of the communicated proposition in the absence of logi-

¹ Reprinted by permission from W. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, 15th ed., pp. 100-01. Boston. John W. Luce & Company, 1923.

cally adequate grounds for its acceptance. The measure of the suggestibility of any subject is, then, the readiness with which he thus accepts propositions. Of course, the proposition is not necessarily communicated in formal language, it may be implied by a mere gesture or interjection. The suggestibility of any subject is not of the same degree at all times; it varies not only according to the topic and according to the source from which the proposition is communicated, but also with the condition of the subject's brain from hour to hour. The least degree of suggestibility is that of a wide-awake, self-reliant man of settled convictions, possessing a large store of systematically organized knowledge which he habitually brings to bear in criticism of all statements made to him. Greater degrees of suggestibility are due in the main to conditions of four kinds—(1) abnormal states of the brain, of which the relative dissociation obtaining in hysteria, hypnosis, normal sleep, and fatigue, is the most important; (2) deficiency of knowledge or convictions relating to the topic in regard to which the suggestion is made, and imperfect organization of knowledge; (3) the impressive character of the source from which the suggested proposition is communicated; (4) peculiarities of the character and native disposition of the subject.

67. The Law of Suggestion¹

The full importance of the subject of suggestion cannot be grasped without holding in mind two fundamental facts in connection with our mental processes. The first fact is that mind is in its very nature impulsive and naturally leads to action. The present conception is that to secure action all that is necessary is to suggest the idea of the action in such a way that no competing or inhibiting idea arises, and then the idea of action will of itself lead to action. This is formulated in the so-called law of suggestion. *Every idea of an action (or function) will result in that action unless hindered by a competing idea or physical impediment.* If I try to think of pronouncing the letter "o," keeping clearly in mind the inhibiting idea that I am actually not to do it, I still find that the muscles at the base of my tongue quiver with the incipient movements of the pronunciation.

The second fundamental fact of the human mind referred to above is this. *Every idea that is suggested to the mind is held as truth, unless inhibited by some contradictory idea.* A conclusion which is suggested is

¹ From W. D. Scott, *Psychology of Public Speaking*, pp. 153-56. Published by Noble and Noble. Used by permission.

accepted as valid unless the idea of a possible alternative is called up at the same time.

The writers of formal logic seem to assume that man is but a logical machine, that he weighs evidence, formulates it into syllogistic order and then reaches the conclusions on which he bases his actions. The more modern conception of man is that he is a creature who rarely reasons at all. Indeed, one of the greatest students of the human mind assures us that most persons never perform an act of pure reasoning, but that all their actions are the results of imitation, habit, suggestion or some related form of thinking which is distinctly below that which could be called reasoning. Our most important actions are performed and our most sacred conceptions are reached by means of the merest suggestion. Great commanders of men are not those who are best skilled in reasoning with their subordinates. The greatest inspirers of men are not those who are most logical in presenting truth to the multitude. *In moving and inspiring men suggestion is to be considered as in every way the equal of logical reasoning.*

68. Suggestibility as an Attitude¹

We believe that *suggestibility is an attitude or set which makes a person amenable to a wide range of stimulus situations.* It is this set which makes associational processes easy, which makes possible immediate and complete responses to stimuli. It is our purpose to analyze the factors involved in this set, to show how such a set develops, how it influences a person's conduct, to what abnormal degrees it may go and to indicate how it may be measured by laboratory methods.

What strikes us particularly about suggestion is that the response is very likely to be out of all proportion to the strength of the stimulating situation. If the response were always directly proportional to the stimulus, there would be no occasion for the term suggestion. But this paradox is not confined to complex behavior. We know that even in reflex responses there is little general correspondence between the energy of the stimulus and that of the response. Some reflexes show a powerful response to a weak stimulus, while others give a feeble response to a strong stimulus. This situation is especially apparent in the so-called spread of a stimulus. As a stimulus becomes stronger the response becomes more and more widespread until the "irradiation" may involve the larger part of the organism. In all this spreading only those muscles

¹ Reprinted by permission from J. J. B. Morgan "The Nature of Suggestibility" *Psy. Rev.* 1924: XXXI: pp. 464-68.

are involved which lead to a harmonious result. The nature of this spreading has been clearly set forth by the researches of Exner and Sherrington. They showed that two stimuli acting simultaneously can either lead to a combined harmonious result or they can antagonize each other and lead to a conflicting result. The former situation is related to the simple spreading caused by increasing the strength of a single stimulus and was called by them facilitation. The latter situation they called inhibition.

There is good reason to believe that these phenomena of facilitation and inhibition apply to more complex mental processes as well as to the simple reflexes. It is quite possible to have a situation which would lead to a certain complex form of behavior in the normal organism. In the face of such a situation it is possible to have an organism tuned to respond in the same way that the situation dictates. Here the inner set and the outward stimuli reinforce each other and you have the phenomenon of facilitation. Viewed from another angle we can say that the person was suggestible. On the other hand, the set of the individual might be such that it opposed the sort of reaction that the outside situation demands. Here we have a competitive situation and the external stimuli might be neutralized by the internal set and the person not respond at all. In such circumstances the person would appear to be negativistic. To say a person is suggestible is only another way of saying that he is tuned to respond to some external situation; to say he is negativistic is another way of stating the fact that his internal set is opposed to the external stimuli of the moment.

Not only may the same individual differ in the relation of his attitude toward an external situation at different times but there is a fairly constant attitude that may be attributed to the same individual in different circumstances. We may have a person who is habitually suggestible or negativistic. The fact that the internal set harmonizes with and reinforces the external stimulus situation has been called dynamogenesis, but this term actually attributes potency in some mysterious manner to the internal set when as a matter of fact the apparent dynamic force is simply the result of harmony.

So far we have considered only conditions where the organism as a whole either harmonizes or antagonises the external situation. In these cases we have what is usually considered normal suggestibility or negativism. There is another factor that needs to be considered and that is the possibility of parts of the organism acting independently. This gives rise to what are known as automatisms. The responses which involve the whole unified organism are known as expressive movements; that

is, the external situation acts as a suggestion which sets off a response in harmony with the set of the individual. In automatic movements the suggestion or external stimulus is in harmony with a partial set and causes a response which may be quite foreign to another part of the personality. The response is automatic in that it occurs without the full co-operation of the individual. In order for an automatic movement to occur there must be a certain degree of dissociation of the personality.

The degree to which persons can respond to a suggestive situation or can dissociate so as to respond partially to a stimulus while partially occupied with another situation varies greatly in the same individuals at different times, and in different circumstances, as well as in different individuals. Binet found that children differed in suggestibility and thought that this might be related to intelligence. Stein found that in some subjects intense mental application favored instead of inhibiting automatic movements. Janet, as stated above, held that suggestibility is the criterion of hysteria; that an hysteric has to an abnormal extent yielded to the influences of certain situations until they have an overwhelming influence upon him; he cannot possibly resist the influence of the situations. Janet has also shown very clearly a direct relation between minor degrees of dissociation such as occur in automatic movements, sleep walking, fugues and the extreme dissociations of hypnosis and double personality.

Freud describes suggestible persons as those showing the possibility of transfer, by which he means those persons who are able to bestow their affection upon another, to take others into their confidence and to receive advice and suggestions from others. This type of person, if he develops a neurosis, is called by Freud a transference neurotic. By this he means one who has a neurosis which can be projected upon another individual. Such a patient is accessible, his confidence can be won and there is a possibility of curing him by analysis. Over against this type of person he describes the one who is negativistic, from whom a transfer cannot be obtained. If this type of person becomes neurotic, he becomes introverted, turns in on himself, will take no one into his confidence and resists all attempts of an outsider to give him suggestions.

All these facts point to the conclusions that *suggestibility is an attitude or set on the part of the individual which may be a temporary or chronic attitude, which may involve the whole organism and thus be what we call an expressive attitude or it may involve only a part of the individual's personality and involve dissociation, and, finally, that this dissociation may develop to such an extent that one shows a double personality.*

69. Sympathy and the Conditioned Response¹

Many explanations have been given of organic or unreflective sympathy, that fellow feeling which we experience when another member of our own species is in physical trouble or pain or some other such elementary situation.

It will be maintained that the simpler types of sympathy, which are known by some as "organic" sympathy, are produced in accordance with the mechanism of the conditioned reflex, and an attempt will be made to trace out the consequences of this theory in certain further development.

Axiomatic for the view here presented is the proposition that another human being is originally like any other stimulus to the infant, presenting no peculiar features and no intrinsic differences from any other combination of stimuli. The process of the gradual development of the environment, or stimulus concept, as opposed to the sensation, is a commonplace. After the marking off of the environment, now arises the distinction within the environment between things and persons. This has its origin in the physical similarity of one organism to another, and in the congruity of response in the two cases. The first factor has been clearly brought out in the literature, but the second will perhaps repay a brief account.

At an early age the cry of a baby and the cry of another baby seem to serve, either of them, as the stimulus for further crying. The sound of crying has, by the mechanism of the conditioned reflex, become a secondary stimulus for the reaction of crying. Similarly the sight of a moving hand may start the child moving his own hand, again by the conditioned reflex mechanism. At this stage, as far as the hearing or the sight of them goes, it seems to be relatively indifferent to the infant to whom the voice or the hand belongs, to itself or another. A similar state of things probably prevails with the other parts of the body. But there comes a time when the bodily reactions and the bodily parts of others are clearly set off from the infant's own bodily parts and reactions. The integration of the one goes to form the first elementary conception of the child's own personality. The integration of the other forms the conception of "a man like unto myself."

What then is the difference between the "self" integration and the "other person" integration? As far as the outward and visible sign goes, the two would appear to be of entirely the same calibre. Objectively, that

¹ Reprinted by permission from G. Humphrey "The Conditioned Reflex and the Elementary Social Reaction" *J. Abn. & Soc. Psy.* 1922-23: XVII: pp. 113; 114-16; 117-19.

is, the two are similar. The difference is on the subjective side. My own limbs are connected up with my own sensations, of a specific, subjective kind that do not belong to the limbs of others. But it is to be insisted again that as judged by the "distance receptors" so called, my own body and that of my neighbor are on a par, not identical but similar. My hand looks like my neighbor's, makes the same noise when it splashes the water as my neighbor's, perhaps smells like my neighbor's. But like the parsley in Bre'r Rabbit, it isn't my neighbor's.

Now, through the mechanism of the conditioned reflex and otherwise, I guide my actions by means of past experience. Originally the human being is equipped with certain reactions which are touched off by certain biologically adequate stimuli. Other stimuli reach the organism simultaneously with these originally adequate stimuli, and are given meaning, becoming secondary stimuli by Pavlov's well-known law. Chaos is reduced. Thus Pavlov's dogs, which learned to anticipate food when a green light was shown them, were using the mechanism to guide their present actions by past experience.

Now of this kind of learning, the greater part takes place by means of the distance receptors. The majority of secondary stimuli are of an auditory or visual nature, and it is within the bounds of possibility that the chief function of these organs is exactly this blossoming out of their data into conditioned stimuli. Certain it is that there are at birth very few discriminated reactions functioning through them. In addition to motor reactions, the pleasantness-unpleasantness feeling and the emotions also become conditioned, that is, are given stimuli secondary to those originally operative, and again, most of this kind of learning takes place through the medium of the distance receptor.

Drawing together, then, the argument up to this point, it would be expected that, at the stimulus which has produced pleasantness or unpleasantness in my own past experience, pleasantness or unpleasantness will follow again, even though the stimulus in question originally came from my own body and now comes from the body of some one else. Pain one would not expect so to occur, pain being of course a sensation. Now this is exactly what happens. If I hold my hand in a candle, I experience the sensation of pain together with the feeling of unpleasantness. If some one else holds his hand in the flame, I do not experience the sensation of pain but I do have the feeling of unpleasantness, because the sight of my hand in fire has in the past been accompanied by feelings of unpleasantness. Similarly, the smell of burning flesh is highly distressing to most of us, and even the other accompaniments of intense nervous shock, such as nausea, often arise vicariously by this mechanism of con-

ditioned stimulation. Here the primary stimulus is the burning of my hand, the secondary stimulus the sight and smell of burning flesh. Sometimes, though this is abnormal, even the actual sensation of pain is produced in such cases, as in example given by Professor Burnham, where a mother seeing an injury to her boy actually felt a sharp pain in the same place.

In still more complex actions and systems of conditioned reflexes I also judge a man by my own experience. A deeply embedded habit becomes sacred to me, and I experience a feeling of unpleasantness when it is broken (Stout and Dewey). The unpleasantness is the natural compass, keeping us within the bounds of the action which has been found in the past to be satisfactory, and registering deviation from the path, and is roughly proportionate to the strength and depth of the habit and the amount of deviation. Now if some one else in the same situation *breaks my habit*, a parallel feeling of unpleasantness is caused, again by the mechanism of the conditioned reflex. This is the germ of a certain kind of social ban. Thus in England, to one who has always dressed for dinner and whose family has always dressed for dinner, sitting down for the evening meal *en famille* in morning clothes will seem an outrage, whether it be the person concerned or some one else that is the culprit. It is the very strength of the impulse leading to the deep seated habit and the fact that this habit has become so fundamental in the individual that makes the breach so painful. Similarly, if it has been my lifelong habit always to rise at six A. M., then to contemplate lying in bed till ten is unpleasant, whether I do it or some one else. Habits are chains of conditioned reflexes. The pleasantness-unpleasantness reaction seems to have for its purpose, in part at least, to call attention to any deviation from the habit. If then I observe another person in a situation that would normally be taken care of by one of my own habits, I am apt to be uncomfortable unless the situation serves as the stimulus for some stronger reaction such as those feelings connected with self gratification. In the early nineteenth century all foreigners were apt to be "nasty foreigners" in England, because they lived differently.

If further there is a person whose whole form of life, complex of habits, and personality, are alien to my own, I find that person irritating. Such a person is continually violating by proxy the habits which I have formed. This is the foundation of much married misery. Just why the untidy person should irritate the tidy one is difficult to answer on any other hypothesis. It cannot be put down altogether to the fact that the tidy person has to do the work ultimately, nor to encroachment on the personality of the tidy individual. These may sometimes play a part, but

at least of equal importance seems the fact that actual feelings of unpleasantness are aroused by the acts in themselves, apart from their consequences. Thus the utilitarian school of morals would seem to be psychologically disproved in their assertion that our only criterion of actions can come from their results. At least in other people, it would seem that actions may be pleasant or unpleasant in themselves, apart from their effects. If again some one else's habits, or individual actions go still more fundamentally against my most deeply ingrained habits, then the emotions may be called into action, and finally the situation becomes intolerable, as in many cases of "mutual incompatibility." This was clearly seen by Plato in his illustration of the perfectly good man, who would, he said, be scourged and ultimately crucified. It was not that the people dislike goodness, for in small doses most of us rather admire it. Rather the spectacle of a man who systematically outrages all our most cherished habits of selfishness and other little meannesses is more than most of us can stand. We require a person that is "made human" by his faults. The Jews crucified Christ, and it is true, as the medievalists have it, that in crucifying Christ we crucify ourselves.

70. Compensation¹

In the effort of the psyche to foster the important organs and functions which it selects for its special care, organic defect may be compensated by excess of nervous activity. Indeed, most compensations are in the psychic though not necessarily in the conscious field. No one is perfect, and hence compensation is necessary for all. It makes for, if indeed it does not make, consciousness itself. Those organs and functions which the psyche cannot directly or indirectly control decay or become stigmata. Where the brain fails to establish a compensatory system we have all the hosts of neuroses and psychoses. The existence of sub- or abnormal organs or functions always brings Janet's sense of incompleteness or insufficiency, and this arouses a countervailing impulsion to be complete and efficient which those to whom nature gave lives of balanced harmony do not feel. The ideal goal is always to be a whole man or woman in mind and body, and this may crop out in the childish wishes that are sometimes fulfilled in dreams, in the ambition of the boy who aches to be a man, and in general in the desire to overcome all defects and to evolve a full-rounded, mature, powerful and well-balanced personality. To illustrate, each bilateral organ compensates for defect in

¹ Reprinted by permission from G. Stanley Hall "A Synthetic Genetic Study of Fear" (Ch. I). *A. J. Psy.* 1914: XXV: pp. 166; 167; 168.

the other, one sense for another like touch for sight in the blind. Mozart had an imperfectly developed ear; Beethoven had otosclerosis; Demosthenes stammered and, as if mythology had recognized this law, many of the ancient gods were defective. Odin had but one eye; Tyr, one hand; Vulcan was lame; Vidar dumb. So, too, the ugly Socrates made himself a beautiful soul. A man with a weak digestion becomes a dietetic expert in battling with fate. Little men walk straight; tall men stoop. Handsome men are superficial.

Sex weakness is supplemented by fancies of superpotence. Many diseases have compensating forms with which they alternate or for which they vicariate and the very principle of immunization is involved. Weak parts and functions draw attention and are invigorated thereby. Fear of an object excites interest in it and this brings the knowledge which casts out fear. Very much of the total energy of all of us and still more of that of neurotics and psychotics is spent in developing and using devices of concealment (*Deckphenomena*) of diseases and defects. Thus often the higher protective and defensive mechanisms come to do the work of the subnormal function even better than it would do it. Conversely compensation has its limits and when it breaks down we have anxiety.

It involves a sense of inferiority, inadequacy and great inner tension.

If the good, strong, healthy, higher components can neither improve nor atone for the bad, weak, low or morbid elements, anxiety, conscious or unconscious, supervenes, values lose their worth, we tend to take refuge from reality in fancies, and innate momenta are arrested and we suffer we know not what, perhaps fear itself.

The work of great artists is often a complement of their lives, expressing in most ideal form what they most lack.

The sense of defect prompts training and education to cure and also countless devices to hide them. Culture corrects the errors of instinct and dress hides deformities. Thus nurture supplements nature, and environment has to rectify heredity. These processes constitute consciousness, which is always more or less remedial.

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises

1. Is there an instinct of imitation?
2. How is imitation explained by modern psychology? (Consult Thorndike and Humphrey.)
3. Give ten different uses of the word imitation citing your own examples. (Consult Peterson.)

4. Show how feelings and emotions play a part in so-called "fashion imitation."
 5. Why is it easier to get a song, a dance, a phrase, a fad imitated than a fundamental philosophic or scientific principle of living?
 6. What is suggestion? Discuss with reference to papers cited above.
 7. Why is one suggestible?
 8. Does suggestion depend more upon the nature of the stimulus presented or upon the mental set and idea which is aroused thereby?
 9. Distinguish between suggestion and other forms of stimulus and response.
 10. Upon what grounds does Morgan base his contention that suggestibility rests upon the same ground as attitudes?
 11. Illustrate the laws of suggestion given by Scott (a) from crowd behavior; (b) from propaganda. Why is suggestion more powerful in moving people than "cool" reason?
 12. How do modern advertisers employ the principles of suggestion and imitation? Give concrete examples.
 13. What is the suggestion in each of the following phrases:
 - a) "The full dinner pail";
 - b) "America for the Americans";
 - c) "The Color Line";
 - d) "The Yellow Peril";
 - e) "The Rising Tide of Color";
 - f) "The Passing of the Great Race";
 - g) "America, the Land of the Free and the Home of the Brave";
 - h) "Lecture for Men Only" or "Lecture for Women Only."
 14. What is the suggestion in the price mark \$4.98?
 15. List other phrases and instances from advertising and current writing wherein suggestion plays an important rôle.
 16. Indicate how imagery of what the other person is doing, saying or experiencing is essential to sympathy.
 17. Why are small children usually rather unsympathetic?
 18. Why is sympathy not full grown until adolescence?
 19. Give an illustration of compensation from your own life or from that of some one known to you.
 20. Cite cases from historical persons where compensation is evident.
 21. Relate compensation to the mechanism of conditioned response.
- B. Topics for Class Reports
1. Review Watson's criticism of imitation as a factor in animal learning. (Cf. bibliography.)
 2. Review Adler's theory of compensation. (Cf. bibliography.)
- C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers
1. The Concept of Imitation in Social Psychology. An Historical Study.

2. Compensation and Social Behavior.
3. The Interrelation of Suggestion, Imitation and Invention.

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CHAPTER XII

THE MENTAL PROCESSES AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

I. INTRODUCTION

While the instinctive-emotional trends furnish the foundation of the social behavior, the intellectual functions play a very important part in determining the direction which this behavior takes. In the present chapter we are concerned largely with the mechanisms of the so-called higher mental processes.

The opening paper discusses the matter briefly from the standpoint of attention and behavior, indicating that attention is a valid concept with which to describe the relation of the organism, as a totality, to the situations in which it finds itself. Attention, in turn, is dependent upon a variety of internal and external factors. These explicit and implicit determiners are seen in operation quite as much in the field of social conduct as in the relation of the individual to his physical world.

Peterson's discussion of the place of ideas in social groups offers a modified behavioristic account of the idea and its place in social interrelations. Moreover, he indicates the essential conservatism of ideas which are social in their implication. (It is this continuity of ideas which is basic to what we have previously discussed under the general term "culture.") He has also shown again the place of crisis and of common groups of stimuli in reference to certain uniformity of responses. Thus, the universality of feeling, idea, attitude, and habit depends first on a commonality of animal mechanism, second on a certain uniformity of social and cultural stimuli, resulting in a general and more or less common response system.

The quotation from Thomas indicates the importance of considering the psychological development of races and culture groups in terms of opportunity, culture background, and innate mental capacity. Often that which we take to be original nature turns out, upon investigation, to be due to social and cultural conditioning of a different order than our own. Thus, in a mental test of an African

child, to ask the time if one reverses the hands of clock from any stated position is nonsense since the African child does not have clocks in his culture; similarly to inquire "What is the thing to do if you are going somewhere and miss your car"? when cars are unknown to him. Analogously one would scarcely expect our first-rate philosopher, thrown into an arctic environment, to understand at once the nice trick of making fire by a bow drill, or to manage a dog team, or to make a pair of watertight boots. We have been too prone to attribute to innate racial mentality factors dependent upon culture training.

The paper by Lund reveals the fundamental aspects of belief. He shows the large emotional content in belief, the tendency to rationalize it, the persistence of beliefs once formed, and the highly important fact that knowledge and belief are merely matters of degree. We shall see in subsequent papers on crowd behavior and public opinion, particularly, how these principles work themselves out.

Not only is the conscious control of behavior to be reckoned with in social life, but outside this field there lies the function of the unconscious or subconscious processes. It is hardly necessary to declare one's allegiance to any particular theory of the subconscious or unconscious. Only a pedantic myopia would lead one to deny that much of our behavior is not consciously determined. Only an ignorance of facts would deny that impressions reach us and later affect our behavior, which have never been in the focus of attention.

The selection from Bleuler gives a statement of the place of the unconscious in behavior. Somewhat different interpretations may be had from Prince, Freud, Jung, and others. (Consult bibliography).

The thought processes are related distinctly to the self or ego. What we attend to, what we form judgments on, what we reason about, the foundations of our concepts—all these have their center in our self or ego organization. And basic to the self or ego lie the instinctive trends and the emotions. It is the recognition of this fact which led Adler to his theory of the ego drive as the most powerful of all, this in contrast with the thesis of Freud that the core of the self lay in the sex drive.¹

The direction of attention, the organization of associative think-

¹ Freud has latterly modified his theory to take into account the ego impulse as well as that of sex.

ing, the development of rationalization, all reveal this egocentric center of mental life, just as thoroughly as attitudes and habits reveal the same thing in overt action. The papers by Wells and Bleuler on autistic or dereistic as contrasted with objective thinking show the nature of the associative processes as projected on the field of experience.

Dereistic thought has hitherto been considered only in relation to extreme life organizations such as dementia praecox where one may invent a new language, a novel interpretation of the universe, and a distinctly egocentric life organization often unknown to any one but the patient. Today, however, we recognize that dereistic thinking is universal. Its extremes we have noted, but upon careful examination we see it functioning in religion, in art, and in verbalisms essential to social control. Many of our stereotypes, described in a subsequent chapter, are dereistic in nature. Certainly such phrases not long ago popular as King Kleagle, Klanton, Hydra of Realms, and the like, partake of this nature. So, too, dereistic thinking is evident in wit, particularly in the pun. There is much of it in metaphor; and it is evident in a good deal of loose subjective philosophy which speaks of "spiritual essences," "affluent liquids," and so on.

One further caution is necessary. Objective or realistic thought is very rare except in the most advanced sciences. The bulk of our associative thinking really takes place somewhere between the extremes of dereistic thinking, which we have just mentioned, and the objective standards of the natural sciences. And it would be ignorance indeed if we failed to see that even in the latter the fictions of the mind did not play an enormous rôle.

Man has everywhere tended to explain his behavior. His explanation, moreover, conforms to culture standards and to the generalized assumptions about conduct accepted by one's group. Rationalization is the term now usually applied to this tendency to give "good" and "acceptable" reasons for conduct rather than the "real" reasons or motives. Of course, much of our rationalization is only in part consciously formulated. Much of it springs out of the unconscious where rest the social codes. The two papers by Wells and Robinson give somewhat different aspects of this important mechanism. It must be borne in mind that rationalization as used in these selections is not synonymous with this word as used in the older

philosophy to describe the rational mental functions, that is, reason and judgment. Gates has suggested that the word "irrationalization" would better describe the process.

Another point. Some current writers imply that rationalization is at once a sin and an indication of abnormality. These are usually persons who look for man to be a deliberate, well-reasoned creature and hence consider rationalization, as here defined, a mark of incompetence and infantilism. If we accept the facts already referred to that man is motivated by his deeper impulses and trends, that man is not a reasoning animal, the logic books to the contrary notwithstanding, we shall see that rationalization has a distinct social function. It keeps the person within the limits of socially accepted motives. It offers a socially-determined defense mechanism for conduct. It protects the person, in short, from the severe strain of reasoning and the solution of problems in a more objective but less pleasant way. So long as man is moved by emotions and feelings, so long as the "logic of feeling" controls us, rationalization will serve a very valuable purpose in maintaining some balance in the personality, even though the integration be not of the most satisfactory sort.

II. MATERIALS

A. THE CONSCIOUS PROCESSES

71. Attention and Behavior ¹

The higher mental processes including the mechanisms of conditioned response, co-ordination, inhibition and integration depend upon the cerebral cortex or the new brain. The new brain was the last division of the central nervous system to evolve in the course of animal evolution. Whereas the operation of the deeper innate tendencies such as hunger, sex, fear, anger and love rest upon structures laid down in the lower brain centers and the spinal cord, the higher mental performances, the higher skills and habits, are mediated through the cerebral centers only. While we may accept the objective standpoint in reference to behavior, we must realize that in dealing with these more complex functions, we are, in part, compelled to use the descriptive terms of functional psychology.

¹ From the writer's notes.

There are four fundamental processes of the psychological functioning which we should note. They are (1) the capacity for perception, (2) the capacity for retention or memory of the impressions brought us through perception, and (3) the capacity for association and integration of these impressions and (4) the inhibitory capacity which is so important in intellectual functions and in will. These four functions are basic to all that is human and social in our behavior. This is the field of image and idea. This is the field which makes possible deliberation and foresight. For our purposes, however, we need not go into the technical aspects of these higher functions. We need but examine the more general features of the conscious processes.

We may think of the individual in his response to any but the simplest situations as possessing some awareness or consciousness of what he is doing. This consciousness may, for our purposes, be defined under the general term attention. Attention describes the direction of response or activity toward a particular stimulus. Attention is distinctly an aspect of the more or less unified functioning of the individual as a whole.

Now the factors which determine attention and hence movement are both internal and external to the human organism. These internal and external stimuli run all the way from the simpler more deep-seated types to those acquired after years of patient concern with art, science, or philosophy. We sketch briefly first the external and then the internal conditions of attention drawing our illustrations wherever possible from social behavior.

The functioning of the external factors depends upon the specialized organs of sense called the receptors. The more familiar of these involve vision, audition, smell, taste, tactile senses, kinæsthetic or muscle senses, systematic or visceral senses, and equilibration.

(a) We may mention eight principle features of the external stimuli which induce attention: (1) At the outset we have all forms of novel or striking stimuli such as bright lights, new colors as in fashions, new sounds such as we have in the voices of strangers, and all sorts of new odors and tastes. (2) The matter of intensity of the stimulus is also important. The more violent or vigorous the stimuli are, the more tendency is there for that stimulus to control the field of attention. Thus the loud voiced individual or the highly colored ritual would attract a person and lead to response where the less intense or more ordinary stimulus would not.

(3) The size of the stimulus is pertinent. Large houses, large populations, large quantities attract us. This is important today with our intense concern with physical materials. So too, large physical stature

would have a pull on attention important for social action. A man six feet two inches tall who weighed two hundred and twenty pounds would stand out in a crowd far more than a man of average height and weight. There is, then, an attentional basis to physical size as a factor in social leadership. (4) The form or configuration of the stimuli also affects the direction of attention. Not only the novelty, the intensity, and the size of the stimuli is important but the arrangement of the same. (5) Likewise the mode of presentation is to be taken into account. For social behavior the influence of person on person is largely mediated through hearing and seeing. The use of other sense modalities will not make the appeal to the attention and hence response like the approach through the ear or the eye. For this reason auditory and visual stimulation are significant in social control. (6) Change in stimuli also affects the course of attention. While this has relation to number one, above, we may think particularly of the place which the movement of stimuli have. The dead monotony of tones of a dull speaker in contrast to the flexibility of a good speaker is illustrative.

(7) Repetition of stimuli is one of the most fundamental principles. This is significant for habit formation. It is highly important in the whole process of socialization. It is through the constant repetition of injunctions and codes that the child learns the definitions of situations from his group, just as it is by repetition that he learns his multiplication table or the techniques of handicraft.

(8) Finally, there is the definiteness of stimuli. Along with repetition must go specificity. The stimuli given the child to bring him within the limits of the group interaction must be distinct and concrete. They must be certain and more or less unchanging. The whole construction of social ritual which is the heart of the folkways and the mores, as well as the core of all techniques of survival, depends upon repetition and definiteness of stimuli as a part of their method.

(b) Of the internal stimuli we may mention the following: (1) There is the whole field of physiological determiners of activity. This furnishes the physical substratum of higher functions. Thus the operations of the hormones in the sex glands give rise to restlessness and seeking leading to sexual interest and activity. So likewise with hunger, and thirst there are here definite physiological foundations which condition the attention. Again fatigue and illness influence the direction of attention. Weariness produces not only a certain dullness, it also heightens suggestibility. It makes possible the operation of other internal and external stimuli otherwise ineffective. So, too, diseases affect the direction of attention. Such a disease as tuberculosis, for example, produces a sense of euphoria

which is not at all correlated with the physical possibilities of recovery.

(2) Closely related to the physiological conditions, but dependent also upon the functioning of the cortex of the brain, are the emotional changes. The emotions give the whole organism an internal set or preparation for action which in the history of the race has been most important. Fear produces preparation for flight and avoidance, rage, no doubt, for fighting, and love for sexual embrace. When we take into account the vast extent of conditioning which goes on in the emotional field, we realize that the emotions become highly significant in determining the course of attention. We shall see this factor made clear over and over again in the rise of personality, in the field of prejudice, leadership, crowd behavior and public opinion.

(3) The muscle tensions or proprioceptive sensations help determine attention. This is important in the interplay of person on person in the field of gross bodily gestures and facial gesture as well as in the postural tensions pertinent to physical movement in a crowd, for instance. These internal pressures are here correlated, of course, with the external stimuli of pushing, seeing, hearing and the like in the crowd.

(4) One of the most significant group of factors determining attention we may call the field of the old associations or the apperceptive mass. Here we have images and ideas or concepts which play so large a part in deciding the direction of attention and action. The images and concepts of mother, father, home, country, right conduct, etc., etc., are highly important in furnishing the basis for attention to social objects of all sorts. This is evident in the case of the stereotypes, of prejudice, of legends and myths. It is seen in the play of the orator on his audience or crowd, in the appeal of organs of public opinion.

(5) Likewise the purposes, the aims and ideals of the person determine the attention. What the psychologist calls "Aufgabe" or what Professor Burnham terms the "task" is highly important in directing the course of the attention and response. Since aims and purposes are for the personality so largely determined by social conditioning, any particular set of purposes, like any set of old associations, are rooted firmly in the social experience of the individual.

(6) Finally, the old associations and the purposes of the individual are related to the attitudes. The likes, dislikes, the avoidances, the anxieties, the hatreds, the loves come into play here. Attitude is essentially a mental-motor set to activity. It thus at once marks the inception of response and gives the direction to it. In truth, the images, ideas, and purposes are closely correlated with the attitudes in determining the course of attention and behavior.

In actuality, of course, the internal and the external factors, which we have sketched, operate together. For instance, in the case of a social ritual both repetition and definiteness of stimuli are important. But to these must be added images, ideas and attitudes before the full meaning can be clear. Thus while elaborate church service may impress the stranger, its full significance is apparent only to the initiated person. Thus, though physical size is important in leadership, to make it really effective, ideas and images of greatness and importance must be added. In fact, the more highly developed the form of social behavior, the more intermingled these two sets of factors become. It is, of course, in the field of the internal stimuli wherein the greatest changes are made in the organism. This is the field particularly influenced by acquirement, hence it is perhaps safe to say it is the aspect of attention which is most significant for social psychology.

In short, through conditioning and integration the world of social objects and social images and ideas becomes built into the person. They furnish the internal bases of attention and action. These arise, on the one side, from the cultural patterns to which he has been exposed and, on the other, from the social life in which he has participated.

72. The Functioning of Ideas in Social Groups¹

In social psychology terms are still commonly used in a very loose and vague manner. It is not so much the kind of terms used as it is the conception of them that is to be guarded. The child inherits socially from the group his ideas, language, customs, etc., and these mold him gradually into the likeness of his fellows, roughly speaking. It would seem desirable in view of certain tendencies in psychology to attempt a more precise statement, in terms of *stimulus and response*, of the social relationships of individuals.

One is likely to be on safe grounds in holding that all ideas arise by a process in the main like that illustrated in the case of the child, that is, that ideas are developed by the association of certain acts with given stimuli. But this association depends, as was suggested in the foregoing, upon inner instinctive tendencies and selective dispositions. It is of course admitted that when many ideas have been acquired by a child he may elaborate these and develop new ones by various combinations of those already attained, and by the substitution of one term already understood for another. That ideas come thus from experience

¹ Reprinted by permission from J. Peterson "The Functioning of Ideas in Social Groups" *Psy. Rev.* 1918: XXV: pp. 214; 219-22; 222-23; 224-26.

wholly no one would likely now deny, though it could not be held by anyone that the mind begins with the passivity implied by Locke's *tabula rasa* conception. It is also to be noted here, to avoid misunderstanding, that in experienced individuals many of the responses here spoken of are not immediate overt acts. Many are more or less delayed, being impeded by others, sublimated into larger responses to almost inconceivable complexities. Allowing for such complications and indirect responses—provided that the instinctive dispositions of the subject are normal and that the fatigue effects and other physiological conditions are as before when the idea was acquired—I see no reason why an idea should not express itself in an act when the recurring stimulus “brings it up in the mind.”

Our point is that to make social psychology free from some of the errors of the older psychology we must get objectively at the nature of ideas, and must understand their origin. From this point of view an idea is a disposition to response, which is associated with a certain kind of objective stimulus, usually a spoken or a written word. Physiologically it is a stimulus-response mechanism whose neural connections are empirically established or developed, a mechanism which in the highly developed individual (or “mind”) becomes extensively particularized both as to type of adequate stimulus and as to the nature of the response; i. e., it becomes *freed* from other stimuli and responses usually associated with it in a larger complex. This does not, of course, deny that in larger and more complex stimulus situations it may function in combination with other such mechanisms. In this sense comparative psychologists speak of “free ideas,” which are usually denied to animals below man. An idea, then, is a sort of acquired, more or less detachable, stimulus-response disposition, or habit. In its most elementary aspect it may function in numerous combinations with other such habits, just as a given word may function in various contexts in a language.

Strictly speaking nothing is communicated when one person tells another something. Not even *meanings* are communicated, in this sense. The second person is stimulated auditorily—or visually if he reads the communication—and what he gets out of the stimulus is what his own experience or training has associated with the word-stimuli. This is obvious if persons of different language groups attempt to converse. They do not understand each other, and must resort to gestures that have approximately equal associations for the two individuals. They have not become accustomed to the same word associations. Conversation in highly abstract and condensed terms is possible only to those with similar experience sufficient to make quickly the multiplicity of associa-

tions with previous acts or experience suggested. That is why education must always, if it is to be real and function successfully, keep close at first to laboratory experiments and to actual first-hand experience, and relax only gradually on these matters as the individual gets the necessary basis for the more symbolic procedure.

Why is it then that ideas are so persistent in generations, and that the older individuals get the new ideas with so much difficulty, if at all? Why is it that the social world changes so slowly? This is most easily understood if we think of the fact that for any important change to take place in society *both the stimulus-systems and the acquired habit-systems must change together*. Wholly new stimuli have no significance; they do not call out any definite response. New ideas must be *learned* just as more explicit acts or habits are learned by an interaction process. Habits are changed only as the necessities of organic needs demand, or as compelled by circumstances. Moreover, and of particular significance here, it is to be noted that, since all the members of the social group have acquired practically identical responses to the several stimuli, one person cannot begin new types of response to particular stimuli without conflict with his fellows. It is also impossible to change instantaneously and extensively the usual stimulating conditions. These difficulties are met, e. g., in our attempts to simplify our spelling, or to get rid of our Fahrenheit thermometer scale. We cannot get rid of old books at once; hence our children must, on the one hand, be under a confusion resulting from the use of both kinds of spelling with the old predominating, and the adults, on the other hand, who have learned to spell in the old way, cannot easily fall in with the new. Only a few enthusiastic individuals, who have been influenced indirectly by certain scientific tendencies, act as the new stimuli to other individuals. Likewise with the thermometer situation and with the taking on of new kinds of tools and of improved methods. The old materials cannot be at once destroyed without too much waste and effort, nor can the new habits be suddenly acquired by all. The new meets difficulties both of a physical and of a physiological nature. This dual aspect of change in social customs, beliefs, etc., has usually been neglected because of a too subjective treatment of ideas. It is instructive to imagine the inconceivably complex modifications required in any change of this kind. These difficulties are all obvious and concrete when we regard ideas objectively as acquired tendencies to respond in certain ways on the occurrence of given stimuli. This view does not, of course, deny in any sense the subjective aspect of ideas, imagery of various sorts, or their accompanying feeling states.

It is to be noted, then, that ideas are acquired by any social group in

accordance with the stimuli which the group encounters, such, for example, as printed matter, spoken language, and various physical objects and symbols of significance. These ideas in turn, these habitual types of response, modify and further elaborate the various symbols and objective environment; and so a process of give and take between the individuals and the objective, standardized symbols develops into a civilization, a "culture." Civilization is not only a matter of habits and ideas, but also just as much a matter of inconceivably complex organization of objective environment. The latter is intricately interwoven with the former both as cause and as effect. Each individual, moreover, is objective environment to every other; and as different individuals overlap variously in their years of existence, some of all ages existing simultaneously, changes in ideas, customs, and conventions are difficult. Big crises bring changes about most easily *because they affect all individuals somewhat alike at the same time*. Thus a great war threatening a social group or a state may bring about important changes with surprising rapidity, as is seen in the recent world conflict.

Imitation and suggestion are no longer adequate terms by which to explain how a child takes on the language, customs, beliefs, etc., of the group into which he is born. In the first place such explanations imply too great passivity on the part of the individual. The child acts instinctively in numerous ways from the time of birth, or, more precisely, inner stimulating conditions and bodily needs bring about various acts which persist until the stimulating conditions are changed. The instinctive impulses are modified by a trial and error process and become adapted to the environment into which the individual is born. Many of them come into conflict with the acts of other persons. Impediments and inhibitions result in numerous more or less subtle ways, and as the child grows his acts naturally find expression and organization along lines of greatest consistency, or of least opposition and obstruction. Thus society results by means of the suppression through conflict of all habits and tendencies not suited to co-operation, and by the facilitation of acts mutually beneficial and objectively consistent. It is obvious, e. g., that in the acquirement of language and ideas by the child these factors play a larger rôle than usually supposed, and that passive imitation is not the important factor that it has been made out to be by such writers as J. M. Baldwin. Moreover, experiments on learning have shown, as is now well known, that new acts must be brought under control of proprio- and interoceptive stimuli by a random trial and error procedure, in which the fittest acts survive, before they can be called out so simply by the sight of others' acts. In the subjective terminology, one must get the resident (kinæ-

thetic) imagery of new acts by trial and error and associate it with remote imagery before the acts can be controlled sufficiently for imitation. Even then imitation must have some adequate motivation.

The Freudian writers are right in putting their emphasis on instinctive and intraorganically initiated activity with consequent conflicts, repressions, sublimations, etc., whatever objection one may have to their over-emphasis of the sexual impulses and to such special explanatory machinery as subconscious "censors." Habits, as McDougall has insisted, are formed in the service of instincts. The instinctive dispositions do not change and function differently just because one sees other individuals perform certain acts; changes in all our habits and ideas come only as they are forced by the maladjustments of one's instinctive equipment, and such changes in turn modify the various symbols by which ideational responses are brought about. Individual innate differences are of course important in these processes of mutual adjustment between individual and environment.

73. Mental Traits and Social Behavior ¹

The study of memory, sense-perceptions, and power of attention among different races and classes will assist in determining the degree to which differences of this character are innate, on the one hand, or due to the habitual direction of the attention and consequent practice, on the other. The study of mental traits must always be made with reference to the condition of activities prevailing, and the study is consequently both sociological and psychological.

The degree to which the power of abstraction is developed in different groups is another fruitful line of interest. The prevailing opinion is that the lower races are weak in the power of abstraction, and certainly their languages are poor in abstract terms. But a people whose activities are simple cannot have a complex mental life. Abstraction is much used in a group only when deliberative as over against perceptual activities engage the attention, and where the manipulation of complex activities involves numerous steps between the stimulus and the response, and a distinction between the general and the particular. The life of the savage and of the lower classes is of an immediate kind, with little mental play between the stimulation and the act, and consequently little occasion to employ abstraction. All races do possess language, however, which in-

¹ Reprinted by permission from W. I. Thomas "The Province of Social Psychology" *Am. J. Soc.* 1904-05: X: pp. 451-53. Copyright by the University of Chicago.

volves the use of abstraction; all have systems of number, time, and space; many of them have a rich repertory of proverbs; and all show logical power. The question which social psychology has to work out is to what degree apparent lack of power of abstraction is due to lack of activities and stimulations which force the attention to employ abstract processes and give it practice in handling series. Deficiency in logical power among groups in lower stages of culture is also obviously largely dependent on the fact that the general body of knowledge and tradition, on which logical discussion depends, is deficient. So far as this view holds, it means that what have sometimes been regarded as biological differences separating social groups are not really so, and that characteristic expressions of mind are dependent on social environment.

The degree to which the power of inhibition is developed in the lower races as compared with the higher leads again to the employment of psychological methods and ethnological materials. The control of the individual over himself and of society over him depends largely on this faculty, and it is often alleged by psychologists and students of society that the inferior position of the lower races is due in part to feeble powers of inhibition, and consequent lack of ability to sacrifice an immediate satisfaction for a greater future one. An examination of the facts, however, shows that the savage exercises definite and powerful restraints over his impulses, but that these restraints do not correspond to our own. In connection with taboo, totemism, fetich, and ceremonial among the lower races, in the hunger voluntarily submitted to in the presence of food, as well as stoicism under physical hardships and torture, we have inhibitions quite as striking as any exhibited in modern society or in history. The occasions of inhibition depend on the point of view, the traditions, the peculiar life-conditions of the society. In the lower races the conditions do not correspond with our own, but it is doubtful whether the civilized make more use of inhibition in the manipulation of society than the savage, or whether the white race possesses superior power in this respect. The point, at any rate, is to determine the effect in a given group of inhibition on activities, and the reaction of the social life on the inhibitive processes of the individual.

The influence of temperament among different races in determining the directions of attention and interest is also an important social-psychological field. There is much reason to think that temperament, as determining what classes of stimulations are effective, is quite as important as brain-capacity in fixing the characteristic lines of development followed by a group, and that there is more unlikeness on the temperamental than on the mental side between both individuals and races.

From this standpoint the social psychologist studies the moods and organic appetites of the lower races—the attitude toward pain and pleasure, vanity, fear, anger, ornamentation, endurance, curiosity, apathy, sexual appetite, etc. It is not impossible, for example, that the arrested development of the negro at the period of puberty is due to the obsessions of the mind by sexual feeling at this time, rather than to the closing of the sutures of the cranium.

Similar to the question of temperament in the individuals of a group is that of the degree to which the affective processes, as compared with the cognitive, are the medium of the stimulations promoting social change. Cognition is of less importance than emotion in some activities, notably those connected with art and reproduction, and it is even true that emotion and cognition are in certain conditions incompatible. In this general region lie such questions as the effect of rhythm on social life, particularly in bringing about co-operation in hunting, war, and work; the psychology of work and play; the bearing on social activity of ornament, dancing, painting, sculpture, poetry, music, and intoxicants; and to what extent an organic attitude of sensitiveness to the opinion of others (an attitude of mind essential to the control of the individual by society) had its origin in courtship and to what extent in the food-activities.

74. Differences Between Knowledge and Belief ¹

That knowledge and belief are unlike in their reference is not a matter for dispute, but there is reason to object when belief is made the logical opposite of knowledge. This is the case in many of the writings of earlier psychologists and their distinction is supported by popular as well as scientific opinion. Maher, in his *Psychology*, indorses the notion of an absolute distinction between belief and knowledge, and gives full credence to the views of Hamilton whom he quotes to the effect that "knowledge and belief differ not only in degree but in kind. Knowledge is certainly founded on insight, belief is certainly founded on feeling. The one is perspicuous and objective, the other obscure and subjective." Maher further differentiates them by declaring that "knowledge is rational, belief irrational; knowledge refers to matters of fact, belief to matters of opinion."

It should first of all be noticed, however, that opinion and not belief

¹ Reprinted by permission from F. H. Lund "The Psychology of Belief" *J. Abn. & Soc. Psy.* 1925-26: XX: pp. 193-95.

is logically contrasted with knowledge. In the second place, the average ratings on the belief scale, when arranged in order of highest rating, as shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 reveal an evenly graded series allowing for no such definite classification of propositions as presumed by Maher and others. (Figures and tables omitted.)

From the graphs presented in Figure 1 and Figure 2 and from the data upon which they are based it would appear that knowledge and opinion are most applicable as designating extremes on the same scale. Belief is distributed throughout just as temperature on a scale the extremes of which are named hot and cold. Further evidence as to the nature of knowledge and opinion, conceived in the manner just stated, may be gained through the correlation obtained between the belief-ratings of group III (115 subjects) and the S. D.'s of the same ratings. The coefficient obtained was $-.92$. This high negative correlation would mean that the greater the degree of variability, the lower the degree of belief, or, the higher the rating of a proposition the higher the consensus of opinion in regard to it, and vice versa. Knowledge, therefore, may best be applied to statements upon which there is most general agreement, and opinion to those upon which there is least agreement.

The classification of the propositions discussed above is of interest in this connection. Thirty-one junior students in Barnard were asked to indicate in the case of each of the thirty propositions whether they constituted matters of knowledge or matters of opinion. Proposition one, for example, was by 17 considered a matter of knowledge and by 14 a matter of opinion. It is interesting to notice the lack of agreement among the judges, even upon propositions where agreement might have been expected. The experiment was not repeated because it depended on too rough and ready a method. However, the results obtained emphasize the lack of distinction between knowledge and opinion as well as a lack of understanding of the distinction.

This lack of agreement as to what constitutes knowledge, or matters of "fact," and what constitutes matters of opinion, is just as marked in the ranks of the scientifically trained. For these knowledge is sometimes made to refer mainly to the factual world, or the so-called "real" world, as distinguished from the world of imagination. But wherein does this "real" world exist? For some it is to be found in the world of sense perception. For others, who appreciate the nature of the purely sensory element, reality is to be found in what they call "primary qualities." Not a few notable thinkers have contended for an intangible yet abiding principle, such as Universal Reason, permeating the universe and form-

ing the ultimate substratum of things. Another group have gone still further and declared that, since the world of sense is not "real," and since everything that is "given" must come through sense, including concepts of relation, reality is not only unknown but unknowable.

The inconsistency of these solutions give added support to the contention, drawn from some of the data here presented, that knowledge and opinion (or belief, so-called) are not clearly differentiable, and that our categories and absolutistic distinctions are idealized and artificial forms.

Conclusions

1. Belief has a large emotional content. The correlation obtained between belief and desire was $+ .88$. The correlation between belief and "knowledge" was $+ .64$, between belief and "evidence," $+ .42$, between "knowledge" and desire $+ .13$, between "evidence" and desire, $- .03$. The much lower correlations between belief and the more objective measures, support the inference to be made from the high belief-desire coefficients that, not only has belief a large emotional content, but emotional factors are significant determinants of belief.

2. There is a marked tendency to idealize the rational principle, and to conceive of it as the most valid and important of belief-determinants, notwithstanding the fact that non-rational factors appear to outweigh it so largely in conditioning our belief-attitudes. However, students, when rating themselves and others on a scale of rationality, do not consider rational factors nearly as important in conditioning the beliefs of their fellow-students as in the case of themselves. They tend to rate themselves nearer the ideal than the typical individual.

3. Beliefs, once formed, are not willingly relinquished, especially in the event of open commitment on a subject. Such unwillingness to give up one's original position, is definitely related, if not responsible for the fact, that the side of the question first presented to us, and the first influences brought to bear upon us, are most effective in determining our beliefs, so much so as to suggest the presence of a law of primacy in persuasion.

4. Opinion and not belief is logically contrasted with knowledge. Knowledge and opinion are not distinct but refer to the extremes of a scale or a continuous series. Belief, as a certain mental content, is present throughout the scale of knowledge and opinion, just as temperature on a scale the extremes of which are hot and cold; it is not present with the same strength, however, but with varying admixtures of doubt.

B. THE UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSES

75. The Place of the Unconscious Functions in Behavior ¹

We perform many trivial actions, such as stroking our hair, undoing a button, shaking off an insect, without knowing it. To a large extent these are neither reflexes, nor subcortical actions, but actions which are performed by the cerebral cortex and are really analogous to conscious functions. Such acts also presuppose memories. "Automatic" actions in hypnotic experiments and in pathological states can be just as complex in thought and motility as any conscious act. The hand may write and the mouth speak without the person having the slightest feeling that these actions originate from his own psyche. As a matter of fact, the constellations which direct our thought are only conscious to a small degree, as a more detailed analysis shows; we often make slips in speaking which are based on unconscious thoughts accompanying it. Only a small part of what our senses perceive comes into consciousness, but the rest surely is not lost to our psyche. Other things become conscious in dreams and in the hypnotic state. Unconsciously a number of complex conclusions are drawn; the so-called intuition is partly based upon this. If we carefully observe ourselves and our fellowmen, we will frequently find that just in important decisions the decisive elements are unconscious. By post hypnotic suggestions we can also experimentally provoke actions, the motives of which remain hidden from the person performing them. Hysterical patients may respond to perceptions of which they do not become conscious.

Everything that occurs in our consciousness can therefore also take place unconsciously. In this sense there are unconscious psychic processes. They have absolutely the same value as the conscious psychisms, as links in the causal chain of our thought and action. It is therefore necessary to include them among psychic processes, not only because they have the same value as conscious ones, lacking only conscious quality, but principally, because psychology, and particularly psychopathology, can only be an explanatory science if such important causes of the phenomena are also taken into consideration.

The unconscious functions are best designated as "*the unconscious*." But in the above described psychisms this does not imply a definitely

¹ From E. Bleuler, *Textbook of Psychiatry* (Trs. by A. A. Brill), pp. 8-10. Copyright 1924 by the Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

limited class of functions; the real facts, however, are that potentially any function whatsoever can manifest itself consciously as well as unconsciously. Neither are there special laws for unconscious thinking; there are merely relative differences in the frequency of the different forms of association.

To be sure one may place into a special unconscious the mainsprings of our strivings and actions which are also hidden from our introspection. This includes not only the congenital impulses but also the unconsciously acquired paths of the strivings.

Such impulses are particularly striking when they are contrary to the conscious strivings through which they attain the same pathogenic meaning as the repressed tendencies.

The unconscious also contains the paths upon which the psyche influences our secretions, the cardiac vasomotor and other activities, even if exceptionally they sometimes become conscious and are accessible to the will in the same sense as we move our limbs consciously and unconsciously.

Many authors, notably Freud, Morton Prince and others, include among the unconscious functions also the "latent memory pictures" ("engrams"). But these are principally altogether different from what we have here described. Latent memory pictures, in so far as we are concerned here, are dispositions without actual functions, but our unconscious psychisms are actual functions just as valid as those that are conscious. We can include among the psychic only those functions which are conscious, or may become conscious under different circumstances. It is for this reason also that we do not designate the action of a machine as unconscious, although it has no consciousness.

To understand the relationship between conscious and unconscious it is best to assume that a function becomes conscious only when it is in direct associative connection with the ego complex; if this is not the case, then it follows an unconscious course. This assumption fits in well with all observations; nor does it run counter to the fact that there are all the transitions from consciousness to semiconsciousness and to the unconscious. The greater the number of associative connections at a given moment between the ego and the psychism (idea, thought, action) the more conscious and at the same time the clearer is the latter.

What we call "unconscious" is designated by some as "subconscious." Philosophers define the term unconscious quite differently; it also varies in meaning in different authors.

C. THE DUAL TYPES OF ASSOCIATIVE THOUGHT

76. Two Types of Associative Thinking: Autistic and Realistic¹

Consecutive thinking consists of associations of ideas. "Associative thinking"—though a tautological term—will be useful as a generic term for all kinds of thinking.

We do, however, conceive associative thinking as of two sorts, one of which "works" and the other does not. The kinds of thinking which work (as that it will injure your enemy to pierce his breast with a spear) have been called *realistic* thinking (Bleuler, Freud), or *directive* thinking (Jung, quoting James). The kinds which do not "work" (as that it injures your enemy to behead an image of him), have been called *autistic* thinking (Bleuler), or *phantastic* thinking (Jung). We shall use Bleuler's terms of realistic and autistic, because he has given us the fullest and clearest development of the conception. To summarize:

Associative thinking divides into:

"False," or Fantastic Autistic	}	Thinking	and	}	Thinking
				"True," or Directive Realistic	

In general, a tendency to realistic, "logical," "common-sense" thinking grows in us by reason of its service in meeting our situations favorably and wholesomely. Just as useful patterns of behavior tend to be perpetuated, and harmful ones to disappear by selection, so have the modes of thought that are more useful tended more and more to order our important actions. Almost the entire thinking of primitive humanity was governed by indiscriminate, simple associative modes of thought, not yet subjected to the selective test of "working" or failure. Autistic thinking in relation to the sphere of voluntary conduct is therefore very prominent in them. Such thinking appears in the foreground of mental disease as we see it today. But in normal persons, autistic thinking is gradually being relegated to less essential functions, like dreaming, wit, and forms of mental recreation. In the mentally healthier persons, this relegation and selection is the more complete. Realistic and directive thinking has been more and more selected for survival. "The more nearly custom represents a direct reaction on the environment in the actual struggle for material aids to existence, the more rational (realistic) a

¹ Reprinted by permission from F. L. Wells, *Mental Adjustments*, pp. 46-48; 54-55. New York. D. Appleton & Company, 1917.

test does it undergo; and, conversely, the more derived the societal forms, the more clearly do they fall under the tests of tradition (which are autistic) rather than of reason."

It has been indicated that the most fundamental needs of human nature, like those for air and water, are comparatively free from such autistic interference. The food of which the Malagasy warrior is deprived by his peculiar superstition may be a convenient one, but it is not essential to his existence. If it were essential, the superstition would not arise. There is a "critical point" in autistic thinking, beyond which wasteful acts in accordance with it will not be performed. Carveth Read cites a tribe which regarded as a spirit or ghost a large eel living in a near-by stream. In consequence, no one might drink at the stream. One pool, however, "for convenience," was not included in the taboo.

The fundamental principle of autistic thinking is, that things are considered to be in the relations of identity, or of cause and effect, simply because they happen to be associated together in the mind. From this we derive the conception of symbolism. A familiar form of autistic thinking attributes responsibility for an occurrence to the nearest person involved in it. The ancients considered the herald responsible for the news he brought, and executed him if he brought bad tidings. People today feel resentment toward the telephone operator who tells them that the line is busy, and to a less degree toward the meteorologist who forecasts bad weather. In a further step toward reality, we jokingly chide the postmen who has no letters for us. These cases show plainly the assignment of a cause on the basis of the primitive associative mechanism; that of temporal contiguity. More rationalized mechanisms of association are found in the ordeals; the fire will not burn the suspect if he is innocent; the water will not receive him if he is guilty; the just cause will triumph in combat.

As we have seen, the whole doctrine of sympathetic magic exemplifies the autistic mode of thought. It does not fit any test of experience. Now, it is obviously less trouble, not to say safer, to hang an image of one's enemy than to go out and fight him. Thus, a very powerful factor in the preservation of autistic thinking is that of *greater immediate ease*. The importance of this greater immediate ease has grown with mental evolution. It is easier to call your opponent names than to show the logical weaknesses of his theory, if indeed it has any. In civilized life, autistic modes of thought regularly occur because they are easier, *when the easier way will do*. The chief examples of autistic mental activity are now found in those passages of life in which the mind is not called upon for the direct meeting of some organic need. That is, they are found in wit,

in dreams, in the child mind, in poetry. Whenever, as in these instances, one is freed from the limitations which logical, reasoned, experiential thinking imposes, the association of ideas can afford to proceed without strict accordance to logical principle. These modes of thought are also richly illustrated in abnormal modes of thought corresponding to abnormal trends of conduct: such are the symptoms of mental disease.

77. Autistic (Dereistic) Thinking¹

Whenever we playfully give free reign to our fantasy, as happens in mythology, in dreams or in some pathological states, our thoughts are either unwilling or unable to take cognizance of reality and follow paths laid out for them by instincts and affects. It is characteristic of this "dereistic² thinking," "the logic of feeling" (Stransky), that it totally ignores any contradictions with reality. Thus the child and sometimes the adult fancy themselves in their day dreams as heroes or inventors or something else great; in one's night dreams one can realize the most impossible wishes in the most adventurous manner; and in his hallucinatory state the schizophrenic day laborer marries a princess. The paranoid finds a piece of thread in his soup which proves his relationship to Miss Threadway. Reality which does not fit in with such modes of thinking is frequently not only ignored, but actively split off, so that, in these connections at least, it is no longer possible to think in terms of reality. Thus the day laborer as the fiancé of the princess, is no longer a day laborer, but the Lord of Creation or some other great personage.

In the sober-minded forms of dereistic thinking, particularly in day dreams, there is very little disregard or transformation of actual situations, and only few absurd associative connections formed. On the other hand, dreams, schizophrenia, and to some extent mythology, exercise far greater freedom in dealing with the thought material, where, for example, a God may give birth to himself. In these forms dereism goes so far as to destroy the most common concepts: Diana of Ephesus is not Diana of Athens, Apollo is split into several personalities, now he blesses and now he kills, he is a fructifier and he is an artist; indeed, he may even be a woman although he is ordinarily a man. The interned schizophrenic demands damages in a sum of gold which would exceed the mass of our entire solar system a trillion times. Similarly in other cases, symbols are treated like realities, and different concepts are condensed into

¹ From E. Bleuler, *Textbook of Psychiatry*, pp. 45-47. Copyright 1924 by the Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

² Derived from *de* and *reor* (away from reality, unrealistic).

one. Persons appearing in dreams of normal people usually have features of several acquaintances.

Dereistic thinking realizes our wishes, but also our fears. It makes the playing boy a general, and the girl with her doll a happy mother. In religion it satisfies our longing for eternal life, for justice and joy without sorrow. In the fairy tale and in poetry it gives expression to all our complexes. In dreams it serves to represent the person's most secret wishes and fears. For the abnormal person it creates a reality which is far more real to him than what we call reality. It makes him happy in his delusion of greatness, and absolves him from blame if he fails in his aspirations, by attributing the cause to persecutions from without, rather than to his own short-comings.

If the results of dereistic thinking seem to be sheer nonsense when measured by realistic logic, still, as an expression or fulfilment of wishes, as a provider of consolation, and as symbols for other things, they possess a kind of realistic value, a "psychic reality" in the above defined sense.

Besides the affective needs, the intellectual ones may also be satisfied in dereistic thinking; but as yet we know very little about them. Thus in mythology, the sun which travels across the sky has feet or rides in a carriage. In a certain sense, however, all "needs" are affective. At any rate, affectivity plays an important rôle in dereistic thinking when it attempts to give us information regarding the origin of the world and the structure of the universe.

In its full development dereistic thinking seems to be different in principle from empirical thinking. But in reality one finds all the transitions, from the slight deviation from acquired associations as is necessary in every conclusion drawn by analogy, to the wildest phantasy.

For, within certain limits, independence of habitual trends of thought is a preliminary condition of intelligence, which strives to find new paths. And the effort to fancy oneself into new situations, day dreams and similar occupations are indispensable exercises of the intelligence.

To be sure, the contents and aims of such unbridled mental activities always represent strivings which most deeply touch our innermost nature. It is therefore quite obvious that dereistic aims are valued much higher than real advantages, which can be replaced. This not only explains the peculiar barbarities of religious wars, but we can also understand why primitives are fettered with taboo rules, and similar superstitions, and why they exert the most painstaking efforts not to leave a particle of their food which could give an enemy the chance to practice harmful magic on them. We can also see why we find it difficult to under-

stand how the savage is willing to bear such burdensome regulations, even if we compare them with Chinese or European rules of etiquette.

It will be interesting to trace the circumstances which determine so marked a deviation of thinking from reality:

1. We think dereistically wherever our knowledge of reality is insufficient for practical needs or our impulse for knowledge urges us to keep on thinking; this happens in problems referring to the origin and purpose of the world and of mankind, in problems dealing with God, the origin of diseases, or evil in general, and how it can be avoided. The greater our knowledge of the actual relationships, the less room there remains for such forms of thinking. Questions, such as how winter and summer come about, how the sun traverses the sky, how the lightning is flashed, and a thousand other things, which were formerly left to mythology, are now answered through realistic thinking.
2. Wherever reality seems unbearable it is frequently eliminated from our thinking. Delusions, dreamlike wish fulfilments in twilight states, and neurotic symptoms, which represent a wish fulfilment in symbolic form, originate in this way.
3. If the different co-existing ideas do not converge in the one point of the ego to form a logical operation, the greatest contradiction can exist side by side, there is no question of any critique. Such conditions are present in unconscious thinking and perhaps also in some delirious states.
4. In the forms of associations prevailing in dreams and in schizophrenia the affinities of empirical thinking are weakened. Any other associations directed by more accidental connections, such as symbols, sounds, etc., obtain the upper hand, but this is especially true of those guided by affects and all kinds of strivings.

D. RATIONALIZATION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

78. Rationalization and Motivation ¹

The voluntary movements that we make we regard as indeed "voluntary"; that is, we feel that we acted so because we judged it best so to act, and that we could have acted otherwise if we had so chosen. So deep-rooted is this feeling of the freedom of our actions, that its loss becomes a conspicuous symptom of mental disease; the symptom is referred to as "ideas of influence," or the "feeling of passivity." This feeling of the independence or control of our actions seems closely associated with, is perhaps the cause of, another very prominent mental fact, namely, a feeling of motive for our actions. Since we control our actions, we want

¹ Reprinted by permission from F. L. Wells, *Mental Adjustments*, pp. 12-13; 14-15. New York. D. Appleton & Company, 1917.

them to have a reasonable motive; man calls himself a rational animal, one guided by reason in his conduct. Our actions thus demand a specific mental adaptation, namely, the assignment of satisfactory motives for them.

The process by which we derive these satisfactory motives is known as *rationalization*; to rationalize an act means to assign a reason for it. The first thing to note about rationalization—wherein it differs, as night from day, from genuine reasoning controlled by experience—is that it is personal and subjective. John tells us that he threw up his job because his chief did not treat him fairly; but James, whom the chief treated in quite the same manner, does not feel unjustly dealt with. John's rationalization does not give the real cause, which lies in a difference of personality between John and James. James says he does not marry because his income is only twenty-five hundred dollars a year, but most people marry on far less. We must always seek the ultimate motive, and ask why that reason is so effective with this particular person.

Our rationalizations give a motive which our personality will accept as a fitting one without giving the real cause of our actions. Now the real motives for our conduct often go back to fundamental trends which we have been taught to regard as degraded; we believe that we are base if we act from such motives; our acts are thus rationalized in the name of some other principle that we have been taught to respect. If our neighbor insults us, we strike him, not because we are angry, but because our honor demands it; we refrain from doing so, not because we are afraid, but because it would lower our dignity. Such are our mental adjustments to whatever conduct our pugnacity or our temptations may occasion, just as the fox rationalized his attitude toward the grapes by assuming that they were sour.

Where our impulses are sufficiently strong and united, rationalizations play a small rôle, and may scarcely be thought of unless a reason is demanded. "I want to do this, I don't need any reason for it," speaks the voice of sincerity, self-assured. Rationalizations play their special parts in justifying an uncertain intention and in supporting an impulse against counter-impulses that are themselves strong enough to block it. The more dependent we feel upon the need of rationalizing an act, the more certainly are powerful influences in the personality opposed to it, and the falser the rationalization is likely to be. It is natural that the same reasons fail to move us at other times and under other circumstances. He who tries to be true to his rationalizations may become a traitor to himself. The test of character is the firm adherence to standards of action: what things must be done and what things are not to be done, and

this in defiance of the rationalizations that may be present to oppose these principles. The subtlest temptation to evil is just that which comes disguised as rationalization of the unworthy impulse. The real conflicts of the soul are not between good and evil, but between rationalized good and what is truly right.

Rationalizations of thought or conduct in terms of moral principle are precisely the function of the so-called "elastic conscience." Religion, indeed, whose purpose is to make people better, may be made to rationalize infamous actions. Comprehensive instances are the torture of heretics, and the execution of witches. These are the work of "cave-keeping" faults of human nature which borrowed from religion the convenient disguise of an act of faith.

In short, the object that rationalization serves is to provide the feeling of moral and logical justification for our acts and thoughts, to supplement our feeling of their freedom, and to keep us at temporary peace with our own natures. Enough instances have probably been quoted to show that the ability to rationalize an act is a slight guarantee of its real moral or logical value. Life is built of the effects we produce, not of the motives we make believe.

79. Rationalization and Social Behavior ¹

Few of us take the pains to study the origin of our cherished convictions; indeed, we have a natural repugnance to so doing. We like to continue to believe what we have been accustomed to accept as true, and the resentment aroused when doubt is cast upon any of our assumptions leads us to seek every manner of excuse for clinging to them. *The result is that most of our so-called reasoning consists in finding arguments for going on believing as we already do.*

I remember years ago attending a public dinner to which the Governor of the state was bidden. The chairman explained that His Excellency could not be present for certain "good" reasons; what the "real" reasons were the presiding officer said he would leave us to conjecture. This distinction between "good" and "real" reasons is one of the most clarifying and essential in the whole realm of thought. We can readily give what seem to us "good" reasons for being a Catholic or a Mason, a Republican or a Democrat, an adherent or opponent of the League of Nations. But the "real" reasons are usually on quite a different plane.

¹ Reprinted by permission from J. H. Robinson, *The Mind in the Making*, pp. 41-43; 44-45; 46; 47-48. New York. Harper & Brothers, 1921.

The Baptist missionary is ready enough to see that the Buddhist is not such because his doctrines would bear careful inspection but because he happened to be born in a Buddhist family in Tokio. But it would be treason to his faith to acknowledge that his own partiality for certain doctrines is due to the fact that his mother was a member of the First Baptist church of Oak Ridge. A savage can give all sorts of reasons for his belief that it is dangerous to step on a man's shadow, and a newspaper editor can advance plenty of arguments against the Bolsheviki. But neither of them may realize why he happens to be defending his particular opinion.

The "real" reasons for our beliefs are concealed from ourselves as well as from others. As we grow up we simply adopt the ideas presented to us in regard to such matters as religion, family relations, property, business, our country, and the state. We unconsciously absorb them from our environment. They are persistently whispered in our ear by the group in which we happen to live.

This spontaneous and loyal support of our preconceptions—this process of finding "good" reasons to justify our routine beliefs—is known to modern psychologists as "rationalizing"—clearly only a new name for a very ancient thing. Our "good" reasons ordinarily have no value in promoting honest enlightenment, because, no matter how solemnly they may be marshalled, they are at bottom the result of personal preference or prejudice and not of an honest desire to seek or accept new knowledge.

In our reveries we are frequently engaged in self-justification, for we cannot bear to think ourselves wrong, and yet have constant illustrations of our weaknesses and mistakes. *Rationalizing is the self-exculpation which occurs when we feel ourselves, or our group, accused of misapprehension or error.*

The little word *my* is the most important one in all human affairs, and properly to reckon with it is the beginning of wisdom. It has the same force whether it is *my* dinner, *my* dog, and *my* house, or *my* faith, *my* country, and *my* God. We not only resent the imputation that our watch is wrong, or our car shabby, but that our conception of the canals of Mars, of the pronunciation of "Epictetus," of the medicinal value of salicine, or the date of Sargon I, are subject to revision.

Philosophers, scholars, and men of science exhibit a common sensitiveness in all decisions in which their *amour propre* is involved. Thousands of argumentative works have been written to vent a grudge. However stately their reasoning, it may be nothing but rationalizing, stimulated by the most commonplace of all motives. A history of philosophy

and theology could be written in terms of grouches, wounded pride, and aversions, and it would be far more instructive than the usual treatments of these themes. Sometimes, under Providence, the lowly impulse of resentment leads to great achievements. Milton wrote his treatise on divorce as a result of his troubles with his seventeen-year-old wife, and when he was accused of being the leading spirit in a new sect, the Divorcers, he wrote his noble *Arcopagitica* to prove his right to say what he thought fit, and incidentally to establish the advantage of a free press in the promotion of Truth.

All mankind, high and low, thinks in all the ways which have been described. The reverie goes on all the time not only in the mind of the mill hand and the Broadway flapper, but equally in weighty judges and godly bishops. It has gone on in all the philosophers, scientists, poets, and theologians that have ever lived. Diogenes the Cynic exhibited the impudence of a touchy soul. His tub was his distinction. Tennyson in beginning his "Maud" could not forget his chagrin over losing his patrimony years before as the result of an unhappy investment in the Patent Decorative Carving Company. These facts are not recalled here as a gratuitous disparagement of the truly great, but to insure a full realization of the tremendous competition which all really exacting thought has to face, even in the minds of the most highly endowed mortals.

And now the astonishing and perturbing suspicion emerges that perhaps almost all that had passed for social science, political economy, politics, and ethics in the past may be brushed aside by future generations as mainly rationalizing. John Dewey has already reached this conclusion in regard to philosophy. Veblen and other writers has revealed the various unperceived presuppositions of the traditional political economy, and now comes an Italian sociologist, Vilfredo Pareto, who, in his huge treatise on general sociology, devotes hundreds of pages, to substantiating a similar thesis affecting all the social sciences. This conclusion may be ranked by students of a hundred years hence as one of the several great discoveries of our age. It is by no means fully worked out, and it is so opposed to nature that it will be very slowly accepted by the great mass of those who consider themselves thoughtful. As a historical student I am personally fully reconciled to this newer view. Indeed, it seems to me inevitable that just as the various sciences of nature were, before the opening of the seventeenth century, largely masses of rationalizations to suit the religious sentiments of the period, so the social sciences have continued even to our own day to be rationalizations of uncritically accepted beliefs and customs.

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises

1. How is attention related to consciousness? How to behavior?
2. What are the internal stimuli, and what the external that determine one's attention to:
 - a) a burning building;
 - b) a member of the other sex;
 - c) a mob leader;
 - d) a newspaper story of a threat of war;
 - e) a new style of dress;
 - f) A call to dinner;
 - g) an appeal for funds for a Community Chest;
 - h) a public movement to rid a city of vice and crime.
3. Why is it so difficult to alter people's ideas and attitudes on social questions?
4. Show how inhibition and the higher mental processes may be affected by cultural and social opportunity and conditioning.
5. Distinguish between knowledge, opinion and belief.
6. Is belief to be thought of as the opposite of knowledge? Discuss.
7. Why is the consideration of the mental processes of importance to social psychology?
8. What place have unconscious processes in social behavior?
9. Give five examples each of dereistic and of objective thinking. (Use materials from wit and humor, from literature, from public speakers, from religious formulations, from science, from common sense.)
10. May we say that dereistic thinking is entirely abnormal and "bad" and that we should indulge only in "objective" thinking? Discuss.
11. What is rationalization? Illustrate.
12. Why may one say that rationalization is a form of defense mechanism?
13. What is the social function of rationalization? Illustrate.

B. Topics for Class Reports

1. Review Freud's, Jung's and Prince's theories of the unconscious. (Cf. Northridge and Münsterberg cited in bibliography.)
2. Report on Watson's paper on wish-fulfilment cited in bibliography.

C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers

1. Rationalizations and Mental Patterns of Culture.
2. The Function of the Unconscious in Social Behavior.
3. The Social Nature of the Concept.
4. The interdependence of Group Life and the Higher Mental Processes.

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PART THREE
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR



CHAPTER XIII

PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL CONDITIONING

I. INTRODUCTION

We have been examining in cross-section the basic mechanisms of the individual. In the present section we shall be concerned with the growth of the personality in relation to its social setting. The personality is acquired upon the basis of hereditary patterns and the social conditionings of its experience. It consists very largely of the various social rôles which the individual is called upon to play. At its basis lie physical make-up, intellectual powers, instinctive tendencies, emotions, feelings, and the will. But the personality is more than this; it is the particular organization of these into a totality with reference to the social groups to which it belongs. This explains James' remark that a man has as many selves as there are persons who recognize him and who carry an image of him in their minds, or Cooley's statement that the individual is not human at birth but acquires human-ness, or Burgess' point that the person is an individual with status. In short, to conceive personality we must think of the organism in its more or less unified nature of attitudes, ideas, and habits directed in reference to the social environment, i. e., to other persons and the cultural patterns.

The selection from Burnham shows how the personal growth of the individual depends on the social conditioning to which he is subjected. To acquire "human nature," to become a "personality" one must learn, one must be educated. Personality does not grow up in a vacuum; it depends on training. Moreover, the environmental pressures are of a dynamic character. As Child has shown above, the direction of the growth of the organism depends upon the environment, and not so much upon specific units of character which mature independently of this environment.

Hall's paper reveals the interplay of adult and child, especially

the place of the mother in the child's early life. So, too, White gives us a picture of the place of the parents in reference to child development, of the place of authority, and of the conditions which impose an inferiority feeling upon many children.

In infancy, as a part of the child-adult relationship, the process of identification begins. In fact, the infant apparently does not consider himself as a being apart from the social world in which he lives. Later as language and consciousness begin to develop, the identification and its accompanying dramatization expand to take in a larger world of social personages. We condition and re-condition ourselves in hundreds of social connections by playing the rôle first of one and then of another person whom we have experienced. "Butcher and baker and candle stick maker" all come in for their share of attention. Or to change the figure to modern times: grocer, chauffeur, postman, engineer, teacher, and doctor become objects of attention and furnish a frame through which personality may be expressed. Hall's paper gives a brief statement of this process.

Closely associated with this identification and dramatization, and with the whole expansion of the growing personality, is the play life. Whatever we may say about the theories of play, it is true that the play life is highly important for the rise of the personality. The earlier attempts to explain play ignored the full importance of the socialization aspects. Schiller and Spencer maintained that play arose from an excess of nervous energy which found its outlet in this manner. Gross thought play a preparation for the serious business of later life. Play, he held, furnishes the essential practice of activities needed in adulthood. Hall connected play with his recapitulation theory. He says:

I regard play as the motor habits and spirit of the past of the race, persisting in the present, as rudimentary functions sometimes of and always akin to rudimentary organs. The best index and guide to the stated activities of adults in past ages is found in the instinctive, untaught and non-imitative plays of children which are the most spontaneous and the exact expressions of their motor needs. . . . Thus we rehearse the activities of our ancestors, back we know not how far, and repeat their life work in summative and adumbrated ways.

None of these theories is thought complete today, and the notion of Hall that play is atavistic or recapitulatory has been more or less

abandoned. Play is preparatory to life in a sense, and yet it is life both for child and for adult. Much misinterpretation is made of children's play in the assumption of adults that children are not serious in their play life. The playful attitudes of children are most serious and all-absorbing for them. For adults play is a somewhat dissociated, often a consciously assumed, attitude. It is a pattern in which we indulge in sharp contrast with the more serious struggle for economic livelihood. With children play is all of life. It is actually highly important as a preparation for life, but more than that *it is child life*. It is preparation only in the sense in which the growth of the first year of life is preparation for the growth of the second year, and so on.

As for the excess energy thesis, this, too, cannot be accepted in its simple statement. Children do seem marked by superabundance of energy, but we also see children playing when tired. We see them, also, in a wide variety of play which is not explained by this theory. McDougall suggests that rivalry and emulation are most important causes of play. But this again, like all other theories, is too narrow. Nowhere, in short, do we see the limitations of simple one-dimensional explanation of social behavior better illustrated than in these traditional discussions of play. To explain or describe play in terms of instincts as with McDougall, or in terms of nervous energy as with Schiller and Spencer, or in terms of a vagary called "recapitulation," is to indulge in the particularistic fallacy which Thomas has done so much to expose.¹

More adequate explanations must take into account the interplay of organism and environment, and on the latter side we must ever recognize both the presence of other persons (the social stimuli) and the presence of culture patterns.²

Play we should say is a generalized term with which we have described the more or less natural unhampered life of children. It is connected throughout with membership in primary groups: family, playground, and school. It is a term often used to cover the process of extension of identification, the process of dramatization, of learn-

¹ Cf. the excellent discussion of particularistic fallacy—that is, the tendency to find a single or particular cause for complex social phenomena—in Thomas' *Source Book of Social Origins*, Boston, 1919, p. 22–26.

² As we saw above, these two are not identical.

ing much mechanical habit, and so on. Rather than try to categorize this complex phenomena in a few phrases, it is more important to observe the stages or types of dominant interest which mark the play life of the child from infancy to adolescence. This is given to us in the selection by Whitley.

Robinson's paper discusses the compensatory aspects of play life. It should not be imagined that all play is compensatory, since that would be to ignore identification and other aspects. But certainly there is a deal of substitutive mechanism found in play.

In the second section of the chapter the relationship of language to personality development is discussed. The importance of language and communication for social life cannot be overemphasized. Cooley's paper shows the place of gesture, of imaginary companions, of the interplay of person and person in the growth of personality. The development of language goes *pari passu* with the rise of personality. The very conception of the self or personality is founded upon the language concepts of others which we accept for ourselves. Furthermore, communication is the essential social mechanism through which personality is developed. The world in which the individual lives is largely delimited and defined for him in language terms. The universe of discourse is largely a verbal one. All the higher mental functions are closely correlated with the language development. It is no superficial correlation which Terman has insisted on in his contention for the close relation of language development and that of the higher mental functions. What Terman ignores, however, is the social factor in the rise of language and thought. Finally, language has become the most significant carrier of culture patterns. The "psycho-social environment" as Bernard calls it, that is, the culture of the more complex societies, is continued from generation to generation largely through the medium of written language. All the concepts of science, art, religion, and philosophy, man's four chief cultural accumulations, rest on language, and without it they would soon disintegrate.

Language is acquired through the conditioned response mechanism. The name and the object are associated as any artificial stimulus-response arrangement is connected with biological or native stimulus-response mechanism. Niemeyer, while she does not employ the terminology of conditioning, describes the process of early lan-

guage development. Cooley's second paper is important in indicating the early conditioning of the child to words of self-reference, thus giving a clue to the method by which the ego concept is built up through language. The somewhat amusing collection of baby names from Hall shows the effect of the older persons upon the child in defining the personal name and thus fixing a rôle for the child to play. To call a child a "black sheep," "cry-baby," "crank," "chatterbox" is a very different thing for the child's development than to call him "buttercup" or "sweetie" or "mamma's life." It would be worthwhile to know more specifically what effect personal names play in determining the part which the child takes in the various groups to which he belongs, that is, in delimiting the direction of the child's conception of himself.

Mead's paper is a more technical discussion of the intimate relation of thought, symbol, and language. Mead's contribution to the understanding to the relation of thought, language, and personality is highly important for social psychology. The interested person may consult the bibliography for other papers by this scholar.

II. MATERIALS

A. THE GROWTH OF PERSONALITY

80. The Conditioned Response and Personal Development¹

The power to form conditioned reflexes occurs at a very early age in the child. According to Krasnogorski this power of association appears in the first year of life, and observation and the studies by Dr. Mateer indicate that it appears at a still earlier age. Probably in regard to a few things it appears in infancy; and yet, as Krasnogorski maintains, it is not developed until during the second year, perhaps not until the child is about two years of age.

The mechanism of conditioned inhibition also, according to Krasnogorski, occurs at the end of the first year of life, and this, according to him, marks the stage when the child can be really educated. Naturally there are individual differences in the times of development, and in the case of feeble-minded children the conditioned inhibition can be formed only with great difficulty or not at all, and such associations have weak inhibitory effect and are easily destroyed. In normal children, however,

¹ Reprinted by permission from W. H. Burnham *The Normal Mind*. New York. D. Appleton & Company, 1924; also *Mental Hygiene* 1921: V: pp. 685-86; 687-88; 689; 691-92; 694-95.

in the first year or two of life, a vast number of conditioned reflexes and conditioned inhibitions are formed by the ordinary environment and by the training given by parents and nurse.

Obviously in the case of children the different learning types appear in the development of conditioned reflexes and there are rather wide individual variations in the ability to form associations. The results given by Dr. Mateer are perhaps representative:

It may be interesting to note that no child over two years of age needed more than eight trials, while none under that age used less than seven, none under three years needed less than six, while the minimum number, three, was all that were required by a child in the fourth year. Out of the fifty children, regardless of age, ten needed only three trials, eleven needed four trials, eleven used five trials, while only seven needed six; five needed seven, four needed eight, and two, nine trials.

The mechanism of the conditioned reflexes in the child varies from that of the animal in several respects. The first characteristic in the child is the extreme rapidity of its acquisition. In the case of the normal child, it is enough to let the effect of any stimulus occur in connection with the opening of the mouth from two to ten times for the temporary association to be formed and for the associated stimulus to call forth independently the opening of the mouth. Further characteristics of the conditioned reflex in the child are the high stability of the association formed and the ease with which it is broken down. The newly formed conditioned reflex in case of a normal child lasts for a long time, but at any time it can be quickly broken up and again re-established.

The infant is conditioned to react to certain specific stimuli, certain sounds of the voice of the mother or the nurse indicating the time for nursing, the sight of certain places indicating the time for a nap, the sight of the bathroom and toilet indicating the time for the bath or the like, and later the sight of cup or spoon or the like indicating the opportunity for food or drink; and again the child is conditioned to certain forms of behavior by the petting or indications of favor and esteem of mother or nurse or playmates, and so on in a hundred ways. Still later, by the training of social groups, the child is conditioned to all the rules of the game—habits of politeness, the conventions of society, etc. Naturally the earliest and most important group of conditioned reflexes is developed in connection with the person and behavior of mother or nurse. As Kempf has expressed it:

The mother's voice, facial expression, color of hair, odors, eyes, skin, the shape of her mouth and conformations of teeth, her neck, bosom, arms

and hands, touch and step, postural tensions, irritability and goodness, habits, ideals, and eccentricities, are all stimuli that come to have a potent autonomic-affective influence upon the child through being *frequently, simultaneously* associated with the giving of nourishment, physical comfort, and relief from fatigue, loneliness, and anxiety. This continues as an almost incessant combination of stimuli, varying somewhat as the mother's affections (love, anger, sorrow, shame, pride, jealousy) determine her reactions to the infant.

Thus conditioned reflexes are formed in children at a very early age, and by the time they come to school they are bundles of such reflexes. These reflexes are formed in the most commonplace and unsuspected situations, in an ordinary environment as well as in the laboratory. Usually the association is produced by many repetitions. It may be produced by shock. A simple concrete case will serve as illustration.

When a young child was lying in bed, a curtain at one of the windows snapped up suddenly with a loud noise, and the child began to cry. The child was quieted, but the next time he was put in this room, he at once looked up at the window where the curtain was and again began to cry. The father was a physician and removed the child from the room. Had he not done so, a permanent conditioned reflex would very likely have developed, so that the sight of the curtain would every time have made the child cry as a result of the conditioned reflex set up by the original shock, and his parents would have wondered why in the world the child was afraid of a curtain.

Formal education is largely made up of inhibitions. Necessarily this is so. The child's social education is chiefly a matter of acquiring inhibitions. The first thing in the social education of a child is to teach him to talk. The second is to teach him not to talk. The first scholastic education is to teach a child to read and read every word and every sentence of his lesson; the later training of the scholar consists largely in teaching one what he should not read, and training one to ignore the unessential. To inhibit or delay reaction is the mark of the educated man.

Thus it comes to pass that sometimes repression goes too far, and an abnormal and exaggerated habit of repression is developed. This may be distinctly injurious to a person's character, and probably in not a few cases the most serious handicap to one's efficiency is such a habit of repression or inhibition.

The significance of this conditioned reflex has already been suggested. It is well illustrated in our social relations, or the affective situations of the individual in relation to other individuals and to the social group, especially when we consider the association of ideas and mental attitudes

as well as the association of stimuli. Dr. Kempf does not put it too strongly in the following passages:

The *conditioning* capacity of the reflex is of the utmost importance in determining our selections and aversions throughout life, such as mating, habitat, friends, enemies, vocations, professions, religious and political preferences, etc. We can understand now how we come to have an aversive prejudice for one person, experience, or object because it has qualities that happen to be similar to some of the qualities that another person, object, or experience had that caused us to feel pain, fear, or embarrassment. Similarly we prefer those new things that have some of the qualities of old things that were pleasing and invigorating stimuli.

It seems naïve to urge that every person, friend or enemy, is essentially a compound stimulus that varies more or less in its gratifying or distressing influence upon an individual, but the stupid resistance to psychoanalysis and the adjustments of repressions makes it necessary. The conditioning of fear, hate, love, shame, sorrow, hunger, occurs without our conscious choice that these affective-autonomic functions should or should not prefer to have or to avoid certain objects, persons, or situations. These mechanisms may often be obscure, but in one respect they are consistent. They are *always determined by experiences*.

Every one, perhaps, at some time has noticed the peculiar character of his own action or the strange things he finds himself sometimes saying. Many of us have comforted ourselves by the clever explanation given by Oliver Wendell Holmes, who states that such things are to be explained only on the supposition that we have a mental blind spot which sometimes functions so that idiotic ideas of any kind whatever may become associated. Probably many of these cases are to be explained as obvious conditioned reflexes.

Probably everybody, especially every child, is handicapped by inhibitory fears of some kind. Such inhibitions may be illustrated by almost any of the common, but often grotesque, fears of childhood. For example, a little girl had heard certain incendiaries referred to as firebugs and had listened to a newspaper account of a terrible fire which, according to the report, was set by a firebug. She thus gained the idea that there were certain insects that set fire to houses, and naturally enough she became afraid of these incendiary bugs, lest her own house might be set on fire. To a child's imagination, an insect like this that walketh in darkness and can effect such tragic results naturally became a secondary cause of fear. Usually a child conceals such fears. If discovered, the method of removing them is simple. But concealed and repressed, a fear of that kind or the inhibition it leaves is liable to cause injury for

a lifetime, as every psychiatrist knows. Dr. Rows, of London, told at Bloomingdale of a case of nervous breakdown and insanity in a woman of thirty-five which was traced back to a fright the child received at the age of five from the bogey stories and behavior of her nurse.

Let us take another concrete case. Charles Lamb, in his well-known essay on *Witches and other Night Fears*, says of himself: "I was dreadfully alive to nervous terrors. The nighttime and solitude and the dark were my hell . . . I never laid my head on my pillow, I suppose, from the fourth to the seventh year of my life, so far as my memory serves in things so long ago, without an assurance, which realized its own prophecy, of seeing some frightful specter." The form of his visitations he attributes to the picture, in Stackhouse's *History of the Bible*, of the raising of Samuel by the Witch of Endor.

Whether the morbid attitude be of long standing or recent, the psychology of the remedy is briefly as follows: One brings the fearful idea clearly to consciousness—lowers the threshold for the idea, as the psychologist puts it. In other words, one brings the child definitely to face the cause of its fear, just as the horse trainer, with soothing words, leads the colt up face to face with what has frightened it. Then one associates a rival stimulus with the fear-inspiring object or idea. In the case mentioned, one would show the child, perhaps, the grotesque and comic aspects of the Stackhouse picture, or convince him that it was nothing but a drawing on a piece of paper similar to what he himself could make—that it represented at most an imaginary object, a make-believe representation. By such a discussion, rival stimuli would be associated with the picture, and after a few conversations of this kind, these associated ideas would inhibit the fear; amusement or orderly thinking would take the place of it. It is always possible to associate a wholesome thought or attitude with the original stimulus as a rival stimulus that shall in turn inhibit the inhibition.

The practical problem, then, is how to form some association with the general attitude of worry which so many people have, so that as soon as this attitude becomes nascent, it may at once be inhibited by some healthful association. That this can be done and actually is done in many cases we have evidence from many individuals of different classes in society, diverse interests, and varying degrees of education. Apparently it may be any one of a number of things, if only the association be made strong and permanent.

The mere knowledge of the fact that violent change of stimuli causes the fear, this itself may become an associated idea that tends to inhibit the fear. The individual says to the fear-producing situation, "I know

the secret. 'I have your number.' With a little easily made apparatus I could do the trick myself." If in no other way, this reduces the fear by the fact that it represents so much co-ordinated thinking, which, like co-ordinated action of any kind, is a universal remedy.

81. The Influence of Other Selves on the Rise of Self ¹

The influence of other selves upon our own self begins in the mysteries of heredity and takes a more objective form in gestation. Whether the mother's movements are tranquil or sudden and violent is registered upon the body and soul of the new life she carries, as the planchette records every change in the tension of arm muscles: she who does most for herself does best by her unborn child. When after birth her movements act no longer through a fluid medium, her touches, pats, caresses, the act of nursing, etc., make for some time a large part of the child's outer world of change. Perhaps as probable a beginning as any for the social consciousness of the child is its first recognition of its mother's face, which occurs during the first few weeks of life, and which many of our reports emphasize as an event of great distinctness and importance, as did Froebel. The child is born with the power to cry with great vigor, but the power to laugh comes very gradually and later, and it is often this recognition that causes the first smile, and may excite it to writhe all over with joy. It is easy either to speculate or poetize about this event. Before, perhaps, the child is solitary, alone in the universe, so far as its own rudimentary consciousness is concerned; but now the first "thou" looms vaguely up in the void. Possibly, too, this moment is the natal hour of the world of objects, of all of which its mother's face is the "promise and potency," and from this is a starting *point de repère* the child's mind slowly delineates impressions of other selves, if not things, etc. At any rate, it is the eye that chiefly fascinates, and, although a stranger might have been detected before, especially by touch this eye and face at least are now known to sight. Sympathy is now born, love has its object, the recognition involved marks the first conscious memory as an act of joy of a new and unique kind. Starting from the face and breast the mother's body is slowly defined, although her eyes and, perhaps, mouth, hair, etc., are noted first: the child notices its own hands, feet and ears before it does those of its mother's, and also becomes aware of its own internal organs and processes first, and the instinctive

¹ Reprinted by permission from G. Stanley Hall "Some Aspects of the Early Sense of Self" *A. J. Psy.* 1897-98: IX: pp. 386-89.

comparison part by part above described defines its first somatic "other" as well as its first somatic self.

Meanwhile the child is subject to many manipulations by the mother. Her face is associated with a vast variety of touches, sounds and movements that make her the source of a great part of all the changes possible in the infant's psychic horizon. She causes it to pass from hunger to satiety; from cold and wet to warm and dry; from one attitude and position to another; her presence means every possible pleasure, and her absence every possible pain. The sense of being alone even for an instant is the desolation and horror of the abyss. She is the child's Providence, on which it is absolutely dependent to a degree that few of the most religious men ever really conceive themselves to be on God. If she fails to make herself thus the bright focus in the child's nascent social consciousness and be all a good mother can and should be, the child's own personality will be less organized and unified and will have less power to reverence the divine personality at the heart of the universe whose place she is shaping in the soul by her own, almost as the wooden model makes the matrix in which the iron will later be cast. She, for a time, embodies its entire world of others, divine or human. She is society, and from her all other persons are learned and differentiated. They, too, dawn upon the infant's mind as she did, eyes and face first, suggesting platonic or cherubic heads, and are slowly defined in body and act as she was.

Again, in all its good moods the child's rapport with its mother dominates its conduct. It early comes to do all she smiles at and to avoid all else, as if its only vocation were to divine and follow all the lines of her likes and wishes. Its nature expands not only toward, but in proportion to the sunshine of her favor. It respects all she smiles at, even buffoonery; looks up in its play to call notice and study the currents of her sympathy. If she is happy when the child is good and slightly saddened at wrong, the normal child will choose the right as surely as pleasure increases vitality. It cannot act on her fear and should not on her resentment, but it can act on her love, and if that is strong and deep, obedience, before language can be much understood, will be an instinct. The mother, too, is the child's first pattern and exemplar, and sets the copies for a mass of imitation, conscious and unconscious. Her rhythms in emotion, accent and inflexion are a contagion. As she is quiet, poised, reposeful or excitable, spasmodic, irritable and nervous, so is the child. If she is happy, euphorious, contented or sour, full of symptoms and aches, discontent or anxiety, each of these moods is reflected in the child. All these and a host of other influences emanating from the mother are

registered in the basal strata of habits in the nutritive and motor systems, in rhythms of rest and fatigue, etc., that are not only unchangeable themselves, but condition all later superstructures.

Soon two tendencies develop one centripetal, inclining the child to its own home of which the mother is the heart, and the other centrifugal. Homesickness and the passion for other scenes and faces, illustrated, e. g., in truancy and the migrating instinct, often struggle with each other. Some children wander away, launching out into the big world, and leaving all behind them without fear or regret, while others show an equally abnormal dread of getting away from familiar faces. Owing perhaps to some reverberations of the ancient war of all against all in the long and bitter struggle for existence, all strangers, especially those with too unusual dress, features, acts, etc., are at some stage more or less feared, although with great difference of duration and intensity in different children. A peripheral limit of the expansive social tendency which radiates from the mother outward is marked for most children by deformed or colored people, policemen, soldiers, tramps, the doctor, coal-man, rag-man, etc., when they fear. Between the too familiar and the all too strange and dreadful lies the wide field where the expansive social tendencies as love, slowly widening to include mankind, nature as a vast repository of personification, and curiosity which would see, feel and know all, meet and mingle with the deeper counter-currents of ancestral dread, and make strange eddies and whirlpools in the brain cell, nerves and pulses as well as in the soul. In some children the latter predominate and they are so embarrassed, shy and timid that they can do nothing before strangers without awkwardness and mental confusion. The attention of friends to the acts or persons of such children is the kinetic equivalent of the presence of strangers in its power to over-stimulate inhibitions or to excite bashfulness; to be looked at is as paralyzing as to be placed before an audience. "Don't let anyone look at me," is a frequent request when something is to be done and a steady gaze may not be the "evil eye," or have power when directed to the back of the head to cause one to turn around according to current superstition, but arouses painful selfconsciousness or anger in children, and is often construed as an insult by adults. Others love to be in the focus of attention and do anything to attract and hold it; are stimulated by it to all sorts of "showing off," and are spoiled by flattery, and dull without it. The passion to be interesting and to compel others to like them may make children bold, vain, affected like George Eliot, who at the age of four would pound the piano with many airs if anyone called, or to make the servants think she was a great musician, yet this indicates

great social sense and capacity. Such children are likely to lose the proper balance between love and fear which gives the psychic tension called from its various degrees and forms bashfulness, modesty, respect, reverence, docility, etc., all of which are manifestations of fear toned down, and variously tempered and alloyed. The very acme of social zest is where some expansive impulse has just won some new victory over fear, and the stranger, the bully, teacher, etc., treated with some new familiarity, the person with decided or superior manners, the critic or enemy faced. There may be flushes, tremors, or even conflicts, but the self grows with every such courageous affirmation.

82. The Child-Parent Relationship: Authority and Inferiority Complex¹

We may profitably think of the child as starting with a certain equipment, and life, in the processes of education and development, as presenting the possibilities and opportunities to this raw material for its unfoldment. This is a very different conception from that, now only beginning to be extensively given up, namely, that the child should be pressed, beaten if necessary, into the form that its elders think it should assume. It is a concept which concedes much more to the individual while not forgetting, however, the claims of society for a reasonable degree of conformity. The whole developmental period of childhood had these two aims, the maximum unfoldment of the individual possibilities consistent with the necessary degree of conformity to social standards.

Into this two-way stream is projected the child who must learn to adapt itself on the one hand to the world of reality about it, consisting of the persons and things in its environment, particularly the parents and those who stand in similar relation to it, and the background of authority represented by these elders. These are what Miller aptly refers to as the barrier of reality and the barrier of authority at which life demands a certain practical adjustment as the means of progress. I shall suggest briefly certain difficulties which ensue when these barriers can not be surmounted.

Many parents act as if they owned their children instead of being, as is implied in what has already been said, the trustees of their childhood for future generations. It is being appreciated as fundamental

¹ Reprinted by permission from *The Child: His Nature and His Needs* (Ed. by M. V. O'Shea), pp. 196-97; 198-99; 201-03; 205-08; 209. (Chapter X by W. A. White) Valparaiso. The Childrens Foundation, 1924.

that juvenile delinquency in a very large number of instances is traceable to home influences, more particularly those of the parents.

The barrier of reality may be impregnable. Juvenile delinquents come from situations where reality is overwhelming, where circumstances are destructive and unconquerable, and so the child tries every means to escape, including the anti-social.

If authority is too powerful and arbitrary it may crush out all initiative and capacity for individual development in the child. On the other hand, if the child cannot be so easily subdued, it may make of him a rebel, an iconoclast, a skeptic, incapable of conforming to any authority. The object of education as regards this aspect of authority is well put by Miller: "It must be our aim, therefore, to bring up children so that they respect all racial experience, and at the same time learn, in due course, to challenge all authority. Authority must not be regarded as ultimately binding, nor must it be disregarded without respectful consideration."

Now, on the other hand if reality is overwhelming, the short cut is by the pathway of phantasy, day-dreaming, creating an imaginary world in which wishes come true to replace the real world in which they do not.

If on the other hand authority is too weak, if the parent, the representation of the racial traditions and of conformity, is too weak then the instinctive forces of the child are not sufficiently restrained; they run wild and lead to serious results. If reality is made too easy, by inherited wealth for example, or by wealthy and indulgent parents, the same results may follow. The instinctive tendencies are not brought gradually under control and direction in the course of growth and development. Strength of character, just like muscular strength, is developed by overcoming difficulties, not by following the path of least resistance.

All of these considerations spell certain conclusions as to what should be the relation of the parent to the child. The parent, as the responsible trustee of the child's possibilities, needs to set the stage, so far as in him the power lies, in such a way as will insure the maximum opportunities for the unfoldment of the child's personality along the necessary lines of social conformity. Two things are necessary. The first, and least important, is the ordering of the environment in such manner as will insure a reasonable amount of success to the child's efforts and thus provide stimuli for further endeavor. Nothing discourages more or is better calculated to destroy all initiative than an impossible task. Secondly, the parent needs to be a good example, a good model for the child to copy and try to emulate. This is, of course, especially true of

the parent of the same sex as the child. The relation of the parent to the child is such that quite instinctively the child desires to be like the parent. The parent is the first model and it is very important that it should not fail. When neither parent is a worthy model and the two parents are at war with one another the child has nothing to latch to and often becomes hopelessly confused, helpless, and impotent when he undertakes life as an adult. He has never had any training in one direction. He has lacked a model and cannot develop one on the instant.

In this matter of the influence of the parent upon the child, what the parents *are* is much more significant for the child than what they *do*. The child reads truly the deeper meanings that lie behind their conduct and the effect of their treatment upon him depends more upon their real feeling for him than upon what particularly they may do. If, for example, the parent is unable to see with the eyes of his child and is really patronizing and lacking in respect for his efforts, then no matter what words he may utter, his underlying attitude will get through and the effort will be to make for a feeling of inferiority in the child and for a lack of affection for the parent, which will remove him from the position of a desirable model.

If the unfolding of the individual does not go on smoothly: if, because of native equipment or of uneven emphasis during the early years an unbalanced type of personality comes to adulthood, there are many, in fact innumerable signs that make it manifest and indicate the nature of the difficulties from which the individual is suffering and which must be overcome in order to make a reasonably adequate adjustment and success of his life. These disturbances may occur in either of two directions, corresponding to the two great fundamental instincts, namely the self-preservative or ego-instinct, and the race-preservative, or sex instinct. In other words, the disturbance may manifest itself in the love life or in the nature of and working out of the ego-ideal. In many instances the disturbance is widespread enough to involve both realms.

Every exaggerated character trait is evidence of an unbalanced personality make-up and is evidence also of the existence of the opposite trait. Between these two extremes the individual is forced to vibrate without ever the possibility of coming to rest. For example: the vain, proud, strutting personality is obviously out of balance and, too, he is distraught because he must everlastingly vibrate between his feeling of vanity and a realization of its emptiness and his real lack of qualities that justify it. He is never able to gain a true estimate of his worth and regulate his life in accordance with his real assets and liabilities, but must always proceed upon a false evaluation and so he frequently fails.

The feeling of inferiority is perhaps the best illustration of an unbalanced personality for our purposes. This feeling of inferiority may have many roots. The child who is persistently undervalued, whose opinions, remarks, and queries are always laughed at, whose efforts are invariably criticized for their shortcomings rather than praised for what they accomplish—all these serve to rob the child of any basis for self-confidence, of any feeling of self-respect. They deprive him of the sense of the joy of accomplishment and of success, and they imprison him behind a wall of relatives who repel his love. All of these results become exaggerated in the case of the "unwanted child," the fundamental antagonisms of its environment are so deeply grounded. A sense of inferiority may be fed also by the circumstances that result from physical deformity or lack of comeliness. The cripples and the "ugly ducklings" have a hard road to travel. The other children are cruel and teasing and in every direction they are forced to a recognition of their inadequacy to meet the more favored individual on common ground.

This feeling of inferiority is a part of that dependence upon the parents which is the lot of all children at first but which should gradually grow less and less as age and strength and knowledge prepare the child for independence.

These feelings of inferiority and dependence are fostered and fixed by faulty attitudes of the parents and other adult members of the household and by wrong traditions in the family, which not infrequently have been handed down from the previous generation so that the parents repeat the mistakes of the grandparents.

Just as the feeling of inferiority is fed by failing to realize the necessity of providing opportunities for success and by treating the child's efforts with that lack of respect and consideration which implies that they are considered of no moment, so the state of dependency is prolonged beyond the safety point by over-anxious parents who will not let their child take any risks whatever, unmindful of the fact that life itself is a great adventure, in its very nature full of risks, and that strength of character can never be developed by removing difficulties but only by overcoming them.

The most important single factor for the child is the quality of the love of his parents. Parents need to have that rare quality of love which is single-minded in its desire for the welfare of the beloved. If it has a selfish component such as a sense of ownership, or the desire to have the child take up a certain career as a matter of parental pride, or later to make a certain type of match that will further the social ambitions of the parent, then the love has certain qualifying characteristics which

may make for an unbalanced type of personality on the part of the child. Without going to further length in the setting forth of principles I will present briefly a few examples of distortions and corrections to give some idea of how personality distortions actually occur. Take, for example, a girl cited by Miss Jessie Taft whose physical ugliness was the basis of a crippling sense of inferiority. The case runs as follows, in her words:

"I have in mind a girl whose physical make-up was fairly adequate but as a very little child she was clumsy, pigeon-toed, and inclined to be afraid to use her body. Her parents laughed at her attempts to walk and run and her frequent falls. This exaggerated her timidity and encouraged her not to try any unusual physical feats. There was no gymnasium work in the schools she attended. She grew very rapidly and at twelve was far too large and heavy for her age. Children called her "Fatty." Her mother said that great big girls should not run about like tomboys, but sit still and be ladylike. Her consciousness of her physical ineptitude increased to a painful extent. She took part in no sports or games that would betray her weakness. She was in deadly fear of walks, because there might be fences to climb. She dreaded the simple feat of climbing in and out of wagons. This lack of confidence extended to every part of her life. She was sure no man could ever care about her. She compensated in an over-development of intellectual interests but even here she had not the confidence that her ability warranted. Middle age finds this girl just beginning, through analysis of her own behavior, to get a legitimate self-confidence, intellectually and socially, as well as the free use of her body." Such a case needs little comment. To her natural handicaps the parents added ridicule which prevented her from making those efforts which might have, in part at least, overcome them. The radiation of her lack of confidence in her bodily adjustments to her intellectual sphere is very illuminating as is also the effort at compensating for a physical defect by mental development. The case also shows the characteristic neurotic under-valuation. She really possessed much greater ability than she felt she did.

Another case showing how a sense of inferiority may produce serious symptoms is that of an intelligent boy of thirteen, who having lost his parents, was living with his sister and her husband. In this home he not only missed the affection of his parents, but he was scolded and punished by his brother-in-law for doing things, or not doing them, quite natural to a boy of his age. By nature he was not aggressive, was easily discouraged and rather shy and reserved. With this make-up and his particular home situation to deal with, his reactions threatened to

become abnormal. He began to steal, for two reasons: in order to obtain money with which to buy candy, etc., and also to cover up a growing feeling of inferiority. He thought it smart to be able to steal. By far the worst effect was on his disposition. He became sullen and insolent, resented any criticism, and cried very easily. Placed in a different environment, this boy responded quickly to encouragement and praise, though he was also taught to receive adverse criticism. He lost all his sullenness, became contented, a willing worker, and eager to please. This case shows how an anti-social act like stealing may be resorted to overcome a sense of inferiority. It also illustrates the possibilities for curative treatment which possibilities are relatively very great in the early years.

Physical handicaps and a resulting sense of inferiority may be compensated for by an over-development of the tendency to day-dream, to phantasy as is shown by a boy eleven years of age, born with physical disabilities and having had several severe illnesses during his life. He had no roof to his mouth, had a cleft palate and marked speech defect. To compensate for these drawbacks he turned his energies inward, until he became highly imaginative even to the point of having hallucinations. He imagined himself doing things which he wanted to, but could not. He also developed other traits. He became cunning and crafty, dishonest, and untruthful. Here we see the child dreaming of the things he wants to such an extent that he is beginning to lose touch with reality and is no longer able to tell the difference between the real world and his phantasies (hallucinations). This method of compensating for misfortune is very common and in fact is perpetuated in many of the well-known fairy tales. Quite frequently the hero of the fairy story is the poor, often simple-minded, son of a woodman or the unhappy, disappointed younger sister (Cinderella).

The following case shows well how an experience in early life may condition late conduct in a thoroughly incomprehensible way unless the experience can be disclosed in explanation.

A boy of thirteen years of age, measuring eighteen years in the intelligence scale, was said to be giving trouble by stealing right and left, irrespective of any object's value or use to himself. Many things he afterwards gave away. By analysis, an episode was unearthed which occurred when he was four years of age. At that time he knew a little girl, and the two became mutually curious on sex matters. In order to get excuses to see her he would take anything at hand in the house to show her. In later years, when his adolescent sex feelings were developing, he found he could get a feeling of relief by simply stealing something. He

had no interest in girls and in fact had a positive dislike for them. When he was gotten to see the connection between the episode when he was four years old and his present habit of stealing he entirely lost his desire to steal and did so no more. This boy had quite a talent for inventing things and later patented an invention for some automobile appliance from the royalties of which he supported his family. His interest in the opposite sex was awakened through a *transference* to a *young woman worker*.

83. Identification and Dramatization¹

The dramatic passion is almost universal with children. They personate all kinds of people, and imitate even defects. "Let us play we are sisters," said two sisters, as if the fiction gave added charm or perhaps reality to the relation. It seems as if children sometimes hate to have or be a self; feel that personality is not essence but phenomena, and before they attain the virtue of unfolding what is peculiar to self, strive to develop what is common to all the species; feel reluctance to be merely a specimen of a type, and experience a touch of the sublime indifference of nature and of philosophy. A girl of five wrestled sometime with the problem, "Am I not a dog straightened out?" In their plays children even become a post, street-lamp, rock, chair, mirror, table, tree, etc. Only five children state that they long have deliberately wished to become another. A girl of six passionately felt that she could and would not be herself; because it was too dreadful. When angry or forbidden some desire, children often wish they were someone else. Girls frequently wish to be boys, and often expect to be when they are older, or fear they may become boys. Others fear at night that they will wake up someone else in the morning; others suffer greatly for fear that they lack sense, or are idiots, or insane. While special features, qualities, accomplishments, brain, stomach, knowledge, music, gifts, disposition, and still oftener wealth and circumstances of others, are very commonly desired, a great majority are glad that they are themselves and would not really be turned into anybody else, especially into certain persons whom they dislike. "I am glad it was papa who found me before anyone else, for they might have changed me." "You wanted a boy, but did not know it was going to be me," said a boy of four. "What was I before I came into the world?" "Were things the same before I was born, and will they be the same, or will they be at all after I am gone?"

¹ Reprinted by permission from G. Stanley Hall "The Early Sense of Self" *A. J. Psy.* 1897-98: IX: pp. 381-82.

"What if I had not been born?" "Where did I come from?" "Why are we in the world, anyhow?" "Will things stay when I am old?" "Who is God, anyhow, and why did He make souls and give us thoughts and watch us use them?"

84. The Play Life of Children¹

C. E. Johnson points out as the most prominent feature in each age period, for the child under three, sensory and motor control plays; until six, imaginative play, with crude construction work; until nine, traditional games, doll play, games of chasing, guessing games; until twelve, competition, skill, some little co-operation; until fifteen, games involving much physical activity. The accompanying diagrams present a few of the findings of McGhee and Croswell. They are based on answers they received from nearly eighteen thousand children naming play activities they preferred. The activities were analyzed for the elements contained. In the diagram on page 319 the figures on the left represent the percentage of boys (heavy line) and girls (dotted line) mentioning a play in which the element in question is prominent. Not only age differences, but sex differences also are well brought out in these diagrams.

The gradual development of group consciousness is reflected very well in the social type of play in which children engage at different ages. At first the play is exclusively *individualistic*,—child, toy, and spectator, or simply child, toy, and imagination, being all that is needed. This is followed by the play of several children together with similar toys. *The group is small but indefinite in number*; moreover, the play is not a game in the sense of an activity with fixed rules, limited participation, a deliberate goal, and an ending point. Imagination plays a great part in directing the play of the group. The life occupations which children have seen, such as those of the fireman, the motorman, the mother, the doctor, are acted out with great fidelity at this stage. Characters from stories are also portrayed, though not at so early an age as those from real life. Very little in the way of stage properties is required, the transformation taking place chiefly in the child's own fancy.

Rhythmic movement and singing games are enjoyed in group formation, and here we note the transition to the next form of social consciousness as the group begins to divide, and opposition commences to be part of the game itself rather than a hindrance to it. Thus, in "cat

¹ Reprinted by permission from *The Child: His Nature and His Needs* (Ed. by M. V. O'Shea), pp. 63-70. (Chapter III by M. T. Whitley) Valparaiso. The Childrens Foundation, 1924.




FIGURE III

Diagram showing percentages of types of play activity preferred at various ages of 18,000 boys and girls. Curve for boys, solid line; curve for girls, dotted line.

and mouse," or "drop the handkerchief," the pursuer and pursued are in opposition at least, while those in the ring may present obstacles to either successful flight or capture. From this point the element of competition enters increasingly and develops by way of such games as "London Bridge," with its final tug of war between the two completed sides, into the *double group* game proper. There, sides are chosen at the beginning, and the group as such acts against the manœuvres of the opposite group. "Hare and hounds," "prisoner's base," most forms of relay races, exhibit this growing group solidarity, as well as group rivalry.

Coincident with the *double group* the game for two or four develops. Here the game is very definitely a contest, the aim being to win over one's opponent. "Naughts and crosses" is an early form of this, checkers a later form, both of a quiet nature, just as tennis is a more violently active form of this *pair or double pair type*. In any case the game has very definite rules, whether few or many, and has a method of scoring which marks its close.

These elements of definiteness carry forward into the next type, that of the regular *team game*, the most highly developed of all from the standpoint of social consciousness. It is like the third type in that two groups are contending, but unlike it and more advanced in that each group is organized. The numbers on each side are limited, and each member of the team has special duties and special positions on the field. Because of this, individual interests and desires to star must constantly be controlled by the relationship of the individual's activity to the good of the team as a whole—a consideration that enters very scantily into the mere *double group* type of game. It is seldom that we find a genuine team game before the teen age. It is true that in imitation of admired heroes of the diamond, the small boys' gang will play at baseball; but a careful spectator, or perhaps auditor, will see and hear undoubted evidences of lack of genuine co-operation and an abundance of individual striving for honor. The group is an aggregate of units rather than an organism with differentiated functions.

Now, in this progression from the individualistic play of the little child to the team game of the near-adult the pleasure of the earlier forms is not lost. The eighteen-year-old and the adult may enjoy all five forms of play, but the four-year-old may enjoy only the first. Picture the summer hotel amusements. The smallest children pick up the quoits, stand anywhere, throw anyhow, in no order, just for the fun of throwing. At six or seven a small group of them will be taking turns in pitching. Then come arguments as to how far off to stand, and how

to count the score, and whose turn it is to pitch. By ten or eleven, a larger group will have evolved more rules, and are likely to pick sides before beginning, and to count, not each individual's score, but the total of each opposing group. The adolescents are almost sure to do this, and to go on to arrange for a tournament. This particular game hardly lends itself to development into the real fifth type; but there will be shown a consciousness of the value of handicaps, of a scorekeeper, and of an umpire. The well-meaning adult who would insist upon the rules of scoring for the little children, or the tournament for the nine-year-olds, would be forcing growth into adult standards prematurely.

Since "we learn by doing" it would seem that the more passive a child is in his play the less he is likely to learn. So again the fact is emphasized that the plaything *at* which he is amused, but which does not stimulate him by further action *with* it, is not the best choice. Again, endless unvarying repetition of the same activity after skill has been acquired is not educative. Therefore, unless it is enjoyed as a hygienic relaxation for muscles, or provides an emotional outlet for harassed nerves, we might be justified in seeking to introduce some form of play more conducive to progress.

However, passivity must not be confused with bodily quiet. Outwardly a child may be passive when he is watching moving pictures or reading a book; but the activity of the mind may be very great, and therein, of course, lies the educative value.

In brief, any play through which a child is led to acquire information, to develop skill, to exercise esthetic judgment or to gain practice in solving problems may be said to be educative—to the degree that the facts learned, or the power produced, have values in themselves.

Let us consider the opportunity for learning moral lessons in play. The five-year-old's biggest social problem is that of adapting himself to the necessity of taking turns. This has two aspects, first, that of waiting for his own turn, second, that of quitting a pleasant occupation so that someone else may have a turn. If these enormously important lessons are not well learned at the start there will be endless trouble in the next five or six years, to say nothing of a possible twist in the wrong direction all through life. When difficulties arise, adult suggestion is of greater help than reprimand or a sudden interference. When a veritable hair-pulling contest occurs as two small people simultaneously desire to use the same toy, it is easy to see how ineffective a mere authoritative judgment may be. It only introduces a third angle into the situation instead

of helping the mutual adjustment of the two combatants. Consequently, the solution is many times simply deferred, while resentment smolders, or a sly child watches for a chance to obtain what he wants by a trick. The friendly co-operation of the adult is what is needed, in order to find the reasonable way to act when personal desires conflict.

Another type of moral lesson comes when the eight-year-old finds his friends jeering at cowardice, and incredulous of bluff. He finds he can win regard by deeds rather than words, by meeting demands for stunts, by never refusing a dare, by making good a boast. The cowardice of the sneak and the telltale meets with such open disapproval by the rest of the crowd that the earlier tendency to run to mamma with grief and grievances is soon checked. A boy learns that he must adjust differences within the group, without a weak leaning on outside authority. He learns, too, that he must stand up for his own rights or be despised as a weakling.

As free play is superseded by the game, the necessity of rules awakens a consciousness of what playing fair means. To prevent others from taking advantage, each child must watch the other player to prevent cheating. In turn, his own selfish desires are held in check by the knowledge that his playmates are just as watchful lest he transgress the rules. What an immense amount of argument and squabbling can be heard as children are learning this lesson of fair play.

By ten or eleven a boy, at least, is learning lessons of group loyalty, how to stand by the others in trouble, how to share his good things with the rest, how to plan with them for added enjoyment. The girl, somehow, learns this less thoroughly, or shall we say, with greater difficulty and more slowly. Certain petty jealousies remain as a divisive force, hindering the co-operation of the girls' group as a unit. Tendencies to snub the others, to retain ideas of caste and clique persist into adolescence, when girls find it so much more difficult than boys do to play the team game heartily. Where the play director succeeds in coaching a girl team it has been against heavy odds, and has required much continued stimulation. Even so, fewer girls than boys engage in team games; and when they do, the self-conscious talk about the team is in marked contrast to the spontaneous enthusiasms of their brothers.

A moral lesson all may learn is that of admiration for honest effort as well as for brilliant results. Important lessons for the teen age are those of generosity to opponents in the hour of triumph over them, and of contest without bitterness of spirit.

How we could wish that these lessons, learnable in play, might be carried over into business, industrial and national relationships.

85. The Compensatory Nature of Play¹

The child is driven by many inherited and acquired impulses, some of which are adequately and easily expressed and some of which find no direct outlet. These latter create a situation demanding compensation, and this compensation is as a rule secured through make-believe activities. Most common among such activities are play and phantasy. A child would fight, hunt, and make a home as particular stimuli arouse him. He is seldom in such an environment, however, and he is practically never so organized by inheritance or training that these undertakings can be fully carried out. There are inexhaustible inhibitors around him and within him which check free expression. And so he plays at, or has day-dreams of, fighting, hunting, and home-making.

There are a number of factors which may act as inhibitors of the behavior tendencies of children. These may conveniently be divided into the *extraorganic* and the *intraorganic*, according to whether they are in the nature of environmental interferences or interferences which arise out of the child's own organism.

During his development the child is constantly running into extra-organic or environmental facts which are incompatible with the satisfaction of his desires. He may want to hunt. Perhaps the family cat supplies him with a stimulus to make this impulse felt. But this hunting impulse has become a particularized affair. Hunting is shooting, and he can not shoot because he has no gun. Instead of ignoring a stimulus to which he can not react adequately, he points a stick at the cat and shouts "Boom!" He may then, and perhaps to his sorrow, try to drag in his "dead" game by the hind legs. But the main and incontestable point is that the child is compensating, by means of his pretensions, for the inadequacies of the situation. He would like only too well to shoot a real gun and drag in game which is really dead, but his environment does not supply the appropriate circumstances. And so he plays.

Among the more important *extraorganic* factors which limit the child's expression are the people around him. Just as he discovers the splendid interior of his father's watch, someone takes the watch away from him. Just as he discovers the importance of certain corners of the pantry, someone carries him away to another room. Everywhere there are people and they are constantly interfering with his behavior.

As I have intimated, it is not only the lack of a physical world fitting in with every whim which causes the child to play rather than to act in

¹ Reprinted by permission from E. S. Robinson "The Compensatory Function of Make-Believe Play" *Psy. Rev.* 1920: XXVII: pp. 429-32; 433-34; 435-38; 439.

earnest. He has also his *intraorganic* interferences arising out of his own complex little nature. For the pure joy of it he would, at times, like to bring down a stout club upon the head of his playmate—that is, he would like to do this if it were not for the disconcerting facts that he would not like to hear his playmate cry in pain, and that he would not like to feel the blows of his playmate's revenge. And so the two boys will play at fighting.

It is evident there are instances of make-believe play and phantasy which apparently, at least, are not primarily compensatory. A child may straddle his hobby-horse, not because it is the best substitute for a real horse he would ride, but simply because he has been taught to do so by his parents. There is little doubt, however, but that the average child enjoys his playing the more where he perceives its symbolic relationship to a more serious pursuit. The fact that children's play is given much of its specific form by adults, does not, in the last analysis, indicate that it is therefore less compensatory. By custom and tradition we initiate various make-believe performances for children, but something in the nature of childhood must explain why children take to the make-believe with such enthusiasm. When we first teach a child to ride a hobby-horse he may be unaware of any connection between this activity and the actualities of horseback riding. But as he learns about real horses and real riding, his play will become more and more clearly compensatory in function. In other words, the rise of certain impulses in children is so inevitable that their compensatory expression may be provided for by the customs of the race. In the case of any one child a compensatory activity may be set up before the need for that particular compensation arises, but we may still consider the activity a typical product of child life and its characteristically incomplete adjustment.

Distinctly unpleasant play and phantasy may also provide for the compensatory expression of negative impulses. There is little reason to believe that fears, for example, do not require expression of some sort as urgently as more positive tendencies. Playing, day-dreaming and the telling of stories involving ghosts and goblins may well serve to express fears which must be inhibited in the world of actuality.

Holding the older view that childhood is a period of happiness and serenity, one could scarcely accept an explanation of play in terms of compensation for incomplete or faulty adjustment—in terms of the partial resolution of conflicts between the child and his environment or between contradictory factors within his own character. I believe, however, that there is little need to argue against that older view. Childhood is primarily a period of incomplete adjustment, and we remember it as

peaceful because we have forgotten its sorrows and because problems of great consequences to us in childhood mean little to us now. Full of impulses to do actual things, the child is equipped with a physique and surrounded by an environment which are constant obstacles. I do not believe, like some, that it is desirable, if possible, to remove these obstacles and make childhood a comparatively easy and comfortable state. The child comes into the world with an inherited behavior equipment, but at best this equipment is an uncertain affair. Each impulse tends to operate in inappropriate as well as in appropriate situations. Each impulse, if the child is to become prepared for adult life, must be defined, and definition implies inhibition. The child must live through a period of paradoxes before he can become an individual of discrimination. The human organism is not perfect, and, while educational practice improves from time to time, the world rushes forward into new complexities. One who has any faith in the present direction of progress can hardly do other than accept the essentially incomplete adjustment of the young as a necessary product of that progress. The happy fact is that the conflicts of youth can be so adequately compensated for by the play and phantasy mechanisms.

The distinction between play and phantasy is, of course, a distinction between overt and ideational behavior. Play, in so far as it is pretending, is never without an element of phantasy, but we may arbitrarily confine the application of the latter term to those forms of pretending which are lacking in overt bodily accompaniments. It will then be possible to distinguish between these two types of compensation and to note their interrelations.

Although we cannot be certain of it, play probably precedes phantasy in the child's life. The latter does appear quite early, however, in some children at least, and before the school age is reached both are clearly present.

In play and phantasy there are two factors, which may or may not be consciously recognized by the child, determining to a large extent the nature of his pretending activities. In the first place, there is a tendency toward breadth and freedom of expression. The child must express impulses which are often clearly incongruous with his world of actuality, and the greater this incongruity the more lively will be the flights of imagination to which they give rise and the more apt will the child be to engage in private phantasy rather than in overt play. In the second place, the satisfaction which is derived from compensatory behavior depends to some extent upon its being within the limits of the child's own credulity. The impulses which drive the child are aimed at an actual world, and

their indirect expression itself must not get too far beyond the realms of that actuality.

The tendency toward free expression leads to the establishment of all sorts of fictitious characters and objects within the playground. Toys and playmates which do not fit in with the completer, fancied world may be put aside. I remember that even up to the age of sixteen I frequently judged congeniality in terms of the readiness of others to disregard reality in favor of a world of pretty definite and well defined fancy. I always preferred to *knock grounders* with one particular lad because he co-operated so well in converting the procedure into the pretensions of a *big league* game. The same was true in boxing. Having read and memorized the details of most of the historic ring battles, we repeated many of these almost blow for blow upon the floor of my mother's laundry. And many were the Harvard-Yale football games in which I engaged with one other actual player, both of us, as often as not, playing on the same side. In cases of this sort, the meaning of ordinary play activity is widened by the liberal use of phantasy.

In the course of an individual's development many impulses arise which can not be expressed to any satisfactory extent in a co-operative fashion. Often a child is afraid of being laughed at for the world he would live in. Under such circumstances there may be a withdrawal from play to pure phantasy with its wider possibilities for pretending. Indeed, one of the signs of coming adulthood is the giving up of overt play and the switching over to compensatory behavior of a more private sort. Adults seldom play in the childhood sense of that term, unless it be in art. In the adult, compensations through pretending are more likely to be worked out in private day-dreams.

Along with this tendency toward free expression, we have a tendency to make that expression as realistic as possible. Children are constantly recognizing inconsistencies in their play life and trying to patch them over as best they can. When, as a very small boy, I played with tin soldiers and miniature locomotives, I always felt the inappropriateness of the size of my own body. The device which I hit upon to get around this difficulty I called *Playing You are Nothing*. Every playfellow who entered into the world of my tiny armies and railroads was introduced to the proposition of suspending all interest in his own body. The running of the trains and the marching of the troops were to be considered as events independent of ourselves. There was one youngster who could not push a locomotive across the floor without playing he was the engineer. His fate was obvious. I never invited him to play unless I could get no one else; and, when he did come, it was to be made miserable

by my constant insistence that he must play he was nothing. Our disagreement, of course, grew out of the fact that each of us in his own way was striving to give the play a more vivid atmosphere of reality.

Just as overt play often passes over into private phantasy owing to a struggle against the limitations of the actual social and physical world, so private phantasy often passes over into overt play in the interests of greater credibility. As a child I was full of baseball phantasies. Although I played baseball a great deal, these games did not satisfy certain standards set up by reading athletic stories and watching older and more skillful players. But the phantasies, too, often became unsatisfactory on account of their intangibility. As a result I formed the habit of laying out a diamond upon the lawn and there, without ball or playmates, carrying out the overt movements of an heroic baseball performance. Many a time, I pitched nine long innings to baffled athletes who swung immaterial bats at my imaginary curves. Here was phantasy improved and made realistic by the actuality of its muscular accompaniments.

The topics of private phantasy are perhaps even more apt to find increased tangibility by being brought into contact with a real social world. The child knows that his day dreams are unreal, but the insistence of that fact becomes less troublesome if only he can get some one else to believe or act as though he believes in the reality of those imagined events. Many of the lies of children arise out of such circumstances. A boy longs for a pony and a box of tools. He fancies these things in his possession, and before a great while he somehow feels driven to tell his friends either that he already has the things he desires or that he has been promised them.

It is interesting to note here that the literary make-believe of adults contains within it evidence of the tendencies toward free expression and credibility, which I have mentioned as such significant factors in child life. Written fiction, for example, may be thought of as an instrument for giving human fancies increased tangibility. It is hardly necessary to point out the importance of artistic appreciation and production for the compensatory life of children.

In conclusion, play, the more private forms of phantasy, much lying and story telling, and the appreciation of stories all serve the same fundamental purpose in human life. They are compensatory mechanisms. They are more typical of children than of adults, because it is in children that the most incongruity exists between different impulses and between impulses and the surrounding world of actuality. The nature of play and the other compensatory mechanisms is determined by the need of imperfectly adjusted organisms to express their impulses as freely as

possible without too greatly straining the possibilities of their own belief.

B. LANGUAGE AND PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT

86. Personality, Sociability, and Language Development ¹

To any but a mother a new-born child hardly seems human. It appears rather to be a strange little animal, wonderful indeed, exquisitely finished even to the finger-nails; mysterious, awakening a fresh sense of our ignorance of the nearest things of life, but not friendly, not lovable. It is only after some days that a kindly nature begins to express itself and to grow into something that can be sympathized with and personally cared for. The earliest signs of it are chiefly certain smiles and babbling sounds, which are a matter of fascinating observation to anyone interested in the genesis of social feeling.

Spasmodic smiles or grimaces occur even during the first week of life, and at first seem to mean nothing in particular. So soon as they can be connected with anything definite these rudimentary smiles appear to be a sign of satisfaction. When a child is, say, five months old, no doubt can remain, in most cases, that the smile has become an expression of pleasure in the movements, sounds, touches, and general appearance of other people. It would seem, however, that personal feeling is not at first clearly differentiated from pleasure of sight, sound, and touch of other origin, or from animal satisfactions having no obvious cause.

But the need is for something more than muscular or sensory activities. There is also a need of feeling, an overflowing of personal emotion and sentiment, set free by the act of communication. By the time a child is a year old the social feeling that at first is indistinguishable from sensuous pleasure has become much specialized upon persons, and from that time onward to call it forth by reciprocation is a chief aim of his life. Perhaps it will not be out of place to emphasize this by transcribing two or three notes taken from life.

M. will now (eleven months old) hold up something she has found, e. g., the petal of a flower, or a little stick, demanding your attention to it by grunts and squeals. When you look and make some motion or exclamation she smiles.

R. (four years old) talks all day long, to real companions, if they will listen, if not to imaginary ones. As I sit on the steps this morning he

¹ Reprinted by permission from C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, pp. 45, 46, 47, 49-50, 52-54, 56, 61-62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 80-81, 82, 84, 85-86. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902.

seems to wish me to share his every thought and sensation. He describes every thing he does, although I can see it, saying, "Now I'm digging up little stones," etc. He thinks aloud. If I seem not to listen he presently notices it and will come up and touch me, or bend over and look up into my face.

When left to themselves children continue the joys of sociability by means of an imaginary playmate. It is not an occasional practice, but, rather, a necessary form of thought, flowing from a life in which personal communication is the chief interest and social feeling the stream in which, like boats on a river, most other feelings float. Some children appear to live in personal imaginations almost from the first month; others occupy their minds in early infancy mostly with solitary experiments upon blocks, cards, and other impersonal objects, and their thoughts are doubtless filled with the images of these. But, in either case, after a child learns to talk and the social world in all its wonder and provocation opens on his mind, it floods his imagination so that all his thoughts are conversations. He is never alone. Sometimes the inaudible interlocutor is recognizable as the image of a tangible playmate, sometimes he appears to be purely imaginary. Of course each child has his own peculiarities. R., beginning when about three years of age, almost invariably talked aloud while he was playing alone—which, as he was a first child, was very often the case. Most commonly he would use no form of address but "you," and perhaps had no definite person in mind. To listen to him was like hearing one at the telephone; though occasionally he would give both sides of the conversation. At times again he would be calling upon some real name, E sylt or Dorothy, or upon "Piggy," a fanciful person of his own invention. Every thought seemed to be spoken out. If his mother called him he would say, "I've got to go in now." Once when he slipped down on the floor he was heard to say, "Did you tumble down? No. *I* did."

The main point to note here is that these conversations are not occasional and temporary effusions of the imagination, but are the naïve expression of a socialization of the mind that is to be permanent and to underly all later thinking. The imaginary dialogue passes beyond the thinking aloud of little children into something more elaborate, reticent, and sophisticated; but it never ceases. Grown people, like children, are usually unconscious of these dialogues; as we get older we cease, for the most part, to carry them on out loud, and some of us practise a good deal of apparently solitary meditation and experiment. But, speaking broadly, it is true of adults as of children, that the mind lives in perpetual conversation.

The fact is that language, developed by the race through personal intercourse and imparted to the individual in the same way, can never be dissociated from personal intercourse in the mind; and since higher thought involves language, it is always a kind of imaginary conversation. The word and the interlocutor are correlative ideas.

The impulse to communicate is not so much a result of thought as it is an inseparable part of it.

Thus the imaginary companionship which a child of three or four years so naïvely creates and expresses, is something elementary and almost omnipresent in the thought of a normal person. In fact, thought and personal intercourse may be regarded as merely aspects of the same thing: we call it personal intercourse when the suggestions that keep it going are received through faces or other symbols present to the senses; reflection when the personal suggestions come through memory and are more elaborately worked over in thought. But both are mental, both are personal.

The mind is not a hermit's cell, but a place of hospitality and intercourse. We have no higher life that is really apart from other people. It is by imagining them that our personality is built up; to be without the power of imagining them is to be a low-grade idiot; and in the measure that a mind is lacking in this power it is degenerate. Apart from this mental society there is no wisdom, no power, justice, or right, no higher existence at all. The life of the mind is essentially a life of intercourse.

Let us now consider somewhat more carefully the way in which ideas of people grow up in the mind, and try to make out, as nearly as we can, their real nature and significance.

The studies through which the child learns, in time, to interpret personal expression are very early begun. On her twelfth day M. was observed to get her eyes upon her mother's face; and after gazing for some time at it she seemed attracted to the eyes, into which she looked quite steadily. From the end of the first month this face study was very frequent and long-continued. Doubtless anyone who notes infants could multiply indefinitely observations like the following:

M., in her eighth week lies in her mother's lap gazing up at her face with a frown of fixed and anxious attention. Evidently the play of the eyes and lips, the flashing of the teeth, and the wrinkles of expression are the object of her earnest study. So also the coaxing noises which are made to please her."

She now (four months and twenty-one days old) seems to fix her at-

tention almost entirely upon the eyes, and will stare at them for a minute or more with the most intent expression.

The eye seems to receive the most notice. The voice is also the object of close observation. The intentness with which a child listens to it, the quickness with which he learns to distinguish different voices and different inflections of the same voice, and the fact that vocal imitation precedes other sorts, all show this. It cannot fail to strike the observer that observation of these traits is not merely casual, but a strenuous study, often accompanied by a frown of earnest attention. The mind is evidently aroused, something important is going on, something conscious, voluntary, eager.

The interpretation of a smile, or of any sort of facial expression, is apparently learned much as other things are. By constant study of the face from the first month the child comes in time, to associate the wrinkles that form the smile with pleasant experiences—fondling, coaxing, offering of playthings or of the bottle, and so on. Thus the smile comes to be recognized as a harbinger of pleasure, and so is greeted with a smile. Its absence, on the other hand, is associated with inattention and indifference. I imagine that children fail to understand any facial expression that is quite new to them. An unfamiliar look, an expression of ferocity for example, may excite vague alarm simply because it is strange; or, as is very likely with children used to kind treatment, this or any other contortion of the face may be welcomed with a laugh on the assumption that it is some new kind of play.

Apparently, then, voice, facial expression, gesture, and the like, which later become the vehicle of personal impressions and the sensible basis of sympathy, are attractive at first chiefly for their sensuous variety and vividness, very much as other bright, moving sounding things are attractive; and the interpretation of them comes gradually by the interworking of instinct and observation. The interpretation of an angry look, for instance, consists in the expectation of angry words and acts, in feelings of resentment or fear, and so on; in short, it is our whole mental reaction to this sign. It may consist in part of sympathetic states of mind, that is in states of mind that we suppose the other experiences also; but it is not confined to such. These ideas that enrich the meaning of the symbol—the resentment or fear, for instance—have all, no doubt, their roots in instinct; we are born with the crude raw material of such feelings. And it is precisely in the act of communication, in social contact of some sort, that this material grows, that it gets the impulses that give it further definition, refinement, organization. It is by intercourse with others that we expand our inner experience. In other words, and

this is the point of the matter, the personal idea consists at first and in all later development, of a sensuous element or symbol with which is connected a more or less complex body of thought and sentiment; the whole social in genesis, formed by a series of communications.

Thus no personal sentiment is the exclusive product of any one influence, but all is of various origin and has a social history.

Facial expression, tone of voice, and the like, the sensible nucleus of personal and social ideas, serve as the handle, so to speak, of such ideas, the principal substance of which is drawn from the region of inner imagination and sentiment. The personality of a friend, as it lives in my mind and forms there a part of the society in which I live, is simply a group or system of thoughts associated with the symbols that stand for him. To think of him is to revive some part of the system—to have the old feeling along with the familiar symbol, though perhaps in a new connection with other ideas. The real and intimate thing in him is the thought to which he gives life, the feeling his presence or memory has the power to suggest. This clings about the sensible imagery, the personal symbols already discussed, because the latter have served as bridges by which we have entered other minds and therein enriched our own. We have laid up stores, but we always need some help to get them in order that we may use and increase them; and this help commonly consists in something visible or audible, which has been connected with them in the past and now acts as a key by which they are unlocked. Thus the face of a friend has power over us in much the same way as the sight of a favorite book, of the flag of one's country, or the refrain of an old song; it starts a train of thought, lifts the curtain from an intimate experience. And his presence does not consist in the pressure of his flesh upon a neighboring chair, but in the thoughts clustering about some symbol of him, whether the latter be his tangible person or something else.

So far as the study of immediate social relations is concerned the personal idea is the real person. That is to say, it is in this alone that one man exists for another, and acts directly upon his mind. My association with you evidently consists in the relation between my idea of you and the rest of my mind. If there is something in you that is wholly beyond this and makes no impression upon me it has no social reality in this relation. *The immediate social reality is the personal idea*; nothing, it would seem, could be much more obvious than this.

Society, then, in its immediate aspect, *is a relation among personal ideas*. In order to have society it is evidently necessary that persons should get together somewhere; and they get together only as personal ideas in the mind.

Yet most of us, perhaps, will find it hard to assent to the view that the social person is a group of sentiments attached to some symbol or other characteristic element, which keeps them together and from which the whole idea is named. The reason for this reluctance I take to be that we are accustomed to talk and think, so far as we do think in this connection, as if a person were a material rather than a psychical fact. Instead of basing our sociology and ethics upon what a man really is as part of our mental and moral life, he is vaguely and yet grossly regarded as a shadowy material body, a lump of flesh, and not as an ideal thing at all. But surely it is only common sense to hold that the social and moral reality is that which lives in our imaginations and affects our motives. As regards the physical it is only the finer, more plastic and mentally significant aspects of it that imagination is concerned with, and with that chiefly as a nucleus or center of crystallization for sentiment. Instead of perceiving this we commonly make the physical the dominant factor, and think of the mental and moral only by a vague analogy to it.

87. The Language Development of the Child¹

Utterance itself is the first thing to be mastered. The baby begins with the cry at birth, the cry which he can make because he has ready-made mechanisms in mouth, throat, tongue and brain. He uses these mechanisms and soon begins to make different noises or sounds. At ten weeks one baby "begins to make noises," at twenty weeks "she begins to talk to herself much more." The babies begin to "coo" and "gaga" and "da-dada." Often they do so at about three months old. They are learning how to produce these sounds, and practising with tongue, lips, ears, and larynx, and doing so with delight. Some babies, however, do not do this at all. J. D. began to speak at sixteen months old, without any of these previous gurglings. One of his first words was "gentleman." Evidently in him, tongue, lips, larynx, and brain worked together very easily, by nature. But at sixteen months, "before going to sleep at night, immediately he awoke in the morning, his all-absorbing game . . . consisted in running over all the words he knew and ringing the changes on them. It is only now (at 4½) that his interest in this kind of activity is beginning to wane." Evidently his interest in making sounds awakened only with his power of using them as words.

Language is much more than utterance, for in it a sound stands for a meaning to another person. The same sound must always stand for the

¹ From *Children and Childhood* by Miss N. Niemeyer (Mrs. Macfarlane); Clarendon Press, 1921, pp. 32-34; 35-36. Used by permission.

same meaning. Such significant sounds are what we call words; and a "word" is necessary really for each meaning. Hardly any language can supply so many words; but skilful people do pretty well. The really lucid talker is he who has a word for each of his many meanings.

One little child only used one word, "star," which he applied to everything bright. Another, at a year old, used only the word "f'ower" (flower), which she applied to everything bright—a lamp, a hat, a yellow daisy, a piece of embroidery.

Words, names, have been given by our predecessors to important things and important qualities. Those are not always the qualities which strike a child first. So the child takes time before it has learnt the words—the classifications—accepted by the adult world of his nation. But when classification first begins, the really important step has been taken. Even the two little children who used "star" and "f'ower" had already done this; they were doing the two things needed for language; they picked out a meaning—the quality of brightness—and labelled it, wherever they found it, with a sound. Had we known either of those children, we should have said, "He's beginning to talk!" But this stage is not really the first beginning. Behind it lies another stage, a stage which is hardly ever noticed. To understand this, we must go back to very early babyhood, and we must give up our own point of view. For to us the simplest thing we can think of is one simple object—bath, hat. Not so to a baby. (We cannot put into words thoughts as vague as a baby's, and when we put them into adult's words we give them a clearness which is not in the baby's mind.) To a baby the simplest thing is not any one object, but a whole, vague, complete experience. "Having my bath" is simpler than "bath." It is one experience—the warmth of the fire, light, a voice, body feelings, colors passing and changing, weight disappearing, the lapping touches of wetness and warmth. Little by little, as this mass of experience is repeated daily, the child recognizes it. He then begins to recognize certain parts of the affair—such as the wateriness of the bath—as the essential. At this stage, perhaps at ten months, he begins to notice another thing which comes, regularly, with this wet and exciting experience—a sound. One sound comes again and again—*Bath—bath*, uttered by various voices. And he recognizes it. Even earlier, he has recognized certain other sounds, such as the clink of the bottle and basin at feeding time. Now he recognizes the word, as a sign of the whole affair. And at last he himself utters the sound "ba-ba," and means "having his bath." It is true that he only utters this sound when the actual bath begins. It is true that this "naming" includes really much

more than "bath" ought to include; it is but a vague sprawling caricature of an adult's clear-cut word. Yet it is speech. Such words, so used, are sometimes called "percept words," because they are used only in the presence of the experience. And at this stage the child must have the whole thing, and nothing but the thing. A baby who uses "Mamee" rightly when his mother has her overall on, may not recognize her in her hat. But these mistakes are only temporary failures. From this time forward children go on splitting up the vast variety of experience into smaller parts, classifying them, and learning sounds with which to name these parts. Soon he begins to evoke by name things that are not there. As soon as he perceives likeness between the lamp that is there and a flower that is not, he is using a new mental power. He is now holding an absent thing in his mind's eye for consideration. The first stage of babyhood is left behind.

"Learning to talk" stands for the baby's first mental dealings with its world. That world is vague, miscellaneous, and indefinite to a degree which we have forgotten, and only recapture as we lie half awake, or in some curious moment of bewilderment. It is a "big . . . buzzing confusion," "a vague, undivided whole." By the time a child is 7 or 8, the world is immensely clearer in his sight. "The parts of the vague whole have become definite." The child can talk. His mind passes on to the more advanced questionings which older people recognize as thought.

88. Language and the Rise of Self-Feeling¹

It has long seemed to me that the first use by children of names for the self—particularly the pronouns "I," "me," "my" and "mine"—was a matter of peculiar interest. Here, if anywhere, I thought, we may hope to make out what the self-idea actually is, in its naïve and comparatively simple form, in the form under which it functions in the every-day relations of life. I was especially attracted by the interest of the matter for sociology—as throwing light on the question how far and in what sense the self-idea is a social conception.

The record extends from soon after birth until the thirty-third month, when the normal use of self-words seemed to have been acquired. The method was simply that of ordinary observation, with very little deliberate experiment: the idea being to get a view of development under usual conditions.

¹ Reprinted by permission from C. H. Cooley "A Study of the Early Use of Self-Words by a Child" *Psy. Rev.* 1908; XV: pp. 339; 340; 340-341; 341-342; 342-343.

I proceed to state more particularly some of the questions in relation to which the observations seem to me to be of interest.

The General Problem.—This may be said to be, "How is 'I' learned and what does it mean?"

It is evident that the learning of "I" offers a somewhat peculiar problem. The reason is the apparent impossibility of learning its proper use by direct imitation. As used by other persons it never, apparently, means the same thing as when used by the child. An apple is an apple to all alike, but "I" is different for every user of the word.

As to what it means; the following, to me at least, are interesting questions. Does it mean the physical self? If something else, then what? How far, or in what sense is it a social idea? How is the naming of the self-related—as to priority and otherwise—to the naming of other persons? What other names for the self are there, and how are they related to the pronouns of the first person? On all these questions the notes have more or less bearing, which I will try to indicate, in part at least, with the hope of rendering them more interesting and intelligible.

Inarticulate Self-feeling.—The child early manifests a feeling akin to pride in control over her own body and over material objects.

This extends, nearly or quite as early, to the sense of power over other persons.

The Correct Understanding of "I" and "You" when Used by Others.—This was achieved by the middle of the nineteenth month. It is to be noted that this does not involve the same problem as the correct use of "I," since that word may be understood as a mere objective name for the other person.

Imitative Use of "I" Phrases, Apparently Without a Sense of the Subjective Reference, or Indeed any Discrimination of "I" from the Rest of the Phrase.—This is clearly the first step in the actual use of the word, and is a phenomenon that continues, more or less, long after the correct use is acquired. It began, in this case, early in the twenty-second month.

Suggestions as to How the True or Subjective Meaning of "I" is Grasped.—This is in some ways the most searching question of all. My answer is that the child gradually comes to notice the indications of self-feeling (the emphasis, the appropriative actions, etc.) accompanying the use of "I," "me" and "my" by others. These indications awaken his own self-feeling, already existing in an inarticulate form. He sympathizes with them and reproduces them in his own use of these words. They thus come to stand for a *self-assertive feeling or attitude*, for self-will and appropriation. This view is reinforced by noticing how responsive the

child is to stress, and how readily she understands and reproduces exclamations and other emphatic words.

Does "I" Mean Primarily the Visible or Tangible Body?—To this, if I correctly interpret the observations, the answer must be, No. "I" means primarily a self-assertive feeling, linked with action or emphasis expressive of the same. The earliest examples connect it with the assertion of sensation, of action, of service and of appropriation ("I see mama," "my toast," "I make go," "I carry pillow," "I get it for you," "my mama," "I go play sand-pile," "I got two flowers," etc.).

Moreover, there is another name which comes into use about the same time as "I" and means primarily the physical body. This name, in this case, was "baby," and was apparently learned by direct imitation and association, like the name of any other visible object. The shadow on the wall and the reflection in the looking-glass play an important part here. It is noteworthy how comparatively late self-feeling seems to connect itself with these images. They are much less interesting at first than the shadows or reflections of other persons.

In what Sense is "I" a Social Conception?—The answer to this is apparently something as follows: "I" is social in that the very essence of it is the assertion of self-will in a social medium of which the speaker is conscious.

A sympathetic study of the early use of the word will, I think, make this quite plain. "I" is addressed to an audience—usually with some emphasis—and its purpose is to impress upon that audience the power ("I make go"), the wish ("I go play sand-pile"), and claim ("my mama"), the service ("I get it for you") of the speaker. Its use in solitude would be inconceivable (though the audience may, of course, be imaginary).

To put it otherwise, "I" is a differentiation in a vague body of personal ideas which is either self-consciousness or social consciousness, as you please to look at it. In the use of "I" and of names for other people, the *ego* and *alter* phases of this consciousness become explicit.

Others are Named Before the Self.—This was clearly true in the present case.

Other Names for the Self.—It is well known that little children frequently use a name for themselves that is directly imitated from others, like the name of any other object. In this case as already noted the first name of this sort was "baby." It did not precede "I" and gradually merged into it as the child became more sophisticated (many have the impression that this is what takes place), but it arose simultaneously, so nearly as could be ascertained, with the pronoun form.

"Baby" meant at first her reflection in the glass, her shadow on the wall, her physical person. It was soon, however, applied to action and possession.

It gained on the pronouns and for some weeks was the commonest name for the self, though it never entirely supplanted "I." The pronouns, however, mended their pace, gained a lead, and gradually displaced "baby" altogether.

"She," another self-name acquired by direct imitation—i. e., by hearing people say "she needs a clean dress" and the like—was used as early as twenty-three months and two days and is noted as common towards the end of the twenty-sixth month. It continues so for about two months, then diminishes, and is discontinued about the end of the thirty-second month.

The use of "you" for "I" by direct imitation (e. g., "I carry you," meaning "you carry me") is first recorded at the end of the twenty-third month, and remained common well into the twenty-seventh. I think, however, that this was never so definitely and deliberately used as a self-name as was "she"—perhaps because "you" was already understood in its true sense. Its use for "I," though very common, was mostly confined to its occurrence in phrases which were repeated as wholes.

89. Names and the Child's Image of Himself ¹

The names by which children are known are a factor of consequence in the early sense of self.

In response to the request to write every designation applied to children, not omitting the silliest effusions of maternal tenderness, 780 different terms were received. Of these 54 were usually applied with the prefix little, 14 with the prefix old, 5 with young, 13 with mama's and 9 with papa's. The majority of these appellations appeared only once, but some were repeated many times. The favorite epithet was Pet, which was returned 52 times; then come Darling 49 times, Baby 41, Honey 31, Sweetheart 31, Sweetness 30, Kid 27, Sugar-plum 23, Brat, Dumpling, Tootsy-Wootsy, each 20; Bub 19, Sissy 16, Angel and Ducky, each 15; Birdy, Chatterbox, Puss, Pudding, Chicken, each 13; Precious and Dolly, each 12; Rascal and Popsy-Wopsy, each 10; Daisy, Fatty, Kittie, each 9; Lamb and Sonny, each 8; Jewel, Girlie, Bibbie, Dearie, Sunbeam, each 7; Monkey, Mischief, Midget, Rosebud, each 6; Sweetmeat 5, Bunnie, Dicky, Curly-head, Cry-baby, Nuisance, each 4; etc.

¹ Reprinted by permission from G. Stanley Hall "The Early Sense of Self" *A. J. Psy.* 1897-98: IX: pp. 368-71.

Among the pet names applied to babies those of animals are very common. They are called ape, monkey, coon, kid, pig, Billy and Nanny goat, kittie, puss, pup, rat, calf, mouse, titmouse, dormouse, cow, horsie, chipmunk, salamander, turtle, lamb and lambkin, periwinkle, pollywog, mink, oyster, crab, goosie, chick, dove, duck, cuckoo, tomtit, robin, bobolink, chickadee, pigeon, blackbird, crow, jaybird.

Names from the vegetable kingdom are common, such as apple-blossoms, apple-dumpling, apple-cider, apple-cart, sweet apple, pippin, peach, turnip, hazel, comfrey, pumpkin, strawberry, bud, blossom, pink, daisy, honeysuckle, tulip, buttercup, poppy, dandelion, sun-flower, peony, heartsease, beanstalk, chickweed, bluebell, harebell, Mayflower, peep-o'-day.

Babies are often named from some part of the body or from some physical trait, as snooty, bow-legs, thumbkin, bony-legs, fatty, neck, elbow, shorty, skinny, babeskin, brick-top, runt, curly-head, frowzletop, bushel, bundle, blue-eyes, bright-eyes, warty, reddy, shinny-bone, hair-pin, clothes-pin, tuning-fork, tow-head, lunky, chub, slab-sides, snow-ball, pinkie, nigger, golden-hair, pug, butter-ball, buster, broom-stick, bean-pole, browney.

Even dress and other externals may suggest names, as boots, pants, buttons, smutty, shirtie, buttermilk, milksop, scarecrow, gig-lamps.

Character appears in such terms as old sober-sides, touch-me-not, cry-baby, crank, busy-body, blarney, high-flyer, dude, dirt, fraid-cat, girl-boy, pert, Miss Independence, Miss Giddy, Miss Contrary, mutton-head, jade, chump, trot, yahoo, moper, harum-scarum, tricky, sauce-box, wretch, villain, rascal, vixen, varmint, torment, tease, tender-heart, piety, tramp, trump, numb-skull, cross-patch, charmer, scalawag, humbug, wild-fire, clod-hopper, romp, sunshine, smartie, sorry, sugar, cold-molasses, stick-in-the-mud, skin-flint, tom-boy, tell-tale, zany, Miss Sarcasm, lucky, slob, pest, Puritan, minx, nincompoop, long-tongue, hussy, lunatic, pesky.

Closely related to the above come names suggesting characteristic acts, as wobbler, paticake, snoozer, chatterbox, trombone, tot, toddles, toddle-kins, sticking-plaster, sucker, tumble-boy, bunter, rooter, bottle-boy, soap-sides, sot, snug, sozzle, sneak, lob, jabberer, music-box, hee-haw, cuddled, butter-fingers, squawker, squeaker, noisy (because so silent).

Names suggesting food and the sense of taste were common, as honey, sweetness, sweetie, sweet, sugar-plum, bun, sugar, dumpling, yum-yum, cake, sweet-meat, mint-drop, cream-cheese, chocolate-cream.

Repetitive and alliterative terms which appear in these returns are lovey-dovey, roly-poly, kit-cat, hun-pun, airy-fairy, unky-dunky, tootsy-

wootsy, popsy-wopsy, flim-flam, hodge-podge, nizzle-nozzle, soft-snap, bed-boy, bottle-boy, piggy-wiggy, nipperty-tuck, buz-fuz, till-the-bell, the October-will, mumblety-peg, posey-woosy, lamie-wamie, orty-warty, highty-tighty, ducky-darling, bity-wity, enty-twenty, flibly-flab, etc.

Supernatural designations were angel, cupid, imp, devil, idol, phoenix, sphinx, spook, witch, cherub, puck.

Fictitious personages appear in, e. g., Annie Rooney, Bill Nye, Dodo, Miss Muffet, Little Boy Blue, Humpty-Dumpty, Uncle Sam, John Bull, Dick Turpin, Two-Shoes, Topsy, Queen Bess, Hop-o'-My-Thumb, Punch and Judy, Ouida, Old Joe Jenks, Ornary Jim, McGinty, Josh Billings, Dixie, Rob Roy.

Often proper names not their own are applied to children as pet terms, e. g., Becky, Teddie, Polly, McGurdy, Pete, Gretchen, Molly, Sally, Bob, Pat, Peggy, Nancy, Ned, Loretta, Lib, Lizzie, Mosey, Jack, Jake. Often a string of these are applied to a child, as Betsy-Jane-Maria-Ann-Betsy-Rubbage-Burney. Changing and exchanging names with their friends so as to act and be another person for a while must have a significance which, suggestive as it is, we cannot fully explain.

Terms used with more reference to their sound or noises than to their meaning seem to be lolly-pops, snooks, weezy, buggins, skeesucks, skee-dunk, skite, coot, thimble-rigger, sniggle-fist, fliberty-gibbits, smuggie, chickapin, bodkin, slab-dab, fiddle-de-flumps, nobs, nibs, ninny-hammer, gicks, gibbits, pot-snap, dot.

Miscellaneous are aborigine, chum, cub, urchin, chap, thug, dew-drop, cud, star, diamond, diamond ring, curiosity shop, zip, young kit, squab, pearl, lugs, snow-drop, gipsy, Indian, mince-meat, Godie-on-wheels, Jim-cracks, cash-cord, ex-post-facto, bow-wow, mamma's life, heart, sun, precious, jewel, bug-bear, cruddy, coddie, old-beeswax, tike, bitzen, swonk, buzey, gudgey, ducky-do, skidd-a-more, jusi, greaser, rag-baby.

Till the age of three one girl knew no other name than papa's devil. One girl was called dolly from resemblance to a certain doll till her true name was lost. At the age of nineteen one is still called baby by her grandfather. Mary called herself bay for baby, and it stuck to her as a young woman. Revilla was small and came to be called Minnie by all. One girl was called Jennie, till at the age of eight she ordered a change and would respond only to Ida, which became her name. Elizabeth used to call herself Liberty, and that is still her name at the age of nineteen. Till eight one had no name but sissy. A girl of thirteen knows no name but stick-in-the-mud, given her by her father. At the age of five Rose became cross if not called Ella, and Ella she became. A girl of twelve had no name but sweet, when she chose Anna Julia; and a boy

sixteen, reared by a wealthy aunt, has no name but goody. Two twins had no name but baby till five, although often distinguished by the descriptive epithets wart and reddy. A girl ran away to Mr. Wetxels terns, and was called Peggy W. up to the age of ten. Till the age of eleven one had no name but boy. Sometimes when they begin to write and go to school, or at the latest in the early teens, such children begin to feel the want of a real name. Children occasionally swap names, or one takes the other's name; one, e. g., becoming Ida I and the other Ida II. Humorous names suggested for twins were Pete and Repeater, Max and Climax, Kate and Duplicate, etc.

Diminutives concentrate attention to a more intense focus, and every language has them. Adolescent girls torture their names, and often give themselves new ones, especially to add a characteristic *ie* to an appellation for the exclusive use of their most intimate friends, somewhat as Germans use *du* in place of *Sie*, or the French *tu* for *vous*, and secret names for the dearest friends are common. Boys, on the other hand, tend to ruder nicknames. A new boy who called all his schoolmates Thomas, James, William, instead of Tom, Jim, Billy, was voted a prig, and generally disliked. There is something wrong with the head or heart of parents who make a point of calling their children Elizabeth, Margaret, Sophia, Robertus, etc., from infancy, as do a small but *ultra* respectable minority of our correspondents, and as do a few of the most proper kindergartners. Ultra-saccharine and nauseating as some of the above epithets seem to the adult consciousness, their copiousness suggests the many-sidedness of childhood, when more than at any other period of the manifold qualities of the race appear in the individual, and every new pet name is a new channel opened for new parental feelings. Love, whether during the honeymoon or in the golden dawn of true motherhood of soul as well as of body, still reveals to us a glimpse of the primeval impulse that gave birth to names, and that was perhaps one of the chief sources of language itself. Many of these designations reflect in the clearest mirror which speech can command traits of body, acts, disposition, etc., that help the child to new points of view of self before his ensemble of parts is labeled by a single conventionalized name that has lost all its appellative root meaning.

90. Thought, Symbols, and Language¹

Among objects that exist only for separate individuals are so-called

¹ Reprinted by permission from G. H. Mead "The Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol" *J. Phil.* 1922: XIX. pp. 159-63.

images. They are *there*, but are not necessarily *located* in space. They do enter into the structure of things, as notably on the printed page, or in the hardness of a distant object; and in hallucinations they may be spatially located. They are dependent for their existence upon conditions in the organism—especially those of the central nervous system—as are other objects in experience such as mountains and chairs. When referred to the self they become memory images, or those of a creative imagination, but they are not mental or spiritual stuff.

Conduct is the sum of the reactions of living beings to their environments, especially to the objects which their relation to the environments has “cut out of it,” to use a Bergsonian phrase. Among these objects are certain which are of peculiar importance to which I wish to refer, viz., other living forms which belong to the same group. The attitudes and early indications of actions of these forms are peculiarly important stimuli, and to extend a Wundtian term may be called “gestures.” These other living forms in the group to which the organism belongs may be called social objects and exist as such before selves come into existence. These gestures call out definite, and in all highly organized forms, partially predetermined reactions, such as those of sex, of parenthood, of hostility, and possibly others, such as the so-called herd instincts. In so far as these specialized reactions are present in the nature of individuals, they tend to arise whenever the appropriate stimulus, or gesture calls them out. If an individual uses such a gesture, and he is affected by it as another individual is affected by it, he responds or tends to respond to his own social stimulus, as another individual would respond. A notable instance of this is in the song, or vocal gesture of birds. The vocal gesture is of peculiar importance because it reacts upon the individual who makes it in the same fashion that it reacts upon another, but this is also true in a less degree of those of one’s own gestures that he can see or feel.

The self arises in conduct, when the individual becomes a social object in experience to himself. This takes place when the individual assumes the attitude or uses the gesture which another individual would use and responds to it himself, or tends so to respond. It is a development that arises gradually in the life of the infant and presumably arose gradually in the life of the race. It arises in the life of the infant through what is unfortunately called imitation, and finds its expression in the normal play life of young children. In the process the child gradually becomes a social being in his own experience, and he acts toward himself in a manner analogous to that in which he acts toward others. Especially he talks to himself as he talks to others and in keeping up this conversation in the

inner forum constitutes the field which is called that of mind. Then those objects and experiences which belong to his own body, those images which belong to his own past, become part of this self.

In the behavior of forms lower than man, we find one individual indicating objects to other forms, though without what we term signification. The hen that pecks at the angleworm is directly though without intention indicating it to the chicks. The animal in a herd that scents danger, in moving away indicates to the other members of the herd the direction of safety and puts them in the attitude of scenting the same danger. The hunting dog points to the hidden bird. The lost lamb that bleats, and the child that cries each points himself out to his mother. All of these gestures, to the intelligent observer, are significant symbols, but they are none of them significant to the forms that make them.

In what does this significance consist in terms of a behavioristic psychology? A summary answer would be that the gesture not only actually brings the stimulus-object into the range of the reactions of other forms, but that the nature of the object is also indicated; especially do we imply in the term significance that the individual who points out indicates the nature to himself. But it is not enough that he should indicate this meaning—whatever meaning is—as it exists for himself alone, but that he should indicate that meaning as it exists for the other to whom he is pointing it out. The widest use of the term implies that he indicates the meaning to any other individual to whom it might be pointed out in the same situation. In so far then as the individual takes the attitude of another toward himself, and in some sense arouses in himself the tendency to the action, which his conduct calls out in the other individual, he will have indicated to himself the meaning of the gesture. This implies a definition of meaning—that it is an indicated reaction which the object may call out. When we find that we have adjusted ourselves to a comprehensive set of reactions toward an object we feel that the meaning of the object is ours. But that the meaning may be ours, it is necessary that we should be able to regard ourselves as taking this attitude of adjustment to response. We must indicate to ourselves not only the object but also the readiness to respond in certain ways to the object, and this indication must be made in the attitude or rôle of the other individual to whom it is pointed out or to whom it may be pointed out. If this is not the case it has not that common property which is involved in significance. It is through the ability to be the other at the same time that he is himself that the symbol becomes significant. The common statement of this is that we have in mind what we indicate to another that he shall do. In giving directions, we give the direction to ourselves at the same time that we

give it to another. We assume also his attitude of response to our requests, as an individual to whom the direction has the same signification in his conduct that it has to ourselves.

But signification is not confined to the particular situation within which an indication is given. It acquires universal meaning. Even if the two are the only ones involved, the form in which it is given is universal—it would have the same meaning to any other who might find himself in the same position. How does this generalization arise? From the behavioristic standpoint it must take place through the individual generalizing himself in his attitude of the other. We are familiar enough with the undertaking, in social and moral instruction to children and to those who are not children. A child acquires the sense of property through taking what may be called the attitude of the generalized other. Those attitudes which all assume in given conditions and over against the same objects, become for him attitudes which every one assumes. In taking the rôle which is common to all, he finds himself speaking to himself and to others with the authority of the group. These attitudes become axiomatic. The generalization is simply the result of the identity of responses. Indeed it is only as he has in some sense amalgamated the attitudes of the different rôles in which he has addressed himself that he acquires the unity of personality. The "me" that he addresses is constantly varied. It answers to the changing play impulse, but the group solidarity, especially in its uniform restrictions, gives him the unity of universality. This I take to be the sole source of the universal. It quickly passes the bounds of the specific group. It is the *vox populi*, *vox dei*, the "voice of men and of angels." Education and varied experience refine out of it what is provincial, and leave "what is true for all men at all times." From the first, its form is universal, for differences of the different attitudes of others wear their peculiarities away. In the play-period, however, before the child has reached that of competitive games—in which he seeks to pit his own acquired self against others—in the play period this process is not fully carried out and the child is as varied as his varying mood; but in the game he sees himself in terms of the group or gang and speaks with a passion for rules and standards. Its social advantage and even necessity makes this approach to himself imperative. He must see himself as the whole group sees him. This again has passed under the head of passive imitation. But it is not in uniform attitudes that universality appears as a recognized factor in either inner or outer behavior. It is found rightly in thought, and thought is the conversation of this generalized other with the self.

The significant symbol is then the gesture, the sign, the word which is

addressed to the self when it is addressed to another individual, and is addressed to another, in form to all other individuals, when it is addressed to the self.

Signification has, as we have seen, two references, one to the thing indicated, and the other to the response, to the instance and to the meaning or idea. It denotes and connotes. When the symbol is used for the one, it is a name. When it is used for the other, it is a concept. But it neither denotes nor connotes except, when in form at least, denotation and connotation are addressed both to a self and to others, when it is in a universe of discourse that is oriented with reference to a self. If the gesture simply indicates the object to another, it has no meaning to the individual who makes it, nor does the response which the other individual carries out become a meaning to him, unless he assumes the attitude of having his attention directed by an individual to whom it has a meaning. Then he takes his own response to be the meaning of the indication. Through this sympathetic placing of themselves in each other's rôles, and finding thus in their own experiences the responses of the others, what would otherwise be an unintelligent gesture, acquires just the value which is connoted by signification, both in its specific application and in its universality.

It should be added that in so far as thought—that inner conversation in which objects as stimuli are both separated from and related to their responses—is identified with consciousness, that is in so far as consciousness is identified with awareness, it is the result of this development of the self in experience. The other prevalent signification of consciousness is found simply in the presence of objects in experience. With the eyes shut we can say we are no longer conscious of visual objects. If the condition of the nervous system or certain tracts in it, cancels the relation of individual and his environment, he may be said to lose consciousness or some portion of it; i. e., some objects or all of them pass out of experience for this individual. Of peculiar interest is the disappearance of a painful object, e. g., an aching tooth under a local anæsthetic. A general anæsthetic shuts out all objects.

As above indicated analysis takes place through the conflict of responses which isolates separate features of the object and both separates them from and relates them to their responses, i. e., their meanings. The response becomes a meaning, when it is indicated by a generalized attitude both to the self and to others. Mind, which is a process within which this analysis and its indications takes place, lies in a field of conduct between a specific individual and the environment, in which the individual is able, through the generalized attitude he assumes, to make use

of symbolic gestures, i. e., terms, which are significant to all including himself.

While the conflict of reactions takes place within the individual, the analysis takes place in the object. Mind is then a field that is not confined to the individual much less is located in a brain. Significance belongs to things in their relations to individuals. It does not lie in mental processes which are enclosed within individuals.

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What is the place of the conditioned response mechanism in the rise of personality traits?
2. Illustrate how early social influences determine the nature of the life organization of the person.
3. How does the nature of the culture patterns of the group determine the nature of the personality?
4. What does Cooley mean by holding that human nature is acquired?
5. How important is the intercommunication of gesture for the early stages of self-development? Why?
6. Explain Cooley's statement "The impulse to communicate is not so much a result of thought as it is an inseparable part of it."
7. Why is the imaginary companionship of the child important for the development of his personality?
8. Show how personal sentiments have a social history.
9. How do we reflect others in our own personality?
10. Distinguish between the reflection of one's self in the eyes of a friend and in the eyes of a stranger or an enemy.
11. What causes a small boy to be ashamed of the following?
 - a) playing with dolls;
 - b) wearing long hair;
 - c) being called a "sissy."
12. What causes a girl to become "motherly" to her dolls?
13. How does the social setting of a classroom affect a pupil's recitation?
14. What is meant by the phrase "the reality of authority" in reference to child development?
15. Report concrete observations on an infant and child to trace the types of his identifications. How do these change with age?
16. How do the types of play correlate with the socialization process of the person?
17. What place does the mother play in the development of the foundations of personality?
18. What is the rôle of dramatization for the child?

19. Are there any dangers in too great amount of compensatory make-believe play? Discuss pro and con.
 20. It is said that language and ideational processes develop together and are inseparable. Discuss.
 21. Explain "Gesture (including language) is a truncated act."
 22. What is the relation of language and the rise of self-feeling.
 23. Indicate how calling a child a name not only reflects the parents' interpretation of the child but sets the frame of the child's future behavior.
 24. What is the relation between social taboos and language?
 25. Correlate Mead's statement that "the self arises in conduct when the individual becomes a social object in experience to himself" with the statement that personality consists in playing a rôle set for us by others, or that a man has as many selves as there are people who recognize him and carry an image of him in their minds.
 26. What causes a person to blush? Does a person ever blush when alone?
- B. Topics for Class Reports
1. Report on Conklin's study of foster-child phantasy. (Cf. bibliography.)
 2. Report on Wells' discussion of symbolic association to show the type of word usage in magic, taboo, punning, etc. (Cf. bibliography.)
- C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers
1. Study of Identification and Projection in the Rise of Personality.
 2. The Comments on Human Nature in the World's Great Literature: A Symposium.
 3. Mead's Theory of the Self.
 4. The Relation of Language, Thought and Social Stimulation.
 5. The Culture Patterns and the Personality.

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CHAPTER XIV

PERSONALITY AND FAMILY AND GROUP PRESSURES

I. INTRODUCTION

The present chapter consists largely of case studies intended to illustrate certain factors of social conditioning in the rise and direction of personality. The particular life organization of the boy or girl is limited by factors of original nature: physical conditions, emotions, instinctive tendencies, and intellectual capacities. But the specific organization and development of one's traits is quite within the influence of the environment.

The quotation from Groves sketches the main stages in the development of the personality of the boy. It is shown that the fundamental attachment is at the outset to the mother, that is heterosexual, and then later the boy moves in his affection over toward the father, and then again in adolescence to the other sex. Specifically, however, this is but a general outline. Circumstances play a considerable part in modifying this general pattern. This is nicely illustrated in the second paper which shows that in the absence of a father at home, the boy's attachment to the mother persists and is later moved over to the sisters. The third paper from a man who was raised in a very orthodox family shows the interplay of family attitudes and a certain resistance to authority which later led to complete break with the family and with the traditional religion leading to membership in socialistic groupings. The projection of class standards upon the child, the intellectual analysis by the boy of certain inconsistencies of attitude, as seen in his defense of the Boers and in his growing disgust with the artificiality of his social status, are well shown. The fourth paper shows the development of an inferiority complex in the presence of physical retardation and ill-health.

Following these life histories of boys is another selection from Groves tracing briefly the personality development of the girl from attachment to the mother to heterosexual attachment of adolescence.

As Groves points out, the course of development for the girl is often more difficult than for the boy, owing to the fundamental homosexual nature of her first fixation on the mother. There is always some danger that this fundamental conditioning may be so excessive or else so incomplete that difficulty in normal development arises later.

The paper by Miss Taft is a very valuable analysis of the development of a life-organization, wherein the roots of the behavior are traced backwards through childhood to early infancy. The maladjustment of the mother-daughter relation is well portrayed. The paper on projection of ambitions of parents on their children reveals another phase of parent-child relationship.

It should not be imagined, of course, that these few histories give more than a meagre sample of the variety of life organizations in terms of social conditioning. Every personality is a unique combination of original nature and acquirement welded together into a more or less harmonious whole. The reader should extend his acquaintance with the variety of personal life histories by following the bibliographic suggestions.

II. MATERIALS

91. The Development of Personality in the Boy¹

The boy's development is more simple and less liable to abnormality than is the girl's. He starts with a heterosexual affection as a result of his contact with his mother. She on her part due to her own heterosexual tendencies is likely to extend to him greater demonstration of affection than she bestows upon children of her own sex. This expression of her love is likely to awaken in the child reciprocal feelings and he naturally looks to his mother rather than to his father for satisfaction of his desire for attention. It is possible also that the boy is instinctively led toward a heterosexual relationship.

During this first period of his life, about eight years, the boy clings closely to his mother and from her gets his largest satisfactions and upon her bestows the greater affection. Toward the close of this period, however, he is led from his mother and toward his father. He is pushed forward into the new attitude by his instincts and his social

¹ Reprinted by permission from E. R. Groves, *Personality and Social Adjustment*, pp. 194-96. New York. Longmans, Green & Company, 1923.

contacts. His instinctive life is awakening to new activities and demanding of him more out-of-the-home experiences. He is interested in enterprises that are primarily masculine in type. The world of things catches his fancy and he begins to appreciate the kind of life represented by his father and his sex. He plays more and more with boys rather than with girls and boys. These boys like himself are also turning from the infantile mother-attitude to the stage of father-emulation. Normally there begins a hero-attitude toward the father. It is now that the father's comradeship will mean most to the boy. The undiscerning father throws away his greatest opportunity to influence the boy, usually because of lack of understanding rather than utter selfishness. This is the time that the boy talks of his desire to be like his "Daddy," that he imitates his father and gives his interest to those things that concern his father.

Again by the normal ripening of his instincts the boy transfers his attention somewhat from his home and parents and increases his interest in his playmates. These will be for the most part boys. His curiosity, pugnacity, self-assertion and other motivating drives bring him more and more in association with playmates. School and especially games occupy the center of his interest. He no longer is so dependent upon his mother. He cares much less about his father's interests but finds instead his supreme social gratification in winning the approval of his mates. Now, as by common impulse, boys join gangs and clubs. Girls and girl interest are largely taboo. Sisters are looked upon as inferiors and frequently are regarded as troubles. Parental standards are in varying measure discounted. There is, however, the greatest sensitiveness to the attitude of members of the gang.

Then comes the fiery ordeal of adolescence. The girls, once taboo or ignored, now become the one compelling topic of conversation, the most persistent focus of attention. Now he is prepared to concentrate his affection on some member of the opposite sex; and teachers and parents do their utmost to keep him from a premature fixation of affection in order that before beginning family responsibilities he may complete the education which he needs for his adult career.

92. Childhood Fixation on Mother and Sisters ¹

My childhood was a rather miserable period for me. I caught cold at birth and until I was about eight years old had every lung trouble but consumption. I had bronchitis, pleurisy, pneumonia, and what not. My mother became my nurse and constant companion. She stayed awake

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nights to attend to me, and a good part of her life was spent in worrying for me. It was to escape the English fogs that were eating into my lungs that she was willing to leave her family, her every relative to come to America. My father had already been here for some years. He had returned to England, and had then gone back to America.

In the meantime, the absence of my father, and my constant association with my mother caused a strong fixation upon my mother. One incident worthy of mention is my earliest recollection of my childhood, I still have the mental image, although it is beginning to fade, of my sisters and mother standing around a trunk which my father was packing. I can see the trunk, I remember its shape and its size. The faces are not clear, and while I see the correct number of figures and the varying sizes of the persons I do not recognize each individual. My mother had tried to induce my father to take with him some canned fruit, and he did not want to. While my father turned away to get something, my mother put the fruit in the trunk, hiding it under some clothes. That is the picture. It recurred to me throughout my youth, although I was three years old at the time of the happening. My mother verifies the incident. My explanation is this. I did not see my father after that time until I came to America, and I really missed him. The other members of the family were my sisters, there are four, and I had no brothers. I wanted my father. I envied my cousins as I saw them playing with their fathers. I had a desire that was never fulfilled, and I cannot express in words the pain I felt as a child. The absence of my father caused many a tear, and even today I retain a copy of a photograph of my father that I smeared with childish kisses. How I wanted to sit on my father's lap, to swing on his leg, to talk to him. On religious festivals I went to the synagogue with my cousins and my uncles. I carried a little flag or noise-maker, or what it was, but never could I enjoy it. I wanted the companionship of my father, and I used to cry bitterly after I returned from the services. I always, after such an occasion, told my mother to write my father that I had missed him. The only thing I had to remember my father by was the memory of his departure, and that incident remained in my mind, I think, not because there was anything unusual in the incident itself, but because of its effect on my later life. In my wish for my father's companionship, the picture of his leaving was the only thing that remained. In this way I explain the survival of the picture, the only tie that bound me to my father. When I finally did meet my father, it was too late. I was still a child, but I was too old for the things I had at one time wanted. Before leaving England, how I used to dream of my father

night after night. The joy I pictured of even seeing him! But I have always felt that I lost a great part of my life in being separated from my father, and yet it was only a few years. I sometimes get a peculiar feeling that I cannot explain. I do not believe in a life after death nor in another world, yet I find myself at times thinking that I shall some day find the pleasure that I lost, a feeling that I will live it over again. I soon call myself to time, and the idea leaves, at the same time leaving me a little more solemn. It is something of a spirit of transmigration, the soul being reborn, yet I do not consciously hold any such belief. Perhaps it is a Freudian suppressed desire to experience the period that I missed so much!

Out of this, however, grew the mother fixation that I have mentioned. I was never jealous of my mother, however. My feelings found an outlet in a different manner. I sentimentalized the situation, and made my mother an idol. I have since earliest times had great ambition to repay my mother. I used to talk when young, I remember, of buying my mother a throne of gold upon which she should some day sit. Later I did not get such wild ideas, but I still thought as I lay in bed, of success in my chosen endeavor. Queerly enough I never thought of my personal pleasure, but of the pleasure it would give my mother to see her only son reach success. I wanted to be rich, not to satisfy personal cravings, but of a desire to give my mother everything she should desire. She had never tasted of prosperity, and I always had a desire to give it to her. Some may see in my desire to make my mother happy a personal selfishness. That may be so, but if it exists it certainly is suppressed. When my thoughts first turned to journalism, I wanted to be an Arthur Brisbane, a great editor with unlimited salary. I blush now as I think of it. But in those days material wealth was my measure of success. Even though I still cannot get away from the idea of my debt, real or supposed, to my mother, I am quite willing to measure my success in other ways.

The absence of men in the family caused a sister fixation, also. I was the youngest member of the family, and besides a weakling. Therefore every member of the family centered her care on me. I did not realize my relation to my sisters until comparatively recent years. They had always been kind to me, had really been too much so. They delighted in my childish witticisms. It was a great life. Finally I began to assert myself. I was a man and of course a man, be he young or old, has a right to feel a little domineering or superior. I am sure my sisters snickered among themselves, but they humored me. Really they were quite intelligent girls, students of English schools, and they were

educated and quite refined. As I grew older I found pleasure in talking school topics and books with them. They were my companions. But "the boy grew older" and so did his sisters. Not so many years ago my oldest sister married—eight years ago, when I was eleven. Then for the first time I realized my fixation. I hated my brother-in-law, not as a man, but because he was taking my sister away. My oldest sister always held more attraction for me than the other girls in the family. She was more of a student, and she seemed to understand me, just as she does today. Many a time at home even now my moroseness overcomes me, and my parents wonder what is the matter. They ask me, but I can as easily answer their questions as count the stars. But my sister understands—"Just leave him alone for awhile, he wants to think, there is nothing the matter." But she was to belong to someone else—I could not stand the thought. A few years later when I knew she was to become a mother (I learned this for myself; nobody told me) I became angered again. Even married she had given me much of her affection, and any success of mine cheered her. But here she was to have a child of her own; her love would no longer be mine. If I got any attention at all it would be divided. I felt restless, and for days when I first knew the fact I felt that something was wrong. Of course I was wrong. My sister is just as interested in me as ever. Every success I have made has been of great interest to her, and I find her an intelligent and genial companion. But I could not see that earlier. My fixation was stronger on her than on my mother. When my second-oldest sister married the rebellion still existed, but it was less strong. By the time my third sister married the feeling had returned. I am rather sentimental anyhow. I think I can cry at a melodrama as easily as any woman. Sentimentality got me. I had played with this sister, who was more nearly my own age, and I had fought with her more than with any other member of the family. When she was to marry I realized that I was about to lose my last companion, at least so it felt, and my sorrow was limitless. Now I have grown still older. I am supposed to be more interested in women outside my own family. But I find my sisters still a receptive audience to my doing and they are still proud of any accomplishments of their brother. They have created in me a desire to "grandstand."

93. Early Social Conditioning: Building of Social Attitudes¹

Of the part of my life spent in the "Brown" house, my mother alone

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stands out clearly in memory. If I had been taken away from the family at that time I would still remember her now. My father, Aunt (my mother's oldest sister who lived in New York), Mable (the nurse and companion of Aunt Ella, also in New York), my brothers and others, are figures of whose existence I am vaguely aware, but whose characteristics are rather cloudy and indistinct. Of the two "girls," the cook and waitress, I recall only Lizzie as someone who existed. George, the coachman, I associate chiefly with my rides on the cow's back.

The first religious training that I can remember, occurred at this time, but the only part of it that remains is the recollection of being held up to the telephone, one day, to ask if one of the neighbor's boys could come over to a "Sunday school" class, to consist of the three of us.

In the "Kingsley" house, where we lived for the next five years, events take on a much sharper outline, and my memories of them are very numerous.

School life began here for me. My father had suggested that we boys be sent to the public school in town, but my mother would not hear of it. We were to be thorough "gentlemen" and therefore must not be allowed to associate with every "rag-tag and bob-tail."

As I have said, the neighborhood in which we lived, was at the very edge of the city, our house being the last but one before coming upon open country. On the side toward town, the residential section extended down to Pemberton's Headquarters, half a mile or so distant, and constituted a very clearly defined social unit: all of the families occupying the same parasitical station in society as our own. From the Headquarters on to the depot, the curve of social "values" took a sudden drop, until at Ledgeway Avenue, it descended to the uttermost depths of the proletariat. There were a number of boys in "our" district, of about the age of my brother and I, and their parents agreed to send them to a private school under the direction of Miss Berry, an English woman, which my mother had arranged to be held in our house. At the beginning there was but one other pupil, but in time it increased to nearly a dozen, some of whom came in carriages from a considerable distance on the other side of town. . . .

My mother's fixed intention was to make "perfect gentlemen" out of us, and we were so ceaselessly instructed in table manners and other etiquette, that I soon developed a marked hostility toward all of it, and decided I did not want to be a gentleman. Piano lessons were a part of our education, which I also hated intensely, and the daily practice period was something to be avoided whenever the opportunity presented itself.

When I was about eight years old, my brother, who had injured his hip in falling off a wagon, had to wear a brace for nearly two years, and consequently was humored and allowed his own way to a great extent in everything. This period was one filled with considerable bitterness for me. Not only was I compelled to yield to him in all disputes, and denied the opportunity for physical redress, which I had formerly sought on occasion; but I received, or at least I thought I received more than my allotted share of parental discipline. I was very frequently whipped, first with a flexible slipper,—which I used to hide on the bed slats close down to the foot board where it would not be detected when the mattresses were turned in the mornings—and later with a small riding whip which was kept locked, when not in use, in the medicine closet. My mother always administered these punishments, and I cannot recall ever being seriously disciplined by my father. The occasional cuffs from him never hurt, although I usually pretended that they did. The most obnoxious form of punishment was not the rod however, but being compelled to stay in bed all day, which I dreaded more than a chastisement. Looking back now, the offenses for which discipline was meted out, were nearly all either quarreling with my brother or lack of manners. Occasionally I indulged in a real crime such as turning the garden hose on the governess, whom I disliked, or chopping up a step with a hatchet, or shooting at the chickens with a sling shot, but for the punishment at such times I did not feel the resentment, which usually accompanied correction on the other points. I certainly used to love my mother, but am convinced that some of the seeds of my dislike for all authority today, were sown by her arbitrary methods. We could not reason with her, and even if we detected her in any inconsistency and sought to improve our case by this, she would stop all argument by saying that she would not be called to account by us. . . .

My father was intensely patriotic, and frequently used to tell us of his Civil War experiences, of which we were always eager to hear. He belonged to the G. A. R. and the Loyal Legion, and the American flag was to him something especially sacred. I recall getting a severe rebuke from him on one occasion on the 4th of July, for shooting down, in a battle of lead soldiers, a small American flag from some "earthworks." Soldiers, by the way, were our favorite toys and we had considerable assortment both of lead and cardboard.

Our most cherished books, at this time, were those dealing with war, especially the American Revolution, and we read these over and over again. I often used to wish that I had lived in those days and had been able to have taken part in the conflict. My patriotism was such that I

found it impossible to conceive of anyone becoming mutinous and deserting just because money was scarce and they were not paid anything. I was convinced that not only would I have gladly fought for nothing, but would have also supplied my own horse and gun to save that much to the common cause.

Our father was a staunch Republican, and my earliest conception of a Democrat was that of a very evil man. When Bryan and McKinley ran for President in 1896, I was sure that something terrible would happen if the former won, and well remember how jubilant we all were that he did not.

The Spanish War was a period of great enthusiasm with us. We were in Washington when war was declared,—having gone down there on a sight-seeing trip, and I recall being in the gallery of one of the halls of Congress then in session. Everything seemed to be in a turmoil, and one man, especially was very violent, standing up and pounding on his desk as he shouted to some one "I say, *War*, don't you?" On our way home, we passed several trainloads of soldiers, who hung out of the car windows and cheered.

It must have been between the ages of six and eight, that I first began to experience the feeling of regret and shame over the fact of our wealth. I did not want to be thought "rich." The first occasion that I can recall was one time when a woman who was cooking for us, brought her little boy of about my own age along with her. I liked him very much and wanted to play with him, which I did whenever there was a chance. This, however, was not often, for my mother would not permit it, telling me that I must not associate with my inferiors, for they would be certain to get familiar and consider themselves my equal. The "inferiority" or "familiarity" did not disturb me in the least, but being forbidden to play with him did do so. We used to sit, he on the back steps and I on the grape arbor and look miserably at each other and wish that we could play. After a while his mother went away and took him with her, and I was very lonesome for a time. I often used to wonder what it was that made this boy "common" and not my "equal." He always seemed all right to me, in fact I got along with him better than with my brother or with some of the neighbors' boys, who *were* my "equals"; with them I had frequent battles; with him none at all. It was evidently because he was "poor" and we were "rich"; for I could see no other reason; so I then looked up certain portions in the Bible which showed that Jesus had always preferred the poor and condemned the rich, and took this as an argument to my mother. She said that it did not mean what I thought it did, but some-

thing else, and I was not to be expected to understand. However, I remained unconvinced.

As I grew older I made more acquaintances among this forbidden class of my "inferiors," some of whom used to come along the Maniwoc River bank from Ledgeway Ave. and we played Indian in the woods out of sight of our house. I also was on excellent terms with the son of the neighbor's coachman, but whenever we were detected together, I was called into the house and he was sent home. It sometimes seems hard to realize what reasons lay behind such strict selection of our playmates, but as my family, together with all the rest of the bourgeois group of our section, were all would-be aristocrats, and extremely jealous and proud of their position in society, nothing was to be tolerated that would tend to lessen the glory which each imagined that they possessed. I have even heard my mother declare that we were as blue-blooded as any of the Lords in the old country. This annoyed me extremely, for I hated the English. . . .

When McKinley was shot, I became aware that there were people called Anarchists in the world, who preached only wickedness and were opposed to everything right and good. If they could, they would take all our property away from us, for they thought it belonged to them; religion too they would destroy. I had the opinion that Czolgosz was a very evil man and was glad when he was executed. We heard considerably of Emma Goldmann in those days, and I was convinced that she should have been imprisoned for life. . . .

When the Boer War broke out, I became a fervent adherent of Oom Paul, and rejoiced greatly over the frequent British defeats. My father and brother were for England, and there were frequent discussions. Great Britain stood at that time for all that was obnoxious to me. She was the natural enemy of liberty as I had gathered from our Revolutionary stories, and was altogether the very incarnation of tyranny and oppression, and I hated her sincerely. I would gladly have volunteered in the Boer army if the occasion had offered itself. The only sympathy I used to get on this subject was from George, the coachman, and the two Irish servant girls, to whom I would explain all the details of the campaigns. In spite of their assurances to the contrary I suspected them of insincerity or at least in being only lukewarm toward this fight for freedom—for they invariably became non-committal whenever any of the rest of the family were about. When Cronje surrendered, I was rather disconcerted, but still maintained hope until De La Rey was taken, after which I had nothing to reply to the jeers of my brother, except that he was a red coat himself, and an enemy to liberty. . . .

94. Personality and Inferiority Conflict ¹

I was born a perfectly normal, healthy baby in a respectable middle class home, with no background whatsoever to suggest inferiority. I was perfectly normal up to my second year when I was taken sick with catarrh, and from then on until my eighth or ninth birthday I was in bed more than I was out of it. During this time, I had been petted and nursed as any sickly child is apt to be, seldom playing with anyone except girls and one or two other boys in a similar condition to myself. This early condition stunted my growth and ruined my disposition as far as social adjustment was concerned, so that I was associated with few gangs and could not become adjusted with these. I had joined the Y. M. C. A. at the age of twelve, but as I weighed only 59 pounds, and as the class they put me in was composed of boys larger than myself, I was pushed still farther into the depths of inferiority. On the school playground, the same thing happened and it was here that my worst trials of childhood came.

I was small, afraid of my associates, but with that pettish wilful disposition, which is the natural butt of all teasing. I had a bicycle of which I was very choice and which excited the envy of the "big boys." They used to delight in taking this away from me and leave me bawling on the street corner. I remember one time they stood me up against the wall of the school house and used me as a target for snow balls. Another high light in my memory is the boy who used to bring candy to Sunday School, pass it to all except me, with the remark that if my hair was not so red I might have had some too.

With this treatment at the hands of the ones of my own age I naturally kept away from them and sought the company of the younger group. This gave me the opportunity to exercise the instinct of the "Will to Power" (Nietzsche) along with pleasanter companionship. At one time I organized an army composed of all of the smaller ones of the school, placing myself at the head. This organization also received the butt end of the displeasure of the older group and had to be abandoned.

I was treated differently by the adults with whom I came in contact, however. A certain precocity coupled with the fact that ever since I was old enough to talk I had been in the habit of giving readings and recitations at every school or church social function held, brought forth the customary praise upon my head, which did me no good in my

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fight for social adjustment. It is probably this praise on the one hand and the intense ridicule on the other that made it doubly hard to get into the group I belonged. The one tickled my vanity and rather tended to show me up superior to the rest, the other impressed me very forcibly with my inferiority. If the former could have been dispensed with, I would have probably fought tooth and nail to become adjusted with my school mates, but this praise gave me just that touch of superiority which accentuated the natural pride to such an extent as to make adjustment almost impossible. One of the phenomena of the complex was that while I was ill at ease in the presence of one or more associates when conversation was the only thing to be carried on, I was supremely happy with a large audience before me and something definite to do, suffering not at all from stage fright.

In high school, things were different, of course. There was no longer the plaguing and teasing of the gangs. I was simply left to myself and a few personal friends. It was as a freshman in high school that I should have come out of the complex, if ever. There were virtually no drawbacks or hindrances. I was in a new group, who had no knowledge of my past and besides this, I had put on weight and height until I was no longer marked out because of my size. With all of these advantages, the probability is that I would have become normal, if it had not been for a still more serious difficulty which came with puberty at the age of 14. With all my natural sensitivity, which had been accentuated by my past associations, I had thrust upon me a new terror in the shape of the disease, *acne vulgaris*, which broke out all over my face and neck. As nothing could cure it, I knew that I was to be chained with this disfiguration until maturity. This naturally nipped in the bud any hopes I had of coming forth and taking my rightful place, because wherever I was or whatever I was doing I was extremely self conscious about my looks, and so tried to hide them as much as possible. Any allusion to my malady was enough to put me in a state of despondency for hours after. Thus this new obstacle made me fear my associates even more. I was constantly afraid of their displeasure, so in order not to incur it I avoided mixing with all but a few intimates. Toward the end of my high school career, I could stand the inferiority no longer, so I launched out in a frenzy of compensation with the result that in my senior year in High School, I belonged to four clubs, being vice president of two of them, was on the staff of the school paper, yell leader and leading man in the class play. But this was not satisfying because I knew that high school offices and honors were not gotten through popularity in the social sense, and my new position in the school did not help

me to feel at ease or really to become intimate with more associates than I had before. I carried around a very suspicious attitude with me, mostly left over from grammar school days. If anyone was particularly friendly with me I thought that he must be doing it for some personal gain and I tended to repulse all except the few friends who won my confidence. It was unthinkable to imagine that anyone was attempting to be friendly just for the sake of good fellowship, because why should anyone want to be friendly with me.

I found out after graduation, that my aloofness was interpreted by my classmates as high-browishness, that I was supposed to consider myself very superior to all the rest and therefore would not disdain to speak to any of them. How little they knew how much I longed to speak to them, to be intimate with them, to have them treat me naturally and with good fellowship. But in the same manner as I was suspicious of all who attempted to make friends with me, I imagined that they too would be suspicious of me if I took any step in that direction, and their ill will was something I could not stand, although unwittingly I followed the shortest course to gaining it through my shunning of them, for if there is anything that makes the normal individual boil, it is to be disregarded or shunned. . . .

95. The Course of Personality Development in the Girl¹

The development of the girl's affection is not so simple as that of the boy's. It also has greater opportunities for emotional disturbances. The girl begins, as does the boy, with a fixation upon the mother. But this, in the case of the girl, is a homosexual experience, and thus at the very start of the evolution of affection of the girl there is satisfaction in a relationship which does not require cognizance of sex differences. It is easier therefore for the girl to continue the expression of affection upon members of her own sex straight through childhood into the adult period. Even if the boy has only the dimmest of ideas of the differences between his mother and himself he nevertheless has some slight understanding that he belongs to the class to which his father belongs and not to that of his mother.

It is fortunate that most girls, as if by instinct, tend as they pass the first years of the infantile period to turn their affections to their fathers. Doubtless the maternal urge, which, given opportunity, appears very early in the girl, is at least partly the cause of this transference.

¹ Reprinted by permission from E. R. Groves, *Personality & Social Adjustment*, pp. 204-05; 207; 207-08. New York. Longmans, Green & Company, 1923.

The idea of maternity after the year of six is bound to involve some recognition of the significance of the father and a turning of attention to him. If, as appears true from experience, this new interest in the father is met by him by a deeper response than the boy receives from the father, there is an additional reason for the girl's affection moving somewhat away from the mother and closer to the father. To some extent also the greater freedom of the father attracts the girl toward him, for often at this time the little girl first protests against the social limitations placed upon her because of her sex, and states her wish that she were a boy and could grow into a man.

The daughter, once she turns to the father, is not infrequently jealous of the mother's relationship with him; and she may manoeuvre so as to bring about friction between the parents. She is more apt to accomplish this disturbance in case she continues her father-fixation into the adult period. Under such conditions she may show deep but subtle jealousy of the mother and at any opportunity attempt to force from the father a decision which requires his choosing to support the daughter against the wife or the wife against the daughter.

If the girl passes into the third period safely and bestows her affections more largely out of the family upon girl friends she encounters a new risk. Her fellowship with her own sex continues into adolescence and social convention requires that she sublimate the newly awakening impulses that would otherwise turn her attention to men. She matures sooner than the boy and the impulses that make for heterosexual interests arrive sooner than social convention arranges for their expression. The girl, therefore, may force these new impulses to express themselves in her present associations and in this manner for the second time in her career she runs risk of becoming permanently homosexual in her affection. Instinct would turn her attention to boys. Convention attempts to prevent this and to postpone until a later time her contact with the opposite sex. As a result she falls back upon her present social resources and finds in other girls a considerable outlet for her need of a more significant association.

In this critical fourth period the girl has to depend upon her father. For a second time the task of bringing her into wholesome heterosexual affection depends upon him. She will naturally gravitate to him for sympathy and comradeship. For three or four years he has a deeper entrance in her life than has anyone else and if he uses his opportunity wisely he has the satisfaction of seeing her gradually seek in men of her own age the comradeship that her normal emotional and social development requires. During this period the father can be more

helpful to her than at any other period of her life. His exhibition of himself will most determine her opinion of men and her reaction to them. If he fails her, she runs danger of carrying through life, whether she marries or not, an abnormal attitude toward men and inherent lack of confidence in them. The father may fail. His inability to cope with the situation may result from his lack of capacity, his intellectual or moral weakness, or it may come about because of the previous attitude of the mother toward the father, perhaps toward all men.

Now will appear the mother's early teaching and its influence upon the daughter. The mother may have criticized the father, ridiculed him, discounted him in the presence of the child. She may have talked much about the vices of men. There are all sorts of baneful suggestions within her power, especially when she has herself been discontented or disappointed in her marriage. As a consequence of such influences the daughter may recoil from her father first and later from all men. If this happens she is unable to cross the line into the heterosexual attitude that is biologically her right; and must withdraw within herself or find in women the satisfaction of her desire for intimate sympathy and contact.

96. The Effect of an Unsatisfactory Mother-Daughter Relationship upon the Development of a Personality¹

Mary R. was reported to the school counselor of a public school in March, 1924, for taking money from the pocketbook of one of the girls in her class. While the investigation of this theft was still pending, she took four Red Cross magazines from a classroom and, when on the point of discovery, tried to put the guilt on another girl. A little later she was discovered ransacking the drawer of a teacher's desk. When brought to account for these misdeeds, Mary gave various reasons for her behavior, none of which had any basis in fact. She also admitted that once before when she was in the 4th grade (she was then in 7B) she took five Eversharp pencils. The mother completed the picture with the story of having found a number of things in Mary's school bag and clothing for several weeks, things for which she could not account and which she had forced Mary to return to school—things such as a wooden spoon from cooking class, bobbins from machines, cardboard wrapped with silk thread. The mother stated that Mary quite

¹ Reprinted by permission from J. Taft "The Effect of an Unsatisfactory Mother-Daughter Relationship upon the Development of a Personality" *The Family*, 1926: VII: 11-14; 14-17.

often took things from her brothers and sisters, things which could be of no value to her and often where she possessed duplicates. She has frequently discovered her going through her bureau and desk drawers and she has known her to take small sums of money found about the house.

One of the reasons why it is hard to study such a case is that the attention of everyone—family, teachers, even the case worker—is caught by the spectacular behavior. Everyone wants something done to stop the stealing, as if the mere fact of discovery made its cessation more important. It takes a good deal of determination on the part of the psychologist, removed as he may be from the practical situation, to detach his own interest from these outstanding events and to forget that he is supposed to interpret and correct a particular bit of behavior. Except for its inconvenience to society, the stealing is no more important than any other symptom as an expression of personality. This anti-social form of adaptation might be altered only to give place to a substitute expression perhaps no more desirable from the viewpoint of the individual's welfare, while the fundamental difficulty, the organization of the personality itself, remained untouched.

Until stealing can be related to the development of this girl's personality, our understanding of it is incomplete, although we succeed in removing it as a symptom.

For orientation one needs first a picture of Mary and her family as the worker sees them through her interviews and observation:

Mary's home background is decidedly above average as middle class homes go. The father is a skilled mechanic who has always worked steadily, has earned a fair living, has been faithful to his wife, and is really fond of his family. He is a young man, healthy, good looking, quiet, easy going, and with no bad habits. The children are fond of him and he enjoys playing with them of an evening. He takes a share in their physical care, such as bathing, dressing, and feeding, but has little real responsibility for the home. The training and discipline is left almost entirely to the mother who is the dominant member of the household. His one weakness has been for gambling and taking chances. Once he used money belonging to his firm. He was able to replace it and only lost his job as a result but his wife insisted that he never work again where he handled other people's money. He still enjoys buying lottery tickets and chances and Mrs. R. can see this tendency coming out in Mary.

The mother herself is very much a person, a dignified, fresh-faced, young woman with a frank, open attitude which disarms criticism. She

is intelligent and conscientious, and struggles to maintain the rather conventional but high moral and social standards under which she was brought up. She devotes herself earnestly to the care of a family of five children, of whom Mary is the oldest. When Mary was first referred there were in the family a new baby, a boy of two, Clara (six), and Philip (nine). The house is small and without adornment but comfortable. There is an atmosphere of harmony and evidence of planning for the children's welfare. They have the run of the house and order is not maintained at the expense of their play. Mrs. R. is perhaps over-anxious about the children, goes to school to see the teachers, and takes Mary's behavior far more seriously than her husband does. It is she who takes all the initiative in bringing Mary to the psychologist. She is overworked, has borne children rather rapidly and is worn out with her futile efforts to reform Mary. She has used every form of correction—reasoning, scolding, shaming, whipping, threatening. She has even spoken of putting her away and painted her fate in the next world. Much of this she realizes was unwise but she felt the honor of the family to be at stake.

Mary herself is an uncanny child with a pale, thin, pointed face and a body so slight and huddled as to give the impression of being dwarfed. Mary, with her furtive, watchful eyes, her hoarse, frightened voice often subdued to a whisper, her nervous, rapid movements and her perpetual expression of fear and suspense, makes a striking contrast to her frank, comfortable, good looking mother. No other child in the family presents such a strange appearance. Philip is quite handsome and fairly well grown. He is polite, manly, and appeals to everyone. Clara looks a little more like Mary but is free and friendly in her contacts. The little ones all seem to be wholesome, jolly, ordinary youngsters.

The mother describes Mary as a nervous child full of fears, very prying and curious, the kind of child who drives one wild with her questions and her continuous flow of talk about her own interests and the pressure of her intense desires to go, to do, and to possess. There is always something Mary is asking for. She is one large want and nothing satisfies that want long. No sooner has she obtained a desired object than she ceases to care about it and transfers her interest to a new end. She is always in the process of seeking or striving for the next thing. She craves personal adornment and stylish clothes but takes poor care of what she gets. She is personally neat and clean always. Her mother says she doesn't get dirty even at play. She can do efficient work about the home, such as getting an entire meal if her interest happens

to be aroused, but ordinarily she is not very reliable or responsible and has to be followed up with constant reminding. She loves to take authority over the younger children when the mother is away but does not manage them well. She teases and bosses and breaks up their games. She is always afraid that she will not have everything the other children have. She is markedly without affection which the other children show. Mrs. R. thinks Mary really cares for no one but herself. She is nicest to the little baby and she is very dependent on her mother but there is no genuine love for any of them. She is entirely absorbed in her own particular desire of the moment, a new dress, a wrist watch, Girl Scouts, movies, a trip, or what not. She craves attention, but when given it becomes unbearable in her boundless hunger for more. She has no special friends among other children and when she plays with girls of her own age shows no particular leadership. As a younger child she was quite contented to play by herself. Now she loves to join a club but she does not remain long, changing her group affiliations often. She has been very sensitive to the criticism which her behavior brought upon her from children and teachers and tried to avert suspicion from herself by putting it upon other girls in quite a deliberate way. She is afraid of punishments and screams wildly when whipped but this is soon over and there is no evidence of remorse or resentment. She is apparently upset over the unpleasant consequences of her acts, not because she has been guilty of them. She is untruthful whenever a situation seems to demand it, either for self-defense or to gain an end. At school, previous to the stealing, she had not been conspicuous for misconduct or for the quality of her work. She began to fail in some studies about the time she was referred for behavior, and had to be tutored. The mother is much distressed over what she considers Mary's failure to do creditable work. Her other children have stood well above the average. Mary used to but now she shows absolutely no interest and never seems to have her mind on her studies. She has to be nagged all the time. Philip on the contrary is a shining example.

Psychometric tests of all three older children show that as far as tests are concerned they have about equal ability, falling in the upper average group with unusual memory spans and, on the part of Mary particularly, superior ability with concrete material. There is no reason for poor school work as far as native intelligence goes.

It is noteworthy that, despite her good ability, Mary shows no genuinely constructive interests. She seems to have no projects which she pursues over a period of time, nothing she is making, no plan she is carrying out because of some idea of her own, except her schemes

for getting her own way, going somewhere, or gaining possession of some coveted object. Yet she does not use or value the things she apparently desires intensely. Nor has she, as far as one can see, the kind of curiosity which leads to intellectual pursuits. In spite of her avidity, she does not seek knowledge. School work means nothing to her but the possibility of success or failure.

Here we have a girl in early adolescence, who stands out in her family as different, difficult, unloving, and unlovable. The parents have a constant struggle to maintain toward her the same loving attitude they have for the other children. They are put on the defensive by her insistent demands, her watchful care of herself, her determination to have her own needs gratified at all costs, her jealous measuring of what the brothers and sister receive. The mother in fleeting moments of insight will admit that she cannot love Mary as she does the rest, but she quickly adds, "I do more for her than any of the others." There is no doubt that Mary by her behavior commands almost as much anxious attention as all the rest put together.

An interesting light is thrown on Mary's character by her reaction to sex instruction. It was noted early in the work on the problem that Mary's stealing episodes at school had happened to coincide with periods when Mrs. R. had gone to the hospital to be delivered. Mrs. R. admitted that she had never had the courage to tell her children anything about sex. She had always maintained that the doctor brought the baby. She was not very happy about her own sex life; she felt that she had had too many children and that her husband disregarded her entirely in his demands. She could conceive of sex as being a happy, beautiful part of some lives but it was not so with her. She felt ashamed of the sex relationship and couldn't bear to tell her children; moreover, she didn't know how to tell them. She was willing to let someone else discuss sex with Mary and agreed to let Mary come to her with all she learned. She recalled that Mary had asked questions which she evaded and had brought home information from a playmate, which the mother had told her never to mention again.

As soon as the subject of sex is broached to Mary and she becomes convinced that it is safe to show her interest, her curiosity becomes uncontrollable. She breaks forth in a stream of questions, many unrelated to sex but all symbolic of her consuming desire to know what has been concealed from her. Step by step she presses the psychologist back to beginnings until the great object of her search is reached: "What does the father do?" When this has been answered to her satisfaction, her exulting triumph over her parents is unconcealed. "Now I know what

they do when they lock the door." (Mr. R. at this time was doing night work.) To her mother's horror, Mary went home and repeated this statement to her father with the greatest satisfaction. She showed none of the ordinary adolescent emotion about sex, she had no apparent interest in it on her own account, no shame, no disgust, just joy in finding out at last what her parents had tried to hide from her. She had won out.

For a time Mary talked to her mother a good deal about the things she had been told, looked at pictures in a book, satisfied every curiosity and then lost interest in it completely.

How much this gratification of her desires had to do with the cessation of the stealing one cannot say, but the fact remains that there has been no offense at school and nothing startling at home since March, 1924, when this conversation took place. The personality, however, is unchanged, the consuming hunger for possessions is unabated and the lack of objective interest in other people remains the same, except that Mary has taken on many of the characteristics of adolescence. She lives in the hope of some recognition on the part of older boys, whom she worships from afar. She has ideas about society and thinks about the life in big hotels as something to dream of. She is preparing herself for appearance in the movies and reads everything she can find on how to become beautiful. Recently she went through some kind of an elaborate starch bath, following directions to the letter, in order to improve her appearance. All of this, however, has the same quality of complete absorption in herself and a compelling drive to get something for that self, with unawareness of the impression this makes on other people and blindness to their feelings and interests.

The question which now arises is, how was such a personality as this evolved? What were the social relationships which determined such a lack of response, such a turning away from persons, such a concentration upon the ego combined with failure to develop real ego power and a more acceptable ego ideal. We surely do not believe that such personality organization as this is simply born with the individual. It cannot be if we really mean what we say when we talk about the self as arising in a social situation.

Granted that Mary was not born with a ready-made self, is there any reason to doubt that the processes of response to social stimuli, which would ultimately result in what we call self, began at least from the moment of birth if not before? And would anyone seriously question that the infant's first possible relationship is ordinarily with the mother?

If we wish to understand Mary, then, we do have to go back to the nature of the situation in which her first patterns of response were laid down. There seems to be no period of life which we have so completely discounted as the first three years, particularly the first year, in our assumption that nothing happens then which matters, except possibly regarding physical health. Certainly we seldom think of it as affecting social attitudes or the type of personality appearing later and, even when we admit theoretically that this period has a determining influence, we fail pretty completely to fill it in with any concrete detail.

However foolish it may seem, however helpless we may be for lack of material and however unused to regarding it, it seems to me we have to face the fact that to every human being the first vitally important outside object is the mother's breast and that the particular kind of nursing experience a baby has is bound to affect his relation to the mother and thereby to all who come after her. Next in importance to satisfying of hunger come the excretory functions and all the possibilities they afford of sensory pains and pleasures, of concentration of interest on themselves, of exercise of power, and control, of experiences of failure, shame, and inferiority, of varying kinds of contacts with father and mother in the process of training to socialized habits.

It is with full realization of how unequipped we are as yet to analyze these early experiences, how little material we have on them and how inadequate are the bases for interpretations, that I venture to give you what material we were able to gather on Mary's early background and to suggest some of the possibilities of its connection with her personality as we now see it.

Mary arrived during the first year of the marriage, quite contrary to all Mrs. R.'s ideas. She had planned on a year in which to become adjusted. As she looks back on it now, she realizes what a very difficult period it was. While she loves her husband and insists that he is the kindest man and a good father, much better than most, she has not forgotten her picture of the man she thought she was marrying. The first two years were years of disillusion. When asked what it is she minds most about Mr. R., she hesitates, and then says impulsively, "If you really want to know, it's his lack of refinement. He'd just as soon eat in his shirt sleeves as not and he'd rather go without shaving than to shave. He doesn't care how he looks. I wasn't brought up that way. Now Philip is refined in his tastes like my family. Mary is more like her father; but he loves the children, he isn't like her that way. He's very good to them and took more care of Mary than I did the first year."

The birth was very hard, as so often happens with the unfortunate

first baby. Mrs. R. had hemorrhage after hemorrhage and was so wretched for several months that much of Mary's care fell upon the father. Mary was breast fed for three months and was then put on condensed milk. Breast feeding was an unpleasant thing for Mrs. R. There was for her none of the intimate union of mother and child, which makes of nursing a unique and satisfying experience to many women. It was something to be dreaded and cut short because of the pain. At three months, then, Mary was deprived of her first, none-too-satisfactory love object and went through eight months of a bottle which was equally unsatisfactory. She had colic, she was so undernourished that growth was retarded, and so constipated that bowel movements caused bleeding and were stubbornly resisted. Finally it was necessary to resort to enemas for every movement and to this day, says the mother, Mary has to be urged to go to the toilet.

The unhappiness of this period was increased by the fact that it was just as the time of Mary's birth that Mr. R. became involved in his speculations with his firm's money and lost his job. When you realize how all this went against Mrs. R.'s strongest beliefs and aspirations for herself and her family, you can easily see that Mary's first social situation was full of pain, fear, anxiety, and deep emotional distress. Mary did not feel the support of a united father and mother. Mary was the center of attention but it was attention of a strained and anxious variety. As it was not possible for Mrs. R. to find much joy in her baby because of the quality of fear or discomfort involved in every aspect of her care (for Mary was a sickly, crying, troublesome child from the first and the mother herself too ill to want to look after her), so it must have been impossible for Mary to find pleasure in her first possibilities of social response. Every contact Mary had with her mother must have been more or less associated with pain—which prevented her from going over to food and the mother who supplied it as her chief source of comfort, safety, and satisfaction. And the mother says that Mary, until she was twelve, never did care anything about food. It was a problem to make her eat.

If the baby finds the feeding process lacking in joy-giving qualities, what is there left upon which his interest may fasten except his own activities of urination and defecation? These have far less immediate relation to a social object. They concentrate attention upon functions which do not so easily transfer the interest of the child to mother or father. The fact that they become the center of attention for parents, because of the physical care involved and the anxiety to train the baby early to good toilet habits, may only add to the child's resistance to

parents or absorption in himself if great tact and wisdom are not used in thus interfering with these important sources of pleasure and power. Certainly in Mary's case where every bowel movement was a contest between herself and her parents, associated with determined resistance, final defeat, and pain on her part and painful emotion on theirs, there were few possibilities for any positive or constructive relationships through this medium.

One can hardly doubt that the two first years of life, deprived of normal food satisfactions and characterized by a relation to parents on the side of training to toilet habits which was almost hostile, had a determining effect upon the character of the child subjected to such a social experience from birth.

While one would not for a moment assume that we have all the data or that what we have is entirely reliable, it is nevertheless interesting to note some of the possible connections between Mary's personality as it is now showing itself and her early experiences. One can see in the failure to find satisfaction in food and in the mother's inability to respond positively to the nursing situation a source of Mary's estrangement from people, her lack of tenderness, her inability to trust herself to another person, her unusual lack of social sensitivity and responsiveness. Why she did not find in the father a secondary love object is more difficult to see because we have not sufficient data but one might venture a guess that his state of mind was not very happy or suited to give assurance to a sick baby, since he was out of a job, disgraced, and subject to reproach from his wife. Moreover, it is not likely that he found sickly, crying Mary and her enemas any more a source of pleasure than the mother did. The fact that Mary at the present time does not seem to turn to her father to any extent is possibly accounted for by her lack of feminine charm and loveableness which might cause him to single her out for attention, and the fact that he is less important in the family line-up than the mother, and so less desirable in Mary's eyes.

The concentration of attention on her own bodily functions rather than on social objects might account for the fact that Mary's personality has been organized about her own ego; but it is not so easy to see why, with all her intensity of ego drive and her quite good ability, Mary has not developed interests and techniques and acquired control over outside objects which would gratify her hunger for personal recognition and power. She seems capable of considerable achievement. Why are all her activities so futile, so meaningless? Why has she not set up an idea of herself which is more in line with social standards? Why must she

collect things, acquire possessions just for the sake of getting them; why does she gain no satisfaction in using them, in constructing or creating?

Would it be too far-fetched to see a parallel to this present use of her energy in the peculiar nature of her infantile experience with defecation and toilet training? We have to remember how much of her craving for satisfaction must have sought an outlet through that channel since the food interest was blocked and how early constipation and the enemas deprived her of freedom with regard to her own functions. Interest, instead of being divided as with many children between process and product, was concentrated on retention at all costs and resistance to the parents' will. She never co-operated with the mother in her own training, never got compensation for giving up infantile privileges, by the sense of power in self-control and the feeling of achievement which comes from pleasing the mother. There seems to be in these circumstances the possibility of an injury to the ego development corresponding to the crippling on the side of social response which has been reinforced all through her young life by the lack of affection from parents, by her unsuccessful rivalry with the better-loved brothers and sister, by her lack of physical strength and beauty, by the taken-for-granted ideas of her personality which are held before her constantly by the other members of the family, and by her lack of standing and importance in the home.

Mary is like one frantically seeking for something satisfying, finding her only comfort by continually proving to herself that she *can* obtain, that she *can* gain possession, that she *can* collect and hoard and retain as she once held back faeces. She seems to get satisfaction in situations which are partly painful, not only to herself but to other people, as were those early struggles with constipation and enemas. It may be significant to note here that Mary has had since early childhood a habit of picking at her fingers until they are raw and bleeding. Not long ago she had her whole hand seriously infected from this source. No attempt to correct this habit has ever had any success until recently Mary, in her desire to be beautiful, began to wear gloves at night to protect them from herself.

Mary is willing to hurt other children; she seems to be unrestrained, in her desires to tease, torment, and injure, by any thought of how she is making the other person feel. Her reaction to the sex information was quite characteristic. Its chief value to her seemed to be the power it gave her over her parents. They were discovered and defeated, for once she was superior; she knew. One cannot help wondering how much of

her stealing has been due not only to her need for possessing and collecting but to an unconscious wish to punish her parents who were deceiving and tricking her and (even more unconsciously) who stood between her and the satisfying of her earliest desires.

If our analysis has any truth, the problem of social treatment in this case would seem to be how one can find for this unlovely personality, organized pretty completely about the ego, some method of detaching satisfaction from this bare fruitless process of resisting, holding, collecting, winning out; and transferring it to a more positive interest in actual achievement, in production, in an exercise of power and assertion of self which is more constructive and valuable personally and socially. How can Mary's ego ideal be put on a higher plane socially? That it would be possible to give Mary the experience of transferring completely to another human being, after her early conditioning, seems to me rather unlikely, yet no one can say what adolescence and sex may contribute to alter her interests. What one fears is a use of sex which will merely gratify her desire for power, possession, and ability to wound. Possibly the only form of treatment really applicable is to try to find some socially valuable use for Mary's drive in its present form, such as a better knowledge and skill in dressing, more rational attention to looks, the intelligent handling and use of money, display of self in entertainments and play, in dancing, athletics, or club organization, collecting more valuable material in legitimate ways. One might even be able to show her that triumph over classmates in terms of better marks would be possible.

The social worker has tried very hard to change the mother's attitudes and methods with Mary. She has helped to improve her school work and has seen to it that she got as much favorable attention from teachers as possible. She has brought in as many new activities and opportunities as possible. There has been improvement. Mary has lost some of her look of fear and suspicion. She is freer, she is better looking, she is not so uncanny, she does not steal publicly.

That the outlook for the future is good as far as reorganizing Mary's personality is concerned, one would certainly hesitate to say. On the basis of our present knowledge and skill, one would be justified in doubting whether Mary will ever be anything but unloving and unlovable. Is there any way to re-educate completely the self which has been built up chiefly by its negative responses to social situations, by its resistances and resentments, and rejections?

From such a picture as this, one can only turn to the constructive possibilities presented to parents into whose keeping is given that first

social situation and the responses out of which the personality may receive its determining organization.

97. The Projection of Parents' Ambitions upon Their Children¹

We are all agreed in recognizing the fact that the human being lives not unto himself alone but is at all times, more or less, under the influence of some particular group of his fellows, be it family, play group, occupational confraternity, or some other sort. Moreover, it has been well pointed out to us that the family, as well as other groups, may be thought of as a configuration of interacting units. One may say that ideally in a well-balanced family these interrelating members should be thought of as in a multiple circular response condition. There would be an interplay of personalities one with the other,—the give and take of co-equals. It is rarely true, however, that a family of parents and children so organizes itself. This type of mutual influence is more apt to exist in play groups and is especially evident in so-called congenial groups of intimates,—those interesting but little studied groups of two, three or four persons united in close bonds of friendship. Very frequently the circularity of the family group resolves itself into other forms of interstimulation. The natural circularity is broken at a number of points by attitudes of authority, domination and sense of superiority of parents toward children, of elder children toward younger, or of near relatives toward children. In other words, various kinds of stoppage arises to the free play of person on person in the family such as might exist in other sorts of socializing groups. Very often in families, in fact, the relationship of parent to child is more in the nature of linear than circular response. The father or mother commands, the child obeys. Very little reciprocal stimulation is permitted. Even in question-answer intercourse the domination of the elder over the younger member of the family prevents the most wholesome learning process of analysis and discovery from taking place in the child. This condition of dominance is probably less common today than in other societies organized about different cultural norms than our own. Yet it still persists, particularly in reference to the younger children. The whole "reality of authority" of which Miller writes is too frequently induced by a linear stimulation.

In the case of projection of ambitions upon children we find just this change from natural circularity to linear relationship. Instead of a

¹ Reprinted by permission from K. Young "Parent-Child Relationship: Projection of Ambition" *The Family*, 1927: VIII: pp. 67-69; 69; 70-71; 72-73.

gradual arousal and development of ambitions out of more normal family relationships, out of the stimulation of play groups and school experience, there is a cutting across this process when the parent projects his personal ambitions upon one or more of his own children. The child, rather than developing his talents and interests out of innate trends and through normal development in various social media, is brought under the domination of a fixed idea of the parent. Too often the parent has harbored some unfulfilled desire or ambition for fame, money, education, social status or what not which is worked over on to the child.

We know full well that parents live in their children quite as do the children in them. "Identification," as it is often called, is by no means a one-sided affair. Not long ago in discussing a certain regimen for children with a mother, she remarked regarding some indulgences she had granted them, "If I have to have the children, I don't see why I shouldn't enjoy them." It has, of course, been long recognized that many mothers derive a distinct erotic pleasure from nursing their babies. But we should not imagine that any pleasure which a mother may take in her children ends there. It is evident everywhere that women do look upon their children as their own in a very intimate, dare one say selfish, sense, in which their own delight in caring for, playing with, and planning for the child becomes highly significant for themselves.

Not only mothers but fathers find tremendous satisfaction in watching over and planning for their children.

Thus, for parents there is afforded them in their children an easy duplication of another childhood and youth wherein their own ambitions, plans, and desires may be thrust upon the next generation. The motives for this projection vary greatly, for the particular type of ambition projected on the child depends, certainly, upon the specific history of the parent. Since a "good" identification concerns a one-to-one relationship, it is usual for one member of the family to be selected to play the rôle the parent lays down, though this is not always the case. A projection may take on a very generalized form for a whole family of children, just as it may take on a generalized form of a leader thrusting his wishes upon his group.

In order to indicate more concretely the mechanism of projection, let us turn our attention upon some illustrative examples drawn from a number of varying situations.

There is no doubt that Clara B. is a very capable child. But it is also evident that the mother who has had a rather stultified life with a mediocre professional man has identified her own cravings for fame in

the possibilities of her daughter. The child has been kept under an intense regimen of reading and writing. The mother looks forward to a great literary career for her daughter. The child is the object of considerable over-stimulation to literary production by the parent. As one psychologist, who worked with the child, remarked, "One moment in Clara's life in which she was left *laissez faire* to form a mental association of her own was a moment lost in the eyes of her mother." I do not wish to create the impression that I am unsympathetic with the selection and special education of superior children, but without doubt the forcing of the process may prove detrimental to the more normal development of the child while affording an unfortunate stimulation to the parent's own ego expansion.

Turning now to a discussion of those projections in which the unfulfilled wishes of the parents are more evidently thrust upon the children, let us examine a number of illustrative cases to point out some of the features of family relationship in this more serious kind of influence of parent upon child.

The following history deals with a combination of thwarted ambition coupled with an unhappy marriage.

The mother of Louise M. married when she was very young. This had meant for her the foregoing of three desires: (1) a college education; (2) the study of music in which she had a great interest; and (3) experience as a teacher. The marriage proved an unhappy one with considerable conflict between parents. Two children were born, one a son "much like his father" whom the mother "could influence very little," the other a daughter who became the "pride" of the mother's life. For Louise the mother wished all the things which her own inhibited life had lacked. The girl was forced to take music lessons although she was not musically inclined. She was also sent to college quite as much because the mother had failed to secure this privilege as for any other reason. Moreover, the mother decided the daughter should be a school teacher as she had once wished to be.

In college Louise fell in love much as co-eds are likely to do. She wished to discontinue her education and to marry. Although the mother now admits that she had nothing against the young man who courted her daughter, in fact she now says she rather liked him, she refused to permit the marriage. Louise was, to her mind, too young. She herself had married too early which had spoiled her own life and she simply would not allow her daughter to duplicate her own sad experience. The marriage must be indefinitely postponed and Louise continue her education

until she might teach. The young man was unwilling to defer matrimony in this indeterminate manner while the daughter, obedient to the mother's wishes, began teaching school not long after, only to make a rather miserable failure of it all. Louise has been utterly unhappy. She is now at home doing nothing in particular, broken in spirit and unable to organize herself for any kind of valuable activity.

Here is an unfortunate situation indeed. The mother, hiding behind current rationalizations, of course, wished her daughter to have the best of an education and professional preparation. Then, when confronted with a wish on the part of the daughter for the most natural step in her life, marriage, the whole emotional conflict of the mother's marriage, her own realization of blocked ambitions and unhappy life came to the front to lead her to prevent it. There is illustrated in this case a common feature, no doubt, of many of these family histories. Had the mother's own married life proved a wholesome one, had her relations with the father been satisfying, it is extremely doubtful if the projection would have assumed such an over-powering influence in the mother's reaction to her daughter, if indeed the projection would have developed at all. But having failed at the level of marriage, the mother herself was thrown back, for emotional balance, upon her earlier wishes for an education and for professional status. These wishes being denied their fulfillment in her, they are fastened upon the daughter with whom the mother has identified herself. With the coming of the probability of marriage for the daughter before these projected ambitions had worked out at all well, from the mother's angle, an even more intense crisis arises. If Louise is permitted to marry, it means that the projection will fail. An important hope for the mother's balance will be gone. She can not face it. The daughter complies, only herself to be disintegrated emotionally thereby. Thus the vicious circle of parent-child relationship is completed, and none of the participants is satisfied. The drama ends not in a *dénouement*, but in a stalemate.

The last family drama which I shall narrate is perhaps less common than the others, but is fraught with greater misapplication in some ways than the others. And it again illustrates the nature of a fixed idea on the part of a parent in contradiction to the most patent reality.

The father is a very wealthy and prominent person in one of our major industrial cities. He was educated in a well-known eastern school. His wife is a very pleasant, cultured person who plays a very minor part in this family tragedy. The father, it seems clear, has wanted to fulfil in his son the cultural and economic ambitions of his own youth. He has

wished his son's preparation for a profession to be easier and more luxurious than anything he could have, even though his own youth was not a hard one. There is also a very considerable amount of desire for maintenance of social superiority through his child.

There are two boys in the family, both of them feeble-minded. One of them is already in an institution. The second boy, George, has a "middle moron intelligence" to use the phrase of a very competent psychologist who examined him. George is a docile, sweet-dispositioned boy with the usual small chatter about automobiles, movies and the like, but years of tutoring and high-grade instruction in private schools have not been able to prepare him for college. The father was determined that his son should master Latin and the other requisite subjects in order that he might enter a certain professional school. The father was furious at the diagnosis of the psychologist that his son had reached the limit of his educability. In truth, the father's whole manner toward the accumulated evidence of teachers, psychologists, and friends has the air of a certain compulsive trend in himself. He pounded on the table in anger at the suggestions of the psychologist. He has attempted to coerce the boy into learning, but coercion does not produce nicety of mental associations. He has threatened the authorities of the private school to whom he had given large sums of money if they did not educate his boy as he thought fit. The judgment of experts and of common sense make no impression on him. He has a definite fixed idea, almost an obsession about his son. It is a distinct mental image that bears no relation to reality. It is almost paranoiac in its violence. And a gentle personality of low mentality must suffer through it all. There is no evidence of anti-social trends. It is a tragedy without a single redeeming note. The drama is still in process. What the outcome will be we can not say. It is evident that the boy has reached the saturation point so far as training goes. Whether the father can be brought out of his delusional system is not so certain.

Although I have by no means exhausted the variety of ambition projection in family situations, these few histories indicate the essentials of the problem in a tentative way. Projection is perhaps more or less inevitable in a society of open classes where there is intense desire to improve the family status in each succeeding generation.

The problem of projection in parent-child relationships is self evident. The more spontaneous development is interrupted to give place to the formulation of life-organization in terms of patterns possessed by the parent that may not be altogether wholesome and sound for the child.

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What is the course of attachments through which the usual boy passes from infancy to manhood? What are the attachments through which the girl passes?
2. The brother of the writer of document No. 93 remained within the patterns laid down by his social class, while the writer revolted and left home to become a socialist. How may one account for the difference in development?
3. What effect may inferiority feelings have upon development of unusual capacities?
4. Write out cases of parents' projections upon their children.

B. Topics for Class Reports

1. Write out your own life history tracing the early social influences and show how they have colored your attitudes, ideas and habits.
2. Illustrate from your own history or from that of others:
 - a) inferiority complexes;
 - b) over-attachment of girls upon their fathers;
 - c) undue attachment of boys upon their mothers;
 - d) substitution of another person for a parent attachment;
 - e) other atypical features of personality development.
3. Report on Forsyth's paper cited in bibliography.
4. Report on Burgess' paper on the family. (Cf. bibliography.)
5. Report on Spaulding's paper on delinquent personality. (Cf. bibliography.)
6. Report on Van Water's papers in the *Survey* cited in bibliography.

C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers

1. Leadership as a Compensation for Inferiority.
2. The Social Conditioning to Delinquency.
3. The Historical and the Quantitative Methods of Investigating Personality.

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CHAPTER XV

THE ADULT PERSONALITY AND THEORIES OF PERSONALITY

I. INTRODUCTION

That the child is father to the adult is literally true. The adult personality can not be understood independently of the life history of the man or woman from infancy through childhood and adolescence. While in the earlier chapters we have revealed the essential foundations of personality, in this chapter we shall present two papers on the relation of occupational choice to personality. Then we shall quote from James' classic description of the social self, indicating with perspicacity, as it does, the intimate connection between the social setting of others with their class and professional standards and the self or personality.

The selection from Bogardus on wit and humor reviews the classical theories of wit and laughter, and then gives a brief discussion of this essentially social function. Man is the only animal that laughs, just as he is the only animal that blushes. No account of laughter would be complete without a recognition of the place it has in social interaction, its relation to superiority feelings, its relation to sex and ego patterns, its relation to whole groups of language forms such as we see in autistic thinking. Like play, laughter is rather a part of the normal life than any simple mechanism for release of energy or other mere physiological manifestation. It is an intimate part of the personal organization of life around one's social and self-centered objects and situations.

The paper by Williams gives, on the basis of a wide experience with men, his formulation of the mainspring of human action. Williams has arrived rather empirically at the general conception already discussed of the place of status and of the desire to play a rôle in the group in reference to personality. If his "desire to shine" is considered, however, as the only root of social behavior it suffers

from being too narrow. The next selection, one from Thomas, presents, again, from empirical evidence, four fundamental wishes as the key to understanding personal response. All four of these have social as well as individual roots. It should not be thought, however, that these four wishes exhaust the possible sources of attitude and action. They are a tentative working scheme for descriptive, classificatory purposes only.

The paper by Conklin presents an analysis of personality organization in terms of introversion, extroversion and ambiversion. These concepts relate to the direction of attention, in large part. The introvert is he who is more or less bound up with his internal machinery, with his images, ideas and thought processes. The extrovert, in contrast, is he who is concerned with externalities, with the world of persons and objects outside himself. We might say for convenience that the introvert lives on the inside of his head, the extrovert on the outside. As Conklin shows, however, no doubt the bulk of people fall in between these extremes. To describe this middle range of life interests, he has invented the word "ambivert."

In the second section of the chapter are three papers presenting three somewhat divergent theories of personality, one from a psychologist who follows McDougall rather closely; the second from a psychiatrist, who is not, however, a Freudian; the third is from a sociologist whose standpoint has been influenced by Thomas. Other standpoints might be presented but these three illustrate the treatment of personality from three distinct angles. The psychologist tends to see the personality in terms of his intellectual, his affective and his volitional characteristics. Bridges, in fact, describes personality very much as Burgess would describe the individual. Rosanoff divides personality into four types which he considers develop from inborn tendencies. Here we see the attempt to understand the personality in terms of manifestations seen in the borderline and truly pathological field. He emphasizes the constitutional background upon which personality develops. Finally, the paper by Burgess approaches the problem from the angle of the social rôle of the individual, from the nature of his social status and his conception of his place in the group or groups to which he belongs. He holds that personality can not be understood without taking into account the social conditioning of groups. Hence, while the

psychologist and psychiatrist contribute much to an understanding of the psycho-biological foundations of personality, the full picture can not be revealed without taking into account the social relations of the individual.

Throughout our entire treatment we have seen how the social environment plays upon the organism to bend it this way or that, to enclose it here and to expand it there. The result of these pressures is something very different than the mere combination of intellect, feeling, and will which Bridges describes, or the four-fold divisions of Rosanoff.

While it is legitimate to use the term "personality" under any definition desired, for social psychology it is apparently more satisfactory to follow the organization of materials given emphasis in this volume. At the outset we saw the place of group behavior and of the culture patterns. Then we described the mechanisms of the individual considered as an organism. Following this, we indicated how the culture patterns and the presence of other persons combining with the individual mechanisms produced the personality—the human organism in his social and culture setting.

In certain chapters which follow we shall discuss the personality in more particular reference to his interaction with others, in reference to prejudice, to leadership, and in regard to collective behavior. But before coming to a description of these social phenomena from the angle of the group-and-individual situation, we shall have to examine more closely into some of the features of the mental patterns which relate the person to his various groupings: primary, secondary, institutional and non-institutional, temporary or permanent. This will be the task of the two chapters which follow the present one.

II. MATERIALS

A. ADULT PERSONALITY

98. The Relation of Occupation to Habits and Values¹

Occupations determine the fundamental modes of activity, and hence control the formation and use of habits. These habits, in turn, are

¹ Reprinted by permission from J. Dewey "Interpretation of Savage Mind" *Psy. Rev.*: 1902: IX: pp. 219-220.

something more than practical and overt. "Apperceptive masses" and associational tracts of necessity conform to the dominant activities. The occupations determine the chief modes of satisfaction, the standards of success and failure. Hence they furnish the working classifications and definitions of value; they control the desire processes. Moreover, they decide the sets of objects and relations that are important, and thereby provide the content or material of attention, and the qualities that are interestingly significant. The directions given to mental life thereby extend to emotional and intellectual characteristics. So fundamental and pervasive is the group of occupational activities that it affords the scheme or pattern of the structural organization of mental traits. Occupations integrate special elements into a functioning whole.

99. The Effect of Occupations on Attitudes and Values¹

(1) *Occupation and Values*

An occupation is a standardized, repeated and persistent type of activity. It is an habitual way of acting, or a complex set of ways of doing according to which persons make a living.

Any type of doing concentrates the attention upon certain objects and processes or values. The seeking of these values produces attitudes, or tendencies to act. Each occupation has its characteristic attitudes, which, taken in the large, may be referred to here as the occupational attitude.

Each occupation has its own peculiar problems, its own demands upon the attention of its representatives, and its peculiar influence upon the latter's mental development and social attitudes. Doing a thing or a set of things according to certain routines every day, in season and out, tends to create mental patterns. The occupation of driving ox teams will produce a slow-moving mental pattern, while driving a taxicab in a large city will lead to quick-moving mental psychoses. Acting as motor-man with the sign before one of "Don't speak to the motorman" gives one a day's work in a mental vacuum, while teaching classes of wide-awake, inquiring young people sharpens one's wits and gives an intellectually alert mental complex. Correcting children's mistakes in arithmetic, spelling, and reading for several hours daily over a period of years produces a mistake-hunting mental pattern.

¹ Reprinted by permission from E. S. Bogardus "The Occupational Attitude" *J. App. Soc.* 1924: VIII: pp. 172-74; 175-76.

Objects won in occupational activities become values, social values, which are paralleled by correlative attitudes; and hence, each occupation is characterized by social attitudes and values peculiar to itself. Business activity yields money profits, which becomes a chief value for business men, with its correlative monetary attitudes of life that characterize business men and often unconsciously influence their extra-business thinking. Missionary activity bears fruit in "converts" who become "values," and a convert-hunting attitude of life develops. In politics, "votes" are perhaps the chief "values" that are sought; they create a vote-hunting attitude.

It would seem that two persons might start with about the same inherited predispositions, the same mental equipment, and by choosing different occupations, for example, one, a money-making occupation, and the other, a service occupation, such as missionary work, and at the end of twenty years have become "successful," but have drifted so far apart in occupational and social attitudes as to have almost nothing in common.

It appears that an ordinary person's mental equipment is such as to fit him to succeed in any one of a number of occupations. "Rarely does it happen that talent is suited to one occupation only." Occupational activity seems, however, to take the inherited stock of impulses and aptitudes, and to be instrumental in organizing them into attitudes and complexes, so that a given person's thinking at the age of fifty is much different than it would have been had he followed some other occupation at which he might have succeeded equally well.

(2) *Occupational Egocentrism*

A person who has enjoyed his work in a given occupation and has succeeded in it is apt to feel that "his" occupation or profession is the most important of all. All of life becomes organized habitually around one's occupational activities. An anonymous writer, for example, illustrates the point when he says: "The miller thinks that the wheat grows only in order to keep his mill going." A social psychological interpretation of the situation is given by J. M. Williams when he refers to a business man as follows:

In the course of his work his business became precious to him because it was that for which he had given his life, just as children are precious to the mother as that for which she has given her life, and the book to the

author as that for which he has given his life. Life is precious and whatever one gives it for becomes precious.

The egocentricism of occupation affects the wage earner and the capitalist alike. The effects of specialization, of working in relatively narrow grooves, in both cases is clearly evident.

Occupational attitudes and values become conventional and more or less fixed. Occupational literature furthers the traditions. Occupational journals cater to the occupational minds of their respective constituents. Each boasts the occupational values it represents, until its readers become saturated with occupational pride, which in time may become occupational blindness. This tendency is furthered by the fact that a person usually takes one or several occupational journals, and rarely reads the journals representing other occupations.

Occupational attitudes and values become fixed in group heritages. Children are trained in these traditional lines of thinking from earliest infancy. Table talk and family conversation have their occupational stimuli. Each occupation tends to develop its own culture heritages, slogans, beliefs, or even superstitions. These are sooner or later caught up by the individual and with modifications become a part of his thought life, creating for him an occupational attitude.

Each occupation has its own type of social interstimulation. People who are working at the same tasks come together to exchange ideas. They have much in common and "shop talk" is a daily phenomenon. Occupational "shop talk" is a strong evidence of occupational influence on thinking, and of the large place which occupational thinking holds in the lives of the workers in any field of activity. By daily meeting people of the same type as oneself, who are doing about the same thing in a similar way, one's tendency to develop an occupational complex is magnified.

Each occupation has its own organizations and institutions through which occupational attitudes and values become crystallized. These organizations may become highly developed and exert powerful control over their members. Gigantic business corporations, the well-established labor organizations, professional associations such as the American Bar Association, or the American Medical Association—all set up occupational values, and rule in a more or less rigid way the occupational or professional attitudes of the respective membership.

Occupational attitudes create class cleavages and other social divisions. Occupational values often come to be rated so high that occupational groups seek political and social power.

100. The Social Self and Social Contact¹

Properly speaking, *a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him* and carry an image of him in their mind. To wound any one of these his images is to wound him. But as the individuals who carry the images fall naturally into classes, we may practically say that he has as many different social selves as there are distinct *groups* of persons about whose opinion he cares. He generally shows a different side of himself to each of these different groups. Many a youth who is demure enough before his parents and teachers, swears and swaggers like a pirate among his "tough" young friends. We do not show ourselves to our children as to our club-companions, to our customers as to the laborers we employ, to our own masters and employers as to our intimate friends. From this there results what practically is a division of the man into several selves; and this may be a discordant splitting, as where one is afraid to let one set of his acquaintances know him as he is elsewhere; or it may be a perfectly harmonious division of labor, as where one tender to his children is stern to the soldiers or prisoners under his command.

The most peculiar social self which one is apt to have is in the mind of the person one is in love with. The good or bad fortunes of this self cause the most intense elation and dejection—unreasonable enough as measured by every other standard than that of the organic feeling of the individual. To his own consciousness he *is* not, so long as this particular social self fails to get recognition, and when it is recognized his contentment passes all bounds.

A man's *fame*, good or bad, and his *honor* or dishonor, are names for one of his social selves. The particular social self of a man called his honor is usually the result of one of those splittings of which we have spoken. It is his image in the eyes of his own "set," which exalts or condemns him as he conforms or not to certain requirements that may not be made of one in another walk of life. Thus a layman may abandon a city infected with cholera; but a priest or a doctor would think such an act incompatible with his honor. A soldier's honor requires him to fight or to die under circumstances where another man can apologize or run away with no stain upon his social self. A judge, a statesman, are in like manner debarred by the honor of their cloth from entering into pecuniary relations perfectly honorable to persons in private life. Nothing is commoner than to hear people discriminate between their different

¹ Reprinted by permission from W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, pp. 294-96; 308. New York. Henry Holt & Company, 1890.

selves of this sort: "As a man I pity you, but as an official I must show you no mercy; as a politician I regard him as an ally, but as a moralist I loathe him"; etc., etc. *What may be called "club-opinion" is one of the very strongest forces in life.* The thief must not steal from other thieves; the gambler must pay his gambling-debts, though he pay no other debts in the world. The code of honor of fashionable society has throughout history been full of permissions as well as of vetoes, the only reason for following either of which is that so we best serve one of our social selves. You must not lie in general, but you may lie as much as you please if asked about your relations with a lady; you must accept a challenge from an equal, but if challenged by an inferior you may laugh him to scorn; these are examples of what is meant.

Our *social self-seeking*, in turn, is carried on directly through our amateness and friendliness, our desire to please and attract notice and admiration, our emulation and jealousy, our love of glory, influence, and power, and indirectly through whichever of the material self-seeking impulses prove serviceable as means to social ends. The noteworthy thing about the desire to be "recognized" by others is that its strength has so little to do with the worth of the recognition computed in sensational or rational terms. We are crazy to get a visiting-list which shall be large, to be able to say when any one is mentioned, "Oh! I know him well," and to be bowed to in the street by half the people we meet. Of course distinguished friends and admiring recognition are the most desirable—Thackeray somewhere asks his readers to confess whether it would not give each of *them* an exquisite pleasure to be met walking down Pall Mall with a duke on either arm. But in default of dukes and envious salutations almost anything will do for some of us; and there is a whole race of beings today whose passion is to keep their names in the newspapers, no matter under what heading, "arrivals and departures," "personal paragraphs," "interviews,"—gossip, even scandal, will suit them if nothing better is to be had.

101. Wit and Humor in the Personality¹

According to Aristotle, comedy is an imitation of the characteristics of a lower type than represented by the imitator. The laughable is something degrading in the object or person at which one laughs—this is known as the theory of *degradation*. Aristotle does not explain, how-

¹ Reprinted by permission from E. S. Bogardus, *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, pp. 75-77; 82-84. New York. The Century Company, 1924.

ever, why the lower or degrading factors in life stimulate mirthfulness, and underestimates the importance of other elements.

Hobbes developed the theory of *superiority*, which is partly correlative to Aristotle's explanation. According to Hobbes, laughter is the result of an expansion of feeling which is brought on by the realization of one's superiority over the person, or thing, or situation at which he laughs. But a realization of superiority does not always lead to mirthfulness; there are evidently important factors which this theory does not disclose. In principle, Addison's theory is similar to that of Hobbes, namely, that pride is the chief cause of laughter.

Kant explained mirthfulness on the basis of *nullification of expectation*, that is, laughter arises from the sudden transformation of a strained expectation into nothing. This interpretation implies the welling up of neural energy toward a certain goal which is suddenly removed, thus putting the individual in an unusual predicament; it is a subjective explanation which does not indicate why it is that sometimes the sudden transformation of a strained expectation produces laughter and sometimes sorrow or anger.

The theory of *incongruity* was advanced by Schopenhauer. Laughter is caused by the sudden realization of an incongruity between a conception and the real object with which it is connected. Of the theories that have been so far mentioned, Schopenhauer's seems to be the most basic, for it analyzes mirthfulness as a psychological process with objective factors.

Herbert Spencer's idea that laughter indicates *an effort which suddenly encounters a void* is not fundamentally different from Kant's, while Sully's statement that laughter is due to a *sudden release from a strained and tense situation*, is another form of Kant's explanation. Bergson expresses the belief that laughter is primarily caused by the appearance of mechanical inelasticity in human life, which is another way of viewing Schopenhauer's incongruity explanation. Weeks declares that "when a man has only one idea, that idea is as serious as can be; when he laughs he is virtually saying that he has had another idea." These single theory discussions of laughter are enlightening but partial. The most synthetic treatment of the subject is that by Dr. Sidis, which is extensively illustrated, but is not entirely in harmony with the conclusions of the latest psychological researches.

The foregoing discussion reveals the complex nature of mirthful attitudes. They are characterized by distinctive physical reactions. An examination of hearty laughter shows that at least ninety per cent of the subjects were enjoying at the time a fair degree of physical health

and mental exuberance. If an individual has worked long hours of tedious labor without sleep, if he has recently suffered serious financial losses, if loved ones are dangerously ill, then it appears that the ordinary causes of laughter do not produce mirthful behavior. It is in the most playful and the most exuberant hours of life that mirthful attitudes flourish best. The joy-in-living spirit of a group of girls easily bubbles over into ripples of silly laughter. The exuberant laughter of boys may easily be accounted for in a similar way.

Relief from strained situations sometimes produces mirthful behavior. Observe children released from long hours of study and recitation, rush forth from school buildings with peals of joy. Sudden release from either physical or mental strain may be counted one of the simpler causes of laughter. Exhaustion when unexpectedly relieved may result in violent, hysterical laughter, which is an abnormal and pathological phenomenon. A sunny disposition is an excellent sub-soil for the development of mirthful attitudes. A vivacious temperament is productive of far more mirthful behavior than a phlegmatic one. Mercurial persons laugh more than those given to deep reflection. A person of the latter type may experience mirth even when he shows no visible signs thereof. He reports subjective pleasure in many cases in which other persons break out into laughter. Hence, one wonders that Bergson should identify the cause of laughter with intelligence, pure and simple, and say that "laughter is incompatible with emotion." It is true that intelligence is a necessary factor, and yet children often manifest uproarious and prolonged laughter over an occurrence which an intellectual adult will scarcely notice. Laughter does not go with sorrow and not as a rule with anger, but is accompanied by the emotion of joy. In a large majority of cases a pleasant feeling or emotional organic tone precedes and accompanies mirthful responses.

Laughter is born of social contacts. Whenever two or more persons who are somewhat like-minded are gathered together under agreeable circumstances, they are apt to burst out into laughter at any moment; while if a person who is alone is heard to laugh long and heartily he is at once interrogated, and if he does so frequently his sanity is suspected. Laughter roots in a social situation.

A child may be stimulated to laugh upon hearing another child or adult laughing; his neuro-muscular mechanism is "set-off" by the sensory stimuli. In the same way sometimes hearing one's self laugh stimulates the individual's laughter mechanism into renewed and invigorated laughter, and the person asserts that he cannot stop laughing. This type of phenomenon is a result of the operation of sympathetic

emotion or vibration, with its consequent release of similarly organized neuro-muscular mechanisms.

The group laughs at almost any mistake of incongruity in conduct or speech of the individual. If the error is easily discernible, the laughter of the group may be *spontaneous*, and the individual victim or victims greatly embarrassed. Spontaneous group laughter is often very hard to bear by the individual, for it is experienced so unexpectedly that he is apt to lose his normal self control. The implication is that the mistake is so evidently simple that the given individual should not have made it; it is a reflection upon his mental ability.

If the error is deep-seated it may not be detected by the members of the group at once, and the laughter of the group may be *delayed*. The individual thus is given time to recognize his own mistake and to prepare himself for withstanding the laughter of the group. The fact that the group does not recognize the error at once implies that its subtlety partially excuses the making of it.

Sometimes the group is prejudiced against an individual, and it may be even organized to embarrass him or the cause which he represents; and he becomes the victim of *concerted*, even of malicious, laughter. A person is apt to feel a gross sense of injustice because of the disadvantages at which group ridicule puts him; he experiences a deep sense of social isolation; and may develop a fighting attitude.

Mirthful nature may be analyzed from still another angle. I may laugh at others; I may let others laugh at me; and I may publicly laugh at myself. It is easy upon seeing the incongruities of other persons to burst into exclamation and laughter. Unrestrained laughter at others is rudeness; it indicates that the individual who so conducts himself is unsympathetic.

To let others laugh at my incongruities and blunders requires self-control on my part, and a habitual adjustment to this sort of experience. If I can cover my chagrin and embarrassment, the group's laughter is kept from being prolonged. By seeming to enjoy the group's laughter at me, I seem to bifurcate myself—I seem to identify myself with the group and hence the group easily develops a fellow feeling for me.

If I can publicly let others laugh at my blunders and defeats, then I have reached a superior stage of self discipline. I may deliberately allow or even invite the group to discipline me, and thus give the impression of complete group alignment. The members of the group recognize my weaknesses as being related to their own foibles, and in consequence I am easily accepted into the social consciousness of my fellows. After his first defeat for the presidency Mr. Bryan achieved a national reputa-

tion as an adept in winning sympathy by telling good stories "on" himself. This is one of the cleverest ways of disarming one's opponents.

Social laughter is a corrective. It arouses fear, "restrains eccentricity," and prevents individuals from innocently straying far from group conventions and standards. It is a patent means of group tyranny and produces conformity in cases in which conformity is of no use to the group but is costly to the individual, e. g., "ridicule of the shiny elbows of the janitor."

Social laughter prevents groups from becoming mechanically inelastic. It helps the members keep "in touch." When individuals laugh together they are apt to feel more kindly toward one another. Laughter socializes those who laugh together, but not as a rule the laugher and laughee. For example: (1) A laughs at C, which usually will irritate C; (2) A and B laugh at C, with the result that A and B feel more alike, while C may feel ostracized; (3) C gives A and B a chance to laugh at him, for example, "tells one" on himself, which causes A and B to feel kindlier toward him and to unify all three. Mirthfulness heightens the group tone; many a tense social situation is relieved by a humorous sally.

On the other hand, one who would voice a strange idea, no matter how worthy it may be, must brave social laughter or ridicule, and by standing out successfully against the group, becomes individualized. In an important sense, mirthfulness is antagonistic to sympathy. If one puts himself completely in the place of another, he will rarely laugh at the other. Thus, mirthfulness may be unsympathetic, impersonal, objective, and individualizing.

Mirthfulness has survival and success values. Mirthfulness builds up both the physical and mental nature of a person. It shakes him up, stimulates, relaxes, and re-creates him. It sets his organism in better tune and enables him to laugh at his duller moments and blunders, thus restoring him to a normal personal equilibrium. Mirthfulness is an open sesame to the good will of other persons; it prevents an individual from taking himself too seriously and restores him to the fellowship of social group life. No national characters in the United States in recent decades have so well illustrated this principle as William Howard Taft in his public attitude toward his inglorious defeat for re-election in 1912, e. g., his calling himself "the worst-licked man who ever ran for President"; and William Jennings Bryan in his references to similar defeats, e. g., his referring back to 1896 when he "first began running for the Presidency." By a mirthful attitude one can come back anew, or maintain mental youthfulness, and multiply his social efficiency. Through mirthfulness one can gain or re-gain a normal, well-balanced develop-

ment of all the natural powers of his personality. A mirthful attitude sanely used may be rated as one of the most useful assets for all participants in intersocial stimulation.

102. Desire for Social Approval: A Mainspring of the Self¹

The key to modern human behavior is to be found less in the effort to save our physiological skin than in the effort to save our social "face."

It is likely that no concise statement can adequately define the full force and direction of all our human appetites and yearnings. Nevertheless, there is need of some simpler naming of the more important sources of our feelings—some naming which may help any one who cares to touch the aspirations or the energies of his fellows. As a kind of unifying factor or balancing influence among the various instincts, and certainly as a substitute for the pay-envelope theory, the following suggests itself:

The prime influence on all of us today is our wish to enjoy the feeling of our worth as persons among other persons. This feeling can hardly exist without a corresponding recognition and respect on the part of others.

To "count"—to avoid the dread abyss of spiritual and social nothingness—this, surely, is the urge which seldom, if ever, ceases to press upon our very souls. And how can we be real people if no one knows we exist? How can we be sure we are counting if there is no one else to say so? Just because this is so supremely vital to our happiness, we dare not wholly trust ourselves: somehow, somewhere, in the eyes of the few or of the many, we must secure the backing of a body of less prejudiced witnesses.

First, then, the initial demand within us to be "worth-while" and, second, the encouraging approvals and the opposing disapprovals of others to whom we give attention—these two forces and the constant interplay between them we must understand if we are to know the mainsprings of our neighbors and ourselves.

That being so, it matters very much who the "others" are to whom we look for notice. For the moment we change our choice of witnesses, we change forthwith, not our inner force, but the direction in which it drives us.

Everywhere in our dealings with each other, crucial events follow from this same mixture of certainty and uncertainty in our feeling

¹ Reprinted by permission from W. Williams, *Mainsprings of Men*, pp. 146-48; 167; 171. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925.

about ourselves. Where our most urgent wish and hope for worth meet our gravest doubt, there is where occur most of those troublesome collisions with our neighbors—collisions which often lead first to the severance of relations, and then to the declaration of war. *We are most sensitive and "touchy" to the measurement of others at exactly those points where we are most wishful to be assured—where the very intensity of our desire for unquestioned value makes all but the most convincing of confirmations appear inadequate and disappointing—and where, accordingly, our over-anxious self-defense looks like aggression.*

"You see, if I'd 'a' put up me dukes," one worker told how he had avoided many conflicts, "then he would 'a' *had* to put up his, or else back down—and be laughed at by the bunch a-lookin' on. But I just rubbed my nose with my left hand—protectin' my face, ye see, but still a-leavin' him free to change the subject if he wanted to—without nobody guyin' him for losin' his nerve."

Everywhere and continually are we driven by the need of maintaining our beliefs in ourselves, of "holding up our end." The sellers of tractors find their chief "sales resistance" in the family's preference for the social reassurance furnished by "the car." The loaners of credit for buying automobiles, similarly, lose only an infinitesimal percentage of the required monthly payments, because so few of us dare to disclose to our neighbors that though we had a car on Monday, alas, we have it not on Tuesday. So we keep the butcher and the baker waiting for their money while we devote our utmost energies to what a wit has called one of the most urgent necessities of post-war existence in America, namely—to "keeping the wolf away from the *garage* door!"

103. Personality as Organized around Fundamental Wishes¹

The human wishes have a great variety of concrete forms but are capable of the following general classification:

1. The desire for new experience.
2. The desire for security.
3. The desire for response.
4. The desire for recognition.

(1) *The Desire For New Experience*

Men crave excitement, and all experiences are exciting which have in them some resemblance to the pursuit, flight, capture, escape, death

¹ Reprinted by permission from W. I. Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl*: pp. 4-5; 9; 12; 17; 18; 31; 31-32. Boston. Little Brown & Company, 1923.

which characterized the earlier life of mankind. Behavior is an adaptation to environment, and the nervous system itself is a developmental adaptation. It represents, among other things, a hunting pattern of interest. "Adventure" is what the young boy wants, and stories of adventure. Hunting trips are enticing; they are the survival of natural life. All sports are of the hunting pattern; there is a contest of skill, daring, and cunning. It is impossible not to admire the nerve of a daring burglar or highwaymen. A fight, even a dog fight, will draw a crowd. In gambling or dice throwing you have the thrill of success or the chagrin of defeat. The organism craves stimulation and seeks expansion and shock even through alcohol and drugs. "Sensations" occupy a large part of the space in newspapers. Courtship has in it an element of "pursuit." Novels, theaters, motion pictures, etc., are partly an adaptation of this desire, and their popularity is a sign of its elemental force.

There is also in the hunting pattern of interest an intellectual element. Watson does not note curiosity among the instincts because it does not manifest itself at birth, but it appears later as the watchful and exploratory attitude which determines the character of action,—whether, for example, it shall be attack or flight. The invention of the bow and arrow, the construction of a trap, the preparation of poison, indicated a scientific curiosity in early man. Activities of this kind were interesting because they implied life or death. The man who constructed the poisoned arrow visualized the scene in which it was to be used, saw the hunt in anticipation. The preparation for the chase was psychologically part of the chase. The modern scientific man uses the same mental mechanism but with a different application. He spends long months in his laboratory on an invention in anticipation of his final "achievement." The so-called "instinct for workmanship" and the "creative impulse" are "sublimations" of the hunting psychosis. This making of a trap was a "problem," and any problem is interesting, whether the construction of a wireless or the solving of a puzzle. Modern occupations or "pursuits" are interesting or irksome to the degree that they have or have not a problematical element.

(2) *The Desire For Security*

The desire for security is opposed to the desire for new experience. The desire for new experience is, as we have seen, emotionally related to anger, which tends to invite death, and expresses itself in courage, advance, attack, pursuit. The desire for new experience implies, therefore, motion, change, danger, instability, social irresponsibility. The individual dominated by it shows a tendency to disregard prevailing

standards and group interests. He may be a social failure on account of his instability, or a social success if he converts his experiences into social values.—puts them into the form of a poem, makes of them a contribution to science. The desire for security, on the other hand, is based on fear, which tends to avoid death and expresses itself in timidity, avoidance, and flight. The individual dominated by it is cautious, conservative, and apprehensive, tending also to regular habits, systematic work, and the accumulation of property.

The social types known as "bohemian" and "philistine" are determined respectively by the domination of the desire for new experience and the desire for security. The miser represents a case where the means of security has become an end in itself.

(3) *The Desire For Response*

Up to this point I have described the types of mental impressionability connected with the pursuit of food and the avoidance of death, which, are closely connected with the emotions of anger and fear. The desire for response, on the other hand, is primarily related to the instinct of love, and shows itself in the tendency to seek and to give signs of appreciation in connection with other individuals.

In addition, the desire for response between the two sexes in connection with mating is very powerful. An ardent courtship is full of assurances and appeals for reassurance. Marriage and a home involve response but with more settled habits, more routine work, less of new experience. Jealousy is an expression of fear that the response is directed elsewhere. The flirt is one who seeks new experience through the provocation of response from many quarters.

In some natures this wish, both to receive and to give response, is out of proportion to the other wishes, "over-determined," so to speak, and interferes with a normal organization of life. And the fixation may be either on a child or a member of either sex.

In general, the desire for response is the most social of the wishes. It contains both a sexual and a gregarious element. It makes selfish claims, but on the other hand it is the main source of altruism. The devotion to child and family and devotion to causes, principles, and ideals may be the same attitude in different fields of application. It is true that devotion and self-sacrifice may originate from any of the other wishes also—desire for new experience, recognition, or security—or may be connected with all of them at once. Pasteur's devotion to science seems to be mainly the desire for new experience,—scientific curiosity; the campaigns of a Napoleon represent recognition (ambi-

tion) and the self-sacrifice of such characters as Maria Spiridonova, Florence Nightingale, Jane Addams is a sublimation of response.

(4) *The Desire For Recognition*

This wish is expressed in the general struggle of men for position in their social group, in devices for securing a recognized, enviable, and advantageous social status. Among girls dress is now perhaps the favorite means of securing distinction and showing class. A Bohemian immigrant girl expressed her philosophy in a word: "After all, life is mostly what you wear." Veblen's volume, *Theory of the Leisure Class*, points out that the status of men is established partly through the show of wealth made by their wives. Distinction is sought also in connection with skillful and hazardous activities, as in sports, war, and exploration. Playwriters and sculptors consciously strive for public favor and "fame." In the "achievement" of Pasteur and of similar scientific work there is not only the pleasure of the "pursuit" itself, but the pleasure of public recognition. Boasting, bullying, cruelty, tyranny, "the will to power" have in them a sadistic element allied to the emotion of anger and are efforts to compel a recognition of the personality. The frailty of women, their illness, and even feigned illness, is often used as a power-device, as well as a device to provoke response. On the other hand, humility, self-sacrifice, saintliness, and martyrdom may lead to distinction. The showy motives connected with the appeal for recognition we define as "vanity"; the creative activities we call "ambition."

The importance of recognition and status for the individual and for society is very great. The individual not only wants them but he needs them for the development of his personality. The lack of them and the fear of never obtaining them are probably the main source of those psychopathic disturbances which the Freudians treat as sexual in origin.

On the other hand society alone is able to confer status on the individual and in seeking to obtain it he makes himself responsible to society and is forced to regulate the expression of his wishes. His dependence on public opinion is perhaps the strongest factor impelling him to conform to the highest demands which society makes upon him.

104. Three Types of Personality Organization: Extrovert, Introvert, and Ambivert¹

No extensive study of human nature as it is about one or as it is analyzed and described in English literature is necessary to convince

¹ Reprinted by permission from E. S. Conklin "The Definition of Introversion,

one that there are people who live more within themselves than in the busy world of activity. The philosopher was and is of necessity one who sits apart and reflectively watches the race of men go by. The enduring satisfactions of life he finds in his interpretations of life, and not in the marts of trade. So, too, the poet, the priest, and the pedagogue. Mr. Sinclair Lewis in his satire on the American small town has drawn an admirable picture of the life of the busy business man who reflects little, who is occupied in the objectivities of life, in trade, or in organization, or in occasional sporting excursions. Such men are bored by much reflection. When they think they think aloud. The very fact of their continuation through life as small business men in small towns is because they think so little. These are extremes to be sure, but they are normal extremes. The philosopher, the poet, the priest and the pedagogue are as normal and often as unprogressive and as impractical as the Main Street business man in Gopher Prairie is normal, hustling, and crassly practical. These illustrate the normal introvert and the normal extrovert. Jung has said that the introvert "finds the unconditioned values within himself" and the extrovert "finds the unconditioned value outside himself," and these words apply very well to the two groups I have just described.

There are people also who would not fall into my poet-philosopher class, and also people whom Sinclair Lewis would not have selected as types for his Main Street business men. From my corner of life I see many who seem to combine the two traits. I see a farmer who not only manages a great ranch but actively participates in its work, and who is also a student of affairs, a philosopher whose insight into human nature is uncanny, a reader of great literature, in all things a thoughtful man. I see an eminent manufacturer, one who has shared largely in the building of a great industry, who is also a thinker, a student, and an essayist of recognized merit. I see a scholar with degrees from many universities and the author of most creditable publications who is also a very successful man of affairs. Such as these do not fall in either the extrovert or the introvert class. They are both extroverted and introverted. They find unconditioned values both without and within themselves. For them psychoanalysis seems to lack a descriptive term. Lacking a better term for them, I shall follow the trend of the psychoanalytic terminology and call them *ambiverted*.

To my mind these ambiverted people are by far the most normal and healthy. Human effectiveness in contemporary civilization requires both Extroversion and Allied Concepts" *J. Abn. & Soc. Psy.* 1922-23: XVII: pp. 368-69; 369; 370; 375-77.

extroversion and introversion. There must be in it no hindering infanilities, no imperfect adaptations or adjustments, and no degeneration to domination by old forms of behavior. The normal healthy individual today is one who is adapted to the world in which he lives and who combines in a socially effective manner both introversion and extroversion. It remains only to add that the demands of different vocations, different environments, require combinations of different relative amounts of introversion and extroversion. Ambiversion might cover all such so long as they are effective and healthy.

Extroversion means a condition of mind in which attention is more often governed by the objective conditions. The extroverted condition must have strong sensory stimulation and is lost or unhappy without it. And this sensory stimulation includes a large share of kinæsthetic stimulation: there is a delight in muscular activity, especially of the fundamental muscles. The extroverted condition is not of course uninfluenced by subjective conditions of attention; but the subjective conditions in extroversion have a peculiar content, a content closely related to that of the objective conditions. The ideas in mind are ideas of action, the sports in which there is actual or ideal participation and the things the person has done, would do, or would have others do. The extrovert's education has been that of physical activity rather than of reflective thought, he has always preferred to do than to reason. His purposes or mental attitudes are the consequence of such an education and so they predispose him to attend to the world of human action. His social pressure selects the same type of thing for his attention because his associates are people who are like himself extroverted, whose subjective conditions of attention are like his. The emotional life of extroversion is cruder, more simple or more primary because it is that type of emotion which is aroused by the activities which dominate the attention in extroversion. Such an individual does not respond, except perhaps with disgust, to classical literature, classical music, and the other fine arts because he has not the capacity for reacting with the refined, complex or derived types of emotion which the enjoyment of these necessitates, and also because his attention determiners have a different content and so are not aroused. In brief one can define *extroversion as a more or less prolonged condition in which attention is controlled by the objective conditions of attention more than by the subjective and in which the content of the subjective conditions is most closely related to the objective.*

Introversion is of course but the reverse of the above. Here the objective conditions are of minor significance. The introvert is not easily distracted, concentrates well, is called absent minded by some. He is not

much interested in business, sports, or that in which physical activity is primary. His subjective conditions are dominant and the content of them is composed of abstractions, principles, interpretations, theories, meanings, and values. The introvert reads much, writes, lectures, sings, plays, paints, is constantly doing those things which use primarily the accessory musculature and higher cerebral organization. His emotional life is consequently very different. In comparison with the extrovert it is finer, more complex, or more of the derived form. The content of his attention conditions is such that there is selected for his attention a very different type of material from that selected for the extrovert and the material to which the extrovert responds makes little appeal to the introvert. Summarizing *introversion* can be defined as *a more or less prolonged condition in which attention is controlled more by the subjective than by the objective conditions and in which the content of the subjective conditions is of a more abstract nature and not so intimately related to the objective conditions.*

I have indicated in an earlier part of this paper that neither extroversion nor introversion are abnormal nor are they to be considered as mutually exclusive. One and the same individual may be now introverted and now extroverted. I have therefore made the preceding definitions comparative in degree. A person may conform more to the definition of extroversion and yet have in the content of his subjective conditions of attention that which will make him occasionally attend with comfort and even pleasure to abstract ideas or some classical music. Likewise a person may conform in his general behavior better to the definition of introversion and yet have enough of experience of active life in his conditions of attention to make him attend at times with comfort and pleasure to that which is the primary interest of the extrovert. Many there are, as I have already shown, whose life can not readily be described by either the definitions of extroversion or introversion. These people are so developed that the subjective conditions of their attention is so varied in its content as to make possible pleasure in a great variety of objects, ideas and activities. Such people may and are for a period thoroughly introverted, they are writing books or preparing lectures on some abstract subject, or are absorbed in some peculiar type of modern musical development and while so conform perfectly to my definition of introversion; at other times they are so completely absorbed in fishing, hunting, mountain climbing and tales of the same, are welcome companions to those who are more constantly extroverted, and while so conform perfectly to the definition given for extroversion. It is these I have called ambiverts. With them

extroversion or introversion are but passing states of mind, whereas with the extrovert extroversion is the dominant condition and with the introvert introversion is the dominant condition. The *definition of ambiversion* grows then directly out of the two preceding and is to be stated as *a condition of development in which attention is controlled by either objective or subjective conditions of attention and in which the content of the subjective conditions is so varied as to make possible more or less prolonged periods of either extroversion or introversion.*

B. THEORIES OF PERSONALITY

105. A Psychological Interpretation of Personality ¹

The personality has three parts or divisions: cognition, affection, and conation. Cognition is probably correlated chiefly with sensory and cortical response as its physical counterpart, affection chiefly with response of the autonomic apparatus, and conation chiefly with response of the neuroskeletal motor mechanism. These three parts can be treated separately only for purposes of exposition. In reality they are closely interrelated in any well unified personality, less closely in a poorly organized personality, and least of all in dissociated and abnormal forms. The cognitive and affective divisions are better known subjectively, and the accounts of them are more easily written in terms of consciousness. The conative part is better known objectively and may be more easily described in terms of behavior.

Some components of personality are original, some are acquired. The original components or elements of cognition are probably sensation and image. More complex, derived components are perception, memory, association, judgment, reasoning, etc. The controversy as to which or what part of the cognitive functions are original, and which derived has, however, no bearing upon the view of personality here outlined. It is enough to assume that some components are original and some acquired.

The components of the affective part of the personality are the simple elements of pleasantness and unpleasantness, and the more complex factors: emotion, mood, sentiment, and so forth. These affective factors probably have as their physical counterpart chiefly activity of the autonomic apparatus: the autonomic or vegetative nervous system

¹ Reprinted by permission from J. W. Bridges "A Theory of Personality" *J. Abn. & Soc. Psy.* 1925-26: XX: pp. 363; 363-64; 364-65; 365-66; 367; 368; 368-69.

(sympathetic, cranial and sacral), the glands, and the smooth muscles.

The components of the conative part of the personality are more easily indicated on the physical side. They are reflex actions, random movements, instinctive responses, habits of skill, social habits, etc. From the standpoint of consciousness the basic element is probably *impulse* (urge or drive). There are simple impulses as the conscious counterpart of reflex action and random movement. There are complex impulses as in instinct and habit. There are original impulses as in reflex action and instinct, and acquired (co-ordinated or conditioned) impulses as in habit. The point to be emphasized is that impulse is a fundamental element of conative consciousness.

It will be noted that instinct and emotion are here classified under different divisions of the personality, and that they are both regarded as psychophysiological responses, that is as having subjective and objective aspects. They differ in the following respects: (a) objectively considered, instinct is response of the sensory-motor neural mechanism and the skeletal musculature, while emotion is response of the autonomic apparatus, that is the vegetative nervous system and the smooth muscles and glands. (b) Subjectively experienced, instinct is impulse or urge; while emotion is "stirred-up" consciousness, probably analyzable into diffuse organic sensations and feelings of various qualities. Instinct and emotion may occur together or separately; because a situation may be such as to elicit an instinctive response only, or an emotional response only, or both forms of response together.

Another important component of personality occurring in all three of its divisions is *intelligence* or the capacity to learn, which on analysis is probably reducible to the capacity to form and to change associative bonds. This learning capacity is probably not a unitary central factor. There seem to be different learning capacities for different things, and some of these capacities are more highly correlated than others.

By *cognitive intelligence* is meant the cognitive learning capacities, the capacities to acquire ideas and ideational associations, to analyze and combine. It is chiefly this form of intelligence which is measured by the intelligence tests. These tests, however, measure it for the most part indirectly by measuring its products: information, knowledge, intellect. But there is also *affective intelligence*, or the affective learning capacities. These are the capacities to condition, modify, and combine feelings and emotions, and to develop sentiments. Affective intelligence is an important condition of affective development just as cognitive intelligence is a condition of cognitive development. The third kind of intelligence is conative or *motor intelligence*, or the motor learning

capacities. These are the capacities to condition reflexes and instincts (impulses), to co-ordinate motor responses into habits, to acquire technical skills and social behavior. Some tests have been devised to measure motor intelligence, but none have as yet been developed to measure affective intelligence. It seems likely that individuals will be found to vary as much in native affective intelligence as in cognitive and motor, and that these variations determine in part the differences in their affective status.

By *organization of personality* is meant the formation of associative bonds among the various elements and the arrangement of the various components into a hierarchy of more and more complex levels. This organization depends upon (1) the existence of original elements, (2) native intelligence, and (3) environmental influences: education, guidance, training. Each of these factors is important and essential for each kind of organization: cognitive, affective, and motor.

Cognitive organization may begin with simple sensations and images. These are organized into perceptions and ideas. These are further organized into cognitive attitudes, information, and systems of knowledge, such as knowledge of physics, chemistry, psychology, history, etc. All systems of knowledge may be further organized into a scientific world view. Such a complete cognitive organization is of course only an ideal which few personalities attain.

Affective organization may begin with simple feelings and emotions, which are modified, conditioned, and organized into compound emotions, moods, affective attitudes, sentiments, loyalties, interests and aversions. These sentiments and other complex affective factors may be further organized into a major sentiment or loyalty to which they become subordinated. Needless to say such a perfect affective organization is even rarer than a complete cognitive organization. The affective life is usually piece-meal, relatively undeveloped and therefore unstable, chiefly because the native affective intelligence is not cultivated. Education has not been directed towards this goal. The organization of affective elements may be called the *temperament*. Temperament is thus the total affective make-up. It includes affective elements, affective learning capacity, and the organization acquired as a result of these and of environmental influences, guidance and training. Physically, affective organization is probably the organization of autonomic functions.

Conative organization may begin with simple impulses which are conditioned, modified and integrated into more and more complex impulses. Physically it is chiefly an organization of skeletal responses, and it can best be described from this point of view. The elements are

thus reflex actions, random movements, and instincts. These are co-ordinated into motor attitudes and habits: habits of work and play, technical habits, social habits. The next step is the co-ordination of these habits and their correlated impulses into a general motor attitude. This organization of conative elements may be called *character*. Character in this sense includes conative elements, motor learning capacity, and the organization due to these and to environmental influences and training.

The personality as thus described varies greatly from individual to individual. These variations are due to (a) differences in the number and strength of the elements; (b) differences in intelligence: cognitive, affective and motor; and (c) differences in environmental influences including guidance and training. Some of these variations will now be briefly indicated. In the first place, there is individual difference in the *complexity of personality*.

Under this caption are therefore included variations in: (a) breadth of knowledge, (b) diversity of interests, and (c) multiplicity of skills and variety of social behavior.

Secondly, there is no doubt marked variation in the degree of *integration of the personality*. Few personalities have attained complete unity. As a rule many components are dissociated from the main organization; and sometimes groups of associated components (complexes) and even more complex organizations may be similarly disconnected and split off from the main personality. Such dissociation may be the sequel to a *mental conflict*. This latter is an incompatibility or antagonism of thoughts, feelings, or impulses. It is a normal phenomenon occurring as a stage in the process of development and organization. Its normal outcome is a resolution in which both terms of the conflict attain adequate expression.

Organization is a slow process, but it is a measure of the *strength of the personality* as a whole or in any of its parts.

A third way in which individuals may vary is in what may be called *balance of personality*. A well-balanced personality is one in which intellect, temperament and character are equally well developed and organized. But there are individuals in whom the intellect is dominant, others in whom the affective side is more highly developed and dominant, and still others in whom the conative or motor organization is dominant. The first are the cold-blooded intellectualists and scientists; the second group have well developed sentiments, artistic appreciation and marked enthusiasm; the third group are the energetic men of action. But knowledge, sentiment, and organized impulse are all equally important for a well-balanced personality.

A fourth variation in personality is in the *mode of expression*. This is probably reducible to variation in complexity, integration and balance. It is dependent upon the direction of attention (interest or libido), the nature of the dominating ideal and of the major sentiment, early environmental influences and training, heredity, and probably upon other unknown factors. In mode of expression the personality may be introverted or extroverted, egoistic or altruistic, conservative or radical, primitive or sublimated or dissociated and repressed; and if repressed it may yet express itself in defense reaction, projection or rationalization.

106. A Psychiatric Interpretation of Personality¹

The term *personality* has been used in different senses. Here it will be used to designate the inborn psychic capacities, traits, and tendencies of individuals.

In psychiatry the starting points for studies of personality have been, naturally, the constitutional neuroses and psychoses; and so the more clearly defined types came to be, (1) antisocial, (2) cyclothymic, (3) autistic, and (4) epileptic personalities.

Antisocial personality, in this connection, is the constitutional basis which underlies hysterical manifestations, malingering, pathological lying and swindling, and some criminal careers. The essence of it is the predominance of illicit selfish motivations in the behavior of the individual combined with more or less pronounced lack of compunction.

Cyclothymic personality is the constitutional basis on which manic-depressive psychoses develop. Kraepelin distinguishes four principal varieties: (a) manic make-up, (b) depressive make-up, (c) irascible make-up, and (d) emotional instability.

Autistic personality is the constitutional basis on which dementia praecox or schizophrenic psychoses develop. Of this, too, there are a number of varieties which find their clearest manifestations in the clinical groups of dementia praecox.

Perhaps the most fundamental trait of autistic personality in general is narrowing or reduction of external interests and contacts and preoccupation with inward ruminations.

Epileptic personality has not been so well defined in mental terms, i. e., it has not been so sharply distinguished from so-called normal

¹ Reprinted by permission from A. J. Rosanoff "A Theory of Personality Based Mainly on Psychiatric Experience" *Psy. Bull.* 1920: XVII: pp. 281-282; 284; 285; 287-289.

personalities. In practice there is no difficulty in identifying it, at least in the cases in which it is accompanied by the ordinary manifestations of epilepsy. It is possible to distinguish *periodic alterations of mood and consciousness* and, less clearly, *permanent characteristics*.

The above descriptions of abnormal types of personality naturally emphasize contrasts with "normal" types, the existence of which is always tacitly implied by the psychiatrist. These contrasts, as all know, are only to a slight extent qualitative, and for the most part quantitative.

Among the traits *qualitatively* distinguishing normal personality are to be mentioned inhibition, emotional control, a superior durability of mind, rational balance, and nervous stability. The results of the lack of these traits in psychopathic individuals, and only secondarily direct observation of them, have enabled us to perceive and evaluate them in normal individuals.

Normal persons are not free in most cases from selfish motivations and anti-social or violent or destructive impulses, but are distinguished mainly by ability to inhibit them; they are, of course, not free from emotion, but seem to possess a controlling mechanism whereby they are protected from excessive emotional manifestations, i. e., at least to the extent preventing interference with steady and purposeful activity.

The very common tendency among epileptics and schizophrenics to suffer early and more or less pronounced mental deterioration is well known; its anatomical basis is brain atrophy which goes hand in hand with the mental deterioration. In contrast with this is the great relative durability not only of normal personality but also of the cyclothymic varieties.

Cyclothymic personalities are protected against such pathological manifestations of autistic thinking as hallucinations and delusions by the continuity of their external contacts. It seems that normal personalities are also protected but by a somewhat different mechanism, namely, an influence which makes for rational balance and which is perhaps akin to the inhibition and control securing other psychic functions against pathological excess.

As regards nervous stability—by which is meant here particularly a power of maintaining uniformity and continuity of consciousness and avoiding fainting spells, convulsions, deliria, automatisms, absences, and other epileptic manifestations—this is possessed not only by normal varieties of personality, but also antisocial, cyclothymic, and, to a somewhat lesser degree, autistic.

Turning our attention to *quantitative* contrasts between abnormal and

normal types of personality, we find, as the most significant fact of experience, that either between the different abnormal types, or between them and normal types, sharp lines of demarkation cannot be drawn; mixed types are the rule, pure types the exception. Every qualitatively definable trait is subject to quantitative variation and may enter into the personality composition of a given case, no matter how classified as to type, in a greater or lesser degree. Even among the extremely pathological cases segregated in institutions a great many are in most respects normal and require custody or assistance only by reason of some limited, perhaps temporary, psychic disability. Similarly, among so-called normal persons we find, at least in rudimentary form, antisocial tendencies, lability of moods, autistic thinking, and a tendency to become faint and lose consciousness or suffer convulsions under the influence of various physical and psychic causes. The time-honored classification of temperaments into the quick (sanguine, choleric) and the slow (phlegmatic, melancholic) is obviously based largely on contrasts presented by traits indistinguishable, except in degree, from those observed in the psychiatric clinic as belonging, respectively, to cyclothymic and autistic personalities.

Owing to the great importance or even indispensableness for our gregarious mode of existence, i. e., for social adjustment, of the inhibiting and-controlling power of normal type of personality it has ranked high in our evaluation. On the other hand, owing to the circumstance that the traits of the so-called abnormal types of personality were first observed in cases which had come to attention by reason of severe social maladjustment, descriptions of them are apt to unduly emphasize their unfavorable aspects.

The fact is that the relative advantages and disadvantages are not so unevenly divided; that for various tasks and situations in life now one group of traits, now another appears most advantageous; and that generally desirable varieties of personality consist rather of fortunate combinations of traits.

Even anti-social traits, within certain limits of manifestation, are not always regarded as undesirable and may be judged to be of biological value; for they undoubtedly underlie a good deal of our prudence, diplomacy, success in commercial and political fields. How much in literary and histrionic art is due to the sensitiveness and power of expression of cyclothymic personality; how much in all pioneering activities to the spirit of enterprise rooted in the same soil? How much in science and in other fields, in which great concentration of mental energy on special tasks is required, is due to the inclination, peculiar to autistic

personality, to exclude every diverting influence, every extraneous interest? How much of all human achievement is due to inspirations, revelations, stubborn patience and determination, such as have been observed in epileptic personalities?

107. A Sociological Interpretation of Personality¹

The person, as previously defined, is the individual with status. Personality may then be regarded as the sum and co-ordination of those traits which determine the rôle and the status of the individual in the social group. Certain traits of the individual—as his physique, mentality, and temperament—definitely affect his social standing. Primarily, however, his position in the group will be determined by personal relations such as his group participation, his character, his personal behavior pattern, and his social type. The following outline offers a scheme for studying behavior in terms of individual and personal traits.

Outline for the Study of Individual and Personal Traits

I. *Study of the Individual*

1. Physical examination
2. Mental tests
3. Affectivity score
4. Will profile
5. Temperamental type

II. *Study of the Person*

1. Participation
 - a) Extent of membership in groups
 - b) Intimacy of membership (social world)
 - c) Rôle in groups
2. Character
 - a) Stabilized
 - b) Unstabilized
3. Personal behavior pattern
 - a) Objective or direct
 - (1) equable, (2) enthusiastic, (3) frank, (4) aggressive
 - b) Introspective or indirect

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- (1) imaginative, (2) secretive, (3) sensitive, (4) inhibited
- c) Psychopathic or perverse
 - (1) eccentric, (2) egocentric, (3) emotionally unstable, (4) psychic inferior
- 4. Social Type
 - a) Practical or Philistine
 - b) Liberal or Bohemian
 - c) Idealistic or Religious
- 5. Philosophy of Life

The technique for the study of the individual is naturally much further developed than the technique for the study of the person. The physical examination now represents a diagnosis based upon the latest researches of medical science. Since 1905-11 when Binet and Simon devised a scale for the measurement of intelligence, mental tests have been undergoing a process of constant revision and standardization. Pressey's affectivity test may be noted as one of the attempts to gauge emotional reactions. Dr. June Downey on the basis of handwriting material has worked out what promises to be a valuable method of measuring will reactions. For example, her tests differentiate twelve volitional traits, namely: volitional perseveration, co-ordination of impulses, interest in detail, motor inhibition, finality of judgment, resistance, reaction to contradiction, motor impulsion, speed of decision, flexibility, freedom from load, speed of movement. Attempts to determine or measure experimentally temperamental types are still in the tentative stage. Shand, Jastrow, and others have, however, at least restated the problem. The tendency seems to be to accept the classic names for different temperaments—the choleric, the sanguine, the melancholic, and the phlegmatic—and to redefine these permanent moods in terms susceptible of measurement.

The outline suggested for the study of the person includes aspects of behavior for which no standardized technique of measurement has been accepted. It may be that the description of factors like participation in groups, character, personal behavior patterns, and social types will always remain primarily a matter of qualitative definition. Our investigation here is too recent, however, to abandon at the start the hope of securing quantitative indices. For illustration, the extent of membership in groups may be stated as the ratio of the groups with which the person is affiliated to the total number of the groups in which membership lies open to him. Or the degree of intimacy of membership in one group may possibly be expressed by the fraction of his total lei-

sure time devoted to the life of this particular group. The classification of character in terms of stability is obviously relative to the social norms of particular groups or to the social standards common to all forms of group life.

The threefold division of personal behavior patterns into objective or direct, introspective or indirect, psychopathic or perverse, is one made tentatively by the writer of this article. These differential types of behavior are not personality, and are not even the spontaneous expressions of temperament or other traits of human nature. They seem to be what the general term personal behavior patterns implies, namely, characteristic types of the behavior of the person fixed in the matrix of social relations in infancy and childhood. Naturally original differences in mentality, in temperament, and in volition enter into the determination of the form of personal behavior patterns, but their organization and fixation occur in social interaction.

Mentality, affectivity, temperament, and will are not uninfluenced by social experience. They are all more or less profoundly modified by education and social contacts. But personal behavior patterns like egocentricism, instability, and secretiveness take form and become fixed in the social interactions of the family and of the play group. These personal patterns of behavior are not biologically transmitted as temperament seems to be. Nor are they derived by imitation of others as is the social type or the philosophy of life of the person. The personal reaction of the individual to his social world is the resultant of the play of social forces in infancy and early childhood. Whether the fixed responses of the person to his social environment will be in the main (a) direct, (b) indirect, or (c) perverse are apparently determined by the rôle which he assumes, or which is forced upon him in his earliest social interactions. In the molding of a social type of personality and in the acceptance of a philosophy of life the influence of the group is definitely exerted. At the same time, the social copies which the person takes for models appear to him to be but the realization of his most ardent wishes.

Compensation as a Mechanism to Maintain Status

The status of the person in the social group is in the last analysis a matter of social attitudes: (a) the individual's conception of his own rôle, and what is even of greater significance (b) the attitudes toward him of the fellows in his group, of the community and of society.

This complex of the attitudes of others toward one is subject to change. These changes may be gradual or abrupt. Gain or loss of

status is naturally of absorbing interest to the person. Since all of us begin life as infants, and since in some one trait at least, if not in many, every one of us is surpassed by his fellows, it is inevitable that consciousness of inferiority is a universal experience. The inferiority complex tends to become organized about deficiency in a characteristic that has a value in the group which constitutes the social world of the person. The possession of this trait gives superior status in the group. Adler in the *Neurotic Constitution* analyzes the phenomenon of compensation in instances of constitutional or psychic inferiority.

The following case indicates how a Negro lad through the mechanism of compensation for physical and mental inferiority organized a personal behavior pattern that secured for him leadership and a superior status in his social world of the gang.

Harry M. is a colored lad, fourteen years old, and forty-nine inches tall. He is perceptibly stunted in growth, and slightly deformed in his legs, not enough, however, to interfere with walking. He is "knock-kneed," walks with a swaying gait, and is sensitive of his difference from the physique of normal boys. Both his two brothers, ages twelve and seventeen, are well developed. Harry dresses mannishly, and assumes a studied air of self-composure. He does not talk freely even in play. His behavior suggests an attempt to conceal his physical weakness and deformity with the prestige which his unexpressed thoughts and *possible* strength might inspire.

Between Harry and his elder brother there has been rivalry for leadership in their common group. Harry carries a scar on his head as a result of a former dispute.

On his father's side there are indications of alcoholism. His parents have been separated for a number of years. One of his early recollections is of appearing in Court with his mother and father when divorce proceedings were in progress. He remembers distinctly that his parents were debating who should keep the children, each with emphasis on a preference to be relieved of the responsibility. It was finally decided that two of the boys should stay with the grandmother. He doesn't believe his grandmother had a husband. He dislikes his father, whom he accused of "staying drunk a lot and cussing," and is moderately fond of his mother although he sees very little of her, living as she does at another address in the city.

Harry has only reached the third grade in school. He thinks his teachers like to "peck" on him. His teachers declare him dull and slow, and devoid of interest. He has a very shallow knowledge of arithmetic, and reasons poorly. For example, he says that a horse weighing 400 pounds standing on four legs, weighs 300 pounds standing on three legs.

His grandmother works out during the day and he and his brother are left to their own devices. The family lives in the section of the Negro community that produces the largest number of delinquent colored children.

The boy has never been in Juvenile Court, but a number of his chums have. His manual training instructor asserts that he is a gang leader, although the smallest in the bunch. On several occasions he has been tempted to leave home, "to go to work somewhere," he "reckoned." This feeling came over him usually while he was chafing under the injuries done him by his father and larger brother.

His grandmother has drilled into him an assortment of moral precepts and practices like saying his prayers and grace before meals. He has a good sense of judgment between right and wrong, but when he plays he "forgets sometimes." One complaint of his grandmother is that he has a mind of his own, going out when he feels like it, and acting generally as he pleases. Incurability, fighting, truancy, and lying are his principal delinquencies. His success in fighting is due largely to the fact that he can induce his pals to do his fighting for him. The boy has a remarkable influence with his "bunch," and can take an interest in useful as well as destructive activities. A test of this came recently when his instructor made him squad leader to shovel snow. Mental conflicts appear to have resulted from his dislike for his father and his rivalry with his brother. This perhaps accounts for his impulse to run away from home.

Although he seems to have compensated for his physical disability through his power over the gang, his school record could be improved by striking his interests and perhaps by placing him in a school with male teachers, since women teachers "make him sick."

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises

1. Do we tend to live our way into our thinking or think our way into our living?
2. What occupations today are dominant in determining standards and values?
3. What is occupational egocentrism? Illustrate.
4. How is a person's "shop talk" related to his "universe of discourse"?
5. Distinguish between the professional ethics of two dominant professions?
6. Why do the professions maintain their standards and values better than do trade unions?
7. What factors determine one's choice of occupation?
8. What is the nature of modern business ethics in regard to prices and to competition?
9. Why is what James calls "club opinion" so very strong in social interaction?
10. What group affiliations of your own bring out distinctive facets of your personality?
11. What place has wit, humor and laughter in the study of personality?

12. Why is it said that man is the only animal that laughs? What is the relation of laughter to the higher mental functions?
 13. What is the difference in one's response when one laughs *with* a group and when one is laughed *at* by a group? Why?
 14. Give two illustrations each of the four wishes listed by Thomas.
 15. Can you add any fundamental wish to his list?
 16. Criticize, pro and con, the attempt to describe personality organization in terms of wishes or desires.
 17. What are the limitations on Williams' thesis of the "mainspring of the self"?
 18. Define the following terms: introvert, extrovert, ambivert. Illustrate.
 19. Define the following terms: cognition, affection, conation.
 20. Criticize, pro and con, Bridges theory of personality. Do the same for Rosanoff's and Burgess'. Point out limitations and valuable aspects of each.
- B. Topics for Class Reports
1. Report on Burgess' article on romanticism and family disorganization. (Cf. bibliography.)
 2. Report on Thomas' paper on urban personality. (Cf. bibliography.)
 3. Report on Freud's theory of wit. (Cf. bibliography.)
 4. Report on Lee's paper on changing standards and family life. (Cf. bibliography.)
 5. Review Hinkle's papers on moral conflict and on changing marriage. (Cf. bibliography.)
- C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers
1. The Contributions of Psychoanalysis to the Study of the Normal Person.
 2. The Contributions of Psychoanalysis to the Study of the Family.
 3. The Effect of Industrialism upon the Family.
 4. The Effects of the Emancipation of Woman Upon Her Personality.
 5. Literary Sources in the Study of Personality.
 6. Study of Personality Types: Philistine, Bohemian, Hobo, Genius, Beggar.
 7. The Study of Divergent Types of Personality.
 8. The Unconscious Mind and the Genius.
 9. The Interplay of Individual Psycho-biological Traits, Social Milieu and Culture Patterns in the Production of Personality. (One might deal with the Actor, the Poet, the Philosopher, the Inventor, the Politician, the Lawyer, the Surgeon, the Scientist, etc., etc.)

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PART FOUR

SOCIAL ATTITUDES AND THE
SUBJECTIVE ENVIRONMENT

CHAPTER XVI

PERSONALITY AND THE MENTAL PATTERNS OF THE GROUP

I. INTRODUCTION

In the early chapters of this book we dealt with some of the more obvious aspects of the culture patterns; technique, folkways, mores, and ethos. In this and the following chapter we shall examine more closely the make-up of the mental patterns which become common property of a group and which come to assume such a large place in the life-organization of the person. Not to understand the importance of the subjective environment, the world of images and ideas (stereotypes) to which the individual is exposed and which become in time the heart of his attitudes and habits, is to ignore the basic clue to man's social behavior. In truth, man lives, not in a world of physical objects only, but in a social psychological world of images, ideas, and attitudes. This type of subjective world lies before us wherever we see prejudice, crowd behavior, relations of masses to leaders and the functioning of public opinion. We cannot understand these phases of social behavior without exposing the dominant features of the mental patterns of culture.

The first paper from Bernard gives a general review of the nature of the environment which surrounds the person. In this chapter we are particularly concerned with what he terms the "psycho-social" environment.

This psycho-social world exists for us as individuals largely in the unconscious, and Finney's paper describes very well the unconscious nature of mental patterns. In the paper from Burrow we look more closely into the nature of unconscious social images. In fact, we live and move largely in the world of social images, which *are* the reality. It is a mistake to consider these images unreal, for they are the most real things in our experience. The social images are some-

what akin to what the French anthropologists call the *représentations collectives*.

Social attitudes also come into the picture, for attitudes themselves lie on the borderline of the unconscious if not actually in that field. Faris's paper defines attitudes under various valuable categories. Park indicates a distinction to be made between attitude and opinion, the latter being far more superficial for the person than the former. The high importance attached to opinions, in common parlance and everyday life, rather than to attitudes, is merely a "hang-over" of eighteenth century rationalism.

Lippmann has made popular the term "stereotype." This term applies to images and ideas which often have that group sanction of which we spoke in Part One. Stereotypes are part of all mental patterns of culture. They are connected with values and weighted down with strong feelings and emotions. The lucid description of stereotypes by Lippmann is already classic. Weeks, although using other terms, shows how stereotypes arise. And the clever experiment reported by Rice indicates a quantitative treatment of common stereotypes of the day.

Language is, of course, an essential ingredient in stereotypes. In fact, since stereotypes are socially accepted images and concepts (ideas), they must be communicable, and language furnishes the medium. But more than that, the verbal expression itself is the stereotype in thousands of instances. Verbal imagery is quite as essential as visual, although Lippmann's discussion of "pictures in the mind" is likely to give the impression that stereotypes are essentially visual. It is the writer's belief that the more deep-seated a stereotype, the more it is apt to lose its visual, auditory or other sensory basis and become a verbalism, a word or phrase, around which is gathered a large amount of emotion and feeling. The most thoroughly tabooed words are often of this sort and the common stereotypes like liberty, equality, justice, freedom, goodness, virtue, are largely, if not entirely, verbal. Lipsky's statement indicates the power of words in the political world. The same is true everywhere.

The final paper, by Lumley, discusses the place of slogans and catchwords in social control. All forms of slogans very rapidly take on the nature of stereotypes, just as do slang phrases. To these slogans, especially those connected with group survival, there is

attached an enormous amount of emotional freight which carries the individual safely through the maelstrom of social action. As we shall see, this is pertinently illustrated in the field of mob behavior and public opinion.

II. MATERIALS

108. The Types of Environment in Which We Live¹

Environment to Which an Individual is Exposed

This classification may be presented in brief outline as follows:

I. The physical environments

1. Cosmic, including such factors as the sun's heat, possible electric or other disturbances due to the relationship of the sun and other heavenly bodies upon the earth, the falling of meteors, the effect of moonlight and of the moon's attraction upon the tides, possible cosmic causes of radical changes in climate, such as the glacial epochs, due to cosmic changes.
2. Physico-geographic, especially such factors as contour and surface configuration (mountains, coast lines, valleys, rivers, mountain passes, etc.), altitude.
3. Soil, especially in relation to the supply and distribution of plant foods, particularly nitrogen, potassium, and phosphorus; the physics of the soils.
4. Climate, including especially temperature relations, humidity, and the succession of the seasons.
5. The inorganic resources, especially the minerals and metals, such as the natural fuels (coal, petroleum, natural gas), the structural materials (iron, copper, tin, zinc, lead, etc.), and the rarer industrial metals. Under this heading might be included the chemical properties of the soil.
6. Natural agencies, especially falling water, the winds, the tides and the sun's rays, which may be used to some extent as power sources.
7. Natural mechanical processes (combustion, radiation, gravity, etc.).

II. The biological or organic environments (plants and animals).

1. Micro-organisms. The various forms of germ life, including pathogenic and saprophytic bacteria, bacilli, and amoebae, and possibly even more minute forms of life.
2. The various parasites and insect pests which establish relations

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with organic life or with man directly, and which not infrequently are germ carriers. Such organisms have a marked influence upon the development of crops and livestock and forests upon which man is so largely dependent.

3. The larger plants which constitute the forests provide materials for shelter and clothing, for medicines and foods, and for some other needs of man, such as weapons, cords, tools, etc., and determine in large measure man's occupations and larger social adjustments.
4. The larger or ponderable animals which form the natural herds, flocks and packs and schools, including materials for food, shelter, clothing, and other auxiliaries, as above, and determine man's occupations.
5. Certain harmful aspects of 3 and 4, especially those plants and animals which carry menacing poisons which are injurious, directly or indirectly to man, in their natural habitat, destructive and harmful plants, such as those which make agriculture difficult, impede man in his movements, injure his body or property—ferocious and destructive animals in the state of nature.
6. Ecological and symbiotic relationships of plants and animals in nature, which may exercise an indirect or direct influence upon human relationships, especially with respect to their economic aspects.
7. The prenatal environment of animals, in which the maternal organism influences in large measure the character of the growth and development of the nascent organism.
8. Natural biological processes (reproduction, growth, decomposition, assimilation, excretion, circulation, etc.).

III. The social environments

1. The physico-social environments
 - a) In general, all inventions that are the product of the human reaction upon the physical environments, and by means of which the physical materials (especially as in 1, 3, 5, and 6 above) are so transformed as better to meet the needs of man.
 - b) More specifically such inventions and transformations as transportation lines and equipment, the paraphernalia of communication, modern housing, including homes, office and industrial buildings, public service buildings and equipment, modern cities themselves and all their accessories, tools, household equipment, many phases of clothing and personal adornment, such as jewelry, buttons, head-dress, artificial heating or clothing apparatus and conditions, ice, fire, war equipment, chemical compounds, industrial machinery, the instruments employed in scientific research, in religious observance, etc., in so far as these are constructed from physical or inorganic materials and are adapted especially to the needs of members of human society.

2. The bio-social or organico-social environments
 - a) Plants domesticated and adapted to agriculture, horticulture, floriculture, including all plants cultivated for the purpose of providing human food, shelter, clothing, ornament, or tools and weapons, as distinguished from uncultivated plants occurring under natural conditions.
 - b) Plants cultivated for the purpose of providing food or shelter or other protection for domestic animals or for other belongings or purposes of man.
 - c) Cultivated medicinal plants and plants grown for the manufacture of perfumes.
 - d) Animals bred and cared for by man as sources of food, shelter, clothing, ornaments, tools, weapons, or medicines.
 - e) Animals domesticated and employed as sources of power, in industrial pursuits or as burden bearers for man.
 - f) Animals used for purposes of play and recreation and as objects of display and as means of social distinction, as pets, aids in the hunt, for shows, etc.
3. The psycho-social environments
 - a) Objectified and standardized behavior processes, which are not visible or discernible directly by the senses, but which are matters of logical or conceptual inference and are treated as behavior entities. Among the more important of these may be mentioned institutions (in their psychic or non-material aspects), customs, traditions, conventions, beliefs, mores, folkways, fads, fashions, crazes, attitudinal evaluations, propaganda, public opinion, science (in some aspects).
 - b) Objectified but incompletely or wholly unstandardized behavior processes, such as rumors, conversational contacts (what Bagehot called "talk"), radio, and certain aspects of public opinion, propaganda, attitudinal evaluations and other categories mentioned above in III, 3, 2).
 - c) Objectified and standardized stored psychic symbols and symbolic meaning complexes. The most important of these environmental storage factors are books and periodicals, but here also should be included pictures, statuary, musical compositions, archeological and ethnological collections and curios, inscriptions, codes, moving pictures, phonograph records, and all similar apparatus which carry a symbolic meaning content which may be apprehended by those who recognize the symbolic keys. These are the carriers of vast bodies of scientific, esthetic, and literary data which act as stimuli to social and individual behavior.
 - d) Here also belong pantomime, gesture, language, etc.

IV. Composite or institutionalized derivative control environments.

So far nothing has been said about the composite or derivative control environments. They also are primarily derivative in their content and wholly derivative in their organization. Perhaps they should be described as quaternary in the order of their development, although they contain secondary and tertiary elements and may even embrace something of the primary environmental materials in their constitution. These environments differ from all the others which have been described in that they are organized around or are defined in terms of problems or ways of looking at things and of making adjustments of man to his environments, while the other classes of environments have been described in terms of the object-materials out of which they are constituted or of the order in which they began to function. Thus these derivative control environments involve much more of the nature of institutions, while the other environments are the materials out of which institutions are formed. This class of environments might have been called institutional instead of control or composite environments, except that it is also proper to speak of institutions as one of the component elements in the psycho-social environment. However, it is only the psychic or subjective behavioristic aspect of the institution which may be included in the psycho-social environment. The material elements of institutions distribute basically to such environments as the physico-social and the bio-social. Also it should be noted that not all of these composite or derivative control environments are truly institutional in form. Many of them have not sufficient history or continuity of form to entitle them to that characterization. They are rather of the nature of temporary organizations developed around some more or less temporary problem for the purpose of organizing or expediting a system of social control.

Samples of the composite or derivative control environments may be presented in the following list. All of these environments are general in character: economic, political, racial, esthetic, ethical, educational, etc. Many others might be cited, as many, in fact, as there are general ways of looking at complex or composite problems of social adjustment.

Examples of the composite specific environments may be cited at random as follows: American, Italian, Jewish, Scandinavian, New England, Southern, Argentinean, Republican, Democratic, Catholic, Buddhist, Revolutionary, Conservative, feminine, masculine, etc. There is literally almost no limit to the number of environments of this specific character under this general category of composite or derivative control environments.

109. The Unconscious Nature of Mental Patterns¹

"The idea of a separate and independent ego is an illusion." This epigram by Charles Horton Cooley, when its implications are discerned, may prove to be one of the most significant ideas of the century. When understood, and carried out to its logical applications, it vacates the individualistic assumptions of the nineteenth century in almost all fields of human theory, and calls for an entirely different attack upon the problem of democracy than the infancy of that modern cult has conceived.

There are two reasons why the important fact expressed in this epigram penetrates our thought so slowly. One reason is that there are obvious senses in which it is not true. Physically we are separate entities, and as independent as things can be in our kind of cosmos. Moreover, as centers of sentient experience, each human organism is an end in itself. The second reason lies in *the fallacy of attributing to mental facts an importance in life proportionate only to their obtrusiveness in attention*. This might be called the iceberg fallacy; inasmuch as the ocean traveler is so prone to forget the fact that the iceberg's bulk is really, nine-tenths of it, out of sight below the surface of the sea.

Professor Cooley's concept seem to be inferred from the obvious fact that the total content of the mind is the product of the learning process. It requires two reproductive processes, therefore, to produce a human personality, a physical and a mental. Learning is the reproductive process by which the mind is procreated. Now the material for that learning process is taken from the social heritage. And since that mental material out of which the mental side of our personalities is made is much the same for all of us it follows that mentally we are mutual participants in a common substance.

And consider how vast is the mass of this learned material which, bit by bit, has crossed the focus of attention and been learned, so long ago that the learning process has now been quite forgotten—how enormous is that common mental capital which is filed away in the cerebral cabinets of us all, to be used upon occasion, but often without overt attention to it. It includes all the folkways and the mores. What an enormous quantity of learned material these two words represent attentive students of these social accumulations will fully appreciate. There are also all the popular mythologies and current beliefs on all

¹ Reprinted by permission from R. L. Finney "The Unconscious Social Mind" *J. of App. Soc.* 1926: X: pp. 357; 358; 357-359; 360-361; 361-362; 363-365.

sorts of subjects. And besides these there is language. Also, there are the techniques of one's occupation, which are possessed by other members of the same trade, at least. And finally there are the sciences and the fine arts. More than is the case with the other elements of the social heritage, these are the mental property of a few experts. And yet, as popular utilization of the sciences and the fine arts increases, the body of common knowledge in these fields increases. To be sure, there is a fringe of all these materials of which specialists alone are the possessors—wider in the case of the sciences, the fine arts, and the industrial techniques, than in the case of the folkways. And naturally it is this fringe which attracts attention, and gets recognized in common sense. But in each field there is a vastly larger mass which is common to all; and it is this vast mass of common material which constitutes the unconscious social mind.

Now let us raise this vast mass, which is so ignored in attention, to the place which it deserves in theory. First, take the realm of *biology*. It is the iceberg fallacy which induces biologists, and individualistic psychologists who adhere strictly to the biological point of view, to overestimate as they do the relative importance of heredity. As a variable in their observations, environment is like the iceberg, most of it is out of sight, and hence ignored. Because differences in the obtrusive one-tenth of the environment produce slight differences in personality as compared with differences in heredity, they infer that environment is of minor importance. They should vary the *total* environments—the *whole* of the unconscious social minds in which their cases are immersed. Then they would draw different conclusions.

Text books in *psychology* are extremely significant in what they omit. A search through one of the most widely used of them discovers almost no recognition of the fundamentally important fact that the learning process is a social process. The learning process, including perception and reasoning, are treated as if each learner or reasoner worked in complete isolation. The word thinking is used in the strict sense of forming independent judgments—a phenomenon which occurs in life with relative infrequency. But the most glaring omission is in the author's summary of man's intellectual superiority over the animals; there is no mention whatever of the great co-operative processes of collective learning, whereby the accumulated knowledge of the race is at the disposal of each person in his attacks upon the problems of life. This omission seems very strange, since it is by this unique trait of the human mind, more than by any other, that man's immeasurable superiority over animal mentality is to be explained. Animals "think" for themselves, liter-

ally, whereas a man seldom thinks for himself. His intellectual efficiency arises from the fact that he is always able to "glean from fields by others sown." And precisely herein lies his incomparable advantage.

This iceberg fallacy in psychology serves, as must be obvious, to exalt independent, original thinking far beyond its total merits in the social life. Original thinking actually occurs with amazing infrequency. What does occur is but the pallid ghost of thought. What most of us mistake for thinking is but the matching of stereotypes which we have memorized out of the social heritage.

At first thought this depreciation of individual thinking seems humiliating and depressing. But not upon a deeper insight. The glory of the human intellect is not in the individual thought but in the collective thought of the race. Left to itself alone, each intellect would be utterly insignificant and helpless—probably a poor match for the instinctive mechanisms of the brutes. But when one feels himself, as he really is, a participant in the total knowledge of the race, he feels a sense of reinforcement and strength which is immeasurable. Mentally we are all members one of another; and therein lies the strength of our minds and the grandeur of our personalities.

Proceeding to *politics*, we find ourselves quite similarly set right by this new insight in the field of social psychology. The problem of modern democracy which is giving thoughtful people increasing concern is: How can intelligent voting be got from the citizenry? The only answer in sight is to encourage to the utmost each individual citizen to think for himself. A short time ago Norman Angell lectured all over the country on this problem. His challenge was: How to get the barber to vote intelligently; barber being an algebraic symbol for the intellectually average citizen. Angell complained that, in the barber's upbringing, he is insistently admonished against thinking about innumerable problems of life that are regarded as too sacred for skepticism. And then, forsooth, we expect the barber to think, he said. Angell's solution was to encourage the barber while he is growing up to be skeptical of every sacred belief in the world. Encourage him to think for himself. Post him as to the principal pitfalls of logic, drunken him with flippant skepticism, and then turn him loose among the sacred icons. Whereupon he will vote right on the income tax, the League of Nations, the tariff on linseed oil, and a thousand other such like problems. And democracy will be saved! James Harvey Robinson and John Dewey offer practically the same prescription.

Here we have the sore thumb fallacy in its most rampant destructiveness. The reasoning process is obtrusive in attention; the vast appercep-

tive mass of learned material is not. From which we quite spontaneously infer that the barber's individual thinking is the vital process, fallaciously overlooking the importance of the apperceptive social mass. The real truth is that thinking is a great collective enterprise, to which only a few rare leaders will ever contribute new ideas. Public opinion is forced up from behind by the apperceptive mass in the unconscious social mind. The problem of democracy is, therefore, for the leaders to predetermine the apperceptive mass. There is hope for the success of democracy only as unselfish and competent leaders can succeed in restocking the social mind with a new outfit of popular beliefs that harmonize with the best modern knowledge. It is a big job; perhaps an impossible one; but there is no other way. Infinitely easier would be the enterprise of provoking every manjack, moron and flapper to iconoclastic skepticism; but that would result in nothing better than a fool's paradise.

In our modern democracies political thought and popular aspiration rotate around the concept of freedom. But there begin to be suspicions that there must be something wrong with the assumptions underlying this concept. It does not seem to be working out in practice according to the expectations in which we moderns had been indulging. The reason becomes clear the moment we apply to it the principle that "the idea of a separate and independent ego is an illusion." It turns out that no such thing as independence is provided in the deal. Freedom, if it means to fly off on some whimsical tangent, is not to be desired. If it means opportunity to participate in an adequate and wholesome common life, then self-realization is a better name for it. The needs of human nature are met by good institutions. The real problem of democracy, therefore, is not individual freedom, but justice in the larger sense of providing social institutions that actually do meet the real needs of human nature.

110. Unconscious Social Images¹

Certain of the social images belonging to our generic unconscious are matters of daily, hourly preoccupation among us. Such images constituting our own social self-reflections present a myriad of facets. We rise from the sleep images of our individual unconscious only to enter the no less unconscious reflections of our social mind in its waking activities. Each of us, for example, occupies a position professionally, polit-

¹ Reprinted by permission from T. Burrow "Social Images versus Reality" *J. Abn. & Soc. Psy.* 1924-25: XIX: pp. 232-235.

ically, economically, personally. Each has his special relationships to this one and to that. There is one's relationship to one's wife, to his child, to his mother, his friends, his servants, and to every class and condition of the people that come within his casual daily contacts. In all these relationships the individual is constantly measuring his behavior according to the estimate of those in front of him. Unconsciously he is at every moment taking stock of his reactions as they appear in the eyes of others. In this way the persons about us have come to represent unconsciously a sort of social foil against which we watch the outline of our own image. Thus in his social relationships the individual *sees* himself in the light in which these relationships reflect him. All of them give back his personal image in the social mirror they present to him. To the servant we play the master; to royalty we play the slave. To the persons who admire us we play the heroic rôle; to those who regard us trivially, we play a correspondingly insignificant part. Accordingly, our so-called social consciousness becomes but an unconscious exchange of personal images based upon habitual covenants of social reciprocity. The more we consider this self-reflective tendency, the more we may realize how readily we fall into the adoption of this, that, or the other characterological rôle in response to the image or rôle that is unconsciously being played opposite us.

With every individual, as we know, the image opposite him that is most important is the image of his earliest and most intimate association. The image, in short, which every individual carries in the locket of his unconscious is the image of his mother. It is this image which he treasures throughout life as beyond price. From Freud we have learned the far-reaching influence of the mother-image upon the affective life. But there is the need to recognize that the mother-image becomes the underlying criterion of every judgment that the individual forms. Its impress is the emotional substrate of all the thoughts and activities of his life. And so the individual's guiding principle in life becomes centered upon the single issue involved in the praise or blame he receives from this, the mother-image. With this image held constantly before him he must ever sue for favor. Winning it, his cup of happiness is overflowing; failing it, he is cast down into inconsolable dejection.

But what is the nature of this mother-image? Or what relation has the mother-image, as existing within the mind of each of us, to the personality of the mother as actually existing in the world of objective experience? If we will observe our data from a basis of relativity or from a point of view that includes our own processes within its own envisagement, we cannot fail to recognize, as we observe the outlines

of this early implanted image, that *what is called the mother-image is but the sum of the impressions reflected by the mother from the social environment about her and that these impressions are again transmitted by us to others through their reflection within ourselves*. If this is true, then the mother-image bears no relation whatever to the mother-organism and our impression of this early association of our childhood is totally unconnected with the personality from whom we receive it. Indeed it would seem that this unconscious idolatry of the maternal image is throughout but a replacement for the organic personality of the mother.

We shall be helped if we will keep in mind the organic significance of this replacement. Much of the confusion of psychoanalysis is due to our failure to realize that there is this distinction between the mother-image and the mother-organism. The image we unconsciously cherish is not the image of the mother's personality. It is the image of the social suggestion that has surrounded the mother. For I think we must ultimately come to see that the child automatically replaces the biological reality of the parent-organism with the *social image* that is artificially reflected to him by the parent. Following the investigations of the last years it has come to be my definite conviction that it is this element of the socially pictorial as reflected in the parent-image, that is the chief impediment to consciousness. But still not recognizing this fanciful image we arbitrarily call it "love for the mother" and under this popular misnomer it continues to be apotheosized by us as from time immemorial.

With the social mind the important image is the immediate community about it. The community occupies the central position within the social unconscious that the mother-image occupies within the individual unconscious. Like the latter, the absorbing desire to which the social image prompts us is the approbation of the community. Our every effort is bent toward winning its favors. In its propitiation we count ourselves fortunate. In its disaffection we are discouraged and unhappy. Thus it would seem that the community is but the projection or extension within the social unconscious of the mother-image within the individual unconscious.

As with the individual image of the mother our social preoccupation is love or the mother's approval, with the image of the social mind about us our daily and absorbing preoccupation is success or the community's approval. As in our individual fixation upon issues of fear or favor, praise or blame, so in the social fixation upon our cherished image of the community, as it exists under our various institutions, economic, politi-

cal, social and personal, our constant preoccupation vacillates perpetually between the dual issues represented by our success or our failure, our private profit or our private loss. But if the social image represented by the community possesses the same underlying psychology as the mother-image, then this social image can have no more relation to the reality of the social organism than the image of the mother has to the reality of the mother-organism. If true, such a conclusion deals a stunning blow to our social as well as to our personal prepossessions. It means that we shall have to reckon altogether anew with the unconscious factor that is of central importance in psychoanalysis—the factor of the mother-complex—and that, if we are truly to comprehend its significance in its inclusive meaning, we shall have to alter the very foundations of its present interpretation, individual and social.

What we call “love for the mother” is then upon analysis but love for ourselves as reflected to us in the image of the mother, as this same self-love was reflected by her in turn from the social environment about her. For in all our human relationships we have been diverted from the organic reality of these relationships and have substituted for them the mental pictures formed by our own artificial projections.

This fetich of our social image-worship is no more recognizable by us in the absence of conditions that make possible an analysis of the social mind as it exists within each of us than it is possible for us to recognize the fetich of our personal images as they exist within the unconscious of our individual minds. If we are to be free and uninhibited in the expressions of our social consciousness, it is as necessary that we bring the images underlying our folkways and our folk symptoms under the scrutiny of analysis as that we bring to analysis the unconscious images that underlie the symptoms and reactions of the private individual.

III. Social Attitudes¹

The logical significance of the concept lies in the change of emphasis from sensation to behavior, from receptivity to spontaneity and innate or acquired motor tendencies. This distinguishes the approach from that of traditional psychology and from some aspects of behaviorism where the problem is to describe the “reaction” to a “stimulus” and where the sense organs are described as “receptors.” But there is another logical difference which is essentially a shift of emphasis from

¹ Reprinted by permission from E. Faris “The Concept of Social Attitudes” *J. App. Soc.* 1925: IX: pp. 404-405: 405-408.

a timeless principle or force to concrete events. This marks off the *Attitude* psychologists from the "Instinctivists." An attitude may variously be designated as a gesture, an incomplete act, or a tendency to act. Some attitudes are overtly motor and muscular though we also speak of "mental attitudes," where the behavior is delayed or only expected, yet always possible.

A dichotomy is that of conscious and unconscious attitudes. For there are unconscious attitudes. Williams discusses judicial attitudes as seen in the five-to-four decisions of the supreme court, made consistently over a long period, and explicable only on the assumption of an unconscious bias or attitude. Other attitudes are conscious, such as my attitudes toward carrots, or the Ku Klux, or Coolidge.

A third division may not be quite so obvious but is valuable and even essential to make, namely, the distinction between group attitudes and individual attitudes. Both are "social attitudes" in the sense above indicated, but the group attitudes also exist. This is probably what the French writers mean by *représentations collectives*. Perhaps the two other invaluable French notions, *morale* and *esprit de corps* also refer to certain phenomena which we may call group attitudes, that is, to collective phenomena which are not mere summations. By individual attitude we may designate not merely the subjective aspect of any group tendency or cultural element but more particularly and more usefully the divergent and differentiated tendencies. The individual manifestation of race prejudice cannot be understood apart from a consideration of group attitudes. In collecting data it often happens that the investigator finds cases of the acquisition of a prejudice with astonishing suddenness and as the result of a single experience. But this could only happen in a *milieu* where there was a pre-existing group attitude. One who has no negro prejudice may acquire it from a single unpleasant encounter but it is the group attitude that makes it possible for him to acquire it. An exactly similar experience with a red-headed person would not result in the same sort of red-head-prejudice in the absence of any defining group attitude. Moreover, in the United States, prejudice against mulattoes means always prejudice against black people. In South Africa and in Brazil where mulattoes are not classed with black people, the outcome would be very different owing to the different group attitude.

With regard to any attitude it is helpful to observe that it may be either *latent* or *kinetic*. These familiar words from physics are perhaps self-explanatory. All attitudes are not always active. We may call a girl's liking for ice cream an attitude but it is not active or kinetic

most of the time. An attitude is kinetic if there is actual motion or tension, for the test or criterion is to be found in motor behavior. An attitude may be kinetic without any observable or objective motion. Consider the difference between the two types of habit represented, respectively, by the ability to write and the tendency to excessive drinking of liquors, which we may call a "bad habit." Both these habits are attitudes but the first is (in Dewey's words) a tool to be used when needed and active only then, while the second is not so. A bad habit intrudes and breaks in. It is like a compressed spring or a pneumatic pressure-cylinder. The tendency arises and determines the attention, but may be the occasion of much disturbance even when unrecognized. The unconscious kinetic attitudes are the chief concern of the psychoanalysts.

A central problem in this field is the relation of attitudes to objective phenomena. Thomas states this as reciprocally causal, and sequential. "The cause of an attitude is always a value and a pre-existing attitude." This is stated to be equivalent to saying that every individual phenomenon has both individual and social causes. This is undoubtedly true but there is another relation which this statement leaves out of account. It is the relation between the subjective individual tendency and the external value (*object* is a better term). Now this relation is not causal or sequential but denotes rather the double aspect of one phenomenon. The attitude is *toward* an object and the object is, in some sense, the externalization of the attitude. *Neither causes the other either with or without help.* They appear together in experience.

It follows that attitudes are just as social as objects and that objects are just as individual as attitudes. Both objects and attitudes have both individual and social antecedents and both are aspects and results of organization. This relation is assumed in the investigation of attitudes which takes the form of questionnaires, concerning not attitudes but objects, and yet which reveal attitudes as counterparts. To ask a man whether he is a reactionary, conservative, progressive, radical, or revolutionary is to demand information which may be difficult even if the subject is willing. But to ask such a one to give his estimate of Coolidge, Wilson, Davis, Gompers, Foster, and Debs is to ask not for his attitudes but for his objects and to get information on both. A man's world is the external aspect of his character; his personality is the subjective aspect of the culture of a group.

The problem of the genesis of attitudes is one aspect of the general problem of emotional disorganization and rational reorganization concerning which there is a very large literature. New objects do not arise

merely as effects of social values and preceding attitudes but as a result of conflict, crisis, and reintegration, wherein social and individual forces and antecedents are in some form of opposition. The present need here for investigation is the study of types of crises and the collecting of new attitudes in their genesis. But the new phenomenon is always an attitude-object or object-attitude. When the draft law made the declaration of war mean something, millions of people redefined the United States. The results were a new country (new object) and a new patriotism (new attitude).

Defined in this way, social attitudes may be spoken of as the elements of personality. Personality consists of attitudes organized with reference to a group into a system more or less complete. A social attitude is not the mobilization of the will of the person but the residual tendency that has resulted from such a "mobilization" and the subsequent campaign.

112. Attitudes and Opinions¹

Much that the historian might characterize as myth and legend; much that is pure poetry, even gossip, so far as it reflects the dominant attitude of the races and parties involved, may furnish material for the student of race relations—may, in fact, furnish material for the student of society. What is society, finally, but just this whole vast complex of human relations in which parties, races, and nations are involved?

The value of "experiences" to the sociologist is then that they are the sources, not the only, but perhaps the best, from which the student can gain a knowledge and an understanding of the attitudes of strange and unassimilated peoples.

Attitudes, however, are not opinions. An individual's own account of his attitude is his opinion; but opinions are after all largely what the psychoanalysts call a "rationalization." They are his explanations and justifications of his attitudes, rather than his actual "tendencies to act."

It is certain, at least, that every man's opinion becomes more intelligible if we know the particular circumstances under which it was conceived; particularly if we knew also, the circumstances that have reaffirmed and intensified it. It is for this reason that, in studying opinions, we seek to go back to the point of genesis, seek to define the concrete circumstances under which opinions took form, and the motives which inspired them. Knowing these things we may say we not only

¹ Reprinted by permission from R. E. Park "Experience and Race Relations" *J. App. Soc.* 1924: IX: pp. 20-21.

know an opinion but we *understand* it. An opinion becomes intelligible in one sense at least, not when we approve of it, but when, knowing the *circumstances*, we are able to appreciate the motives that inspired it.

To make an opinion intelligible in the sense here indicated is to discover and describe the concrete experiences in which it is imbedded. There is always some sort of complex behind every motor tendency, every motor tendency that is not a mere reflex.

To make an attitude intelligible it is necessary to study its natural history; to reproduce the circumstances under which it arose so completely that the observer can enter imaginatively into the situation and the experience of which the attitude is a part. This, at any rate, is the first step.

113. Stereotypes as Subjective Environment¹

For the most part we do not first see, and then define, *we define first and then see*. In the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out what our culture has already defined for us, and we tend to perceive that which we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our culture. Of the great men who assembled at Paris to settle the affairs of mankind, how many were there who were able to see much of the Europe about them, rather than their commitments about Europe? Could anyone have penetrated the mind of M. Clemenceau, would he have found there images of the Europe of 1919, or a great sediment of stereotyped ideas accumulated and hardened in a long and pugnacious existence? Did he see the Germans of 1919, or the German type as he had learned to see it since 1871? He saw the type, and among the reports that came to him from Germany, he took to heart those reports, and, it seems, those only, which fitted the type that was in his mind. If a junker blustered, that was an authentic German; if a labor leader confessed the guilt of the Empire, he was not an authentic German. In untrained observation we pick recognizable signs out of the environment. The signs stand for ideas, and these ideas we fill out with our stock of images.

There is economy in this. For the attempt to see all things freshly and in detail, rather than as types and generalities, is exhausting, and among busy affairs practically out of the question.

Modern life is hurried and multifarious, above all physical distance separates men who are often in vital contact with each other, such as

¹ From *Public Opinion* by W. Lippmann (pp. 81; 82; 88-89; 90-91; 95-96; 98-99, 100; 104-05; 108-12). Copyright, 1922, by Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.

employer and employee, official and voter. There is neither time nor opportunity for intimate acquaintance. Instead we notice a trait which marks a well known type, and fill in the rest of the picture by means of the stereotypes we carry about in our heads. He is an agitator. That much we notice, or are told. Well, an agitator is this sort of person, and so *he* is this sort of person. He is an intellectual. He is a plutocrat. He is a foreigner. He is a "South European." He is from Back Bay. He is a Harvard Man. How different from the statement: he is a Yale Man. He is a regular fellow. He is a West Pointer. He is an old army sergeant. He is a Greenwich Villager: what don't we know about him then, and about her? He is an international banker. He is from Main Street.

The subtlest and most pervasive of all influences are those which create and maintain the repertory of stereotypes. We are told about the world before we see it. We imagine most things before we experience them. And those preconceptions, unless education has made us acutely aware, govern deeply the whole process of perception. They mark out certain objects as familiar or strange, emphasizing the difference, so that the slightly familiar is seen as very familiar, and the somewhat strange as sharply alien. They are aroused by small signs, which may vary from a true index to a vague analogy. Aroused, they flood fresh vision with older images, and project into the world what has been resurrected in memory. Were there no practical uniformities in the environment, there would be no economy and only error in the human habit of accepting foresight for sight. But there are uniformities sufficiently accurate, and the need of economizing attention is so inevitable, that the abandonment of all stereotypes for a wholly innocent approach to experience would impoverish human life.

What matters is the character of the stereotypes, and the gullibility with which we employ them. And these in the end depend upon those inclusive patterns which constitute our philosophy of life. If in that philosophy we assume that the world is codified according to a code which we possess, we are likely to make our reports of what is going on describe a world run by our code. But if our philosophy tells us that each man is only a small part of the world, that his intelligence catches at best only phases and aspects in a coarse net of ideas, then, when we use our stereotypes, we tend to know that they are only stereotypes, to hold them lightly, to modify them gladly. We tend, also, to realize more and more clearly when our ideas started, where they started, how they came to us, why we accepted them. All useful history is antiseptic in this fashion. It enables us to know what fairy tale, what school

book, what tradition, what novel, play, picture, phrase, planted one preconception in this mind, another in that mind.

There is another reason, besides economy of effort, why we so often hold to our stereotypes when we might pursue a more disinterested vision. The systems of stereotypes may be the core of our personal tradition, the defenses of our position in society.

They are an ordered, more or less consistent picture of the world, to which our habits, our tastes, our capacities, our comforts and our hopes have adjusted themselves. They may not be a complete picture of the world, but they are a picture of a possible world to which we are adapted. In that world people and things have their well-known places, and do certain expected things. We feel at home there. We fit in. We are members. We know the way around. There we find the charm of the familiar, the normal, the dependable; its grooves and shapes are where we are accustomed to find them. And though we have abandoned much that might have tempted us before we creased ourselves into that mold, once we are firmly in, it fits as snugly as an old shoe.

No wonder, then, that any disturbance of the stereotypes seems like an attack upon the foundations of the universe. It is an attack upon the foundations of *our* universe, and, where big things are at stake, we do not readily admit that there is any distinction between our universe and the universe. A world which turns out to be one in which those we honor are unworthy, and those we despise are noble, is nerve-wracking.

A pattern of stereotypes is not neutral. It is not merely a way of substituting order for the great blooming, buzzing confusion of reality. It is not merely a short cut. It is all these things and something more. It is the guarantee of our self-respect; it is the projection upon the world of our own sense of our own value, our own position and our own rights. The stereotypes are, therefore, highly charged with the feelings that are attached to them. They are the fortress of our tradition, and behind its defenses we can continue to feel ourselves safe in the position we occupy.

Its (the stereotype's) hallmark is that it precedes the use of reason; *is a form of perception*, imposes a certain character on the data of our senses before the data reach the intelligence.

In some measure, stimuli from the outside, especially when they are printed or spoken words, evoke some part of a system of stereotypes, so that the actual sensation and the preconception occupy consciousness at the same time. The two are blended, much as if we looked at red through blue glasses and saw green. If what we are looking at corresponds successfully with what we anticipated, the stereotype is re-

inforced for the future, as it is in a man who knows in advance that the Japanese are cunning and has the bad luck to run across two dishonest Japanese.

If the experience contradicts the stereotype, one of two things happens. If the man is no longer plastic, or if some powerful interest makes it highly inconvenient to rearrange his stereotypes, he pooh-poohs the contradiction as an exception that proves the rule, discredits the witness, finds a flaw somewhere, and manages to forget it. But if he is still curious and open-minded, the novelty is taken into the picture, and allowed to modify it. Sometimes, if the incident is striking enough, and if he has felt a general discomfort with his established scheme, he may be shaken to such an extent as to distrust all accepted ways of looking at life, and to expect that normally a thing will not be what it is generally supposed to be. In the extreme case, especially if he is literary, he may develop a passion for inverting the moral canon by making Judas, Benedict Arnold, or Cæsar Borgia the hero of his tale.

Most of us would deal with affairs through a rather haphazard and shifting assortment of stereotypes, if a comparatively few men in each generation were not constantly engaged in arranging, standardizing, and improving them into logical systems, known as the Laws of Political Economy, the Principles of Politics, and the like. Generally when we write about culture, tradition, and the group mind, we are thinking of these systems perfected by men of genius. Now there is no disputing the necessity of constant study and criticism of these idealized versions, but the historian of people, the politician, and the publicity man cannot stop there. For what operates in history is not the systematic idea as a genius formulated it, but shifting imitations, replicas, counterfeits, analogies, and distortions in individual minds.

The stereotype represented by such words as "progress" and "perfection" was composed fundamentally of mechanical inventions. And mechanical it has remained, on the whole, to this day. In America more than anywhere else, the spectacle of mechanical progress has made so deep an impression, that it has suffused the whole moral code. An American will endure almost any insult except the charge that he is not progressive. Be he of long native ancestry, or a recent immigrant, the aspect that has always struck his eye is the immense physical growth of American civilization. That constitutes a fundamental stereotype through which he views the world: the country village will become the great metropolis, the modest building a skyscraper, what is small shall be big; what is slow shall be fast; what is poor shall be rich; what is few shall be many; whatever is shall be more so.

And yet, this pattern is a very partial and inadequate way of representing the world. The habit of thinking about progress as "development" has meant that many aspects of the environment were simply neglected. With the stereotype of "progress" before their eyes, Americans have in the mass seen little that did not accord with that progress. They saw the expansion of cities, but not the accretion of slums; they cheered the census statistics, but refused to consider overcrowding; they pointed with pride to their growth, but would not see the drift from the land, or the unassimilated immigration. They expanded industry furiously at reckless cost to their natural resources; they built up gigantic corporations without arranging for industrial relations. They grew to be one of the most powerful nations on earth without preparing their institutions or their minds for the ending of their isolation. They stumbled into the World War morally and physically unready, and they stumbled out again, much disillusioned, but hardly more experienced.

In the World War the good and the evil influence of the American stereotype was plainly visible. The idea that the war could be won by recruiting unlimited armies, raising unlimited credits, building an unlimited number of ships, producing unlimited munitions, and concentrating without limit on these alone, fitted the traditional stereotype, and resulted in something like a physical miracle. But among those most affected by the stereotype, there was no place for the consideration of what the fruits of victory were, or how they were to be attained. Therefore, aims were ignored, or regarded as automatic, and victory was conceived, because the stereotype demanded it, as nothing but an annihilating victory in the field. In peace time you did not ask what the fastest motor car was for, and in war you did not ask what the completest victory was for. Yet in Paris the pattern did not fit the facts. In peace you can go on endlessly supplanting small things with big ones, and big ones with bigger ones; in war when you have won absolute victory, you cannot go on to a more absolute victory. You have to do something on an entirely different pattern. And if you lack such a pattern, the end of the war is to you what it was to so many good people, an anticlimax in a dreary and savorless world.

This marks the point where the stereotype and the facts, that cannot be ignored, definitely part company. There is always such a point, because our images of how things behave are simpler and more fixed than the ebb and flow of affairs. There comes a time, therefore, when the blind spots come from the edge of vision into the center. Then unless there are critics who have the courage to sound an alarm, and leaders

capable of understanding the change, and a people tolerant by habit, the stereotype, instead of economizing effort, and focussing energy as it did in 1917 and 1918, may frustrate effort and waste men's energy by blinding them, as it did for those people who cried for a Carthaginian peace in 1919 and deplored the Treaty of Versailles in 1921.

Uncritically held, the stereotype not only censors out much that needs to be taken into account, but when the day of reckoning comes, and the stereotype is shattered, likely as not that which it did wisely take into account is shipwrecked with it.

114. How Stereotypes Arise¹

The extent to which social adaptation may readily occur is measured to a large degree by the ease or difficulty of securing changes not only in habits but in general ideas or concepts. Indeed, our general ideas may be regarded as of the nature of memory habits or sets of mind, and therefore as promoting or opposing ready adaptations in the same manner as habits generally.

The general idea, or concept, represents the former experience of the individual and embodies a series of impressions. If an individual has come to have an established general idea regarding the proper limits of taxation or of the functions of municipalities, it becomes a matter of breaking habits to attempt to secure a modification of his point of view. The fact that opinions often rest on a basis of habit rather than of rationality is one that cannot happily be overlooked.

The concept or general idea originates in experience with things and cases that resemble one another. Its beginnings are seen in simple form in childhood. For example, a child sees a kitten for the first time. The kitten happens to be black. Blackness becomes a mark or quality or attribute of kitten till a white kitten is seen. Then kittens become either black or white, but having other traits also. Next others of still other color are observed, and finally the child's mind is forced to a concept of kitten that includes color but no color in particular. A general idea of kitten is achieved through acquaintance with various examples. Attributes other than color are also assimilated in a general idea such as the possession of claws, mice-catching proclivities, night-prowling tendency and general contour and size. The child soon is able to classify a cat at sight. Cats are readily distinguished from dogs and goats. Later the child sees a tiger. The concept of cat has to expand to admit the idea of

¹ Reprinted by permission from A. D. Weeks, *The Control of the Social Mind*, pp. 43; 45-46; 47; 48-49; 50-51. New York. D. Appleton & Company, 1923.

tiger; the child's mind comes to rest with a concept enlarged enough to include both cat and tiger. The achieving of a concept including both cat and tiger has entailed many readjustments. Upon achieving the wider concept the child has a more useful and effective intelligence than if he had stopped with the cat in one class and the tiger in a wholly different class. The differences between cat and cat, and between house-cats and tigers are not abandoned; but there is the useful concept of a class including cats and tigers.

This process of enlarging concepts goes forward in a multitude of experiences. The original and tentative concept is invariably wrong through inadequacy. Hence the young learner is forced to yield point after point as new examples force themselves upon his attention. A time comes, however, when one feels that he has cats and animals sufficiently well concepted, and he takes a rest; there is danger that he take a rest too soon.

The perceptions as well as concepts are influenced by the terms of their expression. Any one who has been taught early the words raccoon, bear, Airedale, woodchuck, chipmunk, gopher, gray squirrel, and baboon, will possibly see fewer resemblance among these animals than he would had he been taught names for all these having a common term, as dog. If the baboon were named tree-dog and the chipmunk called chattering-dog, and so on, the observer would perceive similarities that otherwise might go unnoticed or even be denied. Polonius saw first as a ship and then as a camel a cloud that Hamlet pointed out as such successively. The road to understanding is singularly set with signs capable of being misread or actually giving wrong directions.

The relation of words to accurate concepts is therefore one of some delicacy. How to guard against undue domination of the word, while utilizing to the full its unique economy, is a matter for consideration. For the moment a good strong word, spellable and mouthable, is adopted and its definition attached, there develops a tendency on the part of its possessor to cling to concept long after succeeding events have sucked away its substance. New conditions arise which are verily ignored or seen amiss because the most relevant word is pre-empted by a rooted meaning.

Vocabulary has scarcely kept pace with the need of saying things. The term "assault" refers to direct bodily attack. Now bodily damage not to be successfully distinguished from that inflicted by direct attack may be inflicted by selling some one a life-preserver that will not float. There is no word to label with equal opprobrium modernized, long distance assault and the assault of direct action, which may consist of a pulling of

one's nose. Sin was a word; ah, there was a word. Are there phrases that truly convince the reader that to kill at a distance through defective workmanship is in the same class with common law murder? Or that to sell a stock that is worthless is to be conceived with entering through the coal chute? Where is the language that unveils the realities of petit larceny, grand larceny, and the separation on a large scale of investors' money from themselves?

The pitfall of the established concept is that it ignores nice distinctions that are oftentimes of the very substance of issues.

Practically every word bequeathed to us from the fathers has to be watched, or our thinking goes askew. Patriotism—holy word—and yet Dr. Johnson, in his time, essayed a fresh definition. Allowing a term to drag thought after it and accepting a word as a conclusive label is liable to lead us far from the essence of things. Especially in days of much reading and of impulsive response to headlines is there danger of unwittingly thinking evil and doing evil. It is no compliment to the circumspection of the citizen that it is currently held that the label in politics counts for more than the reality. Does the word Republican mean today what it meant in the days of Abraham Lincoln? It does not mean the same. Does it mean what it meant in the time of the French Revolution? Surely not. Yet the spell of the word is potent. It is convenient but unjustifiable to give words stereotyped meanings when used to apply to facts and situations which call for other terms or qualifying terms. Watchfulness in the use of terms applying to social phenomena and program is one of the most needed practices. The public should not be indulged in the impression that it is safely on the way to social welfare when a great body of terms looks one way and shoots another.

Definition is tedious, it is true. Tabloid news and radio do not affiliate with definition. But it is definition that has made science. Physics is a mass of exact definitions. He who learns chemistry learns, besides technic, definitions. Until social terms are defined with approximately the same exactness with which the chemist defines a substance or a reaction, and until some such respect is acquired for exact use of terms as every scientist regards as essential in his field of effort, social welfare and public administration will fail of their possibilities.

By too mechanical and unreflecting acceptance of words in lieu of perception of fitness for purported meaning, words become not aids and tools of thought, but disguises and false signals. Thought precedes language. Where language precedes thought—is adopted without perception into underlying facts—the proper function of speech fails and

falsification appears. Somebody calls somebody else a scoundrel; the word scoundrel is easily repeated and clings to memory; scoundrel has an old, well established meaning. To be sure, it may not be the meaning that ought to be attached to the person labeled with the word. But it is easier to believe that Jones is a scoundrel, thus labeled, than to probe the facts of Jones' conduct or ascertain what his denouncer had in mind when he said scoundrel. It is objected that one cannot thus guard against the fallacy of words, that one cannot wait to ascertain the circumstances. But the practice of definition is commended.

The psychology of mechanical response to familiar words, such as fatherland, Jew, flivver, crown prince, protective tariff, mother-in-law, etc., is not essentially different from that of mechanical reaction to symbols. Flags have immense potency, whether carried for God and home and native land or for conquest and loot. It has been said that the rebellion of '61 might have succeeded if the confederate states had not adopted a new flag. In case either of words or symbols the fact of importance is that of the reality of their influence.

In the early years of one's life it is needful to revise and enlarge concepts freely. Plasticity of mind favors this and the demands of environment compel it. Knowledge is gained through personal experience and the annexation of other people's experience, and is filed away as general ideas or concepts. The exigencies of adjustment to surroundings dictate a certain flexibility in concepts in one's earlier years, a flexibility, however, that tends to pass away. Increasingly the mind tends to become made up, and increasingly the ideas that are stored away resist change. Teach the child aversion to pork; and it will take dieticians a long time to persuade to favorable consideration of pork chops; for pork has become something not conceivable as wholesome food. In thousands of instances the adult carries concepts that, whether properly formed or not, are habitual and definitive. In fact so firmly does the individual tend to become encrusted and bound by comparatively primitive concepts that institutional propaganda has always reached for the child.

115. Stereotypes and Errors in Judgment of Character ¹

What Lippmann calls "stereotypes" or "pictures in our heads" concerning the supposed appearance of individuals of a certain race, class, occupation, or social group, may determine to which of these groups

¹ Reprinted by permission from S. A. Rice "Stereotypes: A Source of Error in Judging Human Character" *J. Personnel Res.* 1926: V: 268; 269-73; 274-75; 276.

the original of a photograph is unconsciously referred by the examiner. The supposed grouping or type in turn suggests the temperamental or intellectual qualities which are believed to characterize it. It is probable that such stereotypes are largely dependent upon superficial earmarks as the cut of the hair, the mode of wearing the collar and tie, and other modes of dress.

The experiments described below were designed to show the existence of stereotypes concerning the supposed appearance of persons of various social types, or having defined social functions. The participants in various phases of the experiments were, first, 258 undergraduates of Dartmouth College, in small classes, over a period of two years. Subsequently, the assistance of 31 members of the Norwich, Vermont Grange, attending a regular meeting, was procured to provide comparative results.

In an edition of the Boston Herald for December 15, 1924, were found nine portraits of persons represented in the day's news. The reproductions were unusually clear and were uniformly about two by three inches in size. They were placed without identification upon a sheet of paper and numbered from 1 to 9. The individuals pictured were as follows: Edouard Herriot, at that time Premier of France; James Duncan, Vice-president of the American Federation of Labor; Leonid Krassin, first Ambassador of the Soviet Government at Paris; Joseph W. McIntosh, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency; Martin H. Glynn, former Governor of New York; Max Agel, arrested as a bootlegger; Charles M. Schwab, of the United States Steel Corporation; Howard Heinz, manufacturer of food products; and Senator George Wharton Pepper, of Pennsylvania. In the first aspect of the experiment, the subjects were informed that the sheet contained the pictures of a bootlegger, a European premier, a bolshevik, a United States Senator, a labor leader, an editor-politician, two manufacturers, and a financier. They were asked to identify these individuals by number. Care was taken that no suggestion be given in the instructions concerning the order of the photographs, and that each examiner make independent selections for each position. Table 1 gives the result of the attempted identifications by 141 students. (Tables omitted throughout.)

Allowing for the fact that two manufacturers were included among the portraits, the total number of correct identifications on a chance basis would have been approximately 168. The actual number of correct identifications was almost exactly double that number, or 337 out of a possible 1224. On a scale between the expected or chance number and the maximum possible number of correct identifications, the excess num-

ber of correct identifications was 169 out of 1056, or 16 per cent. However, such a measure as this percentage provides would not give comparable results as between different series of portraits.

Interest attaches to the fact that Herriot, Duncan, Glynn, Agel, Schwab and Heinz were related each to his respective status in a number of cases substantially above the chance number. Krassin, McIntosh, and Pepper were below or equal to chance or expectation.

• In the case of Krassin, the Soviet Envoy, a wing collar, Van Dyke beard and moustache contribute to an appearance that may be described as distinguished, and which no doubt led to 59 identifications as the United States Senator, in comparison with 9 as a bolshevik and none as a labor leader. Senator Pepper received as many or more identifications as labor leader, bolshevik, financier, editor-politician, and manufacturer than he received in his own senatorial capacity. The largest number of correct identifications was made in the case of the alleged bootlegger. This individual alone among his associates in the gallery, is pictured in out-door costume. He is shown in a heavy overcoat with up-turned collar, a cap, tortoise-shell glasses and cigar gripped firmly between his lips. It is interesting that while Mr. Duncan was identified by 25 men as the labor leader, he was selected by 29 as the premier, by 30 as a manufacturer, by 15 as a bolshevik and 13 as the financier. It is evident that he did not fit definitely into any pronounced stereotype among those called forth by the characters enumerated.

When a comparison of the preceding data is made with that obtained from the group of grange members and presented in Table 2, the correspondence is seen to be fairly close. Among the latter the total number of correct identifications on a chance basis would have been $29\frac{1}{2}$ out of a possible 219. The correct identifications actually number 58, or again almost exactly twice the expectation. Herriot, Agel, Schwab and Heinz, as among the students, were correctly identified in more than the chance number of cases, while the distribution in other respects shows a close parallel, especially in the high proportions of correct identifications of the bootlegger, and incorrect identifications as Senator of the Bolshevik envoy.

It is evident that some measure of the extent to which opinion has concentrated in the identification of each portrait would be useful. Wherever there is concentration among the identifications, whether these be correct or incorrect, there will be evidence of the existence of a common stereotype concerning the social designation to which the portrait is assigned.

Such a measure has been found by calculating in the case of each

photograph the total and the relative differences between the numbers of identifications made for each social designation (i. e., under each column in Tables 1 and 2) omitted and the corresponding numbers that would be expected on the basis of chance. For example, the chance number of identifications for Premier Herriot in each column of Table 1 would be 15. The differences between the chance and the actual numbers of identifications are respectively 39, 4, 40, 13, 12, 11, 26, and 15. These total 160. But since the chance number in the case of each portrait is derived from the total number of identifications of that portrait and is a function of the latter, the aggregate number of differences so determined may be related in each case as a numerator to the total number of identifications as a denominator. This fraction, when converted to a decimal figure, will provide a relative *index of departure from expectation*. This index will serve one of the purposes of a *coefficient of variation*, for by its use it is possible to compare the relative concentration of opinion concerning each portrait in the two groups providing data.

In Table 3, (omitted) there is shown for each group the total departures from chance expectation, the indexes of departure from expectation, and the rank of the nine portraits according to the latter. It will be noted that a high total departure and a high index within each group, and a high index in either group, denote a relatively high degree of concentration of opinion, i. e., of agreement among the examiners.

When the corresponding indexes shown in Table 3 are compared it is observed that in each case those for the grange group are higher. This indicates that within the latter there is a greater concentration of opinion. If the thesis of this article is correct, it indicates that members of the grange are more prone to form their identifications upon the basis of stereotypes than are the students.

The order of rank among the nine portraits in the matter of concentration of opinion is closely similar in the two groups. When correlated by the well known Spearman formula the coefficient of correlation, $r = 0.84$. Herriot, Krassin and Agel occupy first, second or third position in both groups, though it was only in the case of Agel that the centering of agreement among the examiners took place upon the correct identification.

The appearance of each of these men as portrayed could be described for one reason or another as striking, in comparison with the others. In the case of each, it is safe to assert, one or more stereotypes, held in common among the judges, were evoked. With each stereotype, moreover, it seems likely that characteristic mental and moral qualities sup-

posed in a similar stereotyped fashion to accompany it were suggested to the judges, and seen inferentially in the corresponding features.

In an effort to check this assumption, a further step in the experiment was taken by securing ratings of the sort obtained by Hollingworth. Students who had not hitherto acted as judges were used as subjects. However, it is probable that interest in the previous experiments had already been aroused outside of the classroom among some of the subjects and that a number had an impression in consequence that there was a catch in the directions given. The same group of grange members as before was employed for comparison, all phases of the experiment being carried through upon a single occasion.

In the case of the students, three groups of judges were used. Each was requested to grade the nine portraits, first according to intelligence, second, according to craftiness. The latter was defined as that characteristic, the possession of which would lead to the taking of an unfair advantage in a business negotiation. The first group of judges, 47 in number, were given no statement concerning the identity of the men portrayed. The second group, 31 in number, were misled by a set of false identifications, conforming so far as possible to the major erroneous identification in the earlier part of the experiment; that is, with an incorrect stereotype. These false identifications were as follows: Herriot as Bolshevik, Duncan as European Premier, Krassin as United States Senator, McIntosh as manufacturer, Glynn as financier, Agel as manufacturer, Schwab as editor-politician, Heinz as labor leader and Pepper as bootlegger. The third group 39 in number, were shown the portraits accompanied by the real identities.

In the case of the grange members, the group was first asked to grade the nine portraits according to intelligence, without any identifications being given or suggested. After a lapse of time during which identifications were attempted by the members themselves they were asked to fold their papers in such a way that the first series of grades would be concealed. The correct list of identifications was then placed beside the portraits and they were asked once more to re-grade the portraits in intelligence without reference to their earlier gradings. The circumstances and the time allotted did not permit of gradings upon craftiness, or of gradings upon an erroneous set of identifications. Eighteen papers on which the grading and regrading were both carried through were received.

The changes in percentage ratings on intelligence when the true identities were disclosed, as compared with those made without statement or suggestion concerning identity, are as follows:

In Table 4 (omitted) these percentage ratings only are presented, both for the students and for the grange members in the case of intelligence, and for the students alone in the case of craftiness. It should be noted particularly that *three groups of individuals* are referred to in the case of student rating, while the grange ratings are made in both cases by the *same* individuals. However, the variable conditions indicated by the column headings "no statement" and "true identity" are as near as possible alike in both cases.

Table 4 (omitted) and the changes in rating under variable conditions indicated therein seem to indicate that ratings on intelligence and craftiness from photographs are influenced by the assumed or known identity or social type of the individual portrayed, that is, by the stereotype of such a person in the mind of the judge. Disclosure of the true identities of the nine men portrayed led to changes of rating in the same directions among both students and grange members, except in the case of Duncan, labor leader, and Glynn, ex-Governor. It seems clear that among these nine individuals those whose positions or names in the business or professional world carry prestige, particularly McIntosh, Schwab and Pepper, tend to improve their ratings in intelligence and (except in the case of McIntosh) to decrease them in craftiness as their identities become known. The loss of Heinz in intelligence rating is only an apparent exception to this, for the mistaken identifications in this case were very largely for positions in the series which carry prestige. That is, no added impression of high social position was given by a disclosure of his identity. On the other hand, the declines in intelligence rating for the bootlegger and the Bolshevik are striking, the former most noticeable among the students and the latter among the grange members.

Comparisons running counter to *a priori* anticipation include that for Krassin, who among the students rates but slightly higher in craftiness when known as a Bolshevik than when falsely represented to be a United States Senator. Nor do the data always appear consistent, as when the students rate Duncan higher in craftiness when alleged to be the Premier, while Herriot rates lower in the same characteristic when actually identified as the real holder of that position. But other variable factors of explanation may enter here; moreover it must be remembered that the numbers of judges are small.

Some of the more general conclusions suggested by the preceding data may be summarized:

1. The existence of common stereotypes concerning the appearance

of various classes of persons (senators, bootleggers, etc.) is clearly indicated. These led to numerous errors of judgment.

2. The stereotypes found among students and grange members were similar, but there appeared to be a somewhat greater uniformity (concentration of judgment on the basis of a stereotype) among the latter.

3. Estimates of intelligence and craftiness, presumably based upon the features portrayed, are in reality influenced by the supposed identity of the portrait, i. e., by the stereotype of the supposed occupational or social status held in the mind of the examiner.

The implications suggested are both theoretical and practical. The data serve to emphasize the inescapable bias of preconception to which everyone is subject. Stereotypes afford a necessary economy of effort in the process of cataloging our environment. We take note of an actual or alleged association, which may be wholly fortuitous, among the attributes of an individual. From this we generalize and assume a constancy of the association. The appearance of another individual presenting a few of the attributes so associated leads us to believe that we recognize in him, the other attributes as well.

The process of filling out our actual sense perceptions in this manner takes place in our face-to-face estimates of other people, no less than in the case of estimates made indirectly from photographs.

When individuals are in face-to-face contact there is usually an opportunity for the more erroneous stereotypes possessed by either concerning the other to be corrected in the process of becoming acquainted. First impressions are modified by conversation and other expressions of personality. When personality is judged by photographs, or by first uncorrected impressions of appearance, on the other hand, it is inevitable that striking errors will be made. It seems evident that a method of arriving at judgments concerning the character of fellow men or women, sufficiently realistic to serve as a basis for an employment policy, for example, cannot lean heavily upon photographs. The discovery and complete elimination of stereotypes is not wholly possible, but its approximation can probably be attained only as the result of face-to-face interstimulation and response.

116. The Power of Stereotyped Words ¹

The most effective bulwark of government is the word. Put into slogans, catchwords, shibboleths or "stereotypes," it is worth more than

¹ Reprinted by permission from A. Lipsky, *Man the Puppet*. pp. 33-34; 52-53. New York. Frank-Maurice, Inc., 1925.

legions. Who can calculate in military units the defensive value to America of phrases like "the Constitution"? It was said by an ancient Greek, that "Democracy is a state in which everything, even the laws, depend upon the multitude set up as a tyrant and governed by a few declamatory speakers." Plato noted the fact that oratory is the art of ruling the minds of men. "No British man can attain to be a statesman or chief of workers till he has proved himself a chief of talkers," said Carlyle; and Emerson: "it is eminently the art which flourishes only in free countries." The instruments on which orators play are democratic assemblies.

The value of print to the art of government is no new discovery. Julius Cæsar grasped its importance when he had a law passed ordering certain magistrates to post the news of the day on whitewashed walls in different parts of the city, so that even the poorest Roman, who could not subscribe to the hand-copied booklets that served as newspapers, might inform himself gratis on current events. Was it likely that the magistrates whose duty it was to post the news would allow anything that was damaging to the sponsor of the law to appear?

"I am by calling a dealer in words," said Rudyard Kipling in a speech before the Royal College of Surgeons, "and words are, of course, the most powerful drug used by mankind. Not only do words infect, egotize, narcotize, and paralyze, but they enter into and color the minutest cells of the brain very much as madder mixed with a stag's food at the zoo colors the growth of the animal's antlers."

Joseph Conrad, like Kipling, felt the omnipotence of words:

He who wants to persuade should put his trust not in the right argument, but in the right word. The power of sound has always been greater than the power of sense.

Nothing humanly great—great I mean, as affecting a whole mass of lives—has ever come from reflection. On the other hand, you cannot fail to see the power of mere words: such as Glory, for instance, or Duty. Shouted with perseverance, with ardor, with conviction, these two have set whole nations in motion, and upheaved the dry, hard ground on which rests our whole social fabric. Give me the right word and the right accent, and I will move the world.

The name is everything. Concepts are fixed by names. A thing is what it is conceived to be. A name classifies a person, an object or a thought, and it becomes difficult to think of him or it except as a member of the designated class. In order to fix an object in a class it is necessary only to name some prominent trait which is recognized as characteristic of

the class. Imagination completes the picture. A good caricature often conveys a sharper impression of a man's character than a photograph. The Father of his Country, Old Hickory, Stonewall Jackson will remain forever animated virtues. You mark as permanent objects of affection "Teddy Roosevelt," "Uncle Joe Cannon," "Big Bill Edwards." A man speaks with a foreign accent and whatever else he may be as an individual, he is first of all a foreigner.

(Consult Section 174.)

117. Slogans and Catchwords in Social Control¹

1. Among the countless devices employed by those who aspire to master the human herd, one finds "watchwords," "catchwords," "mottoes," "shibboleths," and "slogans."

2. However different their origin, the devices enumerated above have evolved to practically the same point. They were and are instruments of the agitator and the conscriptor. And they are piercing and ruthless instruments. If any differences remain they may be found in this, that watchwords and shibboleths serve to cut sharply into the miscellaneous moods and interests of the common life and secure attention. The mottoes, catchwords, and slogans indicate some desirable objective and secure active participation in its attainment. After one is *in* and approved by means of the former, one must follow the slogan and "put it across."

By way of definition, therefore, it may be said that a slogan is any brief, popularly reiterated challenge to immediate participation in competitive or conflicting interactions. It is not found in the field of scientific investigation for there is no desire to gain adherents. In this area, the truth is wanted, not numbers.

3. This last point introduces the question of those areas within the larger field of competition and conflict where the slogan operates with unmeasured virility. Further analysis reveals its employment in the propagandist and aggressive departments of war, business, politics, religion, and education. Individuals and families set up standards of this sort to which they make efforts, more or less heroic, to adhere.

Originating in the brazen threat of war, the slogan has not ceased to be an effectual war-instrument. It is still impossible to war successfully without it. A returned soldier wrote me last summer that the outstanding, ever-reiterated, clarion challenge to American soldiers—the

¹ Reprinted by permission from F. E. Lumley "Slogans as a Means of Social Control" in *Pub. Am. Sociol. Society* 1921: XVI: pp. 121; 123-25; 125-26; 127; 127-31; 132-33; 134.

slogan that helped the soldiers to associate readily and agreeably with all sorts and conditions of men, endure and even enjoy the otherwise deadening routine of military drill, master those weakening waves of homesickness that attacked their muscles at the most inopportune times, become knit up into an invincible and terrific engine of destruction, recover almost miraculously from serious wounds and illnesses, and to finally "put it across" while they were "over there"—that slogan was "Get Germany." That was the central theme to which studying, traveling, drilling, charging, and all other military operations were but minor variations. And "Get Germany" brought forth its brood of subsidiary slogans such as, "Put it across," "Over the top," "They shall not pass," and others.

Not less spectacular and powerful was the influence of this device upon the populace at home. The thinking and unthinking alike were gathered into a tidal wave to "make the world safe for democracy." The political, social, and religious idealists were captured by the term "democracy." The dull and meticulous were awakened and set at work by the term "safe." That famous sloganizer, Benjamin Franklin, was unceremoniously resurrected and riveted to the game of selling War Saving Stamps. His manly voice, quit of its sepulchral accents, sounded forth, vigorous and clear, in the mottoes, "Thrift is Power" and "Save and Succeed." These words gathered in the close-fisted.

We are all familiar with the use of slogans in political campaigns. Every election brings out a new set, some of them local and some national in popularity. Notable examples are, "Less government in business; more business in government," "Remember the Maine," "The full dinner pail," "No taxation without representation," and countless others, some of which I will mention in an examination of the effective features of the slogan.

In business the vigorous intention everywhere is to overwhelm the buying public and gain support. The bombardment is spectacular, voluminous, continuous, and relentless. *Printer's Ink* recently compiled something over three hundred and fifty slogans that are nationally known. Those of merely local circulation must number up in the thousands. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that the above-mentioned periodical states that: "The slogan was coined as a means of stressing trade-mark significance in the advertising appeal." This may be true as an account of the introduction of this device into selling campaigns, but the slogan was coined, that is to say, was originated, in a very different manner, as I have shown.

The athletic fans are well acquainted with the power of this instru-

ment. It has often made a winning team. Large-scale and small-scale religious enterprise would be seriously crippled without it. And America has throbbed more to this type of appeal, perhaps, than other nations because of the numerous sects and their former bitternesses. For example, one denomination uses "Our Plea" with much unction. It also proposes to "Speak where the Scriptures speak, and remain silent where the Scriptures remain silent,"—an undertaking of such considerable proportions that, of course, it has not lived up to it. "The Evangelization of the world in this generation" becomes the zealous cry of the hosts of young people who gathered in Toronto twenty years ago. "Men and Millions" was the rallying call of a denominational campaign several years ago—but the millions smothered the men.

The history of education is liberally besprinkled with slogans betokening the influence of the propagandists. Few of us are unacquainted with "Education according to Nature," "Social efficiency," and "The project method."

The numerous campaign drives for money to support various worthy enterprises have flung showers of watchwords about our ears and before our eyes. The Red Cross challenges respect and support by declaring itself "The Greatest Mother in the World." The Y. M. C. A. has insisted and demanded that "The Y stands for you; You stand for the Y."

And every party revolt within any larger whole has been unified and spurred on by some unforgettable slogan. The restless poor foregather to the strain of "Unreasonable profits," "A fair day's wage," "The emancipation of labor," while the contented rich patriotically cry back, "America for the Americans," "Law and Order," and others.

4. The features which make the slogan so effective are too numerous even to mention, let alone delineate, in this paper.

The qualities now to be enumerated are not found in every slogan, to be sure, but most of them are strengthened by several.

a) A frequent characteristic is rhythm. The words "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" make pleasant music in the ears of multitudes. A large number of phrases and sentences are metrical in form and can be scanned. Examples are, "Proven by the test of time," "Quickest way to duplicate," "The interest of one is the interest of all," "Woven where the wool is grown," "Handle it mechanically." Henry van Dyke is reported to have said that the phrase, "The skin you love to touch," is highly poetical. The words "Americanism," "Democracy," and many others, are repeated as much for their euphoniousness as for anything else. Certainly clear ideas about their essential meanings do not warrant

such frequent employment. The masses are always ready for a war dance if some clique or leader will only suggest the measure and beat time.

b) The alliterative quality is very often found. We have "Foods of the finest flavor" and we have also "From contented cows." We have the "Eight with eighty less parts," "Land to the landless," "Politics for the people," "Men and Millions," "Mine to the miner," and many others.

c) The appeal is much strengthened by the combination of alliteration and antithesis. "The golden rule against the rule of gold" has played its part as has "Sink or swim." During the silver issue some opponents of the proposition were captivated by the proposition, "The white man with the yellow metal is beaten by the yellow man with the white metal." In 1844 the watchword, "Fifty-four forty or fight" almost provoked war. No such excitement could have been produced by shouting "twenty-one sixteen or fight."

d) Besides the recurrence of letters there is the ringing repetition of sounds. "An apple a day keeps the doctor away," "Cheaper to 'dye' than to buy," "A Kalamazoo—direct to you," "The handy candy," "Tippecanoe and Tyler too," are familiar illustrations of this feature.

e) Le Bon says:

Affirmation pure and simple, kept free of all reasoning and proof, is one of the surest means of making any idea enter the minds of crowds. The conciser an affirmation is, the more destitute of every appearance of proof and demonstration, the more weight it carries. The religious books and legal codes of all ages have always resorted to simple affirmation. Statesmen called upon to defend a political issue, and commercial men pushing the sale of their products by means of advertising, are acquainted with the value of affirmation.

We have already noted examples of affirmation combined with repetition of letters and sounds. Le Bon further says:

Affirmation, however, has no real influence unless it is constantly repeated, and so far as possible in the same terms. It was Napoleon, I believe, who said that there is only one figure in rhetoric of serious importance, namely, repetition.

So we are faced at every angle with unabashed pronouncements such as, "If it isn't an Eastman, it isn't a kodak," "The Standard of the world," "The utmost in clothespins," and "Eventually—why not now?"

In such cases the facts are all in, the argument is done, it is just a question of time until you are led away to be milked by these enterprising firms. The doctrine of predestination has hardly more finality.

And when the auditory appeal is enforced by the visual on every hand and everyday, for weeks and months and years, there are very few minds strong enough not to be affected.

f) Brevity has its part in making the slogan effective. After some examination and comparison it was found that slogans average about four words. Thus they are like coins, condensed and economical. But they are different in that they always pass above their value. This brevity is suggestive with reference to the receptiveness and retentiveness of the popular mind.

g) The appeal to curiosity is not infrequent. For example: "Have you tried one lately?" and "There's a reason." Or again: "Ask Dad—he knows," and "Ask the man who owns one." In these also one may note a quiet confidence that any examination undertaken will reveal only the merits of the case. There is also a subtle suggestion of flattery, for the final decision seems to rest with the investigator.

h) Sloganizers are fond of punning. This equivocal play on words is found particularly in advertising. Examples are: "Hasn't *scratched* yet," "A *case* of good judgment," "Time to *re-tire*," "The *makings* of a nation," "When it rains—*It* pours," "All they're *cracked* up to be," "Have you a little *fairy* in your home?"

i) Of course the sentiment of patriotism is not neglected. There are those saviors of our country who propose "The national drink," "The national joy smoke," and offer themselves as "Home-builders to the nation." Politicians sometimes assure us that "Trade follows the Flag." Occasionally this feature takes the form of unrelieved boasting, but this increases the attraction for certain people.

j) The propagandists, out of the extremely high purposes by which they are moved, do not hesitate to enter, all unbidden, the inner sanctuary of one's private life. Their breezy assurances of disinterestedness and commanding joviality are quite irresistible. They greet total strangers with a cheerful "Good Morning" and then, having observed some suspicious stains on your chin, casually inquire if you "have used our soap yet." This is an illustration of the fact that slogans are no respecters of those protecting formalities that have been preserved through the centuries. Personal privacy and isolation are wiped away by slogans. There are no longer any areas inaccessible to this penetrating device.

k) Certain slogans appear to be meaty and unavoidable conclusions of profound thought. To illustrate, we might mention, "Safety first,"

"He kept us out of war," "Make the world safe for democracy," "Open covenants openly arrived at," "The dictates of right reason," "Too proud to fight," and many others. These phrases have every appearance of representing solid realities. As phrases they are inimitable. As capsular philosophies they are unsurpassed. But who can say what they mean? The average man certainly cannot say what they involve and where they lead. Therefore they are a trap for the unwary.

l) An authoritative note is sounded by some slogans in addition to the affirmation already pointed out. Many of them are hortatory in character. Some power, it seems, has the right to tell us to do this and that without end. "Do your bit," "Go to church Sunday," "Restore the land to the landless," "Vote for Mr. So-and-so." These commands gain ascendancy by reason of the popular tendency to mythologize. They create a psychic strain and this allows the old habits of servility to reassert themselves.

m) Many slogans are strictly class-appeals. Emotions are aroused over old antagonisms. "The demand for labor," "Down with the capitalists," "Just distribution," "Change the system," "Anarchists," "Bolsheviks," and the like thrust into the center of consciousness pet ideas and feelings of disgust or loathing. They are calculated to hold up impossible dream-objectives or awaken a basic human fear.

n) The apparent obviousness of meaning is an effective feature. But it is full of snares. What could be more simple and attainable than to be "True to the faith"? In America who could raise any objections against "Make the world safe for democracy"? Anybody ought to favor "America for the Americans" or leave the country. So would the average man reason. But thoughtful people know that these terms have meanings which are too deep for utterance. When widely used, therefore, the appeal is to popular credulity.

o) Obscurity of origin, combined with euphoniousness, timeliness, and other features, adds greatly to the strength of the slogan. It is then that the popular imagination tends to invest them with extraordinary powers. On the other hand, if the originator is known and happens to be in a position of prominence, his sayings are taken at more than face value.

Many other features of this device might be indicated but these will serve our purpose here. By way of summary Professor Sumner says of watchwords and other verbal coinage:

They are familiar, unquestioned and popular, and they are always current above their value. They always reveal the invincible tendency of the masses

to mythologize. They are personified and superhuman energy is attributed to them. "Democracy" is not treated as a parallel word to aristocracy, theocracy, autocracy, etc., but as a Power from some outside origin, which brings into human affairs an inspiration and energy of its own. The "People" is not the population but a creation of mythology, to which inherent faculties and capacities are ascribed beyond what can be verified within experience. . . . In all these cases there is a tyranny in the term.

5. Coming now to the last consideration, namely, some evils of the indiscriminate use of the slogan, it may be noted, first of all, that hosts of people allow themselves to be ruled by unquestionable and undiscoverable authorities which "to doubt would be disloyalty; to question would be sin." The coiners of slogans may work in the dark without fear of exposure and work quite ruthlessly. This may be necessary but it is a costly phase of our democratic progress.

Possibly the most unfortunate feature of the slogan is its ambiguity. This point has already been noted but it needs emphasis. A little reflection, instead of opening wide the highway of thought, always plunges one into the morass of tangled and contradictory meanings. Take the phrase "Back to normalcy." It sounds good. It appears to represent something desirable. But what does it mean? Was the president philosophizing when he put this verbal token into circulation, or was he playing to the crowd? "Back" to something always sounds good to the routineer; it sounded good to the war-weary. "Normalcy" suggested—well, what it suggested. Anything. Everything. Nothing. The phrase caught the attention of the people and lined them up. But where did it take them?

What does it mean to be "True to the Faith"? This is a phrase eloquent of vagueness. It is a saint-seducing phrase. It has awakened more animosities and precipitated more strife than it has ever allayed. Each individual is more or less true to some faith. But it is rarely expressible in satisfactory terms.

The term "democracy" is almost as inclusive as the sky in its ability to shelter diverse beliefs and opinions. Everybody vocalizes energetically in favor of "Americanism" but nobody can give a consistent interpretation of it. Thus the method of control by slogans is dubious because it depends upon over-simplification.

This type of control is objectionable because it perpetuates undeliberative responses. The people are rallied suddenly and hurriedly. The coiners of slogans and the users of them do not present challenges to thought but to action. They desire numbers not critics. They are adherents to

the "do-something" philosophy. And so the slogan might be described as an effective device for the prevention of thought.

You cannot argue with disease germs. You cannot argue with slogans. Both are in the system and rooted before one knows it. The emotional life of man assumes and supports the absoluteness of its objects. Since slogans touch the emotional life mainly, they tend to become absolute. Only reflective thought qualifies and limits and so escapes the tyrant. Since habit is largely the arbiter of our daily choices, those who help to make our habits exercise control over us. Sloganizers and their instruments accomplish this end with multitudes. They secure actions first and then possibly some thought. And they secure actions favorable to others than the actors, quite largely.

(Consult Section 174.)

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises

1. Describe briefly the most important items in the psycho-social environment in which you live.
2. How different is this environment of yours from that of your grandparents?
3. Distinguish between opinion and attitude.
4. Distinguish between concept (idea) and attitude.
5. Why are we generally unaware of our psycho-social environment?
6. Criticize, pro and con, Faris' definition of personality in terms of attitudes.
7. Make a list of current stereotypes. Indicate which have visual and which verbal associations. (There may be some which have both or even possess auditory qualities.)
8. What stereotypes of the Southern white man in reference to the negro prevent his dealing objectively with the negro problem?
9. What stereotypes of the negro hinder an objective treatment of the negro-white relationships: a) in the South; b) in the North?
10. What stereotypes of the British and the Americans interfere with an objective handling of the Chinese problem (1927)?
11. Show how the stereotypes of the Americans concerning France have changed from 1914-18 to 1927. Account for the change.
12. What was the original meaning of the word "shibboleth"? How does the history of the word give a clue to its present usage?
13. What is the social significance of slogans, catchwords and other verbalisms?
14. How do you account for the fact that such words as justice, liberty, freedom, equality, Christianity, white race, arouse such intense emotions and feelings?

B. Topics for Class Reports

1. Make a study of current cartoons as illustrations of stereotypes.
2. Review Burrow's other papers cited in bibliography as further illustrations of the place of unconscious formulations underlying social life.
3. Report on Faris' paper on the subjective aspects of culture. (Cf. bibliography.)

C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers

1. The Contributions of Levy-Bruhl and Durkheim to the Study of Mental Patterns of Culture.
2. The Place of the Unconscious in Mental Patterns of Culture.

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CHAPTER XVII

MYTHS AND LEGENDS AS PART OF SUBJECTIVE ENVIRONMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Not only are stereotypes and slogans carried in the mental patterns and come thus to affect actions, but there are whole sections of our mental content which are made up of stories, narratives, interpretations, and ideals which play important rôles in the control of social judgments and social activities. In truth, these more systematic legends and myths themselves contain much stereotyped content.

Thus, for example, M. Clemenceau's images and ideas of Germany in 1918 were tied up thoroughly with legends about the Franco-Prussian War upon which were superimposed more recent deposits of legends from the World War. And coursing through this more or less systematic picture were stereotypes such as were described in the previous chapter.

The making of myths and legends is a natural phenomenon of the mind. This is described in detail by van Langenhove. Not only are there illusions of memory in the repeated recall of events, not only is there elaboration and dramatization of these events, not only is there transposition of time and place and actual accretion to the legend or story itself,—but there is, furthermore, in the course of this process, which arises in intercommunication, the acceptance of this much repeated story as objective fact. Moreover, a delusion of any particular individual which may arise in a crisis such as a war, a famine, a flood, or other critical situation may become projected upon other persons in the telling and become part of the whole mental pattern of the group. As Campbell puts it:

Under special strain the orthodox may lapse from conventional belief into individual delusion, and the delusion of one person may in any group or

period become a socially acceptable belief. Delusion is no strange and mysterious element, it is no foreign parasite battenning on the mind, it is not the meaningless expression of disturbed physiological processes; delusion is an attempt of the personality to deal with special difficulties, in which attempt the mind not infrequently tends to revert to primitive modes of adaptation, which are at variance with the actual level of thought of the period and group in which the individual finds himself; it is an attempt which has gone wrong insofar as it estranges the individual from his social group. Delusion, like fever, is to be looked on as part of nature's attempt at cure, an endeavor to neutralize some disturbing factor, to compensate for some handicap, to reconstruct a working contact with the group which will still satisfy special needs.¹

Thus it was that during the World War a whole congeries of legends and myths we built up from delusion and illusion which were fastened upon the various national groups and will remain for generations a part of the mental patterns of these groups unless disturbed by other patterns more objective.² While the psychiatrist may term these illusions and delusions reversions to primitive modes of thought, it is becoming more and more evident that the thought of the masses, corresponding as it does to the mental patterns of culture, is essentially primitive. And primitivity in thought is marked by emotional interpretations and by fictitious associations such as we have in magic. It is marked by illusions of memory, by elaboration, distortion and extension of items in experience which is much akin, as Freud has shown, to the dream consciousness. In short, primitive thinking is personal, subjective, and warm with emotion and feeling. It is, in fact, autistic in nature. It has little of the objectivity of scientific thought. It is marked rather by what Stransky calls the "logic of feeling" than by cool, deliberate, and impersonal conceptions. And the mental patterns of stereotypes, myths, and legends are simply the objectified, projected standardizations, the socially ac-

¹ Quoted by permission from C. M. Campbell, *Delusion & Belief*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1926, pp. 8-9.

² This is the reason why any objective discussion of the origins of the World War receives such scanty attention from the masses of people. These new objective facts about the origins of the War disturb the neatly balanced and satisfying legends and myths which were current during the war and which still serve as convenient rationalizations. Cf: H. E. Barnes, *The Genesis of the World War*, N. Y. 1925, for an able treatment of this problem and for an extensive bibliography. Also H. D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, New York, 1927.

cepted precipitates of this type of thinking. All kinds of historical events, ideals, utopias, and millenniums partake of this character. Napoleon and Machiavelli, for example, for H. G. Wells, with his Fabian coloring, are two very different characters than they are for a chauvinistic Frenchman, on the one hand, or for a believer in *Real-Politik* on the other.

In the first selection from Sorel we have an incisive statement of the importance of the myth in social dogmas of various sorts. In the second paper we have selections from van Langenhove's analysis of the legends built up in Germany about the *franc-tireur* (guerrilla) warfare in Belgium and the accompanying perfidy of the Belgians toward the invaders. He shows how the legend runs its course from mouth-to-mouth, face-to-face, narration to inclusion in newspaper reports, to becoming the subject of literary productions. It gets into formal military accounts, and finally into official histories of the war.

The selection from Addams furnishes a modern instance of the place of myth-making in social control. While the groups involved are immigrant folk, other superstitions among our own rural and even urban population are still current. Freedom from legend, myth, and stereotype is rare and depends on level of culture not on race, nationality, or geography.

The place of historical legends in our own national life is illustrated by Hart's paper. Similar materials on other national heroes such as John Brown and Walter Hines Page may be consulted through the bibliography. As a part of the culture of the Christian era, there is no more constant myth than in the recurrent millennial hope which has sprung up again and again in the course of western history. This idealism has served a valid social purpose in periods of crisis. Such hopes stabilize people when under great strain and provide a core for the integration of individual and social life when all ordinary mundane arrangements have failed.

We should not imagine from our analysis that social concepts could be very different. Rather we are exposing more or less common patterns of culture, at least as they have been prominent in our Western world. As one examines the nature of social life and its culture patterns, one is impressed with the fact that emotions and feelings play a very large part in their formulation and continuance.

The basic values carry emotional freight. These values and ideas are made over into patterns congenial to the survival of our group. The slogans, the mores, the standards, the legends, all revolve around the group as the most significant, the most superior, the most important in the universe. Man's personal egotism has its reflection in the larger egotism of the in-group everywhere. And the mental patterns which we have examined in the present and the previous chapter merely furnish another clue to the understanding of this in-group feature of life and its reference to the personality.

II. MATERIALS

118. Myth and Social Imagination ¹

There is no process by which the future can be predicted scientifically, nor even one which enables us to discuss whether one hypothesis about it is better than another; it has been proved by too many memorable examples that the greatest men have committed prodigious errors in thus desiring to make predictions about even the least distant future.

And yet without leaving the present, without reasoning about this future, which seems for ever condemned to escape our reason, we should be unable to act at all. Experience shows that the *framing of a future, in some indeterminate time*, may, when it is done in a certain way, be very effective, and have very few inconveniences; this happens when the anticipations of the future take the form of those myths, which enclose with them all the strongest inclinations of a people, of a party or of a class, inclinations which recur to the mind with the insistence of instincts in all the circumstances of life; and which give an aspect of complete reality to the hopes of immediate action by which, more easily than by any other method, men can reform their desires, passions, and mental activity. We know, moreover, that these social myths in no way prevent a man profiting by the observations which he makes in the course of his life, and form no obstacle to the pursuit of his normal occupations. The truth of this may be shown by numerous examples.

The first Christians expected the return of Christ and the total ruin of the pagan world, with the inauguration of the kingdom of the saints, at the end of the first generation. The catastrophe did not come to pass, but Christian thought profited so greatly from the apocalyptic myth that certain contemporary scholars maintain that the whole preaching of

¹ From *Reflections on Violence* by G. Sorel, pp. 133-36. B. W. Huebsch 1914.

Christ referred solely to this point. The hopes which Luther and Calvin had formed of the religious exaltation of Europe were by no means realized; these fathers of the Reformation very soon seemed men of a past era; for present-day Protestants they belong rather to the Middle Ages than to modern times, and the problems which troubled them most occupy very little place in contemporary Protestantism. Must we for that reason deny the immense result which came from their dreams of Christian renovation? It must be admitted that the real developments of the Revolution did not in any way resemble the enchanting pictures which created the enthusiasm of its first adepts; but without those pictures would the Revolution have been victorious? Many Utopias were mixed up with the Revolutionary myth, because it had been formed by a society passionately fond of imaginative literature, full of confidence in the "science," and very little acquainted with the economic history of the past. These Utopias came to nothing; but it may be asked whether the Revolution was not a much more profound transformation than those dreamed of by the people who in the eighteenth century had invented social Utopias. In our own times Mazzini pursued what the wise-aces of his time called a mad chimera; but it can no longer be denied that, without Mazzini, Italy would never have become a great power, and that he did more for Italian unity than Cavour and all the politicians of his school.

A knowledge of what the myths contain in the way of details which will actually form part of the history of the future is then of small importance; they are not astrological almanacs; it is even possible that nothing which they contain will ever come to pass,—as was the case with the catastrophe expected by the first Christians. In our own daily life, are we not familiar with the fact that what actually happens is very different from our preconceived notion of it? And that does not prevent us from continuing to make resolutions. Psychologists say that there is heterogeneity between the ends in view and the ends actually realized: the slightest experience of life reveals this law to us, which Spencer transferred into nature, to extract therefrom his theory of the multiplication of effects.

The myth must be judged as a means of acting on the present; any attempt to discuss how far it can be taken literally as future history is devoid of sense. *It is the myth in its entirety which is alone important:* its parts are only of interest in so far as they bring out the main idea. No useful purpose is served, therefore, in arguing about the incidents which may occur in the course of a social war, and about the decisive conflicts which may give victory to the proletariat; even supposing the

revolutionaries to have been wholly and entirely deluded in setting up this imaginary picture of the general strike, this picture may yet have been, in the course of the preparation for the Revolution, a great element of strength, if it has embraced all the aspirations of Socialism, and if it has given to the whole body of Revolutionary thought a precision and a rigidity which no other method of thought could have given.

To estimate, then, the significance of the idea of the general strike, all the methods of discussion which are current among politicians, sociologists, or people with pretensions to political science, must be abandoned. Everything which its opponents endeavour to establish may be conceded to them, without reducing in any way the value of the theory which they think they have refuted. The question whether the general strike is a partial reality, or only a product of popular imagination, is of little importance. All that it is necessary to know is, whether the general strike contains everything that the Socialist doctrine expects of the revolutionary proletariat.

Consult Section 158.)

119. How Myths and Legends Arise and Become Mental Patterns ¹

The legend or story is highly important in the spread of beliefs and opinions. Facts became twisted and altered very rapidly in the course of narration and re-narration. Emotional sets (stereotypes) come into play; the stories are dramatized, condensed or elaborated, new material introduced, different emphasis on items placed in the re-told story than was fact in the event, there is distortion of time and place aspects, etc. The legend, therefore, becomes filled with stereotypes of the sort which appeal to the hearers and tellers of the tales and serve as defenses as well as explanations of action and belief. The stories of Belgium atrocities as re-told in Germany are the subject of the present material. The stories told in the Allied countries about German atrocities in Belgium have the same characteristics.

To understand the spread of opinions, of propaganda and the whole problem of opinions in reference to social conduct, it is essential to note the process of the development of these types of tales. The same thing occurs in all kinds of gossip, in the re-making of stories in the newspapers, etc. (K.Y.)

Hardly had the German armies entered Belgium when strange rumors

¹ From *The Growth of a Legend* by F. van Langenhove, pp. 5-6; 39; 67-68; 118; 119-20; 121; 122-23; 203-04; 205; 215-16; 226-27; 228; 237; 252-53; 268; 273-74; 275-76. Courtesy of G. P. Putnam's Sons, Publishers, New York and London, 1916.

began to circulate. They spread from place to place, they were reproduced by the press, and they soon permeated the whole of Germany. It was said that the Belgian people, instigated by the clergy, had intervened perfidiously in the hostilities; had attacked by surprise isolated detachments; had indicated to the enemy the positions occupied by the troops; that women, old men, and even children had been guilty of horrible atrocities upon wounded and defenseless German soldiers, tearing out their eyes and cutting off fingers, nose, or ears; that the priests from their pulpits had exhorted the people to commit these crimes, promising them as a reward the kingdom of heaven, and had even taken the lead in this barbarity.

Public credulity accepted these stories. The highest powers in the State welcomed them without hesitation and endorsed them with their authority.

(Here follow many concrete examples of stories and tales told of atrocities of which only one is included in the present selection.)

A soldier of the Landsturm of Unterleinach writes from Liege to his wife:

I was yesterday at the citadel where are the prisoners. I saw there some great criminals. There were from 10 to 12 priests who have paid fifty francs to whoever would kill a German soldier; they will all be massacred (!). There were also 8 civilians in a cell: one of them cut off the breasts of a Red Cross nurse; another cut off someone's fingers; all the criminals will be put to death(!).

Informations Pax, in consequence of a demand for information, has received the following letter from the government of Liege:

There is not a word of truth in what the Landsturm soldier of Unterleinach says. If his identity was known he would be punished for having, by his thoughtlessness, propagated false and stupid news and have probably troubled not only his comrades but also the inhabitants of his village.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL N. N.
Governor.

Priests armed with machine-guns, posted on the belfries of churches, appear by hundreds in the original tales from Belgium and France. The result is, each time, the execution of the traitor.

Repeatedly already tales of this kind have passed from newspapers into books. (See, for example, Pauls, *Aus ciscerner Zeit*, Elmshorn, 1914; Hans Leitzen, *Der grosse Krieg in Feldpost-Briefen*, Wolfen-

buttel, 1914; *Feldpost-Briefen*, 1914, edited by Herm Sparr, Leipzig, 1915.)

The novels are all engrossed with the theme. Thus Richard Sexau has published in his book *Blut und Eisen* a short story, *Der Zweifler*, wherein he depicts a fight for the possession of a village situated on the French frontier and defended by some enemy troops and some hidden *francs-tireurs*. The adversary finds his chief stronghold in the church of the place, on the belfry of which a machine-gun is in action. The German lieutenant Holk advances to the assault of the tower. "Now he has attained the summit. A devil in a black robe is found there, his eyes fixed on the gun sights, his hand on the instrument of murder: it is the abbot."

The psychological origin of legends has during recent years been the object of numerous researches. One of these researches is the following:

An experiment was made at the Congress of Psychology at Göttingen; it is still more characteristic. Von Gennep tells the story of it in these words:

Not far from the hall in which the Congress was sitting there was a public fête with a masked ball. Suddenly the door of the hall was thrown open and a clown rushed in madly pursued by a negro, revolver in hand. They stopped in the middle of the room fighting; the clown fell, the negro leapt upon him, fired and then both rushed out of the hall. The whole incident hardly lasted twenty seconds. The president asked those present to write immediately a report since there was sure to be a judicial enquiry. Forty reports were sent in. Only one had less than 20% of mistakes in regard to the principal facts; fourteen had 20% to 40% mistakes; twelve from 40% to 50%; thirteen more than 50%. Moreover in twenty-four accounts 10% of the details were pure inventions and this proportion was exceeded in ten accounts and diminished in six. Briefly a quarter of the accounts were false.

It goes without saying that the whole scene had been arranged and even photographed in advance. The ten false reports may then be relegated to the category of tales and legends; twenty-four accounts are half legendary, and six have a value approximately to exact evidence.

Experiments on certainty lead to analogous results. Witnesses were asked to underline the passages in their accounts to which they would be prepared to swear before a tribunal. It was found there were as many mistakes in the underlined passages as elsewhere. The important point to notice in this connection is that the underlined statements were of the same type as legends: they were objects of belief.

To sum up: the ratio of true to false descriptions of an extraordinary event is about $\frac{2}{3}$ or 66%; that is to say that phantasy and error are normal

even among us and that the tendency to error, both individual and collective, operates from the moment of observation.

In short, the important factors which play a part in the origin of legends may be thus summarized:

(1) The emotional condition of the observer; it increases with the observer's excitement at the moment when the fact occurs.

(2) The particular circumstances which accompany the fact.

(3) Its unfamiliar character.

(4) The predispositions of the spectators in regard to the incident or to the people taking part in it. Whatever their desire to be impartial the spectators will incline unconsciously, in a sense favorable or unfavorable according as:

(a) Their attention is directed particularly to one aspect.

(b) They interpret falsely in consequence of characteristics which they have attributed in advance to the authors of the fact.

(5) The time which has elapsed since the observation of the fact; this element becomes appreciable after forty-eight seconds.

From these facts, it is possible to reconstitute, in a particularly concrete fashion, the process of legendary development.

A column of infantry advances into Belgium at the beginning of the war. The men talk among themselves. Their attention is attracted to something by the roadside. Those in front discover the bodies of civilians. Others, not in an equally good position to see what is going on, question those more favourably situated.

"What is the matter?"

"There are some civilians, who have been shot, by the roadside."

"How many?"

"Two, three, a boy, a man in black, a priest."

A new question immediately arises from the desire for an explanation.

"Why have they been shot?"

And the unformulated answer already controls their thoughts. If these people have been executed, it is because they have committed a crime. What crime? There is one eventuality present to all minds, which masks all others, and the menace of which, directed against themselves, affects them intimately.

They have fired on the German troops; they are *francs-tireurs*. This conviction, which is in harmony with all their views, is at once expressed and becomes a certainty, an established fact.

The mind, however, asks for additional details. As for the man in black, it is natural that he should have so expiated his fault; it is the

priests who incite the populace to commit murder, who make fanatics of them. But how about the boy? Has he also taken up arms? Assuredly not of his own free will; someone has driven him to do it; someone has suggested the act to him, has commanded him to do it. Who, if not the priest? It would be easy for him to invoke the authority of religion, to promise a celestial reward for the assassination—acme of perfidy—of a German officer whom he had welcomed under his roof. Thus the history is rounded off. By the successive addition of suppositions, of points of resemblance, of presumptions passed from mouth to mouth, it is crystallized into a single version which satisfies everybody and corresponds to everybody's notion of the truth. One can thus follow its development in the passage through successive stages. Transmitted from rank to rank by way of question and answer it becomes more and more elaborated as it progresses. It is refracted, deformed, modelled, it nourishes itself on the commentaries and explanations which are added at each stage. Its main features, however, are endorsed and rendered more precise, and thus a simple fact observed by the head of a column has attained the standing of a legend by the time it reaches the rearmost ranks.

At the time of the invasion of Belgium, it was the German army which, as we have seen, constituted the chief breeding ground for legendary stories. These were disseminated with great rapidity, among the troops; the *liaison* officers, the dispatch-riders, the food convoys, the victualling posts assured the diffusion of them.

These stories were not delayed in reaching Germany. As in most wars it was the returning soldiery who were responsible for the transmission of them.

From the first day of hostilities in enemy territory the fighting troops were in constant touch with those behind them. Through the frontier towns there was a continual passage of convoys, returning empty, or loaded with prisoners and wounded. These last, together with the escorting soldiers, were immediately surrounded and pressed for news by an eager crowd. It is they who brought the first stories.

Thus, while the convalescents, the first of the wounded, sunned themselves on the public promenade, they were the objects of popular attention and curiosity. The war was still fresh; their arms in slings, their painful progress with the help of sticks, did not fail to stir the emotions of those about them; the blood they had shed gave dignity to them; they were almost the objects of a cult; they symbolized their country. Groups assembled round the seats they had taken. They had to relate their adventures to a public eager for heroic exploits.

But the facts of war are not all of an epic character; many of the

wounded have seen nothing in any way remarkable. Are they going to disappoint their auditors? Centers of attention, raised to a glorious eminence, can they resist the temptation to retain their hold on public interest by enlarging on the perils they have faced and adding to them extraordinary circumstances? Will not their minds be naturally directed to the legendary accounts which they have heard at the front? Egged on by pressing questions will they not be inclined to fall back on these, adapting them to their own cases and attributing to themselves a prominent rôle?

In their oral form, stories of this kind are not definite, their substance is malleable; they can be modified according to the taste of the narrator; they transform themselves; they evolve. To sum up, not only do the soldiers, returned from the field of battle, ensure the transmission of the stories, they also elaborate them.

The military post links the campaigning army directly with Germany. The soldiers write home, and in their letters they tell of their adventures, which people are eager to hear, and naturally they include the rumors current among the troops.

Submitted to the test of the German military inquiry these stories are shown to be without foundation. Received from the front and narrated by a soldier who professes to have been an eyewitness, they are nevertheless clothed in the public view with special authority. They impose on public credulity, and are soon spread from place to place. The newspapers have opened their columns with eagerness to letters from the front communicated by their readers.

Welcomed without control by the press the stories recounted in letters from the front appear, however, in the eyes of the readers of a paper clothed with a new authority—that which attaches to printed matter. They lose in the columns of a paper their individual and particular character. Those who send them have, usually effaced all personal allusions. The statements thus obtain a substance and an objectivity of which they would otherwise be devoid. Mixed with authentic news they are accepted by the public without mistrust. Is not their appearance in the paper a guarantee of accuracy?

Besides imposing itself on public credulity the printed story fixes itself in the mind. It takes a lasting form. It has entered permanently into consciousness and, more, it has become a source of reference.

All these pseudo-historical publications are, however, only one aspect of the abundant literary production of the "Great War."

All the varieties of popular literature, the romances of cloak and sword, the stories of adventure, the collections of news and anecdotes,

the theater itself are in turn devoted to military events. The great public loves lively activity, extraordinary situations, and sensational circumstances calculated to strike the imagination and cause a shiver of horror.

The legendary developments to which the German invasion of Belgium gave birth furnished in this respect matter particularly fruitful. They are full of surprises, ambushes, treacherous attacks, treasons, mutilations, unheard-of atrocities, Machiavellian enterprises. They correspond, for war-time, to the stories of apaches which in peace-time are in such great demand among the lower classes.

So one finds in this literature of the lower classes the principal legendary episodes of which we have studied the origin and followed the development; accommodated to a fiction, woven into a web of intrigue they have undergone new transformations; they have lost every indication of their source; they are transposed in the new circumstances imagined for them; they have usually been dissociated from the circumstances which individualize them and fix their time and place. The thematic motives from which they spring nevertheless remain clearly recognizable.

The highest ranks in the Empire have given an official sanction to the stories of the popular fury in Belgium. Without submitting them to any control; without subjecting them to any criticism, although their sources were so suspicious; without taking any of the precautions which the effervescence of spirits, the excitation of passions, the natural proliferation of legends in war-time demand, the authorities have accepted in general terms and under their popular forms the principal thematic motives. An august word even affirms, henceforth, that particular one of them of which the legendary character was least doubtful. The Emperor has attested before the face of the whole world the "cruelties perpetrated in this guerilla warfare by women, children, and priests, even upon the wounded."

The legendary stories have thus attained the last stage of their elaboration and completed their diffusion. They have penetrated not only into the purlieus of the cities but into distant countries; into centers of education as among the popular classes.

Wounded convalescents and soldiers on leave at home for a time have told them to the city man and to the peasant. Both have found them in letters from the front; both have read them in journals and books, both have listened to the warnings of the Government and to the Imperial word. The school-teacher has mixed these episodes with his teaching; he has nourished with them infantile imaginations. Scholars have read the text of them in their class books; they have told them at home in the family circle, giving them the authority attached to the master's word.

Everywhere these accounts have been the subject of ardent commentaries; in the village, in the councils held upon doorsteps, and in the bar-rooms of inns; in the big cafés, the trams, and the public promenades of towns. Everywhere they have become an ordinary topic of conversation, everywhere they have met with ready credence.

The legendary stories are gradually fixed in the popular mind which has progressively assimilated them. By imperceptible gradations they have become incorporated in the categories of its logic; they appear to it as a reality marked with the seal of evidence, as a phenomenon capable of sensory appreciation and corresponding to the natural order of things.

120. The Devil Baby: An Instance of Myth-Making in Relation to Gossip and Social Control¹

There is a theory that woman first evolved and used the fairy story, that combination of wisdom and romance, in an effort to tame her mate and to make him a better father to her children. The stories finally became a rude creed, or rather rule of conduct, which softened the treatment men accorded to women. In support of this theory it is pointed out that in the typical fairy story the heroine is often disguised under a repulsive and ugly mask and the man is destroyed by seductive beauties. The old woman, the mother-in-law to the maker of the tale—let us observe in passing—is too often a wicked witch who gives men bad advice, and, above all, the stepmother is the incarnation of all wickedness.

These first pitiful efforts of women became so widespread and so powerful that we have not yet escaped their influence. We had a remarkable experience at Hull House this year of the persistence of one of these tales which has doubtless had its taming effects through the centuries upon recalcitrant husbands and fathers. It burst upon us one day in the persons of three Italian women who, with an excited rush into Hull House, demanded to see the devil-baby. No amount of denial convinced them that it was not there, for they knew exactly what it was like, with its cloven hoofs, its pointed ears, and its diminutive tail. It had been able to speak as soon as it was born and was most shockingly profane. For six weeks the messages, the streams of visitors from every part of the city and suburbs to this mythical baby, poured in all day long and so far into the night that the regular activities were almost swamped. The Italian version, with a hundred variations, dealt with a pious Italian

¹ Reprinted by permission from J. Addams "A Modern Devil Baby" *Am. J. Soc.* 1914: XX: pp. 117-118. Copyright by the University of Chicago. Cf. *The Long Road of Woman's Memory* Copyright 1916 by the Macmillan Company.

girl married to an atheist who vehemently tore a holy picture from the bedroom wall, saying that he would quite as soon have a devil in the house as that, whereupon the devil incarnated himself in the child. As soon as the devil-baby was born, it ran about the table shaking its finger in deep reproach at its father, who finally caught it and in fear and trembling brought it to Hull House. When the residents there, in spite of the baby's shocking appearance, in order to save its soul took him to the church for baptism, they found the shawl was empty, and the devil-baby, fleeing from the holy water, ran lightly over the backs of the pews.

The Jewish version, again with variations, was to the effect that the father of six daughters said before the birth of the seventh child that he would rather have a devil than another girl, whereupon the devil-baby promptly appeared. The story was not only used to tame restless husbands, but mothers threatened their daughters that if they went to dance halls or out to walk with strange young men they would be eternally disgraced by devil-babies. Simple, round-eyed girls came to Hull House to see if this were true, many of them quite innocent of the implications in the warning. Save for a red automobile which occasionally figured in the story, and a stray cigar, the tale was as medieval and unrelieved as if it had been fashioned a thousand years ago in response to the imperative need of anxious wives and mothers. It had fastened itself to a poor little deformed creature, born in an obscure street, destined in his one breath of life to demonstrate the power of an old wives' tale among thousands of people in modern society who are living in a corner of their own, their vision fixed, their intelligence held by some iron chain of silent habit. Or did the incident rather make clear that the love of the marvelous will not die, and that romance springs unexpectedly from the most uncongenial soil?

121. Historical Legends and National Hero-Worship¹

To the student of lies the interesting question about John Smith is whether his life was or was not saved by Pocahontas. Upon that point he had the best of opportunities to tell a thrilling tale in his book *The True Relation*, written in Virginia and published in England in 1608. Among his thrilling experiences he there describes a little excursion to the Chickahominy, where he falls in with hostile Indians, becomes the target for twenty or thirty arrows, and is captured by two hundred men only because he gets mired in a swamp. Being brought before their Indian

¹ Reprinted by permission from A. B. Hart "American Historical Liars" *Harpers's* 1915: CXXXI: pp. 727-28; 732-33; 733-34.

king, although Smith knows not a word of his language, he says, "I presented him with a compasse diall, describing by my best meanes the use thereof, whereat he so amazedly admired, as he suffered me to proceed in a discourse of the roundness of the earth, the course of the sunne, moone, starres and plannets." Eventually he is brought before "their emperour," the great Opechan Conough, commonly called Powhatan. Efforts are made to kill him by Indians whose relatives he has slain, but the guards save him. In due course of time, after "describing to him the territories of Europe which was subject to our great King whose subject I was, the innumerable multitude of his ships, I have him to understand the noyes of Trumpets and terrible manner of fighting." Smith is then sent home with four men, one carrying his "Gonne and Knapsacke," while the other two were "loded with bread."

Elsewhere in the book he mentions the Princess Pocahontas, daughter of Powhatan. This lady was only a girl—perhaps twelve years old—and another contemporary, Strachey, tells curious tales of the maiden's fondness for turning cart-wheels through the streets of Jamestown. About the time Pocahontas married John Rolfe and went to England (1616), Smith published a little book in which he says:

After some six weeks (elsewhere he makes it four weeks) fatting amongst these salvage countries, at the minute of my execution, she hazarded the beating out of her own braines to save mine.

Then in 1624 Smith published another book, the *Generale Historie*, in which his memory seems suddenly to have unlimbered, for he rewrites his narrative, adds a hundred to his earlier enumeration of two hundred adversaries; additionally remembers that the Indians brought out a bag of gunpowder which they proposed to plant next spring; and is brought before Powhatan. With many new details he describes that potentate, and at last comes to the most exciting scene in the drama. You can see it all! The dusky Emperor, R. C.; Princess Pocahontas, L. C.; the hero before the footlights, bound but undaunted, his eyes flashing defiance.

A long consultation was held, but the conclusion was two great stones were brought before Powhatan; then as many as could lay hands on him, dragged him to them, and thereon laid his head, and being ready with their clubs, to beate out his braines. Pocahontas, the King's dearest daughter, when no entreaty could prevaille, got his head in her armes, and laid her owne upon his to save him from death; whereat the Emperour was contented he should live.

First, and still unapproachable, as a biographer who creates the sub-

ject of his book, comes Parson Weems—that beloved, graceless, national favorite—who was an estimable clergyman and one of the first and probably the most successful of book-agents in American history; he is also eminent because he has imperishably entwined his name with that of the Father of his Country. Mason Locke Weems, as the nineteenth child of David Weems, had eighteen opportunities to be gulled by his brothers and sisters. He was ordained a clergyman, became rector of All Hallows parish, combined with it a girl's school, preached occasionally to Negroes, and somehow drew upon himself the dislike of his parish. He probably held services occasionally in Pohick Church, in which, years before, George Washington had worshipped; and upon this slender connection he based the title which he later assumed of "formerly rector of Mount Vernon parish."

Then, in 1800, he made the great hit of his life in his *Life of George Washington*. This immortal work was originally a brief account of Washington's service in the French and Indian and Revolutionary wars, couched in the impassioned language of the time, as, for example, the account of the aftermath of the battle of Lexington:

Never, before, had the bosoms of the swains experienced such a tumult of heroic passions. They flew to their houses, snatched up their arms, and, in spite of their screaming wives and children, flew to the glorious field where liberty, heaven-born goddess, was to be bought for blood. . . . Fast as they came up their ready musquets began to pour the long red streams of fiery vengeance. The enemy fell back appalled; while the gathering thousands hung upon their flight. Every step of their retreat was stained with trickling crimson; every hedge or fence which they passed took large toll of hostile carcasses.

In later editions Weems adds what we should now call an appreciation of Washington, in which are many anecdotes which are either true, or ought to be true, about the Father of his Country, combined with amazing quantities of good advice. Weems lived in a period when it was thought a moral duty to look upon the patriots of the Revolution and the fathers of the Constitution as demigods; it did not expect its historians to search for elaborate details and infinitesimal finish of statement. They wanted a good round mouthful of biography just as they wanted a boiling-hot sermon on perdition.

Weem's *Life of Marion* was confessedly an "Historical Romance," and his *Life of Washington* is not much more authentic. Doubtless the lively parson had no thought of deceiving his readers by inventing long

dialogues and telling speeches; and perhaps his shade is today surprised and gratified to know that the story of the hatchet is an American classic which has crystallized the impression of Washington in the minds of millions of Americans. The text of this immortal invention is perfectly well known to every virtuous American boy and girl:

The following anecdote is a *case in point*. It is too valuable to be lost, and too true to be doubted, for it was communicated to me by the same excellent lady to whom I am indebted for the last.

"When George," said she, "was about six years old, he was made the wealthy master of a *hatchet!* of which, like most little boys, he was immoderately fond; and was constantly going about chopping everything that came in his way. One day in the garden, where he often amused himself hacking his mother's pea-sticks, he unluckily tried the edge of his hatchet on the body of a beautiful young English cherry-tree, which he barked so terribly, that I don't believe the tree ever got the better of it. The next morning the old gentleman, finding out what had befallen his tree, which, by the way, was a great favorite, came into the house; and with much warmth asked for the mischievous author, declaring at the same time that he would not have taken five guineas for his tree. Nobody could tell him anything about it. Presently George and his hatchet made their appearance. '*George,*' said his father, 'do you know who killed that beautiful little cherry-tree yonder in the garden?' This was a *tough question*; and George staggered under it for a moment, but quickly recovered himself, and, looking at his father, with the sweet face of youth brightened with the inexpressible charm of all-conquering truth, he bravely cried out: 'I can't tell a lie, pa; you know I can't tell a lie. I did cut it with my hatchet.' 'Run to my arms, you dearest boy,' cried his father, in transports, 'run to my arms; glad am I, George, that you killed my tree; for you have paid me for it a thousand fold. Such an act of heroism in my son is worth more than a thousand trees, though blossomed with silver, and their fruits of purest gold.' "

It was in this way by interesting at once both his *heart* and his *head*, that Mr. Washington conducted George with great ease and pleasure along the happy paths of virtue.

This story was first printed by Weems in 1806. The "aged lady, who was a distant relative, and, when a girl, spent much of her time in the family," was probably also a creation. As for the tale, it is a curious fact that a grandson of Weems says that one of Weems's children, not long after Washington's death, cut down a "Pride of China," candidly confessed his fault, and was rewarded with a sound whipping! If this anecdote be true, Weems was doing his best to make out that the father of George Washington was a wiser and kindlier man than Weems himself.

122. The Millennial Hope and Crisis¹

History shows many variations in the millennial type of hope. While Gentiles, Jews, and Christians alike looked for a final release from present evils through some unique form of world-renewal, widely varying programs were proposed for the attainment of this end. Nor was there a single program for Gentiles, or for Jews, or for Christians.

This diversity was a natural outcome of the varying circumstances under which millennial speculations arose and developed. They represent the work of different persons with a variety of tastes, living in different surroundings throughout a long period of years. Diversities are especially noticeable among both Jews and Christians. The changes in Hebrew hopes kept pace with changing experiences in the national life, and variations in Christian expectations are closely linked up with the enlarging experiences of the Christians as the new religion spread from Palestine into distant lands. At one time millennialists have been interested in politics, at another time their interests have been social or communistic, some have had a fondness for mysticism, and others have delighted in the fanciful interpretation of prophecy. In each case millennial hopes reflect the special interests of their several advocates.

The fact of variety in millennial speculations greatly increased their functional possibilities. During the course of their history they answered to a wide range of human needs. While always concerned with the main problem of eliminating evil, the particular forms of evil to be abolished were conceived of in various ways. At times millennial imagery seemed to hold out a sure way of escape from the oppression of social ills. Other exponents of this faith stressed the hope of liberation from bodily sufferings due to poverty, sickness, or death. Frequently this type of hope was a strong support in the hour of severe political misfortune or religious persecution. In less strenuous times it served as a vehicle of fancy, enabling the native curiosity of the human mind to construct for itself marvelous pictures of the unknown future. Taken in the large, the millennial type of hope functioned variously at many periods in the past by sustaining man's faith in the triumph of righteousness and providing a mighty hypothetical instrument for the ultimate elimination of evil.

Are millennial expectations capable of functioning efficiently in the modern world with its new problems and its new knowledge? At present this is a question of unusual importance. Today a fresh realization

¹ From *The Millennial Hope* by S. J. Case, pp. 206-08. Copyright by the University of Chicago, 1918.

of life's ills has been thrust upon us by the frightful disaster of a world-war. In this moment of sore affliction, when all the skill and energy of humanity seem wholly diverted into channels of destruction, it is perfectly natural for many persons to follow the example of the past and seek to ward off the recurrence of such a calamity by predicting a speedy end of the present world and the miraculous inauguration of a new age when men shall no more learn war. But serviceable as this type of hope may have been to cheer the afflicted in days gone by, its efficacy in the present situation is open to serious question. Can men today continue with confidence to expect a cataclysmic reversal of present conditions, or does the light of experience and present knowledge demand the adoption of a more constructive, though less spectacular, program for the renovation of the world?

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What are the psychological factors which enter into myth-making?
2. Is the process of constructing myths and legends confined only to primitive people? Defend your position.
3. What is the mechanism of control by myth or legend?
4. What previously established legends furnished the mental soil in which to plant the legends about the Belgians on the part of the Germans in 1914?
5. Discuss the accuracy of recall.
6. Describe superstitions or legends which you heard as a child that have a collective significance of the sort described in this chapter.
7. Why should the two accounts of Pocahontas be so different coming from the same writer?
8. Why do many people object to the exposure of the private lives of many of our national heroes: Washington, Samuel Adams, Jefferson, John Brown, Walter Hines Page and others?
9. Can a national figure or other prominent man prevent the growth, of legends about himself? Discuss pro and con.
10. Will the exposure of the objective facts about popular heroes make the public any less inclined to believe other legends of other men? Discuss pro and con.
11. Do we tend to construct myths and legends about our enemies, about socially disgraceful persons, about traitors and divergent, anti-social individuals as well as about our heroes? If so, why?
12. It is said that myths are projections of our hopes and of our fears. Explain.
13. Trace the inception and growth of some legends with which you are familiar.

14. What is the social function of the legend and myth?

B. Topics for Class Reports

1. Report on Whipple's study of the psychology of observation and report. (Cf. bibliography.)
2. Review Swift's chapter on testimony and rumor. (Cf. bibliography.)
3. Review the French and British legends about the Germans built up during the World War. (Cf. Lasswell cited in bibliography.)
4. Report on Jenks article on the legend of John Brown. (Cf. bibliography.)
5. Report on Grattan's article on the legend of Walter Hines Page. (Cf. bibliography.)
6. Special report on the Ghost-Dance Religion among the American Indians as an illustration of a millennial hope. (Consult Mooney and Goldenweiser cited in bibliography.)
7. Special report on the legends about Napoleon. (Cf. Guérard cited in bibliography.)

C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers

1. The Psychology of Myth-Making and Legend-Forming.
2. The Place of Myths and Legends in the Mental Patterns of Culture.
3. Socialistic Utopias as Forms of Millennial Hopes.
4. Historical Messiahs.
5. The Place of Myth and Legends in Propaganda.

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CHAPTER XVIII

PREJUDICE: AN OUTGROWTH OF SUBJECTIVE ENVIRONMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

There is perhaps no group of attitudes and related habits which reveal the nature of social stereotypes and the persistence of the mental patterns of the group more than those we denote as prejudices. Prejudice is so prevalent that it demands our special consideration. It should be clear at once the prejudice is connected with the in-group attitudes in reference to out-groups. It is related to ethnocentrism as Sumner calls it (Cf. Chapter II). It bespeaks, on the one hand, the attitudes of superiority and class domination. On the other, it reveals fear, jealousy and concern over the rising competition with the other- or out-group. Prejudice is, in short, a name for a group of mental patterns which become thoroughly ingrained in the individual from infancy. The number of verbal stereotypes connected with prejudice is large. They define the situation of the two groups in rivalry or conflict condition. As with other verbal forms they have as a core a distinct emotional tone.

This delimitation in terms of language is brought out among other things in the quotation from Royce. Antipathies may arise between individuals, even within the group, but give antipathies names, associate these names with emotions, and connect them with the larger values of the group and we get prejudice. Park discusses prejudice in terms of social distance. Bogardus taking a clue from Park, has attempted to study social distance and prejudice quantitatively. As he points out, however, the mere measure in terms of social distance of the races which seem nearest or farthest away does not explain how the prejudices arose. This can only be got at by approach from another dimension, which may be called the historical-genetic. That is, to get at prejudice one must trace its inception and growth in the individual projected against his group experiences.¹

¹ The writer has discussed the statistical, cross-sectional method of study-

One of the most prevalent forms of prejudice today is that between the races. The nature of race prejudice is discussed by E. F. Young, Park and Thomas from different angles. The first deals with the place of values behind prejudices, with the dynamic character of these values, and, as regards racial feeling, their constancy once established. The second treats prejudice as a form of defense mechanism directed to the restriction of competition between races. This is particularly noticeable today with the present shifting of racial and national stocks from region to region. In reference to the Oriental, for example, so long as the Chinese served in a non-competitive way the functions of laundryman or house servant no difficulty arose. When they became rivals for a job or a business, prejudice began to form. In the first of the two papers by Thomas, he indicates the deep-seated nature of prejudice and its distinction from mere skin-prejudice and from caste-feeling. As pointed out in the note in the context, Thomas' use of the term instinct is permissible when the current usage of 1903 is understood. In the second selection from Thomas, race prejudice is correlated with isolation. And isolation simply means a phase of social distance.

In the final paper Lord Olivier discusses the connection between color prejudice and the deeper-lying racial dislike and hatred.

II. MATERIALS

A. GENERAL FEATURES OF PREJUDICE

123. Antipathy and Prejudice ¹

What, then, in the light of these considerations, is there which can be called fundamentally significant about our numerous modern race-problems? I answer, scientifically viewed, these problems of ours turn out to be not so much problems caused by anything which is essential to the existence or to the nature of the races of men themselves. Our so-called race-problems are merely the problems caused by our antipathies.

ing social attitudes and traits in contrast to the historical-genetic in a paper "The Measurement of Personal and Social Traits," *Am. J. Soc.* July, 1927, XXXIII: Part II (Proceedings of the American Sociological Society for 1926).

¹ From J. Royce, *Race Questions, Provincialism and Other American Problems*. pp. 47-52. Copyright (1908) by the Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

Now, the mental antipathies of men, like the fears of men, are very elemental, widespread, and momentous mental phenomena. But they are also in their fundamental nature extremely capricious, and extremely suggestible mental phenomena. Let an individual man alone, and he will feel antipathies for certain other human beings very much as any young child does—namely, quite capriciously—just as he will also feel all sorts of capricious likings for people. But train a man first to give names to his antipathies, and then to regard the antipathies thus named as sacred merely because they have a name, and then you get the phenomena of racial hatred, of religious hatred, of class hatred, and so on indefinitely. Such trained hatreds are peculiarly pathetic and peculiarly deceitful, because they combine in such a subtle way the elemental vehemence of the hatred that a child may feel for a stranger, or a cat for a dog, with the appearance of dignity and solemnity and even of duty which a name gives. Such antipathies will always play their part in human history. But what we can do about them is to try not to be fooled by them, not to take them too seriously because of their mere name. We can remember that they are childish phenomena in our lives, phenomena on a level with a dread of snakes, or of mice; phenomena that we share with the cats and with the dogs, not noble phenomena, but caprices of our complex nature.

Upon the theoretical aspects of the problem which such antipathies present, psychology can already throw some light. Man, as a social being, needs and possesses a vast range of simple elemental tendencies to be socially sensitive when in the presence of other men. These elemental tendencies appear, more or less untrained, in the bashfulness of childhood, in the stage fright of the unskilled, in the emotional disturbances of young people who are finding their way in the world, in the surprises of early love, in the various sorts of anthropophobia which beset nervous patients, in the antipathies of country folk toward strangers, in the excitements of mobs, in countless other cases of social stress or of social novelty. Such sensitiveness may arise in advance of or apart from any individual experience which gives a conscious reason why one should feel thus. A common feature of all such experiences is the fact that one human being finds other human beings to be *portentous*, even when the socially sensitive being does not in the least know why they should be so. That such reactions have an instinctive basis is unquestionable. Their general use is that they prepare one, through interest in men, to be ready for social training, and to be submissively plastic. In milder forms, or upon the basis of agreeable social relations, such instinctive emotions easily come to be molded into the

most fascinating of human interests; and the social life is impossible without this basis of the elemental concerns which man feels merely because of the fact that other men are there in his world. If decidedly intense, however, such instinctively determined experiences are apt, like other intense disturbances, to be prevailingly painful. And since novelty, oddity, and lack of social training on the part of the subject concerned are motives which tend to make such social reflexes intense, a very great number of the cruder and more childish social reactions involve antipathies; for a social antipathy is merely a painful, and so, in general, an overintense, reflex disturbance in the presence of another human being. No light need be thrown, by the mere occurrence of such an antipathy, upon any permanently important social character of the hated object. The chance intensity of the passing experience may be alone significant. And any chance association may serve to secure, in a given case, the intensity of disturbance which makes the object hated. Oddities of feature or of complexion, slight physical variations from the customary, a strange dress, a scar, a too steady look, a limp, a loud or deep voice, any of these peculiarities in a stranger, may be, to one child or nervous subject, or other sensitive observer, an object of fascinated curiosity; to another, slightly less stable observer, an intense irritation, an object of terror, or of violent antipathy. The significant fact is that we are all instinctively more or less sensitive to such features, simply because we are by heredity doomed to be interested in all facts which may prove to be socially important. Whether we are fascinated, or horror-stricken, or angry, is, apart from training, largely a matter of the momentary subjective intensity of the disturbance.

But all such elemental social experiences are *ipso facto*, highly suggestible. Our social training largely consists in the elimination or in the intensification or in the systematizing of these original reactions through the influence of suggestion and of habit. Hence the antipathy, once by chance aroused, but then named, imitated, insisted upon, becomes to its victims a sort of sacred revelation of truth, sacred merely because it is felt, a revelation merely because it has won a name and a social standing.

124. Social Distance and Prejudice¹

The concept of "distance" as applied to human, as distinguished from spacial relations, has come into use among sociologists, in an attempt to reduce to something like measurable terms the grades and

¹ Reprinted by permission from R. E. Park "The Concept of Social Distance" *J. of App. Soc.* 1924: VIII: pp. 339-340; 340-341; 343-344.

degrees of understanding and intimacy which characterize personal and social relations generally.

We frequently say of A that he is very "close" to B, but that C is distant and reserved, but that D, on the other hand, is open-minded, sympathetic, understanding, and generally "easy to meet." All these expressions describe and to some extent measure "social distance."

We do not, it must be confessed, know all the factors that enter into and determine what we call social distance. We know, to be sure, that in many cases "reserve" is an effect of timidity and self-consciousness. We know, also, that under certain circumstances reserves may be "broken down" and that with this break-down social distances dissolve and the most intimate understandings are frequently established.

The point is that we are clearly conscious, in all our personal relationships, of degree of intimacy. A is closer to B than C and the *degree of this intimacy measures the influence which each has over the other.*

The native human impulse that leads us to enter imaginatively into the other persons' minds, to share their experience and sympathize with their pains and pleasures, joys and sorrows, hopes and fears, may be blocked by self-consciousness, by vague fears, by positive self-interest, etc., and all these are matters that need to be reckoned with in seeking to measure "distances."

Now it is not only true that we have a sense of distance toward individuals with whom we come into contact but we have much the same feeling with regard to classes and races. The terms "race consciousness" and "class consciousness," with which most of us are familiar, describe a state of mind in which we become, often suddenly and unexpectedly conscious of the distances that separate, or seem to separate us, from classes and races whom we do not fully understand.

Not only is it true that we have this sense of distance with reference to whole groups of persons but it is also true that "race" and "class" consciousness frequently interferes with, modifies and qualifies personal relations; relations which, under other circumstances, it seems, might become of the most intimate and understanding sort.

For example, the lady of the house may be on the most intimate personal relations with her cook, but these intimate relations will be maintained only so long as the cook retains her "proper distance." There is always some sort of social ritual that keeps the cook in her place, particularly when there are guests. This is one of the things that every woman knows.

The same is true in the relations of races. The negro is "all right

in his place" and the same is probably true of every other race, class or category of persons towards whom our attitudes have become fixed, customary, and conventionalized. Every one, it seems, is capable of getting on with every one else, provided each preserves his proper distance.

The importance of these personal and racial reserves, which so invariably and inevitably spring up to complicate and, in some measure, to fix and conventionalize our spontaneous human relations, is that they get themselves expressed in all our formal social and even our political relations.

What we ordinarily call prejudice seems then to be more or less instinctive and spontaneous disposition to maintain social distances. Those distances, in our democratic society, tend to assume a purely individual character. We say we are without prejudice, but we choose our company. On the frontier, before the coming of the Chinaman, and in our village communities where every one called every one else by his first name, we succeeded fairly well in maintaining a society without race or class distinctions. But in the cities we have become "class conscious," just as, with the emancipation of the negro and the invasion of the European and Asiatic immigrants, we have become "race conscious."

Prejudice, in this broad conception of the term, seems to be an incident of group consciousness just as reserve seems to be an incident of self-consciousness. The child at first has no reserves: knows nothing either of pride, humility, gratitude, nor of any of the other excitements and the sufferings of self-consciousness.

The child has no class or race prejudices either. Except in precocious children these manifestations of group consciousness that we call "class" and "race" consciousness do not ordinarily appear until shortly before the age of puberty. When they do arrive, however, they bring with them all the traditional prejudices by which the class and race distinctions and the traditional social distances are maintained.

It is not intended, in what has been said, to suggest that consciousness, race consciousness, prejudice, and all the personal and social distinctions related to social distance, are in any sense identical with it.

As a matter of fact self-consciousness usually arises out of some sort of personal conflict and the personal reserves that spring up as a consequence of past conflicts and the anticipation of new ones, serve the purpose of preserving the individual's private, personal life from intrusion, misinterpretation, and censorship.

Prejudice, on the other hand, seems to arise when, not our economic

interests, but our social status is menaced. Prejudice and race prejudice are by no means to be identified by social distance, but arise when our personal and racial reserves are, or seem to be, invaded. Prejudice is on the whole not an aggressive but a conservative force; a sort of spontaneous conservation which tends to preserve the social order and the social distances upon which that order rests.

One purpose of a racial study is to measure, not our prejudices, but those vaguer, subtler taboos and inhibitions which persist even in so mobile and changing an order as our own, and represent the stabilizing, spontaneous, and instinctive and conservative forces upon which social organization rests.

125. Prejudice as Social Distance¹

Social distance refers to "the grades and degrees of understanding and intimacy which characterize pre-social and social relations generally." The following experiments were conducted to find out just *how* and *why* these grades of understanding and intimacy vary. Two hundred and forty-eight persons, chiefly members of two graduate and upper division classes in social psychology, were asked to classify the following list of racial and language groups in three columns, putting in the first column those races toward which as races and not as individuals a friendly feeling was felt; in column two, the races toward which feeling of neutrality was experienced; and in column three, the races whose mention aroused feelings of antipathy and dislike.

Each person was then asked to re-copy the three columns: to rearrange column one, putting first those races toward which the greatest degree of friendliness was felt, and the others in order; to start off column two with the races toward which the nearest perfect degree of neutrality was experienced, and so on; and to rearrange column three, putting first those races toward which the greatest antipathy was experienced and then the others in order of decreasing antipathy. Each person was also asked to give the races from which both his father and mother were descended. Twenty-four races were represented.

The discussion of the races toward which friendly feeling was expressed and of those to which a neutral reaction was made will be omitted here in order that full space may be given to the "antipathy column." Suffice it to say that friendly feeling was expressed in general toward the races to which the 248 judges themselves belonged, and that

¹ Reprinted by permission from E. S. Bogardus "Social Distance and Its Origins" *J. App. Soc.* 1925: IX: pp. 216-217; 218-220; 221; 224; 226.

the "neutral feeling" column was composed of races concerning which ignorance was expressed. "I don't know anything about them" was a common answer.

The races toward which the greatest or prime antipathy was felt were tabulated and are given in the following table. (The figures give the number of persons listing the races in terms of antipathy).

Table Showing Races Against which the Greatest Antipathy was Expressed

Turk	119	Hungarian	11	Portuguese	3
Negro	79	Servian	3	English	2
Mulatto	75	Russian	8	French	2
Japanese	61	Czecho-Slovak	8	Roumanian	2
Hindu	44	Syrian	6	Spanish	2
Jew-German	42	Bulgarian	6	Swedish	2
Mexican	41	Filipino	5	Canadian	0
Jew-Russian	41	Italian	5	Dane	0
German	38	Bohemian	4	Dutch	0
Chinese	30	Finn	4	French-Canadian	0
Greek	19	Polish	3	Norwegian	0
Armenian	17	Irish	3	Scotch	0

This table gives interesting results, but it does not explain the reasons for any of the antipathetic attitudes that were expressed. In order to penetrate explanations and causes each of the 248 persons was asked to select the race for which he felt the greatest antipathy and describe in detail the circumstances as nearly as he could recall them under which this dislike originated and developed. Not his opinions but his experiences direct and indirect were requested. It was asked that these be written out as fully and freely as possible and with special attention to all important details that occurred.

This personal experience data proved to be as enlivening and interesting as the more formal data were colorless except as one was tempted to "read into" them reactions of his own. The personal experience description of the origins and development of racial antipathy fell into certain classifications.

(1) The first and largest grouping of materials was composed of *traditions and accepted opinion*. It is clear after reading the data that hearsay evidence coming from both one's personal friends and from relative strangers in one's own "universe of discourse" who possess prestige in one's own eyes are widely influential in creating social distance. In the case of nearly every one of the 119 persons who placed the Turks at the head of their antipathy columns tradition and ac-

cepted opinion were the main, if not the only, factor operating. This second-hand evidence came chiefly from one's elders, parents, preachers, returned missionaries telling of massacres of Armenians by the Turks, newspaper articles of a similar character, motion pictures showing Turks as "villains," and from Armenian eye-witnesses of Turkish cruelties. Many of the 119 persons said that they had never seen a Turk, much less did they know even one.

The person who relies heavily on second-hand and hearsay racial reports usually gives evidence of having entered *imaginatively* into them so often and so thoroughly that they seem to have become his own personal experiences. Three large chances for error enter into these handed-down traditions and opinions, namely: (1) the possibility of erroneous observations in the first place; (2) likelihood of errors creeping into the repeating of these statements; and (3) the probability of entering into them imaginatively from the standpoint of one's own peculiar biases and experiences rather than from the viewpoint of the persons about whom they center. It is factors such as these which rule hearsay evidence out of civil and criminal courts; and yet, in studying the origins of race antipathy it appears that handed-down traditions and opinions greatly predominate.

(2) Unpleasant racial sense impressions *personally experienced* in the early years of life are many. Sometimes *fear* is aroused; again, *disgust*. In either case there is a sensory image that is often described as "horrifying." The fact that these images were experienced in childhood gives them a more or less permanent character.

(3) Unpleasant race impressions *experienced* in *adulthood* are also common. As a rule these anti-racial attitudes represent a generalization of experiences with one or a few individuals of the given race. Although there may be a recognition that the given experiences have been related to the less socially developed members of the race in question or from non-typical individuals the aversion is likely to spread to the whole race. Again, *fear* and *disgust* prevail.

While there are definite feeling bases of an inherited nature that lead naturally to race antipathies, unscientific generalizations upon a few personal outstanding adverse experiences or upon many adverse traditions is an outstanding datum.

126. The Measurement of Social Distance¹

One hundred and ten persons claiming racial descent as indicated

¹ Reprinted by permission from E. S. Bogardus "Measuring Social Distance" *J. App. Soc.* 1925: IX: pp. 299; 300-02.

in Table I (omitted) took part. These individuals were all mature persons of experience, being of two groups, either young business men, or public school teachers. (The following table is a sample of one person's responses to this questionnaire).

One of the first questions to be raised is: In how many groupings in our country may the members of any race (as a class), be admitted, as judged by the ratings of the 110 judges using the arithmetic mean? By referring to Document I it will be seen that the Armenians would be admitted by the specific person who made it out to only one group, namely the visitors' group, while the English would be admitted in five groups. In the first case the index to the social contact range is 1.00; and in the second instance, 5.00. The social contacts open to the English immigrant are five times as various as those open to the Greek. The Greeks, it may be noted, would be admitted to no groups within the United States, and thus the social contact range (S. C. R.) index in their case would be .00.

Document I

Social Distance

According to my first feeling reactions I would willingly admit members of each race (as a class, and not the best I have known, nor the worst members) to one or more of the classifications under which I have placed a cross (X)

	7 1	6 2	5 3	4 4	3 5	2 6	1 7
	To close kinship by marriage	To my club as personal chums	To my street as neighbors	To employment in my occupation in my country	To citizenship in my country	As visitors only to my country	Would exclude from my country
Armenians						X	
Bulgarians						X	
Canadians	X	X	X	X	X		
Chinese						X	
Czecho-Slovaks						X	
Danes				X	X		
Dutch				X	X		

Document I (*continued*)*Social Distance*

	To close kinship by marriage	To my club as personal chums	To my street as neighbors	To employment in my occupation in my country	To citizenship in my country	As visitors only to my country	Would exclude from my country
English	X	X	X	X	X		
French	X	X	X	X	X		
French-Canadians	X	X	X	X	X		
Finns				X	X		
Germans	X	X	X	X	X		
Greek							X
Hindus							X
Hungarians						X	
Indians (Amer.)				X	X		
Irish	X	X	X	X	X		
Italians				X	X		
Japanese							X
Jews-German						X	
Jews-Russian						X	
Koreans							X
Mexicans						X	
Mulattos							X
Negroes							X
Norwegians	X	X	X	X	X		
Portuguese						X	
Filipinos						X	
Poles						X	
Roumanians	X	X	X	X	X		
Russians						X	
Serbo-Croatians						X	
Scotch	X	X	X	X	X		
Scotch-Irish	X	X	X	X	X		
Spanish						X	
Syrians							X
Swedish				X	X		
Turks							X
Welsh	X	X	X	X	X		

1. Your father's races.....*English*.....2. Your mother's races.....*Scotch-Irish*.....

Reference to the second column of Table III (omitted) shows that according to the 110 raters the social contact range varies from 1.18 for the Turks to 4.60 for the English, while the social contact range accorded the Italians is 2.26, which is intermediate between the extremes. A significant correlation is at once obvious between racial membership of the raters and the extent of social contact range is to be noted in Table III. Where the racial membership is low and the range high, as in the case of the Canadians, the relationship of the Canadians to the English and other "high" races among the raters is the chief explanation. Sometimes, as indicated by subsequent interviews with the raters, a fellow-feeling was aroused primarily by a racial group name, such as French-Canadian.

B. RACE PREJUDICE

127. The Nature of Race Prejudice ¹

There are many prejudices. Some are seemingly the result of personal experiences, others are traditional attitudes which we hold in common with our associates or which have been inculcated in us by our elders. It is possible that some are instinctive, but this is an unsettled question.

The importance of prejudice is well known to labor managers, salesmen and advertisers, politicians and statesmen, the press, religious leaders, educators, and social workers. White workmen frequently refuse to work at the same trade with colored men, and generally will not work under colored foremen; the public has unexplained buying prejudices which are at once the despair and the hope of the advertiser; voters can be swayed by political demagogues who appeal to their class and race prejudices; practical governmental administrators must take account of the antipathies which various groups in the state show toward each other; the press alternately deprecates and appeals to various prejudices; church and school face the problem, and social workers are in daily touch with attitudes which they have little power to modify but which set for them difficult problems in personal and social adjustment.

Prejudice may be either positive or negative with reference to an object; that is, it may be partiality for as well as aversion for a thing.

The particular prejudices, whether positive or negative, which one entertains are dependent upon his scale of values. To understand the prejudices of given individuals or groups it is necessary to know their

¹ Reprinted by permission from E. F. Young "What is Race Prejudice?" *J. App. Soc.* 1925: X: pp. 136; 137-39; 139-40.

wants. Further, the wants of a given person are not unchangeable. Appetites and wishes change and the values associated with them change. The attitudes toward food and sex, for example, change profoundly as one passes from hunger to satiety; intense cravings give way to aversion and eventually to nausea. The desire for new experience changes to a longing for familiar faces and scenes. Wanderlust is succeeded by nostalgia. In a wholesome personality there is a healthy balance between antithetical desires and a measure of regularity occurs in the oscillations between hunger and satiety.

Prejudices are, therefore, dynamic, not static; they change as appetites and wishes change and they vary from individual to individual and group to group.

We do not, however, define our attitudes as prejudices so long as our conviction in the validity of our "conditional absolutes," to use a telling phrase coined by Josiah Royce, remains unchallenged. It is only when wider knowledge, newer purposes, better methods appear and challenge the old that their relativity becomes apparent.

Racial prejudice differs from prejudice generally in one important respect. One may change his politics or his religion; he may learn new languages and customs, or change the cut of his coat. If the change is successfully made he may, in the course of time—depending on the length of men's memories—become fully assimilated into a new group. As he becomes identified with them he escapes the fire of prejudice directed against his former political and religious beliefs, his mother tongue, and the earlier style of his clothes. When, however, the prejudice is directed against the color of his skin, his features, or any other racial trait, he cannot avoid the effects of prejudices aroused by these traits. He is a marked man. The fact that these traits may be superficial weighs but lightly in the balance against the inescapable fact that he is different and cannot be assimilated except through racial amalgamation. At just that point, however, race prejudice runs highest.

128. Race Prejudice as Defense Mechanism¹

It has been assumed that the prejudice which blinds the people of one race to the virtues of another, and leads them to exaggerate that other's faults, is in the nature of a misunderstanding which further knowledge will dispel. This is so far from true that it would be more exact to say that our racial misunderstandings are merely the expression

¹ Reprinted by permission from R. E. Park in "Introduction" to *The Japanese Invasion* by J. Steiner, pp. xii-xiii; xiv-xvii. Chicago. A. C. McClurg & Company, 1917.

of our racial antipathies. Behind these antipathies are deep-seated, vital, and instinctive impulses. These antipathies represent collision of invisible forces, the clash of interests, dimly felt but not yet clearly perceived. They are present in every situation where the fundamental interests of races and peoples are not yet regulated by some law, custom, or any other *modus vivendi* which commands the assent and the mutual support of both parties. We hate people because we fear them; because our interests, as we understand them at any rate, run counter to theirs. On the other hand, good will is founded in the long run upon co-operation. The extension of our so-called altruistic sentiments is made possible only by the organization of our otherwise conflicting interests and by the extension of the machinery of co-operation and social control.

Race prejudice may be regarded as a spontaneous, more or less instinctive defense-reaction, the practical effect of which is to restrict free competition between races. Its importance as a social function is due to the fact that free competition, particularly between people with different standards of living, seems to be, if not the original source, at least the stimulus to which race prejudice is the response.

From this point of view we may regard caste, or even slavery, as one of those accommodations through which the race problem found a natural solution. Caste, by relegating the subject race to an inferior status, gives to each race at any rate a monopoly of its own tasks. When this status is accepted by the subject people, as is the case where the caste or slavery systems become fully established, racial competition ceases and racial animosity tends to disappear. That is the explanation of the intimate and friendly relations which so often existed in slavery between master and servant. It is for this reason that we hear it said today that "the Negro is all right in his place." In his place he is a convenience and not a competitor. Each race being in its place, no obstacle to racial co-operation exists.

The Japanese, the Chinese, they too would be all right in their place, no doubt. That place, if they find it, will be one in which they do not greatly intensify and so embitter the struggle for existence of the white man. The difficulty is that the Japanese is still less disposed than the Negro or the Chinese to submit to the regulations of a caste system and to stay in his place. The Japanese are an organized and morally efficient nation. They have the national pride and the national egotism which rests on the consciousness of this efficiency. In fact it is not too much to say that national egotism, if one pleases to call it such, is essential to national efficiency, just as a certain irascibility of temper seems to be essential to a good fighter.

Another difficulty is that caste and the limitation of free competition is economically unsound, even though it be politically desirable. A national policy of national efficiency demands that every individual have not merely the opportunity but the preparation necessary to perform that particular service for the community for which his natural disposition and aptitude fit him, irrespective of race or "previous condition."

Finally, caste and the limitation of economic opportunity is contrary, if not to our traditions, at least to our political principles. That means that there will always be an active minority opposed on grounds of political sentiment to any settlement based on the caste system as applied to either the black or the brown man. This minority will be small in parts of the country immediately adversely affected by the competition of the invading race. It will be larger in regions which are not greatly affected. It will be increased if immigration is so rapid as to make the competition more acute. We must look to other measures for the solution of the Japanese problem, if it should prove true, as seems probable, that we are not able or, for various reasons, do not care to hold back permanently the rising tide of the Oriental invasion.

I have said that fundamentally and in principle prejudice against the Japanese in America today was identical with the prejudice which attaches any immigrant people. There is, as Mr. Steiner has pointed out, a difference. This is due to the existence in the human mind of a mechanism by which we inevitably and automatically classify every individual human being we meet. When a race bears an external mark by which every individual member of it can infallibly be identified, that race is by that fact set apart and segregated. Japanese, Chinese, and Negroes cannot move among us with the same freedom as the members of other races because they bear marks which identify them as members of their race. This fact isolates them. In the end, the effect of this isolation, both in its effects upon the Japanese themselves, and upon the human environment in which they live, is profound. Isolation is at once a cause and an effect of race prejudice. It is a vicious circle— isolation, prejudice; prejudice, isolation. Were there no other reasons which urge us to consider the case of the Japanese and the Oriental peoples in a category different from that of the European immigrant, this fact, that he is bound to live in the American community a more or less isolated life, would impel us to do so.

Race prejudice is a mechanism of the group mind which acts reflexly and automatically in response to its proper stimulus. That stimulus seems to be, in the cases where I have met it, unrestricted competition of peoples with different standards of living. Racial animosities and

the so-called racial misunderstandings that grow out of them cannot be explained or argued away. They can only be affected when there has been a readjustment of relations and organization of interests in such a way as to bring about a larger measure of co-operation and a less amount of friction and conflict. This demands something more than a diplomacy of kind words. It demands a national policy based on an unflinching examination of the facts.

129. Race Prejudice and Caste Feeling¹

When not complicated with caste-feeling, race-prejudice is, after all, very impermanent, of no more stability, perhaps, than fashions. The very fact of difference, indeed, and of new appeals to the attention, may act as a stimulus, a charm as is shown by the fact that the widespread practice of exogamy has its root in the interest of men in unfamiliar women. The experiences of each group have created a body of traditions and standards bound up with emotional accompaniments, and these may be so opposed as to stand in the way of association, but it is particularly in cases where one of the groups has risen to a higher level of culture that contempt for the lower group is persistent. In this case antipathy of the group for an alien group is reinforced by the contempt of the higher caste for the lower. Psychologically speaking, race-prejudice and caste-feeling are at bottom the same thing, both being phases of the instinct of hate, but a status of caste is reached as the result of competitive activities. The lower caste has either been conquered and captured, or gradually outstripped on account of the mental and economic inferiority. Under these conditions, it is psychologically important to the higher caste to maintain the feeling and show of superiority, on account of the suggestive effect of this on both the inferior caste and on itself; and signs of superiority and inferiority, being thus aids to the manipulation of one class by another, acquire a new significance and become more ineradicable. Of the relation of black to white in this country it is perhaps true that the antipathy of the Southerner for the Negro is rather caste-feeling than race-prejudice, while the feeling of the Northerner is race-prejudice proper. In the North, where there has been no contact with the Negro and no activity connections, there is no caste-feeling, but there exists a sort of *skin*-prejudice—a horror of the external aspect of the Negro—and

¹ Reprinted by permission from W. I. Thomas "The Psychology of Race Prejudice" *Am. J. Soc.* 1903-04: IX: pp. 609-11. Copyright by the University of Chicago.

many northerners report that they have a feeling against eating from a dish handled by a Negro. The association of master and slave in the South was, however, close, even if not intimate, and much of the feeling of physical repulsion for a black skin disappeared. This was particularly true of the house servants. White girls and boys kissed their black mammies with real affection, and after marriage returned from other states to the funeral of an old slave. But while color was not here repulsive, it was so ineradicably associated with inferiority that it was impossible for a southern White to think the Negro into his own class. This is well shown by the following comment of a southern woman on the color of Shakespeare's Othello:

"In studying the play of Othello I have always *imagined* its hero a *white man*. It is true the dramatist paints him black, but this shade does not suit the man. It is a stage decoration which *my taste* discards; a fault of color from an artistic point of view. I have, therefore, as I before stated, in *my readings* of this play dispensed with it. Shakespeare was too correct a delineator of human nature to have colored Othello *black*, if he had personally acquainted himself with the idiosyncrasies of the African race. We may regard, then, the daub of black upon Othello's portrait as an *ebullition* of fancy, a freak of imagination—the visionary conception of an ideal figure—one of the few erroneous strokes of the great master's brush, the *single* blemish on a faultless work. Othello was a *white man*!"

This lady would have been equally incapable of understanding Livingstone's comment on a black woman:

"A very beautiful young woman came to look at us, perfect in every way, and nearly naked, but unconscious of indecency; a very Venus in black."

Race prejudice is an instinct originating in the tribal stage of society, when solidarity in feeling and action were essential to the preservation of the group. It, or some analogue of it, will probably never disappear completely, since an identity of standards, traditions, and physical appearance in all geographical zones is neither possible nor esthetically desirable. It is, too, an affair which can neither be reasoned with nor legislated about very effectively, because it is connected with the affective, rather than the cognitive, processes. But it tends to become more insignificant as increased communication brings interests and standards in common, and as similar systems of education and equal access to knowledge bring about a greater mental and social parity between groups, and remove the grounds for "invidious distinction." It is, indeed, probable that a position will be reached on the race ques-

tion similar to the condition now reached among the specialized occupations, particularly among the scientific callings, and also in business, where the individual's ability to get results gives him an interest and a status independent of, and, in point of fact, quite overshadowing, the superficial marks of personality.

Note on use of term instinct

The term *instinct* as used by Thomas twenty years ago is not to be confused with the term *instinct* as described in more exact biology today. Hence, when Professor Thomas speaks of race prejudice as an "instinct," he does not mean that such a stereotype and attitude is innate and unchangeable, rather he means to imply that upon the emotions of fear, anger and disgust, the attitudes of hatred and antipathy are built up by social conditioning. The sociologist of the past used the term *instinct* altogether too loosely for what is really an attitude or sentiment having perhaps some innate roots, largely emotional, but which in adults is developed out of their experience. (K.Y.)

130. Race Prejudice as a Form of Isolation¹

For our purposes race-prejudice may be regarded as a form of isolation. And in the case of the American Negro this situation is aggravated by the fact that the white man has developed a determination to keep him in isolation—"in his place." Now, when the isolation is willed and has at the same time the emotional nature of a taboo, the handicap is very grave indeed. It is a fact that the most intelligent Negroes are usually half or more than half white, but it is still a subject for investigation whether this is due to mixed blood or to the fact that they have been more successful in violating the taboo.

The humblest white employee knows that the better he does his work the more chance there is for him to rise in the business. The black employee knows that the better he does his work the longer he may do it; he cannot often hope for promotion.

All these careers are at the very outset closed to the Negro on account of his color; what lawyer would give even a minor case to a Negro assistant? or what university would appoint a promising young Negro as tutor? Thus the white young man starts in life knowing that within some limits and barring accidents, talent and application will tell.

¹ Reprinted by permission from W. I. Thomas "Race Psychology: Standpoint and Questionnaire, with Particular Reference to the Immigrant and the Negro" *Am. J. Soc.* 1919: XVII. 745-47. Copyright by the University of Chicago.

The young Negro starts knowing that on all sides his advance is made doubly difficult if not wholly shut off, by his color.

In all walks of life the Negro is liable to meet some objection to his presence or some discourteous treatment. . . . If an invitation is issued to the public for any occasion, the Negro can never know whether he would be welcomed or not; if he goes he is liable to have his feelings hurt and get into unpleasant altercation; if he stays away, he is blamed for indifference. If he meets a lifelong white friend on the street, he is in a dilemma; if he does not greet the friend he is put down as boorish and impolite; if he does greet the friend he is liable to be flatly snubbed. If by chance he is introduced to a white woman or man, he expects to be ignored on the next meeting, and usually is. White friends may call on him, but he is scarcely expected to call on them, save for strictly business matters. If he gain the affections of a white woman and marry her he may invariably expect that slurs will be thrown on her reputation and on his, and that both his and her race will shun their company. When he dies he cannot be beside white corpses.

Kelly Miller, himself a full-blooded black (for which the Negroes have expressed their gratitude), refers to the backwardness of the Negro in the following terms:

To expect the Negroes of Georgia to produce a great general like Napoleon when they are not even allowed to carry arms, or to deride them for not producing scholars like those of the Renaissance when a few years ago they were forbidden the use of letters, verges closely upon the outer rim of absurdity. Do you look for great Negro statesmen in states where black men are not allowed to vote? . . . Above all, for southern white men to berate the Negro for failing to gain the highest rounds of distinction reaches the climax of cruel inconsistency. One is reminded of the barbarous Teutons in *Titus Andronicus*, who, after cutting out the tongue and hacking off the hands of the lovely Lavinia, ghoulishly chided her for not calling for sweet water with which to wash her delicate hands.

It is not too much to say that no Negro and no mulatto, in America at least, has even been fully in the white man's world. But we must recognize that their backwardness is not wholly due to prejudice. A race with an adequate technique can live in the midst of prejudice and even receive some stimulation from it. But the Negro has lost many of the occupations which were particularly his own, and is outclassed in others—not through prejudice, but through the faster pace of his competitors.

Obviously obstacles which discourage one race may stimulate another. Even the extreme measures in Russia and Roumania against the Jew have not isolated him. He has resources and traditions and technique of his own, and we have even been borrowers from him.

131. Color Prejudice and Race Prejudice¹

I am aware of no moral ingredient in color prejudice which is not, or has not, been displayed in race-prejudice between races of common color, or between tribes of the same race, families of the same tribe or even individuals of the same family. Color prejudice, in the common sense of the term, is in fact essentially a modern phenomenon, dating largely from the rise of the Bristol slave-trade and our assumption of military supremacy in India, and is a complex of many reactions of Negro slave-holding and Asiatic dominion, as will be recognized if one compares the character of interracial feeling at different periods. Its comparative superficiality is indicated by the fact that intersexual attraction overrides it, colored women being conjugally agreeable to white men, whilst the sociably unavowable fact that colored men are the like to white women is one of the strongest provocatives to the killing and burning of Negroes in the United States, as it was to the frequent assaults on colored soldiers who came into England or visited English cities during the war, until English leave was withheld from them.

Race prejudice is a much more ancient, widespread, and deeper-seated phenomenon, and in so far as skin and hair are an ensign and advertisement of race and are interpreted as a docket of the qualities inductively attributed to a race, color prejudice is merely a reflex of race prejudice. It is obvious that many Englishmen and women are capable of as strong a prejudice against Welshmen, Jews, or Germans as a West Indian white woman has against black people; also that many men have a quite analogous prejudice against all the race of Women and many women against the whole race of Men. As to the Germans, it is hardly a generation ago that we were proud to share with them the prestige of representing the great Nordic Teutonic dominant race, as against the black-visaged negroid Latin and the perilous Japanese. During the war we suddenly discovered that they were Huns, Mongolians, which happened, as regarded the old East Prussian nobility, to be ethnologically more correct, and most opportunely enabled us to hate

¹ Reprinted by permission from Lord Olivier "Color Prejudice" *Contemporary Rev.* 1923: CXXIV: pp. 449-56.

and despise them with all the enthusiasm of racial prejudice. Bismarck's skull and jowl we recognized on our ancient Chinese vases, and on his polished scalp the degenerate but imperishable rudiments of a pig-tail.

Color prejudice, let me repeat, as color prejudice, is a very superficial affliction; merely a common form of provincialism. Race prejudice is the substance underlying it. Race prejudice between competitive races is intelligible enough, but it is a product of war, of the bronze and the iron ages. Race prejudice in a dominant race is self-justificatory arrogance. Men hate whom they have injured, despise him for his subjection, and blacken his character in order to justify his oppression. Having enslaved they complain of servile qualities—whether in subject races or women—and say these are unfit to govern themselves. If they struggle the master calls them savages or viragóes; if they argue he imprisons their speakers and writers; if they ignore or disobey outrageous demands he accuses them of rebellion, exiles a Prempeh, bombs a Hottentot village, sends survivors to penal servitude. He demands acquiescence in pillage and burglary as a first condition of clemency to the vanquished.

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises

1. Trace spontaneous and natural antipathy of person for person to its psychological and social roots.
2. How does this natural antipathy become prejudice?
3. What is the relation of prejudice to in-group and out-group contacts?
4. What function does prejudice play in social control?
5. What is meant by "social distance"? Is this a valid social psychological concept?
6. Why, according to E. F. Young, is race prejudice more difficult to overcome than religious or nationality prejudices, at least, in our present period?
7. What does Park mean by the statement that race prejudice is a "more or less instinctive defense-reaction"?
8. To what extent is negro-white race prejudice in the United States based on competition?
9. In what ways does race consciousness make for race conflict?
10. Is nationalist patriotism a reliable guide to national action under all circumstances? Discuss.
11. Is it possible to remove the causes of race prejudice? Discuss pro and con.
12. What is the relation of isolation to race prejudice? What the relation of caste feeling to prejudice?

B. Topics for Class Reports

1. Review Morse's article on prejudice. (Cf. bibliography.)
2. Review Pillsbury's chapter on hate as a social force. (Cf. bibliography.)

C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers

1. The Relation of Prejudice to Social Control.
2. The Social Psychology of Race Prejudice.
3. The Growth of Nationality Prejudice in Post-War Europe.

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CHAPTER XIX

TYPES OF PREJUDICE

I. INTRODUCTION

In the present chapter are presented materials treating largely of the Negro-White prejudices. There are also included by way of concrete personal documents, examples of White-American Indian prejudice, of anti-Jewish attitudes, and of religious prejudice.

While much has been written to prove marked differences between races, it is generally agreed today, among competent scholars, that while there may be slight differences between races, by far the greatest differences exist between sub-racial groups and between individuals of races. The range of individual variation far outruns any racial differences, as such. Then, too, the factors of numbers and of culture opportunity play a distinctive rôle in determining present cultural standing. For example, a large group has distinct advantages over a small one not only in sheer mass of numbers, but in the fact that it would possess, ordinarily, a wider range of variation with more persons of outstanding native capacity. Couple with this cultural contacts and one has the conditions for advancement. Nothing so retards cultural advancement as small numbers and isolation.

Boas reviews the present anthropological viewpoint concerning Negro as against white capacity. Wallis points out the peculiar difficulty in judging cultures of races different than our own. The third selection has been made from that wealth of materials contained in the published report of the Chicago Race Commission made following the race riots of 1919. Here we see the attitudes and stereotypes which exist in both white and Negro groups concerning each other. Both groups carry ideas, images and attitudes about the other which make for racial misunderstanding. These attitudes concern every aspect of life where the two races have come into contact.

The following copy of a telegram from a southern governor illustrates a prevalent attitude among the older generation in the South. In reply to a query from Chicago about the possibility of returning some of the surplus Negro population from the North to the South, Governor Bilbo said :

Your telegram asking how many Negroes Mississippi can absorb received. In reply I desire to state that we have all the room in the world for what we know as "n-i-g-g-e-r-s," but none whatever for "colored ladies and gentlemen." If these Negroes have been contaminated with Northern social and political dreams of equality, we cannot use them, nor do we want them. The Negro who understands his proper relation to the white man in this country will be gladly received by the people of Mississippi, *as we are very much in need of labor.*¹

Ratliff's narrative, in the form of a letter, describes the procedure in dealing with a Negro accused of murder of a white man. The picture is a plain, unvarnished tale revealing the attitudes of the dominant race toward the servile one. The definitions of the situation for the white men are well stabilized. In the mind of "Mr. Tom" as of Governor Bilbo there is only *one* manner of dealing with the obstreperous Negro.

Yet lynching is itself a social custom affording a certain emotional release and satisfaction apart from any social control factors it may have. This is brought out by the short quotation from Tannenbaum.

In contrast to the negro-white friction which is so common in the United States is the interracial relations in other areas, such as Jamaica. The paper included here is from a resident of the island, who has had much opportunity to observe the bi-racial accommodations which have been worked out there.

Following these papers on the Negro, are three personal documents giving other phases of racial and religious prejudice. The first of these is from a life story of a girl of mixed Indian and white parentage. It reveals that even though the American Indian has not been in competition with the white men as has the Negro, there exists a good deal of mild prejudice against him. Once more we note how stereotypes and legends about the Indian come into

¹ Reprinted by permission from *The Crisis* January 1920. The quotation appeared originally in the *Chicago Herald-Examiner*.

play in defining present relations. That is, the legends about the American Indian furnish a basis upon which to build a dislike of the individual Indian.

Moreover, we see something of the tremendous isolation which the person feels who stands between a group obviously less civilized than the white and the white group which will not admit one to full participation. It is hard to be a "man without a country" but it is also difficult to be a person without a solid cultural footing even though one may have one's citizenship.

The selection from the autobiography of a young Jew does not show the violent prejudice which is sometimes encountered by persons of the Hebraic cultural background. It does indicate, however, the gradual development of race consciousness from a mild beginning. Again, in this instance, the felt isolation may be largely due to the restriction as it touches full participation in the American life about him.

The selection on religious prejudice gives the historical setting of a prejudice that although somewhat dissipated continues into the present. It reveals the long life of custom and mental pattern in spite of external changes in economic condition, in spite of the passing of many generations. Once more one may remark that to understand the social behavior of an individual or a group it is necessary to understand the culture patterns as well as the physiology of the individual organism and the interplay of person on person in the social interaction.

II. MATERIALS

A. THE NEGRO PREJUDICE

132. The Negro Problem in the United States¹

When we turn our attention to the Negro problem as it presents itself in the United States, we must remember our previous considerations, in which we found that no proof of an inferiority of the Negro type could be given, except that it seemed possible that perhaps the race would not produce quite so many men of highest genius as other races, while there was nothing at all that could be interpreted as suggesting any

¹ From F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, pp. 268; 269-74; 277-78. Copyright 1911 by The Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

material differences in the mental capacity of the bulk of the Negro population as compared to the bulk of the white population.

Much has been said about the shorter period of growth of the Negro child as compared to the white child, but no convincing data have been forthcoming. Considering the great variation in the duration of growth and development in different individuals in various social classes, according to the more or less favorable nutrition of the child, the information that we possess in regard to the Negro child is practically without value. We have not even evidence that would prove that a shorter period of development must be unfavorable in its results. As it is, almost all we can say with certainty is, that the differences between the average types of the white and of the Negro, that have a bearing upon vitality and mental ability, are much less than the individual variations in each race.

This result is, however, of great importance, and is quite in accord with the result of ethnological observation. A survey of African tribes exhibits to our view cultural achievements of no mean order. To those unfamiliar with the products of native African art and industry, a walk through one of the large museums of Europe would be a revelation. None of our American museums has made collections that exhibit this subject in any way worthily. The blacksmith, the wood-carver, the weaver, the potter,—these all produce ware original in form, executed with great care, and exhibiting that love of labor, and interest in the results of work, which are apparently so often lacking among the Negroes in our American surroundings. No less instructive are the records of travellers, reporting the thrift of the native villages, of the extended trade of the country, and of its markets. The power of organization as illustrated in the government of native states is of no mean order, and when wielded by men of great personality has led to the foundation of extended empires. All the different kinds of activities that we consider valuable in the citizens of our country may be found in aboriginal Africa. Neither is the wisdom of the philosopher absent. A perusal of any of the collections of African proverbs that have been published will demonstrate the homely practical philosophy of the Negro, which is of often proof of sound feeling and judgment.

It would be out of place to enlarge on this subject, because the essential point that anthropology can contribute to the practical discussion of the adaptability of the Negro is a decision of the question how far the undesirable traits that are at present undoubtedly found in our

Negro population are due to racial traits, and how far they are due to social surroundings for which we are responsible. To this question anthropology can give the decided answer that the traits of African culture as observed in the aboriginal home of the Negro are those of a healthy primitive people, with a considerable degree of personal initiative, with a talent for organization, and with imaginative power, with technical skill and thrift. Neither is a warlike spirit absent in the race, as is proved by the mighty conquerors who overthrew states and founded new empires, and by the courage of the armies that follow the bidding of their leaders. There is nothing to prove that licentiousness, shiftless laziness, lack of initiative, are fundamental characteristics of the race. Everything points out that these qualities are the result of social conditions rather than of hereditary traits.

It may be well to state here once more with some emphasis that it would be erroneous to assume that there are not differences in the mental make-up of the Negro race and of other races, and that their activities should run in the same lines. On the contrary, if there is any meaning in correlation of anatomical structure and physiological function, we must expect that differences exist. There is, however, no evidence whatever that would stigmatize the Negro as of weaker build, or as subject to inclinations and powers that are opposed to our social organization. An unbiased estimate of the anthropological evidence so far brought forward does not permit us to countenance the belief in a racial inferiority which would unfit an individual of the Negro race to take his part in modern civilization.

The traits of the American Negro are adequately explained on the basis of his history and social status. The tearing-away from the African soil and the consequent complete loss of the old standards of life, which were replaced by the dependency of slavery and by all it entailed, followed by a period of disorganization and by a severe economic struggle against heavy odds, are sufficient to explain the inferiority of the status of the race, without falling back upon the theory of hereditary inferiority.

In short, there is every reason to believe that the Negro when given facility and opportunity, will be perfectly able to fulfil the duties of citizenship as well as his white neighbor. It may be that he will not produce as many great men as the white race, and that his average achievement will not quite reach the level of the average achievement of the white race; but there will be endless numbers who will be able to outrun their white competitors, and who will do better than the de-

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fectives whom we permit to drag down and to retard the healthy children of our public schools.

The anthropological discussion of the Negro problem requires also a word on the "race instinct" of the whites, which plays a most important part in the practical aspect of the problem. Ultimately this phenomenon is a repetition of the old instinct and fear of the connubium of patri-cians and plebeians, of the European nobility and the common people, or of the castes of India. The emotions and reasonings concerned are the same in every respect. In our case they relate particularly to the necessity of maintaining a distinct social status in order to avoid race-mixture. As in the other cases mentioned, the so-called instinct is not a physiological dislike. It is rather an expression of social conditions that are so deeply ingrained in us that they assume a strong emotional value; and this, I presume, is meant when we call such feelings instinctive. The feeling certainly has nothing to do with the question of the vitality and ability of the mulatto.

It appears from this consideration that the most important practical questions relating to the Negro problem have reference to the mulattoes and other mixed bloods,—to their physical types, their mental and moral qualities, and their vitality. When the bulky literature of this subject is carefully sifted, little remains that will endure serious criticism; and I do not believe that I claim too much when I say that the whole work on this subject remains to be done. The development of modern methods of research makes it certain that by careful inquiry definite answers to our problems may be found. Is it not, then, our plain duty to inform ourselves, that, so far as that can be done, deliberate consideration of observations may take the place of heated discussions of beliefs in matters that concern not only ourselves, but also the welfare of millions of Negroes.

133. Understanding the Negro¹

To understand the African I must do what I should have to do in order to understand my neighbor—be born in his environment, find myself in adjustment with those social conditions, share the tribal ideals, participate in the group activities and be as thoroughly accommodated to my surroundings as he to his. Only thus can I understand

¹ Reprinted by permission from W. D. Wallis "Moral and Racial Prejudice" *J. Race Development* 1914-15: V: pp. 227-28; 229.

him since only thus do the several things of his experience have for me the same meaning that they have for him. Let that meaning be fully appreciated in its satisfying emotional as well as intellectual aspect and my evaluations will not, I venture to say, be essentially different from his. I, too, would prefer economic conditions where the majority feel the throb of life in the hunt, the wild dance or the jungle fight; and where you can sleep when you want and where you want rather than commit yourself an unwilling slave to the endless drudgery of a factory life whose only reward is to prolong the punishment and postpone the respite. I cannot understand the ethical worth that life or any of its aspects have for him until I have looked out both upon his own world and upon other worlds from the social and psychic angle whence he views it.

In a word the difficulty in pronouncing upon the relative worth of the two ethical codes, is just this: if you are born an African you can never appreciate ours, and if you are born an American you can never appreciate his. The accommodation to environment, the reactions, the subtle understanding and responses can come only with the long experience as a *native* member of that group; you at once place yourself in a false position when you seek to enter from without. Even if you could fully appreciate both in the course of a life-time you could never do so in the space of a minute, and yet in order to make a comparison you must be able to offset the one against the other at about the same moment of deliberation.

It is true generally, that when we are dealing with human beings, a thorough intellectual grasp of the situation will, in most cases, actually modify the disapprobation of our moral nature; whereas if our initial judgment were substantially correct, further familiarity with the conditions should serve to deepen and intensify rather than to modify it. So it comes about that those who understand least are most prone to criticize without restraint; while those who have a more penetrating as well as more comprehensive grasp of the situation with its untoward circumstances and its circumscribing conditions are more lenient in their judgment of a given deed or character. In the oft quoted saying of Pascal, that to understand all is to forgive all, there is much truth: if we knew the exact conditions, psychic and social in which the individual or group in question lives, the problems of environment, heredity, social setting and the ability to cope with these, our criticism would, perhaps, not be so severe. After all, which one of our western civilizations is fit to cast the first stone?

134. Negro-White Attitudes¹1. *Primary Beliefs*

Mentality.—The chief of these is that the mind of the Negro is distinctly and distinctively inferior to that of the white race, and so are all resulting functionings of his mind.

In seeking the opinion of white trades unionists on the admission of Negroes to unions in Chicago, the Commission encountered in perhaps the harshest form the conviction that Negroes were inherently unable to perform tasks that white men did as a matter of course. A member of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers felt that no Negro had, or could ever acquire, intelligence enough to run an engine. Employers frequently expressed the belief that Negroes are incapable of performing tasks which require sustained mental application.

A teacher in a Chicago public school said: "I believe like Dr. Bruner (director of Special School, Board of Education) that when a Negro boy grows a mustache his brain stops working."

A teacher in Moseley School said: "The great physical development of the colored person takes away from the mental, while with the whites the reverse is true. There is proof for this in the last chapter of Ecclesiastes."

Morality.—Another of these primary beliefs is that Negroes are not yet capable of exercising the social restraints which are common to the more civilized white persons. Sometimes it is said that they are unmoral rather than immoral. This view, while charitably explaining supposed innate defects of character, places them outside the circle of normal members of society. Thus the assistant principal of a Chicago high school attended by Negroes said:

When it comes to morality, I say colored children are unmoral. They have no more moral sense than a very young white child. Along sex lines they don't know that this is wrong and that is wrong—that wrong sense isn't a part of them. Of course, we say they are immoral and a white child doing the same thing under the same circumstances would be. The colored and white children here don't get mixed up in immorality; they are too well segregated. Not that we segregate them: the whites keep away from the colored.

Criminality.—The assumption back of most discussions of Negro crime is that there is a constitutional character weakness in Negroes and

¹ From the *Negro in Chicago* edited by the Chicago Commission on Race Relations, pp. 438-45; 449; 451; 475-76. Copyright by the University of Chicago, 1922.

a consequent predisposition to sexual crimes, petty stealing, and crimes of violence. Sexual crimes are alleged and frequently urged in justification of lynching. Popular judgment takes stealing lightly, because Negroes evidence a marked immaturity and childishness in it. It is supposed that they appropriate little things and do not commit larger thefts. Crimes of violence are thought to be characteristic of Negroes because crimes involving deliberation and planning require more brains than Negroes possess.

Physical unattractiveness.—Objections to contact are often attributed to physical laws which, it is said, make the sight or other sensory impression of the Negro unbearably repulsive. This attitude is found in protests against indiscriminate seating arrangements in street cars. The word "black" has long been associated with evil and ugliness, and it is not always a simple task to disassociate the idea from impressions given by a black man. Not merely is the color regarded as repulsive, but it is the further belief that Negroes have a peculiar and disagreeable body odor. A Christian Science practitioner in Chicago, giving her opinion of Negroes, had an idea that they carried a "musky odor," and were therefore to be avoided.

Emotionality.—This is commonly regarded as explaining features of conduct in Negroes, some of which are beautiful in their expression while others are ugly and dangerous. The supposed Negro gift of song is thus an accepted attribute of his emotional nature. So with his religious inclination. This same emotionalism is believed to lead him to drink and is frequently made to account for "his quick, uncalculated crimes of violence." The natural expression of Negro religious fervor is supposed to be noisy and frenzied.

2. Secondary Beliefs

In addition to the primary beliefs there are others supposedly not so serious or significant in their effects. These are usually modifications of primary beliefs, and are accepted as a consequence of frequent and almost unvaried repetition. In this manner these secondary beliefs have edged their way into the popular mind.

George Jean Nathan and H. L. Mencken in a recent volume, *The American Credo*, point out fairly striking instances of this tendency of the American mind. They have compiled a series of 435 commonly accepted beliefs covering a wide range. Among these 435 listed American beliefs there are some very real ones which involve and include the following popular notions about Negroes.

1. That a Negro's vote may always be readily bought for a dollar.
2. That every colored cook has a lover who never works and that she feeds him by stealing the best part of every dish she cooks.
3. That every Negro who went to France with the army has a liaison with a white woman and won't look at a colored woman any more.*
4. That all male Negroes can sing.
5. That if one hits a Negro on the head with a cobblestone the cobblestone will break.
6. That all Negroes born south of Potomac can play the banjo and are excellent dancers.
7. That whenever a Negro is educated he refuses to work and becomes a criminal.
8. That every Negro servant girl spends at least half of her wages on preparations for taking the kink out of her hair.
9. That all Negro prize fighters marry white women and then afterwards beat them.
10. That all Negroes who show any intelligence are two-thirds white and the sons of U. S. Senators.
11. That the minute a Negro gets eight dollars he goes to a dentist and has one of his front teeth filled with gold.
12. That a Negro ball always ends up in a grand free-for-all fight in which several Negroes are mortally slashed with razors.

The most usual of these secondary beliefs which figure in the experience of Negroes and whites in Chicago are apparently of southern origin. This is due, not so much to any deliberate effort of southerners to infiltrate them into northern race relations, as that northerners largely regard as authoritative the experience of the South which holds almost nine-tenths of the total Negro population.

Some of the other secondary beliefs are:

1. That Negroes are lazy; that they are indisposed to, though not incapable of, sustained physical exertion.
2. That they are happy-go-lucky; that their improvidence is demonstrated in their extravagance, and that their reckless disregard for their welfare is shown in a lack of foresight for the essentials of well-being. It is asserted that they do not purchase homes and do not save their money; that they spend lavishly for clothes to the neglect of home comforts and the demands even of their health; that they work by the day, and before the week is ended confuse book-keeping by demanding their pay.
3. That they are boisterous. Hilarity in public places and especially in their own gatherings is thought to be common. They are considered as

rude and coarse in public conveyances and are believed to jostle white passengers sometimes without thought and sometimes out of pure maliciousness.

4. That they are bumptious; that when a Negro is placed in a position of unaccustomed authority relative to his group he has an unduly exaggerated sense of his own importance and makes himself unbearable.

5. That they are overassertive; that constant harping on constitutional rights is a habit of Negroes, especially of the newer generation; that in their demands for equal rights and privileges they are egged on by agitators of their own race and are overinsistent in their demands; that they resent imaginary insults and are generally supersensitive.

6. That they are lacking in civic consciousness. Absence of community pride and disregard for community welfare are alleged to be the common failing of Negroes. It is pointed out that the "Black Belt" has been allowed to run down and become the most unattractive spot in the city. To this fact is attributed the tolerance of vice within this region. Negroes generally, it is still believed, can be bought in elections with money and whiskey. They are charged with having no pride in the beauty of the city, and with making it unbeautiful by personal and group habits.

7. That they usually carry razors. Whenever a newspaper reporter is in doubt he gives a razor as the weapon used. Some time ago a woman was found murdered in a town near Chicago. She had been slashed with a razor, and the broken blade was left beside her body. The murder was particularly atrocious, and the murderer left no other clew. Several Negroes were arrested on suspicion but were released when a white youth confessed the crime.

A Negro lawyer said:

During the riot a Negro was arrested for having a razor in his pocket. I was his attorney, and the evidence showed that he always shaved at work. After having shaved at this particular time, he put his razor in his pocket and forgot it. He started home and was accosted by two officers, who searched him and found the razor. The judge heard the evidence and then whispered to me that he was going to give the fellow ten days because "you know your people do carry razors." He asked me if I thought it all right and I said that I did not.

8. That they habitually "shoot craps." The Negro's supposed fondness for gambling is a phase of the belief concerning his improvidence. It is not unusual for whites, in conversation with any Negro whom they do not know well, when they wish merely to be friendly, to refer to

dice. Employers frequently say that Negroes never keep money because as soon as it is earned it is thrown away on gambling with dice. The state's attorney believed that the riot of July, 1919, began over a beach craps game.

Negroes are believed to be flashy in dress, loving brilliant and gaudy colors, especially vivid red. Again, they are believed by white unionists to be natural strike breakers with deliberate intentions to undermine white living standards. Similarly they are believed to be fond of gin. Pauperism among them is believed to be unduly high, and they are thought to have no home life.

3. *Stereotypes about the Negro*

It may help to comprehend the range of conclusions found in the literature on the subject of Negro traits of character to note the array of descriptive adjectives employed, thus: sensual, lazy, unobservant, shiftless, unresentful, emotional, shallow, patient, amiable, gregarious, expressive, appropriative, childish, religious, unmoral, immoral, ignorant, mentally inferior, criminal, excitable, imitative, repulsive, poetic, irresponsible, filthy, unintellectual, bumptious, overassertive, superficial, indecent, dependent, untruthful, musical, ungrateful, loyal, sporty, provincial, anthropomorphic, savage, brutish, happy-go-lucky, careless, plastic, docile, apish, inferior, cheerful.

4. *Southern Sentiments and Attitudes toward the Negro*

In the South the relations between the white and Negro races are determined by custom as well as law, which, however, permit the close personal relationships of family servants. In the North, when these relations become more impersonal and contacts are widened through change of occupation from domestic service to industry, these close personal ties are weakened. There is no established rule of conduct binding on whites and Negroes in their relations with each other; and although traditional beliefs may influence present relations in the North, they do not always dominate them. So it happens that there are to be found shades of opinion concerning Negroes varying from deliberate indifference to vituperative abuse of Negroes, whatever the subject, depending on one's beliefs about them.

5. *Negroes Attitudes toward Whites*

The practice of "keeping the Negro in his place" or any modification of it in northern communities has isolated Negroes from all other members of the community. Though in the midst of an advanced social system and surrounded by cultural influences, they have hardly been

more than exposed to them. Of full and free participation they know little. The pressure of the dominant white group in practically every ordinary experience has kept the attention and interests of Negroes centered upon themselves, and made them race conscious. Their thinking on general questions is controlled by their race interests. The opinion of Negroes, therefore, are in large measure a negative product.

It is probably for this reason that most of their expressions of opinion take the form of protest. This same enforced self-interest warps these opinions, giving exaggerated values to the unconsidered views of the larger group, increasing sensitiveness to slights, and keeping Negroes forever on the defensive. Extreme expressions, unintelligible to those outside the Negro group, are a natural result of this isolation. The processes of thought by which these opinions are reached are, by virtue of this very isolation, concealed from outsiders. Negroes by their words alone may often be judged as radical, pernicious, or fanatic. Without the background of their experiences it is no more possible for their views to be completely understood than for Negroes to understand the confessed prejudices of white persons, or even their ordinary feelings toward Negroes.

Negroes know more of the habits of action and thought of the white group than white people know of similar habits in the Negro group. For Negroes read the whites' books and papers, hear them talk, and sometimes see them in the intimacy of their homes. But this one-sided and partial understanding serves only to make the behavior of the whites more keenly felt. Until these differences, long held as taboo, are thoroughly understood and calmly faced, there is small chance of satisfactory relations.

The opinions of Negroes on this question are as various as the white opinions of the Negro. Their response may reflect the sentiment of the larger group; it may take a conciliatory turn, or, it may be exclusively self-centered in disregard, if indeed not in defiance, of the white group. The rapid growth of the Garvey movement is a good example of this last type of opinion. There is harmony of opinion on ultimates, but on programs, processes, and methods there are differences among Negroes that reach the intensity of abusive conflicts.

No Negro is willing to admit that he belongs to a different and lower species, or that his race is constitutionally weak in character. All Negroes hope for an adjustment by virtue of which they will be freely granted the privileges of ordinary citizens. They are conscious, however, of an opposition in the traditions of the country and actually meet it daily. Conflict arises from opinions as to methods of combating

and overcoming the opposition with the greatest gain and smallest loss to themselves.

Thus we come to hear of different schools of thought among Negroes. Booker T. Washington is contrasted with W. E. B. Du Bois, and Du Bois is contrasted with Owen, Peyton, and Colson, and they, in turn are contrasted with Garvey. Among individual Negroes opinion is determined by experience as well as tradition. The Negro house-servant does not feel toward white persons as does a Negro common laborer. The independent professional man holds an opinion essentially different from the social worker. Yet they are all governed by those trends of sentiment protective of the Negro group, and in crises either act upon them or suffer the group's censure.

An instance of the strength of Negro group opinion appeared in a tragic by-product of the Chicago riot. A Negro prominent in local political and social circles was sought out as a leader, and asked for an interview by a reporter of the *Chicago Tribune* during the riot. In the published interview he was reported as saying: "This is a white man's country, and Negroes had better behave or they will get what rights they have taken away." This aroused a solid Negro sentiment against him; his life was threatened; for several weeks he had to have police protection; he was finally ostracized; and in less than a year he died. His friends assert that he was slanderously misquoted, and that his death was due largely to the resulting criticism.

The more balanced opinions may be found among Negroes who have developed a defensive philosophy. Race pride and racial solidarity have sprung from this necessity. The term radical is used to characterize Negroes whose views and preachments are in advocacy of changes which to the general white public appear undesirable. It will be observed that most of the so-called radicals are southern Negroes now living in the North. They know by experience the meaning of oppression. Contrasts with them are sharper and the desire for change is more insistent, because they can appreciate differences.

135. The Story of a Man Hunt in the Delta¹

Drew, Mississippi, April 24, 1919.

DEAR FATHER,—

The reason I have not written you for several days is because we have been all upset with a "nigger chase."

¹ Reprinted by permission from B. A. Ratliff "In the Delta: The Story of a Man Hunt" *Atlantic Mon.* 1919: CXXV: pp. 456-61 (some omissions).

I believe I wrote you about the Gardner murder, which was committed when I first came down here: a man from Blaine, riding along the road with a friend, was killed by a Negro who had never seen him before. "Will jes' felt biggoty an' took a shot at the car," the Negro's companion said. That was about a month ago, and several rewards have been offered for the Negro's arrest.

Shortly after we started home Sunday, Dr. Sims of Blaine, who knew this Negro, Will Lane, had seen him walking along the railroad just beyond Fitzhugh, headed south toward Blaine. It seems that Negro criminals, instead of leaving the country, almost always go "back home," trusting their friends to hide them. Dr. Sims had his wife and little girl in the car and did not dare shoot for fear Lane was armed. He turned around and drove to Fitzhugh, stopped Mr. Tom, who was on his way to the afternoon train, and asked him if he was going away.

"Just to get a paper," said Mr. Tom, and proceeded about his business.

The worthy doctor was too excited to think clearly. When Mr. Tom came back, he asked him whether he had a rifle. Mr. Tom said that he had.

"Got any buckshot?" demanded Dr. Sims.

"Plenty," said Mr. Tom, in his incurious fashion.

After all this parley the doctor told him that the man who killed Gardner was "up the road." But it wasn't until the doctor's wife, sitting in the car, called out, "He's taken to the woods," that Mr. Tom realized that Lane had been in sight (and within gun-shot for a full fifteen minutes. Of course, if he had known, the trouble would have been over. Mr. Tom is "the best shot in the country," and "has a way with the niggers." Dead or alive, Lane would have been "stopped." But by that time Lane was in the tangled woods, a quarter of a mile beyond the railroad track.

Just before we reached Fitzhugh Paul and I met Mr. Tom and Mr. Vick Burnett "on the trail," with bloodhounds from the convict farm at Parchman.

The whole country seemed to congregate at Fitzhugh, and those who did not congregate telephoned. Men hurried in and out of the house, with rifles and shotguns, and rode across the lawn on mules or horses. There was much excitement, conjecture, and general talk, with Dr. Sims going from one group to another, telling just how Lane kept looking at him to see whether he was recognized, and by what signs he recognized Lane "beyond doubt," and what he would have done if he had not had Mrs. Sims and Sissy in the car.

About ten o'clock Mr. Tom telephoned from Wildwood plantation, away back from the railroad, that the trail was hot and they might come up with Lane at any time.

Two hours later Mr. Tom telephoned from Cole's. They had lost the trail in the middle of the road and could not do anything more until daylight. He wanted Paul to come for him with the car.

Paul and I dressed in a hurry, and went rushing through the night in the big yellow car, which is like a living thing, it is so easy and wise.

There were armed "volunteers" at all the culverts and crossroads. We found three guards sitting on the little cement bridge over the branch a mile from Fitzhugh, and one of them called out, "Nothing doing," as we passed. Half a mile farther, a guard, nearly wild with excitement, stopped us. Will Lane had been there not three minutes before. He came up the track from the direction of Drew. Evidently he had made a circle through the woods and regained the railroad; but the sight of the crowd at Whitney had turned him back to look for a road that would enable him to circle Whitney without getting too far from the railway. He does not know this part of the country (Blaine is nearly twenty miles below Drew) and he had to stick to the tracks or run the risk of losing himself completely. The guard shouted to him to stop. He ran down the embankment, away from the road, and disappeared in the brush. They heard him crashing along up the right of way. We passed him between the bridge and the next guard, we later learned, for the bridge guard saw him try to cross the branch on the trestle and disappear in the woods along the branch. Not a shot was fired after him. Excellent reasons were given, but the fact remains that six of the dominant race, with rifles, did not stop one hunted nigger. Of course, he has a "desperate" reputation since the murder; but the loquacious reasons for the "getaway" never referred to this.

The guard begged us to "get Mr. Tom," and this we proceeded to do at rather a reckless pace. Mr. Tom roused the man with the bloodhounds, who proved to be a trusty (colored) from the convict farm at Parchman. The dogs were nice little sleek brown beasts, gentle as kittens, and so pretty that it was impossible to visualize them as baying bloodhounds.

Mr. Tom was startled to find me in the car, and intimated that this was "no place for a lady"; but there was nothing to do except take me along. We went back to the place where Lane had left the railroad, and the dogs took the trail at once, starting unhesitatingly up the branch.

"He'll look for a good place to cross, I believe," said Mr. Tom; "then

go over and come back to the railroad along the far side, unless we are too close to him. That nigger won't get away from the tracks if he can help it."

Quite a little procession went stumbling across the wet field, led by the graceful little dogs, sniffing along, with the Negro in his stripes holding the reins and encouraging them; then came Mr. Tom and Paul and I; and behind and beside us a dozen armed volunteers, among them one of the bridge guards, still explaining, *sotto voce*, why he didn't shoot.

The stars seemed as large as they do in the desert, and a great red moon was half-way up the sky. You could see for miles and miles by its white, deceptive light. An owl hooted along the branch now and then, and made everybody jump. About half a mile from the tracks Mr. Tom, Paul, and I stopped. We were sure the dogs would cross and come back on the other side in a few minutes. While we waited, Mr. Tom reminisced in his slow drawl about "the last big hunt, after the man that killed Kutner."

"And that was a real chase, too," he said. "The first day we ran that nigger, his trail led to the cabin of a nigger named Ray. Beyond Ray's we couldn't find a trace of it, so we decided he had got a lift from there. I told Ray,—

"'Now, the best thing you can do is tell all you know. It may go hard with you anyway, but your only chance is to tell the truth.'

"He said, 'Yes, suh, boss, I sho' will tell all I knows.'

"He was scared to death. That was a nasty shooting and everybody was stirred up. Ray told his story without any hesitation. Filly, the nigger who killed Kutner, had come to his cabin, he said, but he didn't want to have anything to do with him and told him to get out. Then Filly pulled a gun, according to Ray, and ordered food, quick. With the gun pointed at him, Ray gave him some cornbread and meat and a 'drink of coffee.' Then, Ray said, Martin, another nigger, came along on a horse. He stopped outside the cabin and whistled. Filly got up behind and they rode away.

"Martin lived near Ray and we got hold of him in a few minutes and questioned him. He insisted he hadn't seen Filly since the murder, and said he and Ray were always having trouble. We whipped him till he couldn't stand up, but while we were whipping him he kept screaming that he didn't take Filly away. Then we filled him up with water till he lost his senses, but he stuck to his story.

"Finally I went to Ray's wife, who had been hiding in the cabin, and asked her about it. She said she hadn't seen Filly, and swore he

hadn't been at the house. I took her out in the yard and made Ray tell his story before her. Then we began to whip her. She yelled that she would 'tell it,' and began to give the story she had heard Ray tell. She had it almost right, but there was just enough difference to prove she was lying to save herself and trying to repeat what Ray had said.

"I told the crowd I didn't believe Martin had helped Filly, and that Ray had made up his story because he thought he had to tell something to save his neck. I didn't want any more to do with it and came home.

"We never did get hold of Filly. We finally struck his trail again. Someone saw him drop off a train forty miles away. We carried the hounds down there on a flat car and followed the trail for a week, but we lost him out in the hills. I'd like to get my hands on that nigger, just to find out how he got away from here. He was at Ray's cabin, of course, but I'm convinced it was while they were in the field. He may have stopped somebody passing there who didn't know him and begged a ride, but more likely he was helped. I'd certainly like to know who carried him away."

I wanted to know whether anything happened to Martin and Ray.

"The crowd let Ray off with a whipping," said Mr. Tom, "but they hung Martin."

The owl screeched and I shivered. Mr. Tom suggested that we go back to the car. We found Burnett waiting there. He was tired. He and Mr. Tom had trailed all the evening, a hot trail across Wildwood plantation to the Sunflower River. There they found a Negro who had put Lane over the river. Lane told him who he was, after he was on the other side. He had secured a bottle of turpentine some way and sat on the bank rubbing turpentine on his feet. (That is supposed to destroy the scent.) Lane told his ferryman that the dogs were after him, and, according to the Negro, asked for a gun and a mule. Mr. Tom thought he might have asked for the mule; but if he asked for a gun, it was to give the impression that he was unarmed.

"He had a gun to kill Gardner, and he must have known he would need it again."

Soon after he crossed the river the trail disappeared.

At four o'clock we all went back to Fitzhugh. It was gray dawn, with fading stars, and away up the branch the barking of dogs marked the progress of the chase. The hounds do not bark, of course, but all the dogs they meet do. We dragged into bed, and were asleep almost

before we knew it. The bloodhounds from Crystal Springs, supposedly the best in the state, were expected in the morning.

"Keep him moving all night, get fresh dogs on him in the morning, and it's done," said Mr. Tom.

All yesterday Paul and Mr. Tom were in the woods along Sunflower, and the trail zigzagged back and forth, now up the river, now down.

"That buck's worth trailing," said Mr. Tom.

Mr. Tom came in town early this morning, bringing lots of news. Someone had taken Lane in a car to Ruleville, six miles beyond Drew, on the way to Blaine. That was about noon yesterday, but he had left such a complicated trail that the dogs did not reach the place where he was picked up till late last evening.

At Ruleville Lane went to the home of a Negro family he had known for years. Only the woman was at home. He asked for something to eat, and she gave him a good meal, which he bolted. Then he took to the woods again. He had been twenty-four hours without food or rest. As soon as the woman's husband came home, she told him Lane had been there and she had fed him. He reported it at once to his "boss," knowing the trail would eventually be followed to his cabin, and consequences would be dire if he was found to have been "harboring." The "boss" finally reached Mr. Tom over long-distance, and last night the dogs were taken to Ruleville on the train and carried to the house of Lane's friends, where they picked up the trail. In the woods they came on the place under the bushes where Lane had slept for several hours in the afternoon; then the trail led straight back into the canebrake—heavy, slow going for everybody. This afternoon they were in the woods behind Doddsville, the next station to Blaine. That was Gardner's home town, and the whole place has turned out.

"It's their hunt now," Mr. Tom says: and he and Paul are peacefully at work shingling the kitchen porch at Fitzhugh. "They'll have him by morning. It would have been better for that nigger to have been caught up here where we aren't so excited."

I try to tell this tale without confusing it by my impressions, but I am afraid it is an untidy piece of reporting. There were many sidelights. For instance, the woman from Blaine who stopped at Fitzhugh in her car to learn the progress of the hunt.

"They'll get him, and I hope they torture him a couple of hours before they hang him," she said.

The sheriff of this county said to some men from Blaine, "If we

catch him up here I'll 'phone you all and bring him down on the train. You can meet me and overpower me at Doddsville."

Mr. Tom.—We can't let biggoty niggers get away with things like this. If we do, no one will be safe on the roads.

Jimmy (age six).—Dirty nigger gonna get his if Daddy has to chase him a week.

Mr. Dermott.—If we could trail him all day today and all night, and catch him in the morning, we'd have had a good chase.

Vick Burnett.—Deer-huntin' has its excitement, but there's nothin' as excitin' as chasin' a man. He's worth outwittin'.

They caught Lane this afternoon, just outside Itta Bena. A Negro discovered the fugative hiding near his cabin, and told his "boss," who "stopped" Lane and turned him over to the sheriff of Sunbriar County. The "boss" wanted the reward, Mr. Tom explained at length, and to get it, it was necessary to turn Lane over to an officer of the law instead of to the crowd. They have him in jail at Itta Bena, and the sheriff of this county is going after him to-night. Mr. Tom says he will notify the people of Blaine what train he is taking, and he will be "met and overpowered" *en route*. "Then Lane won't have long to worry." The hunters say they were on Lane's trail, and would have come up with him in about half an hour.

I don't suppose I can ever forget that broad field before dawn, and the screech-owl and the convict in stripes and the cocked guns and Mr. Tom's low, pleasant voice, telling about the whipping and the torture and the screaming Negro; or the little rustlings which might have been a desperate hunted thing creeping through the mud and the brush; or the six-foot strap of harness leather hanging in the commissary which, Mr. Tom told me, "stung mighty sharp."

"Don't be so squeamish, Beulah," Mrs. Clar advises; "remember you've come to live in the delta."

With love,
BEULAH

136. Lynching and Emotional Release ¹

It is this dead monotony which makes the occasional lynching possible. One has seriously to ask why and how a people so generous, kindly, hospitable, free-spirited, and brave as are the people of the South can

¹ Reprinted by permission from F. Tannenbaum "The Ku Klux Klan" *Century* 1923: CV: pp. 878-79. Cf: also Tannenbaum, *The Darker Phases of the South*, pp. 24-26. Courtesy of G. P. Putnam's Sons, Publishers, New York and London, 1924. (Copyright the author's.)

indulge in a lynching. There is seemingly only one answer. The white people are as much the victims of the lynching—morally, probably more so—as is the poor Negro who is burned. They are starved emotionally. They desperately crave some excitement, some interest, some passionate outburst. People who live a full and varied life do not need such sudden and passionate compensations; but those whose daily round never varies, whose most constant state is boredom, must find some outlet or emotional distortion.

Something happens; a rumor is spread about town that a crime has been committed. The emotions seize upon this, and the people are in a state of frenzy before they know what has taken possession of them. Their thwarted impulses become the master of the situation. The emotional grip is unrelenting. Men and women are transported from a state of comparative peace into one of intense excitement. The lynching takes place not because the people enjoy it, but because the passions, the shouting, the running, the yelling, all conspire to give the starved emotions a full day of play. What happens is that, instead of planning a lynching for the sake of the excitement, the excitement determines the lynching, and the people who commit it are its victims. It takes place not because they desire the thrill that it brings, but the thrill determines its occurrence. The outburst victimizes the population, and is only a cruel compensation for many months of starved existence.

After the lynching the community settles back to a state of quiet. One exhausting orgy is enough to last a long while; it provides material for discussion, for argument, for explanation, for reflection. In dull moments the whole thing is lived over again. It helps one to come to grips with the world; it stabilizes the existence of the unfortunate community.

137. Negro-White Relations in Jamaica ¹

According to a census taken in 1922 the population of the island of Jamaica was as follows:

White	14,467
Mixed blood	157,166
Negro	660,250
East Indian	18,846
Chinese	3,696
Not stated	3,693
	<hr/>
	858,118

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The condition which produced the man of mixed blood—or the colored man, the term being used of one other than pure Negro—is gone forever, and the future alone can prove whether this hybrid will continue as a separate social unit or be merged into one or other of the races whose fusion brought him into existence. He varies in color from the sambo or mulatto where the strain of Negro blood is very apparent through the shades of brown or of “musti,” “mustifena,” etc. to “quadroon” where a trained eye is needed to distinguish it. From this last stage for the most part come the “Jamaica Whites” who are very often blue-eyed with hair of light brown. That this strain of black blood is bitterly resented and that every effort is made to hide it goes without saying. This might be emphasized by a remark made by a friend of mine—himself a graduate of Cambridge University and brilliant in the legal world—in reference to some failure where he had hoped for success: “What can you expect of the descendant of a drunken slave driver and a slave?”

The social position of this part of the population rests in its own hands, and one meets with some in whom white blood is pre-eminent working shoulder to shoulder with their black brothers in the field, while others occupy positions equal to or in some cases above those held by their English, Scotch or Irish brethren, in such fields as medicine, religion, and law. Sometimes mental calibre or the presence or lack of proper ambition is the cause, but most often financial position is the determining factor, for given the chance he usually makes good.

Here, too, must be mentioned the “poor whites” as they are sometimes referred to by the Negro. They are the descendants of the German immigrants who were imported into the island in the late nineteenth century in an experiment to supply labor for the fields. In spite of the theory that the white man must succumb to the treacherous climate of the wet tropics they survived physically, but morally they deteriorated very rapidly being victims of drink and immorality. The experiment proved a failure but the descendants of the original stock still exist having in some cases intermarried with the Negro, while in some cases the stock is kept fairly pure.

The rest of the population comprises Europeans (from the British Isles for the most part) holding Government positions or owning plantations; East Indians, imported for many years as immigrant labor until further immigration was prohibited by law some years ago; Chinese, who have practically monopolized the retail grocery trade; and Syrians who after travelling for a few years with their packs of merchandise on their backs or on donkeys soon amass enough to set up wholesale dry

goods stores on the main streets in Kingston, and number among the most wealthy of the inhabitants. In fact from information received from a friend who works in the Revenue Department one of the Syrians who started life as I have mentioned is today the wealthiest man in the island, as far as actual cash is concerned.

Generally speaking each of these groups forms a social unit with the exception perhaps of the Europeans and the educated and wealthy people of mixed blood who have free social intercourse. The barriers, however, are not formed by color distinctions but by educational and financial ability or disability. Since these determine the social status the bulk of the Negro population naturally constitutes the lowest class for they supply for the most part the manual labor at thirty-five cents a day and are generally illiterate, the illiteracy of the island being fifty per cent. The Chinese, Syrians, and East Indians are in themselves exclusive and though there are cases where illegitimate children are born through the intermixture of one of these nationalities with the Negro, the occurrence is comparatively rare, the Chinese usually sending their children to China at about seven years old.

The attitude of the Negro to the white race and vice versa as it exists in America is unknown in Jamaica except perhaps through such feeling as has been stirred in Kingston within recent years by the Marcus Garvey Movement. Garvey, it might be mentioned, in passing, was born in Jamaica. The two races ride together in the electric tramcars or on the railroads, visit the same churches, trade at the same stores and markets, are treated by the same physicians, attend the same schools and generally speaking, receive the same justice in the Law Courts. Perhaps in the last named matter, they sometimes receive more or less than is their actual due because of the judge's lack of knowledge of them. On one occasion an English judge had soundly berated a laborer for living in concubinage and was to some extent prejudiced against him because of this. The next man who appeared before him happened to be in a like condition, but fortunately for himself in speaking of the woman with whom he was living he used the word "sweetheart" which is commonly so used by the laborer. "My man," said the judge, "I am proud of you and must commend you for your honorable life. I trust you will shortly be happily married!" Thus by a turn of the wheel, is Justice perverted!

In these general connections of life then there is no actual difference made. Politically, too, the qualification for the vote is granted to all males who own a comparatively small amount of property—of course, this excludes a large number of the Negro population, but it also includes a fairly large number.

The biggest differences are felt in the economic and social relations, and yet even here no definite hard and fast rules can be drawn as there are exceptions, for should a man be able by dint of hard work to rise above his surroundings he is not debarred from social intercourse with the "upper classes." But he must rise, or otherwise remain the field laborer, earning thirty-five cents a day, or the domestic servant, while the man of white or nearly white blood remains his master and there is no bridging the gulf between them. There are some notable examples of men who have risen from the poorest homes who, today, hold worth-while public positions and are looked up to by everyone. I think now of a very successful barrister-at-law, of an inspector of Elementary Schools, of a minister who was asked by the Government to serve as an elected member in the Legislative Assembly. All of these, and many others, proving that the Negro's brain is not inferior to the white man's.

Morally the black woman has had to face the same problem as here, though, of course, the pressure is not as severe today as it was during slavery; in fact, it has shifted somewhat to the woman of mixed blood and comes to her both from men of her own color and from the white population. I do not think it is exaggeration to say that by far the largest part of the male inhabitants, married or unmarried, has a woman, or women, with whom he is generally known to live. In order to prove this it will be enough to mention that according to the last census seventy per cent of the children were born outside of wedlock, though specific examples might be added. Mention might be made of an English judge who had a son a little younger than his wife's eldest child, of a store-keeper (of mixed blood) who though married had a second "wife" living in a home directly opposite his, and of a member of the Legislative Council living openly in an unmarried state.

B. SOME OTHER FORMS OF PREJUDICE

138. White-American Indian Prejudice¹

. . . The first year that I attended school was a happy one. Things continued to move smoothly for two years but by the third year it was not so pleasant. My playmates were growing older and were beginning to notice their companions a little more closely. Finally I was given the name of "pappoose" which stayed with me the remainder of my time at this school. When called by this name instead of answering and not letting the pupils know that I minded it, I wouldn't answer until they

¹ From an autobiography in the author's collection. Used by permission.

called me by my right name. This made matters worse I believe than if I had passed it off in fun. It not only caused a heartache to be called such a name, but I think that my parents saw that I was dreadfully unhappy except when alone or with some of the neighbor children who attended the convent. My mother being a Catholic had always wanted me to attend the convent but my father refused to listen to the idea. There was one colored girl in the public school and the pupils were naturally trying to cause a rumpus between us two. I'll still maintain that if I had not been in the environment that I was, I would never have had any trouble with the girl. One morning the pupils were successful in getting the "pappoose" and the "nigger" into a tangle. Some of the children put the girl up to pushing me backwards over the banister of the outside stairway (when I wasn't expecting it). I fell where the bicycles were kept but there happened not to be any there at the time, and I bruised myself up a bit. It takes a great deal to make me angry and that was enough to start me. When I did reach the girl, who I will say was much larger and older than I, there was very little reasoning to be done, for she acted smart about the offense, so I flew into her. From riding horseback during vacations on the range I was strong and quick, so I won the "bout without a doubt." The school authorities took the part of the colored girl because I think I was the most "savage fighter" and perhaps had given the girl the most "knockouts." My father felt that it was a one-sided affair, though he never complimented me on my fighting in the least. The next week I started to the convent (day school) where I got along fine the remainder of the school year.

My mother's sister was a widow who had a daughter attending high school, so I was sent there where I spent a happy school year from 1910-1911. Of course there were a few who called me "squaw" but they were not the children of my neighborhood, so I didn't mind it. . . .

The next winter I lived with a wealthy old Quaker couple by the name of Daines. There were about twenty-two rooms in the house, it being the home of a large family at one time, without a picture on the wall or any sign of a musical instrument. At first, I thought that I would die of loneliness because my father, mother, cousin were all musical, and I craved music. Later I found them to be the happiest people that I have ever met and very well informed on educational matters of all kinds. There were books galore, periodicals and newspapers, so that I could find opportunity for reading of which I was fond. The Carlisle students spoke of the patrons as their "country people," country brothers and sisters, etc. My country father helped me in the evenings with my studies, we read and discussed stories together,

attended Quaker meeting every week and became the best of friends. My country mother was an invalid and I spent much of my spare time taking her for little walks in the lane or reading to her. The house-keeper Mrs. Hooton despised Indians and after I was there a few months I found out that it was through fear that she disliked them. Ignorant fear at that, for my country mother said that I was the first Indian that she had ever seen and that her fear was due to the horrid stories of pioneer days that produced this feeling. When I found this out, like any mischievous child will do, I enjoyed frightening her more. Once she was gathering grapes in the arbor and I jumped from behind a rose bush with a terrifying war whoop which I'd heard at the dances at home, a hatchet in my hand held high over my head and my hair stringing around my face. The poor woman screamed bloody murder and fled for the house. I can still see those striped stockings and eight gored skirts flying through the air. I suppose I did look like a savage of the olden days but my country mother never knew the details of these happenings. I always appeared innocent when corrected for them. It was hard for Mrs. Hooton to convince Mrs. Daines of her horror, because Quakers understand the Indians so well and are so fond of them that fear of an Indian is foolishness to them. After a period of some months when it was nearly time for me to return to Carlisle I made friends with Rebecca Hooton and we corresponded for some time afterwards. By giving her a pair of beaded moccasins and a bag, I had won her friendship at last. At least this is how I think I won it. Besides I stopped frightening her when she was unaware, and told her legends and so forth about my people at different times. She became interested in the race and her interest grew into a likeness instead of a dread and fear. . . .

My next transfer took me to the other side of the Delaware again to T. L. Passmore's of Stratam. These people lived in the country and I started to a little red school house on the hill where two of their children attended. There were about a hundred students, the smallest and roughest school that I have ever attended. The boys swore like troopers and the girls didn't do much less. I was called a squaw, savage, injun and every possible name they could think of relating to my race. What a contrast to the last school I had attended. My home life was a happy one but my school days hellish. About three months later our home was quarantined for measles, then whooping cough, which ended our school year much to my joy. I'd rather be sick than suffer such slander at that school house. . . .

In the fall of the same year I again left for the country where I lived

in the second best home under the outing. It was with a little old, old maid at —, a suburb of —. Her name is Elsie Stowe, a first cousin of —, the novelist. She came from a noted old southern family, had been abroad several times and had met many noted people in her life. Often times she entertained the mayor of —, noted musicians and artists in her home. Every one loved her. She had been a beautiful china painter in her earlier days and loved the Indians' art of basketry, pottery and beadwork. Though Miss Stowe was very old she was still active in ladies' clubs and church organizations. It was the best sort of environment for me and indeed a very different one from any I had ever experienced. It was here that my ideals of life were set. I wanted to be a physical education teacher and the best kind of a one that I possibly could. Miss Stowe and I had many heart to heart talks about subjects that have proved most helpful to me. Race prejudice, religion, manners, kindness, the importance of education, associates and every worth while topic which I showed need for was discussed with me in the most helpful manner. I could never be too grateful to Miss Stowe for the training which I received while in her home. Miss Stowe had just moved to this community and no Indian students had ever attended the public school as there were no other patrons in this community. When I first started to G—— it was miserable for me. The boys called me "squaw woman" and the girls had nothing to do with me.

Sometimes when I arrived at the school gates a little behind some boys, they would stop and one would say "Wait kids, let the 'squaw woman' pass," and as I passed I was given a push or poke with the attempt to knock my books out of my arms, while the girls stood around and giggled or laughed aloud at the scene. There were a few of the girls who were my friends but they were never around it seemed when I needed their comfort. One day my English teacher asked me to tell the class something about roundups, branding, etc., as we had to give oral talks that day. I was very diffident about talking but she had warned me previously of this day, so Miss Stowe and I had worked out my talk together, I giving the facts and she helping me to present them interestingly. The boys of my class became so impressed with the fact that I was a girl and had done many things which they no doubt had longed to do but never had the opportunity, that I was not tormented outside of school hardly at all after that. My teacher thought that I did so well that it was decided that I tell of my people and mode of living in the next assembly period. When I was through talking the principal asked me to tell the students how I felt so far away from home and among strangers. Was I impressed with the eastern people or were they un-

friendly? At first I thought that I would say that *every one* was lovely toward me, then I decided that I would be frank and say what I really thought. The pupils who had given me such nick names seemed embarrassed when I proceeded to say that I was terribly unhappy when at school because of the names called me and the insults made and that I longed for the time to leave. I mentioned that my instructors and a few of the pupils were friendly, but that I longed to be friendly with every one. The principal thought that I did so well in my illustrated talk (as I had had a few Indian relics there that day to demonstrate with) that it was decided later that I talk to the high school of ——. This was talked of quite a bit among the G—— pupils and so I had finally made good in the eyes of my school mates. The last half of the school year I was secretary of the student body and vice president of my class. We received our certificates at the graduation exercises at the high school and my classmates and instructors wanted me to dress in my Indian costume because I was the first real American to finish G——. Miss Stowe objected so it wasn't done. This school year ended the happiest in my life. I still correspond with two of my teachers and a few of the students who have now finished the University of ——. . . .

After I finished High School I taught the fourth grade at D—— for a year. A year ago last fall I entered the University of ——. What a disappointment at first! I had always been told by my country mothers that when I reached college there would be a feeling of democracy, no racial prejudices or hard feeling of any sort toward one's nationality. How I had looked forward to those days. I soon found out differently for soon after I arrived, a conversation was held at my table which exposed very plainly the feeling for an Indian. Each one took their turn in tearing the race to pieces, morally, mentally, and spiritually. Up to this time I thought that every girl knew that I was a native American, but it appeared that they didn't, for the head of the table turned to me and asked me to express my opinion of the race. My reply was frank as well as lengthy. My reply was that there were all classes of people in all races and, of course, I stood by the medium class of Indians as well as the best, that I took for granted that they believed in the old saying that the "dead Indian was the only good Indian" but that was because they were either prejudiced towards the race, or that they had only seen the worst classes. Another girl pipes up, "Well you talk as if you knew something about them, Frosh." My answer was that I ought to know a little about them since I still had close relatives in the blanket. The table was silent it seemed for minutes. The girls admitted that they had been hasty in their remarks and decisions and the rest of the meal they

were more humble in their opinions. Since then those girls of that table have proven to be among my best friends.

My house mother didn't like me at all the first year and I still don't think that she cares much about my race judging from a few remarks I've heard, though she has been very pleasant to me this year. About a month ago my mother passed away and I have felt terribly depressed because I realized that that ended my family entirely. However, I could not ask my house mother to be any more thoughtful than she has been, which has indeed been a great help to me. I value her friendship.

And now I have written sheets trying to give you an idea of my school life. Mine is not the hardest of Indian students by any means, nor has it been one of flowery ease, but I have learned a great deal in my experiences in living with all kinds of people, experiences which I would exchange with no one in spite of the fact that I am an American Indian. There was a time in my life that I prayed to be anyone but myself because I was an Indian. Because I was always being classed as different from other people and I hated publicity. That feeling of being somewhat conspicuous in a crowd of people has never left me nor I don't think it ever will, though I have gained some ease and self control. I know that I haven't created that feeling myself because I am of a pleasant sociable nature if the rest of the people about me are just half way so. Once I am given the "cold shoulder," or snubbed in better words, I lack initiative to go ahead because of the fear of some slander or insult I might receive for being too forward. If I am made angry I gain my self-confidence and usually stick the thing out because I can't bear to be dogged in the least. There is no prejudice in my heart for any race. Personality is the point on which I base my likes and dislikes, not the external characteristics. I hope some day that I may reach the stage at which I can return good for any evil done me regardless of its sting.

139. The Jew and American Social Attitudes ¹

Although born in —, —, I lived in — until 13 years ago, when I came to America.

I attended a grammar school in — that was for Jewish students only, although publicly supported,—that is, an official school. The teachers, however, were nearly all Gentiles. In America the grammar school I attended was practically as Jewish as the one I had attended in the old world, except that it contained Italians and Russians and other cosmopolitans. The teachers here were also all Gentiles, but they had a

¹ From an autobiography in the author's collection. Used by permission.

peculiar understanding of, and sympathy for their foreign students. My school life was quite successful. I was the school orator and I enjoyed life in my limited world. Nothing here to arouse my race consciousness.

Then I attended a high school in which my co-religionists were in the minority. Here it was my race consciousness began to develop. Why it was I cannot say. Perhaps I was simply growing older and observing that Jews were not singled out for honors and favors. It was not until my last year that I was able to feel any social satisfaction. I won an oratory contest and was chosen to be speaker at the Memorial Day assembly. And here I made a discovery—that my compensation for a feeling of racial inferiority was winning honors that would for a time at least set me somewhat above my fellow students. Yet I have never made it my aim to work for these honors at the expense of all else. I have no such mania.

By the time I reached the university I knew pretty well that I was a Jew, although I had associated as little as possible with other Jews. I remember before coming here being told confidentially by another Jew who had gone to school here that "you know, Jews aren't allowed in fraternities at —." I have since hated that fellow for telling me that. I already knew it, and I cared little then and less now. But I had anticipated school with a joy that left no room for thoughts of race, and he spoiled much of my expectancy.

To me the sensitivity is evident in racial matters. I confess to be a rather lone soul—there are times when I would give anything to be away from everybody—family, friends, and all others. I always feel somewhat out of place in a social gathering, because of this. The general insipid conduct of a party crowd bores me, and even has the unusual effect of angering me. I know I am not generally thought to hold such ideas. I have made some measures of success in activities at this school, and that, I see, is regarded as evidence of "good mixing." This I deny. But whatever the reason may be, I am accepted as someone somewhat in authority. That is due rather to the position I hold than to me myself. Yet I never feel that I have any right to say yes or no. I insist on telling myself over and over again that "I am as good as the next fellow," but always, always underneath I am saying "I am a Jew, and even if I am as good as the next fellow nobody will admit it." The other fellow flatters me in his complimentary talk, and he humbly seeks my co-operation in some movement and I assent. But I can never feel that the compliment is sincere. I always feel that if a showdown would ever come—well, I have always hated to think of the disillusionment that would await

me. I know I am wrong in feeling this way, but I am never able to fully break away from the thought.

My college career so far has been very pleasant indeed. I have debated for the university, an ambition I hoped to fulfil ever since I first thought of coming here; I have had some measure of success in activities in general. My compensations, I say. When I knew I was to debate, I used to lay awake nights dreaming of myself standing on the platform swaying the audience, I heard my opponent speak, and I saw his arguments fall before my sarcasm. I am indeed quite vitriolic at times, and sarcasm seems quite native to me. Later when I knew I was to be managing editor of the college daily, I dreamt night after night, making plans and building beautiful air castles. Naturally dreams don't always come true, but expectation is so pleasant!

140. Religious Prejudice ¹

A group of counties in Ontario were settled in the second and third decades of the last century by Scotch, Scotch-Irish, and South-of-Ireland immigrants. Land was plentiful and excellent, there were no religious requirements, and, one would say, no opportunities for social distinctions; and yet, I have still to find a society where race feeling is more bitter and unreasoning.

I have been able to explain the situation to myself only in terms of past days. Ulster was, of course, "planted" long ago by Protestant Scotch; Campbells and Rosses and MacDonalds abound in the north-eastern counties of Ireland. These settlers were given extraordinary favors by the English government. They prospered, and they were in proportion hated by the Catholic Irish whom they had dispossessed, and who were living under conditions of destitution and religious persecution. I need not go over the two or three centuries of strife and accumulated bitterness; sufficient to point out that it was obviously based on two of the three principles of prejudice, namely, economic rivalry and religious difference, the latter in days when men took their religion, or at least their creed, seriously, believed steadfastly in a personal devil, and in the active jealousy of a tyrannical deity.

After the War of 1812, the British government decided to encourage colonization in Upper Canada, and made very liberal offers to any who would undertake to establish homes in this new country. Transportation was provided, and clear title to one hundred acres of land to each head of a family, with provisions for one year guaranteed. The opportunity

¹ From a private document in the author's collection. Used by permission.

was not restricted, but was open to all inhabitants of the British Isles. Those were lean years following the Napoleonic Wars, and a chance for a new start appealed to a considerable number, particularly to those who were engaged in the textile industries, suffering just then from the aftermath of a great war, and from the competition of the new factories springing up on the Continent. What appears to have been a whole neighborhood of Paisley weavers pulled up stakes; and about the same time, several families from the North of Ireland. These two groups took up land in the same locality and got on together splendidly: the Ulstermen bore well-known old Scotch names, and above all, they were Presbyterians, and feared the wrath of the same dour God.

In 1820, there occurred one of those periodic failures of crops in Ireland, and one of the early exoduses to this side of the ocean. Many came independently to the United States; some availed themselves of the government's offer and appeared among the Scotch and Scotch-Irish in the new settlements. They came under exactly the same conditions; there was plenty of land and good land. But apparently they mistrusted the sincerity of the British government, and they certainly brought with them their age-old fear and hatred of any Protestant Irishman. Almost immediately there developed a feud. Some of the South-of-Ireland men came from the village of Ballygiblin in County Cork, and as "Ballygibblins" they terrorized the countryside. They would stop a man on his way to the mill, and steal his grist; and that, in those bare years, was like horse-stealing in the Old West. They would drive off a family pig, which meant the winter's supply of meat, or they would even set fire to a barn or a house. Finally, a body of militia was sent from Ottawa, and a number were summarily hanged. The Irish have always maintained, of course, that the Protestants were quite as much to blame, but their offense, as usual, was condoned by the government.

The old hard days are gone. The land is a garden. The soil is extremely fruitful, the cities are excellent markets, and the efforts of any industrious farmer yield many fold. But the bitterness of those early years has not been obliterated. Of course, physical difference is not a factor. And one would think that economic rivalry would be a thing of the past, in view of the very general prosperity. But there is no doubt that religious bigotry and lack of understanding color every phase of life.

I cannot remember ever as a child having a friend who was a Catholic. When we wished to do absolutely the most daring thing we could imagine, we tiptoed in fear and trembling into the Catholic Church in the neighborhood. I recall distinctly the feeling of intense surprise with

which I emerged after one visit to find that nothing had really happened to me, that the sun still shone, and that I had no pain anywhere, although I had defied God by dipping my fingers into the basin of holy water.

In these communities, separate education, both schools financed by public funds, is the rule up to the high school; but even there, Catholic children are not required to imperil their souls by listening to the Lord's Prayer offered by Protestant lips. Many questions of local politics are decided on religious grounds; in the village in which I was born, no Catholic could possibly be elected to any public office however unimportant. The "Orange" lodges are very strong, and July twelfth is a legal holiday. The town is gay with bunting for the celebration of the anniversary of King William's victory in 1690, little Protestant boys and girls make themselves ill with ice-cream and peanuts in his honor, but little Catholic boys and girls are kept strictly in their own backyards. The word "Catholic" is not uttered without a change of tone, the significant dropping of the voice with which one might quote a term of profanity in a none too pious anecdote. Catholic priests are, of course, "monsters of iniquity." I still remember my amazement one day when I was about seven. I had stubbed my toe and met the gravel path with considerable force and was lamenting loudly, and it was the gently-smiling "Father" who set me to rights, wiped my eyes, and consoled me with large white peppermints which he mysteriously produced from somewhere in his voluminous garments—the identical brand of peppermint that my grandmother kept in her reticule to help me through the last half of a substantial Presbyterian sermon! Just what my panic-stricken heart expected of him I cannot say, but certainly not kindness, and emphatically not the good old Calvinistic peppermint.

All of this is purely religious prejudice, and yet there is a racial element, too. For in a county to the south, there is a considerable settlement of Highlanders who are staunch Catholics. They are regarded with sorrowing pity rather than with the withering scorn that is meted out to their Irish co-religionists. Poor things, some great mistake has somehow been made! Surely the Almighty will not hold them wholly responsible, for aren't they also called McKinnon and McDonnell and McIlquham? Surely St. Peter will not be hard when he hears those charmed names!

One of my mother's cousins married an Irishman. Only one who knows can possibly conceive of the courage it must have taken. My grandmother hastened to condole with the grief-stricken parents, as though the girl were dead and buried. "Oh, Janet woman," groaned my

uncle Sandy, "we're mixed amang the Irish!" A neighbor, whose daughter had decided to commit the same treason to her family and her God, wept to my great-aunt: "I'd rather wheel her to the kirkyard in a wheel-barrow, than see her marry an Irishman!" It did not seem to alter the situation that this particular Irishman was an extremely prosperous, fine, "up-standing" young farmer—his name was O'Hara. My father likes to quote a sentence from a prayer, which whether authentic or not, is not incredible: "Oh Lord, build a wall as high as heaven between the cursed Irish and Thy chosen people the Scotch!"

Of course, these are extreme cases, and of course, the prejudice, on the surface at least, is dying out or being covered up by other interests, as the isolation of a backcountry community gives way before the Ford. I was much interested during the war to hear stories of mothers who had lost their sons forgetting that one should go for consolation to the Catholic Church, and the other to the Auld Kirk, and to find my aunt serving on committees with women of most unlikely names. And yet, only lately, when my father was ill and we had been fortunate enough to secure a fine, kind Irish girl to care for him, that same aunt exclaimed in a shocked whisper on the first Friday: "My dear, we'll have to let her go. Did you see? She wouldn't eat her meat!"

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises.

1. What is the present anthropological view of race differences?
2. According to Boas which is of most importance in accounting for racial differences, heredity and race or culture and opportunity? Discuss this problem pro and con.
3. What is essential to the understanding of other races?
4. What are some of current stereotypes and legends which keep the negro and white races from arriving at a more satisfactory bi-racial arrangement?
5. What relation has race problems to the geographic distribution of races? Show by reference to the population distribution of Negroes, Japanese and whites in this country. What is the situation in this regard in Hawaii?
6. Why have few or no race riots taken place south of the Mason-Dixon Line?
7. Why have race riots taken place in the Northern states?
8. Even if it be found that Negroes, on the average are slightly inferior to the whites, even when cultural opportunities seem to be fairly equivalent, is this fact logical ground for a prejudice?

9. Cite examples, giving legends and stereotypes, of Negro-White prejudices of which you know. (Use the case history method.)
 10. Do the same for White-Oriental prejudice.
 11. What is meant by the expression "the Negro has never lived in the white man's world"?
 12. Can you indicate a possible correlation between the culture level of the rural whites in the South and the existence of lynching in these same rural sections?
 13. What factors make for religious prejudice?
 14. Does an organization like the Ku Klux Klan stimulate or allay religious and race prejudice? Discuss pro and con.
 15. Cite examples, if you can, of religious prejudice? (Use the case history method.)
 16. How do you account for the fact that the Negroes and whites get on better in Jamaica and in other regions of the world than they do in our own southern states?
- B. Topics for Class Reports
1. Review Peterson's study of Negro-White mental abilities. (Cf. bibliography.)
 2. Review Kroeber's treatment of alleged racial differences. (Cf. bibliography.)
 3. Report on Woodworth's paper on racial differences. (Cf. bibliography.)
 4. Review Reuter's book on the mulatto to show the place which the mulatto has in Negro life. (Cf. bibliography.)
- C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers
1. The Social Psychology of Religious Prejudice.
 2. The Approach to Bi-racial Accommodation in the United States.
 3. Race and Culture: Conflict of Social Theories.
 4. The Mulatto: a Product of Race Mixture and of Culture.
 5. The Development of Race Consciousness in the Black Race.
 6. The Social Psychology of Mixed-Blood Peoples.
 7. Prejudice and Cultural Isolation.

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
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PART FIVE

LEADERSHIP AND PRESTIGE
IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR



CHAPTER XX

CHARACTERISTICS OF LEADERSHIP AND PRESTIGE

I. INTRODUCTION

No account of the social behavior of man would be complete without giving attention to the factor of prestige and leadership. The relation of the leader to the masses, the factor of personal ascendancy in social groups, has been a frequent subject of both history and literature. It was once customary for enterprising debating societies to consider the question: "Do Great Men Make History or Does History Make Great Men?" While the present writer feels that this is somewhat akin to the ancient hen or the egg controversy or the more recent foolish separation of heredity from environment, nevertheless serious attention has been given this problem. Carlyle, Emerson, and Froude, to mention but three of the nineteenth century writers, had much to say in defense of the Great Man thesis. Certainly the writings of Stirner and Nietzsche gave impetus to the notion. More latterly the work on individual differences following Galton, Pearson, Cattell and Terman has made prominent the idea that superior ability plays an important function in social processes. Ward and Galton, in fact, carried on something of a controversy over the whole matter of ability versus opportunity, the former holding that cultural forces far outweighed any innate individual differences. The psychologists following Galton's lead have, on the whole, tended to see in superior ability the key to progress and invention while most sociological writers follow Ward and take the other position.

No doubt the truth lies between these extremes. Much of the difficulty has been that each side offered a simple particular formula to explain a complex phenomenon. The view taken in the present volume is perhaps more adequate since it would recognize individual differences in ability: it would realize the importance of social inter-

stimulation and interaction; and finally, it would take into account the culture factor as well. Thus the social process is not one dimensional, it is rather three dimensional including the factors: the individual, the social group and the cultural patterns.

Before introducing the materials a word may be said concerning the terms leadership and prestige. The one is often used to indicate the uniqueness and individual quality of the person who is the pace-setter of the group. The other rather implies the power and position accorded an individual by the group. In fact, prestige and leadership go hand in hand together, so that we have employed both words here, with the distinct connotation just noted.

The opening papers by Thomas and Stein give the setting of leadership in the larger social process. Emerson's discussion on the uses of great men while not stated in modern psychological or sociological terms is one of the most incisive analyses of the factors making for leadership and prestige in our language. Cooley carries the analysis of mental traits of leaders further into the social psychological field, while Gowin indicates briefly the relation of leadership to crisis. In an earlier section we noted this last point and the reader may refer again to the paper by Prince (Chapter V).

As an illustration of physical differences between certain types of leaders and ordinary men, a selection from Gowin is included which shows that executives, on the average, are heavier and taller than the average men. Perhaps in the case of intellectual and artistic leadership this physical factor is of less importance.

Chapin's paper presents an analysis of leadership in reference to a number of groups within a community. The overlapping of leadership is very evident. The person who steps out ahead in one group and takes a place of superordination is pretty apt to take a somewhat similar place in any other group to which he belongs.

In the second section are a group of papers dealing more particularly with the prestige factor. The selection from Leopold gives the history of the word prestige. It must still be evident that there is much of the mystery-man about many leaders. At least the masses project such notions on to the leader. Le Bon's paper discusses kinds of prestige.

Cooley shows how leadership rests upon certain incipient movements in the bulk of the group which the leader crystallizes. There

is again an interplay of factors, not a simple one-dimensional cause and effect situation.

Michels shows how much the masses venerate leaders, how they seem to need idols and persons whom they can worship. Le Bon's paper on leaders and faith indicates how the leader establishes the beliefs and attitudes of the crowd. Cooley carries this notion further to show that the leader serves as an ideal symbol for the masses. There is also emulation as well as identification of the led with the leader. And Lipsky shows how authority grows by its ancient and sacred position and how the individual who is a leader for a crowd is really a synthetic person, the creation of legend, myth, and stereotype.

The quotation from Mackay shows how prestige-bearers (leaders) affect conventions of all sorts. This is plainly evident in modern fashions.

Leadership depends for its power on the use of words and phrases which touch off the deeper emotions and interests of the masses. The paper by Abdul Majid brings this clearly before us. The paragraph from Mr. Leadbetter about Mrs. Besant is a fine example of verbalism surcharged with emotion and little else. And yet it is this which moves people to action. Apparently the more abstract, the more mystical, the more verbalistic a writer or speaker is, so long as these words stir the emotions, the better he is liked. This fact is brought out by Schwarz. Finally the persuasion of the crowd by the leader is one of the appeal to unconscious attitudes and beliefs, not to reasoned objective facts. Overstreet lays down twenty short rules in regard to public speaking which indicates the necessity of playing upon the audience in terms of some of the appeals we have discussed.

II. MATERIALS

A. GENERAL FEATURES OF LEADERSHIP

141. The Influence of Leadership¹

Another incident of profound importance to the state of consciousness

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of the group is the emergence of a great personality. The man of genius is a biological freak, whose appearance cannot be anticipated or predetermined. All that we can say is that a certain number of individuals characterized by unusual artistic or inventive faculty, great courage, will, and capacity for organization, or unusual suggestibility in respect to religious and philosophical questions, do occasionally appear in every group, and that they powerfully influence the life-direction and the consciousness of their groups. Moses, Mohammed, Confucius, Christ, Aristotle, Peter the Great, Newton, Darwin, Shakespeare, have left ineffaceable impressions on the national life, and on the mental states of individuals as well. The fact that a school of thinkers at the present day grows up about a philosopher, or that a religious teacher may gather about him a group of fanatically faithful adherents, is a repetition of a principle of imitation which, apparently, has been in force since the beginning of associated life, and which in the history of all groups has tended to direct the thought and activity of the multitude into fixed channels. The central Australian aboriginal is as influential in his smaller group as Aristotle in a larger, until the advent of the white man breaks up his influence. The Chinese are today carrying out principles of conduct inculcated by Confucius and Mencius, no crisis of sufficient importance having intervened to break up the old habits and establish new ones. The manner in which copies for belief and practice are set by the medicine man, the priest, the political leader, the thinker, the agitator, the artist, and, in general, by the uncommon personality, as well as the more spontaneous manifestations of suggestion and hypnotism in public opinion and mob action, are to be studied from the standpoint both of individual and of group-consciousness.

142. The Sociology of Authority¹

By "authority" we mean logically the "untested acceptance of another's judgment." To submit to authority implies the surrender of one's own judgment in favor of another. It means refraining from the expression of private judgment in view of the binding force of the judgment of persons, books, or institutions recognized by us as bearers of authority. The psychic basis of all need for authority is the belief in the superiority of those accepted by us as authorities, be they psychical or hyperphysical persons, works, or institutions. When we conform our thoughts and corresponding actions to the command or counsel of authorities, either set

¹ Reprinted by permission from Ludwig Stein "The Sociology of Authority" *Pub. Am. Sociol. Society*: 1923: XVIII: pp. 117-119.

up or consented to by us, these authorities become moving springs of our action. We subordinate in this case our own will to that of another, be that God or king, religious revelation, or secular law. What the authorities have felt before us, we have to feel after them, what they have thought we have to think, what, finally, they have willed, we have but to will. Command there, obedience here. The authorities fix the rules, norms, and laws of thought, feeling, and action. Those who submit to these authorities or to their bearers are but executive organs—the administrative arm, so to speak, where the authorities represent the legislative. The authorities are the organs for retarding or accentuating our will, as the case may be. They create the value of general validity. They mint the coin, while their adherents merely put it in circulation.

Whence, then, this voluntary enslavement and self-imposed guardianship of the entire human race? Since the beginning of authentic history we know of no people among whom there has not been in effect an above and a below, a cleavage between those who commanded and those who obeyed, those who ruled and those who served, in short, a social differentiation into classes. Could it be a mere accident that the aboriginal state of anarchy has everywhere yielded with advancing civilization to externally regulated convention and law, to a more or less complicated, usually graduated system of subordination and superiority? Why do the *forms* of authority differ according to conditions of climate and soil, exactly as do languages and religious beliefs, while the *principle* of authority appears over all the earth to be just as necessary and irresistible as all languages contain within themselves a common logic?

If the craving of human nature for authority or support were only a historical category, that is, conditioned by space and time, consequently something relative—a fortuitous result that might also have appeared as something else—then that “general consent,” which has among all peoples and in all times and climes produced authority would remain a sociological riddle. Examples of such authority are the subjection of children to their parents (*patria potestas*), of pupils to teacher, of citizens to the state, of the faithful to their church, of laymen to specialists, of common soldiers to officers, of city dwellers to the officials, of political parties to their leaders. Without a subordination of the individual to a collectivity, the societal equilibrium among personalities as sensitive and responsive as we civilized men are would in the long run be impossible to maintain.

At any rate, in the economy of the history of mankind, the principle of authority plays the rôle of social regulator. In this sense I have characterized authority and anarchy as the two extremes of human associa-

tion. I have defined these concepts as follows: Authority is the unifying, integrating, species-conserving principle, while anarchy is the dissolving, disintegrating, species-destroying one: on one side, altruism, on the other, egoism; on one side, the general interest of the race, on the other, the special interest of the individual.

The fundamental conflict of human history is the perennial opposition between the individual and the race, between personality and community. Personality resists the engulfing and leveling effect of authority, the more stubbornly and confidently as time goes on. The theme of modern history since the Renaissance, the age of Humanism and the Reformation, is the struggle for personality, for autonomy against heteronomy, for individuality against authority.

Over against the political battle cry of Stahl, "Authority not majority," there stands sharply and irreconcilably that of Fichte, "Be a personality," the "Individual" of Stirner, and the "Superman" of Nietzsche. In the first position, the interests of the race are asserted just as one-sidedly at the expense of the individual, as in the other the interests of the individual are placed in the foreground quite divorced from those of the race. The antitheses: authority and anarchy, communism and individualism, race interests and individual interests, are always formulated by the dogmatic adherents of the respective philosophies as an exclusive alternative: *either* authority *or* anarchy. No third possibility is presented. But a sociological treatment of the problem of authority will no more admit of the bias on the right than on the left. Where doctrinaire antagonists see only an ardent "either . . . or," the sociological observer discerns a cooler "both . . . and." The problem of authority then involves a reconciliation of opposites.

In the absence of all authority, the human family could no more be educated and guided than by means of an authority that smothered and leveled all personality. Bolshevism as a philosophy was wrecked upon the problem of authority. The place of Czar Nicholas was taken by Lenin. At extremes the human race can never permanently come to rest, for every societal principle carried to its logical limit upsets the equilibrium and finally succumbs to its own anemic one-sidedness. Thus the communistic historian, Hyppolite Castille, once wrote: "The principle of authority is a perpetual safeguard of human society." Robespierre was a remarkable man not on account of his gifts and his virtues, but because of his sense of authority. In fact, even predatory states, like the Filibusters, find themselves forced to set up and obey authorities. This psychic urge to social organization, which breaks forth with elemental force even where personality is in inner revolt against whatever species

of authority, proves unmistakably that the problem of authority, exactly like the problem of faith, its twin sister, concerns not historical but psychological categories. That the bolshevists had to substitute for the dictatorship from above one from below is a classical example for the sociology of authority.

143. Uses of Great Men¹

It is natural to believe in great men. If the companions of our childhood should turn out to be heroes, and their condition regal it would not surprise us. All mythology opens with demigods, and the circumstance is high and poetic; that is, their genius is paramount. In the legends of the Gautama, the first men ate the earth and found it deliciously sweet.

The search after the great man is the dream of youth and the most serious occupation of manhood. We travel into foreign parts to find his works,—if possible, to get a glimpse of him.

The race goes with us on their credit. The knowledge that in the city is a man who invented the railroad, raises the credit of all the citizens. But enormous populations, if they be beggars, are disgusting, like moving cheese, like hills of ants or of fleas,—the more, the worse.

Our religion is the love and cherishing of these patrons. The gods of fable are the shining moments of great men. We run all our vessels into one mold. Our colossal theologies of Judaism, Christism, Buddhism, Mahometism, are the necessary and structural action of the human mind. The student of history is like a man going into a warehouse to buy cloths or carpets. He fancies he has a new article. If he go to the factory, he shall find that his new stuff still repeats the scrolls and rosettes which are found on the interior walls of the pyramids of Thebes. Our theism is the purification of the human mind. Man can paint, or make, or think, nothing but man. He believes that the great material elements had their origin from his thought. And our philosophy finds one essence collected or distributed.

Our common discourse respects two kinds of use or service from superior men. Direct giving is agreeable to the early belief of men; direct giving of material or metaphysical aid, as of health, eternal youth, fine senses, arts of healing, magical power and prophecy. The boy believes there is a teacher who can sell him wisdom. Churches believe in imputed merit. But, in strictness, we are not much cognizant of

¹ The selections here from R. W. Emerson, *Representative Men*, pp. 3; 4-5; 7-9; 13-14; 15; 22-32 are used by permission of, and arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company, the authorized publishers.

direct serving. Man is endogenous, and education is his unfolding. The aid we have from others is mechanical compared with the discoveries of nature in us. What is thus learned is delightful in the doing, and the effect remains. Right ethics are central and go from the soul outward. Gift is contrary to the law of the universe. Serving others is serving us. I must absolve me to myself. "Mind thy affair," says the spirit:—"coxcomb, would you meddle with the skies, or with other people?" Indirect service is left. Men have a pictorial or representative quality, and serve us in the intellect. Behmen and Swedenborg saw that things were representative. Men are also representative; first, of things, and secondly, of ideas.

As plants convert the minerals into food for animals, so each man converts some raw material in nature to human use. The inventors of fire, electricity, magnetism, iron, lead, glass, linen, silk, cotton; the makers of tools; the inventor of decimal notation; the geometer; the engineer; the musician,—severally make an easy way for all, through unknown and impossible confusions. Each man is by secret liking connected with some district of nature, whose agent and interpreter he is; as Linnaeus, of plants; Huber, of bees; Fries, of lichens; Van Mons, of pears; Dalton, of atomic forms; Euclid, of lines; Newton, of fluxions.

Men are helpful through the intellect and the affections. Other help I find a false appearance. If you affect to give me bread and fire, I perceive that I pay for it the full price, and at last it leaves me as it found me, neither better nor worse: but all mental and moral force is a positive good. It goes out from you, whether you will or not, and profits me whom you never thought of. I cannot even hear of personal vigor of any kind, great power of performance, without fresh resolution. We are emulous of all that man can do.

Under this head too falls that homage, very pure as I think, which all ranks pay to the hero of the day, from Coriolanus and Gracchus down to Pitt, Lafayette, Wellington, Webster, Lamartine. Hear the shouts in the street! The people cannot see him enough. They delight in a man. Here is a head and a trunk! What a front! what eyes! Atlantean shoulders, and the whole carriage heroic, with equal inward force to guide the great machine! This pleasure of full expression to that which, in their private experience, is usually cramped and obstructed, runs also much higher, and is the secret of the reader's joy in literary genius.

I admire great men of all classes, those who stand for facts, and for thoughts; I like rough and smooth, "Scourges of God," and "Darlings of the human race." I like the first Cæsar; and Charles V., of Spain;

and Charles XII., of Sweden; Richard Plantagenet; and Bonaparte, in France. I applaud a sufficient man, an officer equal to his office; captains, ministers, senators. I like a master standing firm on legs of iron, well-born, rich, handsome, eloquent, loaded with advantages, drawing all men by fascination into tributaries and supporters of his power. Sword and staff, or talents sword-like or staff-like, carry on the work of the world. But I find him greater when he can abolish himself and all heroes, by letting in this element of reason, irrespective of persons, this subtilizer and irresistible upward force, into our thought, destroying individualism; the power so great that the potentate is nothing. Then he is a monarch who gives a constitution to his people; a pontiff who preaches the equality of souls and releases his servants from their barbarous homages; an emperor who can spare his empire.

144. Mental Traits of Leaders¹

If we ask what are the mental traits that distinguish a leader, the only answer seems to be that he must, in one way or another, be a great deal of a man, or at least appear to be. He must stand for something to which men incline, and so take his place by right as a focus of their thought.

Evidently he must be the best of his kind available. It is impossible that he should stand forth as an archetype, unless he is conceived as superior, in some respect, to all others within range of the imagination. Nothing that is seen to be second-rate can be an ideal. The object of admiration may be Caesar Borgia, or Napoleon, or Jesse James the train-robber, but he must be typical, must stand for something. No matter how bad the leader may be, he will always be found to owe his leadership to something strong, affirmative, and superior.

To be a leader, involves, on the one hand, a significant individuality, and, on the other, breadth of sympathy, the two being different phases of personal calibre, rather than separate traits.

It is because a man cannot stand for anything except as he has a significant individuality, that self-reliance is so essential a trait in leadership; except as a person trusts and cherishes his own special tendency, different from that of other people and usually opposed by them in its inception, he can never develop anything of peculiar value. He has to free himself from the domination of purposes already defined and urged upon him by others, and bring up something fresh out of the vague

¹ Reprinted by permission from C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, pp. 293; 294-96. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902.

under-world of sub-consciousness; and this means an intense self, a militant, gloating "I." Emerson's essay on self-reliance only formulates what has always been the creed of significant persons.

On the other hand, success in unfolding a special tendency and giving vogue to it, depends upon being in touch, through sympathy, with the current of human life. All leadership takes place through the communication of ideas to the minds of others, and unless the ideas are so presented as to be congenial to those other minds, they will evidently be rejected. It is because the novelty is not alien to us, but is seen to be ourself in a fresh guise, that we welcome it.

It has frequently been noticed that personal ascendancy is not necessarily dependent upon any palpable deed in which power is manifested, but there is often a conviction of power and an expectation of success that go before the deed and control the minds of men without apparent reason. There is something fascinating about this immediate and seemingly causeless personal efficacy, and many writers of insight lay great stress upon it. Most men of executive force possess something of this direct ascendancy, and some, like Napoleon, Cromwell, Bismarck, and Andrew Jackson, have had it in pre-eminent measure. It is not confined to any class, however; but exists in an infinite variety of kinds and degrees; and men of thought may have it as well as men of action. Dante, Milton, Goethe, and their like, bear the authority to dominate the minds of others like a visible mantle upon their shoulders, inspiring a sense of reverence and a tendency to believe and follow in all the impressionable people they meet. Such men are only striking examples of what we are all familiar with in daily life, most persons of decided character having something imposing about them at times. Indeed, there is hardly anyone so insignificant that he does not seem imposing to someone at some time.

145. Crises and Types of Leadership¹

It would follow that leadership assumes maximum importance in times when the organization is under stress. Periods of uncertainty, of transition, of struggle intensify the group needs, and in them have all social saviors been born.

To whom shall we today grant this title? To him best able to bear the burden of a large organization, most versatile in dealing with its complexities, most adroit in pushing it at top speed, and most effective in guaranteeing its members greatest returns for least effort.

¹ From E. B. Gowin, *The Executive and His Control of Men*, pp. 6-7. Copyright 1915 by the Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

Two types of men, each in his own way, seek to satisfy these tests: one, *intellectual*,—author, scientist, artist, historian, theologian, philosopher; the other, *executive*,—railroad president, governor, bishop, university president, trade-union official, factory superintendent. In one type, intellect is emphasized; in the other, personal impression—a distinction by no means arbitrary, however. The intellectual leader is never divorced from face-to-face relations, and the personal leader depends upon intellect at every step. The difference is one of relative emphasis only.

146. Individual Differences: Executives Compared with Average Men ¹

Should not leaders be physically large?

It was with a view to bringing statistical evidence to bear upon this question, among others, that a letter of inquiry was sent to one hundred leading railroad executives, presidents in most cases, but a number of general managers of the larger systems being also included; fifty-five replied. Tabulated, their answers reveal the interesting information that this group of men average five feet, ten and nine tenths inches in height; weight one hundred eighty-six pounds. A slightly different type of leader was then chosen, and letters of inquiry sent to the respective governors. Forty-six replies were tabulated. The governors are five feet, eleven and two tenths inches tall; and weight, one hundred eighty-two pounds. Another group of leaders was next selected, this time from the educational field, *the university presidents*. Seventy-six letters were sent; sixty-one replies received. Again was indicated a man of relatively large physique; height five feet, ten and eight tenths inches, weight one hundred eighty-one pounds. One more illustration may here be given. Our country has its reformers, vigorous agitators against city congestion, tuberculosis, bad health and housing, harbingers of good roads, short ballots, workmen's compensation, etc. These men, usually termed executive secretaries, to the number of forty-two gave personal data. Their height is five feet, eleven and four tenths inches; weight one hundred eighty-one pounds.

Following this list, 2197 additional letters were sent, making a total of 2497. The names of those to whom inquiry was directed were secured from Who's Who, various directories, catalogues, and in some cases from secretaries or others informed regarding the particular group.

¹ From E. B. Gowin, *The Executive and His Control of Men*, pp. 22-26; 28-29; 31-32. Copyright 1915 by the Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

The returns, it is believed, cover practically every important group of leaders in America.

The Height of Executives

In addition to the returns received from the executives it was thought advisable to secure data from intellectuals.

In all, data were received from forty different groups of leaders, the most prominent men in the country.

The replies received from these various groups were tabulated and the groups then arranged according to the average height of their members. In looking through this list of forty groups, one finds the executives predominating in the upper ranks while in the intellectuals are all within the lower twenty groups.

The Weight of Executives

In a similar way we may study the returns as to weight. The same general conclusion is shown here, although the result in this case is somewhat more clear-cut than in the table showing heights. The executives predominate in the upper ranks, the six groups of intellectuals being confined to the lower quarter of the groups.

It is clear, in consequence, that the conclusion to be drawn from the table below is not that eminence in general is necessarily correlated with size, but that superiority in weight and height tend to favor one in the contest for executive positions. If the tables are examined, then, not from the standpoint of eminence but with such questions as these in mind, Does this man's daily work require him to meet others in an intimate, give-and-take way? How many people must he deal with, and what kind of people are they? It is believed the favorable relationship between size and executive capacity will not fail to impress the reader.

Table Showing both Height and Weight

NAME OF GROUP	HEIGHT	WEIGHT
Superintendents Street Cleaning	5: 11.3	216.7
Wardens	5: 11.3	191.2
Chiefs of Police	5: 11.1	202.4
Railroad Presidents	5: 10.9	186.3
Bank Presidents	5: 10.7	186.8
Reformers	5: 11.4	181.7
Governors	5: 11.2	182.0
Senators	5: 10.6	185.0
Chiefs Fire Departments	5: 10.3	189.4

Table Showing both Height and Weight (continued)

NAME OF GROUP	HEIGHT	WEIGHT
Presidents of Labor Organizations	5: 10.4	186.3
University Presidents	5: 10.8	181.6
Y. M. C. A. Secretaries	5: 10.3	188.6
Anti-Saloon League Organizers	5: 10.3	184.9
Presidents Fraternal Orders	5: 9.6	190.4
City School Superintendents	5: 10.4	178.6
Social Organizers	5: 10.9	171.0
Factory Superintendents	5: 9.8	186.7
Bishops	5: 10.6	176.4
Corporation Directors	5: 10.4	179.8
World's Work List	5: 10.3	182.2
Sales Managers	5: 10.1	182.8
Economists and Sociologists	5: 10.8	170.8
Presidents State Bar	5: 10.5	171.5
Presidents Religious Organizations	5: 10.4	169.8
Mayors	5: 10.0	176.9
Labor Organizers	5: 8.2	186.1
Insurance Presidents	5: 9.7	175.2
Inventors	5: 10.2	169.4
Roundhouse Foremen	5: 9.3	177.0
Anti-Saloon League Officials	5: 9.2	176.3
Artists	5: 10.1	165.7
Authors	5: 10.2	158.0
Chief Justices State Courts	5: 9.6	169.0
Publishers	5: 7.9	171.9
Manufacturers	5: 9.0	169.9
Merchants	5: 9.4	163.7
Psychologists	5: 9.7	155.3
Philosophers	5: 9.6	158.4
Lecturers	5: 9.2	162.3
Musicians	5: 5.6	161.9

Executives Compared with Policyholders

The above comparison had to do with executives and intellectuals, but it would also be interesting to know how executives compare with the average man, the so-called man on the street. Unfortunately, so far as the author is aware, no satisfactory data concerning the average man have yet been collected in this country. But the life insurance records of their policyholders furnish a fairly good substitute, at least the best that is at present available.

The diagram (omitted) indicates that the executives considerably exceed the policyholders in height.

Size and Importance of Position Held

In noting the favorable relationship between these important executives and their size, one is led to inquire if there might not possibly be some connection between the executive's physique, as measured by height and weight, and the importance of the position he holds. Upon this question some interesting data have been collected, and though the results are not as conclusive as one might desire, they are still well worth consideration.

Statistics have been received from preachers in small towns and villages where the total amount raised for church support was under one thousand dollars annually; presidents of small colleges whose enrollment was under two hundred and fifty and annual budget under twelve thousand dollars; principals of small public schools whose monthly salary did not exceed seventy-five dollars; county attorneys from six different states; salesmen of typewriters; and station agents in towns not exceeding five hundred inhabitants.

In no way is it to be implied that stigma attaches to any of these men. They are merely filling less important positions than the bishops, university presidents, city school superintendents, and others with whom they are compared. Their respective heights and weights are as follows. In each case the larger position is held by the larger man.

Table of Physique in Relation to Position

	CLASS	HEIGHT	DIFFERENCE	WEIGHT	DIFFERENCE
1	Bishops	5: 10.6		176.4	
2	Preachers Small Towns	5: 8.8	1.8 in.	159.4	17.0 lb.
3	University Presidents	5: 10.8		181.6	
4	Presidents Small Colleges	5: 9.6	1.2 in.	164.0	17.6 lb.
5	City School Supts.	5: 10.4		178.6	
6	Principals Small Towns	5: 9.7	.7 in.	157.6	21.0 lb.
7	Presidents State Bar	5: 10.5		171.5	
8	County Attorneys	5: 10.0	.5 in.	162.4	9.1 lb.
9	Sales Managers	5: 10.1		182.8	
10	Salesmen	5: 9.1	1.1 in.	157.0	25.8 lb.
11	Railroad Presidents	5: 10.9		186.3	
12	Station Agents	5: 9.4	1.5 in.	154.6	31.7 lb.

147. Leadership and Group Activity ¹

As it is well to take a simple problem in the beginning, let us select a small community of 4,000 inhabitants for the purpose of discovering what sources of information about leadership and group activity exist in tangible form.

We might easily find that the following groupings of the inhabitants have taken place:

1. *Religious*

- (1) Methodist church
- (2) Baptist church
- (3) Catholic church
- etc.

2. *Occupational*

- (1) County medical association
- (2) Ministerial association
- (3) Board of Trade
- (4) Painters' union
- (5) Plumbers' union
- etc.

3. *Political*

- (1) Democratic club
- (2) Republican club
- etc.

4. *Social*

- (1) Country club
- (2) Woman's club
- (3) Fraternal lodges
- etc.

Each one of these groupings and others not mentioned that may exist, should be studied in terms of quantitative evidences of their activity that are a matter of record and that are accessible. The following quantitative facts are usually a matter of record or may be derived from the records, providing the investigator takes the time to gain the confidence of the leaders of the different groups, without which the investigation can hardly be made:

¹ Reprinted by permission from F. S. Chapin "Leadership and Group Activity" *J. App. Soc.* 1924: VIII: pp. 142-144; 144-145.

1. *Membership*

- (1) Total members by years for a term of years
- (2) Active members as determined by—
 - a—Average attendance as a per cent of total membership for a term of years
 - b—Membership on committees, average numbers as a per cent of members for a term of years
 - c—Distribution and average financial support by members
- 2. *Continuity of personnel in the chairmanships for a term of years*
- 3. *Cross section of membership personnel in different groups based on careful comparative study of the membership lists of the groups*
 - (1) Number of names common to—
 - a—Two or more lists
 - b—Three or more lists
 - c—Etc., for a number of years
 - (2) Number of names common to—
 - a—Two or more committees in the same group
 - b—Two or more committees in more than one group

At this point the hypothesis may be advanced: *There is a direct correlation between the number of groups that the average person may belong to and the intensity of his participation in each group activity as indicated by such objective facts as regularity of attendance, membership on committees, and financial support.*

If this hypothesis meets the affirmative tests of studies made by observers other than the present author, then it would seem that we might discover a *saturation point* for group activity within a given community. It is a well known fact of empirical observation that some communities are over-organized, while others are under-organized. It would seem possible to trace this saturation point of group activity back to the individual citizen's range of elasticity for participation in group activity, which in turn may be roughly measured as indicated.

May it not be that leadership is usually vested in that inner circle of personnel common to several groups? It has certainly been my observation and experience that in the average small community the leaders are active in several different groups. At this point the hypothesis may be advanced: *Leadership in the community is usually vested in an inner circle of personnel common to several active groups.*

Leaders are persons of greater activity than the average and so their range of elasticity for participation in group activities is greater than

the average man's. This inner circle of common personnel may be studied in terms of educational advantage, wealth, age, nationality, and other objective characteristics.

Factions and cliques are frequent characteristics of group activities. In other words, there is a *polarization of leadership* within the community. There is more than one inner circle of common personnel. The interlacings of groups are often complex in extreme. This consideration brings us to another hypothesis: *polarization of leadership within the community as between groups tends to elaborate until some leader's range of elasticity for participation in group activity is passed, when some one or more groups begin to disintegrate until an equilibrium of group activity is restored.* This process is accompanied by a redistribution of membership between operating groups, new allegiances are formed, new loyalties developed, and polarization of leadership again begins to elaborate until the process repeats itself.

B. PRESTIGE AND THE MASSES

148. History of the Word "Prestige"¹

Originally *prestige*—here, too, etymology proves to be an *enfant terrible*—means delusion. It is derived from the Latin *praestigiae* (-arum)—though it is found in the forms *praestigia* (ae) and *praestigium* (-ii) too: the juggler himself (dice-player, rope-walker, "strong man," etc.) was called *praestigiator* (oris). Latin authors and medieval writers of glossaries took the word to mean "deceptive juggling tricks," and, as far as we know, did not use it in its present signification. The *praestigiator* threw dice or put coins on a table, then passed them into a small vessel or box, moved the latter about quickly and adroitly, till finally, when you thought they were in a certain place, the coins turned up somewhere else: "the looker-on is deceived by such innocent tricks, being often inclined to presume the sleight of hand to be nothing more or less than magic art."

The practice of French writers in the oldest times was, so far as we have been able to discover, to use the word *prestige* at first in the signification above assigned to the Latin "*praestigiae*" (*prestige*, *prestigiateur*—*trice*, *prestigieux*). The use of the word was not restricted to the prestige of prophets, conjurers, demons, but was transferred by analogy to delusions the cause of which is not regarded any longer as

¹ Reprinted by permission from L. Leopold, *Prestige: A Psychological Study of Social Estimates*, pp. 16; 17-18; 18-19. London. T. Fisher Unwin, 1913.

supernatural. We hear of the prestige of illusions and fancy (*les prestiges du mirage et de la fantasmagorie*); the word is used of illusions generally, and Diderot actually makes mention of the prestige of harmony. The word "prestige" became transfigured, ennobled, and writers and orators refined it so as to make it applicable to analogies of the remotest character. Rousseau refers to the prestige of our passions, which dazzles the intellect and deceives wisdom. Prestige is the name continually given to every kind of spell, the effect of which reminds us of "prestige" ("cet homme exerce une influence qui rassemble à une prestige"—Litttré), and to all magic charms and attractive power which is capable of dulling the intellect while it enhances sensation. We may read of the prestige of fame, of the power which, in default of prestige, is brute force, of the prestige of literature and the theatre; in one place Tarde speaks of the prestige of the *latest* news, of up-to-dateness; prestige opens the way to a career even on posters: in 1869 numberless placards proclaimed through the length and breadth of Paris that Bourbeau, Minister of Public Instruction, though reputed to be a splendid lawyer, "lacked prestige"—"Bourbeau manque de prestige." The English and German languages make use of the word in the latter meaning, as opposed to the imaginary virtue of the conjurer; the same signification is applied, generally speaking, to the Italian and Spanish *prestigio*, only that the Italian *prestigião* and the Spanish *prestigiador*, just like the French *prestigiateur*, have, as opposed to the more recent meaning, kept the older significance; neither of them means anything more or less than conjurer or juggler.

The market clown, the rope-walker, the sword-swallower, the reciter of long poems, the clever manipulator who defies imitation—all possess prestige: but on the other hand, prestige surrounds demoniacal spells, wizardry, and all effectiveness not comprehensible by logic.

149. Kinds of Prestige¹

Great power is given to ideas propagated by affirmation, repetition, and contagion by the circumstance that they acquire in time that mysterious force known as prestige.

Whatever has been a ruling power in the world, whether it be ideas or men, has in the main enforced its authority by means of that irresistible force expressed by the word "prestige." The term is one whose

¹ Reprinted by permission from G. Le Bon, *The Crowd*, pp. 147-48, 149-50, 151, 158, 159. (14th impression) London, 1922. American copyright by the Macmillan Company.

meaning is grasped by everybody, but the word is employed in ways too different for it to be easy to define it. Prestige may involve such sentiments as admiration or fear. Occasionally even these sentiments are its basis, but it can perfectly well exist without them. The greatest measure of prestige is possessed by the dead, by beings, that is, of whom we do not stand in fear—by Alexander, Cæsar, Mahomet, and Buddha, for example.

Prestige in reality is a sort of domination exercised on our mind by an individual, a work, or an idea. This domination entirely paralyses our critical faculty, and fills our soul with astonishment and respect. The sentiment provoked is inexplicable, like all sentiments, but it would appear to be of the same kind as the fascination to which a magnetized person is subjected. Prestige is the mainspring of all authority. Neither gods, kings, nor women have ever reigned without it.

The various kinds of prestige may be grouped under two principal heads: acquired prestige and personal prestige. Acquired prestige is that resulting from name, fortune, and reputation. It may be independent of personal prestige. Personal prestige, on the contrary, is something essentially peculiar to the individual; it may coexist with reputation, glory, and fortune, or be strengthened by them, but it is perfectly capable of existing in their absence.

Acquired or artificial prestige is much the most common. The mere fact that an individual occupies a certain position, possesses a certain fortune, or bears certain titles, endows him with prestige, however slight his own personal worth. A soldier in uniform, a judge in his robes, always enjoys prestige. Pascal has very properly noted the necessity for judges of robes and wigs. Without them they would be stripped of half their authority. The most unbending socialist is always somewhat impressed by the sight of a prince or a marquis.

I now come to personal prestige. Its nature is very different from that of artificial or acquired prestige, with which I have just been concerned. It is a faculty independent of all titles, of all authority, and possessed by a small number of persons whom it enables to exercise a veritably magnetic fascination on those around them, although they are socially their equals, and lack all ordinary means of domination. They force the acceptance of their ideas and sentiments on those about them.

The great leaders of crowds, such as Buddha, Jesus, Mahomet, Joan of Arc, and Napoleon, have possessed this form of prestige in a high degree, and to this endowment is more particularly due the position they attained. Gods, heroes, and dogmas win their way in the world

of their own inward strength. They are not to be discussed: they disappear, indeed, as soon as discussed.

It is seen from what precedes that a number of factors may be concerned in the genesis of prestige; among them success was always one of the most important. Every successful man, every idea that forces itself into recognition, ceases, *ipso facto*, to be called in question. The proof that success is one of the principal stepping-stones to prestige is that the disappearance of the one is almost always followed by the disappearance of the other. The hero whom the crowd acclaimed yesterday is insulted today should he have been overtaken by failure. The reaction, indeed, will be the stronger in proportion as the prestige has been great. The crowd in this case considers the fallen hero as an equal, and takes its revenge for having bowed to a superiority whose existence it no longer admits. While Robespierre was causing the execution of his colleagues and of a great number of his contemporaries, he possessed an immense prestige. When the transposition of a few votes deprived him of power, he immediately lost his prestige, and the crowd followed him to the guillotine with the self-same imprecations with which shortly before it had pursued his victims. Believers always break the status of their former gods with every symptom of fury.

Prestige lost by want of success disappears in a brief space of time. It can also be worn away, but more slowly by being subjected to discussion. This latter power, however, is exceedingly sure. From the moment prestige is called in question it ceases to be prestige. The gods and men who have kept their prestige for long have never tolerated discussion. For the crowd to admire, it must be kept at a distance.

150. Leadership and the Masses ¹

We have seen that all leadership has an aspect of sympathy and conformity, as well as one of individuality and self-will, so that every leader must also be a follower, in the sense that he shares the general current of life. He leads by appealing to our own tendency, not by imposing something external upon us. Great men are therefore the symbols or expressions, in a sense, of the social conditions under which they work.

Does the leader, then, really lead, in the sense that the course of history would have been essentially different if he had not lived? Is the individual a true cause, or would things have gone on about the same

¹ Reprinted by permission from C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, pp. 321-24; 325. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902.

if the famous men had been cut off in infancy? Is not general tendency the great thing, and is it not bound to find expression independently of particular persons? Certainly many people have the impression that in an evolutionary view of life single individuals become insignificant, and that all great movements must be regarded as the outcome of vast, impersonal tendencies.

The answer to these questions must be that the individual *is* a cause, as independent as a cause can be which is part of a living whole, that the leader does lead, and that the course of history must have been notably different if a few great men had been withdrawn from it.

As to general tendency, it is false to set it over against individuals, as if it were a separate thing; it is only through individuals that general tendency begins or persists. "Impersonal tendency" in society is a mere abstraction; there is no such thing. Whether idiosyncrasy is such as we all have in some measure, or whether it takes the form of conspicuous originality or genius, it is a variant element in life having always some tendency to innovation. Of course, if we believe in the prevalence of continuity and law, we cannot regard it as a new creation out of nothing; it must be a reorganization of hereditary and social forces. But however this may be, the person as a whole is always more or less novel or innovating. Not one of us floats quite inert upon the general stream of tendency; we leave the world somewhat different from what it would have been if we had been carried off by the croup.

Now in the case of a man of genius, this variant tendency may be so potent as to reorganize a large part of the general life in its image, and give it a form and direction which it could not have had otherwise. Would the life we receive from the last century have been the same if, say, Darwin, Lincoln, and Bismarck had not lived? Take the case of Darwin. No doubt his greatness depended upon his representing and fulfilling an existing tendency, and this tendency entered into him from his environment, that is from other individuals. But it came out of him no longer the vague drift toward evolutionary theory and experiment that it was before, but concrete, common-sense, matter-of-fact knowledge, thoroughly Darwinized, and so accredited by his character and labors that the world accepts it as it could not have done if he had not lived. We may apply the same idea to the author of Christianity. Whatever we may or may not believe regarding the nature of Christ's spiritual leadership, there is, I take it, nothing necessarily at variance with a sound social science in the Christian theory that the course of history has been transformed by his life.

Most, if not all, of our confusion regarding such points as these

arises from the almost invincible habit of thinking of "society," or "historical tendency," as a distinct entity from "individuals," instead of remembering that these general and particular terms merely express different aspects of the same concrete fact—human life.

I need hardly add that leadership is not a *final* explanation of anything; but is simply one of many aspects in which human life, always inscrutable, may be studied. In these days we no longer look for final explanations, but are well content if we can get a glimpse of things in process, not expecting to know how they began or where they are to end. The leader is a cause, but, like all causes we know of, he is also an effect. His being, however original, is rooted in the past of the race, and doubtless as susceptible of explanation as anything else, if we could only get at the facts.

151. The Veneration of Leaders¹

The adoration of the led for the leaders is commonly latent. It reveals itself by signs that are barely perceptible, such as the tone of veneration in which the idol's name is pronounced, the perfect docility with which the least of his signs is obeyed, and the indignation which is aroused by any critical attack upon his personality. But where the individuality of the leader is truly exceptional, and also in periods of lively excitement, the latent fervor is conspicuously manifested with the violence of an acute paroxysm. In June 1864, the hot-blooded Rhinelanders received Lassalle like a god. Garlands were hung across the streets. Maids of honor showered flowers over him. Interminable lines of carriages followed the chariot of the "president." With overflowing and irresistible enthusiasm and with frenzied applause were received the words of the hero of the triumph, often extravagant and in the vein of the charlatan, for he spoke rather as if he wished to defy criticism than to provoke applause. It was in truth a triumphal march. Nothing was lacking—triumphal arches, hymns of welcome, solemn receptions of foreign deputations. Lassalle was ambitious in the grand style, and, as Bismarck said of him at a later date, his thoughts did not go far short of asking whether the future German Empire, in which he was greatly interested, ought to be ruled by a dynasty of Hohenzollerns or of Lassalles. We need feel no surprise that all this adulation excited Lassalle's imagination to such a degree that he soon afterwards felt

¹ Reprinted by permission from R. Michels, *Political Parties*, pp. 64-65; 67-68. New York. Hearst's International Library Company, 1915.

able to promise his affianced that he would one day enter the capital as president of the German republic, seated in a chariot drawn by six white horses.

In Sicily, in 1892, when the first agricultural laborers' unions, known as *fasci*, were constituted, the members had an almost supernatural faith in their leaders. In an ingenuous confusion of the social question with their religious practices, they often in their processions carried the crucifix side by side with the red flag and with placards inscribed with sentences from the works of Marx. The leaders were escorted on their way to the meetings with music, torches, and Japanese lanterns. Many, drunk with the sentiment of adoration, prostrated themselves before their leaders, as in former days they had prostrated themselves before their bishops. A bourgeois journalist once asked an old peasant, member of a socialist *fascio*, if the proletarians did not think that Giuseppe De Felice Giuffrida, Garibaldi Bosco, and the other young students or lawyers who, though of bourgeois origin, were working on behalf of the *fasci*, were not really doing this with the sole aim of securing their own election as county councillors and deputies. "De Felice and Bosco are angels come down from heaven!" was the peasant's brief and eloquent reply.

The masses experience a profound need to prostrate themselves, not simply before great ideals, but also before the individuals who in their eyes incorporate such ideals. Their adoration for these temporal divinities is the more blind in proportion as their lives are rude. There is considerable truth in the paradoxical phrase of Bernard Shaw, who defines democracy as a collection of idolators, in contradistinction to aristocracy, which is a collection of idols. This need to pay adoring worship is often the sole permanent element which survives all the changes in the ideas of the masses. The industrial workers of Saxony have during recent years passed from fervent Protestantism to socialism. It is possible that in the case of some of them this evolution has been accompanied by a complete reversal of all their former intellectual and moral valuations; but it is certain that if from their domestic shrines they have expelled the traditional image of Luther, it has only been in order to replace it by one of Bebel. In Emilia, where the peasantry has undergone a similar evolution, the oleograph of the Blessed Virgin has simply given place to one of Prampolini; and in southern Italy, faith in the annual miracle of the liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius has yielded before a faith in the miracle of the superhuman power of Enrico Ferri, "the Scourge of the Camorra." Amid the ruins of the

old moral world of the masses, there remains intact the triumphal column of religious need. They often behave towards their leaders after the manner of the sculptor of ancient Greece who, having modelled a Jupiter Tonans, prostrated himself in adoration before the work of his own hands.

152. Leadership and the Arousal of Faith ¹

As soon as a certain number of living beings are gathered together, whether they be animals or men, they place themselves instinctively under the authority of a chief.

In the case of human crowds the chief is often nothing more than a ringleader or agitator, but as such he plays a considerable part. His will is the nucleus around which the opinions of the crowd are grouped and attain to identity. A crowd is a servile flock that is incapable of ever doing without a master.

The leader has most often started as one of the led. He has himself been hypnotized by the idea, whose apostle he has since become. It has taken possession of him to such a degree that everything outside it vanishes, and that every contrary opinion appears to him an error or a superstition. An example in point is Robespierre, hypnotized by the philosophical ideas of Rousseau, and employing the methods of the Inquisition to propagate them.

The leaders we speak of are more frequently men of action than thinkers. They are not gifted with keen foresight, nor could they be, as this quality generally conduces to doubt and inactivity. They are especially recruited from the ranks of those morbidly nervous, excitable, half-deranged persons who are bordering on madness. However absurd may be the idea they uphold or the goal they pursue, their convictions are so strong that all reasoning is lost upon them. Contempt and persecution do not affect them, or only serve to excite them the more. They sacrifice their personal interest, their family—everything. The very instinct of self-preservation is entirely obliterated in them, and so much so that often the only recompense they solicit is that of martyrdom. The intensity of their faith gives great power of suggestion to their words. The multitude is always ready to listen to the strongwilled man, who knows how to impose himself upon it. Men gathered in a crowd lose all force of will, and turn instinctively to the person who possesses the quality they lack.

¹ Reprinted by permission from G. Le Bon, *The Crowd*, pp. 133, 134-37. (14th impression) London, 1922. American copyright by the Macmillan Company.

Nations have never lacked leaders, but all of the latter have by no means been animated by those strong convictions proper to apostles. These leaders are often subtle rhetoricians, seeking only their own personal interest, and endeavouring to persuade by flattering base instincts. The influence they can assert in this manner may be very great, but it is always ephemeral. The men of ardent convictions who have stirred the soul of crowds, the Peter the Hermits, the Luthers, the Savonarolas, the men of the French Revolution, have only exercised their fascination after having been themselves fascinated first of all by a creed. They are then able to call up in the souls of their fellows that formidable force known as faith, which renders a man the absolute slave of his dream.

The arousing of faith—whether religious, political, or social, whether faith in a work, in a person, or an idea—has always been the function of the great leaders of crowds, and it is on this account that their influence is always very great. Of all the forces at the disposal of humanity, faith has always been one of the most tremendous, and the gospel rightly attributes to it the power of moving mountains. To endow a man with faith is to multiply his strength tenfold. The great events of history have been brought about by obscure believers, who have had little beyond their faith in their favor. It is not by the aid of the learned or of philosophers, and still less of skeptics, that have been built up the great religions which have swayed the world, or the vast empires which spread from one hemisphere to the other.

In the cases just cited, however, we are dealing with great leaders, and they are so few in number that history can easily reckon them up. They form the summit of a continuous series, which extends from these powerful masters of men down to the workman who, in the smoky atmosphere of an inn, slowly fascinates his comrades by ceaselessly drumming into their ears a few set phrases, whose purport he scarcely comprehends, but the application of which, according to him, must surely bring about the realization of all dreams and of every hope.

In every social sphere, from the highest to the lowest, as soon as a man ceases to be isolated he speedily falls under the influence of a leader. The majority of men, especially among the masses, do not possess clear and reasoned ideas on any subject whatever outside their own speciality. The leader serves them as guide. It is just possible that he may be replaced, though very inefficiently, by the periodical publications which manufacture opinions for their readers and supply them with ready-made phrases which absolve them of the trouble of reasoning.

153. Leaders as a Symbolic Projection of an Ideal¹

It is a very natural result of the principles already noted that the fame and power of a man often transcend the man himself; that is to say, the personal idea associated by the world with a particular name and presence has often little basis in the mind behind that name and presence, as it appears to cool and impartial study. The reason is that the function of the great and famous man is to be a symbol, and the real question in other minds is not so much, What are you? as, What can I believe that you are? What can you help me to feel and be? How far can I use you as a symbol in the development of my instinctive tendency?

Thus we may say of all famous and admired characters that, as personal ideas, they partake of the nature of gods, in that the thought entertained of them is a constructive effort of the idealizing imagination seeking to create a personal symbol of its own tendency.

Perhaps there is no more striking illustration of this than that offered by the medieval history of the papacy. The visible pope was often and for long periods at a time a depraved or insignificant man; but during these very periods the ideal pope, the pope of Europe's thought, might and often did flourish and grow in temporal and spiritual power. The former was only a symbol for the better definition of what the world needed to believe, a lay figure for garments woven by the co-operative imagination of religious men. The world needed to believe in a spiritual authority as a young girl needs to be in love, and it took up with the papacy as the most available framework for that belief. The same is true in a large measure of the other great medieval authority, the emperor, and it holds true in some degree of all those clothed with royalty or other great offices. Fame may or may not represent what men were; but it always represents what humanity needs them to have been.

It is also true that when there is a real personal superiority, ascendancy is seldom confined to the traits in which this is manifested, but, once established in regard to these traits, it tends to envelop the leader as a whole, and to produce allegiance to *him* as a concrete person.

The first requisite of a leader is, not to be right, but to lead, to show a way. The idealist's programme of political or economic reform may be impracticable, absurd, demonstrably ridiculous; but it can never be suc-

¹ Reprinted by permission from C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, pp. 307-08; 309; 310. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902.

cessfully opposed merely by pointing out that this is the case. A negative opposition cannot be wholly effectual: there must be a competing idealism; something must be offered that is not only less objectionable but more desirable, that affords occupation to progressive instinct.

154. Emulation and Identification in Leadership¹

It (hero-worship) has a great place in all active, aspiring lives, especially in the plastic period of youth. We feed our characters, while they are forming, upon the vision of admired models; an ardent sympathy dwells upon the traits through which their personality is communicated to us—facial expression, voice, significant movements, and so on. In this way those tendencies in us that are toward them are literally fed; are stimulated, organized, made habitual and familiar. All will find, I imagine, if they recall their own experience, that times of mental progress were times when the mind found or created heroes to worship, often owing allegiance to several at the same time, each representing a particular need of development. The active tendencies of the school-boy lead to admiration of the strongest and boldest of his companions; or perhaps, more imaginative, he fixes his thoughts on some famous fighter or explorer; later it is possibly a hero of statesmanship or literature who attracts him. Whatever the tendency, it is sure to have its complementary hero. Even science often begins in hero-worship. "This work," says Darwin of Humboldt's *Personal Narrative*, "stirred up in me a burning zeal to add even the most humble contribution to the noble structure of Natural Science." We easily forget this varied and impassioned idealism of early life.

155. Leaders as Carriers of Authority²

The leaders that are followed are not always men who have first-hand information on the subjects on which they issue opinions, but those who are credited with special ability in choosing the real thinkers and experts. Clergymen, for example, announce their views on every literary, scientific, philosophical, dramatic and political subject. Men who have won distinction as inventors, chemists or automobile manufacturers pronounce verdicts on problems of education, biology, eco-

¹ Reprinted by permission from C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, pp. 278; 279. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902.

² Reprinted by permission from A. Lipsky, *Man the Puppet*, pp. 48-50. New York. Frank-Maurice, Inc., 1925.

nomics and religion. They are listened to respectfully because they are supposed to know better than the average man on which side the truth is likely to be found. They are the trusted secondary authorities.

It is no doubt true that one man who holds his belief tenaciously counts for as much as several men who hold theirs weakly. Yet it is well known that the intensity with which an opinion is held is in no wise proportional to its truth or to the depth of the mind that entertains it. The shallowest and the most ignorant are the most violent in their opinions. All we know of the intensity of an opinion is the fierceness with which it is expressed and the doggedness with which it is clung to, —qualities not of opinions but of temperaments. Fierceness and tenacity go far in getting opinions accepted by others partly because of the natural dislike of most men for controversy, partly owing to the presumption that an opinion sincerely and strongly held is more apt to be true than one indifferently defended.

Leaders whose opinions crowds adopt are largely synthetic personalities. No sooner does a man aspire to become a leader than there begins the formation of a myth in the minds of the people which becomes less and less like the actual person as time goes on.

156. The Influence of Prestige-Bearers on Convention ¹

When the Emperor Charles V. ascended the throne of Spain he had no beard. It was not to be expected that the obsequious parasites who always surround a monarch, could presume to look more virile than their master. Immediately all the courtiers appeared beardless, with the exception of such few grave old men as had outgrown the influence of fashion, and who had determined to die bearded as they had lived. Sober people in general saw this revolution with sorrow and alarm, and thought that every manly virtue would be banished with the beard. It became at the time a common saying,—

“We have no longer souls since we have lost our beards.”

In France also the beard fell into disrepute after the death of Henry IV., from the mere reason that his successor was too young to have one. Some of the more immediate friends of the great Béarnais, and his minister Sully among the rest, refused to part with their beards, notwithstanding the jeers of the new generation.

Who does not remember the division of England into the two great parties of Roundheads and Cavaliers? In those days every species of

¹ Reprinted from C. Mackay, *Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions*, Vol. I: pp. 300-302. London, 1852.

vice and iniquity was thought by the Puritans to lurk in the long curly tresses of the monarchists, while the latter imagined that their opponents were as destitute of wit, of wisdom, and of virtue, as they were of hair. A man's locks were the symbol of his creed, both in politics and religion. The more abundant the hair, the more scant the faith; and the balder the head, the more sincere the piety.

But among all the instances of the interference of governments with men's hair, the most extraordinary, not only for its daring, but for its success, is that of Peter the Great, in 1705. By this time fashion had condemned the beard in every other country in Europe, and with a voice more potent than popes or emperors, had banished it from civilized society. But this only made the Russians cling more fondly to their ancient ornament, as a mark to distinguish them from foreigners, whom they hated. Peter, however, resolved that they should be shaven. If he had been a man deeply read in history, he might have hesitated before he attempted so despotic an attack upon the time-hallowed customs and prejudices of his countrymen; but he was not. He did not know or consider the danger of the innovation; he only listened to the promptings of his own indomitable will, and his fiat went forth, that not only the army, but all ranks of citizens, from the nobles to the serfs, should shave their beards. A certain time was given, that people might get over the first throes of their repugnance, after which every man who chose to retain his beard was to pay a tax of one hundred roubles. The priests and the serfs were put on a lower footing, and allowed to retain theirs upon payment of a copeck every time they passed the gate of a city. Great discontent existed in consequence, but the dreadful fate of the Strelitzes was too recent to be forgotten, and thousands who had the will had not the courage to revolt. As is well remarked by a writer in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, they thought it wiser to cut off their beards than to run the risk of incensing a man who would make no scruple in cutting off their heads. Wiser, too, than the popes and bishops of a former age, he did not threaten them with eternal damnation, but made them pay in hard cash the penalty of their disobedience. For many years, a very considerable revenue was collected from this source. The collectors gave in receipt for its payment a small copper coin, struck expressly for the purpose, and called the "*borodoŭaia*," or "the bearded." On one side it bore the figure of a nose, mouth, and moustaches, with a long bushy beard, surmounted by the words, "*Deuyee Vyatee*," "money received"; the whole encircled by a wreath, and stamped with the black eagle of Russia. On the reverse, it bore the date of the year. Every man who chose to wear a beard was obliged to produce this receipt on his

entry into a town. Those who were refractory, and refused to pay the tax, were thrown into prison.

157. Leadership and the Power of Words¹

Leading and subordination, originality and conformity, imitation and acquiescence go hand in hand, and in the existence of one is implied the existence of the other.

Apart from logical implications there is also a psychological necessity why masses should always be held under the sway of some master. We have already seen that masses never attain to intellectual manhood; that possessing as they do all the characteristics of children—imitation, fantasticality, suggestibility, predominance of feeling, impulsiveness and sheer incapacity for intellectual application they are perpetually in an age of intellectual minority; and that, by their nature incapable of governing themselves, they must inevitably place themselves under the control and dictatorship of some one mentally their superior.

One method universally employed by successful leaders is the dogmatism of their tone and language. Arguments and reasoned statements can appeal to the minds of highly cultured individuals and to them alone. When addressed to a crowd they defeat their purpose. Very frequently they lead to doubt and skepticism, and even when they produce a conviction they do so only in an indirect way; whereas the peculiar mental structure of masses demands that opinions and beliefs must be imbued in them as directly as the occasion permits, by means of bare assertions or suggestions.

Absence of reasons and arguments, moreover, puts on statements an appearance of self-evident truth, and banishes from the mind of the audience all thought of disputing them.

The following may serve as a typical illustration. Its writer, one Mr. Leadbeater, is eulogizing the services of Mrs. Besant, the President of the Theosophical Society, before his theosophist brethren:

"What can I say to you of Your President that you do not know already? Her colossal intellect, her unfailing wisdom, her unrivalled eloquence, her splendid forgetfulness of self, her untiring devotion to work for others—all these are familiar to you. Yet these qualities, these powers, are but a small part of her greatness; they are on the surface; they may be seen by all; they leap to your eyes. But there are other qualities, other powers, of which you can not know, because they pertain

¹ Reprinted by permission from Abdul Majid, *The Psychology of Leadership*, pp. 52-53; 59; 60-61; 62-63; 66-67. London. T. Fisher Unwin, n. d.

to the secrets of Initiation. She is a pupil of our Masters; from the fount of their archaic wisdom she derives her own. The plans which she is carrying out are Their plans for the welfare of the world. Think, therefore, how great an honor it is for you to work under her, for in doing so you are virtually working under Them. Think, how watchful you should be to miss no hints which fall from her lips, to carry out exactly whatever instructions she may give you. Remember, because of her position as an Initiate she knows far more than you do; and precisely because her knowledge is occult, given under the seal of Initiation, she can not share it with you. Therefore her action must certainly be governed by considerations of which you have no conception. There will be times when you can not understand her motives, for she is taking into account many things which you can not see, and of which she must not tell you. But whether you understand or not, you will be wise to follow her implicitly just because she knows. This is no mere supposition on my part, no mere flight of imagination. I have stood beside your President in the presence of the Supreme Director of Evolution in this globe, and I know whereof I speak. Let the wise hear my words and act accordingly."—(Adyar Album, p. 45.)

Yet even assertions, however dogmatic or epigrammatic, are of little avail unless they are repeated very frequently, with, of course, certain variations in the language. *Repetition* is one of the most powerful weapons in the hands of the rhetorician. Repeat any statement for a sufficient number of times, and the hardest rocks of skepticism and unbelief are sure to melt away from it.

It would be interesting in this connection to have before one's eyes a catalogue of the repetitions occurring in the "Revealed Books." I do not know if any community, other than the Moslems, have prepared such a schedule. But, fortunately, we can lay our hands on a list of the important repetitions of the Koran. The following table may enable the reader to comprehend in some degree the secret of success of a most impressive book on earth:

Heinousness of Idolatry and Unity of God asserted	350 times
Faith and Trust in God ordained	300 times
Pleasures of Paradise described	195 times
Torments of Hell described	200 times
Daily Prayers commanded to the Faithful	100 times

The greater the man, the more of the qualities of leadership are embodied in him. Mohamet, Alexander, Cæsar, Columbus and Napoleon

have been among the greatest characters that history can boast of: in them combined most of the above-mentioned traits, and this accounts for their greatness. Choosing Napoleon as a specimen we give below a *résumé* of his chief characteristics, mental as well as moral, as recorded by his biographers. This may perhaps throw some light on the nature of the stuff that a leader is made of.

Chief mental traits: "An imagination of wonderful force, a power of calculation that embraced every thing, and yet grasped the smallest details; the master faculty of always perceiving the dominant fact in what was before him, of separating it from what was subordinate, and of seeing how it could be turned to account; and admirable celerity and keenness of thought."

Remarkable moral faculties; "Ambition that nothing seemed to satisfy, self-confidence that received no check from experience, indefatigable energy that never tired; a devouring passion to achieve greatness, to do mighty deeds, to acquire renown; decision; firmness and strength of character, dexterity and adroitness in difficult crises; extraordinary craft; and the power of concealing whatever designs or purposes were to be performed, and very distinctly a profound contempt for the great mass of ordinary men; a belief that the world is ruled by force; a conviction that genius can accomplish anything; a disposition that shrank from cruelty and yet that seemed indifferent to human suffering when ambition was striving to gain its object."

(Consult Sections 116, 174.)

158. Why the Masses Like the Mystical Writers¹

The mystical writers have seemingly a greater influence upon the majority than the clear thinkers for their writings have the gift of telling every one what he desires to be told; the meaning is not read from them, but any meaning can be read into them. Even earnest and clear-headed men fall victims to such obscure, semi-insane, nonsense talk: in their naïvete they take it as a duty to try to comprehend everybody, even those who do not comprehend themselves.

The mystic and the pseudo-mystic apply abstract names to very concrete, trivial things, and thus they seem to express general statements, generalizations, original truths, lofty ideas, where in reality they have in mind and mean to speak about banalities, common-place, prosaic, worn-out opinions. Otherwise we could not understand their verbosity,

¹ Reprinted by permission from O. L. Schwarz, *General Types of Superior Men*, pp. 334-35. Boston. R. G. Badger, 1916.

for we cannot speak without having something in our minds to speak about. The only trouble is that the mystical, shadowy, seemingly significant language deceives us as to the real concrete content concealed behind it. We believe to hear a platonic, idealistic, agnostic, wise, impersonal, preaching orator or writer, where in reality there is a sensual, materialistic, anthropomorphic, vain, personal, revengeful pseudo-superior man before us.

The modern mystic (theologian, spiritist, theosophist, etc.) pays homage to science by adopting her language—if not throughout, at least in the introductory part of his writings, teachings, and preachings—and is thus mistaken for a scientist, although he lacks and hates the convictions, laborious methods, skeptical attitude of mind, lucidity, and intellectual honesty of the latter.

The clear-headed, truth-loving thinker cannot have many adherents, for he expresses sharply defined opinions—about men and things—which compel either immediate agreement or disagreement, without allowing any third alternative. By his unambiguous, bold statements he challenges his opponents to defend their opinions, or to surrender themselves; no unnoticed cowardly escape is left open.

Whereas the nebulous, mystical, truth-shunning thinker who gropes in the dark, and not knowing himself very well what opinions to cling to, does not compel his readers to bring order into their confused minds and to assign the proper place to every idea. He spares them this trouble. His writings are so shadowy, so misty; he glides so easily, imperceptibly, evasively from one opinion over into its opposite; he swings so quickly back and forth between opposite views, that every reader finds and notices only what he likes to find. What the clear-headed thinker does in the intellectual world, the moral genius does in the politico-economic world. He lays bare the real motives of human action. He compels those who take offense at the ugliness of the motives, in which he claims to have discovered the hidden mainspring of their overt behavior, to prove their innocence by changing their methods of dealing with their fellow-men, and by making good for the socially evil results which they claim not to have intended.

159. Prestige and Persuasion ¹

The starting point of all persuasion, of ourselves or others, is a belief or wish. Holding a certain belief, or desiring that a certain course of ac-

¹ By permission from *The Psychology of Persuasion* by William Macpherson, pp. 12; 13; 14; 16-17; 18; 25-26. Published by E. P. Dutton & Company, n. d.

tion shall be pursued, we set out to justify our belief and the conduct it implies. Thus, before he begins to speak, the orator whose aim is persuasion has already present in his mind a belief or wish, fully formed, from which all his arguments and appeals flow; and the effectiveness of his persuasion will be proportionate to the clearness and fulness with which the belief has been defined, and the degree of conviction with which it is held.

Our effective beliefs regarding human life and conduct are determined not by reasoning but by many unconscious and frequently irrational factors. We believe because we wish to believe, so that we may satisfy our instincts and emotions and sentiments, because our environment and education have made certain beliefs seem necessary, because our fathers have believed before us, or because it is convenient and expedient to think as our neighbors do. In self-persuasion the belief from which the process starts is often held by us quite unconsciously, having its origin in many remote factors, and the process itself may be to a large extent unconscious. In the persuasion of others we begin with a conscious belief, and the subsequent process is a conscious, deliberate, and more or less systematic attempt to impress our belief on others. But always, alike in the persuasion of ourselves and others, our purpose is to gain approval, our own or that of other people, for beliefs or wishes already formed and accepted by us.

We have used the terms "belief" and "wish" as if they were synonymous. Our beliefs and our wishes, indeed, are inextricably interwoven; or rather, they are not really to be distinguished.

Our beliefs and wishes, from which the process of persuasion starts, our latent and premeditated courses of action, depend mainly on the emotional elements in our nature. The motive force that impels men to action is always some instinct, tendency, emotion, sentiment, or passion. We accept a belief or wish, and act so that it may be realized, primarily with a view to satisfying some aspect of our emotional nature. The fundamental character of persuasion, as a process that aims at modifying conduct and inducing action, is that it is an emotional process. In this respect, again, it differs from the process of rational logic, which should have no tincture of emotion, or so little, and of such a character, as, having exercised no diverting influence on the course of the reasoning and on the conclusion ultimately reached, may be considered negligible.

Persuasion resembles rational logic in that it consists essentially in a series of judgments, but there the resemblance ends.

The cogency of rational logic depends on our being made to perceive

and admit an inherent and significant resemblance between the terms and propositions employed, compelling us to acknowledge the truth of the conclusion. The process starts from a general or a particular proposition, and travels to its conclusion through a series of propositions strictly related to one another by the principle of resemblance, and constituting a rigorous chain of reasoning.

The logic of persuasion, on the other hand, starts from a belief or wish, and proceeds to its conclusion, which is really given beforehand in the initial belief or wish, through a series of judgments related to one another, essentially, only in so far as each serves to promote the realization of our belief or wish, and the consequent satisfaction of its underlying emotion. In persuasion the attitude of the subject is exclusive and one-sided: all his judgments assign value to objects, persons, and actions only in so far as they tend towards the satisfaction of the emotions, sentiments, or passions underlying the initial belief or wish.

In the persuasion of others, especially, it is clear that the mechanism of rational logic is employed. We express the relations between our judgments in an apparently logical form, and the order and arrangement of our arguments are based to a large extent on reflective reasons. If we examine a political speech, or any other instance of verbal persuasion, we shall find in it arguments of all kinds, deductive and inductive, from principles and from examples, analogy, cause to effect, or effect to cause.

But, while the forms and mechanism of rational logic are employed in the logic of persuasion, their use, it must be added, is often more apparent than real. In persuasion the ultimate value of the series of judgments that constitutes the process is relative to its capacity to realize the dominant belief or wish and satisfy the emotions and sentiments underlying it. If we analyse any concrete instance of persuasion, it is nearly always possible to express the arguments in the form of rational logic; but, when we have done so, the resulting forms differ essentially from persuasion, because they do not express in any way the emotions by which all its judgments are inspired.

160. Important Factors in the Psychology of Public Speaking¹

The psychology of speaking may be most effectively summarized in the following score of admonitions:

¹ Reprinted by permission from H. A. Overstreet, *Influencing Human Behavior*, pp. 85-86. New York. The People's Institute Publishing Company, 1925. (The W. W. Norton Company)

1. Do not be an unloader.
2. Think of your audience.
3. Look *at* your audience.
4. Find what *interests them*.
5. Never make an audience feel inferior.
6. Keep your audience thinking along with you.
7. Think along with your audience.
8. Use humor humorously.
9. Never be angry at the audience, only with them.
10. Cultivate a voice that can be endured.
11. Keep off the monotone.
12. Do not let your appearance occupy the foreground.
13. Eliminate distressing mannerisms.
14. Let your speech march.
15. Avoid the commonplace and the bizarre.
16. Do not be a flat-land mind.
17. Nor a string-of-beads mind.
18. Organize your speech into groups and larger groups.
19. Give an effect of rhythmic movement.
20. Close with a snap!

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What influence has the great leader upon the direction of group activity?
2. What, according to Stein, is the function of authority? Do you agree?
3. Why is it "natural to believe in great men"?
4. How do you account for the homage which the masses pay the leader?
5. What are the outstanding mental traits of leaders?
6. In what types of leadership does physical stature count for most? In which sort least?
7. Criticize Gowin's statement that there are two types of leaders. Is the distinction sound? If so, name five men of each type and indicate briefly why you so classify them.
8. What relation has crisis to the rise of leadership?
9. Is Chapin's contention that a man who is a leader in one field is apt to be a leader in another phase of community life correct? Check up by a study of types of leadership in a chosen community.
10. How did the word prestige get its present meaning? Is it a sound usage? What kinds of prestige are there? Illustrate.
11. How do the masses tend to color the leader's qualities?

12. It is said that the leader merely crystallizes the feelings and opinions already existent in the group. Discuss pro and con.
 13. What does Cooley mean by saying that the leader is an ideal, a symbol, for the masses? How does he arouse faith on the part of the crowd?
 14. Some one has remarked that if we destroy men's gods and heroes, they will re-create them anew. Is this sound social psychology? Discuss.
 15. How may a leader be forced to play a certain rôle by the masses? Cite examples.
 16. What vicarious satisfaction does an individual in the mass get from contemplation of the leaders of his social groups?
 17. How does specialization in some field often produce habits which defeat the very leadership one might expect?
 18. Why have some of the world's greatest leaders been unpopular in their own time and place?
 19. Illustrate how prestige-bearers influence social conventions and fashions.
 20. Why do the masses like mystical writers? Name some current writers of this type.
 21. What is the technique by which a leader persuades his audience. Illustrate.
 22. Explain in a paragraph or two, in terms of the principles of prestige, why Overstreet gave items 2, 4, 5, 9, 19 and 20 in his admonitions to the public speaker.
 23. Why do some of the metropolitan Sunday papers carry stories of divorces, extravagant parties and the life of the wealthy leisure classes? Make a study of a dozen of these stories to list the types of subject-matter which appeals to the readers of these newspapers.
- B. Topics for Class Reports
1. Review Freud's theory of the relation of the group to the leader. (Cf. bibliography.)
 2. Report on James' paper on "Great Men and Environment." (Cf. bibliography.)
- C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers
1. The Great Man Theory of History: Social Psychological Critique.
 2. The Place of the Leader in Cultural Diffusion.
 3. The Inferiority Complex and Leadership.
 4. The Galton-Ward Controversy over Genius and Opportunity.

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CHAPTER XXI

TYPES OF LEADERSHIP AND PRESTIGE

I. INTRODUCTION

In the present chapter are given a series of selections on the forms of leadership. Leaders differ depending upon the social situation in which they are placed. While there are certain general qualities no doubt in all leadership, it would be a mistake to set down *a priori* a series of qualities of all leaders ignoring the place which circumstance, time and place have in this expression of superiority. In other words, one can no more understand leadership than any other social process without taking into account, first, the group situation in which it occurs and, secondly, the culture patterns concerned. Thus political leadership has distinctive characteristics, no doubt, as has religious or military leadership. While very little actual investigation has been made on this matter from the angle of social psychology some of the papers indicate a beginning. Such are those by Webster, Munro, Merriam and Root.

Mumford's paper shows the growth of leadership along with institutions beginning in pre-historic societies. Webster's paper is included to indicate by concrete example the type of leadership found in various primitive groups. The ordinary person is apt to be ignorant of the fact and place of leadership in primitive societies. These instances will help to alter this stereotype. We see in Jalina-piramurana, in Finau, Chaka and our own American Indian chiefs, Pontiac and Tecumseh, illustrations of oratorical power, of executive ability, of enormous drive and ambition. Of course, mere age, acquaintance with group custom, and hereditary position also count for much in primitive as in present society. Yet, all in all, these examples reveal the crystallization of group action in one man who carries the group forward with him.

Schwarz furnishes us with some reflections on various mental

characteristics of leaders: philosophers, scientists, poets, and men of action. The effect of the type of interest and attention on the type of mental development is very evident and this, in turn, affects the form of leadership. The broad sweep of the cosmic philosopher is apt to seem vague and all too general to the narrow specialized scientist with his array of hard facts. So, too, the man of action is pretty apt to be irritated by the slower-moving man of thought and contemplation. These various sorts of leaders play parts in the complex social groupings of our society. In some periods of history one type or another has predominated and thus the whole caste of group ethos and movement would affect and be affected by the types of leaders. Certainly, our own period is rather dominated by the practical man of affairs.

Merriam's analysis of the qualities of political leaders is a revision of Michels' incisive study. We owe much to Michels and to Merriam for opening up the field of political leadership to social psychological analysis. This is a rich field heretofore unexplored because of the influence of the legalistic tradition in political science. Kent's paper on the American political boss is a concrete case of the psychological analysis of mechanisms of control.

Munro's contrast of Mayors Mitchell and Johnson is a striking illustration of a type of study that needs more careful work in the future. He has indicated the differences in temperament and attitude of two men in political office.

According to Root there are two types of radical leadership, one the impersonal, objective sort found in the man of science, the other is the kind seen in the emotional social and economic reformer. The selections from this paper reveal the differences in these two types.

Rice has made an effort to state the psychological motives in radical social reformers. There is an attempt to show the relation of individual emotional organization and social and cultural factors. Here as elsewhere one must recognize the three factors of the individual, the social group and culture patterns. To try to explain all radicalism as did Carleton Parker in terms of balked personal desires is to ignore the other factors. Many persons have lately fallen into the error of seeing in every socialist or I. W. W. a mentally unbalanced person. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Nothing could illustrate better how eagerly the ordinary, untrained mind

catches on to scientific formulations and uses them in constructing his own stereotypes, legends and explanations (rationalizations).

The inventor constitutes an important factor in social change. The paper by Baldwin is pertinent to the problem of the relation of the inventor to social groups. It is often thought that inventors are something like biological sports or divergencies which spring out of biological sources alone. Some years ago Professor Ogburn very neatly showed us how inventions follow a general curve of cultural development. This is seen in the numerous instances of duplicated inventions and discoveries of which perhaps the most famous is the joint announcement of the theory of biological evolution by Darwin and Wallace in 1858. And again one invention or discovery is dependent upon an enormous body of material piled up from earlier scientific men and no man has the right to lay claim to anything approaching complete originality as is sometimes held by the uninformed. The selection from Goldenweiser contrasting primitive and modern invention illustrates the place which technique and past culture plays in invention.

II. MATERIALS

161. The Origins of Leadership in Rudimentary Society¹

The growth of both of the elements of social control under consideration—i. e., leadership or personal influence, and institutions—centers about the problems, crises, and emergencies entering the social process; and these difficulties, in turn, depend upon a large number of conditions, some of the more general of which are the size and stability of the group, the degree of complexity of its activity, the definiteness of its organization, the nature of its food resources, its sedentary or nomadic character, and its relation to other groups. The hunting life, using the phrase now in its narrower sense as the dominant food occupation of a group, has its problems, the solution of which is as important as those of any other form of associate life. The difficulties which the leader of this type of associating is called upon to solve require extraordinary keenness of the senses, exceptional powers of physical strength and endurance, promptness of decision, superior ability in making motor coordinations, etc. There is a strong demand for the individual possessing

¹ Reprinted by permission from E. Mumford "Origins of Leadership" *Am. J. Soc.* 1906-07: XII: pp. 520-21; 528-31. Copyright by the University of Chicago.

some or all of these qualities in a larger degree than the other members of the group. The problems are such as require direct, immediate, personal adaptation of the social habits to the new conditions and the ends to be reached. The leaders, as we have seen, are always individuals of superior ability of the nature required to control the conditions of this type of association. In the more primitive groups old age is the most general requisite for eligibility to leadership, though it must always be accompanied by some kind of ability to give any real influence in the group. Another primary factor in conferring leadership is exceptional ability in control of the food supply, so that the great hunter, fisherman, or rain-maker always occupies a position of honor and influence in the group. The other leaders are the ablest warriors, the orators, medicine-men, wizards, wealthiest men, and those exceptionally well versed in the customs and traditions of the tribe.

Taking the social process as a whole in relation to leadership and institutions, it may be said that in most primitive expressions of associate life, where the interactions of organisms are under control of instincts and unconscious customs, there is but little opportunity for the development of leadership, personality, and institutional life. This is most clearly manifested in the societies of the lower animals, where control of societary phenomena most nearly approaches the automatic or mechanical form. In the most primitive human associations instinctive activity still predominates, though modified by custom. However, custom at this stage is very rigid, and ends and aims are few, and the means for attaining them are very inflexible and unadaptive. But with better food resources, and the consequent increase of the population and complexity of social conditions, the problems entering into societary life increase in number and difficulty, and there is a greater demand for individuals of superior ability. Division of labor follows, a few individuals through marked ability obtain positions of influence and authority in the tribe, and these privileges they endeavor to perpetuate during their life, and to extend to their children and friends. Institutionalization of the prerogatives gained takes place, and classes and castes begin to emerge. These institutional forms increase in strength, and may finally lose in plasticity until they become almost as inflexible as instincts and customs, and a social organization, of which the classical illustration is China, results. Or, on the other hand, the power of one or a few individuals may continue to grow until an absolute despotism or an oligarchy is formed. Between these two extremes of control by one individual or by a few individuals, and control in instincts, customs, or very inflexible institutions, such as castes, the social process presents numerous varieties

of relationship between these two forms of the organized and organizing phases of associate life. In the hunting life there are but few groups in which there is any intimation of the exercise of absolute authority by one individual, authority in general being very meager and temporary. On the side of social structure, the control of instinct and custom frequently reaches extreme proportions, but, with very few exceptions, the social structure which we have called institutional has not attained any marked development. The tracing of the evolution of the relation of these two forms of societary control, as they are expressed in pastoral, agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial types of life, should give a better insight into the causes of the dominancy, at times, of one or the other of these phases of social control, and the consequent injury to the whole social process. Such a study should also help greatly in gaining a better insight into all the laws of growth of these two highly important factors in the determination of social welfare.

This investigation of hunting groups has shown that the development of both leadership and institutions has centered about the problems and crises entering into the social process. All social changes, whether a progressive or regressive character, originate in stimuli, creating tensions in the social process and demanding adaptive activities. In these adjustive processes the leader finds his chief function. In the adaptive processes there are various degrees of failure and success, but if the group is to survive, the successful activities must predominate. The long period of existence of hunting peoples, far outreaching that of any other type of associate life, proves that they were able to adapt themselves to their native conditions. But contact with civilized societies introduced problems and disturbances too great for the leaders of primitive man to cope with, and, however friendly might be the attitude of the newcomers toward the native, universal experience has taught that he has been unable to adjust himself to the more complex organization, that the tension has been too great, and that he has broken down under it. Though the hunting groups have all but disappeared from the earth, the hunting impulses still exist in us all and seek expression in the more complex organization under which we live.

Another conclusion of importance in relation to some of the most difficult problems of modern life may be drawn from this discussion. The popular belief in the ideal freedom and perfect democracy of primitive man has no basis in fact. There is little freedom in the mechanical response to stimuli, as represented in instinct or unanalyzed custom. Freedom, in the largest degree, is the result of the control of life-conditions through the reflective or rational processes and of these

primitive society knows but the beginnings. Moreover, the dominance of communal or groupal activities does not mean the existence of a perfect democracy; for such a method of control of life-conditions affords only the most meager opportunities for the development of personality through the part which each individual plays in the social process, and without the consciousness of self which arises because of the rights and responsibilities which belong to each individual in the group, there can be no democracy. The emergence of the individual from the group, or the individualizing of the individual, is a slow growth. Democracy is a late development in associate life. The conferring of privileges and responsibilities begins with the few and gradually extends to the many. That the opportunities of civilized man for self-expression in all of the interests of life have increased greatly beyond those of the hunting man would hardly be questioned by anyone who had carefully reviewed the evidence afforded by ethnology, but many of the steps by which that position has been attained have not been worked out. That a true democracy in the expression of all life's interests has been reached even in the most advanced societies would probably not be asserted by anyone acquainted with the facts, but the ideal exists as a stimulus, and injustice in various forms furnishes still stronger stimuli toward efforts to attain the ideal. An enlightened method for the attainment of the ideal and of the ideals that continue to evolve is the great desideratum, and depends upon the acquisition of a knowledge of the laws of associate life.

162. Some Instances of Leadership in Primitive Societies¹

Jalina-piramurana: Australian Headsman

A few instances of this sort may be cited, beginning with that of Jalina-piramurana, a headman of an Australian tribe fifty years ago.

"During the time I was with them there was only one headman who had supreme control over the whole tribe. From his extremely polished manners and his gestures I named him the Frenchman. He was feared and greatly respected by his own and by the neighboring tribes. Neither of his two brothers, both of them inferior to him in bravery and oratorical powers, nor the elder men presumed to interfere with his will or to dictate to the tribe except in minor matters. It was he who decided disputes, and his decisions were received without appeal. Even the neighbor-

¹ Reprinted by permission from H. Webster "Primitive Individual Ascendency" *Pub. Am. Sociol. Society* 1918: XII: pp. 49-50; 50-51; 63-64; 64-65; 66.

ing tribes sent messengers to him with presents of bags, pitcheri, red ochre, skins, and other things. He decided when and where the ceremonies of circumcision and initiation should take place. His messengers called together people from a circle of a hundred miles to attend the peace festivals (*mindari*), to attend his councils or in other matters which were considered to affect the welfare of the tribe. I have often been invited to attend his councils when they proposed to celebrate any grand ceremony. He possessed wonderful powers of oratory, making his listeners believe anything he suggested, and at all times ready to execute his commands. His disposition was not naturally cruel or treacherous, as was that of many of the Dieri, but he was, when not excited, kind, considerate, patient, and very hospitable. I never saw anything low or mean in him. As a rule the Dieri, being separated from all but their own relations, speak ill of each other; but I never heard anyone speak of this man *Jalina-piramurana* but with the greatest respect and even reverence."

Finau: The Tonga Chieftain

The opening up of the Pacific to European discovery revealed the fact that almost every island had its hereditary chief and that over some of the archipelagos reigned veritable kings. To William Mariner we owe an intimate account of the conditions which prevailed in the Tonga or Friendly Islands during the first decade of the nineteenth century. Mariner, a young Englishman of good birth and fair education, went to sea in the privateer "*Port au Prince*." After cruising in the Pacific for more than a year the ship put in at one of the Tonga Islands, in the same place where Captain Cook had formerly anchored. Here nearly all the crew were murdered by the natives. For some reason *Finau*, the chief of *Vavau*, took a strong fancy to Mariner and gave orders that his life should be preserved. This formed the commencement of a friendship which lasted till *Finau's* death. Mariner lived within the chief's inclosure, and from one of the latter's wives received instruction in the language and customs of the Tonga people. *Finau* even adopted Mariner as his own son and admitted him to all his councils.

Finau's character, as a politician, at least in point of ambition and design, may vie with that of any member of more civilized society; he wanted only education and a larger field of action to make himself a thousand times more powerful than he was. Gifted by nature with that amazing grasp of mind which seizes everything within its reach, and then, dissatisfied with what it has obtained, is ever restless in the endeavor to seize more, how dull and irksome must have been to him the

dominion of a few islands, which he did not dare to leave to conquer others, lest he should be dispossessed of them by the treachery of chiefs and the fickleness of an undisciplined army. His ever restless and ambitious spirit would frequently vent itself in such expressions as the following: "Oh, that the gods would make me king of England! There is not an island in the whole world, however small, but what I would then subject to my power. The king of England does not deserve the dominion he enjoys; possessed of so many ships, why does he suffer such petty islands as those of Tonga continually to insult his people with acts of treachery? . . . None but men of enterprising spirit should be in possession of guns; let such rule the earth, and be those their vassals who can bear to submit to such insults unrevenged."

Chaka: the Zulu Chieftain

The work of nation-making in South Africa was now taken up by the Zulu chieftain Chaka (Tsaka), perhaps the most notable figure that has yet appeared in the history of the African race. The Zulus at this time formed a small tribe, without influence and tributary to the Umtetwa. Chaka as a young man served under Dingiswayo and gained such a reputation for valor that he was given the title of *Sigidi*, "Thousand," in reference to the number of the enemy he had slain. After Dingiswayo's death the army raised him to supreme power as chief of the united Umtetwa and Zulu tribes. Chaka now conceived schemes of conquest on an extensive scale. He strengthened the regimental system devised by his predecessor and adopted a new order of battle, the troops being massed in crescent formation with a reserve to strengthen the weakest point. Chaka also substituted the stabbing-assegai for the throwing-assegai, which had been the typical weapon in this part of Africa, and increased the size of the shield so as more completely to protect the body. Military kraals were formed in which the soldiers lived apart from the rest of the community, and young warriors were forbidden to marry until they had distinguished themselves. "The world has probably never seen men trained to more perfect obedience. The army—consisting of from forty to fifty thousand soldiers—became a vast machine, entirely under command of its head. There was no questioning, no delay, when an order was issued, for to presume upon either was to court instant death. Most extraordinary tasks were occasionally required of a regiment to prove its efficiency in this respect. At a review an order would be sometimes given which meant death to hundreds, and the jealousy between the regiments was so great that if one hesitated for a moment the others were ready to cut it down."

As might be supposed, Chaka's armies were irresistible. During the two years following his accession, he is said to have deprived two hundred communities of their independence and to have brought half a million people under his sway. By 1820 he had become master of Zululand and Natal, while the terror of the Zulu name was carried far and wide into the interior of the continent. Chaka died in 1828, but other Zulu leaders followed in his footsteps, so that the original state of autonomy of the Bantu tribes was replaced by kingdoms over the larger part of South Africa.

Pontiac and Tecumseh

The genius of Francis Parkman has made the name of the Ottawa Indian chieftain Pontiac familiar to all readers of American history. Having united most of the tribes northwest of the Ohio River, Pontiac planned a general uprising of the Indians against the British settlements from Fort Pitt to the Straits of Mackinac. Many frontier posts were destroyed, but the failure of the French to co-operate with the Indians and the successful defense of the main points, Fort Pitt and Detroit, compelled Pontiac to relinquish his hope of driving the British from Canada. He made peace in 1765, and four years later was murdered by a Kaskaskia Indian.

Pontiac must have been a man of extraordinary executive ability. He created a regular commissary department based on promissory notes, these being written on birch bark and signed with the otter, the totem of his tribe. It is said that he employed two secretaries to attend to his correspondence and managed to keep each in ignorance of the business transacted by the other. Concerning his personality Parkman writes :

"The fact that Pontiac was born the son of a chief would in no degree account for the extent of his power ; for, among the Indians, many a chief's son sinks back into insignificance, while the offspring of a common warrior may succeed to his place. Among all the wild tribes of the continent, personal merit is indispensable to gaining or preserving dignity. Courage, resolution, address, and eloquence are sure passports to distinction. With all these Pontiac was pre-eminently endowed, and it was chiefly to them, urged to their highest activity to a vehement ambition, that he owed his greatness. He possessed a commanding energy and force of mind, and in subtlety and craft could match the best of his wily race. But, though capable of acts of magnanimity, he was a thorough savage, with a wider range of intellect than those around him, but sharing all their passions and prejudices, their fierceness and treachery. His faults were the faults of his race ; and they cannot eclipse his nobler

qualities. His memory is still cherished among the remnants of many Algonquin tribes, and the celebrated Tecumseh adopted him for his model, proving himself no unworthy imitator.

"Tecumseh, who took up and carried almost to a successful conclusion Pontiac's idea of a great federation of the native American tribes, was doubtless the most remarkable character in Indian history. Even his opponent, General William Henry Harrison, regarded Tecumseh as a genius and declared that were it not for the vicinity of the United States he would perhaps establish an Indian empire rivaling that of Mexico or Peru.

"He hated the whites as the destroyers of his race, but prisoners and the defenseless knew well that they could rely on his honor and humanity and were safe under his protection. When only a boy—for his military career began in childhood—he had witnessed the burning of a prisoner, and the spectacle was so abhorrent to his feelings that by an earnest and eloquent harangue he induced the party to give up the practice forever. In later years his name was accepted by helpless women and children as a guaranty of protection even in the midst of hostile Indians. Of commanding figure, nearly six feet in height and compactly built; of dignified bearing and piercing eye, before whose lightning even a British general quailed; with the fiery eloquence of a Clay and the clear-cut logic of a Webster; abstemious in habit, charitable in thought and action, brave as a lion, but humane and generous withal—in a word, an aboriginal American Knight—his life was given to his people, and he fell at last, like his father and brothers before him, in battle with the destroyers of his nation, the champion of a lost cause and a dying race."

All the biographical sketches which have been quoted agree in stressing the element of personal ability as the essential factor accounting for predominance. Strength of body and strength of will, unusual intelligence, a persuasive tongue, great energy, ambition, and force of character are the personal traits which raise a man above his fellows and constitute the leader. This is not to deny that other grounds for superiority may exist. In some parts of Australia age alone, unless accompanied by mental weakness, is sufficient to insure influence. In the southern Melanesian islands the chiefs seem to be those who rise to the highest rank in the secret societies. There are instances in North America and Africa where the richest man is he who rules his group. And Sir James Frazer has shown, by a vast collection of ethnographic evidence, how frequently among primitive peoples the magician has de-

veloped into the chief. To enumerate and illustrate all the methods by which men have secured authority in rude communities would form a valuable contribution to comparative sociology.

163. Some Types of Leaders¹

A common characteristic of all geniuses is combining and creative imagination. Observation is mostly required for scientific creations; interpretation or explanation is the main requirement for philosophic work. The technical and the artistic genius have a maximum power of observation and of constructive imagination built thereupon; the philosophical genius has a maximum power of interpretation; in the scientific genius the two abilities are balanced. The specific ability of the technological genius is clear perception and imagination of movements, i. e., of correlated space and time relations. From a large number of observations, the scientist draws a few conclusions, the talented scientist draws less general conclusions than the scientist of genius; from a few observations the philosopher draws many conclusions, or more general conclusions than those of the scientist.

The philosopher's mind's-eye being accommodated for the embracing of vast horizons, for bird's-eye views, rather than of details, is, therefore, liable to become intellectually farsighted; whereas the scientist who is in the habit of paying more attention to particular phenomena, to narrow generalizations, is, therefore, likely to contract intellectual myopia, contempt for (arising from the inability to attain) wide generalizations. An excess of metaphysical speculation leads to mental presbyopia; an excess of positivism leads to mental myopia; and vice versa.

The philosopher is indirectly interested in particular phenomena; he deems them worthy of his attention in so far only as they allow him to ascend through them to general views, for he is more interested in the harmony, relation, between things than in the things themselves. To the scientist, and more so to the technologist, generalization are a mere means to a better comprehension or utilization of things, of particular facts.

The objective, positive, naturalistic or experimental thinker approaches men and things from without; he displays a maximum activity of the perceptive or receptive organs and a minimum of reasoning, i. e., a minimum activity of the associative or combinative brain organs; he reifies men, i. e., he is inclined to obliterate the distinction between human, vital and mechanical phenomena; he advances from the simple to the complex by adding, synthetizing elementary properties; he abstains

¹ Reprinted by permission from O. L. Schwarz, *General Types of Superior Men*, pp. 114-16; 134-38. Boston. R. G. Badger, 1916.

from accepting hypotheses as long as the sense data are scarce; to rise above things upon a weak factual foundation terrifies him, nor does he feel any necessity for doing so; he preferably dwells in the low, prosaic regions of facts and actualities; if he is original, it is in observation, in the discovery of new facts. The subjective, humanistic, or speculative thinker approaches everything from within; he displays a minimum of observation, perception and a maximum of interpretation, combination; he humanizes things and animals, i. e., he is inclined to attribute to them too many human qualities; he advances from the complex, from his own ego, to the simple by means of abstraction, subtraction, simplification, analysis; he prefers any provisional hypothesis, no matter how wildly speculative, to none; disconnected, unexplained, brute facts are a burden to him, his mind cannot digest them unless held together by or diluted in theories; his usual and favorite abode are the high, poetical regions of abstract concepts and general views; his originality consists in inventing new theories to include, to shelter, the new facts discovered by the observer or by the experimenter, or dimly foreseen by himself.

The Man of Action.—Intellectually, the pure or ordinary man of action does not stand much higher than the philistine. He is, as a rule, a pseudo-intellectual man, and, often, a morally pseudo-superior man. Although mercenary and success-worshipping historians, and the credulous masses, erect him monuments and immortalize him in various other ways, the impartial student of human nature cannot assign him any high rank in the hierarchic scale of psychical abilities. Human progress would be more continuous and less subject to disturbances or retrogressions, if the thinkers, the genuine superior men, exerted direct guidance over the masses. The man of action needs the suggestions and guiding ideas elaborated by the thinkers; but the latter—if they had their choice—could dispense with the intermediation of the former—not, however, with the intermediation of technologists, but merely with that of leaders, statesmen, professional reformers, ethical culturists, organizers. . . .

The pure man of action has the following characteristics: Activity, restlessness is his life. Solitude, inaction, revery, thinking for its own sake, thinking that cannot immediately be communicated and put into practise, is a dread to him. His mental activity runs in simple, unilateral, unramified circuits, leading to immediate muscular discharge. His knowledge of men and things is purely empirical, and of no general or theoretical nature. He does not care for the "why"; he merely cares for the "what." In other words: He merely cares to know how to act quickly and efficiently upon a particular class of men or things, and how to make them react; but he does not care to know about physical and

psychical behavior in general, nor about their inner, hidden causes. If he is a leader of men, all he cares to know is, what pleases and displeases them, what prompts them to action, what gains their confidence, what are the safest means of using them for the gratification of his material and egoistically-vain pursuits—if he is a pseudo-morally active man—or what are the safest means of making men work in their own interest and for the gratification of his altruistical vanity—if he is a genuine morally active man, i. e., an ideal man of action. But the fact that he knows how to lead men does not at all prove that he knows and understands them. On the contrary! If he really knew and understood men, as a genuine psychologist does, he would be less enthusiastic. Too much, too general, too deep knowledge would be a hindrance to them. Hence, they avoid it, and are averse to it. They tolerate Science, Art, Philosophy, purely intellectual pursuits, so long and in so far only as it serves their purposes so to do.

The man of action is necessarily narrow-minded, one-sided, oligo-ideistic, or even mono-ideistic; for one cannot pursue many practical aims, i. e., the realization of many ideals, as one can pursue many trains of thought.

The distinction between active and contemplative men is not always a distinction between two kinds of men; it is more often a distinction between two degrees of activity. What is commonly known and spoken of as the active type of men consists of men who are prompt in putting into practise whatever they see, think or is suggested to them; who feel the necessity of being always doing something—be it even something useless, something they do not believe in, something that does not appeal to their interests—rather than do nothing or indulge in thinking and deliberating; who prefer to do something now, at the risk of having later to undo it, rather than deliberate, plan the whole scheme of action, and postpone action or agitation until the entire scheme is worked out in their minds; who feel the impulse of exhibiting themselves, of drawing the people's attention upon themselves; who learn to do by doing, and learn such things only as they themselves can do or put into practise. Whereas what we commonly call the contemplative class of men does not necessarily or entirely consist of inactive men. The contemplating man is not prompt in acting, nor does he like to be continually active. He does not act before having planned the system of means to be employed, before having weighed and valued the consequences, before having made sure that the trouble is worth his while and will yield lasting results. He has no patience for carrying out details and for remaining active in a single cause; nor can he rest satisfied merely with im-

mediately realizable or working knowledge. The man of action acts promptly, much and continually, but achieves very little; whereas the thinking man acts after deliberation and mature conviction, he acts little and but rarely, but achieves much. Left to themselves, the thinkers and philosophers of mankind would have accomplished long ago the international peace, general culture and universal brotherhood which the men of action have been promising and claiming to pursue for so many thousands of years.

Poet and Thinker.—From the evolutionary standpoint, the thinker, the philosopher, must be regarded as superior to the pure poet; since sentimentalism goes together with an immature age, it is only a stage of transition in the life of the thinker, whereas philosophic and scientific thinking comes with maturity. If we admit that the evolution of the superior man during his individual life represents an anticipation at the same time of the evolution of mankind, we have to accept the conclusion that art, in general, and poetry, in particular, represents a lower stage of development than science and philosophy.

The thinker may exceptionally redescend into the warm regions of poetry; and the poet, the artist, may from time to time ascend into the serene regions of philosophical thinking. But, in spite of occasional deep philosophical insights or intuitions, the poet remains a superficial, confused, obscure, inconsistent or immature thinker. Even Goethe, the philosophical poet *per excellentiam*, makes no exception thereto.

The poet is a primitive type of thinker: He thinks in images, mental pictures, not in concepts; he expresses, therefore, his thoughts in pictorial language; he thinks the general and the abstract in the form and by means of the particular or concrete; he thinks the new, the inanimate, the impersonal in terms of the old, traditional, animate, personal. Since conflicting or antagonistic images, unlike conflicting concepts, cannot coexist—but only succeed each other—in consciousness, we understand why poets are partial, one-sided, inconstant, inconsistent, sentimental.

164. The Qualities of Political Leaders ¹

The problem of leadership has not been wholly neglected, although very imperfectly considered thus far. Notably Robert Michels in an inquiry based chiefly upon social democratic leaders in Italy and the Germanic states, made a brilliant study of the "metamorphosis" of party

¹ From *Boss Platt and His New York Machine* by Harold F. Gosnell. From Introduction by C. E. Merriam, pp. xvi-xix. Copyright by the University of Chicago, 1924.

leaders, and of some of the typical characteristics of political leadership. As significant traits of leaders he enumerated the following: 1. Force of Will; 2. Wider extent of knowledge than ordinary; 3. Catonian strength of conviction; 4. Self-sufficiency; 5. Reputation for goodness of heart and disinterestedness; 6. Some form of celebrity. In addition to the possession of certain other qualities I suggest the following as a working list of the attributes of the political leader.

1. Unusual sensitiveness to the strength and direction of social and industrial tendencies with reference to their party and political bearings.
2. Acute and quick perception of possible courses of community conduct with prompt action accordingly.
3. Facility in group combination and compromise—political diplomacy in ideas, policies and spoils.
4. Facility in personal contacts with widely varying types of men.
5. Facility in dramatic expression of the sentiment or interest of large groups of voters, usually with voice or pen—fusing a logical formula, an economic interest and a social habit or predisposition in a personality.
6. Courage not unlike that of the military commander whose best laid plans require a dash of luck for their successful completion.

This was intended, however, only as a temporary scaffolding, and has been so used by others and by me. It will be necessary to accumulate many individual studies before much substantial progress can be made.

We need to know the hereditary influences affecting the individual. We need to have the most thorough knowledge of the social environment in which the phenomena of leadership develop. We need to have the most careful data regarding the physical organization of the leader, an organic survey which we are likely to have available in the near future, and which may contain the explanation of many types of leadership. We need to have a thorough survey of the intellectual qualities of the leader. We need to have an analysis of the social qualities of the leader. We need to have traced the patterns of his traits and dispositions in which may be found some of the springs of his power. It is clear that leadership lies not only in intelligence, but in sympathy, in determination, in social *savoir faire*, in a set of traits which we are just beginning to appraise and very roughly to measure. The interesting attempts of Moore to measure aggressiveness, of Downey to measure will or persistence, of the army authorities to evaluate the character qualities necessary to military leadership; all these and others are interesting illustrations of the types of inquiry that are likely to give us within the

next generation the necessary mental and temperamental measurements of individuals on the basis of which we understand the situation we term leadership. When these patterns are completed, it may easily be found that leadership is a relative term, and that the same individual will be found a leader in this field and a follower in that.

It will also be found useful to examine the achievement record of the leaders in various walks of life, and to find the relations between these achievement records and political leadership, for here again in the experience of the individual, and the circumstances under which he has developed political interests and prestige may be found part of the secret. Another significant field is the decline and disintegration of leadership, and the circumstances under which this occurs, using again the same categories and standards of equipment, achievement, situation or qualification.

Likewise, the study of various kinds of groups will develop much material of value for the understanding of leadership. In the midst of the group arise those who appeal with greatest magnetic attraction to its members, and in proportion to our intimate knowledge of the processes of collective behavior will come insight into the nature and limits of the leader's pre-eminence. Leadership is a function of collective action, and cannot be fully understood outside of its special setting. Possibly some persons of unusual force or versatility would be leaders anytime or anywhere, but most are peculiar to their particular social situation, and all are conditioned by the surrounding social and political forces which they express and interpret. In this connection we may look for interesting analyses of groups among the forthcoming studies of the sociologists. Moreover, social psychology, is likely in the not distant future to come to the aid of the student of government by making clearer the nature of the interaction that goes on in the complex social process. There can be no doubt that political attractions and aversions are intimately related to the elaborate cycles that appear and disappear in the shifts of social behavior, and which can be fully understood only when the group process and social psychology are more thoroughly studied and more fully comprehended.

165. The American Political Boss: Types and Methods of Control ¹

He (the boss) is at the apex of the political machine I have been trying to describe. A curious American institution, with no legal or even

¹ Reprinted by permission from F. R. Kent, *The Great Game of Politics*, pp. 70:

official party status, with a power partly real and partly mythical, sometimes wholly sinister and low, sometimes personally honest, occasionally cloaked in respectability, sometimes possessed of a sense of public service—these state and city bosses are the most influential individuals in their respective communities in America—if exception is made of those persons whose influence is purely a spiritual one.

It is difficult to write accurately about bosses, because there are so many different kinds.

What applied to one type does not completely fit the others. Basically, they play the game in much the same way. There are state bosses and city bosses and there are variations of both types. There is no such thing as a national boss.

It is a mistake to think that all bosses are illiterate products of the slums. It is a mistake to think that all bosses are dishonest, or that all bosses make money out of politics, or run their machines for personal profit. There are bosses who spend their money in politics instead of making it, and there are and have been many bosses of breeding and education.

The late Senator Boies Penrose, of Pennsylvania, was a representative of a distinguished Philadelphia family, a Harvard graduate, and a man of great intellectual force, in spite of the fact that he was one of the most ruthless and unscrupulous of bosses. William Barnes, long Republican boss of New York State, is a university man, with unsuspected literary tastes.

The Massachusetts Republican machine was a Lodge machine and was bossed in the usual hard-boiled manner by that highly cultured and intellectual representative of the Massachusetts aristocracy—Senator Henry Cabot Lodge.

For many years John Walter Smith has been Democratic state boss in Maryland. He has been state senator, Congressman, governor, and United States Senator, but aside, from his salary as public official, he never made a dollar out of politics. On the contrary, he has spent in maintaining his machine and making his fights an almost incredible amount of money.

On the Republican side in Maryland, Senator Weller is the recognized state boss, but his personal honesty is above question, and he has unquestionably spent some of his own money in holding his power.

What men like these get out of being boss is gratified political or personal ambition, public honor or position and the sense of power.

76; 76-78; 81; 72-83; 83-84; 85; 88-89. Garden City, N. Y. Doubleday Page & Company, 1923.

To most of his type a real love of the political game plus the selfish motive is behind their desire to be boss and stay boss. It stirs their blood, gives them a thrill, and often, when they have money and leisure, an interest in life without which they would languish.

Their machines are built on patronage and run on the spoils system.

The successful machine politician who comes up from the ranks is first of all a fighting type. His whole life is a fight. He has to fight to win his place, and he has to fight to keep it. Every campaign is a fight, and as he goes up the political ladder his fights get bigger and bigger, harder and harder. It can be emphatically stated that no boss ever really landed who would run away from a fight. Whatever else they lack, they all have courage—and they are all able to take punishment as well as give it. Politics teaches them many things—and that is one of them.

But merely being a fighter is not enough. There are other essential qualities. Fundamentally a boss must have a flair for politics.

The ability to handle men, to make them follow him, through loyalty or fear, or self-interest, or personality—that is another trait that has to be born in a boss and which he cannot acquire or affect. And then he has to have sense enough to know when not to fight. He has to have enough judgment to inspire his followers with a certain degree of confidence. He does not need much else.

The average story of the rise of a city boss is this: he breaks in when a youngster as a runner or messenger, and makes himself useful to his precinct executive. After a while the precinct executive makes him a judge or clerk of election. As he begins to make friends and gain experience, he gets more valuable, and pretty soon, through the precinct executive, he lands a small City Hall job—inspector in the Water Department, checker for the Street Cleaning Department, or watchman or janitor or some such thing at about \$900 a year. He trains along with this for a while, active in his precinct all the time and making friends around the neighborhood, until the time comes when he either beats the precinct executive in a primary fight, thus taking his precinct away from him, or the precinct executive dies or goes up or gets out, and, having attracted the attention of the ward executive, he gets the place. Then he is on his way.

At once he gets a better job at the City Hall. His power is increased through the precinct prerogatives of naming the judges and clerks of election, picking out the polling place, employing the runners, and handling the precinct money on election day. As time goes on, he begins to gain strength in other precincts in the ward. He joins the ward club, makes alliances with weaker precinct executives, slips a jobholder

in here and there, begins to gain power and know where he is going. And one fine day the ward executive finds that the coming boss has centered around him all the executive's enemies in the ward plus his own friends, has taken away from him most of his precinct executives, and is ready for a fight. If he wins he has the ward. He is its natural leader and inevitably, as the stronger man, he gets the position.

The ward executive is a real political power. Now, the coming boss is in contact with the real boss. He gets a better-paid and more influential city job, and a bigger slice out of the campaign funds. He begins to make his own personality count at the City Hall and to get his share of the patronage. He may even go himself to the city council, or the state legislature. He begins to make some money. He has taken an important stride forward.

At this juncture he may not have it in his mind to become the machine boss. The chances are he is thoroughly loyal to the boss, ready to fight the boss's fights and follow where he leads. But that does not prevent him from doing what machine people call "spreading out." With those qualities born in him, he cannot help it. He solidifies his own ward solidly behind him, and then he begins to lap over into other wards in his district. The boss likes him, recognizes his value, gets in behind and encourages him.

There is always among the ward executives the exceptionally qualified man, who "spreads out" and becomes a district leader. Sometimes he does this in spite of the boss, but usually with his help. The boss wants a loyal, strong man in the district, who can act as his right hand, keep down trouble in the machine, sense the situation, acquire enough strength of his own to keep the ward executives on their toes—and still be his friend.

The coming boss, after he acquires direct leadership, usually plays close to the actual boss. He aspires to be his trusted friend. If he can get himself in that position, the boss takes him in on big things, helps him make money, works through him in many ways, uses him as a confidential agent in more or less delicate and difficult matters. Every boss has a Man Friday, a fellow whom he trusts, uses as a collecting agency and relies on generally in a fight. Sometimes he has two or three, which enables him to avoid putting himself too deeply in the power of one man, and makes it unnecessary to give any man his whole confidence.

And the next step takes him to the final goal—the bossship—which he may reach in one of two ways:

First, the boss may die or retire, and he easily and naturally takes over the management as the only logical leader in sight, or

Second, he may quarrel with the boss, split the machine, ally himself with a temporary independent reform or factional revolt, and beat him in a city-wide primary fight.

The human jealousies and hates, the passions and prejudices, the hot desire for revenge, the bitterness of disappointed office-seekers, the soreness, sordidness, and selfishness of individuals, the vaulting ambitions of some, the apathy of others, sudden strokes of daring and unexpected weaknesses revealed—all these things, and others, help make politics a precarious game, keep machines from functioning full strength, and make the climb of the machine man from precinct runner to boss hard and slippery. Many a promising and sturdy machine product, full of hope and speed, has broken his political neck just as he put his foot on the top round of the ladder.

There are three distinct things which greatly strengthen the city boss after he arrives. They enable him to consolidate his position and make it easier for him to hold on to the job of being boss than it was to get the job. They are these:

First—The urgent necessity of the rank and file of the machine to have a leader, plus the fact that the machine is most effective and the units of the machine most prosperous under a stable and reasonably permanent leadership.

Second—The quick recognition and acceptance of him as the boss by the big business men and corporations of the community and their eagerness to transact business with him.

Third—The advertisement given him by the local newspapers.

166. The Reformer Type of Political Leader: A Study in Contrasts¹

The mental process which the average reformer uses is simple enough. He begins by taking it for granted that he is right. Then it must follow, as the night the day, that if you differ from him you are wrong. That is the sum and substance of his premises and logic. And if you are wrong there can be no compromise with you, for truth cannot enter into any compromise with error. The reformer, when he runs true to type, is not open to argument concerning the validity of his convictions. He will not barter away "his principles." The half loaf, to his way

¹From W. B. Munro, *Personality in Politics*, pp. 5-6; 9; 22-25; 26; 27-31. New York. Copyright 1924 by the Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

of thinking, is worse than no bread. He will not arbitrate an issue of righteousness. As well ask him to dicker on the Golden Rule or the Ten Commandments.

This inclination toward a categorical stand has often led reformers to extreme and indefensible positions. There is such a thing as being too logical in politics. It is not well to carry everything to its inevitable conclusion. Politics is not an exact science, like physics or mathematics. Two and two would make four in politics as in arithmetic, to be sure; but in politics you do not deal with anything so definite as two and two,—you deal altogether with variable and unknown quantities. That is why political prognostications are so baffling even to the thoroughly initiated. Multiplying one unknown factor by another merely gives you an unknown result.

The reformer, as a rule, does not adequately visualize the actual workings of his proposal. When he clamors for an official censorship of motion pictures he envisages a board of high-minded, intelligent, and incorruptible citizens passing without fear or favor upon every film. But it is quite as likely that the administration of his censorship law would presently find its way into the hands of a trio who owe their selection to political influence and whose incorruptibility is more than open to suspicion. Most of our failures in the realm of government are due to lapses in the human equation. There are some communities which are able to secure good government under any system; there are others which seem unable to achieve it no matter how radically or how frequently their political institutions are reformed.

Not only the initial designation but the whole planning of a reform movement has often indicated a poor conception of electoral psychology. Time and again the reform forces have tried to arouse popular enthusiasm for a "business administration," conducted on "business principles," by men who are "efficient" and who will recognize the need for "efficiency and economy in public expenditures." It would be difficult to imagine a more ineffective method of presenting a sound idea to large elements among the voters. The reformer takes it for granted that the great body of wage-earners are friendly to these terms, which is by no means the case. The worker—by which I mean the man who works with his hands and is paid by the day—thinks of "business principles" and "efficiency" in terms of piece-work, time-clocks, and a foreman with the beneficence of Simon Legree. A "business administration," from his point of view, is one in which a few have all the power—and all the profits. To couch their appeal to the wage-earners in this strain, as reformers have so often done, is to display a complete mis-

apprehension of what is running in the worker's mind. Reform ought to be sold to the people in their own language. When Theodore Roosevelt spoke of giving everybody a "square deal" he said something that the wayfaring man could get hold of. In two words he wrote a whole program. But when reformers go to the factory gates and discourse about the reduction of maximum surtaxes, standardization of salaries, unit-costs, and personnel administration, they might better save the strain upon their throats. Not long ago I recall seeing two transparencies hung from the respective headquarters of rival mayoralty candidates. One proclaimed that candidate A stood for "economy and efficiency in city government." The other merely said "Vote for B—he stands by his friends." (I need not mention that B was elected.)

The politics of New York City, during the years 1913-1917, afford an apt illustration of what comes from a failure to make and keep close contact with the temper of the masses among the electorate. John Purroy Mitchel, elected mayor of the metropolis on a fusion ticket in 1913, was one of the most promising chief executives that any American city ever placed at the head of its affairs. At the time of his election he was still in the thirties, but he had already acquired a considerable amount of political experience, having served a term as president of the board of aldermen. He belonged to the dominant political party in New York City, but not to the Tammany branch of it. He was of Irish ancestry and a Catholic in religion. No one doubted his capacity as an administrator or his possession of high ideals. At the outset of his administration he was looked upon by the reformers as an ideal mayor.

And from every standpoint but one Mr. Mitchel proved to be an ideal mayor. He chose capable subordinates, developed a fine spirit of co-operation among the heads of the city departments, reorganized and improved the methods of doing the city's business, toned up the budget system, and put technical work into the hands of experts. He gave the city a government that was both honest and efficient. To accomplish this, however, Mayor Mitchel had to devote his entire time to his official duties and could give no thought to the upbuilding of a political machine. In a word he did exactly what any mayor, according to the reform theory of municipal government, ought to do.

But there was one thing lacking, to wit, an appreciation of the awkward fact that honesty and efficiency will not of themselves suffice to make an administration successful. A successful administration must establish itself on terms of intimacy with the whole body of the people and to this end it must be at pains to stamp correct impressions upon the public mind. Mayor Mitchel permitted a wholly wrong impression of

his own personality to be spread abroad. He was thought to be cold, unbending, and bureaucratic in his point of view—all of which he was not. The obtrusively “professional” flavor of the administration did not appeal to the people of the tenements. An increased tax rate disgruntled the property-owners despite a flood of assurances from the “experts” that the city was getting more for its money than ever before. Because the mayor hobnobbed occasionally with men whose habit it was to wear evening clothes in the evening his critics began to refer to him as the head of a “swallow tail” administration. He allowed himself to become aligned with issues which were unpopular and which weakened him politically. Reformers do not realize that people vote their resentment rather than their appreciation. It is not good political strategy to do something that pleases a majority of the voters but bitterly offends a minority. The novice in politics would reason, of course, that by such action a mayor must necessarily gain more votes than he loses, but it does not work out that way. The approving majority forgets all about the matter long before the next election arrives, the vindictive minority does not forget. The gratitude of one voter for something that pleases him cannot be depended upon to offset the animus of another whom the same action has disgusted. This is a phase of electoral psychology which has had too little heed from the friends of good government.

His (Mitchel's) personality was of a type that could not capture the imagination of the common man. He created too many centers of antagonism. He failed to identify himself with any city-wide popular issue. All too lightly he accepted a challenge from the leaders of his own faith. He let the tax rate soar, as reform administrations so often do, and took for granted that this would be amply justified to the taxpayers by the better service given them. Nevertheless, on the record of his administrative achievements, Mayor Mitchel ought to have been triumphantly re-elected in 1917. But he was overwhelmed at the polls by an obscure Brooklyn politician who did not possess a small fraction of his own administrative capacity.

Let me invite your attention to the career of another mayor whose personality and methods were as different from those of Mitchel as it is possible for diverging personalities to be. Tom L. Johnson, mayor of Cleveland from 1901 to 1909, disdained the title of reformer, yet he was the champion reformer of them all, upsetting more municipal traditions than any other mayor of his day. He had none of Mitchel's administrative capacity, nor did he feel that he needed it. “Fifteen minutes a day,” he declared, was ample time for a mayor to spend at his desk.

In fifteen minutes he could decide the vital questions; a competent secretary could do the rest. A mayor's place, according to Johnson, was "out among the people" and that is where he spent most of his time. Yet strange to say, Mayor Johnson had the reputation of being a good executive. This rather amused him. "Being a good executive," he once remarked, "consists in deciding everything quickly and being right half the time."

Johnson's career had in it all the elements of a good drama. It was full of action, humor, and pathos. Coming to Cleveland a full-grown man, after he had made a fortune out of street railways, he soon found himself at the head of a fight against the traction interests in his new home. The fight, as usually happens, moved into politics and Johnson went with it. Although a Democrat in his political allegiance, Johnson was not a party politician; he was not supported in his fight by either of the two regular parties; he did not trust either of them, and was not beholden to either. To all intents he was a non-partisan. It was his habit to say that everybody was against him, the party leaders, the party organizations, the vested interests, the newspapers, the pulpits—everybody but the people. In four successive mayoralty campaigns the people proved to be with him.

The reason for this repeated success at the polls is not to be found in Johnson's own qualifications for filling the office of mayor. He did not possess the temperament of an administrator. His success was due to his forceful personality, his picturesque methods of campaigning, and his championship of popular issues. These made a strong combination. Johnson was a big-boned man, thunderous of voice, a cyclone in action, without much education, and wholly without a sense of proportion. His remedy for all the evils of municipal government was a three-cent fare. He was a reformer by instinct, but he was also one of the shrewdest politicians that has ever been nurtured in that traditional nursery of practical politicians, the Buckeye State. His campaign methods were Napoleonic in their vigor. He carried his cause direct to the ears of all the people. When he found himself shut out of all the principal halls and large meeting places, he did not whine that "the interests" were in a conspiracy to silence him. He hired the biggest circus tent in the country and drew to it larger audiences than any of Cleveland's halls could hold. Thus he turned all manner of foolish persecutions to his own advantage.

As a purveyor of publicity, Tom L. Johnson has had few equals. His ambition was to hold the headlines every day in the year. When he did anything his first care was to let the people know it and to point out

in his own characteristic way that it was done in their interest. He wasted none of his energy upon routine things which could be left to his subordinates. Johnson was three times re-elected and it was not until 1909 that the people withdrew their support from him. Eight years of perpetual fighting took the novelty out of his main issues and dulled the edge of his picturesqueness. His enemies wore him down. In any city the voters will eventually grow tired of daily pronouncements which sound like communiques from the battle front. Cleveland threw Johnson overboard because it wanted a return to normalcy.

167. Two Types of Radical Leadership: Emotional and Scientific ¹

Radicalism may be defined as a conspicuous departure from definitely established social habits which have the stamp of social approval. About 5 per cent is articulate; about 95 per cent is inarticulate or suppressed.

Turning now to the radicals. They (radicals) may be classified basically as *emotional radicals* and as *intellectual or scientific radicals*.

Emotionalism deserves consideration first. In its purest form there is little indication that rational thought processes are functioning. The victim (and I use the word advisedly) has very definite psychological characteristics. In technical lingo he is said to have a *low emotional breaking point*, that is, seemingly entirely inadequate events (practically any incident at times) may set him off into hysterical or paranoiac tantrums. To him, a chance event is freighted with subtle, sinister, highly purposive, hidden meaning.

Returning to our emotional victims: they show frenzied bravery and win medals on the field of battle; they make conscientious objectors that torture cannot budge; they make Sarah Bernhardts, if we are to believe biographers. They make mobs of all sorts. They make fanatical leaders of lost causes. Such persons are always radical in the sense that they depart from traditional codes of beliefs or give exaggerated emphasis to some hobby, ism, or creed. If highly intelligent, or artistically gifted they may be fully respected by society. In the majority of cases they are tolerated, arousing irritation, amusement, or contempt. By chance alone, we would anticipate that a certain number would become emotionalized over *economic, racial, and national problems*. But here are three fields

¹ Reprinted by permission from W. T. Root "The Psychology of Radicalism" *J. of Abn. & Soc. Psych.* 1925: XIX: pp. 342; 343; 344-5; 345-6; 346-7; 347; 349; 350; 351; 351-2; 353; 353-4.

in which social prestige is clearly and drastically established. At present, acute national fervor has replaced religious fanaticism: the credo is precisely defined, and any infringement brings violent protest, with the severest legal and mob action. It should be noted that emotional radicalism along nationalistic, racial, or economic lines is no more nor less open to criticism intellectually, logically, or scientifically than other emotionalisms. If emotionalism happens to run with popular ideas it may be affably received, however disgusting *intellectually*. If it counters popular beliefs it will meet resentment and seven trumpeters will proclaim the victim radical from the walls of the city. Billy Sunday is as devoid of logic as the most hysterical soap-box orator; but the former is on the whole rather favorably captioned in the newspapers, while the soap-box orator does well if he escapes violence.

A much more interesting phenomenon, psychologically, is the transformation of the *average man into an emotional radical*. Let us consider the motivations of emotional radicalism and trace the emotionalizing process. Generally speaking, incidental radicalism in the average man is the product of dissatisfaction arising either from personal discomfort or from some glaring social inconsistency. Discomfort, of course, may not, usually does not arouse any desire or action *leading* to change, because well-organized social habits care for any spirit of rebellion, however inconsistent and incongruous the social condition may be. Good illustrations of such habits may be found in the church teachings of self-abnegation, conviction of sin, humility, God wills it, all is for the best, and in the opiate effects of mysticism and fatalism. The usual way out is for the individual to squirm loose, partly to alleviate by cunning, or to adopt the attitude of resignation toward an all-wise damnation. The church has through the ages been the gyroscope of social habits, the great stabilizer. It makes for social acceptance and endurance, and the normal individual is quickly restored if attacked by the malady of radicalism. In few cases is there any clear integration of social causes or possible changes.

But where there are many who accept social conditions with humility, a few rebel. Peculiar conditions of oppression, inability to elude economic injustice (imagined or real), bad luck, vocational inadaptability or mishap, alone or in combination, may cause the individual in question to become skeptical of the social or economic order. Once a searching skepticism of social habits of whatever nature is implanted, a thoroughgoing radical attitude may be expected to follow. It will be limited, however, in all probability, to the particular field in which the individual has felt the pinch of social inconsistency.

Of those who turn radical, a very limited number have the courage of their convictions, and in turn a *still more limited number* of the latter have any definite systematic plan of campaign. Thus the number of dynamic, systematic, thoroughgoing radicals is very few indeed.

This leads to the most interesting psychological feature concerning radicalism: *the emotionalizing of the radical who possesses, innately, normal emotional control*. I purposely discussed the type with a constitutionally low emotional breaking-point first. But besides these constitutional types, sustained social disapproval, accentuated by propaganda, can soon reduce the normal individual to a state of acute neurasthenia. A vicious circle of causes is then enacted. The emotionalized radical (innately normal) may come to see in every act of society, in every move of every antagonist, a deep ulterior purpose. Organizations, nations, public characters are made melodramatic in intensity; friends to the cause are models of honesty and sincere intent, enemies are models of dishonesty and insincerity. Society, seeing this crude exaggeration, becomes highly skeptical, accusing the radicals of being dishonest and dangerous as well as foolish and visionary. Thus the vicious circle of counter-accusation increases emotionalization and distortion of fact on both sides. The emotional conservative, of course, is just as bad, except that he *floats on popular approval* thus feeling gloriously self-righteous and superior. The conservative always has at his beck and call the dignified channels of public expression; he is also able to bring into play the most subtle methods of obscurantism. Obscurantism is usually combined with definite propaganda against the radical or his cause. For example, in a strike, all of the virtues, overtures, and wrongs of the strikers are obscured to the point of total suppression from the public press; their acts of violence along with the other side of the question are given *full-page, front-page* publicity. The more kidglove, unctuous, invisible this obscurantism, the more it arouses a futile fury. The psychological setting is perfect for a brainstorm and for functional neurosis.

Consequently, however logical and detached the presentation of the radical, the initial reaction of public opinion is fraught with emotion provided the public realizes that violent hands are being laid on its sacred traditions.

One very interesting mental attitude of the radical (emotional, normal, or superior) is the *superiority-inferiority* complex. He feels in such a case that he has arrived at a superior integration of fact; he is often contemptuous of social tradition. He firmly believes he is ahead of his age. He is often far better read than the average citizen and pillar of

society. He is emancipated from superstition while his inclusions under this caption are generous. He is serious-minded and frequently is better informed generally than the average college man. Natively he may be very superior intellectually. In repartee he tries to meet facetiousness or bitter recrimination with cogent logic and is usually more correct and less personal than his opponent. However, he ignores or is ignorant of the psychology of the large audience, and a man with a tenth the fact and intellectual ability ousts him with a clever display of wit and double use of words. But the radical feels he *is superior*. Public encounters, public abuse, and the contemptuous attitude of his fellowmen grind him into *inferiority*. He knows the reason but has only scorn for the opportunist. *The agony of this tantalizing paradox is almost more than he can bear.* I am convinced that an inferiority-superiority complex is induced in such cases which to a large extent accounts for the hairtrigger nerves, the irascibility, and the tense neurotic voice of some radical speakers.

The direct outgrowth of his mental attitude is twofold: first, an aggressive and egotistical, intellectual assertiveness which invites opposition. In the second place, he has an attitude toward tradition that is sweeping and illogical. Anything old is bad, anything new is good.

Earlier I defined radicalism as a conspicuous departure from definitely established social habits which have the stamp of social approval. Consequently, we must include as radical the scientific and philosophical scholars who have made a most complete departure from social and economic habit.

First, let us consider the general habits of thought in scientific and philosophical procedure.

To the scientists, nothing is of value *because* it is traditional.

To the scientist everything must *show cause* for its right to exist. This is the most terribly radical thing the human mind has ever conceived.

For *unquestioning faith* in creeds and codes, and economic systems, for social practice and taboo it has substituted *questioning disbelief*. I repeat, in the long run, this is the most radical concept the human mind has ever entertained.

A close second is the idea that all action in either the physical or mental world is a matter of cause and effect, of mechanical, physical, chemical causation. It substitutes a causative universe for a vitalistic universe. Determinism, in other words, is thoroughly radical and out

of harmony with the prevailing views as to the origin, ethical value, or future of most of the political, social, moral, religious, or economic traditions.

A direct corollary is a *highly detached, impersonal attitude*. The antithesis is the *emotionalized wish* which is father to the thought; the *mother* incidentally is social habit. Few people realize the far-reaching radicalism in thought and action this single mental attitude implies.

Again, the scientific attitude involves a clear recognition of the inaccurate and incomplete survey of relevant facts even under the favorable conditions of control.

Another basically radical thing is the philosophical and scientific attitude of *degrees of truth*. The very nature of the scientific attitude involves a hunt for degrees and refinements of judgment and degrees of validity. In philosophy and science we recognize shades of validity; thus, a thing is probably so, possibly so, tentatively held in suspended judgment, possibly not so, probably not so. To subject traditions of any nature to such a catechism is hellish beyond belief. The more scant and emotionalized the evidence the greater the assurance. The *group mind*, the *emotional conservative* and the *emotionalized radical* are likely to have two degrees of truth: absolutely true, absolutely false.

Another thoroughly radical scientific concept is the habitual practice of *discounting the validity of all ideas that relate to the ego and the emotions*, either in ourselves or in others.

An appreciation of this *grilling indictment* of the human mind is an appreciation of the most subtle and far-reaching account of the dubious, precarious and highly unreliable *things* we call belief, conviction, judgment and reason.

Numerous corollary factors could be mentioned showing the antagonism between modern scientific thought and social tradition but space will not permit. One further item should be mentioned, though, and that is *creative thinking*. Creative thinking is always radical. It may, as in the case of Galileo or Darwin, arouse bitter opposition. It may, as in the case of wireless telegraphy, lie outside the pale of social tradition, being mechanical and superficial in character. It may arouse antagonism in limited circles, as the music of Wagner, the poetry of Walt Whitman.

Habit moves the masses along a smoother road of mental and emotional thought. *Creative thinkers* are the pioneers who blaze the trails. Some fifty to a hundred years later the trail will be replaced by a thoroughfare properly macadamized with social habit and approval along which ladies and children may pass with perfect social propriety.

168. Radicalism, Leaders, and Social Reform¹

Radicals and social reformers are largely actuated by motives other than those with which they credit themselves in the midst of their activity.

Radical behavior is a function of *two* variables, or kinds of variables, of which motives represent the one, and "culture," "environment," or "circumstance" the other. For example, abnormalities of life, as Dr. Ogburn suggests, surrounded the casual workers in the West before the organization of the militant I. W. W. Repressed impulses by themselves, then, cannot explain the peculiar radical behavior of that movement. But this is not to say that repressed impulses had no outlet in the lives of these workers before 1905. The "red-light" districts of Seattle, Spokane, Butte, and other western cities, in which these casual laborers congregated to "blow" their savings, offered many, diverse, and perhaps almost equally "satisfying" opportunities for release of the same thwarted motives.

The restrictions upon such opportunities that have arisen in recent years are believed by many observers to have stimulated radicalism. This belief is reflected in the strong support given to prohibition by many leaders of western radicalism who were once its bitter opponents.

In an individual, pure chance may determine the impulse and emotional outlets that are found. It may be only accident that determines whether a particular person is a religious dogmatist in a New England town, a Tammany henchman in New York, or a class-conscious "Wobly" in a western camp.

This paper will attempt no derivations of sociological equations for radical or reformist behavior. As the variable more frequently overlooked by reformers in reviewing their own activity, the factor of motives will be singled out for further discussion.

The viewpoint followed is that of a considerable number of motives or impulses in readiness for expression in each individual. One category comprises those which may be loosely characterized as "altruistic." Some of the individual's impulse tendencies, when stimulated, are denied a normal completion in behavior. Individuals may vary considerably in the number and selection of impulses which are thus "balked." Professor Woodworth says: "Let any reaction-tendency be first aroused and then interfered with, and pugnacious behavior is the instinctive

¹ Reprinted by permission from S. A. Rice "Motives in Radicalism and Social Reform" *Am. J. Soc.* 1922-23: XXVIII: pp. 579-82; 582-83; 583-85. Copyright by the University of Chicago.

result. . . . With this impulse often goes the stirred-up organic and emotional state of anger."

In civilized society the agency by which an impulse is "balked" is rarely accessible to retaliation. Social standards of conduct, moreover, dictate modes of constraint upon both pugnacity and anger. Their expression, in modified form, becomes in some way attached to, and to some extent brings about, other forms of behavior. The completion of the latter then provides something of the same satisfaction as would the completion of the reaction-tendency that has been thwarted. The emotion that would normally be associated with the actual behavior seems, nevertheless, to be augmented. This augmentation of emotion may lead to nothing more than innocent enthusiasms or hobbies. It may supply the impetus to rationally calculated behavior. On the other hand, it may lead to such a heaping-up of emotion that the particular activity to which it is attached falls outside of the realm within which the individual's reason exercises a co-ordinating influence.

In the case of most social reformers, especially those of upper or middle-class traditions, this heaping-up of emotion has occurred around what I have termed the "altruistic" impulses. Radicals, social reformers, and social workers are as a rule unselfish and even self-sacrificing. They "burn with conviction" that they are helping to bring about a "better world." Their belief is scarcely distinguishable in this regard from that of the religious enthusiast.

This enthusiasm, being purely emotional, tends to lose touch with the individual's reasoning processes. The program of reform or radicalism that is to "remake society" serves principally as a vehicle for expressions of impulse and emotion. Like the gods of the religious devotee, the reformer's "movement" is a matter of faith. Reason is indeed employed in a secondary manner. Minor points in the program are keenly debated, while the cause as a whole may be promoted with a great amount of skill and intelligence. In its essentials, nevertheless, it is beyond the reach of rational criticism. It reposes in an emotional holy of holies into which unbiased analysis is not permitted.

The fortuitous manner in which a "cause" may be selected is to be illustrated by the apostates to radicalism. Every anti-radical organization or propaganda is filled with supporters who have deserted radical movements. In most cases these men and women have not, as former comrades suppose, "sold out." The new cause is promoted with the same emotional conviction and sincerity as was the old. Such radicals are not "tired." Their emotional satisfactions have merely become recon-ditioned.

As an example of a "reconditioned" radical, I venture to suggest Mr. Ole Hanson, who, as mayor of Seattle, gained national prominence, at the time of the general strike of 1919 in that city, for his alleged suppression of "the Reds." That Mr. Hanson had been for many years prior to this event a somewhat radical reformer is a fact not generally known outside of his own community. It is current belief among many former supporters that he "sold out to the enemy" in the person of traction and other interests. To the writer, a more plausible explanation is to be found for his change of front. Rebuffs sustained from earlier supporters, particularly in a personal appearance before the Central Labor Council at the outset of the strike, served to destroy the accustomed stimuli with which Mr. Hanson's behavior had been associated. Simultaneously, new stimuli in the form of support and applause, substantially the same as the old in kind, but appearing from unfamiliar quarters, were substituted. Hence, the type of response continued unchanged but its objects were largely reversed.

Occasionally it happens that the emotional structure of radicalism is reabsorbed, as it were, at its source. Normal completions are established for impulses that have been interfered with. The emotional pressure behind the radical activities is then reduced.

Thus, happy marriage has frequently withdrawn the driving power of an individual from a radical movement, just as unhappy marriage may place such a drive behind it. The paralyzing effect of a good income upon the radical activities of an individual has often been noted. The effect may be due not so much to a new identification of personal interests as to new possibilities of satisfaction for impeded impulses. Advancing age, even though it brings no additional means of satisfaction, may yet soften the vigor of some of the youthful impulse-tendencies that were drained into radicalistic channels. In all such cases, radicals become, not "reconditioned," but "tired."

Professor Ogburn suggests that, whereas human ability follows the normal curve of error in its distribution, the economic organization of society is to be symbolized rather by the pyramid. Super-imposition will indicate the larger number of men and women who do not find within organized productive processes a sufficient outlet for the abilities that they possess, in whatever degree, to lead and influence their fellow-men. Lacking the training, the environment, the income, or the inclination to seek an outlet in cultural, intellectual, or religious spheres, they naturally become active in the promotion and leadership of class-conscious movements among their associates.

In general, the leader of working-class birth is likely to "have his

feet upon the ground" as regards the realities of life within his group. He is likely, on the whole, to emphasize the economic aspects of the labor struggle, concerning himself with hours, wages, and working conditions. His radicalism remains realistic rather than becomes utopian. Trade unions may affiliate with radical political parties, yet they rarely spend themselves on the political struggle. Win or lose, the economic line-up against employers remains the same on the day after election.

It is the leader of middle- or upper-class birth or training, who, failing to obtain his emotional satisfactions within those classes, is more likely to become a champion of idealistic movements of social reform or radicalism. Generally referred to as an "intellectual," he should oftentimes more properly be termed an "emotional," with reference to the horny-handed variety of leader. Lacking an intimate acquaintance with working-class life and character, he is usually tolerated, but seldom trusted, and rarely really liked by the mass of those men with whom he seeks to affiliate.

A few manage to assimilate themselves into the atmosphere of the labor-born, by means of an excess of devotion to the "cause." An example is that of George F. Vandevor, a highly successful attorney of bourgeois antecedents, who defended the I. W. W. in the "Centralia Massacre" cases of 1920. His courage and conviction of the justice of his case won the admiration of ardent enemies and gave him tremendous prestige within the outlawed organization. The I. W. W. as a whole probably contains a larger proportion of members of bourgeois origin than most of the milder labor organizations. In view of its extreme and doctrinaire tenets, such a fact would be quite consistent with the thesis here presented. It is these very higher-born individuals, however, who are usually loudest in their denunciation of "the intellectuals" and the "white collar class."

Others approach sufficiently near to realities to be rated as "liberals" or "labor sympathizers." In time of labor's strength, the liberals are often ridiculed or charged with ulterior motives by the genuine class-conscious laborite or his counterfeit. In time of need, the liberals' assistance, particularly their financial assistance, is sought and welcomed; but they will not be given control. Witness the 72-hour struggle at Chicago in July, 1920, between laborites and the liberals of the Committee of Forty-eight. The latter, with the assurance of Senator La Follette's leadership, wished to create a "liberal" party that would be a real contender in the presidential election. They were defeated by class-conscious labor leaders who knew that they could not control such a

movement. These labor leaders instead formed a Farm-Labor Party, with the farmers conspicuously absent.

There is a third type of middle- or upper-class radical who is unable or disinclined to make even a partial adjustment to working-class realities. Misunderstanding and misunderstood, he becomes a parlor revolutionist and withdraws into the society of small and unimportant groups of a type associated in the public mind with Greenwich Village.

The general conclusions that I seek to draw from the foregoing analysis are these: Programs of social reform win support largely because they offer an outlet to suppressed tendencies and emotions, and not because of reasoned conviction in the validity or practicability of their aims or promises. Discrepancies are very likely to arise between the professed objects of the movement and the behavior associated with it, either in its promotion or in the event of its possible triumph. Hence, reform programs are to be explained, judged, and their right to support determined not alone by the comparative legitimacy of their formal aims, but by all of the emotional currents that are caught up and expressed in them.

169. The Inventor and Society¹

The child, the poet, the man of science, the religious prophet, all alike use the imagination; by it they suggest to nature and to society new forms of truth, beauty, value, which may be made available for the social store. In all the processes of social absorption and imitation, therefore, we find that the individual thinks and imagines in his own way. He cannot give back unaltered what he gets, as the parrot does. He is not a repeating machine. His mental creations are much more vital and transforming. Try as he will he cannot exactly reproduce; and when he comes near to it his self-love protests and claims its right to do its own thinking. So the new form, the personal shading, the embodiment of individual interest, the exhibition of a special mode of feeling—all these go to make his result a new thing which is of possible value for the society in which it arises.

In consequence of this, the relation between individual and society takes on a new and interesting form. The individual becomes the source of the new ideas, the inventions, the formulas of legislation and reform. The individual is the only source of novelties of thought or practice;

¹ Reprinted by permission from J. M. Baldwin, *The Individual and Society*, pp. 151-3; 153-5. Boston. R. G. Badger, 1911.

and it is from the individual that society learns them. They are "generalized," discussed, pared down, made available in form and content, by social processes, and then finally passed over to the domain of the accepted and socially selected.

There are limits, of course, to this assimilation. In its nature society is conservative. Its form results from long racial processes of gradual adaptation and compromise. It represents a complex state of equilibrium, a balance of opposing and concurring interests. So every new idea, every project of reform or change, has to fight for its acceptance, to struggle for existence, to show itself adapted to social belief and use. Not all alike are available for social generalization. Those which do show themselves available must not be too antagonistic to the established, or too remote from it. They must be, as it were, children of the present, made of the same material and recognizing the same realities physical and social, as the thought already adopted and sanctioned in society.

It is, in fact, the slight variations which are more usually fruitful. Seed-thoughts, epoch-making discoveries, are slow in making themselves felt. If they are too abrupt, too radical in the demands they make for change, they rest dead and fruitless, perhaps always—certainly until some moderate thinker restates them in form more assimilable to the social store.

170. Invention and Culture ¹

An invention, on its objective side, represents a novel combination of things and processes in such a way as to achieve a desired result. On its psychological side, an invention is the utilization in thought of the discovered properties of things and processes in such a way as to produce the objective invention.

The extent to which discoveries and the utilization of discoveries, which is invention, go hand in hand, especially in primitive society, is not always realized. To bring home this point it may prove useful to enumerate some features of primitive industry which one would class as inventions. The making of fire by means of friction is an invention. The friction may be produced by a sawing motion in which two pieces of wood are utilized, or by the revolution of a stick in a cavity in a board, the revolutions being produced by a rapid reciprocating motion of the two palms between which the stick is held. The pump drill of the Iroquois and of other tribes and the bow drill of the Eskimo in-

¹ From A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, pp. 158-59; 160-64. New York. Copyright A. A. Knopf, Inc., 1922.

volve additions to this in the form of further inventions, by means of which the continuity of the revolutions is secured and the speed increased. Numerous elements in a boat or a canoe are inventions: the long and narrow shape, the keel (if there is one), the attachment of the oars, as in the Eskimo woman's boat, the oar itself, or the paddle with its long handle and its broad blade by means of which the resistance of the water is translated into propelling motion, the principle of the sail which fulfills a similar function with reference to the air or wind. Further inventions are represented by the hook, which is used for catching fish in almost all areas where fishing is found; the barbs on arrows and spears; the spear thrower which adds a leverage to the arm and enhances the strength and accuracy of the thrust; the composite harpoon of the Eskimo with its ball and socket device and the detachable point; the composite bow of the same people, with its reinforcing bone attachments, some of which give greater strength, others greater elasticity to the weapon; the use of feathers on arrows and the spiral attachment of these which is encountered in many tribes; the employment of the lever, two examples of which were cited from the Kwakiutl; the principle of release which is utilized in so many traps; the method of bending and of sewing wood which is current among the tribes of the Northwest Coast; the preparation of bark by beating, soaking and drying so as to fit it for the making of wearable materials; and so on, through the wellnigh endless series of primitive inventions. All of these refer to very primitive conditions, for no mention was made of those other numerous inventions implied in the domestication of animals, the cultivation of plants, the origination of the wheel, etc., etc.

The term invention is usually applied only to objects or devices, but it must be extended to cover processes even though these may be executed by the hands alone. The pot maker, the basket weaver, the wood carver, all employ certain sets of motions thus to achieve with speed and accuracy the desired technical results. These motions are often highly complicated and not by any means easily learned. Such complexes of motions, designated by Boas "motor habits" must be regarded as inventions, inventions in a purely dynamic level. If the hand and the object worked upon are conceived as a temporarily mobile mechanism, the movements of the hand represent the dynamic principle which make the mechanism work in order to achieve the desired result, namely, the transformation of the material into the finished article. This dynamic principle, the movements of the hand, always works poorly while the process is a new one. The development of a so-called technique consists in the establishment of motor habits which comprise a series of dynamic

adjustments, discovered in the course of the process itself and deliberately or automatically utilized while the technique is being improved. These dynamic adjustments, when first made, are inventions. The same principle applies even when the *results* achieved are purely dynamic, as for example, in the wielding of a weapon or the paddling of a canoe.

Now all of these inventions, whether static or dynamic, either were discoveries or were preceded by discoveries. Heat or even fire must have been produced by friction accidentally before friction was utilized deliberately to produce fire, and most likely the accident of discovery also suggested the method used, such as rubbing one board against another with a sawing motion or revolving a stick in a cavity in a board. The shapes of boats and canoes represent, without doubt, a prolonged process of non-deliberate trial and error in the course of which certain shapes proved more satisfactory for the attainment of speed and safety. The composite harpoon never could have been originated except through accidental and repeated discoveries of the imperfect working of a spear under the required conditions, and what could have suggested the detachable point but the repeated and disastrous breaking of the spear? And so on with the other inventions. It can scarcely be doubted that other factors, some perhaps of a religious or magical nature, may have contributed to certain practical inventions or to the antecedent discoveries as, for example, in the case of the feathered arrow where, as Wundt suggests, the analogy with the bird brought to mind by the flight of the arrow may have first led to the attaching of feathers. This is, of course, purely speculative, although psychologically feasible. The tendency to call upon such extraneous motives to account for discoveries or inventions can, however, be easily exaggerated, for the objective conditions of matter-of-fact procedure usually suffice to account for the discoveries made.

The preceding sketch reveals both the scope and the limitation of primitive invention. That the invention itself was always deliberate cannot be doubted, although in many instances it may have consisted in nothing but a deliberate reproduction of a discovery. In more complicated inventions a number of such inventions were combined to achieve the desired result, but such complicated inventions were doubtlessly made one by one, with perhaps considerable periods of time separating each succeeding improvement. However that may be, early man deserves credit for ingenuity and originality at least in the utilization and combination of discovered properties and processes.

At the same time, it is easy to exaggerate the amount and overestimate the worth of the mental effort involved in early inventions. For

each new step of innovation is but a slight one. It is directly controlled by the disclosure of an error or imperfection or by an accidental discovery of a process or principle that might be introduced to enhance the effectiveness of a given device. There is no evidence that any individuals in early life devoted themselves professionally or exclusively to the making of such inventions, and although it must be assumed that men in these old days differed in inventive ability as they do now, the scope for the exercise of such ability was limited. It would therefore be incorrect to think in this connection of mental visions, of bold flights of the imagination, the presence of which allies the mental activities of some modern inventors to the creativeness of the philosopher, the scientist or the artist.

To return to the element of discovery in inventions, the contrast between the primitive and the modern is not as great in this particular as might offhand be supposed. Modern inventions—speaking primarily of mechanical ones—are also, in most instances, applied discoveries. The innovation is not the product of detached mental speculation, but is brought into being through the agency of discoveries made in the course of experimentation. The difference between the modern and the primitive situation lies in the nature of the experimental conditions. The modern inventor, in facing the problem of adding a new function to an already complicated machine, is in many ways admirably fitted for his task. He is trained in the theory of mechanics, which saves him the trouble of many vain attempts: he knows the limits within which he must operate. Further, he is familiar in minute detail with the nature of the machine he is about to improve and with many other similar machines of the past and the present. Again, he has a clear conception of the particular additional improvement that is required of him. And finally, he is furnished the tools of experimentation which make it possible for him to condense into a relatively short period a tremendous amount of trial and error. Under these conditions, the discoveries which lead to the invention are practically bound to occur with little delay. That this is so is attested by the financial status of such inventors, guaranteed them by their employers, men who are not usually notable for the appreciation of deferred results.

What modern science, industry and social organization make possible in this direction may be illustrated by an example from recent history.

When the aerial activities of the war suggested the desirability of a radical improvement in aeroplane motors, President Wilson charged his Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. McAdoo, with the accomplishment of this task. Mr. McAdoo, who had had previous experience in engineering

enterprises, retained two consulting engineers, the brothers X and Y, and placed them in a position where they could exercise a free hand in the solution of the problem. X and Y then summoned three experts, Messrs. A, B and C, each one of whom was associated in a consulting capacity with one of the great automobile concerns. A was an expert on carburetors, B—on gases, C—on machine designing. These gentlemen were made cognizant of the problem before them, the requirements to be met including the following specifications. The weight of the new motor was not to exceed $1\frac{1}{2}$ or $1\frac{3}{4}$ lbs. per h. p. This specification was to obtain even if the motor were fed with very low grade gasoline. The parts of the motor were to be standardized and made interchangeable, so that the motor could be disassembled and reassembled under most adverse conditions, and broken or otherwise disabled parts could be easily replaced. The standardization of the parts of the motor was required as a condition for economical mass production.

The required specifications having been indicated, the experts, A, B, and C went into consultation in a room of a Washington hotel and remained there, their meals being served to them, until they had completed in every detail the designs for the new motor. For the mechanical requirements of the task a staff of trained designers was placed at their disposal.

When this was accomplished, the engineers X and Y “farmed out” the different parts of the motor to a number of machine manufacturing concerns, in accordance with their special facilities. The parts of the motor were brought to Washington and assembled. The motor was then subjected to the most exacting experimental tests, and more than fulfilled all expectations. Certain parts of the motor, however, were slightly altered in shape through the stresses and strains of the tests, a condition that is inevitable no matter how accurate or detailed the theoretical specifications. The parts of the motor, in the shape they had thus assumed, were then utilized as models for the building of tools to be employed in the manufacture of the motor. After this was done orders were once more “farmed out” to concerns distributed far and wide over the entire country.

Achievements such as this are made possible by the scientific, technical and socio-economic status of modern society. As contrasted with this, the conditions for discovery and invention in early life are very imperfect. The early inventor faces his task, the nature of which he knows but imperfectly, in a setting that may be described as the very reverse of that pictured in the above example. His knowledge of appliances is limited, his theoretical understanding is *nil*, and the process of trial

and error in the course of which he ultimately achieves his improvement, is irregular, adventitious and not deliberately controlled. Thus, the amount of relevant experience which in the case of the modern inventor is condensed into a few weeks of arduous experimentation in his laboratory, may, under the conditions of primitive life, be stretched out over centuries of effort, failure, disappointment, or partial success of hundreds of individuals, until a satisfactory adjustment is ultimately made in the form of a definitive invention.

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What conditions give rise to leadership?
2. How would the cultural setting of a group alter the form of the leadership? Illustrate, especially from modern periods.
3. From Webster's paper what would you say are the outstanding characteristics of primitive leadership?
4. What is the relation of leadership to institutions?
5. Describe briefly three persons who typify the philosopher, the scientist and the practical executive. What is the basis of the leadership strength of each?
6. It is often said that the political machine has many of the characteristics of the Medieval feudal order. Explain.
7. Why did Mayor Mitchel fail to be re-elected in New York City in 1916? (Cf. Munro above and also Martin's article cited in bibliography.)
8. What is the difficulty with the reformer type of leader?
9. How may propaganda make for emotional radicalism in many ordinary people?
10. Why is scientific radicalism so difficult for the masses to understand?
11. Why are radical leaders so easily associated with various utopian schemes or millennial hopes?
12. What cultural basis has much current radicalism?
13. What is the relation of invention to the culture from which it springs?
14. What is the relation of the inventor to the masses? How does he often become a type of magic-maker in the popular mind? (Cf. Ayres.)
15. Distinguish between invention in primitive people and today.
16. What inventions have profoundly altered our form of living in the last hundred years?

B. Topics for Class Reports

1. Review Ogburn's discussion of duplication of inventions as an illus-

- tration of the effect of cultural trend upon the form of invention and its occurrence. (Cf. bibliography.)
2. Review Wolfe's analysis of radicalism and conservatism. (Cf. bibliography.)
 3. Review Gosnell's study of Boss Platt. (Cf. bibliography.)
 4. Review Taussig's *Inventors and Money-Makers*. (Cf. bibliography.)
 5. Review Cox's book on genius. (Cf. bibliography.)
- C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers
1. The Psychology of Invention.
 2. The Relation of Scientific Progress to Practical Invention.
 3. Types of Political Leaders.
 4. Types of Scientific Leaders.
 5. Divergent Mentality and Leadership.
 6. Leadership and Social Control.

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PART SIX
COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

CHAPTER XXII

CHARACTERISTICS OF CROWD BEHAVIOR

I. INTRODUCTION

Much early writing on crowd behavior dealt with it in terms of group consciousness, mob mind and other psychological concepts applied to mass phenomena. If we mean by such terms as crowd mind merely a universality of attitudes, ideas and actions in a group of individuals, there is perhaps no serious objection to be made. But the difficulty arises as soon as we pass from this analogous treatment to the belief that mobs or audiences possess a super-individual consciousness. It has been our point of view throughout this volume that group materials are best described in terms of cultural patterns, that is in sociological terms, leaving to social psychology the description of the individuals in social interaction. So long as crowd behavior can be dealt with as a phase of interaction, psychological terms are pertinent. When we deal with the more permanent aspects of group behavior, such as one sees in certain institutional formulations, one must introduce the sociological terminology as well.

The opening selection from Bentley gives us a psychological analysis of human groups. While we have not adopted in this volume the distinction of groups in terms of congregate and assemblage, it is clear that in studying collective behavior some distinction may well be made between groups wherein the individuals are in physical contiguity and other groups wherein they are not physically in each other's presence, but are held together by psychological bonds. Bentley's discussion of social meanings and social objects is important. Participation becomes essential to the rise of social meanings. Now this participation may be either direct and presentative as in a mob or audience, or it may be indirect and inferential as in the wider group reached by a newspaper, or in the still wider group of a national political party, or in the international group of bankers,

scientists or artists interested in some common objective. Bentley further shows how institutionalization furnishes a means of priming individuals for participation. Institutions imply previous associations, common sentiments and a standard arrangement of actions. In truth, it is upon this basis that Cooley remarks that public opinion and institutional organization are not antithetical but that one grows into the other. Finally, Bentley has introduced the valuable concept of polarization into his description of social action in the crowd.

Miss Clark following the principles laid down by Bentley has described types of crowds and common predispositions which find expression in the crowd situation.

Allport's paper is an attempt to measure the effect of other persons upon mental associations. This shows something of possible experimentation in the field of crowd behavior. Such work will throw more objective facts into focus and ought to lead to fundamental concepts more valid than those now accepted.

The crowd is distinctly under the domination of stereotypes and word formulas in all cases. As Disraeli puts it, "With words we govern men." The paper by Le Bon brings into focus the close interrelation of word forms, leadership and crowd action.

Scott points out the primitivity of our thought and action in the crowd. The inhibitions are removed and we are more or less free to proceed on lower, more animal levels of response.

Martin, taking his cue from the psychoanalysts, has described crowd behavior most incisively from the point of view of the unconscious formulations behind crowd thinking and acting. He has shown that the crowd is essentially filled with that egotism, hatred and the sense of absolute rightness that also marks the paranoiac. While this treatment of the crowd is most enlightening, it suffers from being based entirely upon an individual psychology. It fails to recognize cultural factors and moreover it does not clearly indicate the place of interaction of individuals. It fails to point out that paranoiac attitudes are part and parcel of the whole unconscious foundation of the in-groups to which we belong. It fails to state clearly the relation of these attitudes to cultural patterns. In short, while incisive and invaluable, it must be supplemented by consideration of other factors than the individual psychology of Freud, Jung and Adler.

Allport's social psychology is distinctly built around the individual, but he indicates the effect of social stimulation upon the individual's behavior. In dealing with crowd behavior he attributes the so-called crowd phenomena to the "sense of universality" and projection of our feelings into others. The moral consciousness of the man in the crowd is brought round by a process of projection and rationalization, so that the essential egotism of it may be covered up in a palaver of high-sounding words.

Scott's description of methods of influencing a crowd shows the place which the leader has in crowd behavior. The appeal, moreover, is not through the reasoning capacities, but through the emotional and instinctive tendencies.

In the second section are two papers on fashion as a phase of crowd behavior. Clerget shows clearly the place which prestige-bearers have on fashion. He indicates the spread of fashions from one social class to another, and the fact that changes in fashion may be a sign of transformations in the whole intellectual, emotional and habitual life of a people. This is nicely seen in the present flapper styles which have some relation to the marked advances in the economic emancipation of women.

Mackay shows the spread of slang and other language phrases among the masses. These phrases are usually meaningless by the time they reach the masses. They come to cover an inconceivable number of situations, often contradictory. They have all the marks of slogans, with emotion accompanying the words, but little of clear idea. Slang, then, becomes a fad or fashion and is under the influence of the laws of human interaction just as are fashions in clothes or tastes in reading or eating.

II. MATERIALS

A. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CROWD BEHAVIOR

171. The Psychological Fundamentals of Social Aggregations¹

(1) *The Primary "Social" Formations*

What are the primary psychological forms of human integration? What characterizes and distinguishes these? What are the essential

¹ Reprinted by permission from M. Bentley "A Preface to Social Psychology" in "Studies in Social and General Psychology from the University of Illinois"

modification of the members entering into each sort of collection?

The principles of descriptive science make it evident, however, that the organization of such units or individuals as are qualitatively diverse invariably produces a totality possessing unique marks and properties. It is only the addition of naked quantities or values which produces a mere sum. The group-properties of conjoined chemical elements and the morphological and physiological integrity of the living organism alike illustrate the production or "creation" of qualities and properties which characterize the total integration rather than the integrated members when these are regarded in isolation.

The first distinction to be drawn among human groups separates the *congregate* from the *assemblage*. The congregate includes all such groups as the audience, the reception, the jury, the throng, and the mob, where individuals are brought into physical proximity. The assemblage denotes individuals placed under common social conditions or "influences" though not physically conjoined. Such *sympathic* groups are illustrated by the community reading its local news, witnesses receiving common summons to appear before the court, voters setting out for the duties of election day, church members anticipating the service of their organization, or a people considering the disseminated announcement of its battles or of its diplomatic adjustments. The assemblage must be socially grouped, though not congregated; and the congregate must be an organization as well as a "company." In both kinds of groups the essential factor is integration of a psychological kind.

This distinction needs to be justified. We may properly be asked to demonstrate (1) that physical presence or absence is indicative of a true psychological distinction and (2) that the two kinds of grouping possess a "psycho-social" character.

a. *Comparison of the Congregate and the Assemblage*

In reply to the first challenge it should be explained that physical grouping is only a means to, or a symptom of, the social tempering of the individual. In the convention, or the public lecture, or the class room, or in the press of a street accident, social relations are laid upon a perceptual basis. The sight and the sound of the speaker or of the instructor or of the injured man, the sight and the unanalyzed sound of the mass or of the audience, the smell, the contact, the heat, and the effort of the individual to maintain his position, taken together with the organic processes which these perceptions arouse, have a profound

(ed. by M. Bentley) *Psy. Mon.* 1916: XXI: Whole No. 92: pp. 6; 7-12; 13-16; 17-20; 21-22; 23-24.

social significance. The significance is revealed by the fact that—as the phrases run—the crowd “forms,” the audience “settles” and “is moved,” the beholders are “impressed.” In the non-congregated assemblage, on the other hand, the social grouping is conditioned in a very different way. Everyone knows the intimacy and warmth of a printed reference to one’s self and one’s affairs. The reader of the personal note is vividly aware that his neighbor or his county or his city is perusing the paragraph and passing judgment upon him. At such a time the individual is, in a social sense, very much in the “presence” of his fellows. But the total state and temper of his mind are determined, not by perceptual matters (the paper and the print are only symbols, which are represented in the background of consciousness) but by imaginal representations, emotions, and thoughts. And as the consciousness of congregated and assembled members differs on the perceptual or apprehensive side, so also does it differ on the executive side or the side of action. The response to other present members is different from the response to absent persons whom one regards, at the moment, in a social relation. I am tuned for action in one way when I read in my morning’s mail of my appointment to an international committee, and in another way when I actually meet my *confrères* and set to work. The one relation is more passive, the other more active. The temper of the members of the one sort of group, the congregate, is expressed by the phrases “we hear,” “we approve,” “we dissent,” “we will do”; of the other sort, the assemblage, by the phrases “I am considered,” “I am condemned,” “I belong,” “I agree with the proposal.” In the one, the main object of reference is the group and its interests; in the other, the place and relation of the individual, considered as a *member* of the group. In the congregate, the main object of individual attention and interest is the group; in the assemblage, it is the relation of the individual himself to the group.

Two qualifications are called for. First, not every person in the congregate or the assemblage is necessarily a member, i. e., is “groupish” or “crowdish” or “clannish.” Individuals may be “lost” or “absorbed in thought” in the mass, or indifferent to exhortation or to the bonds of nationality, or kinship, and of local affiliation. Secondly, like all distinctions which create adjacent or neighboring classes, the two types are not always to be readily distinguished on the basis of such differences as have been pointed out. There are cases of the border-line. Family bonds may, when the members are for a time separated, be represented by a conscious reference akin to that of the congregate; and on the other hand, the audience which is asked to consider its civic duties may bear the appearance of an assemblage.

Neither qualification really violates the principle of the distinction. The first only goes to show that we cannot answer for every person physically present in the congregate and for every person brought under social pressure in the assemblage. Its positive value lies in the demonstration that mere propinquity and isolation are the inducing conditions, not the essential characters, of the classes in question. The second qualification merely warns us that we must not so rigidly fix the lines separating adjacent territories as to endanger the *status* of localities lying upon or near the common boundary.

Further discrimination among the groups which represent the forms and phases of mental dependence must wait upon an agreement as to the conditions of social "influence" and "dependence." We have spoken of the physical presence of other persons and of the knowledge of common interests as determinants of the minds of members in a social group. Let us inquire now in what sense these circumstances may be regarded as falling among the *essential* conditions of mental integration.

(2) *The Conditions of Mental Process and Mental Function in the Individual and in the Group*

The more immediate physical conditions of mind lie within the brain. They are determined in two ways; by stimulus and by disposition or tendency. Stimulus indicates that the functions of the nervous system are determined by an outside agency (either within or without the body); disposition or tendency indicates that neural functions are determined by the residues of earlier function. The commonest forms of the latter are known as impressional, associative, determining and habitual tendencies, and general cortical set. Both kinds of bodily condition are, as we may suppose, in constant operation during normal waking life; though the facts of perception are mainly to be explained by stimulus and associative tendency, passive memory and imagination by associative and impressional tendencies, emotion and action by stimulus and determining tendency, skillful performance by habitual tendency, and thought by dispositions of the determining sort.

If mind morphologically regarded is conditioned in these definite ways, we have to ask how the social psychologist is to conceive those determinations which account for, or underlie, the facts of what has been vaguely called the "social consciousness." As a matter of history, we must note that he has, as a rule, been inclined to disregard the terms of general psychology and to invoke instead a very different set of concepts. He says that the mind of man is "influenced" by other minds, that man is "suggestible" or "imitative," that one mind "rules" or

"dominates" and that another mind "acquiesces." It is obvious that these terms do not rest upon the same empirical plane as those just discussed. A stimulus is a physical agent acting upon a receptor-organ and initiating there a series of concrete organic processes. The same cannot be said of "suggestion," when suggestion is used to account for the fact that the mob destroys or of "domination" when domination is alleged as the cause of the laborers' union. "Suggestion," "domination," and the others are,—until they are empirically defined,—sheer abstractions used as agents or forces. They are precisely analogous to the faculties of the eighteenth century.

It is obvious that the mind of my neighbor is not to be added, as a condition of my mental processes, to the sober and authenticated facts of stimulus and disposition. If my neighbor speaks with the voice of authority and decision and so convinces me that I should attend the meetings of the Municipal League, my mental processes are set up, after all, just as they would be if I found a blight upon my fruit trees and decided to destroy the orchard. Auditory or visual stimuli and associative tendencies account for the perceptual part of either experience, and determining and habitual tendencies for the performance.

The only thing that is unique about the conditioning factors in social or mental dependence is the fact that the presence of other persons (in the congregate) or the assumption of them (in the assemblage) touches off *certain* dispositions or neural tendencies, giving to our "social" experiences a *certain kind of significance*. The sight of the blighted fruit trees and the sight and sound of my persuasive neighbor are psychophysical events of the same order. There is not, in the one instance, the mere apprehension of an object, in the other, the operation of a subtle and mysterious force through the agency of which my mind is wrought upon by my neighbor's. Because of my constitution and my history the two things are differently apprehended, have different significances, and lead to unlike performances. The one object is the tree-to-be-cut-down-and-burned; the other is neighbor-M-whose-opinion-is-to-be-regarded-and-accepted.

(3) *Social Consciousness and Social Objects*

The appeal to the physical concepts of "force" and of "resistance," to account for the facts of social interaction, is as crude as it is unpsychological. A subtler and a commoner way of approach is through "social consciousness" regarded as the condition primarily and universally involved in human relations. But this term is objectionable. There is no class or group of mental processes or of mental functions which can

properly be called "social," just as there are no "social" conditions of consciousness to be added to stimulus and disposition. It is not consciousness that is social. Objects and events are social. They are social when their meaning or significance implies more than one observer. An object or event whose meaning or significance implies no observer, or only one, is *asocial*. When I perceive my inkwell as a part of the furnishings of the desk or as a receptacle which I must fill, it is an asocial object. Regarded as a part of the desk's furnishings, it does not (except logically) involve me or any other observer: as a thing which I must fill, it implies me. But when I regard the inkwell as a cherished gift its meaning at once implies and includes my generous friend as well as myself. It is social. It is social also when its scrolled pattern is apprehended as the artistic achievement of a savage tribe. So too events. The horse-race, the battle, the solar eclipse, and the fall of night are asocial events when they are just happenings, either wanting reference to an observer or making reference to a single observer,—whether myself or some other. But if my horse is contending against B's, if the battle means men-fight or the contest-of-nations, if the eclipse is an impressive event which human beings silently watch, or the fall of night an hour for the cessation of human labor, then the occurrence is social.

The "implication of observers" calls for two comments. First the implication is not a logical implication. It is in the object as perceived. The plurality of observers is a part of the object's meaning. The inkwell is object-scrolled-by-natives-with-a-common-inspiration just as really and directly as it is green-object or ink-containing-object. The socialized eclipse is the eclipse-which-we-are-observing. In the second place, the observer, whether myself or another, is not a logical abstraction. It is a part of the concrete meaning which constitutes the object. When the inkwell is a social object, it is product-of-the-tribe. When the letter which I take from the envelope is a social object it is the thing which speaks for my correspondent to me. The letter is socially constituted by being his-letter-and-my-letter.

As social meanings grow, the observers of an object or an event assume more and more the character of *partakers*. The social reference gradually migrates backward from the common focus of observation to the relations which emerge between or among the observers. More and more the observers *share* the object.

Later, we shall see that this distinction between such human collections as are held together by convergent lines of reference meeting in the object and such collections as are chiefly integrated by lines of reference binding together the partakers of a common experience may

be used to mark off the typical audience from the crowdish mob.

Having now dwelt upon the meaning of socialized objects, we may proceed with the qualification and description of these. They are apprehended by a great variety of conscious functions: they are objects of perception, of memory, of imagination, of thought and of sentiment. But however the plurality of observers is implied, the implication may be brought under one or another of three different types; presentative, empathic, and inferential.

The implication is *presentative* when the mental functions involved are either perceptual or ideational. In this case, the existence or the behavior of observers is immediately apprehended. The social object is presentatively implied when a colleague M. enters my study and scrutinizes with me a new lot of prints. The prints are social. They are works of art which he and I are criticizing and approving. It is not necessary either that I should be "self-conscious" or that I should make my colleague's mind the object of my attention. My attention to the prints, regarded as *our* object, is sufficient. The case is essentially the same when I merely greet my caller. He is an object which implies me. If he shows anger and threatens injury, his behavior becomes a new part of the social object. When I merely ideate or "think of" M. the implication is unchanged. So long as he is an object which implies only himself or only myself the object is asocial: so soon as it sets up some relation between us, it becomes social.

But the implication may be immediate in another way,—in the way of *empathy*. Whenever an object implies the valuation or the appreciation (approval or disapproval, sympathy or antipathy) of one observer by another, the object is social.

Finally, the socialized object implies also through *inference* a plurality of observers. I understand the intent of the engraver of cavern walls to express himself in pictures and hieroglyphs when I have inferred from his drawings the type of his mind and the temper of his cultivation, and just as we pass from the physical or the chemical object to its causes and conditions, so do we proceed by the mediating processes of inference from the "expressive" movement, or from language, law, or custom, to the mental processes and functions which produced it. Now, as in empathy and in presentation, our social implications are bound up with objects; only now, in inference, we pass beyond the primary object to center our attention upon a derived object which it is proper to call "mental." But it must be carefully kept in mind that an object is not necessarily social because it is mental. The mind which we reach by inference to account for mental productions or expressions is an asocial

object when it is observed by itself. It is social only when it implies also another mind. If I read a dead author to discover his ideational type or his knowledge of botany, I regard him asocially; but if I discover in him a revelation of human passions or a means of expressing my own moods and emotions, I regard him socially.

(4) *The Properties of the Congregate*

It has seemed to be necessary to interrupt our discussion of social formations for the purpose of making clear what we must mean by the *conditions* of social grouping and by *sociality* itself. Having discovered that we have no right to invent either a mechanics of social forces to mold and to socialize the individual or a special "social consciousness," where we have found empirically given only certain objects and meanings which arise under certain special dispositions, we may now return to discuss the types of formation,—first the congregate and afterward the assemblage.

We begin with the congregate and we seek a psychological principle of classification. All enumerations based upon convenience or common sense or sociological value must be carefully scrutinized before they are admitted under our classificatory rubrics.

Since it is the integration or organization of individuals which we have found to characterize the "social" facts of psychology, we turn naturally to the phenomena of organization as the appropriate key to the types and kinds of congregate. The most obvious means of distinction lies in the number of associated individuals. Thus the simplest kind of congregate would seem to imply the conjunction of two individuals; the most complex, the congregation of a multitude. But this appearance is false. The measure is quantitative. It does not rest upon the nature of mental functions. That the organization of two members may be of the closest and the most complex pattern is demonstrated by those private and sentimental alliances which include hundreds of relational bonds and which endure over long periods of time. At the other extreme, we may find in the street throng at mid-day a huge aggregate held loosely together by the simplest and weakest of temporary connections.

a. *Grades of Integration Among Congregates*

Without attempting to supply all the grades and levels of organization in the congregate, we can indicate the gradual rise of integration by beginning with such all-to-all groups as appear in casual and unstudied aggregates of men in the new mining camp, the temporary settlement of pioneers, and the accidental conjunction of many persons seeking separate and unrelated ends (the throng). Then we pass to those

temporary and spontaneous gatherings whither individuals are drawn by a common object of curiosity, thence to the ordinary heterogeneous audience gathered for an occasional discourse; thence to congregates of individuals rendered homogeneous by a common purpose or common dread or need or request such as a mass of laborers locked out of their shops or fugitives fleeing before fire or earthquake. The next level of integration includes still more closely organized groups. It comprises congregates which are led or governed. There is a spokesman to give expression or a leader to harangue, to initiate, and to command. Such groups are "polarized."

The next stage of social amalgamation includes groups which bear an external resemblance to the heterogeneous audience, but which really belong at a much higher level. This is the stage of the *selected and primed* audience, the meetings, e. g., of religious, fraternal and social "organizations." These are designated as "primed" congregates because the formal organization implies previous association and common interests, sentiments and needs. The gregal attributes of such meetings presuppose a tacit understanding which is expressed in various bodies by creed, constitution, declaration, or platform. This kind of congregate, then, reveals very much closer mental organization than is to be found in the heterogeneous and temporary audience. Should we consider minor differences of degree at this general level of integration, we should have especially to regard the gatherings of such organizations as strive to forget individual concerns and to unify themselves by devotion to a common cause. It would appear that this extreme unification in the congregate is commonly produced under the stress of violent emotion and of vigorous priming. Thus religious zealots forget themselves in the common frenzy of the maniacal moment. But we must not confuse extreme unification with extreme organization. The former state arises through the loss of individualizing characteristics in the members; the latter state is one of unity in spite of variety. The mammalian organism stands high in the scale of living beings, not because its organs and functions are homogeneous but because they are, in spite of their diversity, wonderfully correlated and bent to a common end.

Neither does our principle of graded congregates permit us to set at the top such automatized unities as the military formation. Unity of function and harmony of arrangement are indeed attained; but only at the expense of differentiation among the members.

b. *The Process of Polarization*

Nothing like specific description of the various all-to-all forms of congregation can be attempted in this place. One mark, however, must

be noted before we can advance to the alternative, or one-to-one, forms.

I have spoken of the "polarized" congregates in which a spokesman or leader appears. Both the temper and the functions of gregal collections are profoundly affected by the unique offices of a single member who serves as leader or speaker or spokesman. The process of polarization implies that the dead-level of a homogeneous congregate is being disturbed. The all-to-all relations are augmented through this process by a new set of one-to-all and all-to-one relations. For example, the thronged aggregate becomes differentiated the moment one of its members calls for help or inveighs against delay in suburban traffic. Attention within the congregate acquires a common object, and thought and emotion receive a common expression. The aggregate is now knitted up into a much closer organization: it acquires new qualities as it reveals the distinction of mass and leader.

It should be noted that the process of polarization, to which every unpolarized congregate is constantly exposed, is the result of two reciprocal conditions. One is the innate difference among the members which prompts one man to aggression and others to passive performance, and the other is the universal recognition of this difference by the members themselves. The "natural leader" or spokesman is a member who is perceived as a person to-be-attended-to-and-followed. The first condition serves for the establishment of the one-to-all relations; the second for the establishment of the all-to-one relations. The phenomena of settlement as well as the casual and local congregations of man, continually afford suitable conditions for the process of polarization.

Our general discussion will only call attention to the fact that the process of polarization depends in part upon the appearance and the performance of the leader, and in part upon the matter of his verbal utterance. This difference is, grossly expressed, the difference between oratory and logic. Physical presence, manner, voice and gesture are vehicles which bear a meaning to the mass of the congregate; and the words spoken are symbols of another kind which likewise bear to the rest of the congregate their significance and temper. While no psychological distinction between the audience and other forms of the polarized crowd is everywhere applicable, we may note that in general the audience is a congregate which is *predominantly* organized under the second set of conditions, the other forms *predominantly* organized under the first. Verbal meanings, apprehended in common by a group, coalesce and integrate the members; while the manner, bearing and movements of the leader augment that temper which it is proper to designate as *crowd-*

ish. In the audience, the meaning of the discourse tends to strengthen the individual relations of the mass to the speaker, who represents the topic; in the polarized mob, the significant conditions tend, on the other hand, to increase the interrelations within the mass, or the secondary pole, of the group. Strong interrelations among the members of the mass form the first and primary characteristic of the mob; strong individual relations between the speaker and the other members, the first and primary characteristic of the audience. Most polarized congregates of the one-to-all type partake at once of the nature of the audience and of the mob.

The polarized congregate naturally leads to the one-to-one groups, which make up the second large class of congregates. In fact, the one-to-one type of formation may be regarded as the limit of polarization. Within it the poles are similar: a second individual takes the place of the multitude. There still remain the phenomena of subordination, of unequal give and take, of common objects of perception, and of a reciprocal guidance of thought and conduct,—although the congregated mass has disappeared.

(5) *The Assemblage*

Set over against the congregates we have the major class of assemblages. There remains the task of deducing the principal forms of the non-congregated or sympathetic assemblage.

So deeply in man are engraved the effects of communal existence that he lives grouped a large part of the time when he is in physical isolation from his fellows. The bare "consciousness of kind," of which Giddings has frequently spoken, represents the lowest order of the assemblage. The conscious meaning which bears it is expressible in the words "I-belong." On the side of numbers, one individual who apprehends himself as a member of a group represents the smallest assemblage. The physical absence of other members does not destroy the sympathetic relation. The fact that one person, relating other observers to himself, is sufficient to form an assemblage will seem less strange when we recall that in this kind of integration, the chief emphasis lies on the side of the member; while in the congregate it rests upon the group.

We have spoken of assemblages as set off from congregates by "distinctive means of formation, qualitative and quantitative properties, differential functions and diversity of products." Our grades or organization ought, then, to be based upon these characteristics. First, compare the lowest degree of organization, represented by a bare "I-belong" at-

taching to objects, with those highly organized assemblages of scattered individuals glowing with loyalty to a common cause. The first may be formed by any chance reference or incident which draws attention to the social medium in which the individual inheres; while that assemblage which stands at the opposite extreme demands, on the contrary, a specific means of arousing dispositions of great age and tenacity,—dispositions which represent a multitude of relations and which serve to identify the member with his group. The integration of the closer assemblages and of the closer one-to-one congregate is conditioned by seasoned and complex tendencies to neural function which are the precipitates and the residues of a vast number of previous "social" experiences.

As regards the distinction of the properties and functions of the loose and the close assemblage, we may note that the representation of the group-relation is made in the first case by a vague and ill-defined object which stands for "society" and, in the second case, by a clear-cut and individualized object,—one's people, one's land,—which could be confused with, or mistaken for, no other object in existence.

With respect to polarization, the assemblage may be said to present a state analogous to the congregate, save that the primary pole, which was, in the congregate, the individual leader or spokesman, is now the mass; and that the secondary pole, which was there the mass is here the individual. In the assemblage the individual "belongs to" the mass very much as the crowd "belongs to," and revolves about, its leader or exponent. Moreover, the assemblage reaches its upper limit of polarization in the one-to-one or paired form and its lower limit in those emotional and estatic forms, especially those composed of mystical and idealizing natures, in which the individual is consumed by, and identified with, the social totality.

On the side of function, the "I-belong" reference serves at once as a refuge against isolation and as a gentle and mild censor inhibiting overt acts against the state and the community; but the passionate acknowledgment of identity with a race or a cause creates a principle of conduct which sets purposes, commands action, and determines the destiny of the member and of his group. Intermediate grades of the assemblage need only be suggested. Many of them fall under our conception of civic and private duty. They represent a large number of ways in which the individual regards himself as related to his kind. They serve in large measure to maintain parties and states, clubs, churches, and philanthropies. The occasional meeting in the congregate strengthens

them and increases their integration; but they exist as unique organizations with properties and functions of their own.

172. The Types of Crowds and Common Predispositions¹

Congregates, or crowds, may be divided into three classes. The group is an *aggregate* when there is no initial leader, when the members become congregated through the agency of a common social object or event. The *mob* is a crowd in which there is one initial leader and also a number of subsidiary leaders, members of the group who are so quickly and strongly influenced by the principal leader that they, too, exert a comparatively great influence upon the other individuals. In the *audience*, however, the influence of the leader is by far the most important, and the effect of the other members of the crowd upon each other is relatively slight.

In order that any congregated group of persons may become conscious of the same social object or event, two conditions are necessary. The same stimulus or environmental factor must, at a given time, affect the same disposition or tendency in all individuals. The crowdish consciousness is, like thought and action a determined consciousness. Crowdishness rests upon racial and individual predispositions toward specific organic functions. The sight of the flag, the announcement of election returns, the charge of injustice against the employer, throw into commission certain prepared functions in the nervous system which are responsible—since these prepared functions are common to the members of the group—for the temper and the activities of the crowd. The organic disposition will, of course, differ considerably in strength from individual to individual. The disposition may be innate, as is the tendency to be terrified under certain circumstances, or acquired, as is the tendency to applaud when the national hymn is heard. In the second place, it is also necessary that all persons regard the object or event as social. A specific example may make this clearer. A number of individuals watching a Fourth-of-July celebration constitute the kind of crowd which we have called an aggregate. A certain part of their environment, the fireworks, influences all members. Although the individuals may differ greatly in other respects, they all possess the disposition to attend to, and to be pleased by, brightly colored lights in rapid movement. To each

¹ Reprinted by permission from H. Clark "The Crowd" in "Studies in Social and General Psychology from the University of Illinois" (ed. by M. Bentley) *Psy. Mon.* 1916: XXI: Whole No. 92: pp. 30-33.

person the display is a social event, although the attribute of socialness may be manifested in different ways. Some may simply apprehend the presence of others. Some may be conscious of their companions' exclamations of delight. Still others may not only experience pleasure themselves, but may infer that the consciousness of their fellows is like their own. Finally, there may be appreciation and sympathy of one member for another. When others act as we act, and toward the same objects, we usually feel that they sympathize with us and approve of our conduct. If these conditions are fulfilled, the crowd continues to exist for a time, and its crowdish characteristics are intensified. As for the dissolution of such a group, we may allege several possible reasons. If the influence of one environmental factor is intense and of long duration, adaptation and shifts of attention occur, and the crowd breaks up. If an appeal is suddenly made to another common organic disposition of the members, the crowd rapidly disintegrates and another crowd of a different character is formed. This occurs, for example, when a dog runs across the rostrum during an interesting lecture. The organization may also be destroyed when strong appeals are made to tendencies not common to all members. Finally, if the object or event loses its social character for a given individual, that individual ceases to be a member of the crowd. If a party is being conducted through an art gallery, one of its members may become so absorbed in the contemplation of a picture that he is oblivious to the presence of others and no longer thinks of the object as in any way social.

When we examine the crowd from a structural point of view, we find that its consciousness and performance have certain peculiar characteristics. In general, there is an intensification and an exaggeration both of organic movements and of mental functions. In any of the three forms of crowd, consciousness may be predominantly emotional, cognitive, or volitional. Aggregates and mobs, however, are apt to be emotional or volitional in character, while in audiences the cognitive phases are usually more prominent. Some emotions, especially fear and sorrow, are produced or intensified by witnessing in others the expressions of like emotions. The instinctive tendency involved in this phenomenon would obviously have evolutionary value. As regards cognitive consciousness, it is evident that we tend to interpret objects as our fellows interpret them, to consider as real what others, by their behavior, seem to recognize as real, and to accept as true the ideas which our companions appear to accept. The basis of this tendency seems to be innate; but it is notably strengthened by experience. The presence of such a disposition would clearly be of benefit to the species. In speaking

of volitional aspects of the crowd, we have tried to avoid the use of such indeterminate concepts as suggestion and imitation. In some cases, the copying of actions of other individuals is purely instinctive. We are apt to yawn when our companions yawn, or to take an attentive attitude when they are attentive. At other times, the individuals in the crowd are cognizant of a general need. If the action of some member indicates a way of satisfying this need, and if no better means occurs to the other persons, the latter are apt to copy the behavior of the first individual. When emotional or hysterical states occur, they usually induce a vague eagerness for action of almost any sort. This nervous energy is directed into specific channels as a result of observing the behavior of a leader or of subsidiary leaders. Contrary to the opinion of several writers, the action of a crowd may involve a certain amount of reasoning. A jury is often crowdish, but we should hardly say that its members are absolutely incapable of rational thought. The emotional, cognitive, and volitional similarities of the members of a crowd may also result, in part, from the belief that one gains the approval of others if one feels, thinks, and acts as they do. The greater the number or the greater the power and prestige of other persons, the more, as a rule, does one seek their approval. Though partially instinctive, this tendency is also the result of experience, since we learn that others have the power to reward or punish us.

173. The Influence of the Group upon Mental Processes¹

If social psychology is to achieve the title of an independent science, it is high time that its many speculative theories and crude generalizations be subjected to experimental methods. The data of this science, it appears to the writer, may be for convenience subsumed under two heads, viz.: (1) the behavior of an individual in direct response to social stimulus, that is in response to some form of behavior in others, and, (2) behavior which is the response to a non-social stimulus, e. g., a column of figures to be added, or a meal to be eaten, when such response is modified by the presence and actions of other persons. Responses to direct and incidental social stimuli are, in brief, the two classes of data for social psychology.

The following experiments bear upon certain problems of the second class of data mentioned. The method employed was to compare the mental processes (in this case association and thought) of the individual

¹ Reprinted by permission from F. H. Allport "The Influence of the Group upon Association and Thought" *J. Exp. Psy.* 1920: III: pp. 159-60; 179-82.

when alone with his reactions to similar and equivalent stimuli when a member of a "co-working or co-feeling" group. In this manner the part played by incidental or contributory social stimulation was determined.

General Method.—It was considered advisable to eliminate all incentives to rivalry which were not inherent in the very nature of the situation (i. e., individuals working on similar tasks in one another's presence). The subjects were instructed not to regard their work as competitive; overt comparisons between individuals were also prohibited. The time given for the tests was constant, hence no one subject finished before the others. In this way rivalry, which is a distinct social problem and which should be studied separately, was reduced to its natural minimum. Each subject, however, was instructed to acquire the attitude of doing his best in both the group and the solitary work.

The subjects were arranged in groups, containing from 3 to 5 subjects each. The groups had no changes of personnel during a whole experiment. The subjects were upper classmen and graduate students in psychology at Harvard and Radcliffe Colleges. They were 26 in number, though not more than 15 were used in any single experiment. There were 24 men and 2 women. In age they ranged from 20 to 40 years, 26 being the average age.

In the group work the subjects were seated one on each side of a table 3 feet by 5 feet in dimensions. In groups of 5 two subjects sat at one of the longer sides. The same seats were retained by subjects throughout the course of an experiment. Care was taken to secure conditions, such as type of table, light, air, seating of the subjects, etc., in the rooms used for solitary work comparable to those conditions in the room where the subjects worked as a group.

The free chain associations which were to be written were started by a stimulus word, for example "building" or "laboratory," written at the top of a sheet of paper given to each subject. The same stimulus words were employed in the two conditions, *T* and *A*. It was also emphasized in group work that the same stimulus word was given to all. It is not believed that the presence of the experimenter in the group work materially affected the results of the social influence.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

A. The Influence of the Group upon Association

Quantitative Aspects

1. The main result of the preceding experiments on association is the conclusion that the *presence of a co-working group is distinctly*

favorable to the speed of the process of free association. In various tests from 66 per cent. to 93 per cent. of the subjects show this beneficial influence of the group.

2. The beneficial group influence is *subject to variation according to the nature of the task.* In the more mechanical and motor requirements, such as writing *each word* associated, the group stimulus is more effective than in the more highly mental or more purely associational tasks such as writing only every *third* or *fourth* word.

3. There are *individual differences* in susceptibility to the influence of the group upon association. One type, who are nervous and excitable, may succumb to the distracting elements of the group activity and may show either no effect, or else a social decrement.

4. *In its temporal distribution* the beneficial effect of the group is greatest in the first part of the task and least toward the end of the task.

5. There is a tendency for the *slow individuals to be more favorably affected* in speed by the group co-activity than the more rapid workers. There are, however, certain striking exceptions.

6. *The variability in output* among the individuals varies generally with the social influence. Hence it is usually greatest in the group work. A striking exception to this occurs in the tests where rivalry is correlated with the social increment, and where only every third or fourth word is written. Here the variability is greatest in the solitary work. This result is in agreement with that of earlier investigators working on different processes.

7. There is suggestive but *not conclusive* evidence that the output of associations in a group where all the members are forming associations in the same category is greater than that in groups in which the members are divided in the trend of their associations between opposite or contrasted categories.

Qualitative Aspects

8. A greater number of *personal associations* are *produced alone* than in the group.

9. In harmony with this fact is the tendency for subjects to produce *ideas suggested by their immediate surroundings* with *greater frequency in the group* than alone.

10. Less clear cut, but very probable, are the tendencies to produce a *greater number of "free rising" ideas in the group*, and to produce a greater number of words *suggested mainly by the initial stimulus word when working alone.*

Factors in the Social Influence

11. There are two opposing groups of factors in the influence of the social condition upon the association process. They are:

(1) Facilitating Factors:

(a) *Facilitation of movement* by perceptions or ideas of movements in others near us.

(b) *Rivalry* intrinsic in the bare social setting of a group working together. Rivalry is well correlated with the beneficial influence of the group in tests of a more mental sort (and less mechanical) such as writing every *fourth* word only. It is not so correlated when each word is written.

The beneficial effects of the group in experiments where the rivalry consciousness is closely correlated with this influence is less than in experiments where it is not so correlated, but where other factors—for example, motor facilitation—serve as the stimulus of the group.

(2) Impeding Factors: distraction, over-rivalry, emotions. Of the two groups, the facilitating is by far the more important in the total effect upon the work.

12. Beside the comparisons already indicated, we may note the general agreement of our work with that of earlier students in the *speed* improvement of mental operations, as shown by the quantity of the product, under conditions of working with others.

B. The Influence of the Group upon the Thought Process

13. In the highly controlled association of the thought process, as typified in written argument, more ideas are produced in the group than when working alone. Again we find an increased flow of thought owing to the social stimulus.

14. Among the ideas so produced, those of superior quality, however, are of relatively greater frequency in the solitary than in the group work. Ideas of a lower logical value are relatively more numerous in the group work.

15. More words are used in the arguments produced in the group than in those produced in solitude.

16. From the above facts, and also from the introspection of the subjects, we may conclude that the presence of the group influences the reasoner toward a more conversational and expansive form of expres-

sion. The more intense logical thinking of solitude gives way in the group to extensivity of treatment.

17. These results appear to be related to the common observation that work requiring imagination or more concentrated and original thought is best performed in seclusion. There is also a connection suggested with the writer's experiments upon the social influence in attention and mental work. In that investigation, as well as in the present, the social influence was found to improve the quantity but not the quality of the mental performance.

174. The Power of Words and Crowd Behavior ¹

When studying the imagination of crowds we saw that it is particularly open to the impression produced by images. These images do not always lie ready to hand, but it is possible to evoke them by the judicious employment of words and formulas. Handled with art, they possess in sober truth the mysterious power formerly attributed to them by the adepts of magic. They cause the birth in the minds of crowds of the most formidable tempests, which in turn they are capable of stilling.

The power of words is bound up with the images they evoke, and is quite independent of their real significance. Words whose sense is the most ill-defined are sometimes those that possess the most influence. Such, for example, are the terms democracy, socialism, equality, liberty, etc., whose meaning is so vague that bulky volumes do not suffice to precisely fix it. Yet it is certain that a truly magical power is attached to these short syllables, as if they contained the solution of all problems. They synthesize the most diverse unconscious aspirations and the hope of their realization.

Reason and arguments are incapable of combatting certain words and formulas. They are uttered with solemnity in the presence of crowds, and as soon as they have been pronounced an expression of respect is visible on every countenance, and all heads are bowed. By many they are considered as natural forces, as supernatural powers. They evoke grandiose and vague images in men's minds, but this very vagueness that wraps them in obscurity augments their mysterious power.

Words, then, have only mobile and transitory significations which change from age to age and people to people; and when we desire to exert an influence by their means on the crowd what it is requisite to know is the meaning given them by the crowd at a given moment, and

¹ Reprinted by permission from G. Le Bon, *The Crowd*, pp. 116-17, 120-21, 122. (14th impression) London, 1922. American copyright by the Macmillan Company.

not the meaning which they formerly had or may yet have for individuals of a different mental constitution.

Thus, when crowds have come, as the result of political upheavals or changes of belief, to acquire a profound antipathy for the images evoked by certain words, the first duty of the true statesman is to change the words without, of course, laying hands on the things themselves, the latter being too intimately bound up with the inherited constitution to be transformed. The judicious Tocqueville long ago made the remark that the work of the consulate and the empire consisted more particularly in the clothing with new words of the greater part of the institutions of the past—that is to say, in replacing words evoking disagreeable images in the imagination of the crowd by other words of which the novelty prevented such evocations. The “taille” or tallage has become the land tax; the “gabelle,” the tax on salt; the “aids,” the indirect contributions and the consolidated duties; the tax on trade companies and guilds, the license, etc.

One of the most essential functions of statesmen consists then, in baptizing with popular or, at any rate, indifferent words things the crowd can not endure under their old names. The power of words is so great that it suffices to designate in well-chosen terms the most odious things to make them acceptable to crowds. Taine justly observes that it was by invoking liberty and fraternity—words very popular at the time—that the Jacobins were able “to install a despotism worthy of Dahomey, a tribunal similar to that of the Inquisition, and to accomplish human hecatombs akin to those of ancient Mexico.” The art of those who govern, as is the case with the art of advocates, consists above all in the science of employing words. One of the greatest difficulties of this art is, that in one and the same society the same words most often have very different meanings for the different social classes, who employ in appearance the same words, but never speak the same language.

(Consult Sections 113, 117.)

175. Some Primitive Characteristics of a Crowd¹

The crowd is like primitive man in its thinking and acting. Reason does not enter in to restrain action, to criticize suggested ideas or to hinder self-surrender to absorbing emotions. It may be truly said that a crowd never reasons and that it is never critical. A crowd composed of intelligent citizens will accept as truth the most absurd utterances and

¹ From W. D. Scott, *Psychology of Public Speaking*, pp. 175-77; 178; 178-79. Published by Noble and Noble. Used by permission.

applaud proposed plans which individually each man might scorn in derision. As individuals we inhibit more actions than we perform. A feeling of responsibility and propriety restrains us in a way that is absent to our primitive ancestors as well as to the crowd. Whatever is done by other members of the crowd is proper; also, because of the many involved, the feeling of responsibility is removed for each member. The crowd, being relieved from the restraints of propriety, responsibility, and critical thinking, is in a condition to act upon every suggestion in an impulsive manner such as is impossible to the individual when acting alone. Under such conditions, instinctive and impulsive actions and imitation play the leading part, as they do with primitive mankind. There is an alacrity of response, an immediate carrying out of every suggested action, which is wholly unlike the independent action of individuals. The individual is wholly absorbed in the crowd purpose and is completely devoted to that purpose, whether it be the lynching of a negro, the adoration of a hero, the winning of the game, or the capture of the holy sepulchre.

The crowd thinks in images, and is incapable of abstract logical thought processes. The images succeed one another in the most illogical order and lead to fantastical situations and conclusions, but the fallacy of the process of thinking is never evident to the crowd. The images in the mind secure such a fascination that they are held for truth and result in the production of exalted emotions such as would normally accompany the reality for which the image is but the symbol. Hence it follows that one of the chief characteristics of every crowd is this prominence of emotions due to the fact that it thinks in a form of images which of necessity results in emotions. As morality and religion find utterance largely in feeling, it is not strange that crowds are frequently highly moral or religious. Even in a lynching party each individual may feel it to be his duty to kill the victim and in the act he may feel that he is performing a high moral duty. The great revivals in religion are not infrequently propagated by the crowd, and the results secured could be had in no other way.

As stated in a preceding paper, an idea is said to be suggested when it has two characteristics, (1) it must be presented by some external stimulus, and (2) it must lead to conviction or action without the ordinary process of criticism and deliberation. If the speaker has presented an idea in the form of a mental image, and I am a member of the crowd, the idea then seems to be presented by each individual, for I feel that each of them is thinking the thought and seeing the picture just as the speaker presented it, and hence it is in a sense presented to

me by all of those present. Since the idea as presented is assumed by me to be accepted by all present, it would seem absurd for me to question it.
(Consult Section 67.)

176. The Crowd and Unconscious Attitudes and Stereotypes¹

My thesis is that the *crowd-mind is a phenomenon which should best be classed with dreams, delusions, and the various forms of automatic behavior*. The controlling ideas of the crowd are the result neither of reflection nor of "suggestion," but are akin to what, as we shall see later, the psychoanalysts term "complexes." The crowd-self—if I may speak of it in this way—is analogous in many respects to "compulsion neurosis," "somnambulism," or "paranoiac episode." Crowd ideas are "fixations"; they are always symbolic; they are always related to something repressed in the unconscious.

Our own view may be summarized as follows: (1) The crowd is not the same as the masses, or any class or gathering of people as such, but is a certain mental condition which may occur simultaneously to people in any gathering or association. (2) This condition is not a "collective mind." It is a release of repressed impulses which is made possible because certain controlling ideas have ceased to function in the immediate social environment. (3) This modification in the immediate social environment is the result of mutual concessions on the part of persons whose unconscious impulses to do a certain forbidden thing are similarly disguised as sentiments which meet with conscious moral approval. (4) Such a general disguising of the real motive is a characteristic phenomenon of dreams and of mental pathology, and occurs in the crowd by fixing the attention of all present upon the abstract and general. Attention is thus held diverted from the individual's personal associations, permitting these associations and their accompanying impulses to function unconsciously. (5) The abstract ideas so entertained become symbols of meanings which are unrecognized; they form a closed system, like the obsessions of the paranoiac, and as the whole group are thus moved in the same direction, the "compulsory" logic of these ideas move forward without those social checks which normally keep us within bounds of the real. Hence, acting and thinking in the crowd become stereotyped and "ceremonial." Individuals move together like automatons. (6) As the unconscious chiefly consists of that part of our nature which is habitually repressed by the social, and as there is

¹ Reprinted by permission from E. D. Martin, *The Behavior of Crowds*, pp. 19; 48-50. New York. Harper & Brothers, 1920.

always, therefore, an unconscious resistance to this repressive force, it follows that the crowd state, like the neurosis, is a mechanism of escape and of compensation. It also follows that the crowd-spirit will occur most commonly in reference to just those social forms where repression is greatest—in matters political, religious, and moral. (7) The crowd-mind is then not a mere excess of emotion on the part of people who have abandoned "reason"; crowd-behavior is in a sense psychopathic and has many elements in common with somnambulism, the compulsion neurosis, and even paranoia. (8) Crowds may be either temporary or permanent in their existence. Permanent crowds, with the aid of the press, determine in greater or less degree the mental habits of nearly everyone. The individual moves through his social world like a popular freshman on a college campus, who is to be "spiked" by one or another fraternity competing for his membership. A host of crowds standing for every conceivable "cause" and "deal" hover constantly about him, ceaselessly screaming their propaganda into his ears, bullying and cajoling him, pushing and crowding and denouncing one another, and forcing all willy-nilly to line up and take sides with them upon issues and dilemmas which represent the real convictions of nobody.

177. Egotism, Hatred, and Absolutism in Crowd Thought and Behavior¹

(1) *Egotism*

The unconscious egoism of the individual in the crowd appears in all forms of crowd-behavior. As in dreams and in the neurosis this self feeling is frequently though thinly disguised, and I am of the opinion that with the crowd the mechanisms of this disguise are less subtle. To use a term which Freud employs in this connection to describe the process of distortion in dreams, the "censor" is less active in the crowd than in most phases of mental life. Though the conscious thinking is carried on in abstract and impersonal formula, and though, as in the neurosis, the "compulsive" character of the mechanisms developed frequently—especially in permanent crowds—well nigh reduces the individual to an automaton, the crowd is one of the most naïve devices that can be employed for enhancing one's ego consciousness. The individual has only to transfer his repressed self feeling to the idea of the crowd or group

¹ Reprinted by permission from E. D. Martin, *The Behavior of Crowds*, pp. 73-74; 77; 78; 83; 92; 106; 112-13; 116-17; 123-24; 133; 139; 140; 141-42; 155-56. New York. Harper & Brothers, 1920.

of which he is a member; he can then exalt and exhibit himself to almost any extent without shame, oblivious of the fact that the supremacy, power, praise, and glory which he claims for his crowd are really claimed for himself.

That the crowd always insists on being flattered is a fact known intuitively by every orator and editor.

This self-adulation of crowds, with its accompanying will to be important, to dominate, is so constant and characteristic a feature of the crowd-mind that I doubt if any crowd can long survive which fails to perform this function for its members. Self-flattery is evident in the pride with which many people wear badges and other insignia of groups and organizations to which they belong, and in the pompous names by which fraternal orders are commonly designated. In its more "exhibitionist" types it appears in parades and in the favorite ways in which students display their "college spirit."

Every organized crowd is jealous of its dignity and honor and is bent upon keeping up appearances. Nothing is more fatal to it than a successful assault upon its prestige. Every crowd, even the casual street mob, clothes the egoistic desires of its members or participants in terms of the loftiest moral motive. No crowd can afford to be laughed at. Crowd men have little sense of humor, certainly none concerning themselves and their crowd-ideas. Any laughter they indulge in is more likely to be directed at those who do not believe with them.

(2) *Hatred*

Probably the most telling point of likeness between the crowd-mind and the psychoneurosis—paranoia especially—is the "delusion of persecution." In cases of paranoia the notion that the patient is the victim of all sorts of intrigue and persecution is so common as to be a distinguishing symptom of this disease. Such delusions are known to be defenses, or compensation mechanisms, growing out of the patient's exaggerated feeling of self-importance. The delusion of grandeur and that of being persecuted commonly go together.

The crowd's delusion of persecution, conspiracy, or oppression is thus a defense mechanism of this nature. The projection of this hatred on those outside the crowd serves not so much, as in paranoia, to shield the subject from the consciousness of his own hatred, as to provide him with a pretext for exercising it. Given such a pretext, most crowds will display their homicidal tendencies quite openly.

We have been discussing crowds in which hostility is present in the

form of overt destructive and homicidal acts or other unmistakable expressions of hatred. But are there not also peaceable crowds, crowds devoted to religious and moral propaganda, idealist crowds? Yes, all crowds moralize, all crowds are also idealistic. But the moral enthusiasm of the crowd always demands a victim. The idealist crowd also always makes idols of its ideals and worships them with human sacrifice. The peaceable crowd is only potentially homicidal. I believe that *every crowd is "against some one."* Almost any crowd will persecute on occasion—if sufficiently powerful and directly challenged. The crowd tends ever to carry its ideas to their deadly logical conclusion.

An interesting fact about the hostility of a crowd is its ability on occasion to survive the loss of its object. It may reveal the phenomenon which psychologists call "displacement." That is to say, another object may be substituted for the original one without greatly changing the quality of the feeling. A mob in the street, driven back from the object of its attack, will loot a store or two before it disperses. Or, bent on lynching a certain negro, it may even substitute an innocent man, if robbed of its intended victim—as, for instance, the lynching of the mayor of Omaha. Such facts would seem to show that these hostile acts are really demanded by mechanisms within the psyche. Many symbolic acts of the person afflicted with compulsion neurosis show this same *trait of substitution*.

The intensest hatred of the crowd is that directed toward the heretic, the nonconformist, the "traitor." I have sometimes thought that to the crowd-mind there is only one sin, heresy. Every sort of crowd, political, religious, moral, has an ax ready for the person who in renouncing its ideas and leaving it threatens to break it up. The bitter partisan hatred of crowds is nothing compared to their hatred for the renegade. To the crowd of true believers, the heretic or schismatic is "worse than the infidel." Let a Nietzsche, though his life be that of an ascetic, openly challenge and repudiate the values of popular morality, and his name is anathema.

(3) *Absolutism*

Wherever conscious thinking is determined by unconscious mechanisms, and all thinking is more or less so, it is dogmatic in character. Beliefs which serve an unconscious purpose do not require the support of evidence. They persist because they are demanded.

Does the crowd's thinking commonly show a like tendency to construct an imaginary world of thought-forms and then take refuge in

its ideal system? As we saw at the beginning of our discussion, it does. The focusing of general attention upon the abstract and universal is a necessary step in the development of the crowd-mind.

The crowd does not think in order to solve problems. To the crowd-mind, as such, there are no problems. It has closed its case beforehand. This accounts for what Le Bon termed the "credulity" of the crowd. But the crowd believes only what it wants to believe and nothing else.

It is not really because so many are ignorant, but because so few are able to resist the appeal which the peculiar logic of crowd-thinking makes to the unconscious, that the cheap, the tawdry, the half-true almost exclusively gain popular acceptance. The average man is a dogmatist. He thinks what he thinks others think he is thinking. He is so used to propaganda that he can hardly think of any matter in other terms. It is almost impossible to keep the consideration of any subject of general interest above the dilemmas of partisan crowds. People will wherever possible change the discussion of a mooted question into an antiphonal chorus of howling mobs, each chanting its ritual as ultimate truth, and hurling its shibboleths in the faces of the others. Pursuit of truth with most people consists in repeating their creed. Nearly every movement is immediately made into a cult. Theology supplants religion in the churches. Straight thinking on political subjects is subordinated to partisan ends. Catch-phrases and magic formulas become substituted for scientific information.

The crowd-mind is everywhere idealistic, and absolutist. Its truths are "given," made-in-advance. Though unconsciously its systems of logic are created to enhance the self-feeling, they appear to consciousness as highly impersonal and abstract.

To the crowd-mind a principle appears as an end in itself. It must be vindicated at all costs. To offend against it in one point is to be guilty of breaking the whole law. Crowds are always uncompromising about their principles. They must apply to all alike. Crowds are no respecters of persons.

As crowd-men we never appear without some set of principles or some cause over our heads. Crowds crawl under their principles like worms under stones. They cover up the wriggings of the unconscious, and protect it from attack. Every crowd uses its principles as universal demands. In this way it gets unction upon other crowds, puts them in the wrong, makes them give assent to the crowd's real purpose by challenging them to deny the righteousness of the professed justifications of that purpose. About each crowd, like the circle of fire which the gods

placed about the sleeping Brunhilde, there is a flaming hedge of logical abstractions, sanctions, taboos, which none but the intellectually courageous few dare cross. In this way the slumbering critical faculties of the crowd-mind are protected against the intrusion of realities from outside the cult. The intellectual curiosity of the members of the group is kept within proper bounds. Hostile persons or groups dare not resist us, for in so doing they make themselves enemies of Truth, of Morality, of Liberty, etc. Both political parties, by a common impulse, "drape themselves in the Flag." It is an interesting fact that the most antagonistic crowds profess much the same set of principles.

178. Sense of Universality, Social Projection, and Moral Consciousness of the Individual in the Crowd Situation¹

The Impression of Universality. There are strict limits to the assumption that the number of stimulations brought to bear upon the individual increases in a geometric relation to the number of persons in the crowd. If one is surrounded by a throng, those near at hand shut out the view of those more distant. Barring volume of sound, therefore, a man in the center of a crowd of five hundred should receive as many contributory stimulations as the man in the midst of a crowd of five thousand. It will be agreed, however, that excitement runs higher in the vast throng than in the smaller body. We must therefore find some explanation, other than facilitation through social stimuli, to account for this dependence of crowd excitement upon numbers. A number of references have been made to attitude assumed by the individual when he knows that he is in the presence of a large company. This situation is more complex than that of the small crowd with actual all-to-all contacts, the form of the response being largely determined by a central adjustment in the individual's nervous system, as well as by the external stimulations which call it forth. In terms of behavior we may say that the individual reacts to stimuli which he actually receives *as if* they were coming from an enormously greater number of individuals. In terms of consciousness he imagines that the entire vast assembly is stimulating him in this fashion. He has mental imagery—visual, auditory, and kinæsthetic—of a great throng of people whom he knows are there, although he does not see them. These people moreover are imagined as reacting to the common crowd object. There is

¹ These selections from F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology*, pp. 305-06; 307; 312-13 are used by permission of, and by arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company, the authorized publishers.

vivid visual and motor imagery of their postures, expressions, and settings for action. We have already seen that there is an attitude to react as the other members of the crowd are reacting. There must of course be some evidence of how they are reacting in order to release this attitude. In default of evidence through stimulation (as in case of those concealed from view) mental imagery supplies the necessary clues.

It will be convenient to speak of the attitude of responding as if to a great number of social stimuli and the accompanying imaginal consciousness of the crowd's reaction as the *impression of universality*.

Social Projection. A further imaginal factor is revealed in the behavior of the individual in the crowd. Whence comes this impression that the entire crowd is accepting and acting upon *the suggestions given by the speaker*? Why does the individual suppose that the attitude of those whom he cannot observe is favorable rather than hostile to the words uttered? The sight of compliance in one's immediate neighbors in part affords an impression which is extended to the entire crowd. The mere fact that the speaker is known to have prestige also counts. But a further explanation probably applies here. It may be stated as follows: As we catch a glimpse of the expressions of the others we "read into them," the setting which for the time is dominating us. This tendency is true of all perceptions under the influence of a special attitude. *We ourselves accept and respond to the words of the leader; and therefore we believe and act upon the assumption that others are doing so too.* The attitude and imagery involved in this reference of self-reaction to others we may call by the figurative term, *social projection*.

In crowds social projection and the impression of universality work hand in hand. To feel fully the presence of the multitude we must realize an identity between their behavior and ours. The response which we imagine to be universal is a "projection" of our own response. By a circular effect, moreover, this same response comes back to us with all the reinforcement that large numbers bring. The sequence is therefore as follows: (1) we react to the common object of attention; (2) we assume the attitude and belief that others are reacting in the same way, and interpret their expressions so far as seen with that meaning; and (3) our response is increased all the more because of this (assumed) agreement and support of the others.

The Moral Consciousness of the Crowd Man. Justification of these acts in the *consciousness* of the individual follows a course parallel with the release of the egoistic drive. All doubt or worry as to one's course of action disappears when one finds one is acting with the other members of the crowd. The fact that others approve of what one

wants to do by doing the same thing themselves gives a comfortable sense of moral sanction. The experience of relief is like that of the boy who, having gone swimming or eaten the jam in the face of the sternest parental injunction not to do so, suddenly finds that his mother did not care very much after all. The atmosphere clears in similar fashion when one's egoistic drives are sanctioned and released through crowd stimuli.

The moral consciousness of the individual in mob violence develops somewhat as follows: (1) "I could do this thing which I want to do as a member of a crowd because no one would observe me, and I would therefore escape punishment. (2) Even if I should be detected, no one could punish me without punishing all the others. But to punish all would be a physical impossibility. And (3) more than that, it doesn't seem possible to punish a crowd, because that would be making a large number of people suffer. And that is unjust: it is the interest of the many which must always be safeguarded. Hence (4) since the whole crowd show by their acts that they wish the deed to be done, it must be right after all. So large a number of people could not be in the wrong. And finally (5) since so many people will benefit by this act, to perform it is a public duty and a righteous deed."

Words are soon found in which to rationalize the injustice of the mob's action, and none of its participants raises a question. "They got what was coming to them: they tried to steal our jobs," was the remorseless statement of the striking miners as they surveyed the bodies of their victims. Where the struggle group is large and the impression of universality strong, the sense of moral justice is exalted to the plane of the heroic. Members of hooded mobs are impressed with the "patriotism" of their self-justified acts of violence. The commander who sank the *Lusitania* received a medal expressing the admiration of the German nation. Revolutionists have put men, women, and children to death upon no further charge than that they were (or might have become) "enemies to The People."

179. Methods of Swaying a Crowd¹

The great orator seems to know instinctively how to deal with the crowd. The successful presentation of a subject to an individual is not at all the same as the successful presentation of the same subject to the crowd. As was indicated above, the mental processes of the

¹ From W. D. Scott, *Psychology of Public Speaking*, pp. 183-84. Published by Noble and Noble. Used by permission.

crowd are similar to those of primitive man and hence the most effective appeal must be made to the mind of the crowd as it actually is, and not as we might assume it to be, from knowing the individuals composing it. The crowd, like primitive man, thinks in mental images rather than in logical processes. The skillful orator awakens these images one after another or holds a single picture so vividly before the crowd that the results, image or images, become as realities and lead to the most extreme measures to carry out that which is merely imagined. A leader of a crowd must have a vivid imagination and must be able to awaken such images in the minds of his hearers. Impassioned form of speech is more likely to find expression in bold flights of imagery and hence the addresses of leaders of crowds are likely to manifest this peculiarity.

The orator who has welded his audience into a homogenous crowd should never be guilty of attempting to reason with them, for, by the very process of forming them into such a crowd, he has deprived them of the power of critical thinking. He should affirm reasonable things and affirm conclusions which he has come to by processes of reasoning, but he should not presume to conduct the crowd through such a process.

Not only do crowds think in images, but a very striking characteristic is the part played by the emotions in awakening the images and the peculiar emotional tone which accompanies them. This might have been anticipated from a study of emotions. Human emotions are always awakened by strong forms of imagery. Logical processes of thought are practically devoid of emotional coloring, while the conclusions reached by primitive man and by crowds are the results of feeling rather than of reasoning. No orator can sway the individuals of a crowd who does not succeed in stirring their emotions; hence successful leaders of crowds are persons of highly emotional natures, who surpass others in moving the feelings of their hearers.

B. CROWD BEHAVIOR AND FASHION

180. Fashion as a Form of Crowd Behavior¹

Fashion is a social custom, transmitted by imitation or by tradition. It is a form of luxury, luxury in ornamentation.

Many writers have sounded the caprices of fashion, its frequent com-

¹ Reprinted by permission from P. Clerget "The Economic and Social Rôle of Fashion" in *Annual Report of The Smithsonian Institution*: 1913: pp. 755; 756-7; 757-8; 759-760; 763-764; 764. Washington, D. C. Government Printing Office, 1914.

ing, its suddenness. It is changeable, unreliable, frivolous; the most careful calculations are often brushed aside for the most trifling causes. Another characteristic is its universal following. Domineering, it reigns supreme over all classes of society. While this "democracy of fashion" is quite recent, yet the taste for finery is as old as the world.

How is fashion created? Since the days of Worth in 1846, it has been the well-known modiste who has been the creating artist. His popularity is such that it has become a regular habit to visit his establishment, and as Pierre Mille says, "he knows how to make the worldly-minded dress and how to prattle."

The modiste seeks out the designs, fits the forms, harmonizes the lines and styles. Each establishment decides upon a model and then selection is made from public opinion expressed at the great gatherings at Auteuil and Longchamp. Each modiste has a representative there and in broad daylight they make comparisons, listen to criticisms, make after-touches, and the "complete results of the races" told in the Paris evening papers omit the most striking act of the day: Fashion was born and a humble seamstress may have had the chance to invent it.

The fashion created, there is haste to make it known, to launch it. Under the monarchical régimes and under the first and second empires, the court fulfilled that duty and gave fashion some distinction. It is only since the first Republic, or particularly since the third Republic, that the prevailing style has been anything more than the reflection of the will of the sovereign whose ideas and customs had the force of law. Under the first empire, Josephine abhorred a stiff style of garment; she preferred the low-neck gown with high waist and flexible skirt; her hair arranged with the bandeau. Roman art then ruled, brought about by Josephine. Empress Eugénia had like influence under the second empire, and to her we owe the taste for a comfortable style, and stuffed, silk-covered furniture.

Today the style is made public by mannequins at the race course, on the street, at the theater, by actors, on the stage, and by such social functions as a wedding or a ball. The fashion at the theater seems to be playing an increasing rôle. Fashionable modistes have recently announced their intention of having their mannequins replaced by actresses, who on the stage, by their grace, their elegance, their beauty, their prestige, would tend to a more ready acceptance of fashion's extravagant innovations. Madame Jane Hading, in the play of *L'Attentat*, introduced the dress known as the "aile de cabeau" or winged pannier. And Madame Martha Brandès created the style of sleeves since known by her name. When *La Walkyrie* was first presented at the opera,

white wings like those attached to Brunehilde's helmet were worn on hats, and the armor of the warlike maiden gave to dressmakers the idea of spangled robes, much resembling the breastplate. The use of pheasant plumage became more general after the presentation of Chanteclair. We already had the "Dame Blanche" fichus, and the Lutheran bonnet was popular after Les Huguenots was played.

Any striking idea may inspire a fashion. Under Louis-Philippe "all the fashionable young men of the capital wanted their trousers plaited at the hips like those of the African chasseurs; they had their turbans and their Arab checias (skull caps) at their homes." Trocadero ribbons became the rage as a souvenir of the voyage of the Duke of Angoulême to Spain, and the Russo-Japanese War gave us the kimono. It is to the passion for sports that we owe the English styles, the success of the tailor-made costume, the fashion for furs, and leather garments, and also that "war hat" attempted by some Americans.

Literature also has been a great inspiration, as shown by the curious and interesting book of Louis Maigrón on *Romantisme et la Mode*.

While we have spoken up to this point simply of clothing and hair-dressing, we should not think that this is the limit of fashion's domain. It controls conversation, the manner of walking, how to shake hands. Such a word as "épatant" (stunning) owes to fashion its recent admittance to the *Dictionary of the Academy*. The general use of such a drink as tea, the abandonment of wine in certain circles, vegetarianism, may all be regarded as fashions, likewise the adoption of some state of the mind which takes the lead at times, as sensitiveness or calmness. We have already spoken of architecture and furniture. The passion for traveling and for sports becomes widespread; there is less taste for home; there is less desire for books and interior ornaments. The influence of fashion is reflected also on the sales of works of art. The great sales recently held in Paris have shown that there is a revival in favor of productions of the eighteenth century. In June, 1912, the portrait of "Duval de l'Epinoy," purchased in 1903 for 5,210 francs (\$1,042), brought 660,000 francs (\$132,000); the "Jardin de la ville d'Este," by Fragonard, which sold for 700 francs (\$140) in 1880, brought 21,300 francs (\$4,226); and the "Sacrifice au Minotaure," by the same painter, for which 5,300 francs (\$1,060) was paid in 1880, was held at 396,000 francs (\$79,200). Such fluctuations, of which we could give many examples, are attributed by M. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu to certain notions, among which fashion forms a large part; the personal satisfaction of connoisseurs, the desire for distinction, snobbishness, which is a grand master in fashionable life, the spontaneous adaptation

of art of the eighteenth century to conditions of contemporary life and the development of large fortunes. In the statistics of foreign commerce works of art show the greatest change; in the fiscal year 1911-12 the importation of that class into the United States rose to more than \$36,000,000, an increase of 60 per cent over 1910-11.

Other industries are also answerable to fashion—the fur trade, ornamental plumes, jewelry, toys, and artificial flowers. The style in furs changes every year, from the tippets to the stoles and scarfs of today, and the consumption of skins increases in enormous proportions.

The appearance of a new style of garment is the visible sign that a transformation is taking place in the intellect, customs, and business of a people. The rise of the Chinese Republic, for instance, led to doing away with plaited hair and to the adoption of the European costume. Taine wrote this profound sally: "My decided opinion is that the greatest change in history was the advent of trousers. . . . It marked the passage of Greek and Roman civilization to the modern. Nothing is more difficult to alter than a universal and daily custom. In order to take away man's clothes and dress him up again you must demolish and remodel him." It is also an equally philosophical conclusion, which Mons. Louis Bourdeau gives in his interesting *Histoire de l'habillement et de la parure*: "There where the same style of clothing is used for centuries, as among barbarous peoples, one has the right to say that civilization remains stationary. There, on the other hand, where, as in Europe, garments are subject to continual modifications, one may see evidence of great comfort and rapid progress. . . . Far from being a custom of incurable frivolity the changes of fashions mark a high civilization, subject to change because it has wide latitude to refine its ideal in proportion as its productions are varied."

What can we do for or against fashion? Can we direct it or can we prevent its abuse? Let us find out first the power of the law, religious or civil. Very early popes and councils strove in vain against the low-neck gown and the dresses "terminating in the serpent's tail." Kings imitated them, Charlemagne setting the example, but sumptuary decrees have had no more effect than ordinances against dueling.

181. Fashions in Phrases¹

And, first of all, walk where we will, we cannot help hearing from

¹ Reprinted from C. Mackay, *Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions*, Vol. II: pp. 240; 242-244. London, 1852.

every side a phrase repeated with delight, and received with laughter, by men with hard hands and dirty faces, by saucy butcher-lads and errand-boys, by loose women, by hackney-coachmen, cabriolet-drivers, and idle fellows who loiter at the corners of streets. Not one utters this phrase without producing a laugh from all within hearing. It seems applicable to every circumstance, and is the universal answer to every question; in short, it is the favorite slang phrase that, while its brief season of popularity lasts, throws a dash of fun and frolicsomeness over the existence of squalid poverty and ill-requited labor, and gives them reason to laugh as well as their more fortunate fellows in a higher stage of society.

London is peculiarly fertile in this sort of phrases, which spring up suddenly, no one knows exactly in what spot, and pervade the whole population in a few hours, no one knows how. Many years ago the favorite phrase (for, though but a monosyllable, it was a phrase in itself) was *Quoz*. This odd word took the fancy of the multitude in an extraordinary degree, and very soon acquired an almost boundless meaning. When vulgar wit wished to mark his incredulity, and raise a laugh at the same time, there was no resource so sure as this popular piece of slang. When a man was asked a favor which he did not choose to grant, he marked his sense of the suitor's unparalleled presumption by exclaiming *Quoz!* When a mischievous urchin wished to annoy a passenger, and create mirth for his comrades, he looked him in the face, and cried out *Quoz!* and the exclamation never failed in its object. When a disputant was desirous of throwing a doubt upon the veracity of his opponent, and getting summarily rid of an argument which he could not overturn, he uttered the word *Quoz*, with a contemptuous curl of his lip and an impatient shrug of his shoulders. The universal monosyllable conveyed all his meaning, and not only told his opponent that he lied, but that he erred egregiously if he thought that any one was such a nincompoop as to believe him. Every alehouse resounded with *Quoz*; every street-corner was noisy with it, and every wall for miles around was chalked with it.

But, like all other earthly things, *Quoz* had its season, and passed away as suddenly as it arose, never again to be the pet and the idol of the populace. A new claimant drove it from its place, and held undisputed sway, till, in its turn, it was hurled from its pre-eminence, and a successor appointed in its stead.

Another very odd phrase came into repute in a brief space afterwards, in the form of the impertinent and not universally apposite query, "*Has your mother sold her mangle?*" But its popularity was not of

that boisterous and cordial kind which ensures a long continuance of favor. What tended to impede its progress was, that it could not be well applied to the older portions of society. It consequently ran but a brief career, and then sank into oblivion. Its successor enjoyed a more extended fame, and laid its foundations so deep, that years and changing fashions have not sufficed to eradicate it. This phrase was "*Flare up!*" and it is, even now, a colloquialism in common use. It took its rise in the time of the Reform riots, when Bristol was nearly half burned by the infuriated populace. The flames were said to have *flared up* in the devoted city. Whether there was anything peculiarly captivating in the sound, or in the idea of these words, is hard to say; but whatever was the reason, it tickled the mob-fancy mightily, and drove all other slang out of the field before it. Nothing was to be heard all over London but "*flare up!*" It answered all questions, settled all disputes, was applied to all persons, all things, and all circumstances, and became suddenly that most comprehensive phrase in the English language. The man who had overstepped the bounds of decorum in his speech was said to have *flared up*; he who had paid visits too repeated to the gin-shop, and got damaged in consequence, had *flared up*. To put one's self into a passion; to stroll out on a nocturnal frolic, and alarm a neighborhood, or to create a disturbance in any shape, was to *flare up*. A lover's quarrel was a *flare up*; so was a boxing-match between two blackguards in the streets; and the preachers of sedition and revolution recommended the English nation to *flare up*, like the French. So great a favorite was the word, that people loved to repeat it for its very sound. They delighted apparently in hearing their own organs articulate it; and laboring men, when none who could respond to the call were within hearing, would often startle the aristocratic echoes of the West by the well-known slang phrase of the East. Even in the dead hours of the night, the ears of those who watched late, or who could not sleep, were saluted with the same sound. The drunkard reeling home showed that he was still a man and a citizen by calling "*flare up!*" in the pauses of his hiccough. Drink had deprived him of the power of arranging all other ideas; his intellect was sunk to the level of the brute's; but he clung to humanity by the one last link of the popular cry. While he could vociferate that sound, he had right as an Englishman, and would not sleep in a gutter, like a dog! Onwards he went, disturbing quiet streets and comfortable people by his whoop, till exhausted nature could support him no more, and he rolled powerless into the road. When, in due time afterwards, the policeman stumbled upon him as he lay, that guardian of the peace turned the full light of his lantern on his face, and exclaimed, "Here's a poor devil

who has been *flaring up!*" Then came the stretcher, on which the victim of deep potations was carried to the watch-house, and pitched into a dirty cell, among a score of wretches about as far gone as himself, who saluted their new comrade by a loud, long shout of "*flare up!*"

So universal was this phrase, and so enduring seemed its popularity, that a speculator, who knew not the evanescence of slang, established a weekly newspaper under its name. But he was like the man who built his house upon the sand; his foundation gave way under him, and the phrase and the newspaper were washed into the mighty sea of the things that were. The people grew at last weary of the monotony, and "*flare up*" became vulgar even among them. Gradually it was left to little boys who did not know the world, and in process of time sank altogether into neglect. It is now heard no more as a piece of popular slang; but the words are still used to signify any sudden outburst either of fire, disturbance, or ill-nature.

The next phrase that enjoyed the favor of the million was less concise, and seems to have been originally aimed against precocious youths who gave themselves the airs of manhood before their time. "*Does your mother know you're out?*" was the provoking query addressed to young men of more than reasonable swagger, who smoked cigars in the streets, and wore false whiskers to look irresistible. We have seen many a conceited fellow who could not suffer a woman to pass him without staring her out of countenance, reduced at once into his natural insignificance by the mere utterance of this phrase. Apprentice lads and shopmen in their Sunday clothes held the words in abhorrence, and looked fierce when they were applied to them. Altogether the phrase had a very salutary effect, and in a thousand instances showed young Vanity that it was not half so pretty and engaging as it thought itself. What rendered it so provoking was the doubt it implied as to the capability of self-guidance possessed by the individual to whom it was addressed. "*Does your mother know you're out?*" was a query of mock concern and solicitude, implying regret and concern that one so young and inexperienced in the ways of a great city should be allowed to wander abroad without the guidance of a parent. Hence the great wrath of those who verged on manhood, had not reached it, whenever they were made the subject of it.

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises

1. Distinguish between an assemblage and a congregate? Is this a valid distinction? Are these terms well chosen? Be specific.

2. Technically speaking is there such a thing as social consciousness which is different from individual consciousness? Explain.
3. What relation has participation to the rise of social objects and social meanings?
4. From your own experience illustrate polarization in crowd behavior.
5. Contrast the types of mental processes which are likely to be uppermost in an audience and in a mob.
6. How would you undertake to change an audience into a mob?
7. How does a co-worker group affect the speed and quality of mental associations, according to Allport?
8. May we draw any conclusion on speed and quality of ideas produced in an ordinary crowd from this experiment of Allport's?
9. How may we account for the primitive behavior of a crowd?
10. Why are words so important in controlling crowds?
11. Why does Martin say that a crowd is not synonymous with a mere horde of people?
12. What influence has abstract ideas on crowd behavior?
13. What relation have these abstract ideas to slogans, catchwords and stereotypes described in Chapter XVI?
14. Upon what basis does Martin hold that ideas generated in the crowd situation are apt to be primitive, dream-like and pathological?
15. How does a crowd situation permit the expression of repressed emotions and attitudes?
16. Illustrate the egotism of a crowd from concrete example in your own experience.
17. Illustrate the hatred of a crowd. Do you agree with Martin that a crowd always tends to be against somebody or some thing? (Go into some detail in your reply.)
18. Illustrate the sense of absolutism and of idealism in the crowd.
19. What is meant by social projection? Illustrate.
20. How does the moral sensibility of a man in a crowd correlate with his egotistic trends? Illustrate.
21. Why do feelings pass through a crowd more readily than do ideas?
22. Allport says, "The individual in the crowd behaves just as he would behave alone, *only more so*." Explain.
23. Under what conditions will a mass movement become organized? And how will it become an institution?
24. Illustrate the methods of swaying a crowd?
25. How are modern fashions made up? How spread?
26. Illustrate some of the types of interest that become fads?
27. What is the relation of changes in clothes and tastes and alterations in social living?
28. Illustrate current fads in phrases.

B. Topics for Class Reports

1. Report on Simmel's paper on fashion. (Cf. bibliography).
2. Report on Thomas' paper on dress. (Cf. bibliography).
3. Review Veblen's theory about the leisure class. (Cf. bibliography).
4. Review Ross on fashion. (Cf. bibliography).

C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers

1. The Psychology of Fashion.
2. The Contribution of Psychoanalysis to Crowd Psychology.
3. The Influence of Tarde on Social Psychology.

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CHAPTER XXIII

THE AUDIENCE

I. INTRODUCTION

The audience is a type of group formation which is much more formal than the spontaneous crowd. Moreover, it is marked, for the most part, by more orderly, systematic procedures. There is often a considerable degree of rationality in the ideas and attitudes called forth. Moreover, the leader or speaker often dominates the situation much more completely than in the crowd. The polarization is much more complete, the audience being rather docile and mild in the presence of the speaker.

Woolbert's paper presents a full and incisive analysis of the psychology of the audience. He shows the nature of the polarization and the mental sets or attitudes which are essential to the audience. He indicates various degrees of integration and disintegration of the audience, and the speaker's relation to his audience.

Griffith's paper reports an experiment in the seating in a classroom audience. Such studies might well be extended to other audiences with profit. The configuration of the audience must be taken into account in dealing with its behavior. It would be interesting to note the changes from an audience to a crowd or mob following these lines of attention and interest.

The paper by Travis indicates the effects of a small audience on a simple mental-motor performance. The presence of other persons, on the whole, tends to enhance the score in this type of test. This sort of study could be carried further into more natural situations to reveal the effects of social stimulation on behavior.

The two selections from Scott show first how to render an audience suggestible and how to change the audience into a crowd. To move the audience to action, to change its opinions, nothing is more essential than to break up its intellectual trends and to reduce its attitudes and ideas to emotional-instinctive bases. Political and

religious leaders have been supreme in this art. The great mass movements of the world have not been accomplished by audiences, but by crowds who take on mob characteristics. The deliberative bodies of the political state, however, are protected against the crowd characteristics by their rules of procedure and by the insistence of third person control, that is, the speaker addresses his fellow members through the chairman. In short, parliamentary procedures attempt to prevent crowdish attitudes and actions from arising. There is thus an effort to keep discussion and deliberation at a more intellectual, a more objective and a more sane level. When parliamentary bodies degenerate into crowds their functioning changes profoundly.

II. MATERIALS

182. Psychological Factors in the Audience¹

(1) *Conditions of Formation of the Audience: All-to-All Relations.*

In the study of congregated crowds the audience's apprehension of itself is a primary consideration. The set of mind in which people come together to hear a speaker or to witness a play very largely determines their behavior when the process of polarization intervenes. Most audiences gather under circumstances which are definitely determinable. Let us cite the most important. We can include them all under the general name disposition, of which we must recognize two main types; the general set of the persons who make up the audience, and a specific set that pertains to the particular occasion.

a. *General Dispositions.*

i. *Receptivity.* The first consideration that affects the character of the audience is what may be called "mental inertia." Ordinarily men meet together in a yielding frame of mind. It is the exceptional instance when people gather in a public place with their backs bristling. They come to listen and to enjoy, to learn and to be inspired; and they willingly lay the burden of responsibility on the speaker or the actor. It is considered socially "proper" to be amiable and yielding. Thus the polarizing power of the speaker is aided by the receptive attitude of the audience. It takes energy to oppose. The fixed tendency is to receive willingly and without opposition.

¹ Reprinted by permission from C. H. Woolbert "The Audience" in "Studies in Social and General Psychology from the University of Illinois" (ed. by M. Bentley) *Psy. Mon.* 1916: XXI: Whole No. 92: pp. 39-43; 44-45; 46-50; 51-53.

This acquiescing tendency, or "primitive credulity," as it has been called, is one of the surest aids to the speaker in causing the audience to form. A vast majority of the members in a congregate give themselves without reserve to the object of their attention,—that is to say, to the speaker. They are his to take, if he knows how to take them. They have come in an expectant frame of mind; their attitude toward the speaker is, at the least, one of tolerant respect, and they make it easy for him to control their mental processes once he gets their attention.

ii. *Homogeneity of Interest.* The second of the factors making for a general predisposition in an audience is similarity of habitual act and thought. Certain groups give allegiance to specific customs, taboos, rituals, ceremonies, traditions, and beliefs. All of these social factors rest on similarity of function and likeness of tradition. Units of the same cult or institution—church, lodge, political party, labor-union, neighborhood—have inclinations toward certain ways of thinking that make them easily consociated. They react to the same ideas, concepts, and beliefs. They do things according to the same ritual and ceremony. Their emotions can be reached by the same objects and in the same sequence. They notice and ignore the same sights and sounds. Their foreground processes wear a common aspect. Any social factor that tends to unite a human group in every-day life makes of it an especially homogeneous audience and also impresses upon its members a fixed disposition toward subsequent union.

b. *Special Dispositions.*

i. *Sophistication.* According as we are or are not habituated to congregating we bring to the congregate dispositions that affect materially the experience we undergo. Persons who are accustomed to attend meetings get into habits of behavior that are quite different from the habits of those who congregate but seldom. The city-bred are usually "audience-trained," especially those who haunt the theaters and the picture-shows. They applaud more freely and from much more obvious incentives than does the countryman. They have a way of following more slavishly certain traditions of the audience. They are sophisticated. They know just what to do when the flag is flashed upon the screen; how to greet the national anthem; how to react at the mention of a political favorite or a pet fallacy. Aristocrats of one kind and another, especially academic and moneyed, are more reserved in their responses. Members of deliberative bodies feel the necessity of proving that they are deliberate; the voting delegates at a convention can be stampeded much less easily than the non-voting galleries. Regular attendants upon the services of the

church come to meeting with an entirely different set of mind from those who attend only by exception. Repetition of the congregating experience is important, then, in fixing the temper of mind under which the audience gathers; for it sets up habitual tendencies which play their part in the social significance of our kind of congregate.

ii. *General Cortical Set.* When an audience comes together with definite intentions and expectations, the pattern of perception and feeling is already determined. When we know that we are to listen to a political speech, our set differs from the set under which we hear a university lecturer discoursing on political science; and the difference is still greater between the tuning for a political meeting and for a religious service, for a gathering of farmers and the convocation of a collegiate faculty. Once we are prepared for a given occasion, we are easily integrated, provided only the occasion yields what we expect.

iii. *Preliminary Tuning.* After the audience is assembled it is influenced in its thinking and behavior by the immediate surroundings. The sights, sounds, smells and temperature of a public hall add to the individual's predisposition to become a part of the audience. The perception of a platform, a pulpit, or a proscenium brings a sense of being-in-a-public-place-in-the-sight-of-others. The pews, the hard chairs or the theater seats add an effect of their own; "storied windows," "dim religious light," music, the bustle of fellow-members moving to their places, the presence of judge and court-officers, the heat of the tent and the smell of crushed grass, the pressure of narrow quarters;—all these things tend to add to the individual's realization that he is "out among others."

Again, when the individual perceives that he is among friends, his behavior is appropriately affected; when he is among strangers, it is different. It is, we may suppose, for this reason that urban audiences are more demonstrative than rustic audiences. The former feel no restraint in the presence of a company made up largely of strangers; while the man in the rural audience ordinarily can call every one present by name, and he is influenced accordingly. We are chary of displaying our emotions and impulsive acts to those whom we expect to encounter on the morrow.

Once more, the size of the audience plays a part in determining the disposition with which its members listen. The greater the number of persons present, the greater the likelihood that they will represent conflicting customs, inhibitions, and modes of acting. The smaller the group, the more likely are they to represent some common interest growing out

of social homogeneity. Men in large groups feel that there must be present a large diversity of opinion and purpose. Men in small groups are likely to infer a basis of unity or actually to apprehend it.

iv. *Associative Tendencies.* A special agent in affecting an audience actually congregated is found in the trains of association that may at any time, through chance or circumstance, focus the attention of a group upon a given set of objects. During a religious revival the congregation holds in readiness a set of associative tendencies quite different from that possessed by the same group at other times. When the political campaign is at white heat, the crowd at the rally possesses a different set from the same company gathered in the Chautauqua tent when political issues are not in the air. Crises likewise dominate the perceptual attention: they force their way into the foreground of everyone's thinking. A catastrophe, a horrible crime, a political victory, a scandal, a national holiday, or a long-looked-for event brings men together primed in a way quite different from ordinary occasions.

(2) *The Integrated Audience*

Thus we have found several factors that prepare the minds of the audience before they are affected by the speaker. Let us note the first effects of these predispositions,—the “frame of mind” that is induced by them. The various sets when brought into contact with the objects perceivable in the congregation create a social significance, chiefly a knowledge of the presence of others. When we sit in our pew or seat, both the foreground and the background of consciousness are occupied by processes that are efficient in providing acceptable social behavior,—conduct that will bear the inspection of others. This means that the processes dominant are those that condition the social factors of custom and taboo. The taboos are especially important. Their principal function in every-day life is to furnish the individual with a body of inhibitions. These inhibitions protect him against behavior that might be looked upon as socially unacceptable. The individual believes that, without these inhibitions, he does not appear to advantage in the presence of his kind. These restraining impulses are the most characteristic manifestation of his psychophysical set when he finds himself to be a part of a congregate. Thus the attention of the individual member of the group is directed outward toward other members. His foreground processes are taken up with perceptions and emotions relating to those around him. The situation can be represented by Figure IV.

a. *Polarization: The All-to-One Relations.*

i. *The Presence of the Speaker.* We come now to the next stage in

the experience of the audience. The members have gathered; and they are attuned by a wide variety of general and special dispositions. They are ready for something to happen. They await the speaker. They are primed for his coming. He enters: he becomes the object of attention: all eyes are directed toward him as he takes his place. Polarization has begun, though his mere presence is not sufficient to break the social connections that were laid before he appeared. The individual members are therefore still alert to the social significance of their surroundings.




FIGURE IV

Next, the speaker rises and begins his address. A change comes over the auditors. Polarization proceeds. The new relations may be represented by the following figure (Fig. V) in which the long lines represent the individuals' apprehension of the speaker. Note that the interconnecting lines are still present, though they are lighter than in Figure IV. This means that the social objects are less vivid and significant than they were before the object on the platform caught the eye.

ii. *Effects of Polarization. The Removal of Inhibitions.* When polarization is complete and the art of the speaker at its highest level of effectiveness, the field of attention is narrowed and the processes in the foreground become very important for the direction of thought and conduct. At the same time, the processes in the background drop out of function. Applied to the audience, then, this means that the speaker's thought, with its attendant motivation, occupies the field. The concentration of the auditor may even approach the state of hypnosis. The sharper and the clearer the concentration, the more is the audience relieved of the inhibiting processes that were represented in the foreground before polarization began. And the first inhibition to go is—as a rule—that




FIGURE V

of the desire to appear socially "proper." When the hearer is lost in the words of the speaker, propriety is a matter of remote concern. Now when the credulous temper, the appropriate surroundings, and the speaker's message are rightly co-ordinated and harmonized, there is no limit to the distance to which inhibitions may be driven, and no practical bound to the extremities to which the individual can be induced to go in following his more asocial impulses. Mobs can be induced to "seek, burn, fire, kill, slay," although the individuals in them, when aware of social surveillance (and in this we may include men's belief in an all-seeing eye), would be very unwilling to act a part, however earnestly they might wish to. The impulse hidden within is brought to the surface; the shell of social habit gives way for the expanding tissue of instinctive impulse; the socially-hardened crust is broken by the eruption of inner fires, long ago kindled in the race.



FIGURE VI

When this loss of "social" inhibitions occurs, the form changes as shown in Figure VI.

Here the inhibitions are gone; attention is at high focus on the speaker and on what he is saying. The speaker has entered in reality into a one-to-one relation with the individuals before him. According to his skill in holding them is his power to prevent the inhibitions from coming back. If he loses his grip, the audience reverts to a state indicated in Figure V. An inept remark will bring about this result, or monotony of utterance, or a sudden interruption, —anything, in fact, which distracts attention from the speaker's thought. Where the speaker is effective, he dominates the mental functions, leading his auditors into new paths of thought, stirring in them a variety of feelings, and arousing, at will, emotional and volitional impulses. But where the occasion and the speech are of such a nature as to enable the audience to retain its social armor, social inhibitions will play their part in action. Church meetings, gatherings on academic occasions, lectures before the community's "best people," seldom call for outbursts which shock the sensibilities. On such occasions the crust usually holds. But an appropriate speech delivered to an audience not so effectively armored, causes the shell to give way to the concealed impulses. On such occasions it is that conduct becomes crowdish and that the mob rules. Social conventions are forgotten. The fear of social ostracism or taboo is removed. Men in such a condition are not concerned whether or not they are social conformists. The idea

of being a pariah has no fear for them; for social consequences do not enter into their thinking.

Men who are reserved under social inhibitions may be made to reveal an inherent coarseness when these social inhibitions are removed. Women who conceal their emotions when they realize that others are looking on, break into hysterical weeping or rage once they forget that they are the observed of observers. The man who says in his own mind—where no one else can hear him—that the objects of the mob's hatred ought to be "strung up," is just the man to take hold of the rope when he is made oblivious to social consequences.

From this point of view, then, crowdishness is in reality based upon isolation, not combination; upon freedom from the presence of others, not subjection to the will of the mass; it is a finding of the self apart from the rest, not a loss of self in a supposed crowd-personality.

iii. *Effect of Polarization: Positive Functions.* Our doctrine of social release may be made to square with the observations of common sense by observing the different functions which an audience may be made to fulfill. We sometimes make the mistake of *assuming* that all audiences are gathered for one and the same purpose. But the tasks of the audience are really three; (1) to comprehend, (2) to act, and (3) to think.

Most audiences are concerned with comprehension: most public speaking is of an informative nature. It is thus of a type that permits the background of consciousness to remain in effective operation. The inhibitions, therefore, which custom and social fear impose, remain in commission during an address which simply aims to clarify ideas. The audience that is polarized for this kind of appeal is in little danger of committing those acts which we designate as "displays of mob-spirit." Their crowdishness still allows them to keep pretty close to proper social behavior. (Cf. Figure V.)

The audience made to act, on the other hand, either emotionally or with selective movement, is further removed from its restraints. Such audiences do those untoward acts that we call unnatural, uncontrolled, reversions to savagery. It is the performances of the executively-functioning audience that are supposed to exhibit that hazy and mythical something we call the "crowd-mind," the "spirit of the mob." This type of audience is merely in the state represented in Figure VI.

The third type of audience is functioning elaboratively,—thinking its way through a problem. Such an audience—when it really fulfills the conditions—has practically no concern for social restraints. Very few congregates actually get to this point, for the reason that seldom can

a group be made to do real and sustained thinking. Only small groups, and those rather homogeneous, can be made to think. Representative types are the jury that really tries to solve its problem, and the class

or seminary made up of trained students. This kind of audience, when it is thoroughly absorbed, can be represented by Figure VII.

In its extreme form, this type of audience has pushed inhibitions so far into the background that in reality there is no audience left. What we have is merely so many individuals pursuing their independent ways. When a student in the class-

room becomes really absorbed in the problem in hand, he is likely to slip down on his shoulder blades, spread his feet, ruffle his hair, and do any number of other unconventional deeds. Let the spell be broken, and up he sits, rearranges his clothes, and again becomes socially proper. His inhibitions come back into function. It is from this type of congregate that we get our reformers, our dissenters, our bolters. Having worked their way through a problem, they have no concern for what society thinks about them. It is worthy of note, also, that decisions made under such circumstances are more likely to last than those arising from comprehension or execution only.

The instances where social inhibitions are entirely removed are so rare that in most congregated actions we can trace the influence of objects of social significance. Especially are these effective in determining the mind of the audience when clear objects are discernible in the congregate itself. The sound of other persons laughing, the sight of men who look angry, the perception of handkerchiefs dabbing at red eyes, snuffling and sobbing, muttered ejaculations, sounds that represent protest,—all these add to the response which the individual gives to the speaker. When these perceptions are in harmony with the auditor's own thought processes and emotions, as induced by the speaker, they add to the tendency to function as the speaker desires. In this way, visual and auditory stimuli from other members of the congregate are added to those from the speaker. Accordingly, we may say that under such circumstances auditor and speaker are one, for they merge, they co-operate to influence the individual members of the congregation. While this condition prevails, polarization is not complete; though the speaker may be very much the clearest object present.

So we may note, by way of summary, that no matter what the type of audience and no matter what kind of appeal the speaker makes to it, manifestations of crowdishness can be explained in terms of the

presence or absence of those inhibitions which serve to protect the individual from being socially noticed and which help him to lose himself in the mass.

b. *Polarization: The One-to-All Relations.*

i. *The Speaker as an Object.* When the speaker becomes the object of polarized attention, whatever he does has significance for the beholder and the listener. How he looks, what he does, how he sounds, and what he says, have meaning. Whatever effect he produces upon the auditors is the result of visual and auditory stimuli which are significant to the members. So that a discussion of the speaker's relation to the auditors necessarily touches upon a consideration of the relation of these stimuli to the meanings which the speaker bears.

As a visual object, the speaker begins to carry meaning the moment he appears. First, his personal appearance affects those before him. If he is tall and straight, his influence is different from that of the speaker short and bent; if he is rotund, he impresses men in one way; if slender, in another; the man with a Jovian-brow and an Apollo-like carriage means a thing quite different from the man whose head is small and who stands like a frightened fawn. Then his clothes also mean much; the well-groomed man means one thing to an audience; the unkempt, unbrushed man means something quite different. The manner of dressing the hair, even the possession or lack of hair, the way of looking at the audience, the speaker's stride, his manner of taking his seat, of switching his coat-tails, of using his handkerchief—all these visually apprehended details have significance for the observer.

When the speaker raises his voice, the audience's interpretation of his visual appearance is likely to move somewhat into the background; though the way he "takes the floor" after the introduction or the opening remarks, still keeps the focus upon what is seen. Once his voice disturbs the hearers' ears with sound-waves, the auditors begin to place new estimates upon the object before them. Every sound he makes means; it means either what the speaker intends or something else; in any case, it is significant. The art of the speaker is so to control his voice and his vocal mechanism that what he says means what he intends.

Once the speaker is launched into his address, he mingles visual and auditory objects in about equal proportions. Continually he is giving the listeners sights and sounds to interpret, and the members have no alternative but to make interpretations of one kind or another. Everything the speaker does by way of posture, action, or facial expression is immediately given definite meaning. Every inflection of his voice, the

volume and the rate of flow of words, phrases, and sentences affect the auditors' interpretation of what he represents. All these factors lead the auditors to place interpretations upon the object before them, and the object before them is, in large measure, a *social* object.

ii. *Ideational Meanings*. So much for the meanings that depend more or less directly upon visual and auditory stimuli. Let us go on to a consideration of the meanings that arise from the words that the speaker is using. When the speaker so uses his vocal organs as to carry what are to him verbal meanings, the hearers attach to his words—rather, to the auditory sensations received—such meanings as their psychophysical set or predisposition compels them to attach. When the speaker is using words in a way that conforms to custom and to habitual usage, including his way of pronouncing and enunciating them, he may carry to all his hearers “standard” meanings. If he departs from the normal or fails in his enunciation or if he uses unaccepted pronunciation he carries only unintended meanings, or even makes it impossible for the auditors to grasp any meaning whatever. In the main, it is the full sentence expressing a judgment by which the speaker holds the attention of his hearers. He gets attention to his judgment by the right choice of ideas, images, and concepts, by the right choice of words, and by the right use of voice and bodily action. Thus by the proper choice of processes in his own mind, by the right choice of symbols in which to express them, and by the right use of stimuli to interpret them, he can be properly meaningful to his auditors.

We say that it is the speaker's mission to carry thought. But there is, in reality, no such thing as “carrying thought.” Positively nothing goes from the person on the platform to the man in the seat but sound-waves and light-waves, which are the ultimate vehicles of meaning. Meaning is the only thing in any sense “carried.” Not only is it true that every movement and every sound has meaning, but, once the speech is launched, lack of movement and silences also have meaning. So that from any point of view the speaker becomes meaningful once he takes the platform in the eyes of the congregated body.

iii. *The Speaker's Relation to the Auditors*. The speaker standing before his listeners represents purpose. What he contributes to the occasion is the idea of an end which he wishes to see advanced. His problem is to convey this idea to his hearers with the accompaniment of the right feeling-tone. To this end, he must so combine, fuse, and integrate his meanings as to bring the idea into the foreground. The speaker's responsibility to his auditors is to make them (1) see a point, an explanation, or an illustration; (2) give some physical re-

action to what he says; or (3) work their way through a problem, to solve a difficulty. The first kind gives us the didactic, the expository, the descriptive address which aims chiefly to inform. The second type gives us the impressive, the stirring, the persuasive, the arousing speech,—designed to animate and to agitate, either emotionally or through overt performance. The third type is the argumentative address, which aims to set forth ideas in such a way as to make the hearer connect and relate them together in a new conclusion. Any appeal that influences an audience can be somewhere classified under these main rubrics. The speaker can take advantage of the dispositions of his auditors and he can polarize them effectively only as he appreciates which of these ends best fits the particular occasion.

183. The Class-Room Audience¹

A group of university students registered in a given course and assembled for the lecture-hour displays in a unique manner the typical characteristics of an audience of the polarized sort. The chief social relations obtaining between the speaker and such an audience are of the all-to-one and one-to-all types. The auditors, so far as general dispositions are concerned, are in a receptive, expectant mood, with a homogeneity of interest which serves to carry the lecture-topic at a fairly high level of attention. Such an audience is characterized by a sophisticated attitude that eliminates the distress and disturbance of unfamiliarity; by a general cortical set which determines in advance of the lecture the general apprehensive and affective patterns; by a preliminary tuning induced by familiar faces, significant apparatus, drawings, charts and so on; and finally, by associative tendencies which focus the attention of the group upon a single topic. It is under these conditions that the all-to-one and one-to-all relations develop; but it is not at all evident that the bonds from every part of an audience are equally effective in drawing individual members into social contact with the speaker. There is no reason to suppose that, in the all-to-one relations, an individual in the periphery of the group is as definitely polarized as individuals nearer the speaker. It might, on the other hand, be conjectured that such an individual was much less an integral part of

¹ Reprinted by permission from C. R. Griffith "A Comment upon the Psychology of the Audience" in "Critical and Experimental Studies in Psychology from the University of Illinois" (ed. by M. Bentley) *Psy. Mon.* 1921: XXX: Whole No. 136: pp. 36-38; 42-43; 43-47.

the group, for the perceptual and affective patterns from nearby neighbors must certainly contribute to the maintenance of the all-to-one relations. Frequently an outlying member of a group does not have just these clues to social integration and the lack may, as has been recently suggested, make a difference in the level of performance of such members of the group.

On the other hand, it is a common complaint among students who sit at the rear of large lecture-rooms that they can neither hear the lecturer nor see his demonstrations. If this complaint is well founded, the fact ought to be reflected in the accomplishment of such students. Now academic grades are a measure of accomplishment in both of the situations we have mentioned, and it follows that a critical analysis of the distribution of such grades in lecture-halls ought to betray differences in performance that cannot be attributed to differences, either in mental ability or in physical well-being.

If it can be determined, other things being constant, that the performance of students at the rear of a large room is actually less than the performance of those at or near the front, the students are partially justified in their complaint. We are not here interested in the complaint, however; instead, our inquiry touches the question as to whether a difference does actually exist between grades in different parts of a room, and if it does, for what reasons.

The answer to our query was sought by a tabulation, according to the seat-numbers in five large audience-rooms at the University of Illinois, of the grades of students registered in several large courses. In every case the students are alphabetically seated. Mid-semester, class, laboratory and final examination grades, as well as the final semester grades, were considered. Courses were sought which, at the one extreme, were conducted with the minimal amount of lecturing and a maximal amount of quiz and laboratory, and, at the other extreme, were conducted with a maximal amount of lectures and a minimal amount of quiz and laboratory work.

To summarize: The statistical treatment of student's grades suggests that there is an appreciable difference between the work and the accomplishment of individuals who occupy a central position in a lecture room and the work and accomplishment of those who occupy the outlying sections. This difference, which is greater at the time of the first quiz than at a later time, is also influenced by a natural division between groups, such as an aisle or a few empty seats or by pillars, and by the degree in which the course is dependent on lectures. Frequent small sectional and laboratory meetings tend to reduce the difference,

which appears to be dependent upon the position of the student with reference to the rest of the group.

Now there are three factors directly related to the distance between auditor and speaker which might tend, in a large group, to bring about the differences of performance which we have found. In the first place, there is a difference in the perceptual factors dependent upon the distance of the student from the lecture-desk.

In the second place, there is a difference in the direction of attention resulting from the distance of the student from the lecture-desk. Our results suggest that there are three zones in which the direction of attention changes. We have found, for example, that, on the whole, individuals sitting very near the lecturer have lower averages than those a little further removed. In these cases, it is not at all impossible that the attention of the student is taken up with a variety of irrelevant details. That is to say, there are facial changes in the speaker, idiosyncrasies of clothing and of gesture, and a host of other items that thrust themselves upon the attention of those near at hand. Unessential details of the apparatus are also a source of distraction. Further back, these details are lost and here, curiously enough, the highest averages are generally to be found. This group is in the best position for attention to the meaning and the sequence of the discourse. At the rear, still another situation appears. We have already indicated that here the perceptual processes may be at fault. This undoubtedly leads to a frequent shifting of attention from the lecture. It seems, then, that there may be an optimal distance at which the perceptual and attentive factors are the very best. In addition to these facts, lecturers differ in the amount of perceptual detail presented which is apt to draw attention. Lecture-rooms differ, also, in the distance between the lecture platform and the first row of seats. Furthermore, some lecture sections make a practice of leaving two or three vacant rows at the front. All of these factors would bear a direct relation to the steadiness and the direction of attention elicited.

There is still another factor which may account for the discrepancy of performance between groups near to and remote from the lecturer. This factor is a result of the kind of instruction which students directly or indirectly give themselves and it is doubtless dependent, in large measure, upon the factors which we have already discussed. Among students sitting near a lecturer, this instruction may take either of two forms. The student may, in a large course, congratulate himself on having a fortunate location and so make it a means of getting all that goes on; or he may be subject to a negative instruction expressed in

the words: "I am near the front. It will be so easy to get everything that I need not exert myself." As regards the group in the center, we find that it is again in an optimal position; these individuals are not near enough to be cognizant of everything, relevant and irrelevant, that is going on; and neither are they so far away as to be in doubt. At the extreme rear, however, there are, again, two kinds of instruction. Some individuals, appreciating the fact that they are working under a handicap, realize that they must give special attention, if they are to maintain their standard of work. The statistical fact that there are about as many high grades at the rear as there are low grades suggests not only that perceptual and attentional factors need not be determinative; but that this kind of instruction plays a major part, especially after the first quiz, when a low grade adds an incentive to improvement. On the other hand, there is a group of individuals who take the negative instruction that since they have been placed where they cannot see well or hear they will give up the effort. Once again, the statistical fact that the low averages in the rear are due not so much to a general lowering of the grades as to a larger number of excessively low grades suggests that this instruction is too often taken.

But when we have made due allowance for such physical factors as distance and intervening objects, factors which directly bear upon the adequacy of perception and the degree and steadiness of attention, there still remains a difference in performance to be accounted for. The fact that the low grades of a small group may exactly coincide in place with the high grades of a large group in the same lecture-room suggests that there is a factor directly dependent upon the group itself. Now it is a commonplace observation that individuals in the periphery of a large crowd are apt to be restless and inattentive to whatever may be attracting the interest of the main group. That is to say, physical compactness and the interest and activities of a group polarized toward the speaker tend to knit together the main body of an audience in a way that is not possible for individuals seated near the borders of the group. That this factor of social integration plays a large part is indicated by the effect of aisles or other marks of separation, by the effect of a dialectic or informal mode of address, by the decrease in the differences between the optimal region and the peripheral regions as the semester goes on and as social integration becomes presumably greater, and finally, by the fact that relatively low grades always come from the periphery of a group, no matter how small or how large,—within the limits of the audiences here investigated,—the lecture group may be.

We are justified, it seems, in speaking of the topography of the

audience where heights and depths are measured by degrees of social integration and hence amounts of individual achievement. If our tabulations represent the facts, a typical audience could be represented as in Figure VIII where the lines represent levels of performance or degrees of achievement (expressed in numerical grades) and thus degrees of social integration. That is to say, a lecture audience is a polarized audience with reference to the speaker; but it is also integrated with respect to itself.

Our investigation has shown, in fine, that there is a well-marked variation in academic grades which is not due to a difference in mental ability or to other factors referable to the individual auditors. Neither is the variation due entirely to the distance of the auditors from the speaker. On the other hand, it does seem to be directly dependent upon position with reference to the total group. That is to say, when due allowance has been made for the factors mentioned above, and for the resulting mental organizations, a residual variation seems essentially to rest upon the varying degrees of social integration among the members of the group.




FIGURE VIII

Topographic chart representing the approximate lines of performance of an audience early in the semester. Aisles or other obstructions would materially affect the "social gradients."

184. The Effect of an Audience on a Mental-Motor Process¹

The test used was the eye-hand co-ordination test of Koerth. Briefly, the test is to hold a flexible pointer on a revolving target. The target is on a disc which revolves at the rate of one revolution per second. The disc is electrically wired so that if the pointer is held continually on the target for one complete revolution of the disc, a counter will indicate 10. Twenty revolutions or seconds constitute a trial and a perfect score is 200.

Twenty freshmen boys, one sophomore boy and one junior boy, acted as observers. The small audience consisted of from four to eight upper classmen and graduate students. There was always an approximately equal number of men and women in the group. The subjects were not acquainted with any members of the audience.

Each observer practiced in the presence of the experimenter twenty trials a day. His learning curve was plotted each day and when for two consecutive days there was no general rise in the curve it was considered that O was about as expert as he would ever be. This is probably an accurate criterion of complete mastery of the task as the learning of eye-hand co-ordination is very rapid, the learning curve showing an early abrupt ascension. When it thus seemed that O had attained his maximum efficiency, the audience was admitted. But on the day that O performed before his audience, he was required to do five trials under the usual experimental conditions, just prior to the introduction of the spectators.

The audience was essentially a passive one. Its members seated themselves in a semi-circle in front of O, who was standing at his accustomed place for the carrying out of the experiment. O was told that here was a number of individuals who wished to observe him follow the target. Unknown to O, the spectators had been asked to intently watch him but not to make a sufficient distraction by means of noises, laughing, or talking to forcibly draw his attention from the experiment. Nearly every observer displayed various signs of confusion and uneasiness, but no attempt was made to study these. Ten trials were done in the presence of the onlookers.

It is seen that 18 of the 22 individuals or 81.8 per cent had a higher average for the ten scores in the presence of an audience than for the highest ten consecutive scores when working alone. Sixteen or 72.7

¹ Reprinted by permission from L. E. Travis "Effect of a Small Audience upon Eye-Hand Co-ordination" *J. Abn. & Soc. Psy.* 1925-26: XX: pp. 142-43; 144; 146.

per cent obtained their highest scores while working in the presence of the audience; 3 or 13.6 per cent had scores during the performance in the presence of the audience that were equal to the highest obtained when working alone; and 3 or 13.6 per cent had scores in the presence of spectators which were below the highest attained when working alone.

By way of summary, it seems legitimate to conclude that there is an indication of superior eye-hand co-ordination among the subjects tested in a social situation. Statistically considered the degree of superiority is not sufficient to be very reliable. Yet a study of individual performances leaves no doubt as to the fact that the influence of the audience materially raises the score.

185. How to Render an Audience Suggestible ¹

The first method is that of avoiding suspicion or securing the confidence of the audience. The presence of suspicion renders all approximation to suggestion impossible, for the subject is not only critical, but is hypercritical of every idea presented. There is no confidence felt in the conclusions or conceptions affirmed, and no tendency to follow out the actions proposed. There are some persons who by their very presence beget confidence, and others lack this power, and are never able to acquire it.

Thus, Mark Antony banished suspicion and secured the confidence of the Roman populace:

I come not, friends to steal away your hearts:
I am no orator, as Brutus is,
But, as you know me all, a plain, blunt man,
That love my friend; and that they know full well
That gave me public leave to speak of him.
For I have neither wit, nor words, nor worth,
Action, nor utterance, nor the power of speech,
To stir men's blood: I only speak right on:
I tell you that, which you yourself do know,
Show you sweet Cæsar's wounds, poor, poor, dumb mouths
And bid them speak for me; but were I Brutus, etc.

The second device to be mentioned is that of AUTHORITY, and is one that appears to be a contradiction of the first, but is in reality

¹ From W. D. Scott, *Psychology of Public Speaking*, pp. 161; 162-64; 165; 166-69. Published by Noble and Noble. Used by permission.

supplementary to it. A man who is regarded by his audience as one speaking with authority presents his ideas, and they are accepted without question, and in so far as they fail to awaken a due amount of questioning and criticism we have an example of suggestion. His conclusions are accepted as valid and his proposed lines of action are carried out without any hesitation or criticism by those for whom he stands as absolute authority.

In order that a speaker may have a maximum effect upon his audience, his coming should be well heralded in advance. He should be looked upon as the man who is leading his fellows in the subject upon which he is to speak. Formality also has a part in spreading the mantle of authority over a speaker. The influence of the court trappings upon the populace of a monarchy is a fact with meaning. The word of the president is enforced by his office. The decrees of the court are made more significant by the grandeur of the costume of the judge and the formality of the delivery. The speaker usually finds that his words have more power when he is introduced to his audience in a dignified way, and when his costume and appearance are such that the respect, if not the awe, of the audience is thereby enhanced.

The third method to be mentioned of securing suggestibility is that of repetition. An idea which upon its first presentation does not meet with acceptance may be more acceptable upon its second and third presentation.

The fourth method to be presented for inducing suggestibility is the use of figures of speech, by means of which the conception or conclusion may be presented in such a suggestive way that it disarms opposition. Of all the figures of speech that may be thus used the most effective seems to be the metaphor.

The last method to be mentioned for inducing suggestibility may be called *INDIRECT SUGGESTION*. By this is meant the process by which a speaker suggests the conclusion or action in an indirect way and so leads the hearer to come to the desired conclusion before it is expressed by the speaker, and when the point is asserted the hearer receives it as a confirmation of the conclusion which he had already formed in his own mind. A conclusion or impression thus formed meets with no opposition, is received uncritically, and is a most powerful form of suggestion.

One of the best illustrations of this method of indirect suggestion is found in Mark Antony's address over the body of Julius Cæsar. In this address Mark Antony desired to have the populace come to

a particular conclusion and to pursue a definite line of action. He was not allowed to express this conclusion or to advise the action, but in an indirect way he accomplished both and with astounding success. The following quotation from this address will illustrate the point:

Ant. Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears;

I come to bury Cæsar, not to praise him.

The evil that men do lives after them,

The good is oft interred with their bones:

So let it be with Cæsar. The noble Brutus

Hath told you, Cæsar was ambitious:

If it were so, it was a grievous fault,

And grievously hath Cæsar answer'd it.

Here, under leave of Brutus and the rest,

(For Brutus is an honorable man,

So are they all honorable men),

Come I to speak in Cæsar's funeral.

He was my friend, faithful and just to me:

But Brutus says, he was ambitious;

And Brutus is an honorable man.

He hath brought many captives home to Rome,

Whose ransoms did the general coffers fill.

Did this in Cæsar seem ambitious?

When the poor have cried, Cæsar hath wept;

Ambition should be made of sterner stuff;

Yet Brutus says, he was ambitious;

And Brutus is an honorable man.

You all did see that on the Lupercal

I thrice presented him a kingly crown,

Which he did thrice refuse. Was that ambition?

Yet Brutus says, he was ambitious;

And, sure, he is an honorable man.

I speak not to disprove what Brutus spoke,

But here I am to speak what I do know.

You all did love him once, not without cause;

What cause withholds you, then, to mourn for him?

O judgment! thou art fled to brutish beasts,

And men have lost their reason.—Bear with me;

My heart is in the coffin there with Cæsar,

And I must pause till it come back to me.

First Cit. Methinks there is much reason in his sayings.

Second Cit. If thou consider rightly of the matter,

Cæsar hath had great wrong.

Third Cit.

Has he, masters?

I fear, there will a worse come in his place.

Fourth Cit. Mark'd ye his words? He would not take the crown.

Therefore 'tis certain, he was not ambitious.

First Cit. If it be found so, some will dear abide it.

Second Cit. Poor soul, his eyes are red as fire with weeping.

Third Cit. There's not a nobler man in Rome than Antony.

Fourth Cit. Now mark him; he begins again to speak.

Ant. But yesterday, the word of Cæsar might

Have stood against the world; now, lies he there,

And none so poor to do him reverence.

O masters! If I were dispos'd to stir

Your hearts and minds to mutiny and rage,

I should do Brutus wrong, and Cassius wrong,

Who, you all know, are honorable men.

I will not do them wrong; I rather choose

To wrong the dead, to wrong myself, and you,

Than I will wrong such honorable men, etc.

The peculiarity of this address is that the desired conclusion and action were not affirmed at all, while in most instances in which this method is employed the mind of the hearer is prepared for the announcement of the conclusion, as was done by Mark Antony, and then after the conclusion is already fairly well formed in the minds of the hearers, it is affirmed in unequivocal terms by the speaker.

186. Advantages and Methods of Changing an Audience into a Crowd ¹

Every audience is either a heterogeneous or homogeneous crowd.

The orator's influence is in direct proportion to the homogeneity of the audience. The orator who is able to weld his audience into a homogeneous crowd has already won his hardest fight. *The difficult task is not to convince and sway the crowd, but to create it.* As a crowd exists only when there is a felt community of experience and purpose, the orator before his audience may assume a certain degree of uniformity of experience, but he must state their problems, aspirations, and purposes in such a manner that each will feel that that which is said appeals to all in the same way and that it is but the expression of the purpose and ideas of each. Thus I as a member of a crowd not only feel that the speaker is presenting my purpose correctly, but in addition to that I feel that each member of the audience is having an experience prac-

¹ From W. D. Scott, *Psychology and Public Speaking*, pp. 179; 180-83. Published by Noble and Noble. Used by permission.

tically identical with mine. It is this feeling of identity of thought in the mind of each present that constitutes the crowd.

There are certain well-established methods of securing homogeneity in a group of individuals. One of the most helpful methods is to get the audience to sit close together. It is easy to speak to a packed house, but it would take a Demosthenes to make an impression when separated from his audience by a yawning abyss of empty seats. Five hundred people scattered over an auditorium which seats three thousand can scarcely be welded into a homogeneous audience, while the same individuals crowded into a room which is intended but for four hundred are easily changed into a psychological crowd. This fact forces itself on all public speakers and leads them to attempt to have only certain groups of seats occupied and preferably the front ones in order that the vacant ones may not form a barrier between the speaker and the hearers. The touching of elbows adds to the consciousness of the presence of others in a way that cannot be secured in any other way.

The second method for organizing a homogeneous crowd is that of the ritual. Here all the members perform the same acts, all rise and sit together, all read or recite the same formulae, etc. This identity in act and in expression of thought serves to impress upon each a consciousness of the unity of the group and is a method employed from primeval times. The singing is frequently an important part of the ritual, and is the particular form most employed in America. Perhaps our most frequent example of the ideal psychological or homogeneous crowd is found in "revivals," and a revival meeting without much singing would be a novelty. Many of our most effective "revivalists" have a knack of making all take part in the singing. "Let everybody join heartily in the singing" is a stock expression with such leaders.

The hymns sung are not directly a form of worship at all. The sentiment expressed is of minor significance, if only the rhythm is pronounced and has a "swing" to it that absorbs the attention and welds all who sing into a homogeneous group.

A third method of creating a crowd is to get all the audience to cheer during the first part of the performance. One of the usual methods of securing such cheering is to have the speaker introduced in such a way that he will be applauded as he steps forth to speak. Another favorite method is to begin by telling a funny story. It does not seem to matter what sort of story it is just so it "brings down the house." Another method and one more frequently employed in operas than on the lecture platform is to have the performer enter in a more or less formal

and impressive manner just as he is to begin his performance. Under such conditions the applause seems to be greater than when the performer has been visible for some length of time before he is presented to the audience. The applause is similar in effect to that arising under ritual methods, but perhaps more effective, inasmuch as the applause seems to be more of a spontaneous expression. Furthermore, the unity of a crowd consists more in identity of feeling than of ideas, and hence the applause, which expresses feeling, is more effective in giving a consciousness of crowd-unity than is the ritual which expresses rather the unity of ideas.

A fourth method of welding heterogeneous individuals into a homogeneous audience is by the presentation of common ideas. Such ideas should be saturated with feeling and must be recognized as universal ideas which will impress all the individuals in the same way. Among such ideas which are frequently used might be mentioned the following: Freedom, liberty, equality, honest labor, character, culture, manhood, chivalry, bravery, industry, liberality, brotherhood of man, Christianity, salvation; also such personages as Moses, Christ, Paul, Washington, Lincoln, etc. Such ideas act as a shibboleth and add a feeling of unity of thought. Those ideas are not abstractions, but are ideas closely connected with historical events or with our personal experiences, and hence are valuable in developing the crowd consciousness.

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What are the conditions for the formation of an audience?
2. Name and discuss briefly the "dispositions" essential to the formation of the audience.
3. Why is it impossible for a speaker to have an audience of a multi-language group? What kind of crowd might there be for such a group?
4. What are the most distinct effects of polarization in the audience?
5. In what way does the speaker become a social object?
6. Why does the successful public speaker use the following techniques in addressing his audience?
 - a) At the outset play upon the common platitudes upon which all agree;
 - b) Relate popular and humorous stories, especially in the early stages of his speech;
 - c) Make each individual feel that he is speaking directly to him;
 - d) Avoid statistics and objective proof;

- e) Instead, use concrete, human-interest stuff (stories, etc.);
 - f) Employ the stereotypes of *Home, Father, Mother, the Church, Our Country, Justice, Liberty, Freedom, Washington, Lincoln*, etc.
7. What factors, aside from subject matter, are important in successful public speaking?
 8. What did Griffith find as to the configuration of students in a classroom in terms of ability and performance? Explain.
 9. What elements in an audience would be the first to feel the change from an audience to a crowd? Discuss in view of Griffith's paper, in reference to "dispositions," etc.
 10. Trace Mark Antony's technique in changing the attitudes and behavior of the Roman populace from one of antagonism to Caesar to one of sympathy and friendliness.
 11. Why is it essential to change an audience into a crowd if one wishes to alter fundamental attitudes in any profound manner? Illustrate such a change.
 12. What is the "psychology" of inviting a scattered audience forward to fill up the front rows of a hall in solid array of persons?
 13. Why is it more difficult to address 100 persons in a hall that will seat 1000 than it is to address the same 100 persons in a room which seats only 75 or 80 people?
 14. What is the "psychology" of the raised platform from which the speaker addresses the audience?
 15. What effect have parliamentary rules in deliberative assemblies?
 16. Why do many students object to the so-called socialized recitation?
 17. Why are lecture courses often more popular with students than small classes using the discussion method of teaching?
 18. What is the merit of an open public forum?
 19. Under what circumstances may a public forum change into a crowd?
 20. How does a radio audience differ from other audiences?
- B. Topics for Class Reports
1. Report on Hamilton's paper on theater audiences. (Cf. bibliography.)
 2. Report on Howard's paper on the spectator. (Cf. bibliography.)
 3. Report on Burnham's paper on the influence of the group on mental work. (Cf. bibliography.)
 4. Report on Beuick's paper on radio broadcasting and social response, (Cf. bibliography.)
- C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers
1. The Changes in the Forms of Audiences through the Motion Picture and the Radio.
 2. The Psychology of the Theater Audience.
 3. The Psychological Influences of Audiences on Speakers and Actors.

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CHAPTER XXIV

MENTAL EPIDEMICS

I. INTRODUCTION

The extreme forms of crowd behavior may be called mental epidemics or psychological contagions. The crowd easily changes into the mob. With the more violent expressions found in an intense crowd, or in a mob, the release of repressions goes on rapidly. Every age and people seem to experience these more extreme forms of crowd behavior. And in the earlier writers on crowd psychology the tendency was to lay down a set of universal laws of this action. If we accept the standpoint of the present volume, however, we shall see that a purely psychological explanation is not adequate. While there are doubtless many features in common in all violent crowds, each expression of crowdish manner must be studied in the light of its social and cultural setting as well as in terms of the psychological changes in the individuals who make up the particular crowd. In short, we shall have to deal again not with one but with three variables, the individual, the culture setting, and the social interaction or group situation, if we are to comprehend the full meaning of mental contagions throughout history.

In the present chapter selections have been made of historical incidents from the Middle Ages to the present day. Examples might have been chosen from primitive peoples and from classical or biblical literature. The crowd situations which developed in Athens are known to us all. So, too, the crowd phenomena in the treatment of the prophets in the Old Testament and the mobs that cried of Jesus "Crucify Him" and the crowds which harassed Paul are equally familiar to us. But for our purposes we have chosen a series of instances of mental epidemics of medieval and modern periods, which we may describe as the more violent sorts of crowd behavior. These have a spread over a territory and have persisted

for a certain period of time. Yet they did not become formalized into institutions.

The opening selection from Sidis reviews briefly the place which suggestion and social pressure play in crowd phenomena. Sidis believes that the personality, being determined largely by social influences, is throughout highly suggestible. By translating his terms into present-day psychology, we can see that his point of view is akin to that of Scott and especially Martin cited in Chapter XXII. Sidis wisely appreciates the place which culture patterns, customs and codes of society, play in fostering crowd behavior and mental epidemics.

The second selection from Sidis lists the best-known examples of crowd contagions throughout later Medieval and Modern historical periods. Of the first period, the Medieval, only two short examples are given, the Crusades, especially the curious Children's Crusade, and the Flagellants. One may consult Sidis and especially Mackay for further illustrations for this period.

At the outset of the Modern period there was an outbreak of demonology or witchcraft mania which swept over all Europe. Here upon the basis of the Christian dogmas about Satan and his powers, all of Europe seemed for a time filled with delusions of persecution and other paranoid types of thought. This touched both Catholic and Protestant countries and reached all social classes from serf and peasant to learned doctor and nobleman.

Within a century speculative manias being to appear in northern Europe. In Holland one of the most curious types of speculative crazes occurred, the whole thing revolving about the buying and selling of tulip bulbs. This was perhaps the beginning of that series of speculative manias which reach down to our own time. As the Middle Ages was culturally marked by the Christian doctrines, so the Modern period is marked by the capitalistic thesis, of which desire for profits looms large. The speculative tendency, the primitive belief in luck, comes into great prominence and from the 17th century on to the latest boom of Florida land and Nevada goldfields, the interest in pecuniary speculation is omnipresent in the areas affected by the capitalistic order of society.

The Mississippi Bubble is a classic illustration of crowd behavior. The rather mild-mannered and keen John Law was largely the vic-

tim of circumstances. This case shows the craze of wealth, of the desire to get something for nothing which the present writer believes is very strong in all peoples, certainly in those in our Occidental cultures. It shows furthermore how the masses project upon a leader qualities almost divine. The veneration accorded Law during the halcyon days of the Mississippi company in Paris indicate the mad extremes to which the populace will go under the influence of social stimulation and emotion.

The selection from Anthony from the life of Catherine the Great gives us a picture of mob behavior in which there is a conflict between scientific procedures in medicine and religious superstition of the masses. This sort of crowd situation may be duplicated almost in our own time. One need hardly mention the crowdish attitudes of those organizations which oppose vivisection, vaccination and the teaching of the theory of biological evolution in our public schools.

While the speculative manias loom large in the last three hundred years, religious interest has not completely disappeared. In fact, as Max Weber and Tawney have shown, there is no genuine conflict between Protestant dogmas and capitalism. Hence, religious concern may exist independently but alongside of pecuniary interests in the Occidental peoples. While there were religious manias during the Middle Ages such as the Crusades, the Dancing Mania and the Flagellants, with the coming of the Reformation there was an outburst of religious expression in which the most violent and extreme crowd phenomena were witnessed. The behavior of such divergent sects of Germany as the Anabaptists, the rise of Methodism in England, and the Edwards and Whitefield revivals are cases in point.

Miss Cleveland's paper presents some of the crowd behavior seen in a backwoods revival in the early nineteenth century in the United States. This outburst of religious expression can only be understood, however, in terms of the whole historical setting of the time and place. To secure the more complete picture the student should read the full cultural history of the period. The material here given is only illustrative of the psychological phase.

The interest in the El Dorados of the world has always been noteworthy. The discovery of gold in the New World led to feverish search for gold both in North and South America. So, too, in the American period, the finding of gold at Sutter's Mill, produced a

mad rush to the Pacific coast of thousands upon thousands of our population then largely located east of the Mississippi. The selection from Cleland shows the beginning of the epidemic in California itself with some notes on the mania as it reached the eastern half of our country.

In our own time we have had the oil booms of Oklahoma and more recently the land boom of Florida. The paper by Shelby gives a picture of some aspects of the crowd behavior in the latter instance.

The final paper of the chapter is selected from Ross's well-known discussion of counter-agents to mob mindedness. He shows the importance of intellectual training, of stable social tradition and custom, especially the existence of the strong ties of family, morality and religious practice. One may infer, I think, from his discussion that periods of change and chaos like the present are much more apt to see violent crowd situations than the more conservative, unchanging societies of other historical periods. The Crusades, for instance, constituted one of the first expressions of coming change in the medieval life. The speculative manias arose during the great commercial outburst following the discovery of the New World and the establishment of commercial contacts with the Orient. Today, while the contiguous crowd may not develop any more frequently than before, certainly the existence of easy means of communication, like the press, makes possible the building up of crowd attitudes and the spread of various mental manias over wide areas and through various classes of people who are not in physical proximity. We shall examine some features of this latter sort of collective behavior in subsequent chapters.

II. MATERIALS

187. Mental Epidemics, Suggestion, and Social Organization ¹

Suggestibility is the cement of the herd, the very soul of the primitive social group. Social life presupposes suggestion. No society without suggestibility. Man is a social animal, no doubt; but *he is social because he is suggestible*. Suggestibility, however, requires disaggregation of consciousness; hence, society presupposes a cleavage of the mind.

¹ Reprinted by permission from B. Sidis, *The Psychology of Suggestion*, pp. 310-12. New York. D. Appleton & Company, 1898.

it presupposes a plane of cleavage between the differentiated individuality and the undifferentiated reflex consciousness, the indifferent subwaking self. *Society and mental epidemics are intimately related; for the social gregarious self is the suggestible subconscious self.*

The very organization of society keeps up the disaggregation of consciousness. The rules, the customs, the laws of society are categorical, imperative, absolute. One must obey them on pain of death. Blind obedience is a social virtue. But blind obedience is the very essence of suggestibility, the constitution of the disaggregated subwaking self. Society by its nature, by its organization, tends to run riot in mobs, manias, crazes, and all kinds of mental epidemics.

With the development of society the economical, political, and religious institutions become more and more differentiated; their rules, laws, by-laws, and regulations become more and more detailed, and tend to cramp the individual, to limit, to constrain his voluntary movements, to contract his field of consciousness, to inhibit all extraneous ideas—in short, to create conditions requisite for a disaggregation of consciousness. If, now, something striking fixes the attention of the public—a brilliant campaign, a glittering holy image, or a bright “silver dollar”—the subwaking social self, the demon of the demos, emerges, and society is agitated with crazes, manias, panics, and mental plagues of all sorts.

With the growth and civilization of society, institutions become more stable, laws more rigid, individuality is more and more crushed out, and the poor, barren subwaking self is exposed in all its nakedness to the vicissitudes of the external world. In civilized society laws and regulations press on the individual from all sides. Whenever one attempts to rise above the dead level of commonplace life, instantly the social screw begins to work, and down is brought upon him the tremendous weight of the socio-static press, and it squeezes him back into the mire of mediocrity, frequently crushing him to death for his bold attempt. Man's relations in life are determined and fixed for him, he is told how he must put on his tie, and the way he must wear his coat; such should be the fashion of his dress on this particular occasion, and such should be the form of his hat; here must he nod his head, put on a solemn air; and there take off his hat, make a profound bow, and display a smile full of delight. Personality is suppressed by the rigidity of social organization; the cultivated, civilized individual is an automaton, a mere puppet.

Under the enormous weight of the socio-static press, under the crushing pressure of economical, political, and religious regulations there is

no possibility for the individual to determine his own relations in life; there is no possibility for him to move, live, and think freely; the personal self sinks, the suggestible, subconscious, social, impersonal self rises to the surface, gets trained and cultivated, and becomes the hysterical actor in all the tragedies of historical life.

188. A List of European Mental Epidemics: Medieval and Modern ¹

Pilgrimage epidemic,	1000 to 1095
Crusade epidemic—Eastern and Western Crusades, Children's crusade,	1095 to 1270
Flagellant epidemic	1260 to 1348
Black Death and Antisemitic mania	1348
Dancing mania—St. John's dance,	1374 to the end of the 15th century
St. Vitus's dance,	1418
Tarantism	1470
Demonophobia or witchcraft mania	1488 to end of 17th cen- tury
Speculative mania—Tulipomania	1634
Mississippi Scheme	1717
South Sea Bubble	1720
and Business Bubble	to our own times

189. Medieval Mental Epidemics: Crusades and Flagellants ²

The most striking phenomenon in medieval history is that of the Crusades, which agitated European nations for about two centuries, and cost them about seven million men. People were drawn by an irresistible longing toward the Holy Sepulchre, which fascinated their mental gaze, just as the butterfly is blindly drawn toward the candle.

¹ Reprinted by permission from B. Sidis, *The Psychology of Suggestion*, p. 349. New York. D. Appleton & Company, 1898.

² *Ibid.* pp. 322; 323; 326. New York. D. Appleton & Company, 1898.

This attraction of devout Christians by the Holy Sepulchre manifested itself in pilgrimages, which at first were rare, but gradually spread, and became a universal mania. Bishops abandoned their dioceses, princes their dominions, to visit the tomb of Christ.

Swarms of men of different races, with their wives and daughters, with infants taken from the cradle, and grandsires on the verge of the grave, and many sick and dying, came from every direction, all of them ready to be led to the conquest of the Holy Land. Peter the Hermit, Walter the Penniless, and Gottschalk became the heroes, the ringleaders of the mobs, which were cut to pieces before they reached Palestine. Then followed an army led by pilgrim princes, who succeeded in conquering the Holy Land, and founded there a Christian kingdom; but this kingdom was unstable, and it fell again and again into the hands of the unbelievers, and crusade after crusade was organized, each being a weaker copy of the preceding, until 1272, when the crusade epidemic was completely at an end.

The abnormal suggestibility of medieval society was most clearly seen in the crusades of children. About 1212, between the fourth and fifth crusades, Stephen, a shepherd boy at Cloyes, in imitation of his elders, began to preach to children of a holy war. Stephen soon became the rage of the day; the shrines were abandoned to listen to his words. He even worked miracles. The appeal of Stephen to the children to save the Holy Sepulchre aroused in the young a longing to join him in the holy pilgrimage.

The crusade epidemic rapidly spread among the little ones. Everywhere there arose children of ten years, and some even as young as eight, who claimed to be prophets sent by Stephen in the name of God. When the "prophets" had gathered sufficient numbers, they began to march through towns and villages. Like a true epidemic, this migration-mania spared neither boys nor girls; according to the statements of the chroniclers, there was a large proportion of little girls in the multitude of hypnotized children.

The king, Philip Augustus, by the advice of the University of Paris, issued an edict commanding the children to return to their homes; but the religious suggestions were stronger than the king's command, and the children continued to assemble unimpeded. Fathers and mothers brought to bear upon the young all the influence they had to check this dangerous migration-mania, but of no avail. Persuasions, threats, punishments were as futile as the king's command. Bolts and bars could not hold the children. If shut up, they broke through doors and windows, and rushed to take their places in the processions which they saw pass-

ing by. If the children were forcibly detained, so that escape was impossible, they pined away like migratory birds kept in seclusion.

No sooner did the crusade epidemic abate than another one took its place, that of the flagellants. In 1260 the flagellants appeared in Italy, and from there spread all over Europe. "An unexampled spirit of remorse," writes a chronicler, "suddenly seized on the minds of the people. The fear of Christ fell on all; noble and ignoble, old and young, and even children of five, marched on the streets with no covering but a scarf round their waists. They each had a scourge of leather thongs, which they applied to their limbs with sighs and tears with such violence that blood flowed from their wounds."

190. The Witchcraft Mania ¹

About the end of the fifteenth century the germs of a fearful epidemic got lodged within the subconscious mind of Western humanity. Demonophobia, the fear of the demons, the fear of witchcraft, got possession of the mind of European nations. Whole populations seemed to have been driven crazy with the fear of the devil. For more than a century and a half did the epidemic of demonophobia rage with an over-whelming fury. No one was exempt from this malady of truly infernal origin. The old and the young, the ignorant and the learned, were stricken by it alike.

Europe seemed to have become a vast asylum of paranoiacs, of monomaniacs, possessed with the fear of persecution by infernal agencies. Weak-minded persons, old, helpless, demented men and women, hysterical subjects, and insane patients with a disposition to form delusions were accused or accused themselves, of having entered into intimate relationship with imps, incubi, succubi, and even of having had direct intercourse with the archfiend himself. So strong were the suspicions of this peculiar acute form of social *paranoia persecutoria* that neither beauty nor tender age could serve as protection.

The pope, Innocent VIII, in his bull of 1488 made a strong appeal to his Catholic fold to rescue the Church of Christ from the power of Satan. He preached a crusade against the atrocious, unpardonable sin of witchcraft. The land must be purified of this great evil. Those servants of the devil, the sorcerers and witches commit the horrible crime of having intercourse with impure spirits; moreover, they delight in mischief and evildoing; they blast the corn of the field, the herbs of

¹ Reprinted by permission from B. Sidis, *The Psychology of Suggestion*, pp. 331-33; 334-36. New York. D. Appleton & Company, 1898.

the orchard, the grapes of the garden, and the fruits of the trees; they afflict with diseases man and beast. Sorcery must be wiped out from the face of the earth.

The appeal of the pope made a strong impression on the minds of the people, and the malady of demonophobia was fairly under way. On all sides men sprang up who made it their sole business to discover and burn sorcerers and witches.

Pious and zealous inquisitors set at once to their deadly work. Cumanus, in Italy, burned forty-one poor women in one province alone; and Sprenger, in Germany, burned numbers of them; his victims amounted to as many as nine hundred in a year. The German commissioners appointed by the pope, Innocent VIII, condemned to the stake upward of three thousand victims.

The new commissioners for the extermination of witchcraft appointed by each successive pope still further increased the virulence of the epidemic. One was appointed by Alexander VI in 1494, another by Leo X in 1521, and a third by Adrian VI in 1522. The epidemic of demonophobia increased from year to year, and the spirit of persecution grew in vigor and intensity. In Geneva alone five hundred persons were burned in the years 1515 and 1516. Bartholomew de Spina informs us that in the year 1524 no less than a thousand persons suffered death for witchcraft in the district of Como, and that for several years afterward the average number of victims exceeded one hundred annually. One inquisitor, Remigius, took great credit to himself for having during fifteen years convicted and burned nine hundred. The inquisitor of a rural township in Piedmont burned the victims so plentifully and so fast that there was not a family in the place which had not its dead to mourn.

The Reformation helped little to alleviate this witchcraft mania; on the contrary, it only served to intensify this truly demoniacal malady. The spirit of persecution was even stronger in Protestant than in Catholic countries. In Luther's *Table Talk* we find the following item:

"August 25, 1538. The conversation fell upon witches, who spoil milk, eggs, and butter in farmyards. Dr. Luther said: '*I should have no compassion on these witches; I would burn all of them.*'"

From the Continent the epidemic spread to England. In 1562 the statute of Elizabeth declared witchcraft as a crime of the highest magnitude. An epidemic terror of witchcraft seized on the English mind, and this epidemic spread and grew in virulence with the growth of Puritanism.

In Scotland the germs of the epidemic were diligently cultivated by

the preachers of the Reformation. In 1563 the ninth parliament of Queen Mary passed an act that decreed the punishment of death against witches and consulters of witches. The Scotch nation was smitten with an epidemic fear of the devil and his infernal agents. Sorcerers and witches were hunted out and tortured with a truly demoniacal cruelty. As a fair example of the cruelties and tortures practised on the poor unfortunates convicted of witchcraft may be taken the case of Dr. Fian, a petty schoolmaster of Tranent.

Dr. Fian was accused of sorcery. He was arrested and put on the rack, but he would confess nothing, and held out so long unmoved that the severe tortures of the *boots* was resolved upon. He fainted away from great pain, but still no confession escaped his lips. Restoratives were then administered to him, and during the first faint gleam of returning consciousness he was prevailed upon to sign a full confession of his crime. He was then remanded to his prison, from which he managed to escape. He was soon recaptured and brought before the Court of Judiciary, James I, the demonologist, being present. Fian denied all the circumstances of the written confession which he had signed; whereupon the king, enraged at his stubborn wilfulness, ordered him once more to the torture. Dr. Fian's finger nails were riven out with pincers, and long needles thrust, their entire length, into the quick. He was then consigned again to the boots, in which he continued "so long, and abode so many blows in them that his legs were crushed and beaten together as small as might be, and the bones and flesh so bruised that the blood and marrow spouted forth in great abundance."

The social malady of demonophobia kept on growing among the Scotch, and the spirit of persecution grew in violence from year to year. From the passing of the act of Queen Mary till the accession of James to the throne of England, a period of thirty-nine years, the average number of persecutions for witchcraft in Scotland was two hundred annually, or upward of seventeen thousand victims!

191. The Tulipomania in Holland: 17th Century ¹

In 1634, the rage among the Dutch to possess tulips was so great that the ordinary industry of the country was neglected, and the population, even to its lowest dregs, embarked in the tulip trade. As the mania increased, prices augmented, until, in the year 1635, many persons were known to invest a fortune of 100,000 florins in the purchase of forty

¹ Reprinted from C. Mackay, *Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions*, Vol. I: pp. 86-87; 89-90; 90. London, 1852.

roots. It then became necessary to sell them by their weight in *perits*, a small weight less than a grain. A tulip of the species called *Admiral Liefken*, weighing 400 *perits*, was worth 4400 florins; and *Admiral Van der Eyck*, weighing 446 *perits*, was worth 1260 florins; a *Childer* of 106 *perits* was worth 1615 florins; a *Viceroy* of 400 *perits*, 3000 florins; and, most precious of all, a *Semper Augustus*, weighing 200 *perits*, was thought to be very cheap at 5500 florins. The latter was much sought after, and even an inferior bulb might command a price of 2000 florins.

The demand for tulips of a rare species increased so much in the year 1636, that regular marts for their sale were established on the Stock Exchange of Amsterdam, in Rotterdam, Haarlem, Leyden, Alkmar, Hoorn, and other towns. Symptoms of gambling now became, for the first time, apparent. The stock-jobbers, ever on the alert for a new speculation, dealt largely in tulips, making use of all the means they so well knew how to employ, to cause fluctuations in prices. At first, as in all these gambling manias, confidence was at its height, and every body gained. The tulip-jobbers speculated in the rise and fall of the tulip stocks, and made large profits by buying when prices fell, and selling out when they rose. Many individuals grew suddenly rich. A golden bait hung temptingly out before the people, and one after the other, they rushed to the tulipmarts, like flies around a honey-pot. Every one imagined that the passion for tulips would last for ever, and that the wealthy from every part of the world would send to Holland, and pay whatever prices were asked for them. The riches of Europe would be concentrated on the shores of the Zuyder Zee, and poverty banished from the favoured clime of Holland. Nobles, citizens, farmers, mechanics, seamen, footmen, maid-servants, even chimney-sweeps and old clotheswomen dabbled in tulips. People of all grades converted their property into cash, and invested it in flowers. Houses and lands were offered for sale at ruinously low prices, or assigned in payment of bargains made at the tulipmart. Foreigners became smitten with the same frenzy, and money poured into Holland from all directions. The prices of the necessities of life rose again by degrees: houses and lands, horses and carriages, and luxuries of every sort, rose in value with them, and for some months Holland seemed the very antechamber of Plutus. The operations of the trade became so extensive and so intricate, that it was found necessary to draw up a code of laws for the guidance of the dealers. Notaries and clerks were also appointed, who devoted themselves exclusively to the interests of the trade. The designation of public notary was hardly known in some towns, that of tulip-notary usurping its place. In the smaller towns, where there was

no exchange, the principal tavern was usually selected as the "show-place," where high and low traded in tulips, and confirmed their bargains over sumptuous entertainments. These dinners were sometimes attended by two or three hundred persons, and large vases of tulips, in full bloom, were placed at regular intervals upon the tables and sideboards for their gratification during the repast.

At last, however, the more prudent began to see that this folly could not last for ever.

Hundreds who, a few months previously, had begun to doubt that there was such a thing as poverty in the land, suddenly found themselves the possessors of a few bulbs, which nobody would buy, even though they offered them at one quarter of the sums they had paid for them. The cry of distress resounded everywhere, and each man accused his neighbor. The few who had contrived to enrich themselves hid their wealth from the knowledge of their fellow-citizens, and invested it in the English or other funds. Many who, for a brief season, had emerged from the humbler walks of life, were cast back into their original obscurity. Substantial merchants were reduced almost to beggary, and many a representative of a noble line saw the fortunes of his house ruined beyond redemption.

192. The Mississippi Bubble ¹

The so-called "Mississippi Scheme" was a financial plan developed by one John Law, a Scotchman, in Paris in 1717 during the regency of the Duke of Orleans. Law had acquired a great reputation as a financier already. He had improved the finances and hence the commerce of France by his establishment of a bank in 1716 which was to serve the purposes of a national banking institution. It finally became, in fact, the Royal Bank of France. Hence, when Law proposed a company for the exploitation of the French possessions west of the Mississippi River in America, the public was much interested. His success with the bank of France gave the people everywhere great confidence in his capacity to make money. The following quotations serve to illustrate crowd behavior under the stimulus of speculation and money-making.

In the end, the whole structure fell upon Law and those members

¹ Reprinted from C. Mackay, *Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions*, Vol. I, pp. 10; 12-16; 17-18; 19; 26. London, 1852.

of the royal government who had supported him, but there is no doubt, as Mackay remarks, that Law was a man of outstanding financial insight and that the craze of the populace for making money, plus the financial stupidity of the Regent, account for the whole catastrophe more than any real animus to do harm on the part of Law himself. K. Y.

He (Law) proposed to the regent (who could refuse him nothing) to establish a company that should have the exclusive privilege of trading to the great river Mississippi and the province of Louisiana, on its western bank. The country was supposed to abound in the precious metals; and the company, supported by the profits of their exclusive commerce, were to be the sole farmers of the taxes and sole coiners of money. Letters patent were issued, incorporating the company, in August 1717. The capital was divided into two hundred thousand shares of five hundred livres each, the whole of which might be paid in *billets d'état*, at their nominal value, although worth no more than a hundred and sixty livres in the market.

At the commencement of the year 1719, an edict was published, granting to the Mississippi Company the exclusive privilege of trading to the East Indies, China, and the South Seas, and to all the possessions of the French East India Company, established by Colbert. The Company, in consequence of this great increase of their business, assumed, as more appropriate, the title of Company of the Indies, and created fifty thousand new shares. The prospects now held out by Law were most magnificent. He promised a yearly dividend of two hundred livres upon each share of five hundred, which, as the shares were paid for in *billets d'état*, at their nominal value, but worth only 100 livres, was at the rate of about 120 per cent profit.

The public enthusiasm, which had been so long rising, could not resist a vision so splendid. At least three hundred thousand applications were made for the fifty thousand new shares, and Law's house in the Rue de Quincampoix was beset from morning to night by the eager applicants. As it was impossible to satisfy them all, it was, several weeks before a list of the fortunate new stockholders could be made out, during which time the public impatience rose to a pitch of frenzy. Dukes, marquises, counts, with their duchesses, marchionesses, and countesses, waited in the streets for hours every day before Mr. Law's door to know the result. At last, to avoid the jostling of the plebeian crowd, which, to the number of thousands, filled the whole thoroughfare, they took apartments in the adjoining houses, that they might be continually near the temple whence the new Plutus was diffusing

wealth. Every day the value of the old shares increased, and the fresh applications, induced by the golden dreams of the whole nation, became so numerous that it was deemed advisable to create no less than three hundred thousand new shares, at five thousand livres each, in order that the regent might take advantage of the popular enthusiasm to pay off the national debt. For this purpose, the sum of fifteen hundred millions of livres was necessary. Such was the eagerness of the nation, that thrice the sum would have been subscribed if the government had authorized it.

Law was now at the zenith of his prosperity, and the people were rapidly approaching the zenith of their infatuation. The highest and the lowest classes were alike filled with a vision of boundless wealth. There was not a person of note among the aristocracy, with the exception of the Duke of St. Simon and Marshal Villars, who was not engaged in buying or selling stock. People of every age and sex and condition in life speculated in the rise and fall of the Mississippi bonds. The Rue de Quincampoix was the grand resort of the jobbers, and it being a narrow, inconvenient street, accidents continually occurred in it, from the tremendous pressure of the crowd. Houses in it, worth, in ordinary times, a thousand livres of yearly rent, yielded as much as twelve or sixteen thousand. A cobbler, who had a stall in it, gained about two hundred livres a day by letting it out, and furnishing writing materials to brokers and their clients. The story goes, that a hunch-backed man who stood in the street gained considerable sums by lending his hump as a writing-desk to the eager speculators! The great concourse of persons who assembled to do business brought a still greater concourse of spectators. These again drew all the thieves and immoral characters of Paris to the spot, and constant riots and disturbances took place. At nightfall, it was often found necessary to send a troop of soldiers to clear the street.

Law, sensing the inconvenience of his residence, removed to the Place Vendôme, whither the crowd of *agioteurs* followed him. That spacious square soon became as thronged as the Rue de Quincampoix: from morning to night it presented the appearance of a fair. Booths and tents were erected for the transaction of business and the sale of refreshments, and gamblers with their roulette tables stationed themselves in the very middle of the place, and reaped a golden, or rather a paper, harvest from the throng. The boulevards and public gardens were forsaken; parties of pleasure took their walks in preference in the Place Vendôme, which became the fashionable lounge of the idle, as

well as the general rendezvous of the busy. The noise was so great all day, that the chancellor, whose court was situated in the square, complained to the regent and the municipality, that he could not hear the advocates. Law, when applied to, expressed his willingness to aid in the removal of the nuisance, and for this purpose entered into a treaty with the Prince de Carignan for the Hôtel de Soissons, which had a garden of several acres in the rear. A bargain was concluded, by which Law became the purchaser of the hotel at an enormous price, the prince reserving to himself the magnificent gardens as a new source of profit. They contained some fine statues and several fountains, and were altogether laid out with much taste. As soon as Law was installed in his new abode, an edict was published, forbidding all persons to buy or sell stock any where but in the gardens of the Hôtel de Soissons. In the midst, among the trees, about five hundred small tents and pavilions were erected, for the convenience of the stock-jobbers. Their various colors, the gay ribands and banners which floated from them, the busy crowds which passed continually in and out—the incessant hum of voices, the noise, the music, and the strange mixture of business and pleasure on the countenances of the throng, all combined to give the place an air of enchantment that quite enraptured the Parisians. The Prince de Carignan made enormous profits while the delusion lasted. Each tent was let at the rate of five hundred livres a month; and, as there were at least five hundred of them, his monthly revenue from this source alone must have amounted to 250,000 livres, or upwards of £10,000 sterling.

During this time, Law, the new Plutus, had become all at once the most important personage of the state. The ante-chambers of the regent were forsaken by the courtiers. Peers, judges, and bishops thronged to the Hôtel de Soissons; officers of the army and navy, ladies of title and fashion, and every one to whom hereditary rank or public employ gave a claim to precedence, were to be found waiting in his ante-chambers to beg for a portion of his India stock. Law was so pestered that he was unable to see one-tenth part of the applicants, and every manœuvre that ingenuity could suggest was employed to gain access to him. Peers, whose dignity would have been outraged if the regent had made them wait half an hour for an interview, were content to wait six hours for the chance of seeing Monsieur Law. Enormous fees were paid to his servants, if they would merely announce their names. Ladies of rank employed the blandishments of their smiles for the same object. But many of them came day after day for a fortnight before they

could obtain an audience. When Law accepted an invitation, he was sometimes so surrounded by ladies, all asking to have their names put down in his lists as shareholders in the new stock, that, in spite of his well-known and habitual gallantry, he was obliged to tear himself away *par force*. The most ludicrous stratagems were employed to have an opportunity of speaking to him. One lady, who had striven in vain during several days, gave up in despair all attempts to see him at his own house, but ordered her coachman to keep a strict watch whenever she was out in her carriage, and if he saw Mr. Law coming, to drive against a post and upset her. The coachman promised obedience, and for three days the lady was driven incessantly through the town, praying inwardly for the opportunity to be overturned. At last she espied Mr. Law, and pulling the string, called out to the coachman, "Upset us now! for God's sake, upset us now!" The coachman drove against a post, the lady screamed, the coach was overturned, and Law, who had seen the *accident*, hastened to the spot to render assistance. The cunning dame was led into the Hôtel de Soissons, where she soon thought it advisable to recover from her fright, and, after apologizing to Mr. Law, confessed her stratagem. Law smiled, and entered the lady in his books as the purchaser of a quantity of India Stock.

The price of shares sometimes rose ten or twenty per cent in the course of a few hours, and many persons in the humbler walks of life, who had risen poor in the morning, went to bed in affluence. An extensive holder of stock, being taken ill, sent his servant to sell two hundred and fifty shares, at eight thousand livres each, the price at which they were then quoted. The servant went, and, on his arrival in the Jardin de Soissons, found that in the interval the price had risen to ten thousand livres. The difference of two thousand livres on the two hundred and fifty shares, amounting to 500,000 livres, or £20,000 sterling, he very coolly transferred to his own use, and giving the remainder to his master, set out the same evening for another country.

When fortunes such as these were gained, it is no wonder that Law should have been almost worshipped by the mercurial population. Never was monarch more flattered than he was. All the small poets and *littérateurs* of the day poured floods of adulation upon him. According to them, he was the savior of the country, the tutelary divinity of France: wit was in all his words, goodness in all his looks, and wisdom in all his actions. So great a crowd followed his carriage whenever he went abroad, that the regent sent him a troop of horse as his permanent escort to clear the streets before him.

193. Crowd Behavior and Religious Superstition ¹

So it was in the city of Moscow in the autumn of 1771. For months the plague had raged and ravaged the town. The Empress had sent all the physicians she could commandeer, which meant a great many. . . . Catherine had opened hospitals for the victims of the plague. All these innovations failed to win the confidence of the terror-shaken population who had somehow got the idea that the physicians and their hospitals had brought the pest to Moscow. They fled from the medical men and gathered at the foot of the icons with their invalids. The Virgin at the Varvasky Gate became more popular than the others, and the terrible pestilence lay massed at her feet day and night. She became the worst center of contagion in the entire city, distributing the pest to hundreds of new victims every day.

The physicians were at their wits' end. They dared not take any radical steps to prevent the frightened people from doing what they pleased. The bishop of Moscow, Father Ambrosius, was an enlightened man who saw that the physicians were helpless. Relying on his authority as a priest, he resolved to adopt a desperate remedy. He had the Varvasky Virgin removed under cover of night and hidden away. When the pilgrims arrived in the early dawn, Our Lady had vanished. The panacea was gone, and Death glowered in her vacant niche. Father Ambrosius believed that the authority of the Church was enough to make these fear-driven human beings submit. They were his children who had always obeyed. He thought that, as soon as they knew that the good father had done it, they would disperse to their homes and the plague spot would be wiped out. But instead of dispersing, they were suddenly welded into a mob, a growling, threatening, creeping, blood-thirsty pack. As the menacing thing began to move, Ambrosius fled from his home into the Kremlin, and took refuge in the Donskoy Monastery. On down into the cellar he fled, hiding himself in the darkest corner he could find. The mob came after him and invaded his sacred retreat. They found him in the darkness and tore him limb from limb.

When the Empress received a report of the tragedy, she realized that the population of Moscow was out of hand. The plague raged on. While the victims multiplied, the hospitals stood empty. Riots were added to smallpox until it seemed as if the old Muscovite city must soon perish

¹ From K. Anthony, *Catherine the Great*, pp. 219-22. New York. Copyright by A. A. Knopf, Inc., 1925.

under its burden of afflictions. The Empress had but one resource left and that was a military occupation. She sent Gregory Orlov with a regiment to take charge of the town. Gregory had been vaccinated by Dimsdale three years before, and the fact that he believed himself immune gave him extraordinary courage and effectiveness on this occasion. It must be admitted that Orlov was not distinguished ordinarily for courage and initiative. His record in putting down the smallpox in Moscow is exceptional. For once he seemed to take a leaf from the book of his brother Alexei. He bullied the populace into complete submission, so that the dying could at least die quietly undisturbed by mobs and riots. He asked the physicians what they wanted to have done and dragooned the people into actual obedience. A certain German doctor is said to have furnished the sanitary ideas which Gregory Orlov put into execution and which finally helped to wipe out the plague. Whatever the scientific man may have contributed, the heroic feat of Gregory Orlov is unquestionable. For once he behaved like a fearless man and deserved his mistress's encomiums.

194. Crowd Behavior in Religious Revivals¹

The following formal letter written by a gentleman in Kentucky to his brother describes his own sensations at one of the large meetings:

The people known by the appellation of Presbyterians assembled on Friday last at Concord-meeting-house, by way of preparation for the Lord's Supper. I did not attend until the Sabbath, when I saw the ordinance administered and many people prostrate on the ground crying for mercy. I passed through the day as an impartial spectator, but frequently wrapt in amazement, involved in doubt, and anxious for certainty . . . I did not intend to return the following day. (Tormented by fears, however, he and his wife returned the following day to the meeting.) A more tremendous sight never struck the eyes of mortal man. The very clouds seemed to separate and give way to the praises of the people of God ascending to the heavens; while thousands of tongues with the sound of hallelujah seemed to roll through infinite space; while hundreds of people lay prostrate on the ground crying for mercy. Oh! my dear brother, had you been there to have seen the convulsed limbs, the apparently lifeless bodies, to all of which the distorted features exactly comported, you would have been constrained to cry out as I was obliged to do, the gods are among the people; nor was this confined to the commonality alone; but people of every description lay prostrate on the ground. There you might see the learned Pastor, the

¹ From *The Great Revival in the West, 1797-1805* by Catherine C. Cleveland, pp. 93-94; 95-96; 115-16. Copyright by the University of Chicago, 1916.

steady patriot and the obedient son crying holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty: behold the honorable matron and virtuous maiden crying with all the appearance of heart-felt distress, Jesus, thou son of the most high God, have mercy upon us. Cast your eyes a few paces farther, and there you might see the prodigal in the arms of the professed libertine, crying hosannah to God in the highest, there is no other name under heaven whereby the man can be saved, but by the name of Jesus. See the poor oppressed African with his soul liberated longing to be with his God.'

Some of those who fell had no previous warning, while others were seized by a peculiar tremor the moment before they fell. Many uttered piercing shrieks. A prickly sensation as if the hand or foot were asleep sometimes preceded the fall. An eyewitness thus described the state of those who fell:

Some have had symptoms before they fell. They have felt it in the great artery of the thighs and arms, but like a shock closed in immediately to the heart. The heart swells, liking to burst the body; occasions shortness and quickness of breath. They become motionless. The feet and hands become cold. . . . Others felt no approaching symptoms; but fall as if shot dead and do not recollect anything until they begin to recover.

Another eyewitness thus describes the falling:

The persons who are struck are generally first observed to pay close attention to the preaching; then to weep and shed tears plentifully for a while; after this a twitching or jerking seizes them, and they fall to the ground helpless, and convulsed through their whole frame as if in the agonies of death. In the beginning of this awakening, it was common for those who fell after they had been lying for a while to speak in an astonishing manner as to length of time, matter, and loudness of voice. Some of the most powerful sermons I have heard from mortals came from the mouths of persons of the above description, unable to help themselves. Some have spoken almost without cessation for the space of five hours, and some parts of the time so loud that they might be heard at a distance of a mile. It appeared as difficult for them to refrain from speaking as it would be for a person under deep bodily distress to refrain from groaning. When entreated both by ministers and people to withhold they would say they could not. Some of them would try; but, in a minute or two, it would burst forth from them like a torrent. The cry has often been so great for a while that there was no such thing as ministers being heard in preaching or exhorting. When this was the case they would stop a while till the torrent of the cry should be over. Their great cry was their guilt and danger—their hard heart—their sin and criminality—that they should die—that they should be damned forever—that God would be infinitely just in sending them directly

to hell. They would frequently cry, I deserve hell, but how can I bear it! One little boy in my congregation, one night, was crying bitterly. "O!" said he, "I am lost forever. I am going right down to hell. O, I see hell, and the breath of the Lord like a stream of brimstone kindling it."

In considering phenomena such as the revival of 1800 presented in the bodily exercises, not only the mental state of those subject to the exercises, but the atmosphere surrounding them must be borne in mind. The individual by himself and the individual as an element in a large unit, as for instance the crowd, may present two very different mental aspects. Again and again, the revival reports make mention of the deist, the scoffer, or the merely curious onlooker who was seized by the particular exercises in vogue at the meeting he chanced to attend. Drawn in spite of himself into the spirit of the hour, he reacted upon the suggestion made by the vehement preacher, the animated song, or the loud-voiced exhortation of someone who had just recovered from an attack, and fell a prey to the exercise. At a meeting in North Carolina,

several young men were struck down . . . who came there as opposers, making boasts of what they would do if any were struck down in their presence, and defying all the ministers to strike them down. . . . They appeared to be in the most agitated misery which it is impossible to conceive, or express, rolling and tumbling about for many hours in the greatest agitation, sometimes crying for mercy acknowledging the most accumulated load of guilt; then despairing to obtain mercy; then pleading again; praying for the souls of their little brothers and sisters . . . for all the world of mankind and with the greatest apparent fervency and sincerity, that none of them might be called from time, before their peace was made with the Redeemer.

195. The California Gold Rush ¹

When Marshall and Sutter became convinced that the bits of yellow metal which remained in the tail race were actually gold, they agreed together to keep the matter secret, not so much, apparently, because they wished to pre-empt the deposit, as because they feared the mining craze might carry off the needed laborers from Sutter's wheat fields, mills, and numerous other undertakings. To cover up such a discovery for any length of time was difficult; yet for nearly six weeks, few peo-

¹ From R. G. Cleland, *A History of California: The American Period*, pp. 226-28; 230; 232; 237-38; 239. Copyright 1922 by the Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

ple outside of those at the mill knew of the event. Inevitably, however, the secret at last became public. Teamsters, coming in from the outside, heard of the find and carried the news back to the coast. Mormon immigrants, many of whom worked for Sutter, spread the report among their co-religionists; and Sutter's own agent, sent to Monterey to obtain a grant or patent to the mining rights, told nearly everything he knew about the discovery.

At Monterey, on May 29th, Walter Colton, the American alcalde, made this entry in his diary:

Our town was startled out of its quiet dreams today, by the announcement that gold had been discovered on the American Fork. The men wondered and talked, and the women, too; but neither believed. The sibyls were less skeptical; they said the moon had, for several nights, appeared not more than a cable's length from the earth; that a white ram had been playing with an infant; and that an owl had rung the church bells.

On June 20th, after several other reports had been received and the alcalde himself had despatched a special investigator to the gold region, this entry was made in the same diary, showing how great an effect the excitement was already having upon the normal life of Monterey:

My messenger has returned with specimens of gold; he dismounted in a sea of upturned faces. As he drew forth the yellow lumps from his pockets, and passed them around among the eager crowd, the doubts, which had lingered till now, fled. . . . The excitement produced was intense; and many were soon busy in their hasty preparations for a departure to the mines. The family who had kept house for me caught the moving infection. Husband and wife were both packing up; the blacksmith dropped his hammer, the carpenter his plane, the mason his trowel, the farmer his sickle, the baker his loaf, and the tapster his bottle. All were off for the mines, some on horses, some on carts, and some on crutches, and one went in a litter. An American woman, who had recently established a boarding-house here, pulled up stakes, and went off before her lodgers had even time to pay their bills. Debtors ran, of course. I have only a community of women left, and a gang of prisoners with here and there a soldier, who will give his captain the slip at the first chance.

By the close of 1848 every city, large or small, from the frontiers of Missouri to the Atlantic seaboard, was affected by the California fever. Men were selling out their business, families were breaking up

their homes, officials were resigning their positions, and professional men were getting rid of their practice. Literally scores of companies and associations were being formed by persons planning to make the trip to California.

There is no way of determining, with even a fair degree of accuracy, how many persons came to California from the rest of the United States in the years immediately following the discovery of gold. The migration, however, was so stupendous as to out-rank in point of numbers anything of its kind in the nation's history, and to stand on an equal footing with some of the great world movements of population.

The ordinary means of travel employed by the emigrants was the familiar "prairie schooner." While this was the typical equipment, many of the emigrants had vehicles of other types, or employed pack animals alone. Some indeed were foolish enough to attempt the journey with wheelbarrows and push carts!

A single entry in the diary of James Abbey, himself one of the Forty Niners, shows better than all the second-hand descriptions that have ever been written, what toll was paid on the portion of the route west of the Humboldt Sink:

August 2nd—Started out by four o'clock this morning; at six stopped to cook our breakfast and lighten our wagons by throwing away the heavier portions of our clothing and such other articles as we best can spare. We pushed on today with as much speed as possible, to get through the desert, but our cattle gave such evident signs of exhaustion that we were compelled to stop. . . . The desert through which we are passing is strewn with dead cattle, mules, and horses. I counted in a distance of fifteen miles 350 dead horses, 280 oxen, and 120 mules; and hundreds of others are left behind unable to keep up. . . . A tan-yard or slaughter house is a flower garden in comparison. A train from Missouri have, today shot twenty oxen. Vast amounts of valuable property have been abandoned and thrown away in this desert—leather trunks, clothing, wagons, etc. to the value of at least a hundred thousand dollars, in about twenty miles. I have counted in the last ten miles 362 wagons, which in the states cost about 120 dollars each.

196. The Florida Land Boom¹

The smell of money in Florida, which attracts men as the smell of blood attracts a wild animal, became ripe and strong last spring. The

¹ Reprinted by permission from G. M. Shelby "Florida Frenzy" *Harper's*: 1926: CLII: pp. 177; 178; 180-81.

whole United States began to catch whiffs of it. Pungent tales of immense quick wealth carried far.

"Let's drive down this summer when it's quiet," said canny people to one another in whispers, "and pick up some land cheap."

Concealing their destination from neighbors who might think them crazy, they climbed into the flivver, or big car, or truck, and stole rapidly down to Florida.

Once there, they found themselves in the midst of the mightiest and swiftest popular migration of history—a migration like the possessive pilgrimage of army ants or the seasonal flight of myriads of blackbirds. From everywhere came the land-seekers, the profit-seekers. Automobiles moved along the eighteen-foot-wide Dixie Highway, the main artery of East Coast traffic, in a dense, struggling stream. Immense buses bearing subdivision names rumbled down loaded with "prospects" from Mobile, Atlanta, Columbia, or from northern steamers discharging at Jacksonville. A broken-down truck one day stopped a friend of mine in a line. The license plates were from eighteen different states, from Massachusetts to Oregon. Most of the cars brimmed over with mother, father, grandmother, several children, and the dog, enticed by three years of insidious publicity about the miracles of Florida land values.

The first stories of the realty magicians had been disseminated through small city and country newspapers, particularly in the Middle West. Systematic propaganda stressed the undeniable fact that Florida was an unappreciated playground. Yet that was far less effective advertising than the beautiful, costly free balls given by one subdivision in certain cities. Those who attended shortly afterwards received a new invitation, to go without charge and view lots priced from one thousand dollars up.

Lured by the free trip, many went. Those who bought at the current prices and promptly resold made money. Other subdivisions met the competition, offsetting the overhead by arbitrary periodic raises in all lot prices. Whole states got the Florida habit. The big migration began.

Millions—variously estimated from three to ten—visited Florida last year, investing three hundred million dollars, and bank deposits swelled till they neared the half-billion mark in July.

Joining the great migration this summer, I went inclined to scoff. Were the others also confident that they possessed average good sense and were not likely to be fooled much?

Probably. I was lost. I gambled. I won. I remained to turn land salesman. Not only with no superiority, but with defiant shame rather than triumph, I confess—not brag—that on a piker's purchase I made in a

month about \$13,000. Not much, perhaps, but a lot to a little buyer on a little bet.

In June an old and trusted friend turned loose upon our family a colony of Florida boom bacilli. It was a year since I had heard from this particular friend. He was down and out, owing to domestic tragedy topped by financial reverses. Suddenly he bobbed up again rehabilitated, with \$100,000 to his credit made in Florida since November, 1924. His associate made more than \$600,000 in six months.

What happens to Florida "sourdoughs" on arrival? Few come fortified with even the names of reliable firms. Notorious as well as honest promoters lie in wait for the gambling horde. Like wolves, they stir up the sheep, stampede them, allow them no time for recovery. They must decide instantaneously.

Again and again I declared that I had no intention to buy, but nobody let me forget for an instant I was a prospect. As upon others, the power of suggestion doubtless worked on me. It is subtly flattering to be the implied possessor of wealth. The kingdoms of the world appeared to be displayed for my choice. To help me choose, I, like everyone else, was accosted repeatedly on Miami streets, offered free dinners and bus trips, besides a deal of entertainment, conscious and unconscious, by high-pressure salesmen.

The boom bacillus thrives on prodigality. The price of good food brings many a prospect to the point of spending thousands. Two unusual concerns rewarded only real purchasers *post hoc*. One gave them an airplane ride, the other a free soft drink.

On account of an inherited notion of conduct towards those with whom one breaks bread, I refused all such bait. On my independent investigations salesmen found me unusually inquisitive. One, trying to sell me a \$3500 lot, reproved me. "Those things don't matter. All Florida is good. What you are really buying is the bottom of the climate. Or the Gulf Stream. All you've got to do is to *get the rich consciousness*. There's the dotted line—you'll make a fortune."

Authentic quick-wealth tales, including innumerable lot transactions, multiplied astoundingly. They were not cases of twenty-five-dollar land proved worth one hundred dollars, but of prices which had pyramided high into the thousands. When I saw the sort of people who were making actual money my hesitation appeared ridiculous. I resolved to invest. I tried to assume an attitude of faith. I said aloud, indiscreetly, "Resisting enthusiasm and using intelligence——"

I was interrupted scornfully. "That's just it. The people who have

made real fortunes check their brains before leaving home. Buy anywhere. You can't lose."

Searching continually for some deal to fit my modest purse, I found that the only ranch tracts priced within my reach were six or seven miles back in the Everglades. No Everglades for me, I decided, until reclamation is completed.

I then was offered by a reputable firm a great bargain in a city lot for \$1000, an unusually low price. Well-located \$3000 fifty-foot lots are rather scarce. This bonanza turned out to be a hole, a rockpit—and I reflected on the credulous millions who buy lots from plats without ever visiting the land!

But to set against this experience I had one of exactly the opposite sort which left me with a sharp sense of personal loss. An unimportant-looking lot several blocks from the center of Fort Lauderdale (whose population is fifteen thousand) on Las Olas Boulevard had been offered me about a week before at \$60,000. I didn't consider it. It now resold for \$75,000.

"It doesn't matter what the price is, if your location is where the buying is lively, I was told. You get in and get out on the binder, or earnest money. If you had paid down \$2500 you would have had thirty days after the abstract was satisfactorily completed and the title was approved before the first payment was due. You turn around quickly and sell your purchase-contract for a lump sum or advance the price per acre as much as the market dictates. Arrange terms so that your resale will bring in sufficient cash to meet the first payment, to pay the usual commission, and if possible to double your outlay, or better. In addition you will have paper profits which figure perhaps several hundred per cent—even a thousand—on the amount you put into the pot. The next man assumes your obligation. You ride on his money. He passes the buck to somebody else if he can."

"But what happens if I can't resell?"

"You're out of luck unless you are prepared to dig up the required amount for the first payment. You don't get your binder back. But it's not so hazardous as it sounds, with the market in this condition."

Imagine how I felt two weeks later still when the same lot resold for \$95,000. By risking \$2500 with faith I could have made \$35,000 clear, enough to live on some years. Terror of an insecure old age suddenly assumed exaggerated proportions. Right then and there I succumbed to the boom bacillus. I would gamble outright. The illusion of investment vanished.

197. Prophylactics Against Mob Mind ¹

Since it is the concern of organized society to lessen its burden of mob folk, let us consider the various conditions that favor the growth of strong, robust individualities proof against mental contagion.

1. *Higher Education.* A college education ought to equip the student with standards and tests of objective truth. When there is, in every community, a handful of well-ballasted college men and women, how often will be stayed the sweep of the popular delusion—rain making, Second Coming, spiritualism, absent treatment, and the like!

2. *Sound Knowledge of Body, Mind, and Society.* Hygiene, psychology, and sociology can ward off more folly than astronomy, physics, or geology.

3. *Familiarity with that which is Classic.* One ought to know the intellectual kings of the human race—Job, Solomon, Aeschylus, Plato, Cervantes, Bacon, Montaigne, Shakespeare, Swift, Goethe, Burns. The first-rank minds that for centuries have been able to impress the generations with their universal appeal are all choice, sane spirits, able to rescue one from the sway of the sensational and ephemeral. Excellent are the winnowings of time.

4. *The Influence of Sane Teachers.* The greatest teachers—Hopkins, Agassiz, McCosh, Jowett, Thomas Hill Green—are just those who, by throwing the student on his own resources, bring to ripeness his individuality. The genuine teacher wants fellows, not disciples, and his happiest hour is when he finds that the cub he has trained is now able to hold him at bay.

5. *Avoidance of the Sensational Newspaper.* The howling dervishes of journalism propagate crazes and fads by distorting the significance of the moment.

6. *Sports.* Physical health in itself makes for intellectual self-possession. Frequently sickness heightens suggestibility, which may in part account for the "cures" at wonderworking shrines, and the successes of magnetic healers.

7. *Country Life.* The city overwhelms the mind with a myriad of impressions which fray the nerves and weaken the power of concentration. One comes at last not to hear the din or see the street signs but, nevertheless, the subconscious is noting them and the store of nervous

¹ From E. A. Ross, *Social Psychology*, pp. 83; 84; 85; 86; 87; 88-89; 90-91. Copyright 1908 by the Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

energy is being depleted. City-bred populations are liable to be hysterical, and to be hysterical is to be suggestible.

8. *Familism*. Close relations to a few people—as in the well-knit family—joined to a vivid sense of obligation to the community, seem to be more favorable to stable character than the loose touch-and-go associations of general intercourse. The Northern peoples, obliged by climate to center their lives in the circle about the fireside, are more resistant to popular currents than the Southern peoples, passing their leisure in the buzz of the street, the *plaza*, and the *foyer*. Worshippers of the spirit of the hearth, they are more aloof from their fellows, slower therefore to merge with them or be swept from their moorings by them. It seems to be communion by the fireside rather than communion in the public resort that gives individuality long bracing roots. The withdrawn social self, although it lacks breadth, gains in depth, and there is nothing to show that the talkative, sociable, impressionable Latin will sacrifice himself more readily for the public weal than the hedged, reserved Englishman.

9. *Ownership of Property*. The protection and care of a piece of property makes for thoughtfulness and steadiness, individualizes.

A wide diffusion of land ownership has long been recognized as fostering a stable and conservative political habit.

10. *Participation in Voluntary Association*. The acknowledged political capacity of the English has been attributed to the experience of the masses in their popular religious organizations, i. e., the dissenting churches. Participation in the management of a society develops acquaintance with the rules of discussion, tolerance of opponents, love of order, and readiness to abide by the will of the majority.

11. *Intellectual Self-possession as an Ideal*. The types of character held up to youth as models should be strong in point of self-control. Self-consistency, tranquillity, balance, robust independence, should be recognized as rare and precious qualities worthy of all honor and praise. Let fad and craze be made ridiculous.

12. *Prideful Morality*. There are two bases of spontaneous right doing, neighbor love and self-respect. Right conduct prompted by the sense of self-respect and honor seems to preserve selfhood more than if it springs from the sense of a common life with one's fellows.

Sympathy and fraternalism must, of course, constitute the emotional background to the moral life; but in the advance of individualization the true line is to awaken a sense of worth and dignity in the common man, and to hinge his social and civic duties on self-respect rather than on the spirit of the hive.

13. *Vital Religion*. A religion for life and work is more individualizing than a contemplative devotional one, and a religion that means the domination of one's life by some principle of responsibility or some ideal of character braces the soul more than an emotional religion that charms the heart to goodness by appeals and examples.

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What pressure does modern life put upon a person which tends to make him suggestible and liable to fall into crowdish attitudes and actions?
2. Illustrate the effect of culture patterns on the form which mental epidemics will take.
3. What was the cultural setting of the witchcraft mania? Why would it be difficult to start such a craze today?
4. How do the principles of identification, emulation and veneration find illustration in the relation of the populace to John Law?
5. What geographic, social and economic conditions in the Ohio Valley furnished the setting for the "Great Revival" of 1797-1805?
6. Can you account psychologically for the intense desire of large numbers of people to secure something for nothing, to gamble, to play "lady luck," to speculate? How much may this be due to cultural and to social influences? How much to individual qualities?
7. Does our present education prepare us to resist crowd suggestion? Discuss pro and con.
8. How do you account for the immense interest in the United States, a republic, in the visits to this country of the Prince of Wales, the Queen of Roumania and other members of European aristocracy?
9. If you have ever been in a mob, describe your experiences in detail.
10. What does it take to change a mere congeries of people into a crowd?
11. Why are mobs so intolerant?
12. Supplement Ross' list of factors which prevent mob behavior.

B. Topics for Class Reports

1. Review the history of the South Sea Bubble. (Cf. Mackay in bibliography.)
2. Report on Down's account of the Klondike Gold Rush. (Cf. bibliography. Gault has a summary of Down's article.)
3. Review Toller's play as an instance of crowd behavior.

C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers

1. Studies in Mental Epidemics.
2. The Psychology of Religious Revivals.
3. Leadership and Religious Revivals.
4. The Relations of Religious revivals and the Rise of Institutions.

5. The Psychology of Revolutions.
6. Fundamental Differences in Mass Movements: Contrasts in California or Klondike Gold Rushes, the Temperance Crusade and the Rise of Bolshevism.

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CHAPTER XXV

THE NATURE OF PUBLIC OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

The type of collective behavior with which we have dealt in the last three chapters has been largely of the sort which is dependent on physical contiguity for its manifestations. The sort of grouping which Bentley calls the congregate is only one of two types of crowd. The non-contiguous crowd or assemblage finds its expression through sentiments, attitudes and universal actions which are not contingent on physical proximity. This is the field of public opinion. It is evident that much of this second type of social behavior belongs to secondary groups and at present public opinion corresponds roughly to the reaches of secondary groups. It is true, of course, that public opinion also exists in primary groups.

The term public opinion has been used in a wide variety of senses. With some writers it is used as a "group mind" "collective consciousness" and "mob mind" as if it represented a super-individual mind, a type of group personality or group manifestation over and above individuals. With many writers, especially in the field of politics, it has been used as relating exclusively to opinions and attitudes about political matters: leaders, political issues and the whole machinery of the state especially of democratic government. In the present chapter while some papers deal with public opinion in this sense of political opinion, we shall adopt the view that it may involve other phases of life interest than politics, such as, for example, religion, art, science, economic activities, and so on. In fact, the terms *public* and *public opinion* are so loosely used as to be frequently nothing but stereotypes. The word public often implies some mystical entity which scarcely exists in reality. There are rather *publics* revolving around objects of interest than any single entity which may be called *the public*. Actually we should do better perhaps to use the term "group

opinion" instead of "public opinion." Moreover, as Park and Burgess, Ross, and other writers point out, public opinion does not mean universal or preponderant opinion. Rather it has come to mean a state of opinions and beliefs over certain issues or matters where there is difference as well as agreement. When there is unanimity there is not opinion but folkways and mores. Public or group opinion implies discussion, differences of opinion, and general unrest of idea and attitude.

Originally public opinion had a very narrow range reaching scarcely beyond the confines of the village or rural neighborhood. Here gossip of the face-to-face sort played a principal rôle in its formation. Today the range of difference, discussion and interest is world-wide, and face-to-face gossip is supplemented and overridden by indirect gossip through newspapers, magazines, movies, radio, and all the latest means of communication.

In the present chapter we shall concern ourselves chiefly with the general features of public opinion, from various angles. In the following chapter we shall deal with the organs of opinion, and in the final chapter we shall present the methods of manufacture of public opinion or propaganda.

The opening paper from Ginsberg attempts to distinguish between the public and the crowd. The former is non-contiguous, multiform, less personal and more amorphous than the latter and yet it possesses possibilities for manipulation much as does the crowd or mob.

Park and Burgess discuss public opinion largely in terms of cross-currents of opinions and ideas coursing through various publics. A public for them is dependent upon consensus, participation and certain common patterns of response. And the opinion of this public implies both likeness and difference.

Allport is very insistent that public opinion is nothing but a collection of individual opinions, whereas Ellwood writes about it as a more or less rational judgment of a group. The former is thinking no doubt of the psychological processes, the latter of the sociological or group aspects of public opinion. Yet it should not be forgotten, as Cooley points out, that the leaders often but crystallize the notions and attitudes of the masses. Munro points out how public opinion is made by the leaders. Lord Bryce's statement of public opinion as the emergence of one set of opinions stronger than others out of a con-

geries of notions, beliefs, and prejudices, indicates the conception of public opinion held by a great political scientist. He sees the differences, the cross-currents of opinion running through a group, but it becomes public opinion only when one of these tends to over-ride the others. And this dominance is determined by the ballot but also it is evident through other means of expression such as newspapers. In the succeeding paper Bryce treats certain aspects of political opinion showing the place which leaders and organs of public opinion have in the formation of public opinion.

The democratic theory that each man thinks out his choice of candidates and makes decision on issues clearly, logically and in isolation is a delusion through and through. Rather suggestion, social interaction through gossip, crowd stimulation playing upon emotions and feelings, in short, all the paraphernalia of crowd leadership, come into action in these situations.

Shepard discusses of the differentia of public opinion. And Allport shows crowdish attitudes and the sense of universality which the person develops under the influence of organs of opinion.

Belief, opinion and knowledge all come into play in matters of public opinion. In the paper by Sheffield we have presented the process by which a group of thinkers may arrive at a consensus without the run of emotions and the shallow currents of opinion. Here facts and knowledge come into action. Thus discussion groups,—the committee, the seminar, the round-table group,—are group configurations wherein the crowdish attitudes and mechanisms have little place.

The consensus from such a discussion is perhaps more rational and objective than any so-called public opinion could possibly be. The small deliberate group therefore is far more effective in arriving at facts and their interpretation than the larger mass, but in our democratic system little place is given such groups in contrast to the place given emotional thinking done for and with the masses by leaders, newspaper writers and contributors to journals of opinion.

Bogardus, following up his studies of prejudice by the measurement of social distance, has analyzed the methods of changing opinion. His material on how an individual alters his opinion is indicative of a change which should be studied in a wide variety of situations. Sutherland shows the relation between attitudes toward institutions and obedience to law. He indicates briefly the contrast

between public opinion in a primary group and its effect upon social control and the conditions in present-day industrialized urban society.

II. MATERIALS

198. The Public and Public Opinion ¹

The public may be described as an unorganized and amorphous aggregation of individuals who are bound together by common opinions and desires, but are too numerous for each to maintain personal relations with the others. It differs from the crowd in the following points.

1. In the first place the public rests not on physical personal contact, but on communication by means of the press, correspondence, etc. There is therefore absent the hurly-burly of the mob and consequently individuality can be retained more easily. There is also absent the heightening of the social feelings, which seem to be induced, at any rate to some extent, by bodily presence, and to this extent individuals in the public are less suggestible.

2. Secondly, while one can belong to one crowd only at a time one can and one often does belong to different publics at the same time. For instance, one may be a reader of several newspapers.

3. Though through space-annihilating devices news can be rapidly communicated, there is not the same degree of simultaneity of stimulation that is present in crowds, and this lessens suggestibility.

4. Though the public is itself amorphous, it does generate organizations and these develop various devices against the mob mind such as rules of debate and the like.

Opinion stands for that mass of ideas and beliefs in a group or society, which has a certain stability and is not a mere series of momentary reactions, but is yet not based on clearly thought out grounds of a scientific character. The meaning of the term public has been previously explained as referring to a group of people more or less amorphous, though it may contain some organizations and institutions within it. In each such group there will be a mass of ideas originally initiated by the more active members, but subsequently profoundly modified by contact with other ideas and frequently assuming a guise in the end which their originators would not acknowledge or recognize. Public opinion is thus a social product, due to the interaction of many minds. But it should be noted that the ideas which emerge from the

¹ By permission from *The Psychology of Society* by M. Ginsberg, pp. 137-348; 144-45. Published by E. P. Dutton & Company.

struggle are not always the best logically speaking. Popular opinion is subject to the most amazing vagaries. The ultimate reasons why some ideas get stamped in and other stamped out are often found in factors which are not under rational control, in complicated circumstances of the time, in an appeal to powerful instinctive and emotional tendencies, but dimly or not at all understood by the people whom they influence. There is, as has frequently been pointed out, a sort of natural "selection" of ideas, but the "fittest" are not always the best logically or ethically speaking, but merely the most adapted to the particular circumstances.

199. The Nature of Public Opinion ¹

We ordinarily think of public opinion as a sort of social weather. At certain times, and under certain circumstances, we observe strong, steady currents of opinion, moving apparently in a definite direction and toward a definite goal. At other times, however, we note flurries and eddies and countercurrents in this movement. Every now and then there are storms, shifts, or dead calms. These sudden shifts in public opinion, when expressed in terms of votes, are referred to by the politicians as "landslides."

In all these movements, cross currents and changes in direction which a closer observation of public opinion reveals, it is always possible to discern, but on a much grander scale, to be sure, that same type of circular reaction which we have found elsewhere, whenever the group was preparing to act. Always in the public, as in the crowd, there will be a circle, sometimes wider, sometimes narrower, within which individuals are mutually responsive to motives and interests of one another, so that out of this interplay of social forces there may emerge at any time a common motive and a common purpose that will dominate the whole.

Within the circle of the mutual influence described, there will be no such complete rapport and no such complete domination of the individual by the group as exists in a herd or a crowd in a state of excitement, but there will be sufficient community of interest to insure a common understanding. A public is, in fact, organized on the basis of a universe of discourse, and within the limits of this universe of discourse language, statements of fact, news will have, for all practical purposes,

¹ From the *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* by Robert E. Park & Ernest W. Burgess, pp. 791-95; 829-30; 830-33. Copyright by the University of Chicago, 1921.

the same meanings. It is this circle of mutual influence within which there is a universe of discourse that defines the limits of the public.

A public like the crowd is not to be conceived as a formal organization like a parliament or even a public meeting. It is always the widest area over which there is conscious participation and consensus in the formation of public opinion. The public has not only a circumference, but it has a center. Within the area within which there is participation and consensus there is always a focus of attention around which the opinions of the individuals which compose the public seem to revolve. This focus of attention, under ordinary circumstances, is constantly shifting. The shifts of attention of the public constitute what is meant by the changes in public opinion. When these changes take a definite direction and have or seem to have a definite goal we call the phenomenon a social movement. If it were possible to plot this movement in the form of maps and graphs, it would be possible to show movement in two dimensions. There would be, for example, a movement in space. The focus of public opinion, the point namely at which there is the greatest "intensity" of opinion, tends to move from one part of the country to another. In America these movements, for reasons that could perhaps be explained historically, are likely to be along the meridians, east and west, rather than north and south. In the course of this geographical movement of public opinion, however, we are likely to observe changes in intensity and changes in direction (devagation).

Changes in intensity seem to be in direct proportion to the area over which opinion on a given issue may be said to exist. In minorities opinion is uniformly more intense than it is in majorities and this is what gives minorities so much greater influence in proportion to their numbers than majorities. While changes in intensity have a definite relation to the area over which public opinion on an issue may be said to exist, the devagations of public opinion, as distinguished from the trend, will probably turn out to have a direct relation to the character of the parties that participate. Area as applied to public opinion will have to be measured eventually in terms of social rather than geographical distance, that is to say, in terms of isolation and contact. The factor of numbers is also involved in any such calculation. Geographical area, communication, and the number of persons involved are in general the factors that would determine the concept "area" as it is used here. If party spirit is strong the general direction or trend of public opinion will probably be intersected by shifts and sudden transient changes in direction, and these shifts will be in proportion to the intensity of the party spirit. Charles E. Merriam's recent study of political parties

indicates that the minority parties formulate most of the legislation in the United States. This is because there is not very great divergence in the policies of the two great parties and party struggles are fought out on irrelevant issues. So far as this is true it insures against any sudden change in policy. New legislation is adopted in response to the trend of public opinion, rather than in response to the devagations and sudden shifts brought about by the development of a radical party spirit.

All these phenomena may be observed, for example, in the Prohibition Movement. Dicey's study of *Law and Public Opinion in England* showed that while the direction of opinion in regard to specific issues had been very irregular, on the whole the movement had been in one general direction. The trend of public opinion is the name we give to this general movement. In defining the trend, shifts, cross-currents, and flurries are not considered. When we speak of the tendency or direction of public opinion we usually mean the trend over a definite period of time.

When the focus of public attention ceases to move and shift, when it is fixed, the circle which defines the limits of the public is narrowed. As the circle narrows, opinion itself becomes more intense and concentrated. This is the phenomenon of crisis. It is at this point that the herd stampedes.

The effect of crisis is invariably to increase the dangers of precipitate action. The most trivial incident, in such periods of tension, may plunge a community into irretrievable disaster. It is under conditions of crisis that dictatorships are at once possible and necessary; not merely to enable the community to act energetically, but in order to protect the community from the mere play of external forces. The manner in which Bismarck, by a slight modification of the famous telegrams of Ems, provoked a crisis in France and compelled Napoleon III, against his judgment and that of his advisers, to declare war on Germany, is an illustration of this danger.

"On the afternoon of July 13, Bismarck, Roon, and Moltke were seated together in the Chancellor's Room at Berlin. They were depressed and moody; for Prince Leopold's renunciation had been trumpeted in Paris as a humiliation for Prussia. They were afraid, too, that King William's conciliatory temper might lead him to make further concessions, and that the careful preparations of Prussia for the inevitable war with France might be wasted, and a unique opportunity lost. A telegram arrived. It was from the king at Ems, and described his interview that morning with the French ambassador. The king had

met Benedetti's request for the guarantee required by a firm but courteous refusal; and when the ambassador had sought to renew the interview, he had sent a polite message through his aide-de-camp informing him that the subject must be considered closed. In conclusion, Bismarck was authorized to publish the message if he saw fit. The Chancellor at once saw his opportunity. In the royal despatch, though the main incidents were clear enough, there was still a note of doubt, of hesitancy, which suggested a possibility of further negotiation. The excision of a few lines would alter, not indeed the general sense, but certainly the whole tone of the message. Bismarck, turning to Moltke, asked him if he were ready for a sudden risk of war; and on his answering in the affirmative, took a blue pencil and drew it quickly through several parts of the telegram. Without the alteration or addition of a single word, the message, instead of appearing a mere 'fragment of a negotiation still pending,' was thus made to appear decisive. In the actual temper of the French people there was no doubt that it would not only appear decisive, but insulting, and that its publication would mean war.

"On July 14 the publication of the 'Ems telegram' became known in Paris, with the result that Bismarck had expected. The majority of the Cabinet, hitherto in favor of peace, were swept away by the popular tide; and Napoleon himself reluctantly yielded to the importunity of his ministers and of the Empress, who saw in a successful war the best, if not the only, chance of preserving the throne for her son. On the evening of the same day, July 14, the declaration of war was signed."

It is this narrowing of the area over which a definite public opinion may be said to exist that at once creates the possibility and defines the limits of arbitrary control, so far as it is created or determined by the existence of public opinion.

Thus far the public has been described almost wholly in terms that could be applied to a crowd. The public has been frequently described as if it were simply a great crowd, a crowd scattered as widely as news will circulate and still be news. But there is this difference. In the heat and excitement of the crowd, as in the choral dances of primitive people, there is for the moment what may be described as complete fusion of the social forces. Rapport has, for the time being, made the crowd, in a peculiarly intimate way, a social unit.

No such unity exists in the public. The sentiment and tendencies which we call public opinion are never unqualified expressions of emotion. The difference is that public opinion is determined by conflict and discussion, and made up of the opinions of individuals not wholly at one. In any conflict situation, where party spirit is aroused, the spectators,

who constitute the public, are bound to take sides. The impulse to take sides is, in fact, in direct proportion to the excitement and party spirit displayed. The result is, however, that both sides of an issue get considered. Certain contentions are rejected because they will not stand criticism. Public opinion formed in this way has the character of a judgment, rather than a mere unmediated expression of emotion, as in the crowd. The public is never ecstatic. It is always more or less rational. It is this fact of conflict, in the form of discussion, that introduces into the control exercised by public opinion the elements of rationality and of fact.

In the final judgment of the public upon a conflict or an issue, we expect, to be sure, some sort of unanimity of judgment, but in the general consensus there will be some individual differences of opinions still unmediated, or only partially so, and final agreement of the public will be more or less qualified by all the different opinions that cooperated to form its judgment.

We are interested in public opinion, I suppose, because public opinion is, in the long run, the sovereign power in the state. There is not now, and probably there never has been a government that did not rest on public opinion. The best evidence of this is the fact that all governments have invariably sought either to *control*, or, at least, to inspire and direct it.

The Kaiser had his "official" and his "semiofficial" organs. The communists in Russia have taken possession of the schools. It is in the schoolroom that the bolshevists propose to complete the revolution. Hume, the English historian, who was also the greatest of English philosophers, said:

"As force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is therefore on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and the most military governments as well as to the most free and popular. The sultan of Egypt, or the emperor of Rome, might drive their helpless subjects, like brute beasts, against their sentiments and inclinations, but he must at least have led his mameluks, or praetorian bands, like men, by their opinions."

Hume's statement is too epigrammatic to be true. Governments can and do maintain themselves by force rather than consent. They have done this even when they were greatly inferior in numbers. Witness Cortez in Mexico, the Belgians in the Congo, and the recent English conquest, with two hundred aeroplanes, of the Mad Mullah in Somali-

land. Civilized people must be governed in subtle ways. Unpopular governments maintain themselves sometimes by taking possession of the means of communication, by polluting the sources of information, by suppressing newspapers, by propaganda.

Caspar Schmidt, "Max Stirner," the most consistent of anarchists, said the last tyranny is the tyranny of the idea. The last tyrant, in other words, is the propagandist, the individual who gives a "slant" to the facts in order to promote his own conceptions of the welfare of the community.

We use the word public opinion in a wider and in a narrower sense. The public, the popular mind, is controlled by something more than opinion, or public opinion, in the narrower sense.

We are living today under the subtle tyranny of the advertising man. He tells us what to wear, and makes us wear it. He tells us what to eat, and makes us eat it. We do not resent this tyranny. We do not feel it. We do what we are told; but we do it with the feeling that we are following our own wild impulses. This does not mean that, under the inspiration of advertisements, we act irrationally. We have reasons; but they are sometimes after-thoughts. Or they are supplied by the advertiser.

Advertising is one form of social control. It is one way of capturing the public mind. But advertising does not get its results by provoking discussion. That is one respect in which it differs from public opinion.

Fashion is one of the subtler forms of control to which we all bow. We all follow the fashions at a greater or less distance. Some of us fall behind the fashions, but no one ever gets ahead of them. No one ever can get ahead of the fashions because we never know what they are, until they arrive.

There is an intimate relation between public opinion and social customs or the mores, as Sumner calls them. But there is this difference: Public opinion fluctuates. It wobbles. Social customs, the mores, change slowly. Prohibition was long in coming; but the custom of drinking has not disappeared. The mores change slowly; but they change *in one direction* and they change *steadily*. Mores change as fashion does; as language does; by a law of their own.

Fashions must change. It is in their nature to do so. As the existing thing loses its novelty it is no longer stimulating; no longer interesting. It is no longer the fashion.

What fashion demands is not something new; but something dif-

ferent. It demands the old in a new and stimulating form. Every woman who is up with the fashion wants to be in the fashion; but she desires to be something different from everyone else, especially from her best friend.

Language changes in response to the same motives and according to the same law. We are constantly seeking new metaphors for old ideas; constantly using old metaphors to express new ideas. Consider the way that slang grows!

There is a fashion or a trend in public opinion. A. V. Dicey, in his volume on *Law and Opinion in England*, points out that there has been a constant tendency, for a hundred years, in English legislation, from individualism to collectivism. This does not mean that public opinion has changed constantly in one direction. There have been, as he says, "cross currents." Public opinion has veered, but the changes in the mores have been steadily in one direction.

There has been a change in the fundamental attitudes. This change has taken place in response to changed conditions. Change in mores is something like change in the nest-building habit of certain birds, the swallows, for example. This change, like the change in bird habits, takes place without discussion—without clear consciousness—in response to changed conditions. Furthermore, changes in the mores, like changes in fashion, are only slightly under our control. They are not the result of agitation; rather they are responsible for the agitation.

There are profound changes going on in our social organization today. Industrial democracy, or something corresponding to it, is coming. It is coming not entirely because of social agitation. It is coming, perhaps, in spite of agitation. It is a social change, but it is part of the whole cosmic process.

There is an intimate relation between the mores and opinion. The mores represent the attitudes in which we agree. Opinion represents these attitudes in so far as we do not agree. We do not have opinions except over matters which are in dispute.

So far as we are controlled by habit and custom, by the mores, we do not have opinion. I find out what my opinion is only after I discover that I disagree with my fellow. What I call my opinions are for the most part invented to justify my agreements or disagreements with prevailing public opinion. The mores do not need justification. As soon as I seek justification for them they have become matters of opinion.

Public opinion is just the opinion of individuals plus their differences. There is no public opinion where there is no substantial agreement.

But there is no public opinion where there is not disagreement. Public opinion presupposes public discussion. When a matter has reached the stage of public discussion it becomes a matter of public opinion.

Before war was declared in France there was anxiety, speculation. After mobilization began, discussion ceased. The national ideal was exalted. The individual ceased to exist. Men ceased even to think. They simply obeyed. This is what happened in all the belligerent countries except America. It did not quite happen here. Under such circumstances public opinion ceases to exist. This is quite as true in a democracy as it is in an autocracy.

The difference between an autocracy and a democracy is not that in one the will of the people finds expression and in the other it does not. It is simply that in a democracy a larger number of the citizens participate in the discussions which give rise to public opinion. At least they are supposed to do so. In a democracy everyone belongs, or is supposed to belong, to one great public. In an autocracy there are perhaps many little publics.

What rôle do the schools and colleges play in the formation of public opinion? The schools transmit the tradition. They standardize our national prejudices and transmit them. They do this necessarily.

A liberal or college education tends to modify and qualify all our inherited political, religious, and social prejudices. It does so by bringing into the field of discussion matters that would not otherwise get into the public consciousness. In this way a college education puts us in a way to control our prejudices instead of being controlled by them. This is the purpose of a liberal education.

The emancipation which history, literature, and a wider experience with life gives us permits us to enter sympathetically into the lives and interests of others; it widens that area over which public opinion rather than force exercises control.

It makes it possible to extend the area of political control. It means the extension of democratic participation in the common life. The universities, by their special studies in the field of social science, are seeking to accumulate and bring into the view of public opinion a larger body of attested fact upon which the public may base its opinion.

It is probably not the business of the universities to agitate reforms nor to attempt directly to influence public opinion in regard to current issues. To do this is to relax its critical attitude, lessen its authority in matters of fact, and jeopardize its hard-won academic freedom. When a university takes over the function of a political party or a church it ceases to perform its function as a university.

200. Public Opinion as a Collection of Individual Opinions¹

The term public opinion usually signifies some conviction, belief, or sentiment common to all or to the great majority.

Public opinion is merely the collection of individual opinions. It has no existence except in individual minds; and these minds can only conjecture what the general consensus is. Like the other unorganized forms of social control public opinion acquires its power through the attitude of the individual. This attitude is one of ascribing universality to certain convictions and then supporting them strongly in order to conform with the supposed universal view. Newspapers and journals are self-constituted exponents of that which they assert to be the voice of the public. Their assertions are often hasty generalizations and sometimes deliberate propaganda. By pretending to express public opinion they in reality create and control it. The illusion of universality may of course be used to establish a popular acceptance of *enlightened* views.

201. Public Opinion as Rational Judgment of a Group²

By public opinion we mean the more or less rational, collective judgment formed by a group regarding a situation. It is formed, as we have seen, by the action and reaction of many individual judgments. It implies not so much that uniformity of opinion has been reached by all members of the group, or even by a majority, as that a certain trend and direction of the opinions and judgments of the individual members has been reached. Of course, there is a certain core of agreement reached among the individuals of a group, or at least among a majority, but there is no absolute uniformity of judgment. It is an organization and co-ordination of individual opinions and judgments. Therefore, it does not necessarily represent, as has often been claimed, the intelligence and judgment of the lowest member of the group, or even of the mediocrity of its average individuals. As it is formed by the co-ordination and organization of individual judgments, it may well represent the matured judgment of leaders and specialists, after these have reacted with their public.

Public opinion should be sharply distinguished from popular emo-

¹ This selection from F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology*, pp. 395, 396 is used by permission of, and by arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company, the authorized publishers.

² Reprinted by permission from C. A. Ellwood, *The Psychology of Human Society*, pp. 228-29; 230-31; 232-33. New York. D. Appleton & Company, 1925.

tion and public sentiment. Popular emotion and public sentiment may exist in groups in which there has been no discussion, but public opinion, as it is a more or less rational group judgment, cannot. Popular emotion depends for its formation upon the contagion of feeling. It is usually highly irrational, and is associated with emotional action on the part of the group, which is rarely constructive. Public sentiment is the mass of feelings associated with the well-established habits of the group. It is usually conservative, while public opinion is concerned with social changes, with making new social adjustments, and if formed through proper public discussion is constructive and creative. Being formed by a discussion process, it is the more or less rational judgment of the group. Much injury has been done to democracy by confusing public opinion with public sentiment and popular emotion. Many of the criticisms directed against the rule of public opinion are really directed against the rule of public sentiment and popular emotion. However, unless public opinion is rightly formed, it may also represent an irrational judgment.

Whether control by public opinion will be control by the worst or best minds in the group will depend upon the circumstances of its formation. The degree of rationality in public opinion will depend upon three things: (1) the general organization of the group, as to ease of communication, individual freedom of expression, etc.; (2) the general level of intelligence in the group, especially its system of social and political education; (3) the quality of its leadership, not only as to expert knowledge, but also as to efficiency in action and moral character.

Under this last point we may note that there is a third thing needed in democratic societies if public opinion is to be rational and powerful; and that is it must be formed under conditions of disinterestedness on the part of those who act as leaders. If selfish interests are allowed to control the channels of communication, if even those channels become so commercialized that people lose their confidence in them, there is little chance of public opinion showing a high degree of intelligence. It is important, therefore, that in our whole social life, between nations as well as between classes and individuals, channels of intercommunication be kept not only free, but also uncorrupted and even untainted by suspicion of corruption. Now these channels in modern civilization are mainly through the press. If the press is commercial, if its news service is tainted by suspicion of corruption in any form, if it is made to serve individual or class interests rather than to serve social welfare, it will fail to create the highest type of public opinion. Much responsibility in the complex social groups of modern civilization evidently rests

upon the press as an organ for the formation and guidance of public opinion. How to secure a press with an adequate sense of its social responsibility is a problem. Means and methods yet remain to be devised by which the press can be kept free, and yet at the same time be brought to realize in the highest degree its social responsibility. Like the church and the school, the press must evidently be left free if it is to function efficiently. Yet owing to its commercialism, to class and party bias, and to its ignorance, it must be admitted that, even in the most advanced civilized societies of the present, the press is still far from being an ideal instrument for the formation and guidance of rational public opinion. If there is a way out of this difficulty, the development of a professional ethics and of a high type of professional training among journalists must play a large part. In this way it may be possible to establish a press upon a social service rather than upon a commercial basis.

202. Public Opinion as Formulated by the Few ¹

Although we of the New World delight to call ourselves a practical people we have been firmly enchained to formulas. The beacon lights of American politics are a series of formulas and slogans. Government rests on the consent of the governed, democracy means the rule of people, the executive and legislative branches of government must be kept separate, we must have a government of laws not of men, and so on. These shibboleths have all the sanctity of gospel in the American mind. Nevertheless it does not require much argument to convince any reflective mind that these creedal phrases, although all of them embody a modicum of truth, have become the cloak for a great deal that is grotesquely absurd.

But a study of the actualities will make clear that the agencies through which the people assume to control their rulers are neither so direct nor so effective as they are thus assumed to be. Public opinion, for example, is believed by the average man to be a spontaneous emanation from the mind of the multitude, which of course it is not. Much has been written during the past few years upon the topic of public opinion, what it is, how it is created, crystallized and controlled, and how it exerts its pressure upon public policy. But in none of these writings does one find any suggestion that public opinion is a thing that rises phoenix-like from the minds of the Many, uninspired from above, un-

¹ From W. B. Munro, *Personality in Politics*, pp. 81-82; 84; 85. Copyright 1924 by the Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

aided, and unled. It is, in very large measure, the handiwork of the Few.

Job Hedges, a New York wit and the author of a readable book on *Common Sense in Politics*, once remarked that "the man who hires the hall is the man who makes public opinion." That is truth. It is not only the man who hires the hall but the billboards, the man who deluges the mails with literature, and who rallies the people into letterhead organizations for the promotion of this, that, or the other cause. He it is who manufactures public opinion. Public opinion, the opinion of the Many, is what the Few have made it. If public opinion insists upon one course of policy rather than another it is because the Few in one political camp have been more successful in marketing their leadership than the Few in the other camp.

203. Public Opinion and Community Interests¹

What is Public Opinion? The term is commonly used to denote the aggregate of the views men hold regarding matters that affect or interest the community. Thus understood, it is a congeries of all sorts of discrepant notions, beliefs, fancies, prejudices, aspirations. It is confused, incoherent, amorphous, varying from day to day and week to week. But in the midst of this diversity and confusion every question as it rises into importance is subjected to a process of consolidation and clarification until there emerge and take definite shape certain views, or sets of interconnected views, each held and advocated in common by bodies of citizens. It is to the power exerted by any such view, or set of views, when held by an apparent majority of citizens, that we refer when we talk of Public Opinion as approving or disapproving a certain doctrine or proposal, and thereby becoming a guiding or ruling power. Or we may think of the Opinion of a whole nation as made up of different currents of sentiment, each embodying or supporting a view or a doctrine or a practical proposal. Some currents develop more strength than others because they have behind them larger numbers or more intensity of conviction; and when one is evidently the strongest, it begins to be called Public Opinion *par excellence*, being taken to embody the views supposed to be held by the bulk of the people. Difficult as it often is to determine the relative strength of the different streams of opinion—one cannot measure their strength as electric power is measured by volts—every one admits that when one stream is distinctly stronger than any other, i. e., when it would evidently pre-

¹ From J. Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, Vol. I, pp. 153-54. Copyright 1921 by the Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

vail if the people were called upon to vote, it ought to be obeyed. Till there is a voting, its power, being open to doubt, has no legal claim to obedience. But impalpable though it may be, no sensible man disputes that power, and such governing authorities as ministries and legislatures are obliged to take account of it and shape their course accordingly. In this sense, therefore, the People are always ruling, because their will is recognized as supreme whenever it is known, and though it is formally and legally expressed only by the process of counting votes, it is frequently known for practical purposes without that process.

204. Political Aspects of Public Opinion ¹

In examining the process by which opinion is formed, we cannot fail to note how small a part of the view which the average man entertains when he goes to vote is really of his own making. Although he supposes his view to be his own, he holds it rather because his acquaintances, his newspapers, his party leaders all hold it. His acquaintances do the like. Each man believes and repeats certain phrases, because he thinks that everybody else on his own side believes them, and of what each believes only a small part is his own original impression, the far larger part being the result of the commingling and mutual action and reaction of the impressions of a multitude of individuals, in which the element of pure personal conviction, based on individual thinking, is but small.

Every one is of course predisposed to see things in some one particular light by his previous education, habits of mind, accepted dogmas, religious or social affinities, notions of his own personal interest. No event, no speech or article, ever falls upon a perfectly virgin soil: the reader or listener is always more or less biased already. When some important event happens, which calls for the formation of a view, these pre-existing habits, dogmas, affinities, help to determine the impression which each man experiences, and so far are factors in the view he forms. But they operate chiefly in determining the first impression, and they operate over many minds at once. They do not produce variety and independence: they are soon overlaid by the influences which each man derives from his fellows, from his leaders, from the press.

Orthodox democratic theory assumes that every citizen has, or ought to have, thought out for himself certain opinions, i. e., ought to have a definite view, defensible by arguments, of what the country needs, of

¹ From J. Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, (3rd ed.) Vol. II, pp. 253-54. Copyright 1920 by James Bryce. The Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

what principles ought to be applied in governing it, of the men to whose hands the government ought to be entrusted. There are persons who talk, though certainly very few who act, as if they believed this theory, which may be compared to the theory of some ultra-Protestants that every good Christian has, or ought to have, by the strength of his own reason, worked out for himself from the Bible a system of theology. But one need only try the experiment of talking to that representative of public opinion whom the Americans call "the man in the cars," to realize how uniform opinion is among all classes of people, how little there is in the ideas of each individual of that individuality which they would have if he had formed them for himself, how little solidity and substance there is in the political or social beliefs of nineteen persons out of every twenty. These beliefs, when examined, mostly resolve themselves into two or three prejudices and aversions, two or three prepossessions for a particular leader or party or section of a party, two or three phrases or catchwords suggesting or embodying arguments which the man who repeats them has not analyzed. It is not that these nineteen persons are incapable of appreciating good arguments, or are unwilling to receive them. On the contrary, and this is especially true of the working classes, an audience is pleased when solid arguments are addressed to it, and men read with most relish the articles or leaflets, supposing them to be smartly written, which contain the most carefully sifted facts and the most exact thought. But to the great mass of mankind in all places, public questions come in the third or fourth rank among the interests of life, and obtain less than a third or a fourth of the leisure available for thinking. It is therefore rather sentiment than thought that the mass can contribute, a sentiment grounded on a few broad considerations and simple trains of reasoning; and the soundness and elevation of their sentiment will have more to do with their taking their stand on the side of justice, honor, and peace, than any reasoning they can apply to the sifting of the multifarious facts thrown before them, and to the drawing of the legitimate inferences therefrom.

205. *Differentia of Public Opinion*¹

Every opinion of an individual is, of course, not a public opinion; not even those opinions to which a majority of citizens agree are all

¹ Reprinted by permission from W. J. Shepard "Public Opinion" *Am. J. Soc.* 1909-10: XV: pp. 35-38; 39-41; 42; 43; 44. Copyright by the University of Chicago.

public opinions. Public opinion, as we have said, is only the opinions of separate individuals, but not their opinions taken separately. This qualification is of prime importance. The majority of the members of the House of Commons may agree in a great many opinions which cannot—not even in a metaphorical sense—be called the opinion of the House of Commons. To be that, this common opinion must be more or less definitely formulated and agreed to by the members. There must be a realization that this is the common opinion, a recognition of its wide diffusion and a readiness to defend. It may never have come to a vote—that is an entirely secondary matter—but it must be generally known that a majority of the members of the House of Commons have taken a stand upon this opinion. This opinion must serve as one of the bonds of union linking the members together and making them the House of Commons and not merely a group of distinguished English gentlemen who happen to be together from pure accident. It is not at all unlikely that a majority of the members of the House of Commons would agree, if asked, that yellow fever is transmitted by mosquitoes, or that the English language requires a simplified spelling; but these can in no sense be said to be opinions of the House of Commons. So a public opinion must be an opinion to which the members of a public agree, not in a merely accidental fashion, but in full cognizance that this opinion constitutes a bond of union between the individuals holding it. The number of such opinions which any collective body may hold is necessarily few; they carry so much the more force for being limited in number.

Any unorganized association of individuals bound together by common opinions, sentiments, or desires and too numerous for each to maintain personal relations with the others constitutes a public in the broadest sense of the term. This association may take the form of a crowd, in which the individuals are always in physical contact, or the individuals may be scattered over the entire country, or indeed the world in which case the association is purely intellectual, there being no corporate proximity between the members. This latter is a public in the narrower or proper sense. All crowds are publics in the broader sense but it is to be noted that not all aggregations of individuals are crowds. There might be a thousand persons accidentally assembled together on a busy street corner without any common opinion, sentiment, or desire. Such a group could not properly be called a crowd. Crowds are a much older and earlier phenomenon than publics proper. Animals and primitive men are capable of forming crowds but not publics; physical contact is necessary with them to preserve the bond

of association. One of the essential conditions for the formation of any public is the sense of actuality among the individuals. This is greatly assisted by physical contact, which distinguishes crowds. In the absence of physical contact it is difficult to obtain a sense of actuality. This difficulty is increased by distance or lapse of time. Hence extensive publics date from a comparatively recent period. Not until means of communication attained a high stage of development could the purely intellectual bond of association be maintained at great distances. The sense of solidarity and unity necessary to a public was entirely lacking among individuals scattered over a larger area than a parish or a township before the invention of printing, and not until the construction of the railways and the invention of the telegraph did it become possible to multiply the number of these intellectual publics.

At the beginning of the French Revolution publics were very contracted and feeble. The political public in France was principally confined to Paris. Arthur Young remarked upon the small circulation of the newspapers in the villages. At the end of the Revolution there was a far more definitely crystallized and extensive political public opinion than at the beginning, but even then when newspapers arrived in the south of France eight days after their publication the consciousness of actuality was lost. It was too much like reading ancient history to arouse the feeling of interest. The disgust which comes over one when he discovers that the paper which he has been interestedly reading is last week's explains the necessity for the element of actuality in order to develop a political interest. In England public opinion developed earlier because distances were so much less. Not only did printing and rapid communication extend the area over which publics could exist, but they also greatly increased the number of publics. When printing was entirely confined to the production of Bibles and works of theology there was but one large public—a religious public; but as other books began to be printed there developed a literary, a philosophic, a scientific, a legal, and a political public co-extensive with a whole country at the least. For a long time the life of these struggling publics had little intensity and depended upon crowds for assistance; the salon and the coffeehouse, in the eighteenth century, owed their position—a position never before attained and never likely to be regained—to this necessity of reinforcing the activity of publics by frequent assemblages.

A complexity of a large number of publics, to several of which every intelligent individual belongs, is one of the most striking characteristics of modern civilization. This complexity is constantly increasing as our knowledge widens and our interests become more numerous. Publics

differ again from crowds in this respect, that an individual can belong to a number of publics but to only one crowd.

Publics often have vassal organizations dependent upon them, but are themselves never organized. The public which supports the Republican candidates at a national election is by no means synonymous with the Republican party. The latter is merely an organ through which the amorphous public can make its opinions, sentiments, and desires known and felt. The Royal Academy is not the same as the art public of Great Britain, nor is the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Lands the same as the public interested in foreign missions. Publics are usually passive. Crowds can indeed become active and without the assistance of any other agency pursue the object of their will; but publics proper must accomplish their desires through agents; an active public (using the term now always in the narrow sense) is an impossibility. When desire becomes strong enough, a public throws off dependent organs which voice its demands or sentiments. Sometimes a public may generate a crowd which takes the action desired by the public.

The term public opinion is used to describe both the sentiments and desires as well as the opinions proper which prevail among the individuals of a public. It is unfortunate that there is no broader term capable of expressing this general idea. Matters of opinion properly speaking are contrasted with matters of fact. George Cornewall Lewis has defined these terms in an admirable passage which may be summarized as follows:

Matters of fact obtain a conviction from our internal consciousness, or any individual even or phenomenon which is the subject of sensation. To be sure even the simplest sensations involve judgment, but when this is of so simple a kind as to become wholly unconscious and the interpretation of the appearances is a matter of general agreement the object of sensation may be considered a fact. Facts must be limited to individual sensible objects and not extended to general expressions or formulas, descriptive of classes of facts, or sequences of phenomena, such as the blood circulates, or the sun attracts the planets. These cannot be grasped by a single sensation, but imply long series of observations and intricate reasoning. Facts are decided by appeal to our consciousness or sensation or by the testimony of witnesses. Matters of opinion, which are not disputed questions of fact, are general propositions or theorems relating to laws of nature or mind, principles or rules of human conduct, future probabilities, deductions from hypotheses, and the like about which a doubt may reasonably exist. All doubtful questions whether of speculation or practice are matters of opinion.

By sentiment is meant the feeling of admiration or of abhorrence, of approval or of disapproval or resentment which one individual feels toward another or with reference to some act. It is emotional rather than intellectual, and, while often influenced by previously formed opinions, it is itself not an opinion properly speaking. The sentiment of outrage which we feel toward the Standard Oil Company may rest upon the opinion that this company has been guilty of gross corruption and graft, but the sentiment is quite another thing than the opinion. Some sentiments, moreover, do not rest upon opinions at all. Such are those which are the product of prejudice, heredity, or tradition. You can scarcely refer the antipathy existing between the Frenchman and the German to any generally current opinion. It is a matter of heredity and tradition. The outburst of public opinion in England against the Roman Catholic Church, which demanded and secured the Ecclesiastical Titles Act, was founded much more on prejudice than anything else; it was not opinion proper, but sentiment.

If sentiment is often the product of opinion, desire is often the product of sentiment, but likewise is quite distinct. Our sentiment of outrage against the Standard Oil Company may lead us to desire its prosecution in the federal courts. Desire is not a process of reasoning, or an emotion, but an act of will.

Thus we have an ascending scale of mental acts which may be so common among the individuals composing a public as to be termed public opinion, public sentiment, or public will. To use the term public opinion for all is necessarily misleading but unavoidable. These are the only mental acts of which a public is capable; that is to say, the only mental acts which, being exercised by a large group of individuals, serve as a bond of union between them all. Imagination, for example, cannot be conceived of as affording such a bond; or perception, or attention. These may all contribute to the opinion, sentiment, or desire, but no bond of association is formed until we have a common opinion, a common sentiment, or a common desire. A group of individuals casually collected may all witness a dog fight, but the common perception does not constitute them a public. If, however, they have all come together for the purpose of seeing the dog fight there is something more than common perception, viz., the common opinion that it will prove interesting, the common sentiment of sport, and the common desire to see the fight. Such a group would be a public. Thus we speak quite correctly of a public at the theater. Such a body of individuals are

brought together by mutual opinions, mutual sentiments, and mutual desires.

From what has been said it must be clear that in our present civilization there are a vast number of publics and a vast number of public opinions. Upon every question of general interest, or even of interest to a comparatively few, there is at least one public opinion and perhaps several. There is the protectionist public, the free-trade public, the reciprocity public, and the tariff-for-revenue public; there is the historical public, the economic public, the sociological public, the psychological public, and the political-science public. Each of these may again form two or more publics. Those psychologists who pursue the inductive and laboratory methods form a public over against those who adhere to the *a-priori* method. In the realm of science and art we call them schools. There is the school of Austin, the school of Bentham, and the school of Mill; also the pre-Raphaelite, the impressionistic, and the romantic school. Each of these is a public with its own public opinion. When any new question of any importance comes up there are at once at least two opinions formed, defended by two publics. In the struggle for supremacy, one may gain such a predominance over the other as to be recognized as the ruling opinion. We then say that public opinion has pronounced its verdict, or that the weight of public opinion favors such and such a proposal, or simply that public opinion is in favor of this or that. We are prone to forget that there may be still an opposing public opinion. When we say that public opinion in the United States favors a protective tariff, what we mean is that among the several public opinions concerning the question of the tariff, that one which favors a protective tariff is predominant.

Every such term as public opinion, which is so difficult of strict definition, is, of course, used in a number of different senses. Usage varies. There are a number of other meanings which must be briefly reviewed. Public opinion is often used to signify the opinions in which all persons in a country are agreed; those opinions about which unanimity can be obtained.

Another usage, which errs quite as far in the other direction, is that which makes public opinion stand for the sum-total of all opinions on any subject, or indeed on all subjects. Public opinion here means little else than the mass of human thought. We have often heard such expressions as that public opinion is becoming more rational, or that public opinion now interests itself in far more matters than it used to. It is in this sense that public opinion is erected into a sort of deity, which no

one can locate because it is everywhere, or characterize because it contains both affirmative and negative elements in nearly every quality. It is a potent cabalistic expression to conjure with, but entirely too indefinite and all-embracing to be of any scientific worth.

Then again public opinion is taken to represent the opinion of the educated classes upon any subject. This will in no wise answer our purpose.

This much-abused term is also used as synonymous with social conscience. M. Hanotaux says, "Public opinion is the conscience of the social body." It is said that *Vox populi est vox dei* is untrue unless *vox populi* or public opinion be taken as the social conscience. We have already noticed the danger of using a terminology which assumes the organic theory of the state. If by social conscience is meant the consciences of all individuals composing a public, then this usage is quite impossible.

Another usage of public opinion which is widespread, even among writers of note on political science, is that which identifies public opinion with one of its organs. The press or the electorate is often confused with public opinion. This, in the first place, entirely ignores the numerous public opinions with which the press and the electorate have nothing to do.

206. Crowd Attitudes and Public Opinion ¹

Psychologically speaking "the public" means to an individual an imagined crowd in which (as he believes) certain opinions, feelings, and overt reactions are universal. What these responses are imagined to be is determined by the press, by rumor, and by social projection. Impressed by some bit of public propaganda, the individual assumes that the impression created is universal and therefore of vital consequence. Thus the impression of universality is exploited and commercialized both on the rostrum and in the daily press. Newspaper columns abound in such statements as "it is the consensus of opinion here," "telegrams (of remonstrance or petition) are pouring in from all sides," "widespread amazement was felt," and the like.

In one of our large cities a great ado was created recently by the sensational newspapers in the interests of a reduction in street-railway fare. A petition to the Legislature for lower fares was circulated and

¹ This selection from F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology*, pp. 308-09, is used by permission of, and by arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company, the authorized publishers.

a large number of signatures secured. The newspapers meanwhile magnified the public co-operation by editorial, article, and photograph. The names of petitioners were affixed not to the pages of a book, but to a roll which when unwound would form "a document a mile and a half long" and which "could be wrapped around the State House many times." This "remarkable document" was "rolled on a giant reel," and hauled to the State House "in a truck" (although a single man with a wheelbarrow would have sufficed). Notwithstanding this great array of names secured and exaggerated through the illusion of universality, no facts or figures were produced in support of legislative interference with the existing rate of fare. The whole movement was a piece of newspaper and political propaganda. And the "remarkable document" was laid upon the table. Deception lurks in flaring headlines. Our eye is caught by these "scare-heads," and we say to ourselves unconsciously: "This is big news: it is printed large to attract universal attention. Hence every one else is looking at it as I am doing. That which everybody is interested in must be of great importance." And we proceed, ready to be duly impressed with what follows. Newspapers which capitalize the illusion of universality in this way unfortunately have little to say that is fit to read. But the unscrupulous and sensation-hunting journalist has scored in securing attention and in controlling a portion of public opinion through social projection and the illusion of universality.

207. Facts, Discussion, and Consensus of Opinion¹

The group of thinkers in concert is not inevitably subject to "crowd psychology." And for the thought-process the group has certain actual advantages as well as disabilities. The thought-process, as described by John Dewey, runs through a cycle, in which appear (1) a problem raised by disturbing facts; (2) an idea suggested as key to it; (3) the development of that idea's leadings. At the first stage, where concentration is a requisite, "solo" thinking has the advantage. But at the second and third stages the special requisite is that a variety of promising ideas shall come to mind. Here, as Graham Wallas has pointed out, group thinking has the advantage of a greatly extended range of mental associations. "In individual thought the thinker waits (in the problem-attitude) till some promising idea comes into his mind, and then dwells on it till further ideas spring from it. A group of people, however, engaged in dialectic, can, like a pack of hounds, follow up

¹ From *Joining in Public Discussion*, pp. viii-xiii, by Alfred Dwight Sheffield, copyright 1922, George H. Doran Company, Publishers.

the most promising idea that occurs to any one of them." Suggestions that merely seem plausible at first may thus have their unfit consequences promptly traced out, whereas suggestions that at first seem without profitable bearings may get from one and another in the group a development that transforms them into ideas recognizably apt and fruitful. The whole process, too, will get in the group a constant testing of its ideas by the atmosphere of the discussion,—by the instinctive value-comments, too delicate for words, that play about the subject in eager tones, embarrassed silences, quizzical smiles, and the turn of eyes.

Not "Majority Win" nor Compromise but "Consensus" the Ideal Aim

The second consideration,—that the solution of a controversy should in some measure *harmonize* the differing ideas advocated—commits us to a new view of the possibilities for group decision. The popular view looks to nothing more than the carrying of a majority vote. It assumes that the majority idea and the minority idea must remain irreconcilable, that the clash over the drink evil, for example, must remain the one sharply drawn between the idea of "prohibition" and the idea of "license." Decision in the arguing group will then resemble the decision in a group playing football. One man hugs fast his smooth, round impenetrable idea, gets a majority to put the momentum of their wills behind it, and drives it to a score over the prostrate wills of the minority. That, indeed, is the best that can be achieved in the counsels of our ordinary unions, clubs, and political caucuses, made up as they are of people untrained to any co-operative method or spirit in arguing. But scientific students of discussion will wish to achieve something better. They realize that a decision will be carried out far more satisfactorily if the minority against it have been brought into some adjustment towards it, instead of merely beaten as a faction. Such an adjustment is possible only if the decision embodies *something* contributed by the minority. Emotionally it should represent "composition of forces," not an all-levelling blast from one quarter. Intellectually it should be an "integration" of ideas,—what Miss M. P. Follett has called a "group-idea." Viewed totally it would be what we shall call a "consensus."

As an ideal aim for discussion the "consensus" is not to be identified with compromise. A compromise between opposed ideas leaves them still mutually unpenetrated. It yields a mere balance between their claims, a harmony merely quantitative, each idea getting a measure of acceptance less than was hoped for, but neither getting any change of quality by taking into itself acceptable factors from the other. In the drink controversy, for example, the compromise decision is represented by

local option. Two ideas here contend to oust each other: the idea of total prohibition and the idea of general license. Local option gives each idea acceptance in some places and not in others; but it leaves the partisans quite external to each other's minds. A compromise usually means that the work of discussion has been stalled by stubborn prejudices all round.

A true consensus, on the other hand, means that the discussion has been the accurate and considerate expression of concerted thinking. Just what concerted thinking is has been described by Miss Follett. When A, B, and C are in conference, each with a different idea, they do not build up brickwise a group idea or plan of action by adding their ideas together. They mutually adjust their ideas, each bringing certain factors of his own idea into relation with factors of the others. "A says something. Thereupon a thought arises in B's mind. Is it B's idea or A's? Neither. It is a mingling of the two. We find that A's idea, after having been presented to B and returned to A, has become slightly or largely, different from what it was originally. In like manner it is affected by C, and so on." Meanwhile B's idea has been affected by the others, and so has C's, so that all three ideas come to interact not as distinct psychic units but each as an interpenetrated system of idea-factors and feelings. It is much as in tennis where each man's play is a resultant of his own stroke and of the way the ball has come to him—itsself a resultant of preceding strokes.

Really to illustrate a consensus we should have to reproduce the speeches that evolve it, but we can perhaps suggest how different ideas on the drink question might come thus to "integrate" into one. If A is an anti-saloon worker, B is a bon-vivant, and C is counsel for a brewery, each would doubtless begin by expressing a view that made much of some elements in the question and made little of others. Their differences would spring from the fact that A's chief concern is to see abstinence gain headway, B's is to see social cheer conserved, C's to see the brewing industry saved. But if they can discuss in any spirit of "get-together," they can reach some joint policy,—say that of a tax on drinks so graded as to make the highly alcoholic almost prohibitive and to leave the low-percentage almost free. That policy will reflect a common idea. To share in it A will have been brought to realize that his *essential* concern is with drink abuses, not with drink as such, that alcohol in low percentages may be no more noxious than other common stimulants, and that the brewing interests may cease to corrupt politics if he no longer drives them to politics in self-defense. B and C, likewise, will have modified their views, realizing that the drink evil does call

for some preventive legislation, that neither social pleasures nor business profits, however legitimate, can claim a right of way against public health and morals, and that other considerations, offered by A and by each other, must enter into any just conception of the whole case.

Such an agreement can be called "compromise" only inaccurately. A, B, and C, to be sure, have each toned down the statements with which he began. But this means not that he has ended by sacrificing something of what he really wants, but that he had begun by over-stating his case. Over-statement, in fact, must always be allowed for. It springs partly from a speaker's feeling that the values at stake for him are underrated by his opponents, and partly from the compulsions of rhetoric. Expression in words always involves a mental struggle between precision and emphasis, and under excitement emphasis gets the upper hand—especially at first. Trained disputants all know that there is no come-down in yielding *something* of their contentions.

208. Analysis of Changes in Public Opinion ¹

Changes in public opinion may be discovered by analyzing changes in personal opinion. The 110 persons who furnished the data for the experiments in measuring social distances were asked to select from the lists of races (39 in all) used in the social distance experiments, (a) the races toward which they now have a more friendly feeling than they had ten years ago, and (b) the races toward which they now have a less friendly feeling than formerly. They were also asked to write out at length a description, not an exposition, of the circumstances whereby (a) they now possess a more favorable feeling than they once did toward some one race, and (b) whereby they now have an increased aversion for some race.

Taken all together, the reasons for no change in opinion by some persons toward some races show no habitual opinions formed at all, because of no personal contacts, or else fixed and unchanged habits grounded in either feelings of kinship and sympathy, or else of aversion arising out of personal experience and traditional teaching.

Of the races toward which a favorable change in opinion has been encountered, *personal contacts* arousing a *fellow-feeling* have been experienced.

Sometimes there are more definite evidences than at other times of a *rational* element in the personal sympathetic experiences. The response

¹ Reprinted by permission from E. S. Bogardus "Analyzing Changes in Public Opinion" *J. App. Soc.*: 1925: IX: pp. 372; 374; 376; 376-378; 379; 380-381; 381.

has not been chiefly automatic, but has contained reflective elements.

There were instances where personal contacts were few or missing and where the change to a favorable opinion came about through *second-hand contacts* and more or less *rationally*, due to the *influence of third parties*, such as teachers, and to *wide reading* and *extensive thinking*. (The following document is illustrative.)

Rational, social, toward the Negro (by a Southerner). The early years of my childhood were spent in Louisiana. There I heard of the Negro only as a dirty black person who was on earth simply to work for the white man. Like others in the town I felt that anything was good enough for the Negro and I never questioned the ethics of working the Negro as hard as he would allow us to, and paying him a pittance for his labors. I never thought of the Negro as a human with a soul. As I analyze my attitude I think it was much like my attitude toward beasts of burden; I was never intentionally cruel to them, nor did I desire to see them suffer. But the idea that the Negroes were men and women, with emotions, desires, and instincts like those of the white people never occurred to me. It was not hatred, but thoughtlessness. That a Negro had a soul was preposterous. I thought of Heaven as being populated only by white folks.

This was the idea I received from my elders and it was one I carried with me when I came to California. Here I found conditions very different. My parents lamented the fact that we would have to sit beside Negroes on street cars and in theaters. My father declared he would never lower himself to the level of the "nigger" like the Californians did—he simply could not understand the attitude of the westerner to the Negro. In different places I heard the southerner criticized by the westerner for his "mistreatment" of the Negro. I was suddenly thrust into a new atmosphere and at first I did not know what to make of it, but gradually my ideas began to change to those of my associates.

One of the three things that aided my change of opinion was a United States history class in high school. I had always heard the history of the Civil War presented from the southerner's point of view, now I was to be under a westerner. The teacher tried to present both sides fairly and this spurred me on to study the question with an open mind. I studied exceedingly hard for the examination over this section of the book and tried to form a fair opinion on the Civil War question. My disappointment was keen when my instructor returned the paper saying, "This is a good paper but I see you are still a true southerner."

Later I took a course in Americanization and wrote a paper on the "Achievement of the Negro in the United States." My research for this paper introduced me to the Negroes who were more than cooks and washer-women and gardeners. I saw the Negro as one who possessed a brain equal to that of the white man. At this time I was a member of a club that was

studying the book *J. W. Thinks Black*. Here I had an opportunity to see the black man with a soul, worshipping the same God that I worshipped, and my idea of Heaven changed.

The change was a gradual one which covered from four to six years. There were many indirect influences that helped me to change my opinion, but the thing that had the greatest influence was the United States history class, the class in Americanization, and *J. W. Thinks Black*. In other words, the factors operating in my change of opinion were the personality of leaders and reading matter that bore on the subject. These two things, it seems to me, are the greatest factors in the change of public opinion.

The changes of opinion from neutral to unfavorable, or favorable to unfavorable, usually occur on the basis of a few personal experiences, where the *feelings*, not of sympathy, but of *disgust* or *fear*, are aroused. The reactions are more or less automatic, and deep-seated, being exceedingly difficult, as a rule, to overcome.

Other instances of changes of increasing aversion bring in the *rational* element more definitely than in those already noted, although feelings of disgust, fear, or both may still predominate. The primary factors are often *traditions, myths, past propaganda*; these are often long-lived and doggedly influential. They have come through *third parties* who have prestige with the influenced. A part of the truth, the unpleasant part, has been emphasized, obscuring the favorable traits of a given race.

The rôle of *a few personal experiences* in changing one's opinion overshadows all other factors. But the question still remains, why does personal contact sometimes lead to a favorable and again to an unfavorable opinion? Why is fellow-feeling sometimes aroused, and again, disgust or fear? The training of the person experiencing the change in opinion is evidently of prime importance. If one is accustomed to filth, then filth is not likely to arouse feelings of disgust; but if one be well trained in health matters, then filth is likely to arouse disgust. The reactions of fear and disgust means, of course, that one's fundamental wish for security has been stimulated.

The attitude of the immigrant is also important, for if he has developed the habit of suspiciousness, subtleness, trickery, lying, as conditions of survival to which he has been accustomed, he will arouse distrust and disgust in this country. If, on the other hand, he comes from a social and political environment where frankness, open-mindedness, fair play, has been stimulated, he will display these attributes here and arouse sympathetic responses.

To us the aliens who are self-conscious and reserved are suspected. On the other hand, they are often self-conscious and reserved because they are alien and different. If the immigrant is more vivacious than we are, he arouses our contempt. If he be more taciturn and unmovable he stimulates fear in us. To the degree that he is a pure immigrant, he is different, and yet the greater the differences the more unfavorable an opinion we are likely to have of him.

Another fact disclosed by the original personal data is that a change from an unfavorable to a favorable opinion usually takes place by a prolonged process.

Changes in public opinion seem to operate similarly. It takes many proofs and a long time element to change public opinion from an unfavorable to a favorable basis, while a few instances, perhaps no more than one, will shift public opinion into unfavorable reactions of a relatively lasting nature. These few instances, looming large in one's personal life, or played up in the newspapers, blind one to the thousand and one favorable traits of the given race.

209. Public Opinion and Crime¹

In view of this general attitude toward the men and institutions that make and enforce laws, it is clear that there can be little respect for law as such. There may be some fear of detection and punishment, but little inner opposition to lawbreaking so long as one is not affected and his intimate associates do not object. The general public attitude seems to be that one should use his own discretion in regard to obeying the laws. In fact one of the prominent newspapers in the autumn of 1923 practically advised people to use their own discretion in the matter of obeying a law that had been passed.

When this attitude is taken the problem is to do the things one wants to do without getting caught. Some crimes are taboo in some circles but the crimes that are taboo in one circle may not be in another. And then when one is caught, the problem is to "fix things." It is popularly assumed that "respectable" people generally succeed in doing this if they have money enough. The jailer of Cook county, in Illinois, in 1922 gave as his fundamental explanation of the prevalence of crime the public belief in the possibility of "fixing things." Because of this opinion regarding the courts and police, these institutions are regarded by those who have less money as selling justice. According to that opinion

¹ Reprinted by permission from E. H. Sutherland "Public Opinion as a Cause of Crime" *J. App. Soc.* 1924: IX: pp. 55-56.

the principal reason for being arrested or convicted is poverty. And it is probable that no part of the population is better acquainted with the corruption and graft in the legislative, judicial, and police systems, so far as they exist, than are the professional criminals and the near-criminals. Those who are most insistent on the observation of law frequently take the law into their own hands, thus violating the law. The lynchings, Ku Klux Klan raids, deportations, and similar practices are illustrations of the public distrust of law and of formal institutions.

And thus we have modern society divided, passing many laws, and having respect for few of them. It has been asserted that we have never in the history of the world had as much government and that government has never had as little influence as now. Both the number and the weakness of laws are explained by the same set of influences. Consequently, in contrast with public opinion in the simpler forms of society where crime was prevented by an even, uniform, and consistent public opinion, many activities are pronounced crimes in modern society because of the lack of a public opinion of that kind, and many persons perform these acts which are called crimes for the same reason.

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises

1. Distinguish between a "public" and a crowd.
2. Distinguish between opinion and attitude.
3. What is the relation of the mores to public opinion?
4. Discuss the soundness of Park and Burgess' point of view that public opinion depends on differences of opinion as well as likenesses.
5. If it be true that public opinion is a mere "illusion of universality," does it necessarily follow that it has little significance in the social process? Discuss in the light of earlier chapters, especially chapters XVI and XVII.
6. What according to Allport does the "public" mean to the individual?
7. If Munro is correct in saying that public opinion is formulated by the few leaders, what place has the mass of people in the expression of public opinion? That is, how much place has the average man in forming public opinion?
8. How does Ellwood distinguish between group opinion and popular sentiment?
9. What type of group or public opinion is rational?
10. What factors according to Ellwood determine the degree of rationality in public opinion?
11. What is the traditional democratic theory of public opinion in regard to government? Is it sound? Discuss pro and con.

12. List some of the groups or publics today which develop group or public opinion. Contrast with public opinion in a primary group.
13. Cite an instance of a change in public opinion over some question.
14. What is the advantage of the small committee or discussion group over the audience or the crowd in the matter of:
 - a) arrival at facts;
 - b) degree of emotionality generated;
 - c) rationality of consensus;
 - d) possibility of putting consensus into action.
15. How may one account for the amount of crime in such a city as Chicago?

B. Topics for Class Reports

1. Review Lippmann's *The Phantom Public* for class discussion.
2. Review Bagehot's *Physics and Politics*, Chapter V.
3. Report on Rice's paper on changes in political preference. (Cf. bibliography.)

C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers

1. The Relation of the Politician to Public Opinion.
2. The Analysis of Public Opinion in Some Specific Community.
3. The Mechanisms in the Formation of Public Opinion.

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CHAPTER XXVI

THE ORGANS OF PUBLIC OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

The present chapter deals with the organs of public opinion, especially the newspaper. In the simple, primary group, opinion was carried from mouth-to-mouth and from face-to-face in a direct way of gossip, folklore and legend. Today with the complexity of groups and modes of living, other organs or carriers of opinion have come into action. Notable among these, of course, is the newspaper. There are also, the weekly and monthly periodicals, there are books and some pamphlets. The movie and the radio also furnish us a novel means of communication and play a part in the formation and extension of public opinion.

Shepard describes some of the more common organs of public opinion. With the increase in literacy in our country the newspaper has played a very great rôle in the formation of opinion. Wilcox in 1899 made an analysis of the content of a large number of newspapers. A part of his published report is given in this chapter. In 1924 another analysis of a similar nature was made. Certain changes in content were evident, especially, however, the increased space given to advertisements and the decrease in space given over to editorial and readers' opinions. The business department of the newspaper has come to overshadow all other aspects of it. It is today more and more a great commercial concern interested in profits and organized with an eye single to stock dividends.

Lloyd's analysis of the lack of professional conscience in newspaper circles is given in brief summary. One should consult his full discussion of this matter.

Lord Bryce's statement of the non-moral nature of the newspaper is excellent. Its impersonality, its lack of compunction and of responsibility make it at once a powerful and at times a dangerous or-

gan in molding opinions. Nowhere is this more easily seen than in the United States. The prestige and yet irresponsibility of the newspapers in our country is simply enormous.

Many suggestions have been made for the correction of the difficulties of the present-day press. Jenks and others have advocated the philanthropic endowment of the press in order to take it out of the hands of pecuniary interests. So far, little has come of this method. We have seen endowed weekly periodicals come and go within the past two decades, and newspapers could scarcely exist without conformity to the standards of business laid down by their *confreres*. In fact, as Wilcox points out in his article, we already have certain types of endowments of some newspapers, witness Mr. Hearst. And if the government should take over this function, as Wilcox further suggests, would such a press be free from propaganda and materials favorable to the administration at the time? The danger from either private or public endowment of the press is too great to offer us much help at the moment. Any betterment in newspaper control, in dissemination of news and in editorial expression is more likely come in part, at least, through the profession of journalism itself rather than through any external scheme worked out by legislative reformers and over-zealous guardians of the public welfare.

II. MATERIALS

210. Organs of Public Opinion¹

By an organ of public opinion we mean any agency which gives utterance of expression to otherwise inarticulate opinions which publics may entertain. But just as the Delphian priests who transcribed the oracles of Apollo were in a position to greatly influence the god's deliverances, so the organs of public opinion often exercise a most potent influence upon the opinions which they express. They mold as well as express public opinion. Publics have been compelled from time to time to secure the offices of new organs in order to obtain adequate expression for their opinions. As public opinion has developed, the number of these organs has greatly increased. In any popular government, it is of the utmost importance that public opinion should be voiced truly and adequately.

¹ Reprinted by permission from W. J. Shepard "Public Opinion" *Am. J. Soc.* 1909-10: XV: pp. 44-48; 49-51; 51-54; 59. Copyright by the University of Chicago.

Confining our attention now to political public opinion, we shall discuss some of the more important organs. These may be conveniently divided into two classes, governmental, or secondary, and non-governmental, or primary. The former include such as are as well organs of government as organs of public opinion. They are rulers, both elective and hereditary; ministers; legislatures; courts, and electorates. The limits of this article do not permit us to more than mention these governmental organs. They only assume the character of organs of public opinion after they are compelled to do so by public opinion acting through the primary organs.

The simplest primary organ of public opinion is conversation. Diderot, in 1775, in a letter to Neckar, defined public opinion in the following words:

"Opinion! that volatile something, with whose power for good and for evil we are all acquainted, in its origin is nothing but the work of a small number of men who speak only after having thought and who continually form in different sections of society centers of instruction from whence both errors and reasoned truths are disseminated little by little to the farthest limits of the city in which they are established, as articles of faith."

This describes accurately the process by which public opinion is transmitted and grows in an age before the development of other organs. Conversation is not supplanted by new organs when they appear, but continues even today perhaps the most important of all methods of expression of opinion. Bryce, has emphasized the importance of conversation in this connection, and Tarde has graphically described the effect of conversation upon the formation and diffusion of opinion. Other organs of public opinion, especially the press, have exercised a powerful incidental influence upon conversation. Before the era of the press the subjects of conversation were connected with the life of the village or the parish. Different communities talked about different matters, but the same subjects were discussed for indefinitely long periods of time. The press has unified conversation in space and diversified it in time. All over the land the people are conversing about the same matters this morning, but tomorrow they will be talking about a totally different set of topics. This increasing identity of conversation over wider and wider areas is of the utmost importance in developing the power of public opinion. Undoubtedly the spread of democratic ideas is partially due to the increase in the number and complexity of public opinions. But the former has in its turn reacted upon public opinion, and topics which one hundred and fifty years ago were re-

served for the conversation of court circles are now discussed with interest and more or less intelligence by all classes. The advantages of conversation as an organ of public opinion are apparent. No special equipment is required; no pecuniary expense is involved; it is not necessary to interest or assemble large numbers of people, and yet all classes and conditions of men can with equal advantage participate in this mode of public-opinion-making. In one's home, or at the club, in the leisure hour after dinner in the society of friends, under the soothing influence of a good cigar, conversation, so far from taxing our energies, is a pleasure which satisfies one of the most fundamental demands of our nature, the gratification of our social instinct. In conversation everything is laid bare; nothing is covered up for the sake of appearances. Men talk about a great many things which they would never write about. Its limitations are likewise obvious. Without the assistance of the press conversation can only busy itself with the gossip of the village; where it is concerned with the affairs of the nation it is so diffuse that it requires itself organs to become definitely articulate. In the multiplicity of voices the words that are uttered are lost; other agencies must be employed to gather and sift the responses of the oracle.

Correspondence has been a most useful organ of public opinion. It is conversation carried on at a distance, and both enjoys much the same advantages and suffers from the same limitations. The same causes which have favored conversation—increase of leisure, unification of language, diffusion of common knowledge, equalization of rank—have contributed to render correspondence more active, but under special conditions which affect this alone, viz., travel, which renders absence more frequent; popularization of the art of writing and a reasonably good postal service. The press, however, which has stimulated and nourished conversation has destroyed many of the sources of correspondence. One is not nowadays inclined to sit down and write his friend a long letter detailing the news of the city, accompanied with his own comments and views, as was the custom of the eighteenth century. He knows that his friend will already have read the news in his morning paper and have had the benefit of the editor's comment, which is likely to be more interesting and valuable than anything that he can write.

Mr. Bryce has also suggested that the very cheap postage which we enjoy today, and the practice of prepayment by means of stamps, while increasing the volume of correspondence a thousand fold, has, perhaps for that very reason, diminished its worth as an organ of public opinion.

When one knew that his friend must pay a shilling upon receipt of the letter which he was writing, he would take pains to make the epistle worth the price. With the cheapening of the postage to a penny, the contents have lost their value at the same ratio. With the urbanization of modern life the number of our friends and acquaintances has greatly increased, while the intimacy which characterized the friendships of the time of Doctor Johnson has certainly diminished. What we have to say now addresses itself less and less to individuals and more to groups of increasing size. Our real correspondent is becoming more and more the public. Letter-writing is giving place to an instrumentality better fitted to the wider audience.

Just as books grew out of the monologue or discourse, so journalism is a development of conversation and correspondence. At first journals were letters addressed to some person and duplicated a number of times. There was such an incipient journalism before the invention of printing. The epistles of St. Paul are of this character; had there been a religious weekly he would have published them as articles. Modern journalism dates, however, only from the eighteenth century, commencing as a side issue of a few enterprising book-sellers. It gradually assumed the dignity of a separate profession, and at length became differentiated into three callings: publishing, news-collecting, and editing. These three interests correspond exactly to the three functions which, Mr. Bryce says, every newspaper fulfils, viz., that of weathercock, narrator, and advocate. All these three elements contribute to make a newspaper an organ of public opinion. Every paper is a compromise between these three interests. The publisher represents the element of capital, which, in the great modern daily, is all-essential; only very rich men or wealthy corporations are able to start a great newspaper today.

News, and not comment or instruction, is what newspaper readers primarily demand. No matter how ably edited a paper may be, unless it has facilities for collecting the news from all over the world at the earliest possible date it cannot succeed. This is the most expensive item in every journalism. The reading public demands telegraphic reports upon every matter of possible interest from ministerial crises and quotations of the stock exchanges to details of football games and the trousseaus of fine ladies at Newport. This demand for news is not the product of modern civilization. Ever since the days of ancient Greece men have spent much of their time in either telling or hearing some new thing. News is the raw material out of which public opinion is made. Its quantity must be proportionate to the number of subjects upon which publics form opinions today. The telegraph has been responsible

for the vast increase of the volume of news and so of the number of public opinions. News enables the newspaper reader to watch the progress of any series of events with the utmost actuality. Like spectators at the theater, they await the development of the plot with the keenest interest. The love of a good story or play is one of the deepest-seated passions of the human heart, and this is successfully appealed to by the newspaper. We await with eagerness for the rising of the curtain to the second act in the tragedy of Russia and wonder whether the villain or the hero will get the better of it. It is because the multitude is so interested that the editors, who play the part of antique chorus, gain the attention of the audience for their comments on the drama which is being presented. The newspapers should be the mirror of life, the reflection of the times. They should not attempt expurgation, but they ought not, on the other hand, to distort facts or make them appear worse than they are. Yellow journals are mirrors whose surfaces are not true planes and which therefore produce distorted reflections and images which are mere caricatures.

The Marquis of Salisbury is reported to have said that the special correspondent is coming to supersede the editor. He is nearer the spot where things happen which people wish to hear about. But it must be remembered that news itself requires editing; not merely the editorials, which occupy less and less proportional space, but the sifting and arrangement of news is the function of the editor, and in this he wields an influence of very great importance. Impressions and ideas are thus inculcated quite as effectively as by direct exhortation and argument. There would certainly be some advantages in the complete separation of the functions of reporting and comment. Lord Rosebery has suggested this. The editor of a daily paper is in no position to form a matured opinion upon an event, the telegraphic report of which has just arrived probably in an inaccurate and exaggerated form. The function of comment, it would seem, should be reserved for the weekly, while the daily should confine itself to news. This proposal is, however, quite impracticable. Not only would it be impossible to compel the daily paper to relinquish this prerogative, but the public, while less interested in comment than in news, demands its editorial pabulum to be served up smoking hot along with the rest of its daily intellectual rations. Its prime requirement is news, but it also wants an immediate interpretation of the news. The newspaper reader is very tolerant of errors, inaccuracies, and mistakes; the editor may even reverse his attitude when it becomes necessary—consistency, so vitally important to the politician, is not required of the writer of leading articles. But it is

all-essential to have an opinion and to have it at once. When a new question arises, editors sometimes try to hedge upon it until they can determine the drift of public opinion; but this must be done very cleverly and not last too long if they are not to lose their influence in their very attempt to retain it. Every paper has its clientèle, who "swear by it" as the colloquialism goes. The editor gives his paper a distinct character; it is Republican, Democratic, or Independent; radical or conservative, pessimistic or idealistic. These qualities attract readers of like temperamental tendencies. Any new question is therefore likely to be viewed by editor and reader from the same angle of observation, and usually the former is not at a loss to know what the latter will think about any new occurrence and free to develop his argument according to the well-known principles and tendencies of his journal. Notwithstanding all his limitations the newspaper-editor wields a power in the molding of public opinion greater than anyone else except perhaps statesmen of the highest rank.

These three functions of weathercock, narrator, and advocate are performed by every newspaper; in some, one predominates, in some, another. There is much difference of opinion as to the question whether the newspaper is a good reflector of public opinion. A writer in the *American Journal of Sociology* takes the view that newspapers make and mar political fortunes; create great men out of next to nothing and destroy reputations of real leaders; decide questions of peace and war; overawe and coerce politicians, rulers, and courts. Commenting on news is done by editors without any reserve. They know no authority. Mature opinions of scholars and experts are treated with flippancy and contempt. This is all accomplished by means of iteration and bombast, to which the average citizen yields. His sentiments and notions are formed for him by this mysterious "we" and he is even unconscious of the fact. Mr. Stead takes much the same view. No systematic effort, he says, is made to gauge public opinion. At present the journalistic assumption of uttering the public opinion is in most cases a hollow fraud. There seems little room left here for the office of weathercock. Mr. Peirce, the editor of *Public Opinion*, is also of the opinion that the metropolitan dailies are not so good reflectors of public opinion as the county newspapers and the journals of the smaller towns. After Dewey's victory at Manila the question of Expansion was agitated and a favorable opinion reached by the small western papers several weeks before the New York dailies had awakened to emergence of a new political issue of prime importance. Mr. Bryce some years ago noted a similar tendency in England, which has undoubtedly become stronger by this time. The

long pre-eminence which the *Times* enjoyed was due to its quick detection of any change in the public pulse. The provincial papers are today better reflectors of public opinion than the great London dailies. There is no doubt that newspapers have on various occasions been seriously at fault as to the prevailing sentiment of the country. The general elections of 1880 and 1885 in England revealed a totally different public opinion than the newspapers had anticipated, that of 1906 was likewise a great surprise, although in this case it was only the extent of the Liberal victory that was not foreseen. In 1896 all the newspapers in New York were deceived as to the issue of the election. The newspapers are, moreover, very inaccurate reflectors of what the people are thinking and talking about. This must be apparent to anyone who has been absent from his country for a few months, no matter how diligently he has perused the newspapers. He has not enjoyed the benefit of the organ of conversation. Many a matter is glossed over in the public press from motives of discretion which is handled without reserve in the conversation of a few congenial friends. If in America and England newspapers are by no means perfect weathercocks they are much less so in other lands where the capacity for public opinion is itself not so highly developed. The virulent and demoralizing press of France certainly does not register French public opinion to anything like the degree of accuracy that obtains among Anglo-Saxon newspapers, while the German press is either appropriated by the government or fettered by press laws.

There are a number of means by which publics express themselves, which are all clearly related and usually used together, yet we have no general term which includes them all. Public speaking, public assemblies, the passing of resolutions, petitions, and addresses, delegations sent to wait upon governmental authorities, organization of political associations, and other demonstrations of various sorts which are calculated to attract wide attention and make a strong impression, are all means which publics continually take to gain adherents and bring the pressure of their opinions, sentiments, and desires to bear upon the organs of government. Mr. Jephson in his great work on the *Platform* has traced the rise and development of all these forms of public expression in England. But manifestly the "Platform," meaning, as he himself defines it, "every political speech at a public meeting, excluding those from the pulpit and those in courts of justice," is far too narrow a term to include all these various phenomena. Since, however, the central and most important of these agencies, the one upon which the others all in a measure depend, is the public speech, it may, in the absence of a

better term, not be too violent a use of synecdoche if we use the platform to designate the entire group of organs above enumerated.

Developing later than the press, the platform is its only possible rival in effectiveness and power. It came into existence in England during the eighteenth century, suggested probably by the great religious meetings of Wesley and Whitefield. The times were, however, ripe for the development of new organs for expressing the public will. Southey, in his *Life of Wesley*, says:

"Perhaps the manner in which Methodism has familiarized the lower classes to the work of combining in associations, making rules for their own governance, raising funds, and communicating from one part of the kingdom to another, may be reckoned among the incidental evils which have resulted from it; but in this respect it has only facilitated a process to which other causes had given birth.

"There has been isolated cases of popular clamor, as in 1733 against Walpole's excise scheme, but as a definite instrument for expressing the public will the platform dates from 1763, when it was used very effectively against the government's proposal of a tax on cider. Public meetings, petitions, resolutions, instructions to members in the House of Commons were all used with such good effect that within three years the obnoxious measure was repealed."

(Here follows a review of the development of the platform in England down to the present. The outstanding events in this history were the case of John Wilkes, the championing of the platform by Burke, the restrictions on the platform during the period of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, culminating in the Six Acts of 1819 "the effect of which was to completely gag the press and smother the platform." After 1829 and 1832 the freedom of the press and the platform came to be firmly established in England. K. Y.)

One very frequently encounters the statement that the press is *the* organ of public opinion. So Tarde, in his work, *L'Opinion et la Foule*, totally disregards the platform as an organ of public opinion, as does Godkin also, who says, "There are only two ways in which public opinion upon political questions finds expression or is thought to find it. One is the vote at elections, the other is journalism." To anyone at all familiar with the history of the platform such a view seems extremely shortsighted. We have already quoted Mr. Stead's opinion of the power of the editor; yet in the same article he says, "Public meetings, it will be said, are superior even to newspapers as exponents of public feeling.

It is true, because a public meeting is the direct utterance of the voice of demos without any intermediary. There is nothing in England so powerful as a series of public meetings." The platform is more tangible than the press and possesses the greater authority, which the personal presence of numbers gives to expressed opinion. It is, however, dependent for its greatest influence upon its rival. Were not the speeches of ministers and other public men printed in all newspapers, they would influence only the few hundreds who had assembled to hear them. But when published they have a weight greater than leading articles. Through the assistance of the press the platform has multiplied its influence many fold.

211. The Content of Newspapers: 1899¹

As the organization of society becomes more complex and far-reaching, the importance of the newspaper in the distribution of intelligence inevitably increases. The modern social man finds himself in much the same position as the ancient individual who first discovered confusion in his sensations and believed that his senses were deceiving him. The newspaper is to society much what sight and hearing are to the individual, and it is a momentous day when the community, overwhelmed with newspaper sensations, begins to doubt and discriminate. The function of the newspaper in a well-ordered society is to control the state through the authority of facts, not to drive nations and social classes headlong into war through the power of passion and prejudice.

There are five general divisions under which newspaper matter falls. These are:

- I. News.
- II. Illustrations.
- III. Literature.
- IV. Opinion.
- V. Advertisements.

Under "News" should be included every item that is a first-hand report of current events. "Illustrations" include all pictorial matter outside of advertisements. Under "Literature" are included serial stories, special studies, humorous sketches, jokes, poetry, book reviews, and foreign correspondence not in the nature of news. "Opinion" is made up of letters, exchanges and editorials. "Advertisements" are items of any

¹ Reprinted by permission from D. F. Wilcox "The American Newspaper" *Annals of the American Academy of Political & Social Science*, July 1900: XVI: pp. 56; 61-66; 66-67; 73-74; 77-79.

kind for the printing of which the newspaper receives direct compensation, as well as business announcements made by the newspaper in its own behalf.

"News," for which the newspaper is named, generally occupies the largest share of space, and is made up of very heterogeneous elements. During the Spanish-American war—and the analysis which forms the basis of this essay was made of papers published at that time—the war news formed so large and so special a department—sometimes occupying more than one-fourth of the newspaper's entire space—as to deserve separate classification. Accordingly, under the head of "News" we have three main subdivisions—war news, general news, and special news.

The distinction between general news and special news, though in some cases difficult of application, is nevertheless of first-rate importance. Briefly, general news is news that is edited; special news is news that is not edited. General news is reported inexactly, and sometimes incorrectly; special news is reported exactly, and men do business in reliance upon it. General news may be subdivided into foreign news, political news, news of crime and vice, and miscellaneous news. Special news may be subdivided into business news, sporting news, and society news. "Opinion" may be divided into editorials, which give expression to the newspaper's individual policy, and letters and exchanges, which express, in a more or less restricted way, public opinion in general. "Advertisements" may be separated into six classes—want, retail, medical, political and legal, miscellaneous, and self advertisements.

According to this analysis, the matter contained in the newspaper is arranged under eighteen heads, which may now be described more in detail:

1. *War news* includes news of the actual military operations of the combatants in the field; news of the organization and discipline of the army, of the movements of troops at home, of the camps, and of the food supplies for the soldiers; news of legislation by Congress, and the general policy of the government in regard to war revenues and expenditures; news and notes referring to individuals brought into prominence by the war; and news of the foreign relations of the United States as affected by the war.

2. *Foreign news* includes reports of all current events in foreign countries which are not connected with our own wars, and which are reported on account of their international interest. This separate classification of foreign news would be illogical except on the hypothesis that society is, on the whole, organized with reference to political divisions.

3. *Political news* includes news of current administration and legislation in nation, commonwealth, and city, as well as news of party conventions, candidates, and speeches, of conferences and discussions calculated to influence political action, and of elections.

4. *News of crime and vice* includes accounts of the commission of crimes and of the trial and punishment of criminals, and news of suicides, brawls, drunkenness, prostitution, divorce proceedings, etc.

5. *Miscellaneous news* includes reports of celebrations and meetings, some personal notes, general news of trusts, labor unions, and strikes, religious news, and other general news not included under preceding heads.

6. *Business news* includes regular reports of organized business life, news of the markets, financial and commercial, insurance notes, railway notes, court calendars and legal news, shipping news, real estate news, and weather bulletins.

7. *Sporting news* includes news of baseball, football, golf, cycling, cricket, chess, billiards, prize-fighting, yachting, and all sorts of recognized general interest.

8. *Society news*, the least definite of the divisions under special news, includes a number of items ranging from obituary and marriage lists through reports of music and the drama, to more general news of "society" as it is at Newport and elsewhere.

9. *Illustrations* include cartoons, illustrative sketches, and portraits. Cartoons comprise all pictorial caricatures and humorous representations giving point to the news of the day. Sketches include drawings of buildings and scenes, whether illustrative of crime or of war, and all professedly *bona fide* illustrations of news and literature, other than portraits.

10. *Literature* includes the various kinds of matter enumerated in an earlier paragraph, and ranges between wide extremes in both quantity and quality. Many "exchanges" should, perhaps, be classed under this head, but on account of the difficulty of sorting them, all exchanges are classed together under a later head.

11. *Editorials* include the editor's comments upon current events, news summaries on the editorial page, and editorial articles on science, literature and art.

12. *Letters and exchanges* include all signed communications to the editor from general public, and all articles or items copied from other journals. This division does not include signed news correspondence or the dispatches of the Associated Press or of the news syndicates.

13. *Want advertisements* include those so designated by the papers themselves and, in general, most of the advertisements occupying only a few lines each and placed together in columns of nearly solid printed matter.

14. *Retail advertisements* include chiefly the large mass of advertisements calculated to attract local custom to mercantile establishments, and represent roughly the attractions of the "shopping district."

15. *Medical advertisements* include advertisements of sanitariums, special treatments, and patent medicines ranging from "Cuticura Soap" to "Paine's Celery Compound." Advertisements of this class often refer to sexual disorders, and thinly-veiled announcements of criminal medical practice not infrequently appear.

16. *Political and legal advertisements* include reports and notices the publication of which is required by law, whether paid for out of the public treasury or by individuals. The proceedings of municipal and county legislative boards, lists of delinquent taxes, and notices of sheriff sales, mortgage foreclosures, and the like, make up the bulk of this division.

17. *Miscellaneous advertisements* are composed, chiefly, of transportation, financial, educational, amusement, hotel, and summer resort advertisements. This division of advertisements corresponds roughly to the "business" division of special news.

18. *Self advertisements* include notices referring to price, circulation, the Sunday issue, some special feature, or other topics for announcement or self-gratulation.

The writer has received sample copies of 240 of the 250 leading dailies already described. Of 186 published in the twenty-one principal news circles, 147—136 English and eleven foreign—have been analyzed in detail. In this analysis, each paper was examined column by column and the amount of matter coming under the several subdivisions was estimated down to the twentieth of a column. The totals under each subdivision were reduced to percentages of the whole, and the papers in each news circle were compared. General percentages were made out for the papers in each news circle taken in aggregate, and by comparison of news circles, averages for the whole country were obtained. The copies analyzed were, for the most part issues for some day in June, 1898, but quite a number bear date, September 1898, and a few were issued in other months. In addition to this analysis of single copies, a full week's issues in September, 1898, and also in September, 1899, of two great dailies, the *New York Times* and the *Chicago Record*, were analyzed. All these papers were affected, though not in the same

degree, by the existence of the war with Spain and the resulting complications in the Philippines.

The various kinds of newspaper matter were found to occupy on the average for the whole country the following percentages of the total space:

I. News .. 55.3	{	a. War news..... 17.9	{	Foreign	1.2
		b. General News... 21.8		Political	6.4
				Crime and vice ..	3.1
				Miscellaneous ...	11.1
				c. Special news.... 15.6	Business
Sporting	5.1				
Society	2.3				
II. Illustrations 3.1					
III. Literature 2.4					
IV. Opinion 7.1	{	a. Editorials	3.9		
		b. Letters and exchanges .	3.2		
V. Advertisements 32.1	{	a. Want	5.4		
		b. Retail	13.4		
		c. Medical	3.9		
		d. Political and legal	2.0		
		e. Miscellaneous	6.0		
		f. Self	1.4		

The analysis of individual papers shows "Literature" entirely wanting more frequently than any other class of matter. "Illustrations" are also quite frequently wanting. "News," "Opinion," and "Advertisements" are the three grand divisions of matter that are never wholly lacking. It should, perhaps, be remarked that news of crime and vice, on account of which the newspaper is so often denounced, fills on the average only 3.1 per cent of the whole space, though the percentage ranges in individual papers from zero to 18.8, both extremes being found in New York City.

An examination of the contents of papers arranged in classes according to circulation shows some interesting results. In news of crime and vice, illustrations, and in want and medical advertisements, the percentages of space occupied show an almost steady increase with increase

of circulation, while the opposite is true in political news, editorials, letters and exchanges, and political advertisements. Some of the more important differences between papers having more than 40,000 circulation and those having between 7,500 and 17,500 are as follows:

	40,000 or more	7,500 to 17,500
Crime and vice	4.2 per cent	3.0 per cent
Illustrations	5.2 per cent	1.9 per cent
Want advertisements	6.6 per cent	3.8 per cent
Medical advertisements	4.1 per cent	3.2 per cent
Political news	5.7 per cent	7.0 per cent
Editorials	3.8 per cent	4.3 per cent
Letters and exchanges	1.9 per cent	4.4 per cent
Political advertisements	1.0 per cent	3.6 per cent

But, in spite of all the difficulties, an examination and comparison of contents will be of some use in measuring the relative influence of the two kinds of journalism. A comparison of fifteen yellow with fifteen conservative journals, selected by general appearance and reputation from all parts of the country, showed the following divisions of newspaper matter as characteristic of the two kinds of journalism, respectively:

Of yellow journalism	{	News of crime and vice. Illustrations Want advertisements. Medical advertisements. Self advertisements.
Of conservative journalism	{	Political news. Business news. Letters and exchanges. Miscellaneous advertisements.

By adding the average percentages (for the whole country) of the classes of matter in each group we get 16.9 as the average percentage of yellow characteristics and 23.8 as the average of conservative characteristics. By classing journals as yellow or conservative according as they have more than the average percentage in one kind of characteristics and less than the average in the other, leaving as uncertain those which rise above or fall below the average in both, we are enabled for practical purposes to herd the horses, the asses, and the mules separately. Out

of 147 papers analyzed we find 47 yellow, 45 conservative, and 55 uncertain journals. Their distribution according to news circles is shown in an accompanying table. Of twenty papers classed as "uncertain" published in the New York, Boston, Philadelphia and Pittsburg circles,

NEWS CIRCLE	Number of Yellow Journals	Number of con- serva- tive Journals	Number of un- certain Journals	Total
	Journals	Journals	Journals	
New York	11	10	6	27
Boston	5	4	3	12
Philadelphia	4	4	6	14
Chicago	3	4	3	10
Baltimore and Washington	2	4	2	8
Pittsburg	1	2	5	8
St. Louis	3	0	2	5
Cincinnati	1	1	2	4
Minneapolis and St. Paul	2	0	4	6
Kansas City	1	2	1	4
Louisville	0	1	3	4
San Francisco	2	2	4	8
Buffalo	1	2	2	5
Cleveland	2	1	3	6
Indianapolis	2	0	1	3
Omaha	0	2	1	3
Detroit	2	0	2	4
Milwaukee	2	2	1	5
Rochester	1	1	1	3
New Orleans	1	3	0	4
Denver	1	0	3	4
Twenty-one centres in U. S.	47	45	55	147

eighteen have less than the average percentage of both yellow and conservative characteristics; while of eight such papers published in San Francisco, Denver and Omaha circles, all have more than the average percentage of both. This fact indicates that journalism is less differentiated in the West than in the East, extremes meeting, not only in the same city, but even in the same papers. An illustration of this fact may be taken from W. R. Hearst's two papers, the *San Francisco Examiner* and the *New York Journal*. In these two papers the percentages are:

Examiner, yellow, 37.6 per cent; conservative, 27.2 per cent.

Journal, yellow, 38.0 per cent; conservative, 14.8 per cent.

Yellow journals, have, as a rule, a larger circulation than conservative journals.

212. The Content of Newspapers: 1924¹

Twenty-five years ago Delos F. Wilcox examined issues of 110 daily newspapers printed in fourteen cities and tabulated the space which they devoted to various subjects. In the *Editor and Publisher* of May 31 Paul W. White sets forth the results of a similar survey in the present year, for which purpose he studied an equal number of newspapers but chose them from sixty-three cities. The increase of our journals in sheer bulk is the most striking change in the quarter of a century—the typical newspaper of today has sixteen pages of eight columns each as against a journal of twelve pages of seven columns each in 1899.

Mr. White, in his survey for the current year, found newspaper space thus distributed:

I. News.....	40.5
(a) General	22.1
Foreign	2.3
Politics	6.5
Crime	4.9
Miscellaneous	8.4
(b) Special	18.4
Business	7.9
Sport	7.5
Theater	1.5
Society	0.8
Radio	0.9
II. Illustrations.....	5.7
III. Literature.....	5.3
IV. Opinion.....	2.7
(a) Editorials	2.2
(b) Letters	0.5
V. Advertisements	45.8
(a) Classified	14.3
(b) Display	31.5

One sees at first glance that in spite of the increased bulk of the modern newspaper the proportion of it that is devoted to news has

¹ Reprinted by permission from "What Do You Read?" *The Nation* (N. Y.) June 25, 1924: CXVIII: p. 725.

decreased by more than 25 per cent. The percentage devoted to foreign affairs, however, as one would expect owing to the kaleidoscopic changes in Europe since the war and our greater relation to them, has almost doubled. Politics remains about the same, while crime shows a notable increase. The percentage of space devoted to sport also shows large expansion, while in society news there is a tremendous slump.

More strikingly than any changes in news policy, however, is the decreased space given to opinion. The percentage devoted to editorial utterance has been reduced by more than two-thirds, while letters to the editors have been cut to about one-sixth of their former quota. The decline in the editorial influence and importance of American newspapers has long been a familiar fact. So far as space goes, Mr. White finds that the decline is not only proportional but actual, the newspapers examined printing an average of fifty-six inches of editorial a day in 1924 as against sixty-five inches in 1899. This curtailment of letters to the editor Mr. White regards as "evidence of the lost intimacy between reader and editor." It is also due to the tendency toward standardization of thought, with an increasing contempt on the part of wealthy owners of the modern press for the views of the readers, and an unwillingness to give dissenting opinion a chance to express itself.

Finally, and perhaps most important of all, one notes that the proportion of space devoted to advertising has increased by about 50 per cent. In actual amount the advance is still more impressive, the daily average of advertising having jumped in twenty-five years from 395 inches to 1,172 inches. It is only another proof, of course, of the increased commercialization of our press. As Mr. White puts it:

It is evident that the business department of a newspaper has become more and more important. When one considers that in the last twenty-five years the circulation of daily newspapers throughout the United States has jumped approximately 15,000,000, and that the financial demands of present-day journalism have grown consistently more complex, there is seen to be ample cause for this development.

213. The Lack of Professional Conscience in Newspapers¹

Like life generally, the newspaper has been abnormal and hardly suggestive of conscience and control. Yet it may have belied appearances. Its obvious faults, too, may be potential with virtue. Like the late medieval church, as necessary as outwardly offensive, it has at least

¹ Reprinted by permission from A. H. Lloyd "Newspaper Conscience: A Study in Half-Truths" *Am. J. Soc.* 1921-22: XXVII: p. 197 (Abstract). Copyright by the University of Chicago.

set offense and opportunity intimately vis-à-vis and so its awakening and reform are assured. Such an attack as Sinclair's is not to be taken whole, but it may not be denied or neglected. The real case of the people against the press has at least six counts—commercialism, a general salesmanship mentality not confined to the advertising, a merely stand-pat and falsely motivated conservatism, a boasted but biased, often pruriently selective publicity control by the crowd mind with accompanying "automatism" and occult "communication," and finally a ready but really undemocratic contempt for positive individuality and leadership. While of course only half-truths, these charges are too generally warranted to be overlooked. The newspaper will show conscience, as it wakens generally to its faults, and its ideal expression. Conscience is simply intelligence about self and the life in which one finds oneself with an accompanying sense of obligation to realize the recognized desirable possibilities, and the newspaper, today more or less of a prodigal, is bound thus to come to itself. There are already certain signs of its awakening and a vigorous newspaper conscience may be counted on to become general instead of exceptional.

214. Newspapers and Public Responsibility ¹

The power of the newspaper, one of the most remarkable novelties of the modern world, has two peculiar features. It has no element of Compulsion and no element of Responsibility. Whoever exposes himself to its influence does so of his own free will. He need not buy the paper, nor read it, nor believe it. If he takes it for his guide, that is his own doing. The newspaper, as it has no legal duty, is subject to no responsibility, beyond that which the law affixes to indefensible attacks on private character or incitements to illegal conduct. It is an old maxim that power and responsibility should go together, and that no man is good enough to be trusted with power for the employment of which he need give no account. Here, however, we have power which can be used without anything except conscience to restrict or guide its use. A journal is not liable, civilly or criminally, for propagating untruth or suppressing truth unless damage to a particular individual or harm to the State can be proved.

The paper is an impersonal entity. Its writers are unknown: its editor, and even its proprietors, may be known to comparatively few. Proof of a deliberate purpose to mislead will not necessarily affect its circula-

¹ From J. Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, Vol. I, pp. 105; 105-06. Copyright 1921 by the Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

tion or reduce its influence upon masses of men who know little and care less about such offenses. Except in the most glaring cases, it can with impunity misuse its power. The proprietor, or the editor to whom his proprietor gives a free hand, may be patriotic and well-intentioned, but the power either wields is not accompanied by responsibility.

215. Newspapers and Public Opinion in the United States ¹

The press, including many weekly and some monthly magazines which handle political questions, is a chief agent in forming opinion by letting everybody know what everybody else is saying or is supposed to be thinking. This tells on the minds of undecided or unreflective people. Having neither the time nor the knowledge to think for themselves they feel safe in thinking with the majority. In this sense the press makes opinion more effectively here than in any other country, because the habit of reading is more general, and prominent men, though less given than are the English to writing letters to the newspapers, are more wont to confide their views to an interviewer. The papers have their defects. The reporting of even the best speeches is full and exact only in a very few of the best journals, the rest confining themselves to abridgments which often miss the really important points. As everything is done in haste, the truth of facts fares ill; but in the general result the whole opinion of the country is mirrored more completely than anywhere in Europe. It is the statements of events and of the opinions of public men that tell. They would tell even more but for the inaccuracies frequent in papers of the second rank and rarely corrected, yet here, as elsewhere, these do not prevent the average man from assuming that what he sees in print is likely to be true. Editorial articles count for less than in England or France: few people swear by their favorite paper, as many still do in England, and the names of editors and of writers of leading articles are scarcely known to the public.

216. The Prestige of the Newspaper ²

Prestige is heightened by mystery. Scarcely any of those who read what the paper tells them know who has written what they read, or

¹ From J. Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, Vol. II, pp. 117-18. Copyright 1921 by the Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 102, 103. Copyright 1921 by the Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

what sources of information he possesses, or what intellectual weight. The voice seems to issue from a sort of superman, and has a hypnotic power of compelling assent. It is like the voice of a great multitude. Behind the argumentative advocacy, in itself a small matter, is the power of manipulating news, and of reporting what the proprietors wish to be known and ignoring what they wish to keep out of sight. Strange is the fascination of the printed page. Men who would give little credence to a tale told them by a neighbor, or even written to them by a friend, believe what the newspaper tells them merely because they see it in print.

217. The Need for an Endowed Press¹

It is perhaps, however, too much to expect from any newspaper that must be run more or less from motives of commercial profit to take a thoroughly judicial attitude on all questions, whatever they may be, that arise. We shall never have a paper thoroughly independent in stating its views on public questions until we have a paper entirely independent of its circulation and advertising. Probably no greater service could be done to the country by any wealthy man or group of men than the liberal endowment of a paper with a sum so large that it would be a matter of indifference whether people subscribed or not. A paper with such an endowment, in the hands of trustees of integrity, whose aim it should be to give the news fairly and fully, to give the basis for judgment on all political questions, to give carefully written, moderate opinions on both sides, might be more of an educating influence in the community, and might have a stronger tendency toward elevating the political tone of our country than a dozen new universities. Something is now done in that direction by *Public Opinion*; but that gives simply a culling from the existing papers—and that by no means suffices.

The difficulty, of course, of securing a thoroughly intelligent, unbiased corps of editorial writers cannot be overestimated; but a sufficient sum given for so worthy a purpose might beyond question make a vast improvement, at any rate, upon present conditions, and one might well believe that the details could be reasonably well arranged. A paper of the kind suggested, if independent of circulation, would easily secure, nevertheless, a very large constituency, and would exert an influence more than proportionate to its circulation.

¹ Reprinted by permission from J. W. Jenks "The Guidance of Public Opinion" *Am. J. Soc.* 1895-96: I: pp. 168-69. Copyright by the University of Chicago.

We see, then, that, in fact, at the present day our public opinion is not thought, but that it is largely made up of prejudice, of sentiment, and is easily led in almost any direction regarding matters on which one has not already committed himself by joining a party or by previous habit. We have seen still further that it is perhaps one of the greatest misfortunes of our time and country that public opinion is so little a matter of judgment based on ripe consideration; and the present condition of affairs makes it evident that it is the duty of thoughtful men first to take the lead consciously and conscientiously on important questions of the day, as best they can; to use their influence in shaping public opinion, not by concealment of the facts but by open statement of the facts and fair argument so far as possible; and, secondly, to use what influence they can exert to promote among the people, by the means suggested, as well as by all other means, methods of training that will lead our people more consciously to wish to free themselves from prejudice and to shape their lives in public matters more and more by judgment.

218. The Difficulties Involved in an Endowed Press¹

Is it at all unlikely that, government, particularly in cities, will sooner or later put into the field newspapers to cover at least the news of local business and politics and be available for use in the public schools, the public libraries, the city offices, and elsewhere? If such journals could be kept free from factional control and from the debauching influence of irresponsible newspaper competition, they would be of great service in the education of the "public" and in the control of private journals.

But let no one imagine that government operation is here prescribed as a panacea for the evils of irresponsible journalism. Mr. Hearst has worked like a hero to make the *New York Journal* the yellowest and most successful journal in the United States. Practically, he "endowed" yellow journalism. The endowment scheme for newspaper reform is not generally accepted as practicable. There is a feeling that journalism should be a business, and that news-gathering and distribution should pay for itself. Those who object to the endowment plan should, however, reflect upon the question whether or not the *public* has not already been "endowed" by someone when a newspaper can be bought regularly

¹ Reprinted by permission from D. F. Wilcox "The American Newspaper" *Annals of the American Academy of Political & Social Science*, July 1900: XVI; pp. 91-92.

for less than the cost of the paper on which it is printed. Possibly the secret of many newspaper evils lies in the fact that the advertisers and the readers can be played off against each other. In order to get a large circulation with which to catch advertisements, the price of the paper is reduced, its size increased, its headlines made sensational, and illustrations introduced to stimulate the flagging senses of the reader. Then, as advertisements flow in at increased rates, the price of the paper can be further reduced and its attractions multiplied. Under these circumstances advertisements of doubtful character are accepted as a matter of course. Ought not the advertising sheet and the newspaper be separated so that each would have to pay for itself? Advertisements that are really of general interest to the public should, on such a theory, be published as news. At any rate, the chief argument against the endowment of a newspaper seems to rest on a misconception of present conditions, and there is no apparently satisfactory reason why some of our surplus millionaires should not emulate the example of Mr. Hearst, with this difference, that they devote their money, their brains, and their energy to the promotion of public intelligence instead of the stimulation of public passion. In the meantime it may be possible to work toward a better journalism by introducing or strengthening the legal responsibility of newspapers for publishing only reliable news.

We ought not to despair of newspaper reform. We need a development of the sense of social responsibility for the use of brains and money. If this were general, government journalism would be safe, though perhaps unnecessary. While this sense of responsibility manifests itself in a few individuals only, they have all the greater opportunities for distinguished social service. The efforts of reformers are often decried on the plea that we are in the grasp of inevitable tendencies and that there is no use of trying to turn the natural course of civilization. Do we not forget that the instruments of our present civilization were invented and the direction of our development turned in particular ways by the herculean efforts of individuals, formers and reformers? Anyhow, there is still room for evolutionary methods: for good is mixed with the evil of even the yellowest journals, and many successful journals still preserve their fair name. When society is well organized, social intelligence will be better organized than it now is. The advance of the newspaper toward exact reporting will go hand in hand with the exact organization of human affairs.

(On newspapers and on public opinion consult also Sections 8, 11, 17.)

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises

1. Make a list of the organs of public opinion that you know and experience. Which exerts the most and which the least influence upon your opinions and why?
2. One hundred years ago pamphlets were in common use in propagating ideas and opinions. Why is this method in less vogue today?
3. Examine a daily paper of the present and estimate the amount of space given to the items listed by White (Cf. article reprinted from *The Nation*). What variations are there from his figures? How do you account for the same?
4. In your opinion, what are the principal factors retarding the development of a higher ethical standard among newspapers? Use concrete illustrations.
5. How might newspapers be made more responsible to the publics they serve: a) in the matter of news; b) in the matter of editorial opinions?
6. Can you offer any concrete suggestions to raise the ethical level of our various organs of opinions?
7. What is the relation of news to social control?
8. What is the function of gossip?
9. It is said that a newspaper is merely "organized gossip." What is the meaning of this statement?
10. What influence have advertisers on the policies of newspapers? Give concrete examples.
11. What is the influence of newspaper syndicates upon the formation of opinion throughout the country?
12. Discuss the problem of the endowed press.

B. Topics for Class Reports

1. A review of Will Irwin's series of papers on the newspaper cited in bibliography.
2. Review of Lippmann and Merz's analysis of news of the Russian Revolution and the Counter-Revolution against the soviets. (Cf. bibliography.)
3. Review of Park's book on the immigrant press. (Cf. bibliography.)
4. Review Lumley's treatment of gossip. (Cf. bibliography.)

C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers

1. The Negro Press in America.
2. The Control of the Press in Japan.
3. The Psychology of Gossip and of News.
4. The Relation of the Newspaper to Social Control.

5. The Freedom of the Press and of Opinion.
6. The Press and the Secondary Group Organization of Society.
7. The Social-Psychological History of American Journalism.
8. The Censorship of the Press in Wartime.

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CHAPTER XXVII

PROPAGANDA: THE MANUFACTURE OF OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

The modern extension of the range of public interest and action has made for profound changes in the control of opinion. So long as a person's scope of interests and activity does not stretch beyond the neighborhood or village, he can observe and make some judgments himself regarding matters of common concern. When, today, as a citizen of a federal government, or even as the citizen of a commonwealth, he is called upon to make political decisions which touch the world beyond his immediate visual and auditory sensibilities, that is, beyond the world of immediate perception, the whole question of facts and information, the bases upon which he must construct his opinions and form his judgments, becomes altered. The ordinary citizen of the United States can not have first-hand information on the situation in Central America, in China or in Europe. He has to depend on secondary and even tertiary sources for his knowledge. This leaves open great possibilities of misrepresentation, distortion and deliberate suppression of facts. It even permits the manufacture of events and situations for the avowed purpose of prejudicing the attitudes and judgment and hence the actions of the populace.

It was the World War which introduced us on a broad scale to the functions of propaganda. Each of the belligerent nations established bureaus for propagating their own particular points of view. Such books as Creel's *How We Advertised America* and Brownrigg's *Indiscretions of a Naval Censor* indicate something of the control of information during the war. Lasswell's work *Technique of Propaganda During the World War* is a most valuable source of information, revealing, as it does, the scope and method of propaganda throughout the world during the years 1914-1918.

Propaganda in the sense of proselyting has been in vogue in the spread of religious dogmas for ages, especially in Christian countries. But modern means of controlling ideas and information has made possible its extension into political, economic, and social fields hitherto undreamed of. Sometimes this propaganda is disguised under the more polite title of "publicity." Yet it should not be imagined that the results of propaganda and publicity are necessarily nefarious. Health campaigns, many educational and other reform movements use methods essentially propagandist in nature. Our purpose in this chapter is not to discuss the ethical aspects of this type of thing but rather to reveal the social psychological mechanisms involved.

The first paper from Dunlap gives a short statement of the nature of propaganda. The paper by Dodge goes into the psychology of propaganda in considerable detail. He shows particularly the function of emotional appeals in the spread of propaganda. The logic of feeling is employed to change opinions and attitudes and thus bring about a change in behavior. The selection from Strong deals both with the psychological factors in propaganda and also with the appeal to the instinctive-emotional drives of individual behavior.

In the fourth paper Dunlap summarizes six rules to consider in the spread of propaganda, while in the paper following, Lipsky points out that all forms of propaganda are best put over by means of organizations. If the purpose of these is disguised, however, the effect is much greater.

In another selection from Strong the relation of propaganda to social control is revealed.

Kent's paper shows how the newspaper's political policies are controlled in the interests of special groups. And Bernays illustrates from the case of Lithuania what can be done to arouse and to influence public opinion on a situation through the clever use of publicity or propaganda. Ellwood's paper shows how the churches may use publicity in the interests of their dogmas, while the paper by Larrabee indicates in detail the place which the motion picture may play in the spread of ideas and opinions.

The final paper from the writer's own collection describes in detail the method by which a minority group of college students incited and put over a campaign for funds with which to construct a student union building. The attention to every item in social control which

is revealed in his paper shows that college education often extends to fields not given a place in the formal curriculum.

Mention may be made in closing of the growing power of the radio as a factor in the spread of propaganda. We are not yet fully aware of the extent to which the radio is being employed by advertisers, special-interest groups and governmental agencies in their efforts to control public opinion. This is a powerful weapon the full measure of which we have not yet secured.

II. MATERIALS

219. The Definition of Propaganda¹

The term propaganda is often used in two limited senses. First; as designating the activity of a definitely organized smaller group within the larger society, which attempts to change the opinion of the larger group. Second; as designating the attempt to spread a wrong or vicious view as contrasted with a noble or correct view. Neither of these limitations in meaning can be justified, and the acceptance of either has unfortunate practical consequences. Vicious propaganda, as viewed at a certain time, may succeed, and later be viewed as beneficent and progressive; and advocacy of apparently essential reforms may ultimately turn out to have been vicious propaganda. The distinction between the work of an organized group, (such as the Anti-Saloon League, or the Associations opposed to Prohibition), and the work of an individual is hardly useful, when both employ the same means; nor can the propaganda addressed to a small group in a Pullman smoking compartment be usefully contrasted with the efforts of a speaker in Madison Square Garden. The more useful sense of the term is in its designation of every deliberate attempt to influence the opinion of another, or of others, in respect to accepted conventions, laws, or standards, of conduct; or to influence any other opinion affecting the organization of society or the interrelation and adaptation of the members generally. The pedagogical work of inculcating in children the opinions which adults of their group hold, and which it is not proposed to modify, is not usefully classed as propaganda, although it is obvious that propaganda in the strict sense may be, and often is, extended into pedagogical work.

¹ Reprinted from *Social Psychology* (Dunlap) (pp. 247-48) by permission of The Williams & Wilkins Company.

220. The Psychology of Propaganda¹

The Great War has left us many disturbing legacies. Prejudice, mutual distrust, social unrest, and political chaos rest heavily upon us. Not the least of our troublesome relics is the curse of propaganda, the greatest of indoor military sports. Propaganda antedates the War but its previous existence seems relatively mild and inoffensive. Only occasionally did it appear in the open. All that is changed now. Propaganda as the great art of influencing public opinion, seems to be a permanent addition to our social and political liabilities.

Paper bullets, according to Mr. Creel, won the war. But they have forever disturbed our peace of mind. The war is long since over, all but saying so; but our consciousness of the immanence of propaganda bids fair to be permanent. It has been discovered by individuals, by associations and by governments that a certain kind of advertising can be used to mold public opinion and control democratic majorities. As long as public opinion rules the destinies of human affairs, there will be no end to an instrument that controls it.

Propaganda of some kind is doubtless as old as human society. One of its earliest, and until recently one of its most famous varieties was religious propaganda. But there seems to be no essential differences between religious, political, and business propaganda, except the ends it serves, and the license under which it operates. The expansion of propaganda to political fields was directly conditioned on the growing power of public opinion in government. As physical warfare is less and less resorted to in settling disputes, propaganda warfare is bound to become of greater relative importance.

Speaking generally, propaganda is the art of making up the other man's mind for him. It is the art of gaining adherents to principles, of gaining support for an opinion or a course of action. So are some forms of education, so at times is advertising.

Probably the commonest popular connotation of propaganda involves something underhanded or sinister. Advertising and education stand out frankly for what they are. Propaganda tends to hide both its nature and intention. To label a story propaganda would immediately rob it of most of its powers to influence opinion. This popular view is certainly not an adequate one. It may be that it has grown out of the

¹ Reprinted by permission from R. Dodge "Psychology of Propaganda" *Relig. Educ.* 1920: XV: pp. 241-42; 243-44; 244-45; 246-47; 248-50; 250-52.

malignant varieties to which we have been exposed for war purposes.

Until recently the most famous historical use of the term propaganda made it synonymous with foreign missions. It was Pope Gregory XV who almost exactly three centuries ago after many years of preparation, finally founded the great Propaganda College to care for the interests of the Church in non-Catholic countries. With its centuries of experience this is probably the most efficient organization for propaganda in the world. But religious propaganda is much older. Christian propaganda against Judaistic interpretation of prophesy relating to the Messiah reaches back to the earliest years of the Christian Church. Probably most apologetics is propaganda. No religion and no age has been entirely free from it.

Similarly political propaganda is very old, reaching a climax of classical effectiveness in the impassioned orations of Demosthenes against Macedonian aggression. Whatever one may think of the counter-agitations, it would be impossible to characterize all these cases as sinister. We would be compelled to place in a similar category most of our own missionary enterprises, our revivals, campaigns for the enlistment of men in the Navy, campaigns for liberty loans, for food saving, for near-East relief, red cross, community chests, and the like.

The one characteristic that seems to differentiate all such enterprises from simple education is their emphasis on the feelings and their appeal to emotional logic. An appeal to the emotions may be sinister or it may be benevolent. Whether it is regarded as one or the other will often depend on the point of view of the judge rather than the absolute content of the appeal.

Where emotional logic appears directly in the discussion we may call it primary propaganda. There is another variety in which, on the basis of some emotional appeal, an attorney takes his position on a question and uses his intellect to present the best possible case to his hearers. Emotional logic may not appear in the argument, but the fact that it is presupposed in the prejudice of the attorney justifies us in regarding it as actually present. Such a case might be called secondary or implicit propaganda.

Direct propaganda tends to be relatively honest and aboveboard. One recognizes the emotional appeal, rejects it or accepts. In secondary or implicit propaganda there is usually no way of proving from his utterance what the prejudices of the speaker may have been motivated by. It is this secondary propaganda that is consequently the most insidious, the most dangerous, and the most offensive. Consciously or unconsciously it is bound to distort the facts. They are transmitted through

an imperfect medium and tend to take their color from the medium. The paid attorney prejudiced in favor of a cause, and unscrupulous in his methods of propagation, is the cause of most of our indignation against propaganda, and propagandists.

The fact that conviction is often determined by feeling rather than by reason is neither new or especially humiliating. It is a commonplace of our experience. Aristotle recognized the fact and gave it a place with the fallacies. Bacon regarded it as one of the causes of the low estate of science in his time. The common human tendencies to estimate facts according to their personal consequences are just as real now as ever and probably no more so. It is sufficient to disqualify legally the judgment of partisan, friend, or relative. This is not an imputation of dishonesty. Partisans, friends and relatives are naturally incapacitated for objective judgment. Conversely, whenever feelings can be aroused we may commonly predict the judgments. On this law depends the art of the spellbinder, and the soap-box orator. It is the chief reliance of the professional propagandist.

A cartoon discloses the anatomy of propaganda more completely than any other kind. It must all be there in compact form for those who run to read. I know of no pictures that succeed in stirring the great moral forces of humanity and turning them into propaganda like the cartoons of Raemaker. But they are more tragic than is necessary for our purpose. We are likely to be carried away by their art to forget the artifice which is our immediate concern.

The Berlin *Ulk* in 1916, just before the Egyptian campaign collapsed, pictured a burly John Bull waving a whip over a prostrate female figure labeled "Egypt." Two gleams of light pierce the gloom as the twin Sir Galahads, Germany and Turkey, come rushing up from the distance shouting: "We'll finish you this time, you old slave-driver." The Berlin *Ulk* knew very well how violent the emotional force of that slave-driver appeal was. They had Raemaker clearly enough in mind when they tried to turn the sting against Britain.

In those same dread days when we were anxiously facing the unknown, DeMar in the Philadelphia *Record* pictured a balky little donkey hitched to an impressive load of preparedness plans. The traditional pachydermatous G. O. P. quizzically looks over the back fence while Uncle Sam admonishes the donkey, "Pull, damn ye, or I'll have to get an elephant." Probably the central emotional force came from the instinct to self-preservation, but the whole thing is alive with direct and indirect *motifs* down to the balky donkey. The sting in the case was a real threat.

About the same time, Tuthill in the St. Louis *Star* pictured the naked foot of American unpreparedness about to descend on the spines of the Mexican cactus. The emotional force in this case came from an imaginary event that is merely suggested. A similar suggested calamity appeared in the Des Moines *Register and Leader* apropos to the arming of merchant ships. President Wilson was made to stand on a partially dislodged overhang of a precipitous cliff below which yawned the bottomless chasm of "War."

If one were to make a catalogue of all these passional premises one would find that they ran the entire gamut of human experience. The most fundamental and primary appeals would be those inborn tendencies to emotion that we call the instincts. The great self-preservative, social, and racial instincts will always furnish the main reservoir of motive forces at the service of propaganda. They will have the widest and the most insistent appeal. Only second to these in importance are the peculiar racial tendencies and historical traditions that represent the genius of civilization. The racial superiority consciousness of the German operated as a never-ending motive for their "*Aushalten*" propaganda. The consciousness of racial superiority had been cultivated so long that it was almost as solid a foundation as instinct. Similarly, the moral superiority consciousness of the Yankee became the basis for all sorts of propaganda before and during the war. We Americans have a notable cultural premise in our consideration of the under-dog. Few things outside our consciousness of family will arouse us as surely and as universally as this modification of the protective instinct.

The most commonly exploited motive during the various drives was our new-born social consciousness, focusing in patriotism, combined with our dread of social disapproval. Buttons, placards for the doors, public solicitations, and the visitation of committees were freely used to exploit these emotional premises.

Apparently any group of ideas with an emotional valance may become the basis for propaganda.

Obviously emotions are not capable of association on equal terms with ideas and concepts. Strictly speaking, emotions can build neither judgments nor arguments. They are not capable of recall nor generalization. They are not subjects of attention.

Of course emotions may be re-aroused even though they are not subject to recall. The name will not serve to re-arouse them but an emotional experience may. However frequently and vigorously I might repeat the word anger, your anger will scarcely be re-aroused. The situation merely bores you. But I am sure that I can arouse your indigna-

tion if I remind you of the clever German trick by which under cover of diplomatic protection they plotted against the industries of our country in comparative security. If now while that emotional complex is still aroused I remind you that the same old foreign propaganda office is still working overtime and that when everything is ready for new propaganda against the demands of the Allies it simply uncovers a new monarchistic or bolshevistic plot, throwing us into a panic on demand; you may likely find your indignation turned against the German Foreign Propaganda Office.

This would not be a logical process, it really wouldn't be an intellectual process at all. One idea aroused an emotion. Another idea quite disconnected with the first by any logical bond tends to take its emotional tone just because it occurred in the same conscious context.

It is a curious situation but it may be better understood if we remember that ideas as the results of shifting stimuli are in constant flux. One could not hold an idea steady if he would. Emotions, on the other hand, are relatively slowly changing states with only two great tonal differences. The simplest interaction is a sort of radiation or spread of the emotion over the whole content of consciousness. *The rule seems to be that an emotional attitude when once aroused tends to radiate over all concurrent conscious processes.*¹

In addition to the utterly illogical general radiation of emotion the transfer may be more specific, following any of the many systematic connections of ideas in consciousness, and not infrequently achieving an appearance of logical defensibility. The radiation may be spatial, temporal, causal, symbolic, or it may take any of the other forms of accidental association.

One of the commonest radiations is from persons to things. Things that belonged to friends, letters that we treasure from sweetheart or from wife, relics of the family or of departed great ones have an emotional value that only the initiated know. There is no power of mind over body that they may not on occasion exercise. Relics are never trivial things to the soul that makes the connection with the wonderful past. They are ever potential material for miracles. Conversely, in the curious philosophy of clothes, things give fictitious value to persons. Vestments, rich raiment, jewels, insignia of office, are not without propaganda value. They arouse and sustain a consciousness of importance that radiates to the personalities which they cover.

Religiously perhaps the most significant radiations are those between symbol and reality. No man is so superior to popular prejudice

¹ Italics not in original article.

that he could endure the name Judas in a Christian community. It is a perfectly good name, easily spoken, characteristic in sound, and reasonably euphonious but it carries an emotional value that would foolishly but inevitably radiate to the man. Such a name would be a serious handicap. Similarly, each of us probably treasures, often from the remotest childhood, good names and evil ones. The origin of their emotional values is usually discoverable in their association with real or fictitious persons. But once set and while still unanalyzed the good or evil name like a phantom may still operate to bias our first estimates of character.

The psychological power of the curse and the benediction, of the creed, the cross, or the flag, all show the effect of emotional transfer between symbol and reality. The persistence with which creed has been mistaken for substance only emphasizes the importance of the transfer and its possibilities for propaganda.

The vulgar craze to inscribe one's name in public places is not of simple psychology. But through all the hunger for conspicuous position, for possession, for fame, or for eternal life runs a persistent confusion between symbol and thing symbolized, between name and personality.

Of the many other avenues of emotional transfer let me mention only one, the radiation from function to thing. Doubtless the most conspicuous case of radiation of this sort is our respect for money. The classical economic example is Robinson Crusoe's gold pieces. It was a severe wrench for him to realize that without a market gold pieces were of less worth than a single needle. The climax of the common radiation from function to thing in money is found in the miser. Here the functional value is siphoned dry and transferred completely to the thing. Conversely, at least one of the evils of gambling is the degradation of the medium of exchange to a plaything.

Similar transfers from function to thing occur more or less in every aspect of our religious life. The Bible itself is an example. It carries the great religious traditions of the race. This high function gives the books themselves peculiar radiated value. The Bible must be bound differently from ordinary books, and it must also be handled and carried differently.

The multiform ramifications of emotional force have recently been disclosed to us by the psychoanalysts in the enormous complications of sex feelings. Their radiation to objects, signs, symbols, and rites, to the whole tissue of our social consciousness, is more easily understood than their sublimation in art and science. But the fundamental

mechanisms are the same that we have been discussing. In a similar way the tender feelings radiate to weaker objects of every conceivable sort, to lost causes, to philanthropies, war derelicts, European or near-East relief, poodle dogs and canary birds.

So intricately are all these tendencies interwoven in our consciousness that no one may pretend to disengage the tangled web of any human mind, to say here are the original feelings and here are the derived. Each derived tendency becomes in turn a motive force, and each original is reacted upon by each of its derivatives.

These mechanisms of emotional transfer are not primarily the laws of propaganda. They are primarily the laws of our mental life which propaganda on occasion may exploit for its own ends.

There are three limitations to the processes of propaganda that we have been considering. The first is emotional recoil, the second is the exhaustion of available motive force, the third is the development of internal resistance or negativism.

The most familiar of the three is emotional recoil. We know only too well what will happen if we tell a boy all the things that he likes to do are "*bad*" while all the things that he dislikes are "*good*." Up to a certain point the emotional value of bad and good respectively will be transferred to the acts as we intend. But each transfer has an emotional recoil on the concepts good and bad. At the end a most surprising thing may happen. The moral values may get reversed in the boy's mind. Bad may come to represent the sum-total of the satisfactory and desirable, while good may represent the sum-total of the unsatisfactory and undesirable. To the pained adult such a consequence is utterly inexplicable, only because he fails to realize that all mental products are developments. There is always a kind of reciprocity in emotional transfer. The value of the modified factor recoils to the modifying factor.

The whole mechanism of the transfer and of the recoil may best be expressed in terms of the conditioned reflex of Pavlov. The flow of saliva in a dog is a natural consequence to the sight and smell of food. If concurrently with the smelling of food the dog is pinched, the pinch ceases to be a matter for resentment. By a process of emotional transfer, on being pinched the dog may show the lively delight that belongs to the sight and smell of food. Even the salivary secretions may be started by the transfigured pinch. It was the great operating physiologist, Sherrington, who exclaimed after a visit to Pavlov that at last he understood the psychology of the martyrs. But it is possible to so load the smell of food with pain and damage that its positive value breaks down. Eating values

may succumb to the pain values instead of the pain to the eating values. This is the prototype of the concept bad when it gets overloaded with the emotional value of the intrinsically desirable. The law of recoil seems to be a mental analogue of the physical law that action and reaction are equal and in opposite directions.

The second limitation to propaganda occurs when the reciprocal effects of transfer exhaust the available motive forces of a mind. Propaganda certainly weakens the forces that are appealed to too often. We are living just now in a world of weakened appeals. Many of the great human motives were exploited to the limit during the war. It is harder to raise money now than it was, harder to find motives for giving that are still effective. One of my former colleagues once surprised and shocked me by replying to some perfectly good propaganda in which I tried to tell him that certain action was in the line of duty, to the effect that he was tired of being told that something was his duty, and that he was resolved not to do another thing because it was his duty. There seems to be evidence that in some quarters at least, patriotism, philanthropy, and civic duty have been exploited as far as the present systems will carry. It is possible to exhaust our floating capital of social motive forces. When that occurs we face a kind of moral bankruptcy.

A final stage of resistance is reached when propaganda develops a negativistic defensive reaction. To develop such negativisms is always the aim of counter-propaganda. It calls the opposed propaganda, prejudiced, half truth, or as the Germans did, "Lies, All Lies." There is evidence that the moral collapse of Germany under the fire of our paper bullets came with the conviction that they had been systematically deceived by their own propagandists.

There are two great social dangers in propaganda. The first is its concentrated power of destruction of the established order. Great destructive power in irresponsible hands is always a social menace. We have some legal safeguards against careless use of high-powered physical explosives. Against the greater danger of destructive propaganda there seems to be little protection without imperiling the sacred principles of free speech.

The second social danger is the tendency to overload and level down every great human incentive in the pursuit of relatively trivial ends. To become *blasé* is the inevitable penalty of emotional exploitation. I believe there may well be grave penalties in store for the reckless commercialized exploitation of human emotions in the cheap sentimentalism of our moving pictures. But there are even graver penalties in store for the generation that permits itself to grow morally *blasé*. One of our

social desiderata, it seems to me, is the protection of the great springs of human action from destructive exploitation for selfish, commercial, or other trivial ends.

The slow constructive process of building moral credits by systematic education lacks the picturesqueness of propaganda. It also lacks its quick results. But just as the short cut of hypnotism proved a dangerous substitute for moral training, so I believe we shall find that not only is moral education a necessary pre-condition for effective propaganda, but that in the end it is a safer and incomparably more reliable social instrument.

221. Propaganda and Motivation ¹

The drive, a new form of propaganda, has now become a regular business. According to James H. Collins, somewhere between a billion and a billion-and-a-half dollars have been raised in one year for various causes other than governmental. Many of these have been worthwhile, but unfortunately many have been the reverse. A bureau that makes a business of investigating national and interstate money-raising activities, reported that by April, 1920, the number of drives had risen to 1,021, of which the bureau approved only 124. The district attorney of New York County investigated 534 money-raising activities in 1918 and put 384 of them out of business. One gang of ex-convicts had obtained \$500,000 in eight months.

Consequently today the average citizen confesses he really does not know what the facts are in this and many other important issues. He has been deluged with facts, near-facts and falsifications put forth by interested parties, so that he has a mass of undigested and conflicting ideas on these subjects, or else has become frankly partisan to one view.

President Butler, of Columbia University, recently called attention to the dangers to society of this sort of thing. "Liberty," he said, "which once was endangered by monarchs and by ruling classes, has long since ceased to fear either of these; it is now chiefly endangered by tyrannous and fanatical minorities which seize control for a longer or shorter time of the agencies and instruments of government through ability and skill in playing upon the fears, the credulity and the selfishness of men."

The question naturally arises, is there no way of controlling propaganda? Certainly there are ways and they are enforced more or less in

¹ Reprinted by permission from E. K. Strong "The Control of Propaganda as a Psychological Problem" *Scien. Mon.* 1922: XIV: pp. 235; 235-36; 236-39; 239-41.

the case of certain types of propaganda. But there are other types which are not so easily evaluated and consequently not so easily handled.

First of all let us clarify the use of certain terms which are employed in discussing the subject and at the same time come to an understanding of the psychological elements which are involved.

The word "propaganda" means essentially the spread of a particular doctrine or a system of principles, especially when there is an organization or general plan back of the movement. Propaganda differs from "education" with which it is purposely confused, in that in the case of the former the aim is to spread one doctrine, whereas in the case of the latter the aim is to extend a knowledge of the facts as far as known. Advertising men have never been able to agree on a definition of "advertising" and I should not want to attempt here what they have failed to do. But I think we can distinguish between advertising and propaganda by saying that advertising is usually concerned with making known and desirable a definite commodity or service with the definite aim of leading many individuals, as such, to acquire the commodity or service. Propaganda includes many types of advertising, but it is mainly concerned with the subtle presentation to the public of information so chosen and so focussed that among many individuals there develops a general "point of view" which is favorable to the aim of the propagandist and leads to action in that general direction. A further distinction between these two methods of influencing people pertains to the *methods* employed rather than the *object*. The advertiser buys space upon which appears this message, and the reader knows it a paid advertisement. The propagandist may advertise, but he especially aims to employ space he did not buy, at least directly, and not to permit the reader to know that the material is propaganda. He believes his material will have greater effect when its source is unknown.

It is clear that both advertising and propaganda make use of argument and suggestion.

The term "suggestion" has been employed in a great variety of ways, sometimes in a narrow sense, but usually in a rather broad and indefinite way. Frequently it is used to cover all the means of imparting information and exerting influence other than through reasoning. Without going into the subject here, let us recognize three phases of non-rational influencing of others. In the simplest form one or more ideas are presented which are known to be associated in the minds of the audience with another idea not mentioned. The audience thinks the non-mentioned idea because of their established habits of thought. In this way a speaker may denounce most viciously and unfairly a prominent man without

giving his name, by skillfully referring to one or more of his known characteristics. The desired effect is accomplished and without making it possible for the prominent man to reply. Then there is the more complicated phase of suggestion where an *action* is brought into the mind of the audience—the action being a familiar one and also one that will be desired as soon as mentioned. Thus a school boy at recess says, "Let's get a drink." The other boys might not have gotten a drink if they had not been reminded of the action. But as soon as it is called to mind, they feel the desire and so go. So also a nation like Germany, all primed for war, as in 1914—I don't refer here to her military preparations, but to the state of mind of her citizens—was ready to act immediately when her leaders said "Let's fight." It was the absence of just such a mental state in the United States that kept us out of war. Later on the attitude was developed—almost over-developed before it had a chance to function—and we were eager to act when the word was given.

In both these phases of suggestion the effect is produced because there exists within the mind of the person being influenced certain habits of thinking and action and when the proper stimulus or cue is given the associated thinking and acting immediately follow. There is still a third phase of suggestion, which I prefer to call motivation, in which a person is led to do something which is unfamiliar or which he would not do if it were merely mentioned. It is because of this third method of influencing others that the control of propaganda is so difficult. Let us see what this process of motivation is.

Consider an example: An electric light and power company launched a newspaper campaign some time ago in order to sell vacuum cleaners. The appeals were made to women to buy the cleaners in order to save labor and to make their homes cleaner and healthier. Many cleaners were sold. But the stock on hand was far from exhausted. Some time later the company launched another campaign, in which they directed their appeals to husbands, not wives. In these advertisements they depicted, for example, a successful business man in his office surrounded with filing cases, typewriters, dictaphones, and the like, and in another cut, showed the wife at home with a dust-cap on her head, sweeping the dining room, with the dust flying all about. The caption underneath read something like this: "Why not equip your wife's office like your own?" This second campaign sold more vacuum cleaners than the first one. Why? Because the man's love for his wife was aroused and this strong force was coupled to the idea of vacuum cleaners. Buying a vacuum cleaner then became a most satisfactory manner of expressing love. In advertising to the wives, on the other hand, no such fundamental motive was

aroused. The vacuum cleaner would save labor, it is true, but it would not give to the wife as much satisfaction for the money as a new rug to be seen by every one coming into the home, or as new clothes for the children.

In this case we have men led into doing something they had no intention of doing, of buying something that little concerned them, and that they probably knew very little about. They were so led because love for their wives was aroused and they were shown how this love could be very adequately expressed.

Motivation involves two elements—first, the arousal of a strong desire, and, second, the presentation of a certain action which appears to be a satisfactory way of expressing the aroused desire. Moreover the action in such cases is not one that the individual would perform if it were merely suggested.

Recent work in psychology has emphasized the distinction between an "idea" and a "sentiment." The sentiment, according to Rivers, is an idea emotionally toned. "House" is thus an idea, whereas "home" is a sentiment, for home always includes an emotional consciousness of mother and father, brothers and sisters, old familiar associations and the like. When the sentiment becomes suppressed and lost to consciousness it is called a "complex." Sentiments and complexes, we are coming to see more and more are extremely important in explaining behavior; much of abnormal conduct being traceable to the existence of complexes.

Motivation is thus the process of deliberately developing a sentiment, of deliberately associating an idea with an emotion, of tying together in the mind of another the love for wife and the idea of buying a vacuum cleaner, or of sympathy for the Belgians and hatred of the Germans, and the idea of war.

The aim of propaganda is to develop sentiment and then precipitate action through mere suggestion. Let us consider some implications which are involved in all this.

First of all let us note that theoretically any emotional element can be associated with any specific line of action. Practically, certain combinations are difficult to accomplish, but theoretically they are possible. Thus, the correspondence school arouses the boy's love for his mother and challenges him to make her proud of him and "funnels" the aroused emotional desire into taking a correspondence course. The same appeal could be utilized to get young men to go to church, to quit gambling, to work harder for their employer, to enlist when war is declared, to do anything the boy could be made to believe his mother would approve of.

In the last political campaign for President of the United States, the

maternal instinct was appealed to by both sides. A Democratic editorial appealed as follows:

"Mother of America! Mother of Pennsylvania! Mother of Pittsburgh! Do you want your boy to go to war? Is the roll of battle drums sweeter in your ears than the song of his voice in the home? Would you rather have his hands in fierce grip on gun in battle's rack than have his arms in love about your neck? That is the question you must answer to your God and your fellow-man when you go into the voting booth on November 2. Do not let demagogues confuse you. The issue is plain: A vote for the league is a vote for peace; a vote against the league is a vote for war. . . . Mother of an American boy! The munition makers of the world are arrayed against American participation in the League of Nations. They are snatching at your vote, because with it they may claim the body of your first-born. Mother of a Pittsburgh boy! The question comes home to you! Your boy was not born to be food for guns."

A Republican advertisement stated in part:

"Women! For your own good vote the Republican ticket. . . . The American woman asks of her country: That it be a secure place for her home and for her children and that it be security with honor. That it give her children opportunity to lead their lives even better than she and her husband led theirs. That it be just in its relations with other nations, and merit the pride which the best of its citizens have in it, in its history and its ideals. A policy which has these purposes will have the support of American policy and has been Republican policy from the days of Abraham Lincoln. The Republican policy is to protect the security of the United States by preserving its right to make decisions regarding its actions in the future as events in the future demand. The Republican party is unwilling to pledge now that it will protect European boundary lines and to deprive Congress of the power to say in each case what the action of the United States will be . . ."

Here we have the same instinctive emotional element aroused and then associated with two diametrically opposite lines of action. Both of these articles are intended to arouse a mother's love for her boy and consequent horror of war, and then show that her desire could be best obtained by voting the Democratic ticket in one case and the Republican ticket in the other.

A second fact can be considered regarding motivation. It is that no logical connection needs to exist between the emotion which is aroused and the program which is outlined. And further still, there need be no logical establishment of the fact that the program is really the best one to be pursued or even that it is honestly conceived.

Consider the propaganda for the Red Cross, an organization for which we are all enthusiastic. The Red Cross has rendered inestimable service. And because its work has touched our hearts a real sentiment has been built up about its name. So strong is this sentiment that one now finds himself unable to resist the request for annual dues.

Propaganda depends upon this psychological process of motivation for its success. And motivation, as we have seen, is the deliberate process of arousing one's emotions and desires and then suggesting a line of action by which these desires may be expressed. And we have seen further that any emotional element can be associated with any specific action; and that when one is well motivated he ignores intellectual considerations touching upon the honesty of the statements or the efficacy of the program.

222. Principles and Rules of Propaganda ¹

The principles of propaganda as it is employed today by agencies of all sorts are reducible to succinct rules. These rules read like a catalog of social shame, but that they are in use is "a condition and not a theory," and it is imperative that those to whom propaganda is directed should recognize them, since the propagandists recognize them well enough. There are six fundamental rules:

1. If you have an idea to put over, keep presenting it incessantly. Keep talking (or printing) systematically and persistently.

2. Avoid argument, as a general thing. Do not admit there is any "other side"; and in all statements scrupulously avoid arousing reflection or associated ideas, except those which are favorable. Reserve argument for the small class of people who depend on logical processes, or as a means of attracting the attention of those with whom you are not arguing.

3. In every possible way, connect the idea you wish to put over with the known desires of your audience. Remember that wishes are the basis of the acceptance of ideas in more cases than logic is.

4. Make your statements clear, and in such language that your audience can repeat them, in thought, without the need of transforming them.

5. Use direct statements only when you are sure that a basis for acceptance has already been laid. Otherwise, use indirect statement, innuendo, and implication. Use direct statement in such a way that the

¹ Reprinted from *Social Psychology* (Dunlap) (p. 256) by permission of The Williams & Wilkins Company.

attention of the audience shall be drawn to it sufficiently to take it in, but not sufficiently to reflect upon it.

6. For the most permanent eventual results, aim your propaganda at the children; mix it in your pedagogy. Follow the example, in this respect, of Ivory Soap and Prohibition.

223. Propaganda and Organization ¹

Propaganda is feeble and ineffectual unless it fashions for itself an organization. An organization endows an idea with a degree of prestige which it can never obtain from the advocacy of scattered individuals. De Tocqueville thought that he was discovering an American peculiarity when he noted the great number of organizations for all conceivable purposes. If the Bostonians were threatened with smallpox, they formed an anti-smallpox society, he said. Organization is the universal propaganda agency. It is the club with which non-official statesmen compel the official chiefs to make innovations in public policy.

224. Propaganda and Social Control ²

Now let us consider how propaganda may be controlled by society so that dishonest and pernicious campaigns may be prevented without interference to worthwhile propaganda.

The most convenient method of considering the many angles of the subject will be through discussing propaganda in terms of the following three aspects: First, propaganda considered with regard to the truth or falsity of the statements in which it is presented; second, with regard to the action suggested as the means of satisfying the aroused desire; and third, with regard to the emotional element, the desire that is aroused. The matter of control can accordingly be discussed in terms of these three questions: First, how far can propaganda be controlled in terms of the validity of the statements which are made? Second, to what extent can propaganda be controlled in terms of the action which is proposed? And third, to what extent can propaganda be controlled in terms of the emotional elements that are involved?

First of all, then, how far can propaganda be controlled in terms of the validity of the statements which are made?

¹ Reprinted by permission from A. Lipsky, *Man the Puppet*, p. 86. New York. Frank-Maurice, Inc., 1925.

² Reprinted by permission from E. K. Strong "The Control of Propaganda as a Psychological Problem" *Scien. Mon.* 1922: XIV: pp. 242-43; 244-46; 249-50; 250-51.

Society has long dealt with false statements and already has postal regulations, laws against slander, libel and the like. To protect politicians the English law provides a fine not to exceed £100 if the name and address of the printer and publisher is omitted from a poster relating to the candidature of any person for Parliament and other offices. The Association of Advertising Clubs of the World carries on a steady campaign against dishonest advertising and has accomplished a great deal of good against this type of propaganda. At this time, thirty-six states have passed the Printers' Ink Statute or a modification of it, thereby facilitating convictions in such cases. And the Association of Advertising Clubs of the World is spending money and effort in enforcing it. Control of propaganda publicly making dishonest statements can clearly be taken care of.

But unfortunately much undesirable propaganda will not fall under the class of propaganda publicly making dishonest statements. One very undesirable sort is spread by word of mouth. No one knows from whence it comes, and exactly what is back of it. We had many stories thus circulated against the Germans during the war, and we have the same sort of thing carried on against prominent men almost all the time. Stories of Roosevelt's excessive drinking were thus circulated. And it was not until they were publicly expressed that he had an opportunity of disposing of them through law suit. Such word of mouth propaganda is fostered in times of emotional stress and particularly wherever people believe they are not being told all the facts. The best possible cure for it is publicity of the sort that makes people *believe* they are getting all sides to the question.

But in addition to this sneaking underhand propaganda there are all sorts of campaigns which are very undesirable, but which adhere technically to the truth. They cannot accordingly be prosecuted for dishonesty. Some of them, however, give false impressions just the same. This is so because the human brain does not necessarily think in a logical manner.

To require that propaganda contain truths and not falsehoods is a desirable regulation, but it will not stop undesirable campaigns.

Let us consider second to what extent propaganda can be controlled in terms of the action which is proposed.

If the proposed action is that of buying, it is not difficult to evaluate the propaganda, or advertising as it would usually be in this case, upon the grounds that the individual did or did not get value received. But if the proposed action is that of giving money for some cause or charity, justification upon such grounds is far more difficult. If a woman, very

fond of cats, wants to endow a hospital for them, run by thoroughly incompetent people whom she likes, isn't that sufficient to justify her action and the propaganda, as far as she is concerned? It is hard to attack such action in terms of the rights of individuals, but it is being more and more attacked upon the grounds of social welfare. Business men through their Chambers of Commerce in sheer defense are increasingly investigating such propositions and in many places list the charities that they will countenance. Out of the war has come the Community Chest movement whereby all social agencies in a district make up their budgets in advance and after they have been gone over by both disinterested and interested parties, a single united effort is made to raise the total amount in one campaign for the year. Such plans help the worthy cause and interfere with the unworthy one. But they do not eliminate the unworthy campaigns.

The establishment of bureaus, whose business it is to investigate all organizations asking for funds—organizations like the National Information Bureau—renders it easier to determine whether any organization is desirable or not. Can society go farther here? Can society not only positively help the worthy cause, but put the unworthy, inefficient or unnecessarily duplicating agency out of business? There is no question but that many individuals are being fooled every year and much money squandered through such non-worthwhile causes. But at the same time, we must remember that most new uplift movements have encountered great opposition at the start, and to increase this opposition still more through the establishment of legal regulations may do society in the long run more harm than good.

In addition to campaigns to sell a commodity or service or to obtain gifts, there are other campaigns devoted to accomplishing specific actions of a sort much more difficult to estimate fairly. Political campaigns aim to secure votes for certain men; propaganda appears from time to time to influence citizens to vote for or against certain measures; propaganda appeared in many forms a short time ago, appealing to citizens of the United States to intervene in Mexico; lobbies are familiar accompaniments to our legislatures, each one aiming to accomplish a specific program; unions appeal to public opinion to aid them in winning a strike and companies appeal to the same public to help them prevent or break the strike, etc. We are so accustomed to our political machinery that we do not often stop and ask ourselves whether it is geared up so as to serve society in the best way. Only when some enthusiastic social uplifter boasts that she and four others alone put a measure through a state legislature by the use of skillful lobbying, or a secretary of a business

man's organization calmly announces months in advance that Congress will do away with a bureau because his organization is demanding such action, and his prophecy comes true, does one wonder whether some sort of control of propaganda would not be worthwhile even here. And one waxes quite indignant, as did a former Secretary of War, when he comes to realize that much of the propaganda for bringing back the bodies of our dead soldiers was instigated by the journal of the undertakers and casket makers.

To control such propaganda we must have facts and we must have a body to review the facts. This we do not have in many cases. A political campaign on a clean-cut issue is supposed to be a trial as to the merits of the two sides before all the citizens who through their votes decide the issue. This is the theory of the democracy. It works pretty well in many cases, surprisingly well in some. But in most campaigns the issue is not clean-cut and in nearly all campaigns the political strategist endeavors to confuse the issue, so that many a time a citizen votes against what he really wants. And then there are many measures coming up in our fearfully complex life of today upon which the average man is not at all competent to pass judgment. Except in a few instances, society has not yet organized itself so as properly to handle such matters. In the case of struggles between capital and labor, we are steadily advancing toward the insistence upon both sides that they shall present the facts as they see them and also toward the establishment of tribunals which shall weight all the facts and decide the issue. The impartial chairmanship program maintained by the clothing industry in Chicago and other cities has worked very satisfactorily and seems to be the ideal machinery for controlling propaganda in that field. Its greatest merit lies, it seems to me, in the fact that complaints are studied and evaluated very shortly after they arise, thus eliminating the getting under headway of extensive propaganda with all the arousal of emotions that propaganda assures.

But there are many issues today, strongly supported by a minority, regarding which it is difficult to obtain facts. And as long as one side is insistent and the other side largely indifferent, society cannot expect that the minority will present facts regarding their claims. For it is not facts that will sell the program, but emotion and the emotion which is aroused need not be logically connected with the issue. So a few harrowing tales of deserted mothers and their poverty-stricken children bring us a mother's pension program because a few people believe this is the best solution. Possibly it is. I am not here arguing the case. But

how much real thinking has entered into the matter by disinterested parties before a legislature has voted!

We have seen that theoretically any emotion may be aroused as the basis for stirring one to act and that there needs be little or no rational connection between the two. The detailed suffering of a little girl and her kitten can motivate our hatred against the Germans, arouse our sympathy for the Armenians, make us enthusiastic for the Red Cross, or lead us to give money for support of a home for cats. The story may be true or concocted for the purpose; the inferences against the Germans or for the home for cats may be also true or false; the organization carrying on the propaganda may be efficiently administered or not—all these considerations little concern us. We feel the emotion, we want to do something because by acting we will feel better, and away we go regardless of mere intellectual considerations.

Here is the real psychological problem concerning propaganda. Take away the emotional element and society need have no fear of propaganda. For man is always very slow to act in terms of ideas alone. Witness his indifference when he really knows the political organization in control of his municipality is flagrantly dishonest. He does nothing until his emotions are aroused by a whirlwind speaker, or by personal injury. So long as a radical writes or speaks in a philosophical manner society can rightly be indifferent. But when he discards the intellectual aspects of his views, seizes upon some slogan and fills his writings or speeches with concrete tales of human suffering and the arrogance of the rich, society rightly becomes alarmed. For now the radical is setting fire to dynamite and neither he nor any one else can tell what may result.

At the present time the prospects do not appear overbright of controlling propaganda through regulation. There is, however, a method of weakening its influence, that is by fighting one propaganda by another, or by general publicity. The trouble, however, with fighting bad propaganda by good propaganda, aside from the very practical consideration that the former is usually better equipped financially, is that seldom is the public supplied with facts upon which a real conclusion can be thought out. Instead it is inflamed to take sides and a deadlock results, or the matter is settled by some sort of resort to force. Just in this way arose the turmoil about the League of Nations program. Instead of thinking it through and arriving rationally at a real conclusion. Wilsonites and anti-Wilsonites became emotionally aroused and it was voted down because the latter group had the greater force measured in votes. Both sides know the real issue is not dead, and the Republicans who

defeated Wilson's program are now attempting at Washington to find the conclusions we should have reached months ago. Fighting propaganda with propaganda is not likely, then, to give us satisfactory results.

Can propaganda be controlled through publicity? Yes, if we had perfect publicity. But that, apparently, we cannot have. Hence, we can only hope to have partial control by this means.

It has been suggested that propaganda could be controlled by national control of all publicity. Would such regulated and censored publicity help here?

The two extremes of publicity are no freedom of speech and complete freedom to say whatever one wants to. The Anglo-Saxons have decided that freedom is better than no freedom. The French lean quite strongly to centralized control of all publicity. Observers both from within and without that country testify that such censorship deadens public interest in the news of the world. And it certainly makes possible all manner of mouth-to-mouth whisperings—the most insidious and undermining of all propaganda.

Possibly publicity is the one best cure we have today for handling those forms of propaganda which are not readily controlled by other means. But if this is the case it means that more of our newspapers and magazines will have to convince the public that what they print is not controlled by certain interests. At the present time I should judge that great numbers of citizens believe most newspapers, if not their own, distort the facts to fit their purposes. And again, if publicity is to cure the evils of propaganda, it means that society must work out some more satisfactory method than now exists of providing the groups of poor people with adequate publicity to offset the enormous advantage that groups composed of wealthy people have in commanding the printed page. Too few newspapers print today, and too few can ever afford to print, the detailed testimony in a labor controversy, yet unless the laboring man feels his side is presented, he will have supplied to him and will read wild denunciations of capital instead of the sworn testimony of his leaders as given before a board of arbitration.

Another means of controlling propaganda lies in educating the public to an understanding of the methods employed in propaganda. It is thought that man likes to feel he is being appealed to on logical grounds; that he resents being "soft-soaped." And that he does not want to be "worked," or to have something "put over on him." Possibly, it is contended, articles such as have appeared recently in our magazines recounting the methods by which propagandists have fooled men and women may educate the public to see through a publicity campaign.

Personally, I do not believe that very much can be accomplished in this way, for, as Barnum claimed, the public likes to be fooled; and secondly, clever appeals to the emotions will nearly always win against intellectually held convictions.

225. How the Newspaper's Political Policy is Formed ¹

Practically 75 per cent. of the county press—the smaller papers of the country, who serve the rural communities, are straight-out Republican. The remaining 25 per cent. are Democratic. The Republican press is unceasingly and regularly served with Republican propaganda, sent out by the Republican National Publicity Committee, with headquarters at Washington. The Democratic committee does the same for the Democratic county press, but far less efficiently, effectively, and regularly.

Many of the owners and editors of the county press not only depend largely upon party support for the existence of their papers, but are themselves interested and active in party politics. It is, of course, greatly to their interests to print their party propaganda and support their party candidate, and they naturally do so.

There are approximately 18,000 daily, weekly, and semi-weekly newspapers in the United States. Of this number 15,000 can be classed as the strictly party county press. No such thing as fairness in political fights is attempted in these papers. Their game is to make the best out of their own side and the worst out of the other, and their ammunition and material in all national campaigns comes from the national publicity headquarters.

In local campaigns they follow along similar party lines. The voters have no chance to get a true and impartial picture of politics from these papers.

With the great metropolitan papers there is a difference. They do not, as a rule accept or print propaganda from publicity committees. They are financially independent of parties and politics and, except in rare cases, their owners and editors are not actively interested in politics. Most of them are prosperous enough not to have any strings tied to them financially or politically.

They are—most of them—in a position to be wholly independent. It would be a fine thing if they functioned that way, but the fact is that, while there are a few great papers whose policy is determined by conference of the editorial executives who are, or ought to be, the men best equipped to decide, the bulk of the city papers do not follow that method.

¹ Reprinted by permission from F. R. Kent, *The Great Game of Politics* pp. 210-11; 212-13; 214. Garden City, N. Y. Doubleday Page & Company, 1923.

The fact remains that all over the country, except in rare instances, the political policies of newspapers are formed either by the local newspaper situation, the probable effect on circulation, or advertising, or by the personal, political, and financial predilections and interests of their owners. There are few newspapers anywhere in the United States not affected politically by one or the other of these reasons.

As a whole, therefore, the press of the country is not at bottom concerned in presenting full and accurate information about campaigns and candidates regardless of consequences. Even those whose policies do reflect the honest convictions of the men who run them do not always present that sort of information. As has been pointed out, in the first place, not infrequently they do not know the full facts themselves, and, in the second place, there has grown up a curious restraint about printing them when they do know them. Sometimes this restraint is based on fear of libel suits, sometimes on fear of making powerful and revengeful enemies, sometimes because of the impossibility of getting proof, and sometimes it is just because of the habit of hiding the facts, and the feeling that there is something indelicate, not to say indecent, in printing them.

Any well-posted political reporter or managing editor can always tell you the inside story of the fight in his city or state, together with the real facts about all the candidates, but he does not print these things in his own paper. Travelling correspondents, who go out on tours of political observation, always get clear-cut, unbiased, real information from the local newspaper men in the states they visit. These men are delighted to have the whole truth about their local political fight printed in a paper 500 or 1,000 miles away, but for one reason or another they do not print it at home.

This is a curious situation but it exists all over the country and helps to prove the statement that the veil of pretense behind which the realities are hid from the voters is held up by the candidates on one end and by the newspapers on the other.

225. Publicity and the Alteration of Knowledge and Opinion ¹

An illustration which embodies most of the technical and psychological points of interest in the preceding incidents may be found in Lithuania's campaign in this country in 1919, for popular sympathy and official recognition. Lithuania was of considerable political importance in the

¹ Reprinted by permission from E. L. Bernays, *Crystallizing Public Opinion*, pp. 24-27. New York. Boni & Liveright, 1923.

reorganization of Europe, but it was a country little known or understood by the American public. An added difficulty was the fact that the independence of Lithuania would interfere seriously with plans which France had for the establishment of a strong Poland. There were excellent historical, ethnic and economic reasons why, if Lithuania broke off from Russia, it should be allowed to stand on its own feet. On the other hand there were powerful political influences which were against such a result. The American attitude on the question of Lithuanian independence, it was felt, would play an important part. The question was how to arouse popular and official interest in Lithuania's aspirations.

A Lithuanian National Council was organized, composed of prominent American-Lithuanians, and a Lithuanian Information Bureau established to act as a clearing house for news about Lithuania and for special pleading on behalf of Lithuania's ambitions. The public relations counsel who was retained to direct this work recognized that the first problem to be solved was America's indifference to and ignorance about Lithuania and its desires.

He had an exhaustive study made of every conceivable aspect of the problem of Lithuania from its remote and recent history and ethnic origins to its present-day marriage customs and its popular recreations. He divided his material into its various categories, based primarily on the public to which it would probably make its appeal. For the amateur ethnologist he provided interesting and accurate data of the racial origins of Lithuania. To the student of languages he appealed with authentic and well written studies of the development of the Lithuanian language from its origins in the Sanskrit. He told the "sporting fan" about Lithuanian sports and told American women about Lithuanian clothes. He told the jeweler about amber and provided the music lover with concerts of Lithuanian music.

To the senators, he gave facts about Lithuania which would give them basis for favorable action. To the members of the House of Representatives he did likewise. He reflected to those communities whose crystallized opinion would be helpful in guiding other opinions, facts which gave them basis for conclusions favorable to Lithuania.

A series of events which would carry with them the desired implications were planned and executed. Mass meetings were held in different cities; petitions were drawn, signed and presented; pilgrims made calls upon Senate and House of Representatives Committees. All the avenues of approach to the public were utilized to capitalize the public interest and bring public action. The mails carried statements of Lithuania's position to individuals who might be interested. The lecture platform

resounded to Lithuania's appeal. Newspaper advertising was bought and paid for. The radio carried the message of speakers to the public. Motion pictures reached the patrons of moving picture houses.

Little by little and phase by phase, the public, the press and Government officials acquired a knowledge of the customs, the character and the problems of Lithuania, the small Baltic nation that was seeking freedom.

When the Lithuanian Information Bureau went before the press associations to correct inaccurate or misleading Polish news about the Lithuanian situation, it came there as representative of a group which had figured largely in the American news for a number of weeks, as a result of the advice and activities of its public relations counsel. In the same way, when delegations of Americans, interested in the Lithuanian problem, appeared before members of Congress or officials of the State Department, they came there as spokesmen for a country which was no longer unknown. They represented a group which could no longer be entirely ignored. Somebody described this campaign, once it had achieved recognition for the Baltic republic, as the campaign of "advertising a nation to freedom."

227. Control of Publicity in the Interests of the Christian Church ¹

What agencies may the Church legitimately employ to form and guide public opinion? This question we have already answered by implication but it may be well to discuss the matter explicitly. First of all, there is oral discussion. Church members should realize that one of the first duties of the Christian life is to create public opinion and public conscience on social matters. This they can do by discussing these matters with friends and neighbors in the light of Christian principles. Habits and opportunities favoring oral discussion are falling into disuse, however, in many sections of American society. The Church can overcome this tendency to a certain extent by organizing "open forums" and "discussion groups," as a part of its regular activities. Sermonizing by the pastor on social questions, no matter how excellent, is certainly by itself not sufficient, for it fails to create effective opinion because there is no give-and-take. Effective public opinion is always the *co-operative* product of the interaction of many individual minds. Possibly it might be well in some churches to transform the prayer meeting from a purely devotional service into a meeting in which the ethical and religious truths

¹ Reprinted by permission from C. A. Ellwood "The Formation of Public Opinion" *Relig. Educ.* 1920: XV: pp. 78-80.

set forth by the pastor in the previous Sunday's sermons were discussed and applied to present social situations. In this way the prayer meeting might again be made to function, as at present in some churches it does not do. It need not become, of course, any the less a prayer meeting because it is devoted to the application of moral and religious principles to social situations.

The second agency which the Church should employ to form and guide public opinion is the press, which in our civilization is becoming more and more the chief factor in the making of public opinion. Here indirect methods will count most. The majority of those connected with the press are church members and especially those in responsible positions. The Church should insist that in their business they have the greatest opportunity for Christian service. If Christian managers and editors did their full duty in creating Christian public opinion, our civilization would soon become Christian. They are not wholly to blame, however, for failing to carry Christianity into their business, for the Church thus far has failed to insist that a supreme duty of its lay members is to create Christian public conscience regarding social conditions.

Direct methods of work through the press to reach public opinion should, of course, also be employed by the Church. Here the most powerful agencies are undoubtedly the daily and weekly newspapers, whose importance in forming public opinion is obvious; but we should also not forget the pamphlet. The recent successes of government bureaus and of radical groups in spreading their propaganda by means of pamphlets suggest that the Church would do well to revive this ancient means of forming public opinion. Telling articles in magazines or addresses at such a gathering as this ¹ might be printed in pamphlet form and distributed widely over the country. Finally, display advertising in newspapers may and should be used by the Church, within reasonable limits, not only to call attention to its own program, but to mold opinion on vital moral issues. In one sense, the whole matter of propaganda is a matter of advertising, and this should be recognized. The most righteous program of the ages cannot succeed unless in some way it can be made to secure the serious and thoughtful attention of the public. Sensational methods, of course, discredit themselves; but on the other hand, Christians have been too timid in employing psychologically approved methods to champion the Christian cause before the public.

Finally, the chief agency which the Church may legitimately employ to create Christian public opinion, because it is peculiarly its own, is the Church school. The overwhelming American opinion against alcoholic

¹ A religious conference.

beverages was undoubtedly largely the result of introducing temperance instruction into the public schools. The Church should use its influence, of course, to get instruction on all matters introduced into our public schools; but as yet, it is not possible to have such instruction given in the public schools in direct and vital connection with Christian principles. This can be done, however, easily enough in the Church's Sunday schools. It is obviously what should be done; but the average Sunday school will have to be re-modeled before it is done effectively. The average Sunday school teaches the Bible or Christian principles abstractedly with little or nothing said about concrete social situations in our civilization. This is probably the reason why the religion of so many church members fails to function when they come into practical contact with the labor problem, the Negro problem, the divorce problem, or some other concrete social situation. Something more than the Bible and Christian principles in the abstract should be taught in our Sunday schools; and that is knowledge of actual social conditions in the light of Christian ideals. There is no good reason why good books on social and economic problems, written with a Christian background, should be excluded from our Sunday schools any more than the Bible. A text-book in sociology, with a Christian viewpoint, is no more out of place in the Sunday school room than a book in Christian theology. The advanced classes should, indeed, be studying such books in connection with the Gospels rather than the Bible alone. The vital study of Christian ideals in relation to real life could be made to do more to Christianize public opinion probably than any other agency.

And here it may be remarked that the Sunday school should not be merely for children and adolescents. The Sunday school should be the whole Church mobilized for study—the study of Christianity, on the one hand, and the study of the actually attained Christian living, or the lack of it, on the other. If the Sunday school were thus vitalized through connection with concrete problems of Christian living there would probably be no lack of interest in it on the part of either children or adults.

To sum up: The Church to mold public opinion democratically and effectively must keep the conditions of its formation those of freedom, disinterestedness, and intelligence. It should employ as agencies for its formation, oral discussion, the press, and the Sunday school. Christianity has never been effectively taught or even in my opinion clearly presented to the mass of our people. The consequence is that we still have in large degree, a pagan world. The time has now come, however, when Christianity, if it is to survive, must control in larger measure public opinion which is the ruling force of our time, the real sovereign of

democracy. To do this the whole method and machinery of the Christian Church must be modernized. It must make a larger use of scientific sociological and psychological knowledge of every sort. The social function of religion is doubtless to conserve, propagate and develop social values and ideals; but these, to be sound, must rest upon adequate knowledge. Hence, a sound social religion must be profoundly interested in promoting and diffusing social knowledge. If the Christian Church is not thus interested, it will fail to function, and it and probably also the civilization which it is supposed to support will pass away, to make way for a more socially intelligent religion. The world is perishing for lack of knowledge of the way in which human beings should live together. The Church holds one key to this knowledge, social science the other. Here then, is the secret of effective control over the formation of public opinion in order to create a Christian world: Let the Church use not only the key of Christian ideals, but also the key of scientific social knowledge.

228. Propaganda Through the Motion Picture ¹

The Scope of the Medium. To what extent is it possible to influence public opinion by the use of motion picture? This question must first be answered from the point of view of the production of the films, and, secondly, from that of distribution. For our purpose, it will be convenient to divide the films into five classes, on the basis of their ultimate presentation to the public, as follows:

1. *Theatrical* or Commercial-Dramatic Films, the 5-8 real "features" with a starred player, including comedies.
2. *News* Films, pictorial reviews issued weekly, the screen newspaper or magazine.
3. *Education* Films, many sub-divisions, viz: Travel, Classical, Juvenile, Religious, etc.
4. *Industrial* Films, in part educational, for advertising purposes, overtly or otherwise.
5. *Propaganda* Films, may take any of above forms, or be simply propaganda, political films, etc.

How many people does the motion picture reach, and under what circumstances? What results may be expected from efforts to influence public opinion through this medium? These are the questions of distribution to which we must next apply ourselves.

¹ Reprinted by permission from H. A. Larrabee "The Formation of Public Opinion Through Motion Pictures" *Relig. Educ.* 1920: XV: pp. 144-49; 150-153; 154.

According to statements by prominent film men, the last reliable figures upon the number of commercial motion picture theaters in the United States were obtained in 1914, when there were about 12,000. In the opinion of many authorities the number has decreased since that time, owing to the "swallowing up" of the five and ten cent houses by the larger theaters during the war. A recent newspaper estimate places the number at 16,200; but 12,000 to 15,000 is probably more nearly correct. Of these 317 are listed as "First-Run" houses, located in 133 cities in 38 states. In these houses films are shown immediately on issue; in fact it has been stated that it is possible at the present time through the organization of exchanges brought about during the war drives, to exhibit any given film simultaneously in every motion picture theater in the United States!

The publishers of motion picture magazines state that no trustworthy estimate can be made of the total attendance at the theaters for any given period. Some have reckoned that one-third to one-half the population of the United States enter motion picture theaters weekly; others as high as ten million each day. The lowest total figure likely (to make the business profitable) would be above three millions daily, while five millions is probably much nearer.

What draws the millions into the film houses not once, but twice and thrice weekly? The answer is, first, amusement. They may be instructed, educated, cajoled; but they come for another purpose—to be amused. And the first drawing-card for amusement is the "star" of the picture, or the title of the film. Music, news reels, scenics, are side attractions; the stars make the fortunes for themselves and their employers.

News films are regular features at the larger theaters and many vaudeville houses as well, reaching perhaps one-fourth to one-third of the total attendance at the motion picture theaters, and a few through other agencies.

It is a great surprise to most persons to learn that there are more motion picture projection machines being operated outside the theaters in this country than inside them. In 1914, when there were about 12,000 theaters, there were about 18,000 projectors in use outside theaters. Undoubtedly the excess outside is considerably greater now than in 1914. The non-theatrical field offers a greater number of machines, but not nearly such a large audience, nor the corresponding opportunity for profit. Some 3,500 of these machines, we are told by the *Boston Traveler*, are in churches; the rest being scattered in schools, colleges, community centers, settlements and private homes.

Educational films in the form of screen magazines are often found

in these theaters. *The Ford Educational Weekly* was, in March, 1919, being shown in some four thousand theaters. Theatrical audiences crave amusement primarily; non-theatrical audiences are willing to be educated. This means that educational films can be produced with a different standard in view. They must be interesting; but just as the high school does not teach current magazine literature, but the classics; so the educational film, not depending on evanescent publicity, may be produced for the years to come. The theatrical film is the motion-picture *Saturday Evening Post*, the educational film may aspire to be the motion-picture *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.

Propaganda films generally reach the public through an independent showing in a hired theater or by motor-truck projection. The goal of propaganda managers is, of course, the regular theater program, but it has been found a difficult objective to reach. Vast resources are necessary, as in the case of the Government, and great skill in manipulation, to produce a film sensational enough to be "put over" on the theatrical interests.

Do motion pictures reach the people? In some form they reach nearly all the people in the United States, not yearly, nor yet monthly, but some say, weekly. The vast majority look to the screen for amusement,—diversion from the daily task; but the number who are instructed by the motion picture is constantly growing. Professor Ernest W. Burgess in a report to the Chicago Censorship Commission, summarized observations by 3,237 teachers of over 100,000 school children; and concluded that 50 per cent of the children were vitally affected by the motion picture; and that in relative influence on their lives, the home stood first, the school second, *the movies third*, and *the church fourth*. If this be said of children, for whom motion pictures in the theater are certainly not designed, what shall we say of adults?

Turning from this survey of the motion picture in general, we come to specific instances of the use of the films in forming public opinion.

Theatrical films affect the ideas of those who see them in two ways; first, by their conventional moral standards; and second, by their direct use to convince the audience of the right or wrong of a particular cause.

The subtle colorings in many films, which have a great effect upon the ideas of the masses, lie more in the field of censorship than propaganda. Fortunately, perhaps, the screen is slavish in its devotion to popular outward convention. Consider but a few of its unalterable canons that a rich man is bent on villainy; that a poor man is *per se*, noble; that "finding real love" removes all pasts; that ex-convicts surpass in morality most men who have remained at liberty; that infants or

their clothes will by their mere presence reform the hardest characters; and that most of the world's romances take place in Greenwich Village, desert islands, the frozen North, or Riverside Drive.

The public, you say, will have what it wants; but can it not be told what to want? Take a single instance: a recent newspaper story states that "the feeling that all American films contain 'dry' propaganda is rapidly assuming alarming proportions in foreign countries. Yet nothing could be further from the truth." The American movie convention makes liquor and crime synonymous; hence the foreign suspicion of our films!

To what extent are theatrical films used directly for propaganda? An examination of the list of 840 feature films produced between September 1, 1918, and September 1, 1919, reveals only 15, or 1.7 per cent, suspected of specific propaganda purpose, such as: Anti-German, Pro-Christian Science, Anti-Venereal, Armenian Relief, Salvation Army, Draft, Anti-Radical, Pro-Food Conservation, and Political.

The most noted film of this sort is, of course, "The Birth of a Nation," which has been attacked as propaganda by the Negro race. No single film has had a greater influence, arousing race riots in some places and promoting conciliation (as between North and South) in others. A word should be said also of another class of these films, which have so far proved to be distinctly crude and misdirected, the anti-Bolshevist films, most of them harping on the alleged nationalization of women.

Motion pictures of news events have much the same usefulness for propaganda that the press has—they may be "colored." This coloring process may affect either the film itself, or the captions, or both. At first blush one might easily be led to believe that the camera does not lie. Seeing motion pictures of a victorious general entering a captured city makes believing easier than merely reading a news dispatch. But the camera may lie. More likely, the camera will not tell the whole truth. The motion picture photographer may take only the things he wished to emphasize. At a critical moment the film may shift its scene and the meaning with it. A common example might be adduced in the war pictures which were permitted to reach us, showing the doughboys to be creatures who were eternally engaged in grinning, fondling pets, and devouring food, playing baseball and fathering French orphans. In other words, we saw only one side of the picture.

It is conceivable that a situation like that in Mexico might be handled similarly—one faction photographed only in its saintly aspects, the other always at villainy. Just as the newspaper selects events for our attention, headlines one thing and ignores another, the screen pictorial edits the scenery.

A second opportunity for "coloring" news films lies in the captions. Here a psychological factor enters in, that of expectation. That is to say, if we are told distinctly in a caption that a certain event is to be shown us forthwith on the screen, we expect to see the event, and are likely to see it! At least we are likely to attach to it the meaning pointed out in the caption. Suppose, for instance, we are to be shown some scene of disorder in which members of foreign factions clash, people whom we cannot identify off-hand. We are certainly likely to believe the Blank party guilty of whatever the captions may impute to them, regardless of the looks of the picture.

Like all agencies for transmitting information, the news films can be used for good or evil. It is important, therefore, to know who is using them, and for what purpose. The interests behind the daily press we can identify, in general, for the law compels a statement annually. A similar law should reveal the owners of the news weeklies, all but two of which, it is said, are now under the control of one newspaper magnate.

The remaining three groups of films—Educational, Industrial, and strictly Propaganda—are so closely related that it will be difficult to distinguish between them. All the good industrial and propaganda films have educational value. We are concerned at this point with the educational films which instruct with a particular bias in view, rather than merely to inform. Such are: Biblical films, health films, Red Cross propaganda, forestry, public roads, and agriculture films, in short, all instructional films not advertising a special business interest.

As a matter of technique, the most successful of these films make use of a story interest. Take for instance a "Pig Club" film which was produced by a Banker, a Breeder, and the Chamber of Commerce in Fresno County, California, at a cost of about one thousand dollars. It shows a boy on a farm who buys a pig, raises it, and sells it at a fine profit—the sort of a human interest story in which any boy would be interested.

The use of educational films by governmental agencies is on the increase. The Public Welfare Commission of the State of Illinois has recently completed films showing the old and new methods of treating the insane in state institutions. The National Tuberculosis Association has four films dealing with the white plague; the Army uses motion pictures in recruiting; the Elks spent fifty thousand dollars on "The Greater Victory," a film advocating rehabilitation *via* the Federal Board for Vocational Education.

In all these instances organizations interested in the public welfare have sought to educate, or form public opinion at the source, by the

use of instructional films. Often such efforts are at the same time appeals for support, financial or otherwise, which is a tribute to the effectiveness of the motion picture in stimulating action as well as enthusiasm. In any case the technique used in visual instruction adheres to the best education theory of the teaching process; first, secure a point of contact with your audience; and secondly, connect the subject in hand with their welfare. The effectiveness of visual instruction properly conducted cannot be doubted. One has but to remember that "87 per cent. of our knowledge is acquired through the eye."

The Use of Films in Religious Education. This phase of the use of educational films for propaganda is worthy of special mention. The adoption of the motion picture by the Sunday school and church has been slow but apparently sure. The religious film is still in its infancy compared to any other sort of motion picture.

Industrial and Commercial uses. As early as 1912, the United States Steel Corporation inaugurated the use of the film in its relations with its employees. Their first effort was called "An American in the Making," and dealt with safety in industry and the lately popular Americanization. The moral throughout was the benevolence of the corporation, and its solicitude for its employees' welfare. A second film, "The Reason Why," carried substantially the same message in 1917. Other big business interests have used the motion picture to great advantage in solving internal problems of accidents, wastage, and holding employees. Probably the most striking results were obtained by the Ford Company's safety films. According to an article in the *Educational Film Magazine*, August, 1919, some 34,821 men saw the safety films at the Ford plant from January to June, 1919, resulting in a 27 per cent decrease in the number of lost time accidents.

The aggravated labor unrest has made the problem of contentment of the employee of paramount importance. In this process the films can be used in several ways. Employees of large concerns may be shown the details of other departments, to impress them with the excellence of the working conditions in general and the high standing of their employers. They may even be shown the unsatisfactory conditions existing in the works of their competitors. More important, however, are the films dealing with the labor problem in general. Several such subjects have been produced, mirroring the conventional philosophy of benevolent capitalism, the virtues of thrift, the possibility of sudden riches, the iniquity of the agitator, and similar conservative axioms. It is reported that under the auspices of the Chamber of Commerce, of a middle Western city, films with this purpose were shown from motor trucks to

large audiences with quite the desired effect, ascertainable in the reduced number of strikes during the period thereafter. No films from the point of view of labor have appeared to date.

The national advertiser is concerned with the problem, how reach the most people most effectively? And of course the motion picture theater with its millions of attendance rightly presents itself at once as the channel *par excellence*. But the constant attendants of these houses will not manifest enthusiasm longer over a picture just because "it moves." They demand quality, and resent having to gaze at an endless series of gaudily colored slides extolling the merits of the local merchants. More and more they are coming to resent the advertising film at a theater which charges a stiff admittance, even though the film be "thrown in" as an extra.

In consequence, subtlety is now the watch-word in the industrial field. The climax in this respect, so far as the writer can testify, has been reached in a film produced by Harry Levey, who has been called "the D. W. Griffith of the industrials." This film, called "The Hope of the Hills," was given a private showing in New York City some months ago, and widely advertised in the press as a social service affair. It shows the regeneration of some eleven thousand poor whites in Knott County, Kentucky, under the leadership of a Mrs. Lloyd, who operated the Caney Creek Community Center, Pippapass, Kentucky. According to the *Educational Film Magazine* for October, 1919, this film, six reels in length, *was produced for the Multigraph Company, and advertises their machine, which is introduced only at one or two critical junctures.* To what extent this film has been shown elsewhere the writer is not aware, but it furnishes an excellent example of the new school of "soft-tap" as against the "hard hammer" motion picture advertisers. It is no longer necessary to be blatant; better advertise your goods by the subconscious method!

This subtle school of advertising is likely to have considerable sway during the next few years, until the audiences "get wise" to the technique and suspect every film of ulterior purposes. This will eventually kill the process for a long period thereafter.

There is another important phase of this matter of the industrial film, subtle or otherwise, and that is the attitude of the exhibitor, governed of course by the business aspect of the matter. An exhibitor makes money either by holding and increasing his audiences or reducing his film rental charges below the losses in audiences. In other words, if industrial films do not please his patrons, they may still fill a place on his program because they cost him little. But the feeling is growing at

present that ultimately exhibitors must be *paid for showing* any picture with the "industrial" taint.

Any such procedure, fair as it obviously is, is bound to mean a great change in the attitude of exhibitors toward industrial films. When they become not merely a relief from big rentals but a source of revenue, the temptation to show them will be well-nigh irresistible. But audiences are sensitive, particularly in these days of rising admissions rates; and industrial films at any great length or in great numbers will find a scant welcome unless liberally camouflaged.

Propaganda Films. Under this division we shall consider all films produced for a specific propaganda purpose not commercial, i. e., political films, nationalistic films, philanthropic drive films, and religious denominational propaganda films. Foremost among these examples stands the Governmental film propaganda during the war, which has given us a large-scale example of the direct use of the motion picture in the formation of public opinion.

Motion pictures played a great part in maintaining the morale of the American armies and their allies. Some thirty million feet of film was supplied each week to the Government by the Community Motion Picture Bureau. Much of it went abroad, to France, England and Italy, in order to show to the tired warriors of those nations that the Americans were really on the way. Neutral countries were liberally supplied with films showing the justice of America's cause. The Committee on Public Information organized a Division of Pictorial Publicity under Charles S. Hart, which arranged for the production of pictures by the Government, later sold to private distributors. It is believed by many that this was a great mistake, allowing private parties to exploit Government guaranteed films in commercial theaters, when they might have been shown everywhere under Government supervision.

The great effort was of course to interpret America to the Allies. This involved counter-propaganda; for it is said that enemies of the Entente secured a large number of the worst type of American "vampire" films, which were then shown in Allied countries in an effort to give our fellow-fighters the impression that we were a corrupt, sensual, money-grubbing people. William A. Brady headed a great drive to counteract this insidious propaganda by deluging the Allied Countries with the best examples of the cleanest American films which could be assembled from our producers.

How much was accomplished in our own country by the use of the war films cannot be stated, mainly because the end of the war suddenly interrupted most of our propaganda activities. "Made in America"

was a film designed to popularize the draft, but appeared some time after the need for such propaganda had disappeared. The scenes of actual fighting involving American troops also appeared late. Probably the news films, carefully edited by the Government censors, added more to the civilian morale than the strictly propaganda films.

National Propaganda in motion pictures still continues, both in the interests of better understanding and of revolution. In the case of England, W. E. Faulkner, of the Northcliffe papers, recently arrived in New York, stating that he is "solely concerned with the creation of a better understanding between America and England through motion pictures." On the other hand, a film advocating Irish independence has been produced and is being shown in the interest of the "bonds" of the Irish Republic.

Probably the best example which has come to the attention of the writer of the effect of propaganda films was a story told of the feature called "Starvation," photographed and produced "under the supervision" of Herbert Hoover. It recently had a showing in New York City, as a theatrical venture, and attracted many foreign-born residents anxious to see motion pictures of conditions in their native lands. The film deals with famine conditions in Central Europe, and shows the work of the American relief agencies in saving the lives of thousands. A "viewer" for one of the film companies reports the following incident: She had gone to the topmost balcony in order to see the effects of the film upon the persons who had paid least to see it. She found herself seated between a prosperous-looking Greek and a number of Russians. She noticed that several of the foreigners had opera glasses in order to scrutinize the film closely. As soon as it began, the Russians set up a great flow of excited conversation which she could not understand. Curious, she asked the Greek if he knew what they were saying. "Yes," he said, "they think it is all a fake. They are looking to see whether it was really taken in Russia."

The film continued, and the Russians became more excited, giving vent to loud exclamations. The Greek informed her that they were saying: "Why, it's real! It's no fake! I have seen that place myself. It's really in Russia," and so on. Finally, when the picture showed American soldiers giving food to starving Russians of all classes and factions, their enthusiasm knew no bounds. "Why, they're giving it to both sides! Both the Whites and the Reds! I believe! I believe!" And finally, on his way out, one said, "That makes it all different!"

The motion picture had accomplished what neither the press nor the "still picture" could do. These men had come with the firm conviction

that the picture was posed, a deliberate fake. But the picture carried with it the proof of its genuineness, and better still the message, of "trust America!"

The prostitution of news films calls attention to a striking phase of the whole motion picture propaganda problem, namely, the ease with which the meaning of any film now in existence can be changed by rearrangement, cutting, and rewriting the captions. Indeed it has been said that the whole message of any given film can be reversed by anyone clever enough in retouching the story. This means that besides the limitless numbers of films which it is possible to produce in the future without duplication, there are now in existence thousands of films which can be revamped (no witticism intended) to suit the requirements of the propagandist. Any religious attitude could easily be introduced into the fabric of a film already photographed by the judicious use of captions whereby other motives are attributed to the pantomime of the performers. For unless you are a lip-reader, and the actors and actresses actually said what the captions say they do (which they don't), photoplays are not lucid on the subject of motives. The captions supply most of the screen "morals," and captions are changeable.

Just at present much emphasis is being placed upon "Americanization" by means of the screen. A move in this direction was the filming of the original documents of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States for display in the motion picture theaters of the United States, in the belief, as stated by the press, that such scenes "would remove from the public mind any possible effects of the recent 'Red' activities."

It is certain that the motion pictures can wield a tremendous influence upon our standards of life, providing as they do, not only the "raw material of thought," but, through the captions and the better actors, the actual interpretation.

From the foregoing data certain conclusions may be drawn regarding any calculated attempt to use the motion picture for propaganda purposes:

1. The standards and development of the industry on the financial side make a considerable expenditure necessary (\$500-1,000 per reel at least) in order to produce any sort of propaganda film.
2. If films are to be secured from the trade, rivalry with the trade through *competitive* exhibition, in church, schools, etc., will have to be avoided.
3. To introduce propaganda films of any sort into the commercial

theater it will be necessary either (a) to pay for their exhibition; (b) to camouflage their real nature; (c) to make them sensationally popular in appeal; (d) to conduct an advertising campaign creating a demand; or (e) to control the theaters in which they are to be shown.

4. Propaganda films in the non-theatrical field may be produced on a different basis, for extended use instead of one showing; with an educational appeal instead of straight entertainment.

5. The wisdom of the Interchurch's strategy is shown in sending expeditions to produce two types of film, one of religious activities for non-theatrical exhibitors; the others, scenic films for a screen magazine in the commercial theater.

229. Propaganda and a Student-Union Drive in a College¹

Fire starts slowly in green timber but when wood has been skillfully seasoned, a few sparks may rapidly become a conflagration. As fire may be an instrument of good as well as evil, so also may be the mind of the mob.

The student union idea on the ——— campus had its conception in the minds of a small group of men who were inspired by the popularity of the idea on other campuses. Realizing the necessity of thoroughly acquainting the students with the function of a student union and of making the need apparent, this group set about at the beginning of the year to lay plans which would bear fruit near the close of the school year in a great drive to raise the necessary money for the building fund.

Certain principles apply universally to campaigns for money. One of them, the first to be applied in the student union campaign is: Create a demand for and popularize the motive of the drive. This was done through the organ of the associated students, the Daily ——— (student paper). So called "news stories" were run in prominent "six heads." These stories made no mention of a proposed student union on this campus but told of the wonderful achievements of such a building on a certain other campus. Each week a story was run and each dealt with a different university. Of course to make the articles readable, each union was featured from a different angle—one for its cafeteria, one for its Co-op, another for its guest rooms, and so on. For several months these stories made no perceptible impression, but nature was taking its course. It is a long time after the seed is planted before new life is manifested

¹ From a document in the writer's collection. Used by permission.

in a slender green shoot. People were getting the idea and later when they were solicited they recalled having read good things about the student union.

As people came to know more about the subject they discussed it around the fireplaces of dormitories, fraternities and sororities. Objections were raised, but that is a healthy symptom. It denotes interest and opens the way for another agency, namely, the good conversationalist who has been "spiked" and "planted" to talk student union. These agents were conscientious and thoroughly in favor of the idea. Their heart and soul was in their work and they won converts by their prestige and sincerity. These discussions had to be cooled off occasionally by tactfully withdrawing in order that the subject would not be forced to become an issue before the date set for the campaign.

People do not like to be influenced, as they say, against their will. The problem of a power behind the throne has always been a revolting one to the American mind. The power may be exercised for good, but its potency is frightening. If the students had been permitted to vote on the advisability of having a drive, (before they were educated to the plan) they would have put a quietus on it and dubbed it the brain-child of a few overly ambitious campus busy-bodies.

So we come to the beginning of the Spring term. An organization of four hundred committee workers was selected, highly organized and centralized under one general chairman. Each class was separately organized and headed by a class chairman. Class members usually work better together but the main reason for the division was to promote class competition. There is always a certain amount of latent rivalry between classes which if stirred up into active being, may be an instrument of production as it was in this case. The seniors were not going to sit idly by and permit the juniors to reach their quota first. So it was with all—striving to be first to go over the top.

In addition to the class organizations, there were two other committees, the special gifts committee, and the flying squadron. The former was composed of sons and daughters of wealthy people who could afford to give more than the minimum. By putting them on the "inside," they felt a certain responsibility that would not have occurred to them otherwise, therefore they gave generously themselves and then went out to interview other wealthy students and ask them to follow their example. They were in a favorable position to get what they asked for because they had "practiced what they preached," to use a homely expression.

The flying squadron was composed of very active students who were

exceptionally persuasive in their argument. It was their business to follow up on the conscientious objectors and try to sign them up by answering their arguments and explaining away all their objections.

As soon as these appointments were made a meeting of the four class chairmen was called. At this meeting everything was talked over and the complete history was revealed together with the proposed program for the drive. Enthusiastic talks were made by members of the executive committee until it was felt that the chairmen were sufficiently instilled with enthusiasm. The next day another meeting was held for all the team captains under the various class chairmen. Much the same program was carried out. The following day each class held separate meetings of class chairman, team captains and committee workers. The organization and all members of all class committees and of the two special committees were present. Thus the fire spread—starting in the small group and gradually working up through successive stages adding numbers each time. In this way there was no chance for the enthusiasm to fall flat. The executive committee was sure of its ground as it went. These “pep” meetings were made very interesting by short, happy, optimistic talks. Attendance was always practically one hundred per cent. even at the large meeting. The publicity men saw to that.

A few days before the drive started special feature editions of —— (the alumni magazine) were mailed to every student on the campus. This issue was done in a colored cover and contained beautiful pictures of the campus. In fact it was almost purely a pictorial issue. The captions were skillfully worded to make a strong sentimental appeal and aimed to awaken a love for the Alma Mater. No mention was made of a campaign, but it was propaganda of the finest sort.

Two days later another booklet was mailed out so as to arrive the day before the drive started. This one contained cuts of student union buildings of other campuses and spoke of the great part they played to further the happiness of the undergraduate days. On each page there appeared in bold type the phrase: “We also can have a Student Union.”

The morning before the drive started, the —— (the college daily) was distributed on the campus instead of being delivered to the living groups. This was done to disturb the usual order of things and to awaken all to the realization that something was going to happen. This issue of the —— was devoted exclusively to student union. On the front page was a cut of the proposed building. Along with it went a story to the effect that the board of regents would provide the site if the students would provide the building. There was a story about J——

M—— and W—— T——, (the popular coach and the trainer) and that they had each signed a pledge for five hundred dollars. There was also a fac-simile of the pledge note correctly filled out. All the advertisements bore reference to the student union. Letters were published which had been received from prominent people wishing success in the campaign. Student Union glared at the reader from every line. There was nothing else to read about.

The evening before the drive officially started, the stunts committee arranged a great banquet which was attended by all the four hundred on the committee. There were four long tables, one for each class committee, and the teams were all kept separate and preserved their identity even at table. The executive committee, stunts committee, flying squadron, and special gifts committee sat at a special speakers' table at the head of the others. An orchestra provided music; and led the diners in the college song before they were seated. Everything was very impressive. There is nothing like dining at common board to bring people around to a common point of view. A good meal stimulates the heart to magnanimity and will often convert the most bigoted misanthrope to philanthropy. Aside from the valuable information which was imparted to those assembled, the banquet had another important influence. It served to prove to all conclusively that here was a movement that had backing and carried prestige. It was no longer a plan on paper but the eve of a great event was at hand. They heard the college songs by the glee club, they heard the college talked of and praised by faculty, alumni, and undergraduates, they heard of the future of the institution and what she was building for. During one of the talks, a man jumped up and challenged the speaker. A debate ensued wherein all the possible objections to student union were advanced and successfully answered. It ended by the signing of a pledge by the objector. It was only a stunt but it gave heart and courage to those who sat and listened. Here was a prominent man signing on the dotted line although he had at first strenuously objected. It could be done!

It was an inspired four hundred who left the banquet hall. They were determined to go out and get the money.

The next morning the whole committee assembled out of the way of the campus and formed a parade headed by the band. This group was to act as a nucleus for the great rally parade to follow and to impress people with the ultimate success of the parade in turning out the whole campus. The senior "cops" led and went through buildings notifying people that the classes were dismissed. Here again the student

was impressed with the force behind the movement. The marchers gathered all and proceeded to assembly. Here the campus as a whole was acquainted more fully with the drive and its purpose. President —, although he was very ill, got up out of bed to speak. He had to remain seated while he talked and looked a very inspiring figure. He told of the important connection of the student drive with the alumni campaign and stated that it was his great wish that the students might have the opportunity to start the big campaign and after they had successfully gone over, the alumni must feel a greater responsibility. What did the students see and hear? They saw an old man broken in health as a result of his strong fight for a greater university. They heard their president pleading for their support to a cause which found a responsive chord in their hearts. He spoke of Alma Mater. She was calling through him.

Other men spoke. Their talks were appealing. The alumni president charged all with the duty of carrying the ball to the first goal. An announcement was made that if the drive went over, a certain woman would donate money to furnish a room in the building. A business man of the town spoke of the probability of having an auditorium very soon. The ball was rolling. We were actually making history at the university. The new birthday had arrived. Our school was striding onward. We must sacrifice for Alma Mater. These were the thoughts of those who left the assembly.

Then the actual solicitation began. People swarmed the campaign office to sign a pledge not wanting to wait for their solicitor. Red became the predominating color, on the campus. Some were ambitious to be among the first to wear a red ribbon, given those who had pledged.

The solicitors worked by two's and interviewed just one at a time. Each pair had a list of ten people whom they were to see. They had previously learned all arguments for the union and had learned to refute those against, which information was contained in mimeographed instructions handed out at the first banquet. Two people can talk twice as loud and twice as long as one. Very little opposition was met. If a man conscientiously objected and at first refused to sign, his name was turned to headquarters and two members of the flying squadron went after him. He was appealed to from various angles until the angle was found which produced the desired reaction, then this line was developed until the prospect was convinced and put on the ribbon. If he persistently refused, he was left alone until the last day when red was the prevailing color and then two different people interviewed him. He usually fell in line.

At campaign headquarters there was always "something doing." A large score board was erected which bore the names of all team captains as well as the class teams as a whole. Results of amounts raised were chalked up daily at a ceremony which followed the daily banquets at noon. In this way, committee workers could constantly visualize the amount they had raised and its relation to their quota. Each team captain was thus spurred on to greater effort not only to see his class go over first but to see his team go over first in the class.

A feature stunt which created much interest in the class competition was a miniature race track with grandstand and all. On the turf were four horses, one for each class. The mile posts took the form of markers for the percentage of the quota raised. These horses were moved as returns came in. It was a game for all to play at. A freshman would not stand by idly without a red ribbon if his horse was running last.

A barometer to mark the total amounts raised was erected on top of campaign headquarters and at the daily ceremony the band played the Alma Mater as the red slowly crept up to the mark attained. An attempt was made to get everyone out for the ceremony in the hope that an objector might be present and feel some slight gnawing at his conscience which would be sufficient to cause him to change his mind.

At the daily banquets, each team was seated together and turned in their reports to their captains. The latter were called upon to rise and report briefly just what success they had attained in the last twenty-four hours. Each captain was ambitious and proud. He wanted to make a good report. He kept all this in mind while he was in the field.

III. CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What are the emotional appeals used in war propaganda? In religious propaganda? In political propaganda?
2. What place has the cartoon in propaganda? Illustrate from current cartoons.
3. What place have stereotypes in propaganda?
4. Should effective propaganda be labeled such? If not, why not?
5. In publicity and advertising is argument the most effective method of putting ideas across? Discuss.
6. What conditions of our living make propaganda so much more easy than in earlier times?
7. What are the limitations on education in training people to resist propaganda?

8. In what fields of social life is propaganda most likely to develop in the near future? Why?
 9. Cite an instance with which you are familiar of propaganda through the motion picture medium.
 10. Cite an instance with which you are familiar of propaganda through the medium of the radio.
- B. Topics for Class Report
1. Review Lasswell's study of propaganda during the World War. Why was the British propaganda in the United States so much more successful than the German? (Cf. bibliography.)
 2. Report on Sir Gilbert Parker's account of the British Propaganda in the United States. (Cf. bibliography.)
 3. Review Creel's account of his war propaganda. (Cf. bibliography.)
 4. Report Taft's paper on history textbooks and international differences. (Cf. bibliography.)
 5. Review Scott's book cited in bibliography on the menace of nationalist propaganda in modern education.
- C. Suggestions for Longer Written Papers
1. The Growth of Propaganda in Social Control.
 2. Propaganda in History.
 3. Propaganda and In-Group Attitudes.
 4. The Relationship between Propaganda and Censorship during War.
 5. The German Propaganda in the United States during the World War.
 6. The British Propaganda in the United States during the World War.
 7. Current Propaganda in Reference to Mexico and Central America.
 8. Current Propaganda in Reference to China.
 9. The Relation of Propaganda to Myth- and Legend-Making.

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INDEX

- Abbey, 714.
 Absolutism in crowd behavior, 653-55.
 Accessory muscles, hegemony of, 12-13.
 Acquired nature of man, 193-217.
 Activities, three-fold hierarchy of, 151-54.
 Adaptability, civilization and, 163-64.
 Addams, 398, 463.
 Addams, on devil-baby myth, 473-74.
 Adler, 146, 269, 412, 628; compensation, theory of, 186.
 Adolescence, 351.
 Adrian VI, 701.
 Adjustments, extra-organic, 13.
 Advertising, a form of social control, 731.
 Æschylus, 718.
 Affection, 402.
 Agassiz, 718.
 Alexander, 561, 573.
 Alexander VI, 701.
 Allport, 148, 627, 629, 723; influence of group on mental processes, 643-47; list of prepotent reflexes, 157-58; public opinion, 734, 745-46; sense of universality, social projection and morality of individual in crowd, 655-57.
 Altruism, crisis, 91-92.
 Ambiversion, 383; definition of, 402.
 Ambivert, 398-402.
 Americanization, 47-53.
 Ames, 167.
 Angell, 166, 427.
 Anger, in Sultan, the ape, 23.
 Anrep, on inhibition and conditioning, 223-24.
 Anthony, 695; on crowd behavior and religious superstition, 709-10.
 Anthropoid, 9.
 Antipathy and prejudice, 483-85.
 Ape, punishment of, and group response, 22.
 Apes, communication among, 25-26; friendship among, 24-25; imitation among, 26-27; isolation of, 20-22; mentality of, 20; "motion patterns," in group, 27; no social imagery, 22; new members adopted, 23-24; "spells of pure excitement," 25-26; social life among, 20-26; subjective moods and communication, 26-27.
 Apperception, culture backgrounds in, 48-49.
 Aristotle, 546, 787; on comedy, 389-90.
 Art, instinctive responses in, 238-39; phantasy in, 327.
 Assemblage, 630-32; 639-41.
 Associationism, inadequate for psychology, 212-15.
 Associative thought, dual types of, 286-90.
 Asthenic, type of physique, 132-34.
 Athletic, type of physique, 134-35.
 Attention, behavior and, 268; 271-75; crisis and habit in, 81; external stimuli to, 272-73; internal stimuli to, 273-74; 275-76.
 Attitudes, 168; emotional or impersonal, 610; object and, 433-34; occupations and, 385-87; opinions and, 434-35; Negro-White, 512-18; social, 431-34.
 Audience, 668-90; class-room, 679-83; crisis and, 672; crowd and indirect suggestion, 686-88; cultural background and, 670; effect of, on mental-motor process, 684-85; how changed to a crowd, 688-90; how to make suggestible, 685-88; inhibitions and, 673-75; integration of, 672-79; polarization of, 672-79; preliminary tuning of, 671-72; psychology of, 669-71; size of, and hall, 689; sophistication of, 670; speaker and, 677-79; speaker and removal of inhibitions, 673-75; suggestion and, 685-88; three tasks in, 675-76; use of authority in, 585-86.
 Austin, 744.
 Authority, custom and, 104-06; ritual and, 106-07; sociology of, 546-49.
 Autistic thought, 270; 286-90; 288-90; wishes in, 289.
 Bacon, 718, 787.
 Baldwin, 243, 278, 584; on inventor and

- society, 615-16.
 Barnes, 462, 598.
 Bartholomew de Spina, 701.
 Bawden, 8, 9; on evolution of social behavior, 10-17.
 Besant, 572.
 Bebel, 565.
 Beebe, 8.
 Behavior, attention and, 271-75; five factors in, 43; intellectualistic interpretation of, 176; multi-individual, and dramatization, 44; not purely reflex, 213; words and, 334-35.
 Behmen, 550.
 Belief and knowledge, differences between, 281-83; emotion and, 283.
 Benedetti, 729.
 Bentham, 744.
 Bentley, 627-28; psychology of social aggregation, 629-41.
 Bernard, 148, 149, 219, 242, 419; critique of instincts, 158-61; critique of McDougall's theory of emotion and instinct, 162; hierarchy of habits, 239-40; misuse of instinct in social science, 161-65; types of environment, 421-24; types of instincts listed by writers, 165-66.
 Bernays, 783; on Lithuania's publicity campaign, 806-08.
 Bilbo, on negroes, 506.
 Binet-Simon tests, 410.
 Bismarck, 115, 563, 564, 728.
 Blake, 137.
 Bleuler, 137, 269-70, 286; on autistic or dereistic thought, 288-90; on unconscious, 284-85.
 Boas, 505, 617; on negro problem, 507-10.
 Bogardus, 177, 382, 482, 724; effects of occupations on attitudes and values, 385-87; feelings, 182-83; how public opinion is changed, 749-52; prejudice and social distance, 488-90; wit and humor in personality, 389-94.
 Boss, political, how trained, 599-601.
 Bourdeau, 661.
 Boys' gang, as a primary group, 65-69.
 Brady, 818.
 Bridges, 383, 384; psychological interpretation of personality, 402-06; relation of temperament to instincts and compensation, 185-89.
 Brierley, nature of emotion, 179-80.
 Bryan, 393.
 Brownrigg, 782.
 Bryce, 723-24; 756, 759, 760, 762; newspapers and public opinion in United States, 775; political aspects of public opinion, 738-39; prestige of newspaper, 775-76; public opinion and community interests, 737-38; responsibility of newspapers, 774-75.
 Buddha, 561.
 Burnham, 219, 299; conditioned response, 220-24; conditioned response and personality, 303-08.
 Burn, 718.
 Burgess, 383, 723; public opinion, 726-33; sociological interpretation of personality, 409-11.
 Burrow, 419; on unconscious social images, 428-31.
 Butler, on propaganda, 793.
 Cæsar, 450, 550, 561, 573.
 Cæsar Borgia, 551.
 California gold rush, 712-14.
 Calvin, 465.
 Campbell, on delusion, 461-62.
 Carlyle, 450, 543.
 Carr, 20.
 Cartoons, propaganda through, 787-88.
 Case, on millennial hopes, 478-79.
 Caste, 495.
 Caste feeling and race prejudice, 497-99.
 Catherine the Great, 709-10.
 Cattell, 543.
 Cavour, 465.
 Censorship, motion picture, 602.
 Ceremony, 670.
 Cervantes, 718.
 Chaka, 589-90.
 Character, physique and, 132-39.
 Charlemagne, 661.
 Charles V, 550, 570.
 Charles XII, 551.
 Chapin, 4, 30, 544; human association, 35-37; leadership and group activity, 557-59.
 Chauvinism, 113.
 Chicago Race Commission, on negro-white relations, 505; on negroes, 512-18.
 Child, 4, 193, 299; on individual and environment, 194-206.
 Child-parent relationship, 311-17.
 Child, relation to mother, 308-11.
 Children's crusade, 688-90.

- Christ, 546.
 Christian church, publicity for, 808-11.
 Christians, myths of, 464-65.
 Church, 171; control of public opinion by, 809-11.
 Civilization, divergent types and, 52; adaptability in, 163-64.
 Clark, 628; types of crowds and common predispositions, 641-43.
 Class feeling, how built up, 355-58.
 Cleland, 616; on California gold rush, 712-14.
 Clemenceau, 435, 461.
 Cleveland, 695; on revivals, 710-12.
 Clerget, 629; on fashion and crowd behavior, 658-61.
 Cognition, 402.
 Collins, 793.
 Color prejudice, race prejudice and, 501-02.
 Colton, on California gold rush, 713.
 Columbus, 573.
 Colvin, 123; on intelligence, 140.
 Communication, 13; participation and, 52.
 Community, definition of situation in, 96-97.
 Companionship, imaginary, 329-30.
 Compensation, 243, 264-65, 359-61, 534, 651-52; as conditioned response, 243; day-dreams and, 316; inferiority and, 264-65, 315; mechanism to maintain status, 411-13; phantasy and, 316; play and, 323-28.
 Competition, social attitudes in, 46-47; social consciousness in, 47.
 Complex and sentiment, 796.
 Conation, 402.
 Conditioned response, definition of, 220-21; definition of situation and, 96; description of, 230-31; mechanism of, 220-24; personal development and, 303-08; relation to habit formation, 225-26.
 Conditioned stimulus and response, 227.
 Conditioning, technique of, 228-31; temporal factors in, 232-34.
 Condorcet, 146.
 Confucius, 546.
 Congenial groups, 69-71; in childhood and adolescence, 69-70; in college, 71-72.
 Congregate, 630-32; properties of, 636-39.
 Congregates, integration of, 636-37; popularized, 638-39.
 Conklin, 196, 383.
 Conrad, on power of words, 450.
 Conscience, 6.
 Conscious motives, in crisis, 83-84.
 Consciousness, ejective, 243; of kind and language, 45-46.
 Consensus, 724.
 Convention, leadership and, 570-72.
 Conversation, public opinion and, 758-59; social recognition in, 43.
 Cooley, 4, 59, 299, 302, 303, 425, 544-45, 628, 723; on emulation and identification in leadership, 569; false separation of individual and society, 4-6; formalism in society, 80, 108-11; language and rise of self-feeling, 335-38; leadership and masses, 562-64; leadership as projection of an ideal, 568-69; mental traits of leaders, 551-52; personality, sociability, and language, 328-33; primary groups, 63-65; social change in modern industrial society, 72-75.
 Co-ordinations, intra-organic, 13.
 Coriolanus, 550.
 Correspondence, public opinion through, 759-60.
 Cortex, conditioning in, 220-21.
 Cortez, 730.
 Coué, 248.
 Craig, 9; on voices of pigeons, 17.
 Creel, 782, 785.
 Crime and public opinion, 752-53.
 Crisis, attention and habit, 81; altruism in, 91-92; anti-social behavior in, 90-91; audience and, 672; crowd behavior in, 86-87; customs and, 82-83; definition of situation in, 79; emotion in, 88; endurance in, 93; energizing effect of, 92; feeling in, 88; generosity in, 94; group control in, 81-83; illustrated by Halifax disaster, 84-94; interpretation of, by past experience, 85; institution and, 82; millennial hope and, 478-79; mutual aid in, 93-94; physiological effects of, 84; profiteering in, 91; the revelation of conscious motives in, 83-84; rise of professions and, 82; suggestibility in, 90; sympathy in, 89.
 Croswell, 319.
 Crowd attitudes, public opinion and, 745-46.
 Crowd behavior, characteristics of, 627-

- 64; crisis in, 86-87; fashion and, 658-64; in Mississippi Scheme, 704-08; power of words, 647-48; psychology of, 629-58; religious revivals and, 710-12; religious superstition in, 709-10; suggestion in, 649-50.
- Crowd, how to sway, 657-58; moral consciousness of individual in, 656-57; primitive characteristics of, 648-50; ritual in, 689; sense of universality in, 655-56; size of, and hall, 689; social projection in, 656; stereotypes in, 654, 690; types of, and predispositions in, 641-43; unconscious attitudes in, 650-51.
- Crowds, homicidal, 652-53; opposition in, 653.
- Crusades, 688-90.
- Cult, 654.
- Cultural background, audience and, 670.
- Culture, 9, invention and, 616-21; patterns of, 31; social conditioning in, 46.
- Culture standards, or ethos, 112-13; group controls in, 78-116.
- Cunmanus, 701.
- Custom, 670; authority behind, 104-06; crisis and, 82-83; enforcement through physical force, 106; how enforced, 105; law and, 111.
- Cyclothymes, 137.
- Cycloid personality, 137-38.
- Dahomey, 648.
- Dalton, 550.
- Darwin, 10, 36, 121, 546, 563, 584, 610.
- Davenport, 189.
- Day-dreams, compensation in, 316.
- Definition of situation, 49; by the group, 95-97; community and, 96-97; conditioned response in, 96; crisis and, 79; education and, 49-51; family and, 96; gossip and, 96; habit and, 51; individual versus social forms of, 95; public opinion and, 50; social heritages in, 49-50; social unrest and, 51; stereotypes in, 435-40; tradition and, 49-50.
- Delusion, 85; 461-62.
- DeMar, 787.
- Democracy, education in, 75; freedom in, 428; mores in, 100; place of communication in, 74.
- Demonophobia, 700-02.
- Demosthenes, 786.
- Dereistic thought, 270, 288-90; conditions of, 290; life organization and, 270; wishes in, 289.
- Desire, feeling in, 170-71; as fundamental concept, 168-73; social approval and, 394-95.
- Desires, 168, Dunlap's list of, 171.
- Determining adjustments, 152-54.
- Determinism, 142.
- Divergent types, civilization and, 52.
- Devil-baby, a modern myth, 473-74.
- Dewey, 79, 176, 262, 294, 427, 433, 746; on custom and authority, 104-06; relation of occupation to habits and values, 384-85.
- Dacey, 728, 732.
- Diderot, 560; on public opinion, 758.
- Diogenes, 294.
- Disraeli, 628.
- Dodge, 783; on psychology of propaganda, 785-93.
- Downey, 178, 410, 596; on volition or will-temperament, 190-91.
- Dramatization, 300; identification in, 317-18.
- Drives, 147, 151; "first" order and "second" order, 150; fundamental nature of, 149, 150-51; relation to mechanism, 148, 150.
- Dunlap, 147, 212, 783; definition of propaganda, 784; on desire as fundamental concept, 168-73; rules of propaganda, 798.
- Education, democracy and, 75; motion pictures in, 815-16; participation and, 49-51; propaganda and motion pictures, 817; public opinion and, 733.
- Ego, reverly and, 293.
- Egocentrism, occupational, 386-87.
- Egotism in crowd behavior, 651-52.
- Elizabeth, 701.
- Ellwood, 166, 723, 783; on human associations, 61-63; on public opinion, 734-36; publicity in the Christian church, 808-11.
- Emerson, 450, 543, 544, 552; on uses of great men, 549-51.
- Emotions, 176-91; belief and, 283; crisis and, 88; energizing effect of, 180; instinct and, 162, 179; nature of, 179-80; physiology of, 180.
- Emotional release, lynching and, 524-25.
- Emotional transfer, 790-91.
- Emotions, fundamental, 180-82; propa-

- ganda and, 788, 789-91.
 "Ems telegram," 729.
 Emulation, identification in leadership and, 569.
 Endocrines, autonomic system and temperament, 188; temperament and, 187.
 Endowed press, 776-78.
 Engrams, 285.
 Environment, 10; adaptations of, 11; extra-organic control of, 11; heredity and, 200; individual and, 194-206; intra-individual and physiological integration, 203-04; subjective, 461-79; types of, 421-24; versus heredity, 426.
 Ethos, 80-81, 100, 112-13; Asiatic, 112; cosmopolitanism in, 113; European, 113; isolation and, 112; Occidental, 113-16; standard of criticism, 113.
 Ethnocentrism, 60-61.
 Euclid, 550.
 Evolution, 9, 10; of behavior, 16; extra-organic, 12-13; pre-human social life and, 8-27; social life and, 36.
 Extrovert, 398-402; as man of action, 593.
 Extroversion, 383; definition of, 400.
 Fabre, 8.
 Family, 171; as primary group, 64-65; definition of situation and, 96; personality and group pressures, 349-78.
 Paris, 149, 420; instincts as data or as hypotheses, 166-68, on social attitudes, 431-34.
 Fashions, 629, 731-32; in phrases, 661; crowd behavior and, 658-64.
 Father-son relationship, 351.
 Faulkner, 819.
 Fear, 9, 180; inhibition of, by conditioning, 307; inhibitory, 306-07.
 Feeling, 169-70, 176-91; crisis and, 88; desire and, 170-71; prejudice and, 183; thinking and, 183; tonal quality in, 182.
 Ferri, 565.
 Fetishism, 83.
 Fian, persecution for sorcery, 702.
 Fichte, 548.
 Filial regression, Galton's law of, 128-29.
 Films, how "colored" in effects, 814.
 Finan, 588.
 Finney, 419; on unconscious mental patterns, 425-28.
 Fixation, brother-sister, 353-54; child-hood, on mother and sisters, 351-54.
 Flagellants, 700.
 Florida, land boom in, 714-18.
 Folklore, folkways and, 99.
 Follett, 194, 747-48; on studying individual in total situation, 206-08.
 Folkways, 79; due to false inferences, 98; folklore and, 99; morality and, 98-99; mores and, 97-103; rise of, 98; social conditioning in, 46; taboo and, 99.
 Formalism, education and, 110; drill as, 110; in industry and business, 110; in language, 108, 111; in newspapers, 110; in society, 80, 108-11; intolerance and, 109; personality and, 109.
 Frazer, 591.
 Frederick II, 101.
 Freedom, 428; democracy and, 428.
 French Revolution, 567.
 Fries, 550.
 Freud, 146, 167, 176, 260, 285-80, 429, 628; on suggestion, 260.
 Froebel, 308.
 Froude, 543.
 Funeral oration, on Caesar, 685, 687-88.
 Furfey, 57.
 Galileo, 610.
 Galton, 121, 543; studies on mental heredity, 127-29.
 Gang, 351; boys', 57; criminal, 57; democratic organization of, 66; leadership, 66-67; loyalty and justice in, 67-69; names of, 66; primary group, 65-69; social code, 67; social attitudes, 68-69.
 Garner, 9.
 Garvey, 517.
 Gates, 271.
 Gautama, 549.
 Gestalt, 194-207.
 Gesture, an arrested act, 16.
 Giddings, 30-31; stimulation ranges and reaction areas, 43-46.
 Ginsberg, 723; on public opinion, 725-26.
 Girl, personality and development of, 361-62.
 Godkin, 764.
 Godwin, 146.
 Goethe, 718.
 Goldenweiser, 584; invention and culture, 616-21.

- Gossip, definition of situation in, 96;
newspaper and, 74.
- Gottschalk, 699.
- Gowin, 544; individual differences
among leaders, 553-56; leadership
and crises, 552-53.
- Gracchus, 550.
- Gradient, effect of environment on,
198-200; heredity and, 200; physiolog-
ical, 198-200.
- Gradients, dominance and subordina-
tion in, 201-03.
- Green, 718.
- Gregariousness, basis of social behavior,
37-43.
- Gregory XV, 786.
- Griffith, 668; class-room audience, 679-
83.
- Gross, 137, 300.
- Groves, 349-50; personality development
of boy, 350-51; of girl, 361-62.
- Group, definition of situation by, 95-
97; influence of, upon association,
644-46; upon thought, 646-47; origi-
nal form of, 35.
- Group activity, leadership and, 557-59.
- Group control, crisis and, 81-83; stand-
ard of culture and, 78-116.
- Group heroism, in crisis, 94.
- Group life, 8; of apes, 23.
- Group pressures, family and personal-
ity, 349-78.
- Groups, congenial, 69-71; institutional
and non-institutional, 62-63; primary,
63-65; secondary, 62; temporary and
permanent, 63; voluntary and invol-
untary, 61-62.
- Habit, confused with instinct, 164-65;
crisis and attention, 81; definition of
situation and, 51; values, occupation
and, 384-85.
- Habit formation, hierarchy of, in social
evolution, 239-40; mechanisms of,
219-40; relation to conditioned re-
sponse, 225-26.
- Haldane, 207.
- Halifax disaster, 84-94.
- Hall, 146, 243, 300, 303; on child names,
338-41; on compensation, 264-65; on
dramatization and identification, 317-
18; on rise of self, 308-11.
- Hallucination, in crisis, 84-85.
- Hanotaux, 745.
- Hanson, 613.
- Harrison, 591.
- Hart, 463, 818; legends in history, 474-
77.
- Hatred, in crowd behavior, 652-53.
- Hayes, 166.
- Hearst, 757.
- Henry IV, 570.
- Herd, conformity in, 38-39, 40; crowd
behavior and, 40; homogeneity of, 37-
38; leadership in, 40-42; loneliness
and, 39; religion and, 40; speech and
conformity in, 39; suggestibility in,
39.
- Heredity, developmental possibilities
and, 201; environment and, 200; gra-
dient in, 200; meaningless without en-
vironment, 195-96; social environment
and, 206; standardized environment
and, 201; versus environment, 193;
426.
- Herrick, 122, 208; on organic basis of
intelligence, 139.
- Hindoos, 109.
- Hobbes, on laughter, 390.
- Hobhouse, 80; on custom and law, 111.
- Hoch, 189.
- Holmes, 306.
- Holt, 207, 214.
- Hoover, 819.
- Hopkins, 718.
- Huber, 550.
- Human association, biological variation
in, 37; human nature and, 35-37; imi-
tation and, 37; intelligence and, 36;
survival and, 36-37; types of, 61-63.
- Human nature, 5; primary groups and,
65; human association and, 35-37.
- Humphrey, 242-43; conditioned re-
sponse and sympathy, 261-64; imita-
tion and conditioned reflex, 253-56.
- Hunger, as first order drive, 150.
- Hunter, 166, 219; modifications of in-
stinctive tendencies, 226-39.
- Hunting pattern, of mind, 396.
- Ideas, functioning of, in groups, 275-79.
- Identification, 300, 375; dramatization
and, 317-18; emulation in leadership
and, 569.
- Imagination, play and, 329.
- Imitation, 242, 244, 256, 278, 343; ap-
plies only to specific act, 248; condi-
tioned response in, 253-56; definition
of, 254; example of, 255-56; human

- association and, 37; loose and proper use of, 245-53; in masses, 572; nature of, 253-54; processes in, 255-56; suggestion and, 44; uncritical use of, 250; various uses of, 246-49.
- Imitative actions, integration of, 254-56.
- Immigrant, definition of situation and, 51; participation of, in group, 53.
- Inborn capacities, 124-25.
- Indian prejudice, White-American, 528-33.
- Individual, 4, 5; environment and, 194-206; false separation from group, 3-6; in the total situation, 206-08; mental processes in relation to group, 632-33; not passive factor in learning, 250; only small part of hereditary possibilities, 205; person and, 409-11; society and, 425-28; versus mores, 103.
- Individual differences, 121, 129-31; among leaders, 553-56; in physical form, 132-39; original nature and, 123-39.
- Individualism, 3; culture patterns and, 30.
- Individuality, 5.
- Industrial society, social change in, 72-75.
- Inferiority, compensation for, 264-65; 315.
- Inferiority complex, 313-17; social conditioning in, 314-17.
- Inferiority conflict, personality and, 359-61.
- In-group, 56, 60; primary, 63-65; sentiment of, 59-61.
- Inheritance, Galton's law of, 128.
- Inhibition, 178, 209, 222; conditioned response and, 221-24; race differences in, 280; audience and, 673-75.
- Innate ideas, fallacious belief in, 160.
- Innocent VIII, on withcraft, 700-01.
- Instinct, 176; as desire, 147-48; abuse of term, 149; biological and social purposes, 235-39; confused with habit, 164-65; emotion and, 162, 179; hormic and mechanistic views, 147-48; inadequacy of theory of, in educational and social psychology, 165; Mendelian trait, 162; misuse of in social science, 161-65; modified by society, 233-34; not conscious, 162-63; not purposive, 163; often confused with habit, 159-60; purpose of the organism, 154; reflex and, 168; temperament, interrelation with, 186; value of concept for social psychology, 146-49.
- Instincts, 124-25; data or hypotheses, 166-68; expression of, in crisis, 86; McDougall's list of, 155; pleasure in, social sanction of, 237-39; prepotent reflexes, 157-58; social, 33; types of, listed by 500 writers, 165-66; Warren's list of, 155-56.
- Instinctive nature, 146-73; versus intellectualism, 146.
- Instinctive tendencies, civilization and, 90; modification of, 226-39.
- Instinctive tendency, delayed, 20; range of stimuli and, 20.
- Institutions, 171-73; crisis and, 82-83.
- Integration, of behavior, 207, 208-10; of personality, 405; intra-individual environment, 203-04.
- Intelligence, 5, 121, 210-16; cognitive, affective, and conative, 403-04; definitions of, by Colvin, Terman, and Thorndike, 140; mechanism, 141-43; organic basis of, 139; physical basis of, 139-43; purpose and, 216; selective mechanism, 216-17; training and, 143.
- Intellectualistic fallacy, 427-28.
- Interest, homogeneity of, 670.
- Interest groups, 61.
- Interstimulation, 8; of instinct and temperament, 186; in gang, 68; social conditioning and, 44; stimuli ranges and response areas in, 30.
- Intolerance, formalism and, 109.
- Introversion, 383; definition of, 401; of behavior processes, 14.
- Introvert, 398-402, 593.
- Invention, culture and, 616-21; modern versus primitive, 619-21.
- Inventor, society and, 615-16.
- Irrationalization, 271.
- Isolation, ethos and, 112.
- I. W. W., as radical group, 611-14.
- Jalina-piramurana, 587-88.
- James, Jesse, 551.
- James, W., 137, 166, 209-13, 286, 299, 382; on innate fear in children, 167; on social self, 388-89.
- James I, 702.
- Janet, on suggestion, 260.

- Japanese, prejudice against, 495, 496.
 Jastrow, 410.
 Jealousy, 9.
 Jelliffe, 189.
 Jenks, 757; on endowed press, 766-77.
 Jennings, 208.
 Jephson, 763.
 Jesus, 561.
 Jew, American prejudice against, 533-34.
 Joan of Arc, 561.
 Job, 718.
 Johnson, 318, 760.
 Johnson, T. L., as Mayor of Cleveland, 604-06.
 Journalism, origin of, 760.
 Jowett, 718.
 Jung, 137, 146, 167, 189, 269, 286, 628; on introvert and extrovert, 399.
- Kant, on laughter, 390.
 Keller, 79.
 Kellogg, on inheritance of mental ability, 127-29.
 Kempf, 207; autonomic system, 187-88; on conditioning, 304-05, 306.
 Kent, 783; on American political boss, 597-601; propaganda and newspaper policies, 805-06.
 King, William, 728.
 Kipling, 450.
 Knowledge and belief, differences between, 281-83.
 Knowledge and opinion, parts of scale of belief, 283.
 Köhler, 9; on social life of apes, 20-28.
 Kraepelin, 132.
 Krasnogorski, 220, 224, 303.
 Kretschmer, 122; on physique and character, 132-39.
 Kropotkin, 167.
 Ku Klux Klan, 58.
 Kunkel, 4, 30; on social evolution, 32-35.
- Lafayette, 550.
 La Follette, 614.
 Lamartine, 550.
 Lamb, 307.
 Langenhove van, myths and legends in mental patterns, 466-73.
 Language, 9, 14, 302; development of the child and, 333-35; discrimination in, 45; intellectual life and, 16; memory and, 35; origination of, 14-15; participation and, 48-49; personality and, 328-46; personality, sociability and, 328-33; rise of, 12; sociality, consciousness of kind and, 45-46; stereotypes in, 420; symbols, thought and, 341-46; the rise of self-feeling through, 335-38; words, thoughts and, 15-16.
- Larabee, on motion picture propaganda, 811-21.
 Larynx, function of, in indirect control, 13.
 Lassalle, 115, 564.
 Lasswell, 462, 782.
 Laughter, 389-94; group control and, 392-93; social contact and, 391-94; theories of, 389-90.
 Law, custom and, 111.
 Law, 694; Mississippi Scheme of, 704-08.
 Leader, crowd recognition of, 42; gang and, 66-67; masses and, 41-42; reformer type of, 601-06; stereotype and, 42.
 Leaders, carriers of authority, 569-70; mental traits of, 551-52; radical, two types of, 606-10; radicalism and social reform, 611-15; symbolic projection of an ideal, 568-69; types of, 592-95; veneration of, 564-66.
 Leadership, characteristics of, 543-79; crisis and, 552-53; emulation, identification in, 569; faith in, 566-67; group activity and, 557-59; influence of, 545-46; in primitive societies, 587-91; masses and, 562-64; origins of, 584-87; power of words and, 572-74; types of, 582-621; war and, 42.
 Learning, 210-16; as control of environment, 214; gradations in, 215-16; not by imitation, 249; not passive adaptation, 210-12; organic basis of, 139.
 Le Bon, 167, 454, 544-45, 628, 654; on kinds of prestige, 560-62; on leadership and faith, 566-67; on power of words in crowd behavior, 647-48.
 Legends, as subjective environment, 461-79; become mental patterns, 466-73; national hero-worship and, 474-77; process of development of, 469-70; Smith and Pocahontas, 474-75.
 Lenin, 548.
 Leo X, 701.
 Leopold, 544; on meaning of word prestige, 559-60.

- Lewis, S., 399.
 Lewis, G. C., on opinion, 742.
 Lincoln, 563, 797.
 Linnaeus, 550.
 Lippmann, 420; on stereotypes, 435-40.
 Lipsky, 420, 545; on leadership, 569-70; power of stereotyped words, 449-51; propaganda and organization, 799.
 Littré, 560.
 Livingstone, 498.
 Lloyd, 756; on newspaper conscience, 773-74.
 Locke, 276.
 Lodge, 598.
 Love, 9, 181.
 Loyalty, in gang, 67-69.
 Luck, 104; social behavior and, 80.
 Lumley, 420; on slogans as means of social control, 451-58.
 Lund, 269; on difference between knowledge and belief, 281-83.
 Luther, 465, 565, 567; on witches, 701.
 Lynching, emotional release through, 524-25.
 McAdoo, 619.
 McDougall, 121, 146, 147-49, 176, 215, 243, 301, 383; criticism of his list of instincts, 166-67; instinct as purpose, 154; list of instincts, 155; suggestion, 256-57.
 McCosh, 718.
 MacCurdy, 147.
 Machiavelli, 463.
 Mackay, 545, 629, 694; on fashions in phrases, 661-64; Mississippi Scheme or "Bubble," 704-08; on tulipomania, 702.
 Macpherson, prestige and persuasion, 575-77.
 McGhee, 318.
 Magic, 237; sympathetic, and autistic thought, 287.
 Maher, 169.
 Mahomet, 546, 561, 573.
 Maigron, 660.
 Majid, on leadership and power of words, 572-74.
 Marriage, in mores, 100.
 Martin, 628, 694; on crowd and unconscious attitudes and its pathological nature, 650-51; on egotism, hatred, and absolutism in crowd, 651-55.
 Marx, 565.
 Masses, leadership and, 41-52, 562-64; mystical writers liked by, 574-75; prestige, 559-78.
 Mateer, 303; individual differences in conditioning, 304.
 Maternal instinct, 168.
 Mazzini, 465.
 Mead, 303; on thought, symbols, and language, 341-46.
 Meanings, culture backgrounds of, 48; as nascent responses, 16; as tactile-kinesthetic imagery, 17; social experience and, 344-46.
 Measurement, of social distance, 490-93.
 Mechanism, 151; drive and 148, 150.
 Mencius, 546.
 Mencken, 513.
 Mental ability, inheritance of, 127-29; percentages of, in population, 131; statistical treatment of, 129-31.
 Mental epidemics, list of European, 698; suggestion, social organization, and, 696-98.
 Mental patterns and unconscious, 425-28.
 Mental processes, influence of the group upon, 643-47; social behavior and, 268-94.
 Mental set, audience and, 671-72.
 Mental traits, social behavior and, 279-81.
 Merriam, 582-83, 727; on qualities of political leaders, 595-97.
 Metabolic changes, importance of, in behavior, 213-14.
 Michels, 545, 583; on qualities of political leaders, 595-96; veneration of leaders, 564-66.
 Mill, 744.
 Millennial hope, and crisis, 478-79.
 Miller, H. C., 312.
 Miller, K., on negro prejudice, 500.
 Milton, 294.
 Mississippi Scheme or "Bubble," 704-08.
 Mitchel, as Mayor of New York, 603-04.
 Mob mind, prophylactics against, 718-20.
 Moltke, 728.
 Moore, 596.
 Montaigne, 718.
 Morality, folkways and, 98-99; human culture and, 34; socialization and, 35-37; social instincts and, 34.
 Mores, 79; authority behind, 104-06; authority of facts in, 100; definition

- of, 99-100; different from law, 112; dissent from, 102-03; folkways and, 97-103; group orthodoxy and, 102-03; how changed, 102, 731-32, judged by, 101; in North and South, 101; possibility of modifying, 101; public opinion and, 731-33; reflective analysis of, 100; ritual in, 102; as social ritual, 107-08; versus individual, 103.
- Morgan, J. J. B., 243; suggestion as attitude, 558-60.
- Morgan, T. H., 195.
- Morgulis, on conditioned response, 224.
- Mother-daughter relationship, unsatisfactory development of, and personality, 362-74.
- Mother-image, social image in, 429-30.
- Mother, relation to child, 308-11.
- Mother-son, fixation, 351-53; relationship, 350.
- Motion pictures, how "colored" in effects, 814; education through, 815-16; propaganda and education, 817; propaganda in, 811-21; stereotypes in, 813-14.
- Motivation, rationalization in, 290-92; suggestion and propaganda, 793-98.
- Motor organs, 10.
- Moses, 546.
- Multiple response, multiple causation in, 126.
- Mumford, on origins of leadership, 584-87.
- Munro, 582-83, 723; on public opinion, 736-37; reformer in politics, 601-606.
- Mutual aid, 9; in crisis, 93-94.
- Myth, becomes mental pattern, 466-73; social imagination in, 464-66.
- Myths, 751; as subjective environment, 461.
- Names, child's image of himself through, 338-41; for self, 337-38.
- Napoleon I, 397, 463, 551, 561, 571; characteristics of, 574.
- Napoleon III, 728.
- Nathan, 513.
- Natural selection, extra-organic evolution in, 11.
- Negro, beliefs about, 512-16; man hunt of, 518-24; prejudice, 507-28.
- Negro problem, in the United States, 507-10.
- Negro-White, relations in Jamaica, 525-28; attitudes, 512-18, 750-51.
- Neurone, 123-26.
- New experience, desire for, 395-96.
- News, divisions of, 765-68.
- Newspaper, 74; as organized gossip, 74; percentages of various matter in, 769; three-fold function of, 760-63.
- Newspapers, 745-46; content of in, 765, 772-73; lack of conscience, 773-74; prestige of, 775-76; propaganda in, 805-06; public opinion in the United States, 775; public responsibility of, 774-75; sensationalism in, 115.
- Newton, 546, 550.
- Nicholas, Czar, 548.
- Niemeyer, 303; on development of language in child, 333-35.
- Nietzsche, 137, 543, 548.
- Nightingale, 398.
- Non-social tendencies, 5.
- Object, attitude and, 433-34.
- Objects, social, 633-36.
- Occupations, effect of, on attitudes and values, 385-87; egocentricism of, 386-87; relation of, to habits and values, 384-85.
- Ogburn, 584, 611, 613.
- Ogden, 208.
- Olivier, on color and race prejudice, 501-02.
- Opinions, and attitudes, 434-35.
- Original nature, 121; individual differences in, 123-39; social nature and, 122.
- Original tendencies, combination of, 127; components of, 125-26; names for, 124-25.
- Origins, of custom, 104.
- Organism, understood only in reference to environment, 195-201.
- Organization, propaganda through, 799.
- Ostwald, 137.
- Out-group, 56; sentiments of, 59-61.
- Overstreet, psychology of public speaking, 577-78.
- Pain, 182-83.
- Paranoïa, in crowd behavior, 650, 652-53.
- Pareto, on rationalization in social science, 294.

- Park, 31, 420, 482-83, 723; on attitudes and opinions, 434-35; on participation and social assimilation, 47-53; on public opinion, 726-33; race prejudice as defense mechanism, 494-97; social distance and prejudice, 485-88.
- Parker, 166, 583.
- Parkham, 591.
- Participation, 31; communication in, 52; immigrant, 53; political and social, 51; social assimilation and, 47-53.
- Parturition during crisis, 89.
- Pasteur, 397-98.
- Pavlov, 262, 791; experiment on conditioned response, 220.
- Pearson, 543.
- Peckhams, 8.
- Pierce, 762.
- Penrose, 598.
- Perry, 213.
- Person and individual, 409-11.
- Personal development, conditioned response in, 303-08.
- Personal idea, as social reality, 331-33
- Personality, adult, 384-402; antisocial, 406-09; autistic, 406-09; balance of, 405; complexity of, 405; cyclothymic, 406-09; development in boy, 350-51; development in girl, 361-62; epileptic, 406-09; family and group pressures, 349-78; fundamental wishes in, 395-98; growth of, 303-28; inferiority conflict in, 359-61; integration of, 405; Kretschmer's types of, 138; language and, 328-46; organization of, 404-05; psychiatric interpretation of, 406-09; psychological interpretation of, 402-06; sociability and language development in, 328-33; social conditioning of, 299-346; sociological interpretation of, 409-13; theories of, 402-13; wit and humor in, 389-94.
- Personality types, extrovert, introvert, ambivert, 398-402.
- Peter the Great, 546; taboo on beards, 571-72.
- Peter the Hermit, 567, 699.
- Peterson, 123, 194, 242, 268; critique of imitation, 245-53; function of ideas in social groups, 275-79; on intelligence and learning, 210-16; on intelligence as mechanism, 141-43.
- Phantastic thinking, 286-90.
- Phantasy, in art, 327; compensation in, 316; literature and, 327; play, distinction between, 325-26.
- Philip Augustus, 699.
- Physical types, tables of, 137.
- Physique and character, 132-39.
- Physique, meaning of "I," and, 337.
- Pigeons, ceremonies of, 19; social conditioning to sex behavior, 20; voices as a means of social control, 17-19.
- Pigeon society, flexibility of, 18.
- Pilgrimages, 689-90.
- Pillsbury, 166.
- Pitt, 550.
- Plantagenet, Richard, 551.
- Plato, 264, 450, 718.
- Play, compensatory nature of, 323-28; imagination in, 329; in child life, 64, 300-02, 318-22; phantasy and, 324-28; differences from phantasy, 325-26; social experience in, 320-21; socialization of, 322; theories of, 300-01.
- Pleasure, 182-83; pain and, 173; pain and folkways, 97.
- Pocahontas, legend of, 475.
- Poet, as introvert, 595.
- Polarity, 197-99.
- Polarization, audience and, 672-79; process of, 637-39.
- Political leaders, contrast in Mitchel and Johnson, 603-06; qualities of, 595-97.
- Political boss, American, 597-601.
- Pontiac, 590-91.
- Popular assemblies, 83.
- Power, sense of and worship of, 115.
- Power of words, leadership and, 572-74.
- Press, as reflection of public opinion, 763.
- Pressey, 410.
- Prejudice, as subjective environment, 482-502; antipathy and, 483-85; feeling in, 183; general features of, 483-93; group attitudes in, 432; intolerance in, 109; negro, 507-28; religious, 535-38; social distance and, 485-90.
- Prepotent reflexes and instincts, 157-58.
- Prestige, 561-62; characteristics of, 543-79; history of word, 559-60; kinds of, 560-62; masses and, 559-78; news-

- paper and, 775-76; types of, 582-621.
- Prestige-bearers, influence of, on convention, 570-72.
- Primate, 10, 12.
- Primary groups, 57; human nature and, 65; nature of, 63-65.
- Primitive man and sex, 238.
- Prince, M., 269, 285.
- Prince, S. H., on Halifax disaster, 78, 84-94.
- Progress, as a stereotype, 438-39.
- Projection, 652; leadership and, 568-69; of parents' ambitions upon children, 374-78.
- Propaganda, 653-54, 731, 745-46, 751; cartoons as, 787-88; crowds and, 651; definition of, 794; emotion and instincts in, 788; food-relief, 819-20; films, 814; governmental and World War, 818; motion picture, 811-21; motivation in, 793-98; newspapers and, 805-06; organization for, 799; psychology of, 785-93; rules of, 798; sentiment in, 796-97; social control of, 799-805; student-union drive in a college as, 821-26; suggestion in, 794-95.
- Property, 83; in mores, 100.
- Protoplasm and environment, 196-97.
- Public and public opinion, 725-26.
- Publicity, change of opinion through, 806-08; Christian Church, 808-11.
- Public opinion, 428; community interests in, 737-38; collection of individual opinions, 734; controlled by church, 809-11; crime and, 752-53; crowd attitudes in, 745-46; definition of situation and, 750; differentia of, 739-45; discussion in, 727-28, 732-33; education and, 733; formulated by the few, 736-37; how changed, 749-52; mores and, 731-33; nature of, 722-53; organs of, 756-78; organs of, by Shepard, 757-65; political aspects of, 738-39; public and, 725-26; rational judgment of a group, 734-36; rural press and, 762-73; through correspondence, 759-60; use of word, 722-23.
- Public responsibility and newspapers, 774-75.
- Public speaking, psychology of, 577-78.
- Puffer, 57; on boys' gangs, 65-69.
- Purpose and instinct, 154.
- Purposes, biological and social in reference to instincts, 235-39.
- Psychological processes, fundamental, 272.
- Pyknic type, of physique, 135-36.
- Quantity, worship of, 114.
- Queen Mary, 702.
- Race and temperament, 280-81.
- Race differences and inhibition, 280.
- Race prejudice, 493-502; caste feeling and, 497-99; color prejudice and, 501-02; defense mechanism, 494-97; isolation in, 499-501.
- Radiation of emotions, 789-91.
- Radicals, types of, 613-14.
- Radicalism, leaders and social reform, 611-15; scientific and emotional, 606-10; scientific attitude in, 609-10.
- Raemaker, 787.
- Rage, 181.
- Rationalization, of culture, 112-17; defense of, 271; definition of, 293; in character formation, 291-92; motivation in, 290-92; personal and subjective nature of, 291; social behavior and, 290-94.
- Rationalism in social theory, 146.
- Ratliff, 506; on negro man hunt, 518-24.
- Reaction areas and stimulation ranges, 43-46.
- Realistic thought, 270, 286-88.
- Recognition, desire for, 398.
- Reflexes, 124-25, 152; instincts and, 168.
- Relations, presentative social, 635; social inferential, 635-36; social types of, 635-36.
- Religion, 237; ritualism in, 108.
- Religious revivals and crowd behavior, 710-12.
- Remigius, 701.
- Repetition and words, 573.
- Réprésentations collectives*, 419-20, 432.
- Repulsion, 9.
- Response, complete, 252; desire for, 297-98; total, and different stimuli, 126.
- Responses, 13; multi-individual, 44.
- Revery and ego, 293.
- Ribot, 189.
- Rice, 420, 583; motives in radicalism, 611-15; stereotypes and errors in judging character, 443-49.
- Ritter, 208.
- Ritual, 79, 105, 654, 670; authority

- and, 106-07; mores and, 102; place of, in group, 106-08; religion and, 108; suggestion in, 107.
- Rivers, 796.
- Robespierre, 562, 566.
- Robinson, E. S., 302; on make-believe play, 323-28.
- Robinson, J. H., 270, 427; on rationalization, 292.
- Rolfe, 475.
- Roman Empire, 109.
- Roosevelt, 800.
- Root, 583; on emotional and scientific radicalism, 606-10.
- Rosanoff, on types of personality, 189; on psychiatric interpretation of personality, 406-09.
- Roseberry, on press, 761.
- Ross, on prophylactics against mob mind, 718.
- Rousseau, 560, 566.
- Rows, 307.
- Royce, 482; on antipathy and prejudice, 483-85.
- Rural press and public opinion, 762-73.
- Salisbury, 761.
- Savonarola, 567.
- Sayce, on language, 35.
- Schiller, 300-01.
- Schizoid personality, 137-38.
- Schizothymes, 137.
- Schopenhauer, on laughter, 390.
- Schwarz, 545, 582; on masses and mystical writers, 574-75; on types of leaders, 592-95.
- Scott, 243, 628, 629, 668, 694; changing audience into a crowd, 688-90; methods of swaying a crowd, 657-58; on primitive characteristics of crowd, 648-50; on rendering an audience suggestible, 685-86; on suggestion, 257-58.
- Seattle strike, 613.
- Secondary groups, 57.
- Secret societies, 58, 83.
- Security, desire for, 396-97.
- Self and meaning, 344-46.
- Self, place of others in rise of, 308-11; rise of, 342-43.
- Self-feeling, meaning of "I" and, 336-37; rise of language and, 335-38.
- Sensory organs, 10.
- Sentiment, complex and, 796; propaganda and, 796-97.
- Sex, as first order drive, 150; social approval of, for pleasure, 238-39.
- Shand, 410.
- Shakespeare, 546, 718; Othello as black, 498.
- Shaw, 565.
- Sheffield, 724; on consensus of opinion and discussion, 746-49.
- Shelby, 696; on Florida land boom, 714-18.
- Shepard, 724, 756; on organs of public opinion, 575-65; on public opinion, 739-45.
- Sherrington, 207, 224, 791; on inhibition and excitation, 222.
- Sidis, 694; on pilgrimages, crusades and flagellants, 698-700; on suggestibility, mental epidemics, social organization, 696-98; on witchcraft mania, 700.
- Slang, 628; its nature and contagion, 661-64.
- Smith, on Pocahontas, 475.
- Social adjustment, dynamic nature of, 251-52.
- Social aggregate, 4.
- Social aggregations, psychological fundamentals of, 629-41.
- Social assimilation and participation, 47-53.
- Social attitudes, 431-34; in competition, 46-47.
- Social behavior, 10; general features of, 3-116; human, 30-53; mental traits and, 279-81; organic basis of, 121-43; psychological foundations of, 121; rationalization in, 290-94.
- Social change, with change in stimulus-response systems, 277-78; enlargement and animation in, 73; in industrial society, 72-75; speed of, 58-59.
- Social conditioning, attention in, 275; culture and, 46; folkways and, 46; personality and, 299-346; thought and, 427-28.
- Social consciousness, competition and, 47; social objects and, 633-36.
- Social contact and laughter, 391-94.
- Social contract theory, 3.
- Social control, propaganda and, 799-805; slogans and catchwords in, 451-58; song of birds as, 18-19.
- Social distance, measurement of, 490-93; prejudice as, 485-88.

- Social environment and heredity, 206.
 Social faculty view, 5.
 Social formations, primary, 629-32.
 Social group, types of, 56-75; an evolutionary unit, 32-35.
 Social image and mother-image, 429-30.
 Social images, unconscious nature of, 428-31.
 Social life, prehuman, 17.
 Social meaning and participation, 633-36.
 Social nature and original nature, 122.
 Social objects and social consciousness, 633-36.
 Social organization, suggestion, and mental epidemics, 696-98.
 Social projection, 745-46.
 Sociability, personality, and language development, 328-33.
 Social purpose and modification of instinctive tendencies, 234-39.
 Social reality as personal idea, 331-33.
 Social reform leaders, radicalism, 611-15.
 Social science, largely rationalizations, 294.
 Social self and social contact, 388-89.
 Social stimulation in infancy, 331.
 Social unrest and suppression, 51.
 Sociality, 5.
 Society, 4, 5; approval by, of instinctive responses, 237-39; influence in conditioning instinctive responses, 233-34; inventor and, 615-16; stimuli to conditioning, 226.
 Socialization, brought out in crisis, 92; morality and, 35-37; play and, 322.
 Solomon, 80, 718; on Occidental ethos, 113-16.
 Son-mother relationship, 350.
 Son-father relationship, 351.
 Sorel, 463; on myth making, 464.
 Southey, 764.
 Speaker and audience, 673; 677-79.
 Speech, 14; as attitude, 13; a human trait, 33; a social creation, 36; community life and, 34-35; essential to social control, 79; social stimulation and, 45.
 Speed, worship of, 115.
 Spencer, 300, 301; on laughter, 390.
 Spiridonova, 398.
 Sprenger, 701.
 Stahl, 548.
 State, 171; nature of, 111.
 Status and compensation, 411, 13.
 Stead, 762, 764.
 Stein, 544; on sociology of authority, 546-49.
 Stephen, leader of children's crusade, 699.
 Stereotype, 420; as form of perception, 437; leader and, 42.
 Stereotypes, 647; appeal of, 449-51; about the negro, 516; crowd and, 654, 690; definition of situation by, 435-40; errors in judgment of character and, 443-49; how formed, 440-43; in World War, 439-40; language and, 420; motion pictures and, 813-14; as subjective environment, 435-40.
 Stimulation ranges and reaction areas, 43-46.
 Stirner, 543, 548, 731.
 Stout, 169, 215, 263.
 Strong, 783; on propaganda motivation, 793-98; control of propaganda, 799-805.
 Subconscious, 285.
 Sublimation, as conditioning, 227-29.
 Subordinate acts, 152.
 Suggestibility, 572; as an attitude, 258-60; crisis and, 90; repetition of stimuli in, 686.
 Suggestion, 243, 256, 260, 278; contrasted to reason, 258; crowd behavior and, 649-50; definition of, by McDougall, 256-57; definition of, by Morgan, 260; figures of speech and, 686; imitation and, 44; mental epidemics, social organization and, 696-98; motivation and propaganda, 795-98; propaganda and, 794-95; ritual and, 107.
 Sumner, 79, 80, 482; on differences between mores and law, 112; on ethos, 112-13; on folkways and mores, 97-103; on in-groups versus out-groups, 59-61; on watchwords, 456-57.
 Sutherland, 724; on public opinion and crime, 752-53.
 Swedenborg, 550.
 Swift, 718.
 Symbol, limitations and dangers of, 15; reality and, 790; speech and, 14; thought and, 14; thought, language and, 341-46.
 Symbolism and autistic thought, 287.
 Sympathy, 89, 243, 264; conditioned re-

- sponse in, 261-64; crisis and, 89.
- Taboos, 79, 83, 99-105, 670; folkways and, 99.
- Taft, J., 350; on inferiority and compensation, 315; on mother-daughter relationship, 362-74.
- Taft, W. H., 393.
- Taine, 648.
- Tannenbaum, 506; on lynching, 524-25.
- Tarde, 560, 764.
- Tawney, 695.
- Tecumseh, 591.
- Temperament, 177; autonomic system and, 187-88; classification of, 184; cycloid and schizoid, 137-38; diathetic proportions, 137-38; endocrines and, 187; instinct and compensation, 185-89; Mendelian trait, 189; psyches-
thetic proportions of, 138; psychop-
athic personalities and, 188-89; race
and, 280-81.
- Tennyson, 294.
- Terman, 123, 543; on intelligence, 140.
- Tharaud, 79.
- Thinker, as introvert, 595.
- Thinking and feeling, 183.
- Thought, as interior speaking, 14; sym-
bols, and language, 341-46; social
conditioning and, 427-28.
- Thomas, 31, 268, 383, 433, 483, 544;
crisis and group control, 78, 81-83;
on definition of situation, 95-97; four
wishes of, 395-98; on leadership, 545-
46; on mental traits and social be-
havior, 279-81; on participation and
social assimilation, 47-53; on particu-
larism in science, 301; on race preju-
dice as isolation, 499-501; on race
prejudice and caste feeling, 497-99.
- Thorndike, 121-23; 149, 166, 242; def-
inition of intelligence, 140; list of
original response patterns, 156-57; on
imitation, 244-45; on original nature,
123-27.
- Thrasher, 57.
- Tocqueville, de, 648.
- Tolman, 148; drives, list of, 150; nature
of fundamental drives, 149-50; three-
fold hierarchy of instinctive activi-
ties, 151-54.
- Totemism, 83.
- Traditions, 670, 751.
- Travis, 668; on effect of audience on
mental-motor process, 684-85.
- Trotter, 30, 167; on gregariousness,
37-43.
- Tufts, 79; on custom and authority,
104-06.
- Tulipomania, 702.
- Turner, 122; on individual differences,
129-31.
- Unconscious, nature of, 284-85; behav-
ior and, 284-85; mental patterns and,
423-28.
- Unconscious social images, 428-31.
- Universality, impression of, 745-46.
- Values, habits and occupation and, 384-
87; organization, 16-17.
- Van Gennep, on psychology of testi-
mony, 468-69.
- Van Langenhove, 461, 463; on legend-
making, 466-73.
- Veblen, 294, 398.
- Vocalization, 9, 13.
- Volition, types of, 190-91.
- Wagner, 610.
- Wallas, 146, 166, 176, 746.
- Wallace, 34, 36, 584.
- Wallis, 505; on negro, 510-11.
- Walter the Penniless, 699.
- War and leadership, 42.
- Ward, 543.
- Warren, 148, 166, 177; on instincts, 155-
56; on temperament, 184.
- Watson, 166, 176, 207, 219, 242; dis-
proof of James' instinct of fear of
furry objects, 167; habit formation
and conditioned response, 225-26;
stimuli to fundamental emotions, 180-
82.
- Weber, 695.
- Webster, 550, 582; on leadership in
primitive society, 587-9.
- Weeks, 420; on how concepts and
stereotypes arise, 440-43.
- Weems, story of Washington, 476-77.
- We-group, 60.
- Weller, 598.
- Wellington, 550.
- Wells, 270, 463; on autistic versus real-
istic thought, 286-88; on rationaliza-
tion, 290-92.
- Wesley, 764.
- Wheeler, 8.
- White, review of Kretschmer's theory
of physique and character, 132-39.

- White, W. A., 122; child-parent relationship authority and inferiority, 311-17.
- White, P. W., on content of newspapers in 1924, 772-73.
- White-American Indian prejudice, 528-33.
- Whitefield, 764.
- Whitley, 302; on play of children, 318-22.
- Whitman, 9, 148, 610; on sex-conditionings of pigeons, 20.
- Whittemore, 31; on competitive consciousness, 46-47.
- Wilcox, 756-57; on content of newspapers in 1899, 765-72; on endowed press, 777-78.
- Wilkes, 764.
- Will, 176-91, 214; freedom of, 214-17; social adjustment and, 178.
- Williams, W., 382; on desire for social approval, 394-95.
- Williams, J. M. 386; on motives, 78; on crisis and conscious motives, 83-84.
- Wilson, 619.
- Wishes, 168; autistic (dereistic) thinking and, 289.
- Wit and humor, in personality, 389-94.
- Witchcraft mania, 700-02.
- Woodworth, 148, 611; on drives and mechanism, 150-51; on sublimation, 228-29.
- Woolbert, 668; on audience, 669-70.
- Word, substitute for a gesture, 16.
- Words, discrimination of behavior and, 334-35; meanings and culture backgrounds, 48; medium of exchange, 15; power of, in crowd behavior, 647-48; power of stereotyped, 449-51.
- Wundt, 215.
- Yellow journalism, 761.
- Yerkes, 9.
- Young, A., 741.
- Young, E. F., 483; on race prejudice, 493-94.
- Young, K., on attention and behavior, 271-75; on integration of behavior, 208-10; on projection of ambition, 374-78.



